Syngman Rhe Japan Inside Out 3 Ch 9-12

Syngman Rhe

 목차

• 10. FOREWORD

• 2Ⅰ. JAPAN'S "DIVINE MISSION" AND WAR PSYCHOLOGY

• 3Ⅱ. TANAKA MEMORIAL

• 4Ⅲ. JAPAN READY TO UNMASK HERSELF

• 5Ⅳ. THE BEGINNING OF THE SINO-JAPANESE WAR

• 6Ⅴ. FOREIGN NEWSPAPERMEN MUST GO

• 7Ⅵ. FOREIGN MISSIONARIES

• 8Ⅶ. THE LADYBIRD AND THE PANAY INCIDENTS

• 9Ⅷ. U. S. NATIONALS AND THEIR INTERESTS

• 10Ⅸ. NINE-POWER PARLEY

• 11Ⅹ. JAPAN'S MARCH OF CONQUEST AND ITS REPERCUSSIONS

• 12ⅩI. THE UNITED STATES NAVAL INCREASE

• 13ⅩⅡ. JAPANESE PROPAGANDA SHOULD BE CHECKED

• 14ⅩⅢ. PACIFISTS IN AMERICA

• 15ⅩⅣ. PACIFISTS ARE LIKE FIFTH COLUMNISTS

• 16ⅩⅤ. DEMOCRACY VERSUS TOTALITARIANISM

• 17ⅩVI. CONCLUSION

• 18REFERENCE

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Ⅸ. NINE-POWER PARLEY

9:1 The Sino-Japanese war has placed the United States government in a most embarrassing and trying situation. During the last three decades, and up to the present crisis, the United States maintained peaceful relations with Japan, and there were no serious differences between the two nations. Now the United States has come to a point in the road where it must decide what course to follow, whether to accept Japan's challenge or to about face. An unsettled situation is always a trying one.

9:2 More than that, the United States government finds itself bound by the Nine-Power Pact, as well as by other international agreements, which guaranteed the territorial integrity and political independence of China, now being attacked by Japan, another signatory. When the Japanese invasion began, China demanded that the signatory nations consult with one another upon what action to take. This they have not done, although public sentiment in America, as well as in the entire world outside of the Axis powers, has rapidly changed unfavorably toward Japan. Japan's bold challenge to the civilized world revealed, without a shadow of doubt, the fact that she is a real menace to all nations in general, and to the United States in particular. This being the situation, the President and Secretary of State should have felt it their duty to take determined action in carrying out the American treaty obligations. It is true that material assistance in the form of loans, equipment, and supplies is being furnished to China by the American government and the American people, but more positive action in the beginning might have halted Japan in her tracks and saved China from her sore suffering and anguish. It is quite safe to say that had the United States government been solidly supported by the nation in the beginning, peaceful means could have been found to arrest international banditry either in Europe or in Asia, or both, without dragging the nation into war. However, party politics and indifference and apathy of the mass of the people toward the true world situation had to be taken into consideration, and it was found necessary to move slowly. Now world events have convinced the American public that its own safety is in danger.

9:3 The Nine-Power Treaty was an outcome of the Washington Conference of 1921 and was ratified in 1925. It was submitted to the conference in the form of a resolution by Elihu Root.

9:4 By this instrument the powers agreed to:

1. Respect the sovereignty, independence and territorial and administrative integrity of China.

2. Provide the fullest opportunity for China to develop and maintain an effective and stable government.

3. Use their influence effectually toward establishing and maintaining the principle of opportunity for commerce and industry to all nations.

4. Refrain from taking advantage of present conditions to seek rights and privileges which may abridge the rights of subjects or citizens of friendly states.

9:5 Another treaty, known as the Four-Power Agreement signed at the same conference by the United States, Great Britain, France, and Japan, provided that should any dispute arise between any of these powers in the Far East, the powers concerned would consult together at a conference before resorting to war. Of these two international instruments, the Nine-Power Treaty, the main object of which was to check any trend toward the dismemberment of China, was the keynote. For the ensuing ten years, China benefited by it, because the powers abandoned all ideas of territorial aggrandizement or economic concessions by their solemn covenants. At that time, Japan had to give up her notorious Twenty-one Demands on China.[12] In effect, Japan was the contracting party most benefited by this arrangement. Just as the Open-Door policy helped Japan by holding Manchuria intact during the first period of her military preparation, the Nine-Power Pact held China intact during Japan's second period of preparation. When, in 1931, she found herself armed to the teeth, Japan scrapped the Open-Door agreements, rushed into Manchuria, and slammed the door against the others. Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson urged action to halt the Manchurian invasion, but Sir John Simon, British Foreign Secretary, could not make up his mind to do anything, and the first opportunity to enforce the law was lost. Japan walked out of the League of Nations in open defiance of all the powers present. Now again she is on the march for the conquest of a continent. A belated effort was made to stop her. On September 20, 1937, in Geneva, the British delegation proposed the application of the Nine-Power Treaty for the settlement of the Sino-Japanese conflict. It was believed that the move would bring the United States into full co-operation in peace efforts and that Japan could not refuse to attend a conference of the treaty signatories.

9:6 Japan's Attitude Toward the Nine-Power Parley

9:7 Japan signed the Nine-Power Treaty when she was not strong enough to enforce her will. When she felt that she was sufficiently powerful to attempt the conquest of China, she proceeded to do so. Most naturally, the other powers decided to call her to a conference table to answer questions. The formal invitation to attend the Nine- Power conference to be held in Brussels on October 30, 1937, reached Tokyo on October 21. Nearly three weeks before, the Asahi Shimbun editorially remarked that the invocation of the Nine-Power Pact might be acceptable under reasonable conditions, though, properly speaking, it was virtually a dead letter, or, at least, entirely unsuitable to the present Far Eastern situation. This editorial was an unofficial expression of the real attitude of the Japanese government. Results have proved it.

9:8 The Japanese government formally replied to the invitation on October 27, only three days prior to the opening of the conference. The reply, declining to attend the parley, was made by issuing a public statement to the effect that the League of Nations inspired the conference in order to "put serious obstacles in the path of a just and proper solution of Sino-Japanese disputes," that Japan is fighting a "defensive war," and that "the Nine-Power Treaty is obsolete anyway." The newspaper Okugai Shogio said editorially on November 5 that Japan acquired political superiority in the Far East through "the holy war" and that other powers lost their qualification to discuss East Asia without Japan's understanding. Finally, a few days later (November 12), the Japanese Cabinet again rejected the second invitation to be present at the conference. The following day the delegates at Brussels dispatched a final appeal to Tokyo, suggesting: (1) acceptance of an immediate armistice, (2) settlement through mediation, and (3) a proviso that the underlying principle of the Nine-Power Pact should govern peace efforts.

9:9 The "final appeal" seemed to be in perfect order as a peaceful means to a peaceful end. Only one thing was lacking-there were no teeth in it. And that is why the diplomats in Tokyo had a good laugh up their kimono sleeves over the "stupid fiasco" of the League of Nations.

9:10 Japan has said the Nine-Power Treaty is a "dead letter," and "obsolete." Germany has said the same thing, that a treaty is “a scrap of paper." The difference is, while the United States fully realizes the danger of the German menace, it does not yet fully realize the danger of its Eastern prototype, Japan. That is where the danger lies. Any nation, even the United States, which enters into a treaty relationship with these nations is only courting disaster.

9:11 The Japanese asserted: Japan is fighting a "defensive war," a "holy war." It is not easy to perceive where the " holy" part of it comes in, unless it refers to their claim that the rulers of Japan were direct "sons of the sun goddess." The term "defensive" is somewhat incomprehensible to the Occidental mind. Japan's way of looking at things is quite different from the Occidental. For instance, if you were forcibly to enter your neighbor's house, he would naturally attempt to put you out by force, wouldn't he? In such a case, you would have either to get out or to fight in "self-defense." This was the Japanese psychology when they said, in reference to the invitation of the Nine-Power Parley, "that the difficulties can be solved only between the two powers." That is, between the burglar who stands with a pistol and the victim prostrated at his feet, and no one else.

9:12 It is significant to notice how carefully American diplomats worded their statements so as to avoid any criticism at home that they were trying to drag America into the affairs of other nations. At the same time, they could not turn a deaf ear to the cries for help reaching them from all parts of this troubled world, which in its distress and agony looks to the United States, the biggest and most influential power, for succor. Furthermore, in reference to the protection of China's sovereignty and territory, the United States, as signatory to the Nine-Power Treaty, has not only moral but legal obligations to make every effort to help China. For this reason, if for no other, the government should be willing to do anything short of war to stop Japanese aggression. Yet the American people, who determine national issues both foreign and domestic, were, because of the influence of pacifists and propagandists, and the experience of the last war, absolutely opposed to anything smacking of foreign entanglement. This being the situation, the government found itself in a very embarrassing position.

9:13 Secretary Hull's repeated assertions condemning Japanese aerial bombardment of undefended civilian areas seem to have furnished the basis of a hope built up by the League of Nations for the possible co-operation of the United States in bringing international pressure on Japan. His note of September 22 to the Japanese government clearly set forth the view that "any general bombing of any extensive area in which resides a large populace engaged in peaceful pursuits is unwarranted and contrary to principles of law and humanity." This note Japan did not answer. A week later, Hull reiterated the American protest, thus, without mentioning the League, indirectly endorsing the League resolution which condemned Japanese bombing of civilian populations. The United States could not officially associate itself with the League because it was not a member nation.

