ONE KOREA: Visions of Korean unification | Edited by Tae-Hwan Kwak and Seung-Ho Joo
Rethinking Asia and International Relations. London; New York: Routledge, 2017. xi, 217 pp. (Table.) US$149.95, cloth. ISBN 978-1-472-47614-2.
A key strength of this edited volume is its overarching view of the issue of inter-Korean unification, an event that would exert a substantial impact on the lives of seventy-five million Koreans as well as on the peace and stability of the East Asia region. First, the volume closely examines the significant discrepancies between North and South Korea’s unification formulae—Democratic Federal Republic of Koryo (DFRK) and Korean National Community (KNC), respectively. The DFRK formula is “to establish a federal state with one nation, one state, two systems, and two regional governments” while the KNC formula is “to establish a unitary, democratic unified state based on nationalism, democracy, freedom, and a welfare state” (18). In addition, the DFRK plan presents at least five preconditions to establishing a federal state, including the resignation of the current South Korean government and the withdrawal of US troops from the peninsula. It is extremely difficult for South Korea to accept such conditions. Given the implausibility of adopting either the DFRK or the KNC formula, the volume proposes an alternative approach—a unified Korea through neutralization. This neutralization-unification formula first requires the two Koreas to make every effort to neutralize their extreme thinking and antagonistic policy measures. These actions, it is argued, will trigger national reconciliation, the harmonization of interests, and ultimately peace between North and South Korea, thus smoothing the road toward a peaceful unification. A unified Korea will maintain the status of a non-aligned, neutral state and seek a balanced security and foreign policy. Based on this basic concept, the volume presents specific action plans for a five-stage neutralization-unification formula.
Second, in this volume a number of Korea experts from the five key stakeholders—the United States, China, Russia, Japan, and South Korea—address their respective nation’s fundamental stance on the issue of Korean unification. According to the authors’ analyses, although not officially opposing Korean unification, all four giants overall prefer the maintenance of the status quo on the Korean Peninsula, since Korean unification threatens to bring about significant changes and/or disruptions to the East Asian security and economic order. Since the end of the Korean War in 1953, the US has not adopted any consistent strategy for the achievement of Korean unification. The Korean issue has been tangential to America’s grand strategy toward the Soviet Union until the end of the Cold War and a rising China during the post-Cold War period. In this context, the US has preferred the preservation of the status quo on the Korean Peninsula, while regarding the Korean unification issue as part of South Korea’s sovereign authority. China, which has placed a great emphasis on peace and stability in the East Asia region, also supports the continuance of the status quo on the Korean Peninsula. It would not want to share an extended border with a unified Korea under heavy US influence. Moreover, China is extremely sensitive to potential problems deriving from the process of Korean unification, including a possible refugee crisis, pandemics, and unstable security and economic conditions. Russia’s posture on the issue of Korean unification is similar to that of China in the sense that Russia dislikes the emergence of a unified Korea that is heavily influenced by the United States. Rather than facing a disruptive unification process, which could be detrimental to its national interests, Russia places great weight on the promotion of economic cooperation between itself and the two Koreas, such as with the construction of a gas pipeline connecting the three nations. Japan is also reluctant to support Korean unification, as rapprochement on the Korean Peninsula could weaken the justification for a US military presence in East Asia and hamper its strategy to check and balance a rising China threat. Furthermore, a nationalistic, unified Korea could be detrimental to Japanese interests, because the unified nation would be antagonistic to a Japan that has not adequately come to terms with its past misdeeds during its colonial rule over Korea from 1910–1945.
Given these studies, the volume implies that it will be extremely challenging for the two Koreas to achieve unification without a clearly shared roadmap and close cooperation from the four giants. In this sense, the neutralization-unification formula suggested by the authors could be an ideal approach, as it goes beyond the presently contradictory DFRK and KNC formulae and mitigates the misgivings of the four stakeholders, particularly China and Russia, about the negative consequences that Korean unification could trigger. Nevertheless, the authors’ arguments are not free of shortcomings. First, their claims over the neutralization roadmap are largely normative, rather than based on thorough assessments of actual conditions. For instance, the first stage of the neutralization-unification formula is to replace the 1953 Korean Armistice Agreement with a peace treaty signed by the US, China, and the two Koreas, along with the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. As seen in the ongoing diplomatic negotiations between the US and North Korea, peace-regime building on the Korean Peninsula and its attendant denuclearization are very complicated and bumpy processes. To make the neutralization-unification formula a more feasible approach, the authors should have paid closer attention to the forging of more concrete measures for the first stage—the neutralization preparation. Second, the authors’ argument does not clearly address whether a neutral, unified Korea would be in the four powers’ best interests. It makes sense that China and Russia prefer the option because it could prevent the US from dominating a unified peninsula, as the authors claim. However, why do the authors expect the US to support this approach? It seems fair to assume that the US would seek to preserve its hegemonic power status in the East Asia region even after Korean unification. Third, it seems too idealistic to imagine that, without addressing potential political changes in North Korea, a neutral, denuclearized, unified Korean state will be born through general, democratic elections at the fifth stage of the neutralization-unification formula.
Yangmo Ku
Norwich University, Northfield, USA
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