Peak Japan: The End of Great Ambitions

Peak Japan: The End of Great Ambitions
Peak Japan: The End of Great Ambitions Kindle Edition
by Brad Glosserman  (Author)  Format: Kindle Edition
3.9 out of 5 stars    4 ratings
 See all formats and editions
Kindle
$25.48


Read less
Length: 355 pages Word Wise: Enabled Enhanced Typesetting: Enabled 
Page Flip: Enabled Grade Level: 17 and up



The post-Cold War era has been difficult for Japan. A country once heralded for evolving a superior form of capitalism and seemingly ready to surpass the United States as the world’s largest economy lost its way in the early 1990s. The bursting of the bubble in 1991 ushered in a period of political and economic uncertainty that has lasted for over two decades. There were hopes that the triple catastrophe of March 11, 2011—a massive earthquake, tsunami, and accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant—would break Japan out of its torpor and spur the country to embrace change that would restart the growth and optimism of the go-go years. But several years later, Japan is still waiting for needed transformation, and Brad Glosserman concludes that the fact that even disaster has not spurred radical enough reform reveals something about Japan's political system and Japanese society. Glosserman explains why Japan has not and will not change, concluding that Japanese horizons are shrinking and that the Japanese public has given up the bold ambitions of previous generations and its current leadership. This is a critical insight into contemporary Japan and one that should shape our thinking about this vital country.

-----Editorial Reviews
Review
"[Glosserman] traces the present trajectory of Japan. He does so in a readable style that presents his narrative convincingly to both students of Japanese affairs and readers coming to this question with little foreknowledge." ― Socialism Today

"Japan, in Brad Glosserman's view, is currently "understudied, undervalued, and underappreciated" in international relations.... [He] draws out the lessons for us all." ― Times Higher Education

"Glosserman hits the mark with this readable, insightful, and smart book about this most significant U.S. alliance partner in Asia. Writing with a gritty, real perspective given his time as a journalist in the country, and with policy acumen stemming from his work at Pacific Forum, the author provides the reader, both expert and layperson, with a unique view into Japan's search for its own identity, from Kantei, to boardrooms, to conference rooms." ― Victor Cha, D.S. Song-KF Endowed Chair in International Affairs, Department of Government and School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University

"Are Japan's best days behind it? In Peak Japan long time Japan-observer Brad Glosserman, weighs the complex arguments surrounding this question through an engaging mixture of behind-the-scenes details, poignant anecdotes and insightful interviews, emphasizing the handicaps faced by Japan. This is a timely analysis that will engage readers regardless of the conclusions they finally draw about Japan's future." ― TJ Pempel, Jack M. Forcey Professor of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley

"It is a timely, well researched, and grabbing analysis of contemporary Japan. Brad Glosserman has spent nearly 30 years after the end of the Cold War on Japan first living there and then observing it from the vicinity of Hawaii as executive-director of the Pacific Forum. He detected four shocks of the so-called "lost 30 years": the Lehman, the failed Democratic Party, the Senkaku (Dyaoyutai) and finally, the Great Eastern Japan Disaster. Shinzo Abe, in the last six years, now likely to be extended for another three, has done much more than anyone thought. But are Abe, his successors, and ultimately, the people of Japan, decisive and fast enough to let Japan really overcome these "lost decades" and activate it to meet the requirement of the era? Brad's analysis is fair, penetrating and ultimately embraced with warm feeling toward Japan." ― Kazuhiko Togo, Professor and Director, Institute for World Affairs, Kyoto Sangyo University

"Brad Glosserman's book is deeply-researched and closely-argued but winningly readable. Always fair but bracingly clear-eyed, its key conclusions are both important and hard to challenge. It is an essential guide to understanding not just Japan's future, but Asia's as well." ― Hugh White, Professor, Australia National University

"Peak Japan is a thought-provoking book on the analysis of many challenges Japan is to face. The background of the author makes the book compelling to read for interested readers both inside and outside of Japan." ― Takatoshi Kato, Senior Adviser, Japan Center for International Finance