9:14 Leland Harrison, United States Ambassador to Switzerland, was instructed to attend committee meetings of the League to remind the League of the fact that the United States could not attend the conference which the League was about to call. That is why the Brussels Parley was called in place of a meeting under the auspices of the League. The other powers, without the co-operation of the United States, could not entertain any hope of success, and the United States, as one of the signatories, could not decline to attend. Now that the position of the United States was made clear, Secretary Hull announced that Norman Davis, United States Ambassador-at-Large, would represent the United States at the session. Mr. Davis was accompanied by Dr. Stanley K. Hornbeck, chief of the Far Eastern Division of the State Department, an outstanding authority of Far Eastern affairs, Robert Pell, as press officer, and Charles Bohlen, secretary. The delegation sailed for Brussels with very little enthusiasm.

9:15 However, the world was not ready for genuine international co-operation, which is essential to any degree of success. Frank Kellogg, former Secretary of State, and coauthor of the Kellogg-Briand Pact, must have had this in mind when he said in a statement at this time that

9:16

"governments believing in the sanctity of international obligations should consider most carefully steps which can be taken to make effective the principles of the pact. I still believe as I did in 1928, that world peace depends upon observance by all signatories of terms and principles of the pact. I can reconcile the present policy of Japan in China neither with the letter nor the spirit of the Paris pact. It is a matter of definite regret that any government should show disregard for its plighted word, for such is destructive not only of the pact but of the mutual confidence on which alone the society of nations can exist. The alternative to such confidence is international anarchy."

9:17 To all the peace-loving peoples of the world, who had pinned sincere hopes on the conference at Brussels, came the disheartening and humiliating news of its first session on November 4. At that session, the British delegates, realizing the helplessness of the parley because of Japan's refusal to join the discussion, tried to save face by "flirting with Japan." Soon after this meeting, Sir Robert Clive, British Ambassador to Belgium, conferred with S. Kurusu, Japanese Ambassador to Belgium, and attempted to learn whether Japan would agree to attend a different conference to discuss a Sino-Japanese settlement on a broader basis. Other conferees openly remarked that this offer was designed to enable Britain to sidestep the embarrassing necessity of considering coercive measures against Japan. The American delegate, Norman Davis, warned, in his brief address to the conference, that cessation of the conflict was essential to world peace. French Foreign Minister Yvon Delbos followed Davis's speech by emphasizing the sanctity of the Nine-Power Treaty. Count Luigi Aldrovandi Marescotti, Italian delegate, struck a discordant note by saying that the conference could not do any more than invite China and Japan to participate in discussions. "It cannot quarantine Japan" was a direct reference to President Roosevelt's Chicago speech in 1937. No doubt most of the delegates left the first session quite discouraged and somewhat disgusted.

9:18 The conference continued in session until November 20, 1937. The British and French delegates definitely realized that the United States would not take the lead in halting Japan and did not even attend the sessions regularly. During all this time, the main questions discussed at the meetings were: how to censure Japan, and how the leading conferee powers could supply arms to China on credit as a "last resort" to halt Japan. When the former question came up, the Italians bolted, in accordance with Mussolini's friendly relations with Japan. The conference overrode Italian protests and approved the declaration charging Japan with responsibility for failure of peace efforts and continuance of bloodshed in the Far East.

9:19 As to the latter question, it was agreed that signatory powers might join in a proposal to aid China through munitions credits. The conference adjourned, sine die, on November 20. Delegates openly charged that the American policy of "strict neutrality" had killed international efforts to mediate the Far Eastern conflict.

9:20 It is interesting to observe that it was Great Britain which proposed the Nine-Power Parley though she had failed to follow Secretary of State Stimson's lead in protesting Japan's conquest of Manchuria and refusing to acknowledge Japanese sovereignty over that unhappy land.

9:21 However, the United States is not free from criticism. If the United States government was either unwilling or unable to take the lead in coercive measures against aggressor nations, it was a mistake to participate in the parley at all, for, so long as it was only a friendly gesture, the parley was doomed to failure before it opened. There was no nation but the United States which could wield moral or economic weapons sufficiently effective to make Japan feel the pressure. That was the hope of the world then, as now. At the same time, it should be remembered that the American people were opposed to any entanglement. They still believed the United States should keep out of everything. Perhaps, this accounts for the refusal of the American delegation to go any further. Thus the parley ended.

9:22 The failure of the parley was neither a surprise nor a disappointment, since there was not much hope for it from the beginning. The nations represented were far from being ready. On the report of the subcommittee condemning Japan as the invader three nations abstained from voting. Why? Was it because they were not sure whether Japan should be condemned as such? It seemed most likely that they refused to vote because they did not wish to hurt Japanese feelings. If the small nations were so influenced, as every evidence indicated, the great powers apparently were similarly influenced. Great Britain, as has been pointed out, was the first one at the conference to seek a way out without losing face. In other words, all the nations, powerful and weak alike, acted as if they were treading on thin ice. Had they all come with the full conviction that if they failed to stop international piracy at once, they would be victims of that piracy, the situation would have been different. The tendency of all the nations was too narrowly individualistic to be willing to do anything for collective security.

9:23 The powers underestimated Japan's military strength. They still regarded Japan as the second- or third-rate nation that she was thirty years ago, little realizing that Japan had reached a stage where she could stand out boldly in defiance of the whole world. They judged that Japan would still respect the public opinion of the nations of the West. Counting too much on their belief that Japan could not afford to ignore her treaty obligations, they came with the hope that they might succeed in halting the war by "friendly" persuasion. Of course, they had never thought of the need of force, moral or economic.

9:24 It was suggested at the parley that either economic sanctions be applied against Japan, or an understanding be reached among the leading signatory powers to sell arms and war materials to China on credit, thus backing China in her struggle for existence. But neither course was possible, because the Japanese said: "If Americans and others make further representations based on the Nine-Power Treaty, which savors of pressure against Japan, Japan definitely will demand correction of their views."

9:25 Japan thus frustrated all the peace efforts of the Brussels Conference simply by refusing to participate in the discussions. Meanwhile, her army and navy were steadily proceeding toward the realization of the Tanaka predictions, not only in China, but in other parts of the world.

Ⅹ. JAPAN'S MARCH OF CONQUEST AND ITS REPERCUSSIONS

10:1 While Japan was struggling to conquer the rest of China and seeking to grasp everything within the ever expanding radius of her empire, the repercussions of her military movements were felt all over the world. Through Axis alliance, she was rendering helpless the British, French, and Dutch possessions in the East, and indirectly augmenting the Nazi threats to the United States on the Atlantic side. On the other hand, her attempts to monopolize China's vast material resources, man power, and foreign market, and her claim to the mastery over the Pacific, menaced the peace and security, not only of the United States, but of the entire Western hemisphere.

10:2 Shanghai

Japan's original plan to take over the French Concession and the International Settlement was stalemated by the refusal of the United States to abandon its treaty rights, backed by the speedy concentration of its naval fleet in Hawaiian waters and its intensive preparations for national defense. No doubt this maneuvering of power in the Pacific has slowed down Japan's war machine in China. Threats by Tokyo war lords failed to create the desired reaction in America, and they consequently decided to go easy for a while. That does not mean, however, that they will desist from further aggression. They are resourceful and relentless so long as their army and navy have the upper hand. If they discard one method, they can employ another just as effective and less noisy, perhaps.

10:3 Whispering campaigns and vernacular newspaper drives have been going on in metropolitan Shanghai for months. During the latter part of September, 1940, strikes and violence spread to the International Settlement. Bus and street car employees quit their jobs, tying up the city's transportation service for several days. The strike soon threatened to paralyze every industry in the city. The municipal garbage collection employees soon joined the strike. Agitators threatened to harm the families of workers unless the employees of gas, electric power, and waterworks walk out within a week after posting of the notice. Japanese newspapers stated as news, but intended as an order, that taxicab drivers would join the strike soon. They said, further, "The United States Marines will soon be withdrawn, because the force is too small to preserve order." Foreign observers feared a crisis that might culminate in a Japanese move to seize control of the French Concession and International Settlement. This situation was created by the Japanese to give them an excuse to seize the municipal government under the guise of "restoring order." The Utilities Company directors insisted on remaining indoors and avoided contacts during the disturbance for fear of personal attack.

10:4 Thirty years ago, this underhanded method was used in Korea with great success when the Japanese were driving out all foreigners engaged in business in Seoul, Chemulpo, Fusan, and other places. The Koreans told their American friends that it was the Japanese and not the Koreans who were the real instigators of the trouble, but very few foreigners believed it. They could not believe that the Japanese, who were so friendly to foreigners, could be capable of such duplicity. Of course, the Japanese were more careful in carrying on agitation then than they are now. Many Americans are now aware of the fact that most of the violence of the last thirty years in Korea occurred at the direct instigation of the Japanese.

10:5 While tension in Shanghai was thus growing higher all the time, Fu Hsiao-en, Japanese-directed puppet Mayor of Greater Shanghai, was killed at his home in Hongkew. Japanese military headquarters immediately declared martial law, and searching parties ransacked the entire sector. The assassins escaped. No doubt, the crime was a part of the militarists' own plan to precipitate trouble. Just at that time, a report was circulated that a Japanese officer had been shot and severely wounded near the foreign sector. This intensified the tension, and the entire city felt as if it were sitting on a pincushion.

10:6 Consequently, the State Department at Washington again ordered American women, children and men not in essential business, to return to the United States as soon as possible from China, and also from Japan and Korea. Anti-American movements were spreading all over Japan and it was impossible for any Westerner to feel safe and secure there. Owing to the lack of transportation, Washington arranged for two American steamships, the Mariposa and Monterey, to expedite the evacuation of the American refugees from the Orient. On October 10, there were still over 4,000 Americans in Shanghai. Some of them were ready to leave but they had to wait months before they could make reservations. In addition, many more hundreds in North China and Indo-China could not leave because of lack of transportation facilities. It was decided later that two more American liners, the Manhattan and the Washington, would sail immediately for the Orient to help bring Americans home.

