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Matthew B. Ridgway
The Korean War: How We Met the Challenge: How All-Out Asian War Was Averted: Why MacArthur Was Dismissed: Why Today's War Objectives Must Be limit Hardcover
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In December 1950 General Matthew B. Ridgway replaced General Walton Walker as commander of the Eighth Army, and in April 1951 he succeeded Douglas MacArthur as supreme commander of the United Nations forces in Korea and supreme commander of the United States Far East Command. In this spirited book, General Ridgway describes how he took a dispirited army and rebuilt it in a few short months, leading it into battle against the Chinese and North Korean forces, forcing them back over the 38th parallel and victory. It is a book that takes a close look at MacArthur, his failings and brilliance, and a hard look at the idea of limited war. Infused with a humane leaders appreciation for the ordinary fighting soldier, Ridgways history also teaches important lessons about Vietnam and any future conflict. Above all, he emphasizes: We should not involve ourselves in escalating warfare without a specific and attainable goal.
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Adolf Carlson
4.0 out of 5 stars A Study in High Level LeadershipReviewed in the United States on 25 April 2011
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I am a retired US Army colonel. During my time on active duty, I was an instructor and department chair at the US Army War College. During that time we used incidents from the Korean War for the purpose of historical case study. So I believe I can comment on this book with some authority.
At the outset, however, I must confess that I am biased toward the author. I believe that Matthew B. Ridgway was the greatest general between Eisenhower and Abrams. I say that because he overcame what I believe is the greatest challenge that any commander could possibly face: taking command of a beaten, demoralized army and leading it to victory. In holding this opinion, I find myself in distinguished company. No less a luminary as General Omar Bradley described Ridgway's work turning the tide of the Korean War as "the greatest feat of personal leadership in the history of the Army."
Ridgway's battlefield achievements are well documented and need no embellishment here. What I find even more interesting is his contribution to the art of high-level joint and multinational command. Matthew B. Ridgway is the only man I know of to have commanded three of the unified commands created as a result of the National Security Act of 1947: the Caribbean Command, the Far East Command, and the European Command. He was single-handedly the man who made the Allied military command structure work during the Cold War, first on the battlefields of Korea and then in Europe. He re-oriented America's strategic thinking to deal with the new kind of threat posed by the Soviet Union and communist China, and contributed materially to the implementation of the resulting strategy. That is an unmatched record of achievement.
His book on the Korean War is a personal history. Those looking for detailed tactical or operational studies will have to look elsewhere. But the book is well worth reading to appreciate the character that was required to turn the Korean War around in the dark days following Chinese intervention. The best parts of the book deal with that.
Ridgway's solutions to the problems he faced were first and foremost practical. When he assumed command of the EIGHTH Army there were no bombastic speeches; no self-promoting public appearances; no laying of blame on his predecessor, his subordinates, or his superior. Ridgway called his corps commanders together and as a team they identified the problems and worked out solutions. For the most part, these solutions were just good soldiering - better use of the terrain, more disciplined movements, more attention to intelligence analysis. But in two ways Ridgway did more than improve procedure - he installed a new collective ethos in the entire EIGHTH Army. He made sure that everyone knew that the Army was going to attack the enemy, not run from him. And he made sure everyone knew what he was fighting for. Ridgway believed that one of the main reasons for poor morale was the fact that the soldiers did not understand this new form of war. So he issued a simply worded circular explaining in straightforward language what was at stake and why it was worth every person's sacrifice. The results were impressive.
Ridgway's voice in this book assures the reader on every page that he is sharing the thoughts of a man of character - of self-discipline, loyalty, selfless service, modesty, and the willingness to accept responsibility and admit mistakes - which Ridgway himself said is the "bedrock on which the whole edifice of leadership rests." His language is direct and lucid, suggesting that he was a man both cultivated and rugged. It is a good American book.
