Beyond the Two-State Solution, Executive Summary

 Beyond the Two-State Solution

Executive Summary

It is now commonly acknowledged that the two-state solution is physically impossible to implement. The premise of the Two States Solution (two-state solution) was that the 1967 War provided an opportunity for a pragmatic compromise between the Zionist movement in the State of Israel, and the Palestinian national movement with its Arab allies. This could be achieved in a strategic "land for peace" formula whereby the state of Israel would withdraw from the lands it recently occupied, in return for peace and normalization. Additional elements were sometimes mentioned such as: sharing East Jerusalem, a Palestinian Right of Return to the new Palestinian state, as well as security arrangements such as the demilitarization of the State of Palestine. Clearly, Jewish settlements would run counter to this proposed compromise.

Now, in 2020, the extent, depth, and longevity of the occupation has created new facts on the ground, notably the colonization of the West Bank with roughly 700,000 settlers, with their entire legal, administrative, political, transportation, security and economic infrastructure. The changes are so profound that they render the proposed compromise (two-state solution) no longer possible, even if Israel and the Palestinians were fully committed to it. The recent announcement of the Trump Plan, as well as steps towards annexation of portions of the West Bank further make this compromise no longer a viable possibility.

But if that is the case, what is the alternative? What is the endgame for those on both sides, as well as their supporters outside and the international community itself? Some out-of-the box thinking is required: a new strategy by which we may pursue peace, justice, some measure of stability, and an end to the conflict. Such new thinking would require a radical reformulation of the language, assumptions, and orientation of people on all sides. How to achieve it is a totally different question.

Why Two-State Solution Thinking Persists

But before we approach this Herculean task, we must understand why two-state solution thinking persists and continues to dominate the discussion, even in the face of a current reality, that thoughtful analysts agree is no longer viable. There are a number of reasons why that must be understood, since they constitute a serious hurdle to any new and innovative thinking.

1. The compromise was eminently reasonable at the time it was suggested. It reflected both the balance of power at the time, and the majority interests of both protagonists. It was vehemently condemned by sizable populations on both sides, but slowly gained majority support, and became the official platform of both communities. It did not require the repudiation or radical rethinking of any of the ideologies involved, but merely limited the application of such ideologies to geographic portions of the contested land.

2. International law supported the two-state solution in that it prohibited the acquisition of land through armed conflict. It proclaimed the status of the territories in question to be "occupied" under the law of belligerent occupation. Even the Israeli High Court supported this legal classification and does so to this day. This was also reflected in numerous pronouncements of the UN Security Council and was affirmed unanimously by the International Court of Justice in the case of the Wall, 15 - 0. The single dissenting judge in that case agreed with the rest of the judges on the matter of the status of the occupied territories and the applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention to them.

3. This is the position of all the countries of the world, including the United States, and was reaffirmed by the Saudi Initiative, which promised full normalization with all the Arab and Moslem countries in return for full Israeli withdrawal from lands occupied in 1967.

4. The alternative to the two-state solution, some form of a one-state solution (one person-one vote), was viewed by many as a repudiation of Zionism, a rejection and a call for the destruction of the concept of a Jewish state. In the minds of many, this was akin to calling for expulsion of Jews from Palestine, and possibly a second Holocaust. The prospect was so unthinkable that in many venues no serious discussion of a one-state solution was even tolerated.

5. Ending the occupation. Pro-Palestinian activists (and their Arab and international supporters) gradually changed their goal from the "liberation of Palestine" to "ending the occupation." This was a slogan and program acceptable to many international activists, who cared about peace and justice, but who were reluctant to take positions that were perceived as anti-Israeli. The presence of a sizable 'peace movement' inside Israel that claimed to support the two-state solution contributed to this.

6. Deception. It is possible that many in the consecutive Israeli governments since 1967 never believed in the two-state solution and were deceiving the world, as well as their own public, by claiming they supported a two-state solution while working hard to undermine it at every level.

7. The fly in the ointment of the two-state solution was the settler project, and the settlers themselves. This project introduced hundreds of thousands of Jewish settlers into the occupied territories, while still claiming the privileges of Israeli citizenship for them. This directly contradicted the entire logic of the proposed compromise. In effect it championed Zionist dominion over all the contested area of Palestine. Each additional settler, or confiscation of a dunam for settlements, or creation of structures, including roads, courts, laws, regulations, called into serious question the claims of Israeli governments concerning their support of a two-state solution. Rather, their actions reaffirmed Zionist claims to all of Palestine for the Jewish people. Therefore, a genuine support of two-state solution required opposition to the settlement enterprise.