10:7 Indo-China

During the middle of September, 1940, everyone in Indo-China was expecting war to descend upon them at any moment. However, the Japanese at first attempted to attain their ends by peaceful means. With the French government at Vichy doing Hitler's bidding, the Japanese felt that they could force the French authorities in lndo¬-China to obey their orders. If they could "kill a mosquito without drawing a sword," so much the better. In the meantime, Britain's successful resistance against Germany and the presence of the United States naval fleet in Hawaiian waters were anything but reassuring to the Japanese. The Vichy government had to comply with their requests, willy-nilly, and had already granted them the use of the three Tonking air bases and also permission to transport 20,000 troops on the French railway to China's border. Now they wanted permission to move 40,000 more troops and the free use of Saigon, the French naval base near Singapore. This, they thought. would be easy by making direct demands upon the French authorities in the territory rather than dealing with Vichy.

10:8 On a September midnight, when the Governor-general of French Indo-China, Admiral Jean Decoux, was in bed at his official residence in Hanoi, the Japanese Major-general, Issaku Nishihara, arrived and demanded an immediate conference with him. The irate admiral indignantly shouted, "I am not getting up. If the Japanese want to declare war, they can do it tomorrow morning." The Japanese were taken aback by the blunt rebuff of this undaunted Frenchman. This event was soon followed by the announcement of General Julian François René Martin, Commander of the Indo-Chinese forces, that he would resign if the Vichy government yielded further to Japan's demands. The Japanese decided then that peaceful means would not work here.

10:9 By the end of September, Japanese planes rained bombs on French positions and also on certain sections of the city of Hanoi, inflicting many casualties, and the attacking troops encircled the defense forces about eighty miles northeast of the city. Heavy fighting raged along a fifty-mile front. As the French poured machine gun and artillery fire into the advancing columns from fortified positions, Japanese casualties were reported quite heavy. However, the French forces were forced to withdraw from the city.

10:10 The French troops had started on their own initiative to fight the invaders, in spite of their government, from which no reinforcements or even encouragement could be expected. The invaders, on the other hand, with a full force of 30,000 men, were irresistibly advancing. Under these circumstances, the French could not help being pessimistic. They discovered that they had been tricked by the Japanese negotiators, headed by Nishihara. In the negotiations at Hanoi, Nishihara succeeded in concluding the Franco-Japanese¬-Indo-China pact, which was signed a week prior to the clash, limiting the Japanese troops to 6,000. By this pact, the French were led to believe that the Japanese would land no more troops than this limited number. A larger number would put their own French force in an inferior position. It was not until after the fighting was nearly over that they learned to their amazement that they had been fighting 30,000 Japanese instead of 6,000. It may be repeated again that to make any agreement with Japan and attach any importance to it is not worth the trouble. The French sustained a number of casualties, including an air force officer. Then women and children were hurriedly evacuated to Haiphong, the port of Hanoi.

10:11 In a combination of political and diplomatic forces working together to bring pressure to bear on the authorities of Indo-China, the French had to take orders from Vichy and fell back without further resistance. A reinforcement of 20,000 Japanese troops landed in Indo-China, September 26, 1940, marched under the powerful but silent French guns, and occupied Haiphong without resistance. Meanwhile, Japanese planes dropped bombs, damaging several buildings, killing fifteen and wounding eighteen civilians. As usual, the Japanese army spokesman stated that the bombing was "a mistake." It was a sharp contrast as the little brown soldiers proudly made their triumphal entry into the city, while the crack battalion of the French colonial infantry, their artillery and machine guns muzzled, moved out as if on a funeral march. Another undefeated army yielded fortified positions to their enemies without firing a shot.

10:12 The Japanese occupation of Indo-China is no concern of ours, many Americans say; but it is their concern. The United States has relied on Indo-China for rubber supplies which are essential to the automobile and other industries. A Japanese economic mission was expected to arrive in Hanoi on October 13, 1940, to take over the entire rubber supply for Japanese military use. It cuts the United States out of at least this one material, which is necessary not only for American industries but for national defense as well.

10:13 Hong Kong

China's Open Door is now barred to Occidentals. The "Asia for the Asiatics" cry has changed to a still louder cry of "Asia for the Japanese". The only footholds Westerners still claim in China are Hong Kong, the British Crown Colony, and the International Settlement. Since the fall of France, the French Concession has been virtually under Japanese control. The status of the International Settlement is still unsettled, because of the firm stand taken by the United States.

10:14 As the Westerner's strongholds in the East were crumbling like toy houses before this rapidly spreading fire, the white men had to flee, as the little brown men watched with satisfaction. Wives and children of British naval and army personnel began to evacuate in June, 1940. Other foreigners, not fully realizing the seriousness of the situation, would not move unless the official families started first. Gradually, most of the women and children were sent to Manila, leaving their homes and men behind. About three hundred Americans, mostly women and children, were among the refugees, while there were over nine hundred British women and one thousand British children. This exodus kept up until the latter part of October, when the British government ordered the complete evacuation of all British women and children from Hong Kong to Australia, with the understanding that their living expenses would be paid weekly by the London government through the Commonwealth government. Meanwhile, the Colonial government at Hong Kong made preliminary appropriations of one million Hong Kong dollars for the purpose of constructing air defenses as well as underground shelters which would eventually accommodate a million persons. In conjunction with this program, a number of tunnels were bored in the hillsides. This indicates that, so far as the British authorities in Hong Kong are concerned, the Britons will, to all intents and purposes, remain.

10:15 The danger lies not with the British Colonial government in Asia but with the British government in London. The irresolute and wavering attitude of the British Cabinet in the early years of the crisis served to strengthen Japan's position in later years, even when Great Britain was relatively in a much stronger position than she is today. Now, in this most critical situation, she may feel obliged to yield almost anything in order to appease Japan. In such a case, although it is hardly probable, the guns of Singapore, like the guns of Indo¬-China, may fall into the enemy's hands without having a chance to fire a shot, and English troops in Hong Kong, like the French in Indo-China, may be ordered to march out without having a chance to fight in their own defense. If this danger seems imaginary, see what the Prime Minister had to say on October 9, 1940, to the House of Commons: "We must avoid a showdown. We are not at war with Japan."

10:16 So it is that Britain is paying today for yesterday's failure to see that Japan was definitely embarked on a nationalistic venture that was bound to bring about a clash with British power.

10:17 Burma Road

Indeed, the most discouraging feature in the world crisis was Britain's vacillation. Sometimes it has been difficult to ascertain whether or not she had any definite policy. At the beginning of the conflicts in Asia and Europe, Prime Minister Chamberlain's appeasement policy made the British position more precarious than ever before. When Churchill took up the leadership in the new government, it was hoped that he would adopt a firm and perhaps more definite policy toward the Nipponese. But lack of preparation, of trained forces, and of matériel forced him to restraint and caution. Then, too, there was the great enigma of Russia to consider. The attempt to woo Stalin to the British cause ended in a major diplomatic defeat for Britain and victory for Germany. On top of all this came the alignment of Japan with Germany and Italy and, later, her pact with Russia.

10:18 However, the Rome-Berlin-Tokyo line-up brought a new determination to the British, who then began extensive aerial attacks on German bases and the city of Berlin. In spite of all the raids, London has met the attackers with stubborn counterattacks. Hitler has been somewhat disconcerted. Now all those who wish the British well are much encouraged by the successes lately scored by them. It is to be earnestly hoped that Britain will from now on forge ahead in the task of defeating the Axis powers.

10:19 While the London government was still continuing with its policy of uncertainty, Mr. Churchill offered, on July 12, 1940, to close the Burma Road to China, which was at that time the main thoroughfare by which China was importing most of her war supplies necessary for continued resistance to the invaders. Japan had repeatedly demanded that Britain close this road. Finally, Churchill quietly complied. Originally, it was to be closed for two months, but later, when the order was extended to three months, Japan accepted the offer. This was hard on China, because it was the main route to the outside world. Britain closed it in order to placate Japan. However, this did not satisfy Japan, who, instead of showing appreciation, kept on with her anti-British campaign. Meanwhile, the Axis triple alliance definitely proved to Britain the futility of further friendly gestures.

10:20 On October 9，Churchill, speaking to a packed House of Commons, said that the Burma Road would be reopened on October 17, the day when the period of three months expired. He said, further, that Japan's allies would not be able to help her so long as the British and American fleets control the seas. This stand by the British Prime Minister was reassuring to all friends of Britain.

10:21 The Burma route was reopened at the scheduled time, to remain China's only Open Door. Long before the date of opening, Japanese militarists threatened to blow up the bridges, the highway, the railroad, and freight. As a matter of fact, they did much bombing along the Chinese section of the road, but did little damage. In spite of all the threats, thousands of Chinese operators assembled American motor trucks and freight at stations between Rangoon and the Chinese border in anticipation of its opening. Two days before, 300,000 gallons of gasoline were transported to the border, and 5,000 trucks were in use by October, 1940.

10:22 China is now getting war supplies necessary for the continuation of its resistance against the invaders. Ten days after the opening, on October 28, 1940, the Japanese army announced that it was withdrawing from Nanning, strategic communications center in Kwangsi Province, which it had held nearly a year. The South China command at Canton, referring to the Japanese withdrawal, said, "The Japanese forces are evacuating Nanning because of the steady pressure of the Chinese forces which have been attacking the Japanese in Kwangsi." This alone proved that the Japanese, if they only have sufficient supplies. America is the only nation which can give these supplies, and it has every reason to give China this essential support.