Another point I found interesting was Ridgway's discussion of African-American soldiers. Contrary to popular belief, President Truman did not desegregate the Army with a stroke of his pen in 1948. Many `all-black' units deployed to Korea. Ridgway is the man who desegregated them, and as one would expect, he did it for both practical reasons - desegregation facilitated a more efficient use of military manpower - and for moral reasons - it was the right thing to do. He did not do it overnight, but rather in a methodical sequence, battalion by battalion, making sure that military discipline never suffered. [Representative Charles Rangel's 503rd Field Artillery Battalion, for example, was an `all-black' unit well into 1951.] In the early days of the Korean War there was a lot of controversy over the alleged poor performance of all-black units like the 24th Infantry Regiment. After Ridgway's tour in command there was no more controversy because there were no more segregated units. Each soldier stood on an equal footing regardless of color.
Ridgway is very mild in his criticism of the poor battlefield decisions and misjudgments made before his arrival in theater, even though those decisions and misjudgments were the proximate cause of the appalling situation he inherited. His most critical comments are directed toward the employment of X Corps in the summer and fall of 1950, but even here his criticism is nothing compared to what can be found in other sources. He is rather more harsh in his criticism of the EIGHTH Army's chain of command, from van Fleet on down, in their reaction to the prisoner of war riots on the island of Koje-do in early 1952. Overall, however, he is fair and even-handed in his treatment of all of his subordinates.
His most serious criticism is reserved for MacArthur, who died three years before this book was written.
Ridgway takes MacArthur to task for one thing and one thing only - insubordination. He very carefully recounts his respect and professional relationship with MacArthur, which began when MacArthur was superintendent of the Military Academy and Ridgway was Director of Athletics. He consciously does not second-guess any of MacArthur's operational decisions, even though some of them were disastrous. He demolishes the criticisms of the most vociferous MacArthur detractors - especially the ones that portrayed the great general as a war monger. All those make Ridgway's real critique of MacArthur more persuasive and more worthy of the reader's consideration. Ridgway argues that MacArthur's sin was in thinking that any theater commander, regardless of how well renowned and esteemed, could set strategic policy for the United States as a whole. MacArthur's public pronouncements that the President did not appreciate the true value of Asia in the nation's overall strategy undercut the President's overall authority, and that is what could not be tolerated.
The book's conclusions regarding the place of the Korean War in the larger context of the Cold War are well written and well reasoned. Ridgway certainly has the credibility to reject conclusively the "no- substitute-for-victory" school of strategy and his thoughts on the use of the military as one of the nation's instruments of power in a large, global struggle, with nuclear annihilation as a potential outcome, are worth considering.
The jacket blurbs on the back cover of the book promise a `shocking' commentary on the Vietnam War, which was in full swing when the book was written. The truth of the matter is they are not so shocking and, considering how good the rest of the book is, rather disappointing. Ridgway criticizes the effort in Vietnam as not being directed toward any "concrete and pragmatic political objectives" that "conform to our vital national interests." There is nothing new or shocking in any of that. But by innuendo, he levels a more serious charge, using a quotation from President Eisenhower's MANDATE FOR CHANGE that suggested that the loss of Vietnam would mean the "loss of valuable deposits of tin and prodigious supplies of rubber and rice." In Ridgway's defense, the year 1967, the year the book was written, was the so-called "Year of the Big Battles" in Vietnam, when General Westmoreland was waging the war pretty much as an American show with the South Vietnamese military sidelined. So if one were prone to distrust American motives in the war, 1967 would probably be the year of greatest suspicion. But I still find that to take that quote out of context to insinuate the American effort in Vietnam was a case of neo-imperialism goes too far and does Ridgway no credit.
Some editorial comments:
The book has a lot of pictures, but they are not good quality. I suspect that in the original hard-cover edition they were better.
The book has a map section, but the maps are of the `broad arrow' variety. Supplementing this book with the WEST POINT ATLAS or the OFFICIAL US ARMY HISTORY OF THE KOREAN WAR would be a good idea for the serious military reader.