8. The two-state solution has become a mirage which permits the status quo of settlement expansion to continue. Failure to achieve the two-state solution could be blamed on the absence of effective Palestinian leadership, lack of unity among Palestinians, or lack of sufficient outside pressure. Modifications to the two-state solution are proposed, such as designation of "settlement blocks," exchange of territories, and endless negotiations. Meanwhile Israeli Zionist control of the occupied territories continues to thrive and expand.

Even the Oslo Process and the creation of the Palestinian Authority did not change this formula. Inertia is a powerful force. It is no wonder that deceptive Israeli politicians, and even AIPAC itself, would claim to support the two-state solution while effectively ensuring it will never be implemented.

New Thinking is Necessary

To think out of the box regarding a future for Israeli Jews and their supporters, and for Palestinian Arabs and their supporters, we must start by acknowledging that the ideologies of the two protagonists are basically incompatible: One ideology wanted to have a Jewish state in the land (whether by divine right, or historical connection, or existential need) which serves the interest of all Jews worldwide, and is dedicated exclusively to their interests. This necessarily requires the elimination, subjugation, and repression of the indigenous non-Jewish population. On the other hand, a different ideology insists on an Arab Palestine as part of the Arab world, treats all Jews- other than the original Palestinian Jews as foreign invaders with no rights and connection to the Land. Such an ideology logically requires the elimination or forced expulsion of most Israelis as recent immigrants, and a denial of the Jewish religious and cultural aspirations and requirements.

New thinking, beyond the two-state solution, would require each group to sufficiently empathize with and understand the hopes, fears, interests, and aspirations of the other group.

It would lead each group to sufficiently moderate/alter, and otherwise change its own ideology to accommodate the other group rather than vanquish and dominate it and deny it any legitimacy.

To achieve this outcome, we need to ask Zionists, What is it that you really want? What are your rock bottom needs, and can those needs be accommodated in Palestine/Israel without thoroughly negating the interests and reality of the Palestinians?" We also need to ask the Palestinians, "What is it that you really want? What are your rock bottom needs, and can these needs be accomplished in a state where you are not dominant, and where Israeli Jews are roughly equal in number to the Palestinian Arabs?*

Implicit in both questions is a belief that while an electoral democracy requires one-person one-vote, a state that belongs to more than one major ethnic/religious group cannot afford to ignore the other. It must find a formula that accommodates all of them and contains sufficient iron-clad legal and institutional guarantees that protects each group, particularly the minority against the caprice of the majority. This is especially true where historic differences and recent enmities shape present realities. New structures must be created, and iron-clad guarantees must be firmly established in constitutions and laws that cannot be altered or overtured by numerical majorities, or that require a supermajority of more than one house of representatives, so as to prevent them from being derailed by the group which has a numerical majority.

In our situation, the system requires in addition to internal legal and other controls- high level of international support, guarantees, and legitimacy in light of the extensive interest of and involvement of significant outside actors. Specifically, the religious importance of the Land to all three monotheistic religions, and particularly Jerusalem, gives the international community a significant stake. It is of interest to ensure the governance of the whole country in a manner that guarantees open access to it, and non-exclusive control over its destiny. Jewish or Moslem claims of exclusivity cannot be tolerated. Thank God, since the times of the Crusaders, Christians have ceased to make such exclusive religious claims.

For a solution to commend itself to people of goodwill on both sides, and significant third parties as well, it must address the major needs of each community. These needs should be identified by each side as bottom line irreducible requirements, as opposed to desired or demanded outcomes. These needs must be met and addressed by the new order regardless of whether either group is in the numeric majority or minority now or in the future. We suggest possible bottom line irreducible requirements may be similar to the following nine points.

Essential Elements of the New Order

1. Right of Return. Jews have insisted on a Right of Return to Israel as a fundamental right for any and every Jew throughout the world, particularly if they feel persecuted or endangered for their Jewishness. As it stands now, this right is not qualified by the need to show persecution or fear of a tangible threat. The institutions of the State actively promote aliyah and incentivize Jews to come to Palestine. The availability of this right is a serious requirement for Zionists which Palestinians must accept. On the other hand, Palestinians, who have been forcibly denied access to their homeland, also must have a recognized right of return (awdah).

2. Equality and Non-discrimination. The State of Israel has failed in law and in practice to provide even to its own Arab citizens full and true equality. Palestinians will require the new state which is likely to continue in the foreseeable future to be dominated by Jews for a number of reasons to strictly abide by the principle of equality in the public sphere.