10:23 Dutch East Indies

Anyone in this scientific age of ours who still believes that we have nothing to do with anything that takes place on other continents, does not realize what a small place the earth has become. There is hardly an event anywhere in the world of which we do not feel the effects. The fall of Holland and France had direct and profound effect upon the Sino-Japanese war, as well as being almost entirely responsible for getting America's defense program really under way.

10:24 The Japanese expansionists had long been casting greedy eyes upon the Dutch East Indies, Holland's "treasure chest." These islands produce many raw materials essential for war supplies, as well as numerous commercial products such as oil, tin, rubber, tea, gold, rice, lead, quinine, copra, tobacco, etc. As a noted writer has well said, "With the Dutch East Indies, Japan could thumb her nose at the rest of the world."

10:25 The Japanese government announced on May 11, 1940, that notification had been handed to the United States, Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy that Japan would "insist on the maintenance of the status quo in the Netherlands Indies, in spite of Holland's involvement in the European war." That was the time when rumors were circulating to the effect that the United States might take them over until a final settlement of the situation was reached. This notice was purported to be a "hands-off" warning to the United States. So far as the United States was concerned, it was quite satisfactory, because Japan, by warning others, voluntarily pledged herself to maintain the status quo. Whether or not Japan really meant to include herself in the warning, it was quite convenient for the United States to assume that she did so, and it thus accepted the notification as a bona fide expression of Japan's intention.

10:26 Japan formerly imported a relatively small amount of oil from the Dutch East Indies. Her annual purchase was usually not more than 30,000,000 barrels. Soon after the fall of Holland, Japan sent a special mission to Batavia and notified the Netherlands government that Japan desired an oil concession in the islands. The mission quietly expressed their desire to take over the oil refineries that were operating under Dutch control. The Dutch authorities were unable to resist and authorized the Netherlands Indies delegates and representatives of the oil companies to negotiate with the Japanese mission. They met October 14-16, 1940, under the chairmanship of the Japanese Minister of Commerce, who said at the opening of the negotiations that "Japan strongly desires to maintain and promote friendly relations with the Netherlands Indies." Under the contract which was dictated by Japan, forty per cent of Japan's oil requirement for the following six months would be supplied by the Netherlands Indies. In addition to this supply, Japan gets the balance of her needs from American oil companies.

10:27 It seems that Americans are determined not to learn from the bitter experience of the Dutch East Indies. It seems that the whole world helps Japan to continue its aggressive expansion. Governments seem to speed up this suicidal tendency of mankind. Take the case of the American embargo, for example. The United States government shut off exports of high octane gasoline to Japan. It was clear then that the government apparently intended to stop arming Japan. Every American citizen and every American organization, commercial or otherwise, should co-operate with the government in its efforts to withhold further material aid to the aggressors. Yet Japan continues to get shipments of low test gas, crude oil, Diesel oil, kerosene, and other petroleum products from America. As has been said elsewhere, steel rails, as well as many other raw materials without which Japan would be unable to carry on her international brigandage, still find their way into Japan uninterrupted.

10:28 Henry H. Douglas made a startling report when he said in a recent article in Asia magazine:

10:29

"In spite of the fact that in 1939 Japan bought from us more of these products than ever before, a comparison of our exports of some products for the month of October in 1939 and 1940 will be an eye-opener to many."

Oct., 1939 Oct., 1940

Gasoline 148,000 bbls. 627,000 bbls

Iron and steel scrap 259,000 tons 148,000 tons

Iron and steel bars and rods, including wire rods 1,715 tons 17,623 tons

Steel sheets, black 43 tons 1,554 tons

Copper refined 11,148 tons 27,815 tons

10:30

"In many products there were astonishing increases in exports in August, 1940, as against August, 1939, because in July, 1940, the Japanese thought we really meant business and intended to shut off her vital supplies, but they decided in a few weeks that we were only bluffing after all. The embargo action of October 16, 1940, probably brought about by the announcement of the Three-Power Pact, reduced our November exports of scrap iron to Japan to twenty-five torn."

10:31 How long are Americans going to continue to give Japan weapons with which to assail them? When are they going to use their intelligence and their products for self-defense instead of self-ruin? If they use their heads now, they will not have to use their arms later.

10:32 Thailand

Thailand, or Siam, one of the old Asiatic countries, has been subjected to Japanese diplomatic intrigue and is now practically a Japanese protectorate. The country is about the size of France, with a population of 14,000,000. Vast resources are still undeveloped, and "peaceful" Japanese penetration has reached far into the interior. All the works of river dredging and harbor construction are being conducted by the Japanese. Thailand is learning that Japanese intervention in her affairs is but another means to Japanese expansion.

10:33 In an address at a Lion's Club luncheon in the Mayflower Hotel, Washington, D. C., Mom Rajawongse Seni Pramoj, Thailand's Minister to the United States, sketched the background of the conflict between Thailand and Indo-China and the settlement of the dispute by Japan as mediator. After the speech, he was to answer questions. One of the Lions asked him about land-hungry Japan in the rôle of mediator. "Wasn't it like a fox coming in to arbitrate a dispute between two rabbits in a cabbage patch? Wasn't the fox likely to fatten up the rabbits and then eat both of them?" he was asked.

10:34 Minister Pramoj looked over the questioner and smilingly replied: "What would you do if you were a rabbit?" The audience roared their appreciation of the riposte.

10:35 Philippine Islands

Early in March, 1938, the War and Navy Departments were considering withdrawal of the United States first defense line from the Philippines to Hawaii. This was based on the observations of some strategists that the American defense front should be drawn closer to continental United States so as to strengthen the security of the Pacific coast.

10:36 Admiral William D. Leahy, chief of the naval operations, informed the Naval Affairs Committee nearly a year before that it would be almost impossible to defend the Philippine Islands against a first-class sea power, even with the twenty per cent naval increase proposed by the Vinson Bill at an estimated cost of $800,000,000.

10:37 Japan demanded a share in the development of economic resources in the Philippine Islands. The Japanese Chamber of Commerce of Manila filed with the Commonwealth government on October 20, 1937, what is known as "a surprise brief" advocating an establishment of joint economic relations in the islands. The brief said, "The commerce between the United States, the Philippines, and Japan furnishes an excellent example of 'triangular' arrangement."

10:38 The embargo declared by the United States on exports of war materials to Japan seems meaningless. The war lords in Tokyo have been constantly warning against the embargo enforcement. The shipments of strategic war materials to Japan have been greatly increased recently. In order to evade legal technicality, some of these articles are being shipped from mainland ports to Manila and reshipped thence to Japan.

10:39 In addition, the Japanese are purchasing all iron ore from private owners of mines in the Philippines. In January, 1938, "a most attractive offer" was made by the Japanese to the Commonwealth government to lease and develop rich iron reserves in Surigao province. Such a lease would violate the Philippine constitutional provisions, but the offer was so tempting that the Philippine authorities had given it "a lengthy consideration" before they finally decided to turn it down.

10:40 The story of "a mystery flotilla" of twenty-two vessels sighted off Davao Bay kept the American public agog from April 12 to 23, 1938, when it was disclosed that "the hostile fleet" was nothing but a few Japanese whaling ships. The collector of customs reported that they were either destroyers or submarines. Some said it was "established beyond doubt warships entered Davao waters." A retired army officer was positive that he "saw around seventeen warships in column formation," while many others "watched the ships maneuvering at night and displaying varicolored lights."

10:41 On April 23, the commander of a Japanese whaling fleet calmly announced that he had stopped off with his depot ship, Nishi Maru, to fuel the whaling ships in the fleet. And all was quiet again in the western Pacific front.

10:42 Guam

Early in August, 1938, Japanese officials informally intimated to the United States authorities that they desired to apply for permission to land their planes in Guam, linking with the Pan¬-American Airways trans-Pacific route. About this time the American commercial attaché at Tokyo reported that the Japanese were seeking an appropriation of nearly $2,000,000 for this project.

10:43 However, this project failed to materialize. The American authorities refused even to consider such a proposal. The Japanese should be reminded that their laws permit no foreign air lines landing rights in their territory. Furthermore, whenever the United States proposed to fortify the island of Guam, the Japanese government strenuously objected on account of its propinquity to their naval bases. The Japanese appeared to blink the fact that Guam's propinquity to the United States naval base in Manila is of prime concern to the United States naval authorities.

10:44 On February 2, 1941, a bill asking for $898,392,932 for new naval bases at Samoa, Guam, and other American outposts in the western Pacific was put before Congress. This included $8,100,000 for fortification at Tutuila, Samoa, and $4,700,000 for "fleet operating facilities" and bomb-proof shelters at Guam.

10:45 During the two previous years, Congress has twice refused the requests on the ground that it was an "aggressive move" against Japan. Admiral Harold R. Stark, Chief of Naval Operations, declared, "If Japan is offended, her protest should be totally disregarded. After all, Guam is United States property and it seems to me our actions should be determined by what is best for the United States and not dictated by any foreign power."

10:46 On February 19, the move was revived in Congress and it was passed without a single voice being raised against it.

10:47 Mandate Islands

Under the mandate given her Japan was not allowed to fortify the group of islands which the League of Nations granted her to hold for a term of years. Yet she deliberately built fortifications and naval bases there, and evidenced no intention to relinquish them. When the term of the mandate expired, she frankly informed the League that she intended to keep the islands "at any cost," and denied that she had fortified the islands. When the League proposed to investigate the situation, Japan announced that no foreigner was allowed to visit any of them and that if the League refused to believe her word, she would take it as an insult. Other nations were fearful of creating trouble and the matter was dropped then and there.

10:48 On November 30,1937, the Japanese Communications Ministry announced that Japan's long planned commercial air line linking her with her mandate islands would come into existence in December. According to this announcement，two trips a month were scheduled between Tokyo and Palao in the Caroline Islands, some two thousand miles apart. The island Saipan, which is almost within sight of Guam, would be one of the stop-over points. It was purely from a strategic standpoint, as a counterbalance to the military importance of Guam and the Philippines, that she determined to tighten her hold on them.

