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Yoon’s Vision for South Korea as a Global Pivotal State: Is There Anything to It? > Articles |








Yoon’s Vision for South Korea as a Global Pivotal State: Is There Anything to It?
By John Nilsson-Wright












IN FEBRUARY 2022, Yoon Suk-yeol, then the candidate of the conservative People Power Party (PPP) for president of South Korea, called for a new foreign policy of “clarity and boldness” in an article in Foreign Affairs. He accused the liberal government of President Moon Jae-in of “timidity” and telegraphed his intention to transform South Korea into “a global pivotal state” that would place freedom, values and the support of international rules at the heart of its diplomacy.1 This new approach would involve strengthening alliance co-operation with the United States; enhancing trilateral ties among Washington, Seoul and Tokyo; a more critical stance toward China; and, replacing the Moon administration’s focus on North-South engagement with a priority toward North Korea of deterrence and defense policy.












Following Yoon’s inauguration in May 2022, his foreign-policy critique of the Moon administration became more pronounced. Writing in the Washington Quarterly in late 2022, Yoon’s deputy national security adviser, Tae-hyo Kim, accused the outgoing government of being in thrall to rigidly doctrinaire and overly ideological left-wing, pro-North Korean policymakers — the so-called 586 generation (those born in the 1960s, who went to university in the 1980s and are now in their 50s). Kim accused past left-wing administrations — not just Moon’s but those of Kim Dae-jung (1998-2002) and Roh Moo-hyun (2003-07) — of undermining ties with the US, placing too much stress on balancing between China and the US, being overly critical of Japan, placing ideology ahead of pragmatism and practicing appeasement toward both Pyongyang and Beijing.2












In December 2022, the Yoon administration unveiled its long-awaited new “Strategy for a Free, Peaceful and Prosperous Indo-Pacific Region.” The 44-page document appeared at first to make good on the claims of boldness and clarity that Yoon had foreshadowed earlier and on the need for pragmatism underscored in Kim’s article. The document trumpeted South Korea’s stance as an open-trading nation interested in future-oriented partnerships based on inclusivity, with both a regional and global focus. The three key principles of inclusivity, reciprocity and trust would be at the heart of the government’s foreign policy. The document noted that the new administration would “work with every partner that is aligned with our vision and principles of co-operation.”3
















To give substance to this ambitious approach, the document noted nine core areas where the government would concentrate its policy efforts: building regional order; promoting the rule of law and human rights; strengthening non-proliferation and counter-terrorism efforts; expanding comprehensive security; building economic security networks; boosting co-operation in science and technology, especially in the digital domain; leading regional co-operation on climate change and energy security; fostering tailored development co-operation; and promoting mutual understanding through people-to-people exchanges.












GLOBAL CHALLENGES AND FEARS OF A US RETREAT
















At first glance, the case for a fresh foreign-policy approach appears straightforward. The world is in the grip of geopolitical and geo-economic changes that are a source of great uncertainty. Ideological rivalry, particularly the division of the world into authoritarian and democratic states, looks to be growing. China under Xi Jinping embraces a revitalized form of Marxist-Leninist dialectical materialism that prompts visions of inevitable conflict with its democratic rivals.4 Russia under Vladimir Putin nurtures historical grievances, nostalgia and myth-laden notions of past greatness to justify a viciously aggressive policy of territorial revanchism. The energy shortages arising from the war in Ukraine, the persistent threat of climate change, the declining capacity of states hamstrung by populist politics to co-operate multilaterally, and the retreat into economic nationalism threatening to spark protectionism and undermine Bretton Woods-based free trade are all major sources of uncertainty.












Looming ominously in the background is the concern felt by many elites in East Asia and Europe that the US can no longer be counted on to play its traditional hegemonic role as the “indispensable superpower.”5 The transactional approach of the former Donald Trump administration has prompted fear that a future US Republican president, whether Trump or an equally nationalist figure (for example, Ron DeSantis), might embrace a renewed “America First” policy that could undermine longstanding US security and political commitments to East Asia. With more states in the region, most notably Japan, stepping forward as “tier 1 states,” in Mike Green’s words,6 and wanting to address instability, it is pertinent to ask if South Korea has the capacity to act in a manner that is proportionate, targeted and can realize its new ambition to be a global pivotal state.