"Brad Glosserman has produced a well-informed book on contemporary Japan." ― Survival: Global Politics and Strategy

"Glosserman's book deserves to be widely read." ― The International Spectator

"Glosserman injects a welcome dose of nuance into often black-and-white debates on Japanese decline and resurgence." ― Social Science Japan Journal --This text refers to the hardcover edition.
About the Author
Brad Glosserman is deputy director of and visiting professor at the Tama University Center for Rule Making Strategies in Japan, and a senior advisor at Pacific Forum International, a Honolulu-based think tank; he previously served there as executive director for 16 years. He was a member of The Japan Times editorial board from 1991 to 2001 and continues to serve as a contributing editor there. He is the co-author of The Japan-South Korea Identity Clash. --This text refers to the hardcover edition.
Product details
Publisher : Georgetown University Press (April 1, 2019)
Publication Date : April 1, 2019
ASIN : B07NSDKBH3
File Size : 1324 KB
Word Wise : Enabled
Print Length : 355 pages
Language: : English
Text-to-Speech : Not enabled
Enhanced Typesetting : Enabled
X-Ray : Not Enabled
Screen Reader : Supported
Lending : Not Enabled
Best Sellers Rank: #1,072,450 in Kindle Store (See Top 100 in Kindle Store)
#769 in History of Japan
#1,904 in International Relations (Kindle Store)
#2,758 in Japanese History (Books)
Customer Reviews: 3.9 out of 5 stars    4 ratings
Related video shorts (0)Upload your video

Be the first video
Your name here
More about the author
› Visit Amazon's Brad Glosserman Page
Brad Glosserman
 Follow
Follow on Amazon
Follow authors to get new release updates, plus improved recommendations and more coming soon.

Learn More

Biography
Brad Glosserman is deputy director of and a visiting professor at the Center for Rule Making Strategies at Tama University in Tokyo, Japan. He is also senior advisor (nonresident) at the Pacific Forum International, in Honolulu, where he served for 13 years as executive director. He is the author of Peak Japan: The End of Great Ambitions, (Georgetown University Press, 2019) and coauthor, with Scott Synder, of The Japan-South Korea Identity Clash (Columbia University Press, 2015), a study of national identity in Japan and South Korea and its impact on U.S. alliances. He is also editor, with Tae-hyo Kim, of The Future of U.S.-Korea-Japan Relations: Balancing Values and Interests (CSIS, 2004).

His opinion pieces and commentary regularly appear in media around the globe, and he has written dozens of monographs on U.S. foreign policy and Asian security relations. Other articles have appeared in scholarly journals throughout the region, and he has contributed numerous chapters to books on regional security. He is a frequent participant in U.S. State Department visiting lecture programs as well as the US Navy’s Regional Security Education Program, and speaks at conferences, research institutes, and universities around the world. He is a guest lecturer at the Osaka University School of International Public Policy and an adjunct lecturer at the Management Center of Innsbruck (MCI). Prior to joining Pacific Forum, Mr. Glosserman was, for 10 years, a member of The Japan Times editorial board, and he continues to serve as a contributing editor for that newspaper. He is also the English-language editor of the journal of the New Asia Research Institute (NARI) in Seoul.

Mr. Glosserman holds a J.D. from George Washington University, an M.A. from Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), and a B.A. from Reed College.

Customer reviews
3.9 out of 5 stars
3.9 out of 5
4 global ratings
5 star
 43%
4 star 0% (0%)
 0%
3 star
 57%
2 star 0% (0%)
 0%
1 star 0% (0%)
 0%
Peak Japan: The End of Great Ambitions
Peak Japan: The End of Great Ambitions
byBrad Glosserman
Write a review
How are ratings calculated?
See All Buying Options
Add to Wish List
Search customer reviews
Search
SORT BY