10:49 On April 2, 1938, the Hochi, a Tokyo newspaper, reported that a mysterious warship, believed to be American, entered the harbor of Truck Island, one of the mandate group, after midnight, flashed its searchlight around the harbor and then disappeared.

10:50 Meanwhile, another news dispatch was widely circulated, causing a profound sensation all over Japan. The dispatch said the United States navy had concentrated ten capital ships, five hundred warplanes, an armada of aircraft carriers, and other vessels in the areas between Wake Island and American Samoa, along the Phoenix group and Howland and Baker Islands. Admiral C. C. Bloch, Commander in Chief of the United States fleet there, issued a statement saying that "the concentration referred to has no foundation in fact," and the Hochi at once admitted that "the boat was not even identified,... and it might have been a fishing boat."

10:51 Hawaii

If Japan's invasion of China had taken place a century ago, it would hardly have been noticed in territory as far from the Orient as the islands of Hawaii. In this machine age of ours, when continents are no longer divided by water and air but connected by them, Hawaii seems almost to be the very centre of events. Suffice it to say that Japan's war on China affects Hawaii's present chances to win admission to the Union as a state, for which it has applied to the United States Congress. However, the question of the Japanese population in the territory puts the territory in a dubious position.

10:52 The Japanese-Americans have been reaching voting age rapidly, but when they vote for territorial legislators, they are known to vote almost exclusively for their own Japanese candidates. This is particularly true on the island of Hawaii, the largest in the group. This experience has been repeated a number of years. At all events, the Japanese-Americans are gradually getting into key positions in the territorial government, and it is difficult to stop them.

10:53 Some of the far-sighted citizens in Hawaii have been watching the rapid development of this anomalous situation with silent but serious forebodings. The former Governor of Hawaii, Charles McCarthy, was one of them. When he was serving as a delegate from the territory to the United States Congress, he quietly approached the Interior and State Department authorities with the proposal that a limited number of Koreans be admitted to the territory as laborers. At that time, the sugar plantations in Hawaii were in need of a fresh supply of cheap labor. The main purpose for which he submitted this proposal was, however, to have an equal number of Koreans settled side by side with the Japanese, in order to safeguard the peace and security of the territory, the most strategic insular possession of the United States. Koreans and Japanese are hereditary enemies，and Governor McCarthy saw the wisdom of such a move. As a result, the Korean Commission in Washington was advised by the Interior Department that any Koreans who were outside of Korea in 1910, the year in which Japan formally annexed Korea, would be permitted to enter the Territory of Hawaii. The Korean Commission at once took the matter up with the immigration authorities, who informed them that the Immigration Bureau could not act upon it unless the State Department issued similar instructions to that effect. The State Department authorities frankly stated in their reply to the Korean Commission that the United States could not allow Koreans to enter without Japanese passports, because that would violate the so-called "Gentlemen's agreement." That ended the negotiations.

10:54 Since there was no special restriction against Koreans, Korean students used to receive lenient treatment at the hands of the United States Immigration officials and steamship companies. Once or twice, several political refugees managed to get aboard American steamships in one of the Oriental ports, and the ship’s captain, or some other officer, protected them from the Japanese police. When the refugees arrived in America, the United States authorities permitted them to enter as soon as they proved themselves to be Korean students. This special favor was too irksome to the Japanese to bear. To plug this loophole, the Japanese made a special effort to put a separate clause in the so-called "gentlemen's agreement" to the effect that Koreans, being subjects of the Mikado, should not be permitted to enter the United States without Japanese passports. Passports, so freely obtained by Japanese, were about the last thing possible for Koreans to secure. Thus Japan managed to bar Korean students from the United States. According to the Korean interpretation of this clause of the agreement, the Koreans who were not in Korea during the time of annexation, and still refused to be classified as Japanese, as most of them did and still do, should be treated as men without a country and be exempted from the passport requirement. The Interior Department readily accepted this interpretation, but the State Department in those days was anxious not to displease Tokyo, and the matter was dropped.

10:55 Now, to go back to the Japanese in Hawaii. The question of Japanese dual citizenship has been a subject of public discussion for many years. Under the Constitution of the United States, Japanese, born on American soil, are, like all other native-born, American citizens. Japan, on the other hand, claims that a Japanese is a subject of the Empire irrespective of the place of his birth. The crux of this question is to which country does an American-born Japanese owe allegiance and for which flag will he fight? In this controversy, if the Japanese government had insisted on claiming that such a person would fight for Japan, the American government would have classified him and thousands of others as aliens, a decided disadvantage to Japan. Therefore, the Tokyo government finally agreed to give the Japanese in this category an opportunity to expatriate themselves. This arrangement was accepted as satisfactory to all concerned.

10:56 Under the alien registration act of 1940, the United States Department of Justice, granting the petition of Kilsoo Haan, representative of the Sino-Korean league, ruled that Koreans be allowed to register as Koreans, not as subjects of Japan. Earl G. Harrison, director of alien registration in Washington, announced a similar ruling. It was reported that under this ruling 2,276 Koreans in Hawaii were to register as Koreans. The rest of the Koreans, some 6,500 in all, according to the last census, are American citizens. The Japanese were highly dissatisfied with this ruling. Kiichi Gunji, Japanese Consul General, openly declared that American citizens of Korean parentage are still dual citizens and must be expatriated from Japan by filing their applications with the Japanese consulate in Honolulu. This stupid statement stirred up the Korean community in Honolulu to such an extent that a mass meeting was promptly called by the Korean Civic Association, and after indignant speeches and denunciations a resolution was unanimously adopted reasserting that Koreans had never recognized Japan's forcible annexation of Korea, that they never allowed themselves to be called Japanese, that they owed no allegiance to any country but the United States, and that they would take in the future, as they had taken in the past, their full share of obligation as worthy citizens of the United States.

10:57 The Japanese Consul General in Honolulu knows that Koreans born under the Stars and Stripes will never go to the Japanese for expatriation, and the Japanese in America have no way to force them to do it. No one except the Japanese would think for a moment that these young Korean-Americans should be expatriated because the Japanese are required to do it. The reason why the Japanese are required to renounce their Japanese citizenship, if they want to become American citizens, is because, under the old dual citizen law, they would have been free to voluntarily take up arms for Japan in case of war. But no such requirement is needed for the Koreans, because no Korean would fight for Japan against the United States or any other nation. They would welcome an opportunity to fight Japan. The very fact that a Korean army, fully equipped and organized, is fighting the Japanese in China is significant. There is no Korean army, except in Japan's propaganda, fighting for Japan. That the Japanese dare not trust the Koreans with firearms speaks eloquently. The following instance is another evidence of Japanese animosity toward the Koreans:

10:58 The last year witnessed one of the worst famine disasters in Korea. In fact, the famine condition was so bad that it was widely reported in the American press, despite the strict censorship in Korea. If such suffering were going on in China, India, or Japan, appeals for relief would have reached the philanthropic hearts of Americans immediately and repeatedly. It is proverbial that Japan's policy of repression in Korea has built an almost impenetrable barrier between that unhappy land and the outside world.

10:59 In the early spring of 1940, the Koreans in Hawaii and the mainland made whatever contributions they could to help alleviate the famine in their mother country, and, with the aid of their American friends in California and elsewhere, appeals for contributions were made to the general public. Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt, First Lady of the nation graciously included the Korean famine situation in her weekly radio broadcast and also in her daily column. In conclusion, Mrs. Roosevelt said:

10:60

"I tell you all this because, while Korea is far away, perhaps you will send an occasional check to the American Red Cross, marked for these people who are just one more addition to the world's suffering people. It seems hard to sleep at night these times because the stress of homeless, hopeless people haunts one's dreams."

10:61 This touching plea in behalf of suffering humanity was bound to bear fruit. Voluntary subscriptions increased the total of the Korean relief fund substantially. Naturally, the Koreans were made happy and grateful.

10:62 The next question was how to distribute this fund to the famine sufferers without going through a Japanese agency. If it was turned over to the Japanese consulate, to be handled by the Japanese, it would not have appeared so objectionable to the Japanese, perhaps. But the Koreans would not think of such a thing, and subsequently they made arrangements with the American Mission Board in Korea to distribute the fund among the most needy ones. This was too much for the Japanese to keep quiet about. The Japanese Consul General in Honolulu made another misleading statement, asserting that there was no famine in Korea. He said, in part:

10:63

"It is unthinkable that Korea today is suffering from a large scale famine as some reports reaching here have stated.... I have never heard or read of such disastrous famine yet. If there were such famine, the Japanese government would have taken immediate steps to remedy the situation."

10:64 By making that statement，the Japanese Consul General made the situation all the worse for Japan. The outside world had learned through more trustworthy sources than the Japanese consulate that the suffering was worse than was generally known. One would like to know the reason why the Japanese so strenuously objected to American relief funds going into Korea. Was it in pursuit of the policy of repression? If so, the policy does not seem to kill or even dampen the Korean spirit. On the contrary, that spirit grows stronger inwardly as the pressure from without becomes harder. Yet the Japanese blindly refuse to see this.