DIPLOMATIC BOLDNESS
















Speaking at the 77th United Nations General Assembly last September, President Yoon talked powerfully about the need for “solidarity and unity in safeguarding freedom and pushing our civilization forward.” He also made clear that South Korea was “committed to playing its due responsibility and role for the freedom of global citizens and prosperity of the global community.”7 In putting some flesh on the bones of this commitment, Yoon itemized the country’s success in combatting Covid-19 and its willingness to fund global health initiatives, contribute to combatting climate change, foster development and share digital technology with developing countries. Conspicuously absent from his remarks was any reference to North Korea or the challenges posed by a more assertive China.












A sympathetic reading of Yoon’s avoidance of some more familiar security issues might point to the UN as a venue for addressing broader themes. Moreover, bilaterally, such as in his meeting early in his presidency with US President Joe Biden in May 2022, Yoon was happy to focus, among other things, on the security threat from North Korea, human rights issues and the challenges posed by the war in Ukraine. Even on the sensitive issue of Taiwan, an area that South Korean presidents have tended to treat with caution, Yoon and Biden were fairly explicit, noting "... the importance of preserving peace and stability in the Taiwan strait as an essential and important element in security and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region.”8
















Yoon also has made good on his plans to strengthen US-South Korea-Japan trilateralism. There have been, in the last few months, a flurry of trilateral meetings between senior defense, foreign policy and intelligence figures from the three countries, most recently in February in Washington, when US Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman met with the vice foreign ministers of Japan and South Korea. Last September saw the third meeting of the Extended Deterrence Strategy and Consultation Group (EDSCG), an important vehicle for providing reassurance to South Korea that Washington and Seoul will remain closely coordinated in deterring provocations from North Korea.












If further confirmation were needed of the improved dialogue among the three countries, one need only look at the co-operative statement issued by President Biden, President Yoon and Japanese Prime Minister Kishida Fumio at the ASEAN summit on Nov. 13, 2022 in Phnom Penh.9 Bilaterally, Japan and South Korea have also moved closer together, in part by facilitating high-level visits by senior officials, including most notably a visit to Seoul by former Japanese Prime Minister Taro Aso in November 2022.10 This trip, by a politician not noted for his sensitivity and diplomatic finesse on contentious historical issues, may have proven crucial in paving the way for a breakthrough on a sensitive dispute over forced colonial and wartime-era labor. On March 6, the Yoon administration announced a new plan to provide private sector compensation, funded initially by South Korean companies, for South Korean plaintiffs seeking redress for Japan’s colonial use of slave labor.11












SECURITY ASSERTIVENESS
















The Yoon administration has also sought to deliver on its promise of enhanced security by promoting military partnerships. The South Korean navy participated in trilateral anti-submarine exercises with its US and Japanese counterparts in September 2022; in November, a South Korean combat ship participated in the Japanese Fleet Review for the first time in seven years;12 also in November, the South Korean and US air forces participated in joint exercises involving 240 aircraft, entitled Vigilant Storm, and intended to guard against North Korean threat.13 Nor is the military dimension limited to East Asia. On Feb. 13, South Korea and NATO officials met in Seoul for their first direct military consultative discussions exploring the options for enhanced security collaboration on the Korean Peninsula.14 The meeting will be followed by a similar meeting next year in Brussels and can be viewed as the natural extension of Yoon’s attendance at the NATO annual summit in Madrid on June 29, 2022.












Some of South Korea’s enhanced security activism is driven by the growing belligerence of North Korea, not only its massive increase in missile launches over the course of 2022-23 (more than 95 launches in 2022 alone), but also its aggressive nuclear brinkmanship, its claims (as yet unsubstantiated) of having acquired tactical nuclear weapons and warnings that it would consider first use of nuclear weapons against potential conventional armed threats from its neighbors.15












In the face of this threat, Yoon in early January hinted in unscripted remarks that South Korea might need to acquire its own independent nuclear deterrent or request the redeployment of US nuclear-armed forces on the Korean Peninsula, last deployed in South Korea before 1991. This remarkably frank departure from past policy, enshrined in the 1992 North-South Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, reflects a growing nuclear populism in South Korea, on both the left and right, with over 70 percent of South Koreans expressing support for an independent nuclear deterrent.16 It may also reflect growing South Korean public resentment towards China in the face of Beijing’s coercive diplomatic and economic tactics following the deployment of US Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) anti-aircraft batteries to South Korea in 2017.