Top reviews
Top reviews
FILTER BY

All reviewers
All reviewers

All stars
All stars

Text, image, video
Text, image, video
4 global ratings | 2 global reviews
From the United States
A. J. Sutter
3.0 out of 5 stars OK if you're looking for an outsider's view
Reviewed in the United States on May 25, 2019
Verified Purchase
This is a fact-filled analysis of Japan from an American point of view, and a variation on the "declining Japan" literary genre of the past quarter-century or so. The thesis of the book is that current era of leadership under PM Abe Shinzo, head of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), is "the apogee of Japanese power" -- "Peak Japan." From sometime soon after the 2020 Olympics, "a combination of structural and attitudinal constraints will limit Japan's ability to adapt to current and future challenges" (@2). Rather than urging Japan to adopt the usual neoliberal fixes, though, the author (BG) proposes instead to explain Japanese attitudes and other constraints to non-Japanese readers "so that they can make informed choices about their own options" (@2).

In this long review, I'll first (1) describe the book's structure and approach, and then (2) focus on two substantive aspects of the book that make it very much an outsider, American view rather than the view of someone who calls Japan home.

(1) BG introduces his thesis and his background in the introduction. The main text opens with a brief history of Japan from the 19th Century to around 2008. The next four chapters describe a series of "shocks" the country experienced from that date: the Lehman shock and global economic crisis, the "political shock" of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) taking over the reins of government from the LDP in 2009, the "Senkaku shock" of confrontation with China over a small group of islands whose ownership is contested, and finally the Great Eastern Japan Earthquake and Tsunami of 2011 March 11. This is followed by a chapter entitled "Abe Shinzo's Triumphant Return," and then a conclusion focusing on the "structural and attitudinal constraints" alluded to in the introduction.

The book follows a very traditional "Japan-hand" pattern in several respects. First, the country is reduced to its economy, geopolitical relations, and national party politics. Second, it's assumed that countries compete with each other, and that competitive strength boils down to GDP growth and diplomatic influence (military competition being downplayed in this work perhaps because of Japan's constitutional provision that prohibits war). Third, the narrative centers pretty much entirely on events in Nagatacho, the Tokyo neighborhood that is the seat of government, and on the opinions of various pundits.

What's distinctive is the book's tone. Although BG is an admirer of Abe, he's both more candid about Abe's failings and more balanced in his criticism of the three years of DPJ rule than are many Western commentators. In addition, he doesn't make the usual Western recommendations about how the country needs more "structural reforms" and immigration. Instead, he offers an elegiac image of a Japan that has lost its way, that is inevitably going to be pulled out to sea, lacking the will to resist the receding tide of history. Though the image is sometimes more strident than elegiac: "Japan's population is declining. Its economic rank is dropping. Confidence is falling. Its international stature is diminishing. Insecurity is mounting." (@233).

The argument of each chapter is supported by copious chapter endnotes. So if you're a US foreign policy wonk who's looking for some factual background about contemporary Japan, this book might do the trick and even stretch your worldview slightly. If that’s you, you might want to stop reading here.

(2) On the other hand, if you're more interested in Japan for its own sake rather than for America's, the book presents a couple of major substantive drawbacks: (A) First, its description of Japanese politics is incomplete in material ways. And (B), the underlying metaphor that motivates the analysis is stuck in the 20th Century.

A. For a book that makes Japanese politics one of its central themes, it's surprising that the text totally ignores the legal machinery of the political system. Did you ever wonder how -- or were you even aware that -- one party, the LDP, has ruled Japan for roughly 60 of the past 64 years? That's a record bested only by the Communist Parties in mainland China and North Korea. Do you think the LDP's success is simply because Japanese voters love it, or at least trust it more than the opposition? That's the impression you'd get from this book. But the real answer is that the LDP stays in power thanks to a web of laws that make them hard to dislodge, even when most votes are cast against them. And these laws can be revised by simple legislative majorities in the National Assembly (a/k/a/ Diet), making the LDP the foxes guarding the hen-house with the keys to power.