Public institutions, lands, funds, and resources must be utilized in the interest of all citizens, and discrimination must not be tolerated. Arabic, which is currently formally recognized as an official language in Israel, will need to be deliberately incorporated into public life, on a par with Hebrew. While it was a Zionist need to promote Hebrew in Israel, and indeed to revive it after centuries of non-use, there can be no excuse for the deliberate downgrading of Arabic. Currently, Arabic signs, where they exist even in the West Bank appear to be deliberately misspelt, and it is easier to find government documents in Amharic (the language of the recent Ethiopian immigrants) than in Arabic.

3. Freedom of Movement. Freedom of movement within the new state must be guaranteed. Restrictions of travel between the West Bank, Gaza, the settlements, Jerusalem and pre-'67 Israel must be removed, as well as the Wall and the checkpoints. Discretionary restrictions on travel within as well as to and from the new state must be removed.

4. Relations with the Arab world. Israeli Jews feel a great connection to diaspora Jews and obtain a lot of support from them, and advocate that such Jews have a stake in Israel as well as a responsibility for it. Similarly, Palestinian Arabs feel they are an integral part of the Arab world and get-or at least expect-support from them. The new state will have to deal with both these inclinations. In this sense, Palestinians need to reevaluate their pan-Arab identity, and adjust it to reflect the reality that their state now is both Jewish and Arab to its very core.

-

5. Defense. For a number of reasons, primarily the trauma of the Holocaust and the bitter experience of anti-Jewish antisemitism in the West, Israelis have a heightened sensitivity to control of the army. The new State may require that the Minister of Defense, as well as a majority of the top brass in the army be Jewish as a matter of permanent constitutional law. Palestinians, however, must be free to join the army on the basis of equality, while all citizens who wish, must be free to demand exemption from military service for reasons of conscience.

6. Legal Protections. In addition to a constitution that embodies strict guarantees that safeguard the interest of either group, the "Protection Clauses" must be safeguarded from alteration by requiring that they can only be altered by high majorities. It must also be cleared by a super majority (four out of five) of a special constitutional court where each group has at least two representatives. In other significant ministries and public bodies, quotas must dictate the minimum number of representatives at the highest level, while all other positions are filled on a merit, and non-discriminatory basis. In government ministries, the deputy for each Ministry must belong to the other major group. In this manner the fear that a high-level public servant who belongs to one group will be oppressive to those in the minority group will be eliminated. This and other similar "Protection Clauses" will remove the 'demographic threat' and ensure that a group which has numerical majority will not be able to oppress a numerical minority, or that a future change in the numerical balance between the two communities will not make the minority vulnerable to oppression by the majority.

7. Ministry of Cooperation and Coexistence. Out of a recognition that the security of citizens is a vital interest of the country, and in appreciation for the past experience of both peoples, the country shall invest at least 10% of its defense budget into deliberate activities by a governmental ministry of tolerance. This ministry will promote understanding of the history, culture and language of each community by the other. It will also promote joint activities and programs intended to heal the hurts of the past and build understanding and tolerance between the two communities.

7. 협력상생부. 국민의 안전이 국가의 중대한 이익임을 인식하고 양국 국민의 과거 경험을 고려하여 국가는 국방예산의 최소 10%를 정부 관용부의 의도적인 활동에 투자해야 합니다. 이 사역은 각 공동체의 역사, 문화, 언어에 대한 이해를 촉진할 것입니다. 또한 과거의 상처를 치유하고 두 공동체 간의 이해와 관용을 구축하기 위한 공동 활동과 프로그램을 추진할 것입니다.

8. Civil Law. While personal status matters are currently handled by the religious courts of the different communities, new civil laws must be promulgated that will ensure the rights of secular individuals, mixed couples, and religious communities that are not currently recognized. These include Reform and Conservative Jews, as well as Evangelicals. Without derogation from the existing rights of religious courts, individuals who choose not to be so governed should be allowed to follow their conscience and not be forced to submit to religious courts of their particular religious community. This system could be a model for other nations in the Middle East which are currently governed by the Ottoman Millet System.

9. Name, Character, Public Holidays, Symbols and Flag. Careful thought and creativity with input from both sides are required to have these elements of national identity reflect the desires of both communities without exclusivity or discrimination against the others.

FINALLY, CONCRETE STEPS must be jointly undertaken by each community to advance the possibility of realizing this vision. These steps can be initiated now, and do not require prior commitment to a specific outcome nor do they preclude any particular ideology. They require a rethinking of the positions of settlers and Hamas as partners in the peace process, as well as joint activities towards ending the most outrageous forms of oppression. Ultimately, they require rethinking Zionism and Palestinian nationalism altogether.

-