There seems little reason to question the activism and energy underpinning Yoon’s foreign policy. However, it is debatable whether this pragmatism is really new or especially innovative. Past South Korean presidents on the left and right have long stressed the novelty and creativity of their foreign-policy approaches. In fact, the one-term limit on the presidency guarantees that all new presidents will strive to roll out a new set of distinctive policies from day one.












FALSE IDEOLOGICAL DIVIDE
















Moreover, the claim that the left-right divisions in South Korean politics translate into a rigid ideological dichotomy, as Kim Tae-hyo argues, is simply not supported by the historical record. It was Park Geun-hye, a conservative president and the daughter of the former dictator Park Chung-hee, who talked of a “strategic partnership” with China and travelled to Beijing in 2015 to attend the public celebrations marking the 70th anniversary of the end of World War Two.17 Similarly, the progressive President Roh Moo-hyun, in an effort to bolster ties with the US, dispatched South Korean military personnel to Iraq in 2003 as peacekeepers to support the US-led war against Saddam Hussein. South Korea’s long history of multilateral engagement and support for international norms is well-documented, and as recently as 2021, under the Moon presidency, South Korea was an enthusiastic participant in the G7 summit in Cornwall — further evidence that global South Korea has been a leitmotif of both progressive and conservative administrations.












EXCESSIVE PARTISANSHIP
















There is arguably a danger in over-emphasizing the contrasts between left and right in foreign policy — a fetishizing of small differences that stem from the highly polarized nature of domestic politics in South Korea. Prior to being elected, Yoon served as the country’s prosecutor general, and some see in him a prosecutorial mindset that fuels a relentless, if not vindictive, tendency to use the full apparatus of the law to target political opponents. This creates a near-pathological tendency to view politics in zero-sum terms and to delegitimize one’s political opponents, a not uncommon occurrence on both sides of the political aisle in South Korea.18 It also raises important questions about how much policy bandwidth the government, including the president himself, may have for the complexities of foreign policy when so much energy is devoted to partisan point scoring.












With the left-leaning Democratic Party commanding a majority in the National Assembly, the Yoon administration is likely to face difficulties translating policies into law and may encounter strident opposition to some of its signature policy innovations, particularly on contentious issues such as historical tensions with Japan. The party’s leader, Lee Jae-myung, has already criticized the government for “humiliating” the South Korean victims of Japanese colonial domination.19












WHEN IS A PIVOT NOT A PIVOT?
















The historian Paul Kennedy, as long ago as 1996, talked about the relevance of “pivotal states” in international politics but his allusion was to countries that had disproportionate influence in particular regions.20 Under Yoon, South Korea is embracing a global role, but in this larger context it is harder to visualize how the metaphor and the concept more generally might work. Where is the axis or fulcrum or pivot around which South Korea will translate its political, economic and diplomatic resources into meaningful outcomes at the global level? Where is the costing and commitment of financial resources to the ambitious, nine core issues listed in Yoon’s Indo-Pacific strategy — an approach that shares much with the New Southern Policy of the last administration and the attempt to enhance South Korea’s ties with Southeast Asia?












So far, there is limited evidence that either the Moon or Yoon administrations has had much impact in winning friends and influencing people within the region. South Korea’s approach to Southeast Asia is not insignificant, but it is often highly bilaterally focused (particularly toward Vietnam, the country’s third-largest trading partner) and has not yet boosted the country’s image or reputation as a major regional partner.21 Moreover, when it comes to engaging with local actors with problematic human rights records, such as Myanmar, it is still unclear how far Seoul is prepared with its promise to “work with every partner that is aligned with our vision and principles of co-operation.” When South Korea’s corporate and human rights interests are at odds, there is a distinct possibility that corporate concerns will win out.