The most important of these laws is Japan's Public Offices Election Law (POEL). Its roots go back to the pre-war era, when the Emperor was divine and democracy was something to be contained, not encouraged. Among other things, it establishes the election system, i.e. the method of translating votes into seats. There are many types of election systems, and these can be ranked on their "proportionality," that is, how likely they are to allocate X% of the seats to a party that gets X% of the votes. Prior to the 1990s, the POEL adopted the "single non-transferable vote" system, mathematically one of the least proportional used anywhere. In 1994 this was changed to a system only slightly better: known as "mixed member majoritarian," it's the same one used in that hotbed of democracy, Putin's Russia. This system gives each voter 2 votes, one for a candidate in a single-member district seat and one for a political party's so-called proportional list (or sometimes for a candidate on the list, e.g., in Upper House elections). District candidates win by a plurality system similar to the US or UK, while seats are awarded from proportional lists per a specific mathematical algorithm. The winners in each category are simply added together, and there's your parliament.

Japan's election system can produce perverse results -- and recently, it always does. In each of the 2012, 2014 and 2017 Lower House elections and 2013 and 2016 Upper House elections, the ruling coalition of LDP and Komeito won a majority of seats despite receiving only a minority of the total votes cast. In the 2014 and 2017 elections, approximately 52% of all votes cast were *against* the ruling coalition, and in the 2012, 2013 and 2016 elections this proportion was roughly *60%*. (I'm counting votes here by cumulating votes for a party's single-member district candidates with votes for its proportional list.) Yet despite losing the vote count year after year for five elections in a row, the coalition not only got majorities of the seats in every election, but 2/3 supermajorities of the seats in 2014, 2016 and 2017. That the LDP can tighten its grip on power even when most votes are against them may help to explain why voter turnout is declining: if you're part of a majority who keep voting against a party, but their grip on power only gets tighter, wouldn't you feel your vote is a little futile? But since BG doesn't consider any of this background, he instead blames the victims: he attributes declining voter turnout to voters' lack of a "sense of responsibility" (@88).

This isn't the only obstacle created by the POEL and related laws. If you want to run for office, you'd better be rich: whereas you need a deposit of only $100 to run for Congress from Delaware, and under $1,000 to stand for the UK House of Commons, you need roughly $30,000 to stand from even the poorest election district in Japan. And then you'd better hope you're not running against the kid of a former politician: Mom or Dad (almost always Dad) can transfer their campaign war-chest to Junior tax-free. How about raising the funds by setting up a new political party? The Japanese system awards public money to each political party based on the number of MPs they have at the beginning of each year. If you don't have at least 5 members, you don't get any money. Consequently, it's well-nigh impossible to form a new political party except by defection of people who are already elected.

Moreover, unlike such countries as France, Germany or the US that freely allow the formation of parties as non-profits or 'associations', this won't fly in Japan: either you need approval from a Ministry (overwhelmingly loyal to the LDP), or else you can't engage in political campaign activity. Once you do start campaigning, the POEL sets all sorts of subtle traps so that your enemies can blame you for bribing voters or other violations. Serve guests coffee instead of tea? It's a bribe. So is distributing cheap paper fans with your picture on them in the height of the summer, or letting a taxi driver keep the change. Have three or more campaign workers wearing the same T-shirt or jacket spread out in the crowd to distribute flyers? Intimidation of voters. Lots of times you can't even judge whether you've done something wrong: the POEL leaves that determination up to the local police. And soon after Abe's "triumphant return" to power, his MPs amended the POEL to make it against the law for a teenager to send an email to her own family member during the campaign period recommending a particular candidate. (A restriction on free speech? Absolutely. But despite a guarantee of free speech under Art. 21 of Japan's Constitution, Japan's Supreme Court has never struck down any law limiting free speech.)

Another feature of Japan's system is that all of the Lower House elections mentioned above were 'snap' elections called by the PM. Although the Constitution does not grant the PM this right, the Japan Supreme Court refused to consider the question of its constitutionality almost 60 years ago, allowing the PM to do what he likes. (The PM has veto power over who gets to sit on the JSC, which might have something to do with it.) Consequently, the PM can time elections to destroy the opposition, much as, in the days of ice cube trays, you used to be able to prevent your freezer from making ice cubes by opening the door and stirring the water in the trays every few minutes. As I write this, there are rumors that another snap Lower House election may be called in summer 2019, less than 2 years after the prior one -- and the tactical purpose of weakening the opposition is openly discussed in the media.