Overall, I am glad I read this book.
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Auditor
3.0 out of 5 stars A view from the top with two major digressionsReviewed in the United States on 21 August 2022
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General Ridgway choppered in to our sector of the MLR (Front line) once during my tour. OK, Marines don't snicker, but he should have left that orange hand grenade at home. That fake hand grenade had no validity anywhere.
Theatrics aside, General Ridgway and his successor in Korea, General Van Fleet, accomplished an amazing restoration of US/UN forces after China's surprise attack sent them into a disorganized retreat from the Manchurian border. Seemingly defeated US/UN troops soon resumed the offensive and controlled the military situation in Korea, until the final ceasefire.
The General’s book presents an overview of military action during his four months in command of US/UN military operations in Korea and an overview of the remaining 27 months of the war from his Tokyo HQ. The on-the-ground, "blood and guts" experiences of those who took the incoming, moved forward under fire, etc. are not in these pages. Two aspects of the General's views depart significantly from Government records and testimony.
Although General Ridgway saw no serious ammunition shortages, reports from those on the firing line and sworn testimony in Washington tell otherwise. The U.S. entered the Korean War with enough WW2 "'war surplus" ammunition to supply the first two years of combat in Korea, Somehow, a two year head start for ammo production was not enough!
The 1st Marine Division, then blocking the invasion route to Seoul, reported critical shortages of hand grenades, 81 mm mortar rounds and artillery ammo rationing that "Allowed the enemy to show himself almost at will without receiving fire."*
General Reeder of G4 logistics admitted troops were being rationed artillery ammunition. Congress' heard flimsy excuses. A steel strike was blamed, (that strike lasted six weeks). Media called it a "heavy caliber cover-up". The Senate Armed Services Subcommittee found needless loss of American lives because of ammo shortages. Democratic Senator Byrd blamed the President, but further investigation pointed to then Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall, who stated he was acting on estimates he made before Communist China entered the war, (China attacked only four months after the war began.). While the situation defied reason, it echoed General Marshall's performance a few years earlier when he blocked ammo and weapons, promised to America’s WW2 ally China by Presidents Roosevelt and Truman. Thus, in two wars, Americans or their allies ran out of ammo and died at the hands of Mao Zedong’s communists, while the U.S. was actually over stocked with ammunition?
In another departure from records, author Ridgway outdoes himself in his dedication to the above mentioned George C. Marshall. He declares Marshall’s “…achievements have been surpassed only by…George Washington". This is off the wall. General Marshall won no battles, (He fought none.) He was a desk soldier and a skilled collector of accolades. Marshall enjoys a "Foundation" that presents him as a leading WW2 strategist. Ridiculous, he failed to attend the meeting that decided major U.S. Pacific strategy.
Marshall was Chief of Staff of U.S. Army Ground Forces, responsible for training, equipping those forces. He did not command the U.S. Army Air Force. When his Army units first faced the Germans in Tunisia, they were routed. The victor, German General Rommel commented that he'd "never seen troops so inept." The defeated U.S. Commander, Eisenhower, sacked his second in command,(a Marshall favorite) and brought in a British Army training program. At the next encounter, General Rommel was both impressed and defeated.
General Marshall equipped his Army with machine guns that fired at 1/3 the rate of German machine guns and with lightly armored, under-gunned, flammable tanks. (Troops named them "Ronsons", (a then popular cigarette lighter). While war weary, British and German combat units were rotated to the rear for replacement, refitting and rest, Americans remained in combat operations until they were wounded or killed. Green replacements were inserted piecemeal. Overall, the U.S. Army relied on blood, guts and combat leadership. They enjoyed air support when weather allowed.