LIMITS TO TRUST AND THE PERSISTENCE OF HEDGING
















More generally, the core principles of inclusivity, reciprocity and trust may prove difficult for the Yoon administration to realize fully when policy aspirations encounter the challenge of deciding what to do in practice. In economic policy, corporate South Korea has been opposed to elements of the US Inflation Reduction Act, particularly as it relates to batteries and electric vehicles. These measures have been attacked by some South Korean officials as a “betrayal” that risks poisoning other aspects of the US-South Korea bilateral relationship and the Yoon administration has been actively lobbying governments in Europe to find ways of combatting the Biden administration’s trade protectionism.22
















Even on China policy, the South Korean government continues to hedge in a manner that echoes the “dual alignment” strategy of the previous government. Given the premium placed on inclusivity, China is, perhaps unsurprisingly, not criticized in the Indo-Pacific strategy, in contrast to the approach of other countries such as the US, Japan and Canada, which have been far more explicit in identifying China as a “strategic challenge.”23 The Yoon administration is actively hoping to revitalize trilateral coordination among China, Japan and South Korea, making deliberate use of the trilateral secretariat based in Seoul. Strikingly, during the visit to Seoul and the region of then US House of Representatives Speaker Nancy Pelosi last August, Yoon chose not to meet with her, a decision that seemed motivated by a desire to avoid antagonizing Beijing after she visited Taiwan.












Even when it comes to today’s most immediate security challenge — the war in Ukraine — South Korea’s response has been ambivalent. On the one hand, it has been quick to back international sanctions against Moscow, but it has been unwilling to give military support to Kyiv directly, preferring instead to funnel aid indirectly by sending howitzers and tanks to neighboring Poland so that the Warsaw can pass the arms on to Ukrainian forces.24 This caution appears consistent with the relatively muted public and political response to President Volodymyr Zelensky’s online address to the National Assembly and reports that some in Seoul prefer to maintain a degree of equidistance between Russia and Ukraine.25












Tensions and limitations in translating policy ambition into workable foreign policy outcomes are also likely to be exacerbated by the absence of a tightly organized and regularized national security decision-making process (comparable to the National Security Council mechanisms in countries such as the US or Japan). This breeds a reliance on short-lived, ad hoc “special committees” and the dominance of personal advisers (often former academics) to the president, often eclipsing a relatively uninfluential foreign policy bureaucracy.26
















The Yoon administration should be commended for its ambition and willingness to set out a comprehensive vision of desirable policy goals, and for its appetite to engage with the global community at multiple levels. But there is perhaps a more urgent need for the government to provide clarity and concrete policy priorities and less boldness. Too much preoccupation with crafting a distinctive message may undermine the government’s ability to deliver meaningfully over the long term and in a manner that will be sustainable across future administrations.












This article is based on a presentation and related discussion made at the East-West Center in Washington, DC, on Feb. 13, 2023. Funding for the research behind the paper was provided by the Korea Foundation and the Taejae Academy.