10:65 In connection with the Sino-Japanese war, it is evident that Japan has to recruit her man power, not only at home, but abroad as well. Instructions were issued last year by the Tokyo government to all Japanese consuls abroad to conduct a census of all Japanese subjects everywhere. Under the guise of census taking, they were to recruit Japanese males who were subject to service in the Japanese army. Somehow American authorities in Washington learned of this and started an investigation. Upon inquiry, the Japanese consul in New York replied, "This is the routine official census of our subjects living in all foreign countries, as well as in Japan, compiled by our government every five years." In this connection, the consul unwittingly made the significant statement that the instructions issued from Tokyo had "no special reference to those born between February 2, 1920, and December 1, 1921, because these persons, under Japanese law, would be subject to service in Japan's army in 1941." It was an indirect admission that those born in America are subject to Japanese military service when they reach military age, and are to go back to their country for service voluntarily. This admission is directly contradictory to the statement which Japanese diplomats and propagandists had so constantly repeated, that Japanese born in America are not subject to Japanese military service. It is clear, then, that all the Japanese fishermen along the American coast and in Hawaiian and Philippine waters, who have surveyed and charted these waters, as well as those who are otherwise employed elsewhere in America, would attempt to go back to their country should Japan call them to contribute their unique services in the cause of empire building. They would be invaluable assets to the Nipponese militarists, especially should there be an attack upon the United States.

10:66 Alaska

American navy and aviation experts seem to agree that of all the strategic possessions of the United States in the Pacific covering the vast distance from Manila, Guam, and Hawaii, Alaska is, from the military standpoint, the most strategically situated. From there to the nearest Asiatic coast is only twenty-five miles. With sufficient equipment, the American forces there could easily check both Russian and Japanese bombing planes should they attempt to fly over American territory. Russia's attitude toward Japan remains highly uncertain, even though Foreign Minister Matsuoka succeeded in signing a pact with Russia on April 13, 1941. The interests of the two countries are too diametrically opposed for any agreement between them to have much substance. In any event, American fliers could sweep down upon the islands of Japan from this base much more quickly than from any other point.

10:67 The navy has ordered material costing $4,305,000 for the construction of air bases on Kodiak and Unalaska islands, which are United States territory the closest to Japan. Meanwhile, the United States navy has reinforced its land forces with infantry, artillery, and anti-aircraft troops in these bases. Hundreds of planes are being delivered there for defense purposes.

10:68 Australia

The Australians, in their lonely outpost of the British Empire, have had very little to do directly with Japan. To the Japanese expansionists this was an unbearable attitude. As one of the "have not" nations, suffering intensely because of lack of land for her surplus population, Japan regarded it as an injustice that such a vast continent as Australia, inhabited by a relatively small white population, should close its doors to Japanese immigrants. Japan long ago included all the South Sea islands in her military and naval blue prints. Her plan was to leave them alone, without raising questions as to their political status, until the Japanese navy was strong enough to control the Pacific; then all these problems would automatically be settled by the Japanese. That is what Baron Tanaka referred to in his memorial when he said, "The South Sea countries will surrender to us."

10:69 It is noteworthy that as early as August 18, 1940, Premier Robert G. Menzies, of the Commonwealth of Australia, announced the appointment of Sir John Greig Latham as Australia's first Minister to Japan. He expressed the hope that a Japanese Minister to Australia would arrive shortly, because "this exchange of diplomatic representatives was the culmination of a desire of both countries for more direct and intimate relationship."

10:70 This diplomatic gesture on the part of Australia at this juncture was by no means voluntary. It was due either to pressure from London or fear of Tokyo that the Commonwealth government changed its policy and slightly relaxed its immigration restrictions. Instead of saying "No" outright to the "friendly and neighborly" advances made by Nipponese diplomats, it was considered wise to let them in. That is how Japan forced a "white man's country" to open its doors while she is bolting down every possible door against the white man.

10:71 Nevertheless, Australia's opening of intercourse by the exchange of diplomatic representatives with Japan augurs ill. The situation of Australia is not altogether dissimilar to that of Korea in 1876, when Korea was induced to open her doors to commercial intercourse with her island neighbor. It is like the story of the camel, which, permitted to stick its head inside the tent, finally moved its whole body in and became the sole occupant. Japan is the sole ruler of Korea, although the Koreans still refuse to recognize her as such. It is hoped, however, the Australians will learn a lesson from the Koreans' experience.

10:72 Mexico

Mexico is one of the twenty-one republics of America which pledged at the Pan-American Conference in Havana to co-operate with the United States in protecting the Western hemisphere under the principles of the Monroe Doctrine.

10:73 In its policy of friendship and collaboration with the United States, the Mexican government has been enforcing a strict embargo on exports of war materials and foodstuffs to Japan. Secret agents of the Federal Attorney General's office have impounded thousands of tons of such items as oil, flour, molybdenum, scrap iron, mercury, antimony, and fibers, which were ready for shipment to Japan in various Mexican ports. Later, it was announced in Mexico City that this embargo would be lifted, "because the ban on the exports of war materials to Japan threatened to upset the nation's economy at this time." However, a government spokesman made it clear that if international developments make it necessary, "Mexico would co-operate with the United States and the other republics by officially proclaiming such an embargo against Japan."

10:74 Argentina

It will be remembered that when the twenty-one American republics were represented at the Havana Conference under the leadership of the Secretary of State of the United States of America, Argentina presented the first "discordant note" to the proposed hemisphere policy. About that time, Japan made special efforts to tie up, commercially at least, with some of the Central and South American republics in opposition to the United States. She had little success, except in Argentina and Uruguay. Whether or not this had any connection with the dissenting attitude of the Argentine delegates at the Pan-American Conference is hard to determine. At any rate, during the latter part of April, 1940, Japan concluded two treaties of trade and navigation, one with Argentina and the other with Uruguay. On May 5 of that year, both Tokyo and Buenos Aires announced the ratification of the pact. When the import license regulations published by the Argentine Government covering the operations of the treaty with Japan were disclosed, it was seen that there was much more discrimination against the United States in favor of Japan than originally had been supposed. In most cases, Japan received preferential treatment decidedly better than that accorded the United States. In the fifty classifications of import articles in which the United States was discriminated against, thirty-¬one classifications were items considered most important in United States trade with Argentina. The importation of these goods from America is now either embargoed entirely or highly restricted.

10:75 In the matter of textile goods, Japanese exports to Argentina were limited by quota, but American importation has been embargoed. Furthermore, since Japan has obtained the privilege of issuing import licenses, the United States has been singled out to the extent of "what amounts to a virtual black list," as observed by a well-¬informed commentator.

10:76 Uruguay

The Japan-Uruguay treaty, signed about the time the Japan¬-Argentina treaty was signed, contained nearly the same stipulations. There is, however, one exceptional proviso, which excludes the privileges granted by either of the contracting parties to its neighboring countries and also the privileges based on customs unions. While this treaty contained an "unconditional" most favored nation clause, the privileges enjoyed by the members of the customs union were not to be extended by either of the contracting parties to the other. By this proviso, Japan kept herself free to make any arrangement. In short, Japan's new commercial ties with independent states in the Western hemisphere at this time are ominous, to say the least.

10:77 It should be remembered that America's main artery of communication between its navy in two oceans is the Panama Canal. A large Japanese population in Brazil and some other South American countries may furnish some Trojan horses in time of stress. All they need is a connecting link, commercial or otherwise; hence these new "treaties of trade and navigation." America's hemispheric policy focusses its attention mainly on Nazi activities on this side of the Atlantic and may overlook the Japanese threat.

10:78 Tokyo and Berlin have repeatedly echoed and re-echoed their shouts for "a new world order," saying that if the United States recognized a Monroe Doctrine of Asia for Japan and a Monroe Doctrine of Europe for the Nazis, they would recognize the Monroe Doctrine of the Americas for the United States. To "recognize" now a doctrine that even they themselves had never challenged was of a piece with the crass ignorance of American history and American character which the dictators have displayed.

10:79 By this method, however, the Japanese hoped to be left alone in building their Asiatic empire. By dividing the West they hoped to conquer Asia now as the Germans are attempting to conquer Europe. It is an insane hope, we may say. But let us remember that all militarists are crazy when they are drunk with the glory of conquest. That is where the danger lies. Many people regret that we have allowed this insanity to go so far.

ⅩI. THE UNITED STATES NAVAL INCREASE

11:1 Theodore Roosevelt, as President of the United States, stated in 1905, in defense of the Japanese treaty rights against California anti-Japanese legislation, that "if we want to fight Japan, we must have the navy of the United States combined with that of Great Britain." It was an open acknowledgment that, since the United States navy was not strong enough, the United States must yield what Japan demanded. That was the time of President Roosevelt's famous phrase, "Speak softly but carry a big stick." Since that time, when the United States navy was not so strong as it is now, American statesmen have undergone many humiliating experiences. There was no awareness until Hitlerism awoke the nation to its peril. The people, ignorant of the world situation, self-satisfied and self-sufficient, would never tolerate any tendency toward an increase of the nation's war strength. Peace-loving citizens throughout the country, trusting Japanese diplomatic and propaganda assertions, saw no need of national preparedness. All this self-imposed American naval weakness of an earlier day served to amuse and gratify the proud militarists in Tokyo, for thus, they thought, they could hold the United States while they themselves rapidly forged ahead. The more successful they were, the haughtier and more menacing they became, and now and then boldly stated, "If Americans fail to respect the national susceptibilities of Japan, there will be 'grave consequences,'" and "If they do not desist from meddling in Far Eastern affairs, they will soon see the Rising Sun flag flying from the top of the Empire State Building," and the like. Americans who understood what it meant generally took it good-naturedly, while most of them, not knowing what it really meant, paid no attention.

11:2 There were a few American statesmen, far-sighted enough to be apprehensive of the growing danger in the Pacific, who tried to check it before it was too late. They observed, with some apprehension, that the alliance between Great Britain and Japan was still in force and that it might be productive of a delicate situation. Sentiment against the alliance was aroused among the British people and in Canada, too, and it was terminated by mutual consent at the Washington Arms Limitation Conference of 1921. It was succeeded by the Five-Power naval pact with the 5-5-3 building ratio. By scrapping some of its battleships and voluntarily setting a limit to its naval construction program, the United States set a self-denying example in the hope that others would follow. Japan followed only in words. Carrying on her own construction program under cover, she soon succeeded in approximating the strength of her rivals, and when her secret preparations for war reached their scheduled height in 1935, she threw of her mask and started another invasion of helpless China, in open defiance of the entire world and in violation of all treaties with other powers.