BG doesn’t tell you about any of this. He acknowledges that Abe can be "ruthless" (@179). But when he touts Abe's election victories (id.) he doesn't tell you anything about the real or imagined legal underpinnings that enable his ruthlessness. Obviously, it’s not impossible to beat the LDP – the DPJ coalition managed it, with a majority of both votes cast and seats, due to a perfect storm of LDP policy disasters and awful PMs. But Abe's return is less "triumphant” when you know that 60% of the votes were against him and his coalition partner, and that he’s taken steps to undermine the opposition ever since.

Far from making this transparent, BG claims that the DPJ's mediocre performance in office "confirmed to the Japanese public that the problems plagued their political system (and their country) were not the result of one-party rule [or] LDP rule" (@79). Really? Granted that the DPJ made some of their own difficulties, is it reasonable to expect an opposition party to ace administration as freshmen in government, if they've been actively prevented for decades from ever having a chance? Look at US Presidents, most of whom enter office with some experience in government: are they perfect from day 1, or even in year 1? Moreover, if the public doesn't blame the LDP, why do they so substantially vote against them in election after election? Elsewhere in the book, BG describes a 2012 conversation with rising LDP star Koizumi Shinjiro, the photogenic son of the neoliberal PM mentioned above, in which Koizumi asserts the need for a two-party system consisting of "a strong opposition party and a strong ruling party" (@92). This seems to be suggesting that the next generation of LDP leaders is aware of the problems of one-party rule. But actually, Koizumi doesn't mention alternation of power: his idea of a strong opposition party could entail a party that is *perpetually* in opposition, as in Singapore. BG doesn't interrogate this, nor does he fault the LDP for actively and jealously guarding its monopoly on power.

Of course I believe BG is sincere, and isn't deliberately setting out to offer readers a twisted view of Japan's party politics. Nonetheless, the book's analysis will give you a mistaken impression of how Japanese politics really work.

Moreover, the cumulative impact of the book's omissions (as well as some affirmative statements: see next paragraph) is consistent with the American prejudice favoring political stability, rather than democracy, in military allies. No mention is made, for example, of the US role in destabilizing the first DPJ PM, Hatoyama Yukio, who lasted less than a year in that role. BG portrays Hatoyama's failure as entirely due to his personal weakness. Yes, the man had plenty of mishugas, as became even more evident after he relinquished the responsibilities of office. But as soon as he came to power, the Obama Administration, and especially Secretary Clinton, began pressuring him mercilessly over the issue of a new US base in Okinawa, to which many local residents were (and remain) opposed. Through their actions, Obama and Clinton showed a clear preference for dealing with the familiar LDP, and a lack of regard for the democratic alternation of power in Japan. See R. Taggart Murphy's "Japan and the Shackles of the Past" for a fuller description of these events as they appeared to those of us living in Japan at the time.

BG also follows, at least negligently, the Japanese pro-Government press's tactic of disparaging the opposition by claiming that the DPJ had "vanished" (@180) or "effectively dissolved" (@182) in 2017. These statements are simply false. The party organization, and its campaign treasury, have existed continuously to the present day (May 2019), though it has changed its name twice. It was the largest opposition party in the Upper House from 2017 until relatively recently, and continues to have many members of prefectural and local legislatures -- levels of Japanese politics ignored by this book. BG should have checked his facts more carefully: false statements about political antagonists are not neutral in impact, even if not malicious in intent.

B. Apart from the book's deficiencies in presenting Japanese politics, its image of what constitutes national well-being is one-dimensional: you're either on your way up, or you're on your way down. As BG puts it, "The study of history is in many cases the plotting of national trajectories that soar and eventually collapse back into themselves" (@7). "Peak Japan" marks the turning point for this trajectory -- it's all downhill from there, suggests BG. But this framing of national paths is entirely inadequate for the 21st Century.