The deferred investigation of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor attack found Marshall responsible for failing to keep his Army people, the Pearl defenders, aware of the immediate Japanese threat. As the war ended, Marshall had worn out his image with FDR and the British. However, Marshall had taken time to impress a small town, freshman Senator from Missouri. When FDR died, Harry Truman, after only months in Washington rose to the Presidency of the United States and George C. Marshall was propelled to new heights when the new President gushed that Marshall was the "Greatest living American". Now, Ridgway raises Marshall over all Americans living and dead, except for The Father Of Our Country? (General Marshall did propose and approve the WW2 promotions that advanced General Ridgway’s career).
* Ref.- USMC Operations in West Korea, Vol. V, p. 193
Recommended further reading:
:
Abandoning an Ally- Fitzgerald, James- Amazon.com - The story of China's betrayal to Communism and the resulting Korean War, Includes the first exposure of long-suppressed Government Documents. Fitzgerald, a Korean War vet, tells the hidden story of the era President Eisenhower described as "Harrowing decades that partly poisoned our national life".
U.S. Dept. of State- Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS)- The Far East and China-1946, 1947&1948- Exposes history’s deadliest betrayal and the lead up to the Korean War.
Wedemeyer Reports- (Head of U.S. military in Asia) - General Albert C Wedemeyer
Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung- Vols. 1-5, Mao Zedong - exposes the real Mao, Much of it was “selectively” overlooked in U.S. published history of that era.
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pat
5.0 out of 5 stars this was a good way to find out where I was - back thenReviewed in the United States on 1 July 2010
Verified Purchase
After the 23rd RCT got out of Chip Yong ni, Gen Ridgway stopped his jeep, got out & asked several of us walking down the road if we were from the 23rd; yes we said & then he thanked us for holding on till the 52nd tank bat. could break the trap & relieve us - (we were surounded for three weeks - Feb 51). It knocked me out out to think a Gen would do this , so I didnt say anything, but a few of the others thanked him for stopping. Ever since, when I think of that damned place(it stunk, & the temp hit 20 below) I sure wish I had responded to his nice gesture. Mac would never in a million years done this. I've looked at maps in the library to find out where Heartbreak & the Punchbowl were, but this execellent book provided the answer. Once started reading, I couldn't put it down. Great book. Ridge was a good man, & a damned good Gen. May he rest in peace. pfc jscanlan
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Stephen
5.0 out of 5 stars The Korean War - RidgwayReviewed in the United States on 18 January 2016
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A good addition to a Korean war study. It helps to read directly from the operational and later combatant commander. Nothing I can add other than his personal comments on how he and later Van Fleet fought the war. I guess the real thing to remember his confidence, the training of US and ROK forces, and his political activity that led turn from the absolute defeat to acceptable outcome: from MacArthur's commitment to Unification, probably not achievable in the political environment, in China and the US, to stalemate and a show of commitment written in treasure and blood. What puzzles me is the difference in leadership. Both Walker and Ridgway were successful WWII commanders. Was Ridgway that much better or where circumstances that much better when he came on, or both?
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lavicats
4.0 out of 5 stars From the horse's mouthReviewed in the United States on 10 December 2013
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Ridgeway's writing gives an accurate account of the Korean conflict without hyperbole. Even as the book was published two years after MacArthur's death, Ridgeway maintains a very respectful account of MacArthur's 'genius'. This is not a page turner, but it does provide a first hand look at the challenges of this war. It is curious after what was learned in this conflict why the US pursued more of the same in Vietnam.