11:3 At a late hour, then, Americans learned to their sorrow that they might have prevented the present crisis if they had been more observant and less trusting in the days when Japan was beginning to design her pattern for tomorrow. More than any other incident, the Panay bombing thoroughly awakened the American nation to the fact that Japan will do anything as a means to an end.

11:4 At the same time, the Nazi threat, the western counterpart of Japan, emerged bigger and nearer to the Western hemisphere, while Nipponese expansion drew nearer to the Pacific side of the United States. The President's national defense program requiring huge naval appropriations met with little opposition. The mission of the United States is clear. The Open-Door principle in China must be maintained, treaty rights of Americans in the Orient must be protected, and Japan's dream of expansion in the Pacific must be limited. If the Japanese become convinced that the United States is both willing and able to carry out its policies, regardless of the consequences, this can be achieved without firing a single shot.

11:5 Despite the strict censorship enforced in Japan, the United States navy learned that Japan was constructing a powerful "hit-and-run" fleet capable of forty knots. In comparison, the heaviest cruisers in the United States navy were only 10,000-ton ships, armed with 8-inch guns. In addition, Japan was reported to have authorized construction of three dreadnoughts in the 46,000-ton class, five aircraft carriers, forty-three destroyers, eight light cruisers, and eight submarines. If this information were correct, Japan's fighting force would be tremendously more powerful than any American or British force. American and British naval experts agreed that these new Japanese ships would represent, perhaps, the most powerful offensive sea weapon in existence, and that, with their speed, they could scourge the shipping lanes of the world.

11:6 The United States and Great Britain requested Japan to furnish information about her secret building program. Japan refused to comply. The United States and Great Britain decided to compete with Japan in the naval race. Since Japan refused to keep any longer within the 5-5-3 ratio, and had started to build beyond that limit, the only course for America and Britain was to increase their own navies proportionately.

11:7 On April 2, 1938, the American and British governments simultaneously made public an announcement that they would build dreadnoughts greater than the 35,000-ton limit established at the London Conference of 1935. They revealed also that they based their decisions on the refusal by Japan to inform them whether or not she intended to build or was building dreadnoughts bigger than 35,000 tons. The British announcement concluded:

11:8

"In view of the refusal of the Japanese government, on being formally approached, to give assurances that these reports were ill founded, His Majesty's Government had no alternative but to regard them as substantially correct."

11:9 Senator David I. Walsh, chairman of the Senate Naval Affairs Committee, made public on April 3, 1940, the State Department's response to a Senate Naval Affairs Committee's request for a statement of policy for maintaining a fleet sixty per cent more powerful than that of Japan. The statement observed that "it is believed to be in the interest of security for us to adhere to the principle of 5-5-3 naval ratio," that "Japan refuses to give assurances she would comply with any restrictions in naval construction, and the United States must build accordingly." It was clearly set forth that the term "national defense only," which was inserted in the naval expansion bill, included defense of the homeland and outlying territories from invasion or aircraft attack, protection of citizens' legitimate business abroad, protection of commerce and the merchant marine to maintain the American standard of living. This was decidedly a change in the American naval policy, and came as a blow to Japan's secret plan to become the mistress of the Pacific. The military leaders of Japan had fully expected that peace-loving America would shrink into its shell of isolation. Now they were disappointed and perturbed.

11:10 Whenever the Japanese made a propaganda statement relating to some important international issue, they found, almost without fail, that the reaction in America was more or less satisfactory to them. It was perhaps nothing but a coincidence, but when such coincidences were repeated time and time again, it seemed rather strange. Notice the two following instances, for example:

11:11 (1) Naval conference. When the Japanese delegates withdrew from the London Naval Conference in December, 1935, the military leaders in Tokyo began to bluster toward the United States. On January 16, 1936, Vice Admiral Takahashi, commander of the battle fleet, said, "If the Japanese navy is called to fight the combined power of America and Great Britain, I am confident we will win, even if the ratio is 10 to 1." Rear Admiral Kiyoshi Noda, chief of the Japanese information bureau, said on January 20, "Japan still is ready to participate in a limitation conference, provided that she will be assured a policy on nonaggression, nonmenace, and a common upper limit with other world powers."

11:12 This was a deliberate attempt to mislead the American public to the belief that it was the American and not the Japanese government which had started the naval building race and that, therefore, the American people should urge their government to halt the construction program, regardless of whatever the Japanese might feel necessary to build. Comparatively few people in America knew, or even cared to know, that the Japanese in their efforts to outbuild the United States and Great Britain tried to wipe out the naval ratio 5-5-3 or 10-10-7, and when that failed, they broke loose from the naval conference of 1935. Noda, knowing this fact, deliberately made this appeal to the peace sentiment in America, and he was not disappointed. Letters and telegrams pressing the government to call an international conference for the reduction of armaments went out. The State Department found it necessary to explain the situation in its statement of policy, made public April 3, through Senator Walsh, that "the United States would welcome an agreement to reduce naval arms, but a world conference now would be untimely." This ended the naval reduction issue for the time being. Whenever the leaders in Tokyo could see any advantage in digging up this question again, the discussion on this topic would surely revive in America.

11:13 (2) The question of naval frontier. Japan has for years regarded the Pacific ocean as "Japan's lake" or "Japan's back yard." Her diplomats and propagandists have declared this openly and repeatedly. Each time Japan claimed her supremacy over it as if it were her own, Americans overlooked the claim. Since no one objected to their saying it, the Japanese kept on repeating it, until it gradually became a habit for them to look at it as such, with the tacit approval of the United States. Thus having established, according to the Japanese way of thinking, undisputed claim to mastery of the Pacific, all American activities in the Pacific were regarded as an encroachment upon Japan's sphere of influence. This was the reason that the Japanese raised strong objections whenever the question of naval maneuvers in Hawaiian waters, an air base at Manila, fortification of Guam, or some other such undertaking, was taken up in the United States. In their minds, all these actions were at Japanese sufferance. When Japanese naval strength reached a certain stage, they would stop. Was this not predicted by Baron Tanaka? Thus American complacency and tolerance allowed a molehill to grow into a mountain now impossible to remove without a clash.

11:14 It is noteworthy that an attempt was made in the United States Congress to establish a naval frontier between the United States and Japan. The idea was to draw an imaginary line somewhere across the Pacific, to be regarded as a boundary line between the two nations. The proposal shows there were some persons in Congress who still believed that the trouble among nations was due to lack of agreements. They seem to have forgotten that there had once been boundary lines between Japan and Korea, between Korea and Manchuria, and so on. To allow Japan to destroy the old lines one after another, and, as she advances, to keep on establishing new lines always nearer to American coasts would not be sound policy. The State Department blasted this idea by declaring in its statement of policy already quoted that "any efforts to establish a naval frontier would circumscribe activity of the navy behind an imaginary Japanese wall and expose American citizens to attack everywhere in the world."

11:15 This was a little too much for the Japanese to accept without objection. So long as American naval expansion was limited to the California coast, Japan would acquiesce, but this statement of policy has extended its scope. It included the Hawaiian Islands, the Philippines, and other American possessions in the Pacific. More than that, it was intended to protect United States nationals and their legitimate business abroad, which meant treaty rights of Americans in the Far East. The Japanese gathered that the United States did not intend to give up everything in the Orient or in the Pacific.

11:16 K. Noda, official spokesman of the Japanese navy, commenting at length upon the Japanese navy’s conception of the western Pacific situation, on April 7 declared:

11:17

"Formerly America regarded her defense area as near the coast line, but Secretary of State Hull's letter to Senator Walsh indicated America's defense line is advancing westward.... If American policy means sticking to the 5-5-3 naval ratio among Great Britain, the United States, and Japan, and opposing establishment of a definite naval frontier, we are watching with very grave concern."

11:18 Is it not clear, then, that the contention between the United States and Japan is over the mastery of the Pacific Ocean? It is up to the American people to decide whether they shall let Japan control the Pacific in order to maintain peace until Japan gets ready further to advance her expansion or insist, even at the risk of war, upon keeping the great ocean as an international highway.

11:19 When the Senate Naval Affairs Committee reported, April 18, 1940, on the naval expansion bill, urging prompt passage of the $1,156,546,000 program, Senator Gerald P. Nye condemned it as a "challenge to other nations to increase their shipbuilding." He said, "We are basing our plans on rumors or gossip of what the Japanese may be doing." Senator Walsh replied, "Every government has certain official staffs in foreign countries which supply it with information of foreign activities." Senator Nye responded, "Those who would profit by large shipbuilding activities may be eager to convince us other nations are doing certain things that will induce us to undertake large programs. If we do this, we are only throwing a challenge to other nations which have no intention of building large navies. Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg asserted that a navy within the terms of the Vinson-Trammel act "will be thoroughly adequate for our defense if we mind our own business and stay out of other people's wars?" Of course, this was just the attitude Japan wanted to create in this country. Because of the general awakening of public sentiment, however, the senators' statements could not halt the steady progress of naval development.