Notes








1 Yoon Suk-yeol, “South Korea Needs to Step Up,” Foreign Affairs, Feb. 8, 2022, www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/south-korea/2022-02-08/south-korea-needs-step
2 Tae-Hyo Kim & Bernard Rowan, 2022, “The Rise and Fall of South Korea’s 586 Generation: Implications for the US Alliance,” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 45 No. 2, pp.23-38, doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2022.2090759
3 “Strategy for a Free, Prosperous and Peaceful Indo-Pacific Region,” Government of the Republic of Korea, December 2022, www.mofa.go.kr/eng/brd/m_5676/view.do?seq=322133
4 See Kevin Rudd, “The Return of Red China: Xi Jinping brings back Marxism,” Foreign Affairs, Nov. 9, 2022, www.foreignaffairs.com/china/return-red-china
5 Hiroyuki Akita, “Why the world needs Indo-Pacific Charter,” Nikkei Asia, Feb. 11, 2023, asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Comment/Why-the-world-needs-Indo-Pacific-Charter
6 Mike Green, “The Real China Hands: What Washington can learn from its Asian Allies,” Foreign Affairs, Nov. 1, 2022, www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/real-china-hands-what-us-can-learn-from-asian-allies
7 “President Yoon Suk Yeol, Keynote Speech at the 77th UN General Assembly,” Government of the Republic of Korea, Sept. 21, 2022, overseas.mofa.go.kr/eng/brd/m_5674/view.do?seq=320741
8 “United States-Republic of Korea Leaders’ Joint Statement,” The White House, May 21, 2022, www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/05/21/united-states-republic-of-korea-leaders-joint-statement/
9 “Yoon announces summit with Biden, Kishida in Cambodia,” Joongang Daily, Nov. 10, 2022, koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/ 2022/11/10/national/politics/Korea-United-States-Japan/ 20221110155642901.html
10 Mari Yamaguchi, “Japanese ex-PM Aso to visit South Korea to improve ties,” AP News, Nov. 2, 2022.
11 Gabriele Ninvaggi and Jesse Johnson, “South Korea announces plan to resolve wartime labour dispute with Japan,” The Japan Times, March 6, 2023, www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2023/03/06/national/politics-diplomacy/south-korea-japan-wartime-labor-agreement/
12 “S. Korea takes part in Japanese fleet review for first time in 7 years,” Hankyoreh, Nov. 7, 2022, english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_international/1066090.html
13 Nick Giurleo, “US and South Korea to begin Vigilant Storm air exercises,” Foreign Brief, Oct. 31, 2022.
14 Ji Da-gyum, “South Korea, NATO carve out path to step up military cooperation,” The Korea Herald, March 13, 2022, asianews.network/south-korea-nato-carve-out-path-to-step-up-military-cooperation/
15 Hyun-Binn Cho & Ariel Petrovics, 2022, “North Korea’s Strategically Ambiguous Nuclear Posture,” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 45 No. 2, pp.39-58, doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2022.2091874
16 Stephen Herzog & Lauren Sukin, “The Dueling Nuclear Nightmare Behind the South Korea President’s Alarming Comments,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Jan. 25, 2023, carnegieendowment.org/2023/01/25/dueling-nuclear-nightmares-behind-south-korean-president-s-alarming-comments-pub-88879
17 Scott Snyder, “Why did Park Geun-hye mark the end of World War II in Beijing?” Forbes, Sept. 2, 2015, www.forbes.com/sites/scottasnyder/2015/09/02/why-did-park-geun-hye-mark-the-end-of-world-war-ii-in-beijing/?sh=53a5ae782d71
18 John Nilsson-Wright, “Contested Politics in South Korea: Democratic Evolution, National Identity and Political Partnership,” Chatham House Research Paper, July 28, 2022, www.chathamhouse.org/2022/07/contested-politics-south-korea
19 “DP’s Lee accuses Yoon administration of humiliating forced labor victims,” Joongang Daily, March 2, 2023, koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/2023/03/02/national/politics/lee-jaemyung-yoon-suk-yeol-wartime-labor/20230302094834562.html
20 Robert Chase, Emily Hill, Paul Kennedy, “Pivotal States and US Strategy,” Foreign Affairs, Jan/Feb 1996, www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/algeria/1996-01-01/pivotal-states-and-us-strategy
21 Andrew Yeo and Kuyoun Chung, “A relational approach to Indo-Pacific strategies: South Korea’s role in a networked regional architecture,” Asian Politics and Policy, Vol. 15, No. 1 (2023), pp.5-20, doi.org/10.1111/aspp.12678
22 Troy Stangarone, “Inflation Reduction Act roils South Korea-US relations,” The Diplomat, Sept. 20, 2022, thediplomat.com/2022/ 09/inflation-reduction-act-roils-south-korea-us-relations/
23 Jagannath Panda and Choong Yong Ahn, “South Korea’s Indo-Pacific Strategy: Quest for Clarity and Global Leadership,” The Diplomat, Jan. 16, 2023, thediplomat.com/2023/01/ south-koreas-indo-pacific-strategy-quest-for-clarity-and- global-leadership/
24 Josh Smith and Joyce Lee, “Seoul approved Poland’s export of howitzers with South Korean parts to Ukraine,” Reuters, March 8, 2023, www.reuters.com/world/seoul-approved-polands-export-howitzers-with-skorean-parts-ukraine-official-says-2023-03-08/
25 Anthony V. Rinna, “The Russia-South Korea Relationship after Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine and Implications for the US-ROK alliance,” Asia Policy, Vol. 18, No. 1, January 2023, pp.95-113.26 Jeffrey Robertson, “Future Proof? Korea’s Indo-Pacific Strategy and Presidential Initiative Longevity,” Korea Economic Institute, Jan. 9, 2023, keia.org/the-peninsula/future-proof-koreas-indo-pacific-strategy-and-presidential-initiative-longevity/