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Rated 5 stars
Full StarFull StarFull StarFull StarFull StarRidgeway has his say on Korea
By Thriftbooks.com User, August 18, 2002
One of the finest books written on The Korean Conflict by a man who ought to know as much as anyone about combat and Korea. As a personal hero of mine in WWII he took over an army totally unfit to fight and win against the new enemy, the Chinese. How he turned this sorry situation around is spelled out in many other books. The General simply tells his story about how he helped to make the 8th Army combat effective again. As far as I'm concerned South Korea is the nation it is today partially because of him. This book pulls few punches and the truth rings clear to anyone who has worn our nation's uniform in battle. Read Less
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Rated 5 stars
Full StarFull StarFull StarFull StarFull StarRidgway and Limited War
By Thriftbooks.com User, May 18, 2001
Matthew Ridgway is a fairly unknown general in US military history. This is unfortunate because he was incredibly insightful and capable. In fact, he was probably the United States' best general of the Cold War. _The Korean War_ is an account of his experiences commanding first the Eighth US Army and then the entire United Nations Command against the Communists. He entered the war at a time of catastrophic defeat. The... Read Full Review
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Rated 5 stars
Full StarFull StarFull StarFull StarFull StarExcellent book for a military perspective of the Korean War
By Thriftbooks.com User, November 10, 1999
General Matthew Ridgway commanded the U.S. Eight Army in Korea from December 1950 until April 1951 when he succeeded General Douglas MacArthur as Supreme Commander of the United Nations forces in Korea and Supreme Commander of the U.S. Far East Command. The Korean War is his personal account of the military and political aspects of the conflict and his view of the implications the Korean conflict would have on future U.S. foreign policy. Ridgway does a fine job of explaining the impetus for U.S. involvement in a war on the Korean peninsula, a war in which America was incredibly unprepared and downright disinterested. Ridgway's analysis of the U.S. failure to anticipate the invasion is insightful. The U.S. believed the next war would be another global conflict similar to World War II in which Korea would play very little importance. Ridgway states that the U.S. was not concerned with Korea mainly because it was beyond the traditional U.S. defensive perimeter that would be protected against the next global conflagration. Furthermore, Ridgway points out that the U.S. had faith in the United Nations to forestall any serious aggression and, in the event of a failure, the U.S. felt confident in the power of its nuclear deterrence. Ridgway claims confidence in these factors left America believing in a psychological Maginot line in Korea. Little fault can be found with Ridgway's analysis of the North Korea's invasion of South Korea and subsequent unprepared U.S. entry into the Korean War. Ridgway states "diplomacy is only as strong as the military muscle willing to be put forth." The amount of military muscle put forth is driven by the resolve of the American populace and with Korea there was little. Had the U.S. demonstrated or even indicated a resolve to protect the South Korea, the invasion probably could have been averted. Ridgway dedicates much time to the civil-military dispute between General MacArthur and President Truman during which MacArthur was eventually relieved and replaced by Ridgway. Ridgway claims that the outcome of this dispute settled once and for all the debate over military versus civilian supremacy when determining the course of U.S. policy. From the beginning of the Korean War, MacArthur had his sights set on a victory that was not the limited to South Korean liberation but included to global destruction of Communism. President Truman on the other hand was mindful of the politics at home and abroad and did not support MacArthur's calls for the isolation and destruction of China and all of Communism. Truman knew what MacArthur refused to recognize -- that America would not rise to fight World War III as it did to fight World War II. Additionally, Truman was very aware that the new dynamics of the Cold War and of nuclear proliferation were changing the face of warfare and bringing to light a new concept of conflict, limited war. Ridgway does a superb job of analyzing the conflict betwee Read Less
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Rated 5 stars
Full StarFull StarFull StarFull StarFull StarThe commander tells how he saw the war in Korea
By Thriftbooks.com User, September 8, 1999
Matthew Ridgway was arguably the finest general officer to serve in United States forces in the 20th Century. Whether one agrees with this ranking or not, no one can dispute that he performed a feat of leadership unmatched by any senior general in American military history - he took an American army that had suffered the greatest defeat in its history and rebuilt it through the force of his personality and gifts of leadership and turned it around and had it successfully on the offensive in only one month. Had he done nothing else, his fame would be unmatched, yet he additionally kept the United States out of the Indochina morass that ten years later would be Vietnam - when there were no Ridgways to warn of the dangers of commitment there. Read Less
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