For one thing, it prioritizes ends over means (another favorite proclivity of American realpolitik). The countries rising the most in terms of power and economy at the moment are authoritarian or becoming more so. Even the US is succumbing to this trend, which began before the current occupant of the White House (though he hasn't exactly slowed it down). Japan is not currently a true democracy, but it's still a darn sight better than China, and it shouldn't emulate it for the sake of economic success.

For another, the "peak" metaphor shows a lack of imagination about the futures of nations. BG seems scandalized or at least concerned that some people in Japan seem to think that further economic growth is unnecessary, and economic inequality undesirable (e.g., @231, 235). He observes that many Japanese lack any aspiration for Japan to become a great power, and that "the Japanese tend to see new value and benefits in accepting limits and working within them" (@236). Yet while conceding that "this could become a source of strength and even a model if refined, articulated and pursued" (id.), just a few lines later BG calls this sentiment "perilously close to resignation," and dubs the present era "Peak Japan, ... a last gasp by great power traditionalists to boost their nation's standing and to secure a leading role in regional and global councils" (id.). In other words, despite his faint praise, it's still a *downward* trajectory. With his metaphor of the "peak," he makes clear his view that abandoning the "great power traditionalist" view is a lamentable thing.

Why must this be the case? Pioneering a way for a country to maintain a "stationary state" of well-being (the term is from John Stuart Mill), or even enriching the qualitative well-being of its residents, is a tremendous creative challenge. And given the global environmental crisis, which is entirely ignored in this book, it's also far more responsible than boosting Japan's consumption for the sake of maintaining our GDP ranking. Properly pursued, this new "trajectory" could make Japan a role model among nations in the new, warmer version of our planet -- though honestly, this whole idea that Japan needs to be engaged in competition of this sort seems very American Retro, from when GDP rankings sublimated our impulses to have a shooting war with the Soviets. That's not to say I'm confident that Japan will be able to pioneer in this way: there are still too many "great power traditionalists" among Japanese politicians and bureaucrats, as well as those who are simply too interested in short-term gain. But my own teaching and writing here is oriented to encouraging people toward this sort of future. Some call it "degrowth" or "post-growth"; a more suitable term might be "grown up."

(4) One more note: although published in March 2019, the book speaks as of spring 2018 (@6n3). Consequently, it doesn't address, among other things, some of the Labor Ministry misinformation scandals of 2018-2019 that cast doubt on some of the rosier supposed results of Abenomics. It also is a bit too optimistic about the political skill of Tokyo Governor Koike Yuriko (@89), who after a brief flirtation with being a national power broker in 2017 quickly became the object of her local constituents' dissatisfaction and ire. This time lag is of course the responsibility of the publisher, not the author -- though I mention it because it may be important if you're considering whether or not to buy the book.

In sum, this is a detailed, professional and sincerely motivated examination and diagnosis of the current state of Japan. It's somewhat more balanced than most other comparable books by American scholars. In addition to being useful to American policy wonks, if you're an investor or someone else outside Japan and wanting to get a rough idea on where the country is headed so you can place a bet, it might be helpful -- particularly if you want to understand how most other people will think about Japan (George Soros's notion of reflexivity). But if you're interested in Japan for its own sake, this won't give you an adequate view.
21 people found this helpful
Helpful
3 comments Report abuse
J. Ormond
5.0 out of 5 stars Interesting, insightful, and thought-provoking look at Japan
Reviewed in the United States on August 23, 2019
A terrific book, well organized and documented, filled with insightful commentary and context. The author provides excellent insights on Japan’s recent political developments and social/economic challenges and weaves in extensive polling data and expert commentary throughout. The broad, high-level conclusions are difficult to challenge though even those who know Japan well will find interesting and insightful surprises. I’m not sure there are many comparable current books out there. For anyone interested in Asia – because Japan’s still an influential and important country and Asia is shaping the world – this is a book to read and enjoy.
3 people found this helpful