11:20 Former United States Ambassador to Canada J. H. R. Cromwell reported in a lecture at the University of Chicago that early in December, 1940, the Japanese Foreign Minister, Yosuke Matsuoka, said, in effect, that if Japan decided the United States was giving too much help to Britain, Japan might attack this country. Japan, in other words, notified the United States that if its foreign policies did not meet her approval, she would make war against the United States. At that time, the United States fleet was in Hawaii, the British completely controlled the Atlantic, the Mediterranean, and Singapore, and important allied forces blocked Japan in the south. Also hostile Russian aircraft and well equipped troops were stationed in the north, and determined Chinese armies faced hundreds of thousands of Japanese soldiers in the west. If Matsuoka did not hesitate to threaten the United States under such circumstances, what might be expected if all these deterrents were swept away, as they would be if the British were defeated and the United States fleet had to be moved to the Atlantic?

ⅩⅡ. JAPANESE PROPAGANDA SHOULD BE CHECKED

12:1 In the beginning of commercial intercourse between the East and the West, the general tendency among the rank and file of American people was to ridicule and discriminate against the Orientals. The Chinese were the first group of the Orientals to come to the United States. Children in the streets insulted them openly. Barber shops and restaurants refused to serve them. Books, magazine articles, newspaper stories, and public lectures were characterized by jokes at the expense of the Asiatics. Neither the government nor any of the civic societies paid any attention to this practice. The Chinese, having no alternative, took it as a matter of course.

12:2 Later the Chinese immigration laws barred them from entry into the United States. Then the Japanese came in in hordes, especially after the Sino-Japanese war of 1894, by which Japan won the admiration of the American people. This influx of immigrants soon resulted in anti-Japanese labor agitation on the Western coast and anti-Japanese legislation in California. The proud Japanese resented all this and sought to stop it by the following two methods:

12:3 The first was a retaliatory measure. One of the labor rioters who had taken part in one of the anti-Japanese mob gatherings near San Francisco was seized by a Japanese at a trolley car station and was stabbed to death. Two or three other cases more or less similar to this were reported in different sections of California almost simultaneously. Every Japanese attacker subsequently surrendered to the local police. Then appeared Japanese newspaper statements which said in substance, "The Japanese, having no way of redress, are forced to resort to direct action to avenge themselves. Any person or persons who would deliberately offer either an insult or injustice to a Japanese without cause shall meet with the same measure of punishment. The Japanese as a people would rather be feared and respected than patted and abused."

12:4 This story spread all over the country like wild fire, and created at once a shocking and startling effect throughout the country. Unconsciously a sense of fear, perhaps more mental than physical, gradually affected the consciousness of the American people, who began to regard the Japanese with a certain degree of respect. And that feeling of fear thus created was so deeply implanted that it still persists in some sections of the country, where one often hears it said that "to do or say anything hurtful to the Japanese is dangerous and unwise." This was the beginning of the Japanese conquest of American public opinion.

12:5 The second was the inauguration of the Japanese propaganda movement in America. It was reported in the American press in May, 1940, that Japan spends at least $5,000,000 a year in this country for propaganda, according to a United States Intelligence Official's estimate. Practically every large city has one or more Japanese propagandists, it was said. This activity was openly inaugurated nearly thirty-five years ago with an annual appropriation of not less than $1,000,000. This appropriation has fluctuated from time to time, in proportion to the gravity of the situation. How the money has been spent or how the executive work has been carried on are known only to those in the inner circle. But the result could not escape the attention of close observers. All the Japanese agencies, wherever they were, were controlled from Tokyo. Whatever was said, orally or in writing, had to come from the same source, and the uniformity of the idea embodied or information disseminated was most effective. The charm of the people, the beauty of the country, the silk kimonos, cherry blossoms, and the ancient culture, which "excelled" Western civilization, were fascinating themes for newspaper and magazine articles.

12:6 All this, together with prepared statements, or news dispatches or interviews made public by Japanese diplomats, visiting admirals, viscounts, tourists, and good-will parties, coming out almost every day in many newspapers throughout the country, was bound to produce the desired effect. One very important objective was to win over the most influential person or persons in every organization in America. And anyone whom the Japanese could not win over would be branded as "anti-Japanese" and, when he went to the Orient, would be so inhospitably treated that he would refrain from saying anything unfavorable to Japan. Of course, everybody considered to be a friend of the Japanese would be treated royally, with entertainments, and some persons would receive decorations. Everyone who had means to travel would expect to visit the Orient some day, and he would not want to be considered an enemy of the Japanese. And on top of all this, most of the big concerns in America had business connections in Japan and would not do or say anything that would displease the Japanese.

12:7 During the early stage of the publicity organizations, it was a common practice, if a newspaper came out with any article derogatory to Japan or the Japanese, to have many letters addressed to the editor and also many telephone calls criticizing and condemning him for publishing such an "anti-Japanese" story. This method taught the editor such a lesson that he would refuse to print anything, true or false, which might annoy the Japanese or their friends. At the same time, anything that would flatter the Japanese occupied the front page or a prominent place. Through this process, the Japanese gradually succeeded in creating a peculiar psychology in America, so that any anti-Japanese sentiment was generally tabooed, except among labor groups. Anyone who was branded as an anti-Japanese was regarded as a fanatic or as badly informed. Yet when Japanese propagandists or their paid agents publicly made humiliating jokes at the expense of the American people, their government, or policy, most Americans seemed to enjoy it immensely, and few there were who showed resentment. Freedom of speech and a spirit of tolerance are two of the great democratic principles of America, and the Japanese took full advantage of them. But how far a democratic nation can permit a militaristic neighbor to come and conquer domestic public opinion is a question which the American people must consider quite seriously.

12:8 So long as the American policy ran parallel with that of Japan, as it did during the early part of President Theodore Roosevelt's administration, the Japanese propaganda agencies had no difficulty with the American government. If the two nations followed opposite directions, these agencies worked for the interest of Tokyo against that of the American people. Most naturally, they would line up with the political party, antagonistic to the administration in power, and also with any other elements that would help undermine the policy of the President or the Secretary of State. Even today they keep in touch with the military and civilian officers in Japan and check up exactly the changing pulse of the nation. Tokyo issues instructions and these agencies carry them out. Through the daily newspapers, public addresses, and quiet whispering campaigns, they attempt to swing public opinion whichever way they desire. And on many an occasion, these subversive activities have forced the administration and the Secretary of State unconsciously to alter their policy.

12:9 Some of the stories illustrating how Japan succeeded in winning the support of the American people during the establishment of a puppet government and ultimate annexation of Korea (1910) will give an idea of how Japan tried to win American support in her China campaign.

12:10 Professor Ladd of Yale was invited by Prince Ito to visit Korea and write a book, With Marquis Ito in Korea[13]. When he returned to America, he lectured extensively in the interest of the Japanese regime in Korea. However, the book was so obviously pro-Japanese that Ito himself became disgusted with it and remarked that the author had overdone it, and the book has no propaganda value.

12:11 George Kennan was sent to Korea as a special correspondent for The Outlook magazine, of which Dr. Lyman Abbott was the editor and President Theodore Roosevelt was a corresponding editor. Kennan did his job thoroughly. He wrote a series of articles describing how corrupt and helpless the Korean government was and how beneficial it would be to the Korean people to be under the rule of Japan.

12:12 During the Japanese invasion of Manchuria, George Sokolsky wrote article after article for a New York paper, replete with stinging remarks on China, and advocating every move Japan was making in her invasion. The purpose was, apparently, not only to hurt China, the victim of military conquest, but also to combat the Far Eastern policy of Secretary of State Henry Stimson. Many influential Americans, deeply exasperated, wrote letters to the editor of that paper, but to no avail. There was no possible interpretation for this, except that the American press in those days still believed that it was the way to serve America best.

12:13 Even during the present Sino-Japanese conflict, it is generally believed that American sentiment is ninety or ninety-five per cent for China. To all appearances, every newspaper throughout the country is more or less against Japan. If this is really so, why is it that Japan gets ammunition from America with which to crush China, while China secures comparatively very little support to carry out her defensive war?

12:14 The United States is the only nation that has no national propaganda machinery of its own. Every other nation has such machinery, and seems to be benefited by it. All the totalitarian countries have their agencies in this country, and leave no stone unturned in trying to get what they want. And, generally, they get it at the expense of the United States

12:15 It is high time for the American patriotic societies to start a nation-wide propaganda machinery, independent of political creeds or religious faiths, to counteract all the un-American and subversive propaganda influences. If the United States is to face all these odds, it is up to the patriotic citizens to exert their concerted efforts to protect its interests, institutions, and principles in time of peace as well as in time of war.

12:16 There are many periodicals in America that are American in name only. Japan spends millions of dollars annually in this country for the purpose of misleading the American public. Unless every true American journalist makes it his patriotic duty to guide public opinion in the right direction and to fight the sinister alien influence of falsification, the United States will be greatly handicapped in establishing a just and lasting peace.

12:17 Recently some of the leading newspapers began to show a tendency not to publish any Japanese articles that bore the marks of propaganda, without comment or explanation of them. For instance, the Washington Star on May 4, 1941, printed an article by Felix Morley, who suggested a careful study of Tokyo's proposal to negotiate peace on a basis that would leave Japan supreme in Asia, the Axis powers master of Europe and Africa, and relegate the United States to the position of a third-rate power. The editor of the Washington Star said in a note: "The Star does not accept Mr. Morley's thesis or share his conclusions. And it should be pointed out that 'a negotiated peace' even approximating the terms of the Japanese proposals would be tantamount to capitulation not only by England but by the United States, and a clear-cut victory for the Axis powers."

12:18 Such an analysis should be made of every newspaper article or dispatch emanating from Japanese or pro-Japanese sources. For, without such guidance, most of the news readers would blindly follow the course cleverly mapped out by the war lords in Tokyo. Uncensored news from Japan or the Japanese-occupied regions is almost impossible. Any correspondence passed by the Japanese censors most likely contains in it something sugar-coated which Japan wants the American people to swallow. Therefore, it should not be permitted to reach the news-reading public without exposing the poison concealed therein.