동아시아의 평화와 화해의 정치학 Scrapbook: DPRK Study Group - US AND SOVIET MILITARY OCCUPATION IN KOREA AFTER WWII -

(8) DPRK Study Group

Austin Krause
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- US AND SOVIET MILITARY OCCUPATION IN KOREA AFTER WWII -

As can be expected following a brutal war like World War II, the first Soviet troops who arrived in Korea were a hardy, desperate group of men. They were poorly clothed, poorly equipped, and expected to live off the land - which meant taking things from the Koreans, who were also in poor shape from the Japanese occupation. The departure of the Japanese and the devastation they left behind made conditions worse for both Koreans and the Soviet troops. Social relations between the Soviets and Koreans fared better than expected, however, because the Soviets expressed little of the racial prejudice with which Americans denigrated "Gooks" in the South. Americans were ignorant of the culture and external conditions of Korea; they also had no idea how to deal with the power vacuum left over from the defeat of Japan. The US command subsequently suggested that the Japanese continue to govern southern Korea until arrangements could be made. This led to widespread protests throughout Korea.

Syngman Rhee, a US-educated nationalist, personally recommended by fellow Nationalist leader Chiang Kaishek, was flown to Korea on General Douglas MacArthur's own plane.

In the North, the Provisional People's Committee was established, with Kim Il Sung as head. The Soviets were explicitly denied from attending their private meetings, where Kim and his colleagues would intentionally speak Korean and purposely develop strategies that alienated Moscow's generals from interfering in Korean affairs in case the Soviets showed up.

Still, the Soviets' treatment of the Koreans was much better than that which they experienced under the Japanese. Keep in mind, however, that the Soviets still had an agenda. For example, they instituted Russian-language instruction at all primary schools. All upper-government officials who desired a position in favor with Moscow had to speak Russian, a practical matter because of their dealings. Officials from the USSR flew in and granted positions to Koreans who found favor with them. The Soviets favored loyal Korean officials over the growing rivals in Pyongyang.

In 1946, leaders like Kim Il Sung and Kim Tu Bong helped consolidate various leftist factions like the New People's Party, Democratic Party, the Celestial Friends Party, and the Communist Party into the Workers' Party of Korea. Pak Hon Yong's South Korean Workers' Party later merged with Kim Il Sung's Workers' Party in 1949 in a matter of consolidation.

President Truman became apprehensive about evacuating US military forces because it would cause his administration to lose confidence and international credibility in the face of Soviet and Communist might. On top of that, the United Nations had been formed in 1945 and US interests demanded a position of authority with the formation of the new international body. On March 5, 1946, UK Prime Minister Winston Churchill made the "iron curtain" speech. The Containment theory of foreign policy was born.

The US subsequently took the Korean division to the UN, where it was thought that two temporary regimes could function in the country until a unified form of government could be agreed. Notably, it excluded any Korean involvement or Korean input on the matter. Noting recent Communist revolutions and takeovers, the UN voted in favor of allowing only its elections in Korea, creating civil unrest.

South Korean regime leaders were not happy with the two-state idea, traveling to Pyongyang to seek a North-South conference and requesting Kim Il Sung and his allies to not advocate for nationalization of all industries, and guard against military rule or less than free elections.

Observers along the 38th parallel noted that the Russians seemed to get along better with the Koreans than the Americans did. No doubt this was the result of gradual rapport between Koreans and Soviets. The Soviets developed a bond with the Koreans, allowing up-and-coming military officers to command Soviet troop units and lead drill exercises and local community activism. The Americans often behaved as if they were colonial overlords by retaining Korean domestic servants and showing a lack of interest in local customs or traditions. As I referred to earlier, the Americans tended to refer to Koreans as "Gooks" and poor relations festered.

The US occupation was ill-fated from the state. Experts in Washington provide examples why it was; the US was not prepared for it, they planned on establishing a satellite client state so dissent was met harshly; this was in direct contrast to the occupation of Japan after WWII. In addition, US troops in South Korea were increasingly hostile, most of them being battle-hardened veterans who were sent to Japan - and had their enlistments increased involuntarily as a result. The US Commander of troops in South Korea, John Hodge, was seen as a brutal leader who was ill-suited to civil service: "He had no knowledge of Korean culture or ... its differences. He had neither the temperament, the tact, nor the sensitivity suited for politics..." Communist activities were widespread throughout Korea, generating instability for the American presence there and the Koreans' history of resistance to colonial occupation provided the necessary framework for their refusal to cooperate with those whom they saw as another foreign power and oppressor. Koreans expected liberation following their resistance to Japanese rule; instead, super powers came in who treated the Koreans as war criminals akin to Japan and domestic resistance became the norm once more. The Korean War started in 1950, in large part due to these tumultuous conditions.

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Sources:
"Reconstituting Korean Security, A Policy Primer," by Smith;
"Political Systems of East Asia," by Hayes;
"Asia Pacific in World Policies," by McDougall