WERE WASHINGTON'S CABLES READ AS A GREEN LIGHT FOR TilE 1980 KOREAN MASSACRE? T SHOBRUCK 1996

The-Nation-Dec-9-1996.pdf

WERE WASHINGTON'S CABLES READ AS A GREEN LIGHT FOR TilE 1980 KOREAN MASSACRE?

Debacle in Kwangju

TIlL SHOBRUCK

Few incidents have rc'1ed so starkly the contradiction between US. seanity te5ls and human rights os the decision to release South Korean Iroin under U.S. command k suppms the Kwangju uprising of 190. The move was taken with MI knowledge that the rebellion was thggcred by the massacw of him-dreds of pmtct4crs by black beret Special Forces dispatched by military strongman Chun Oco Hwan after he ended a brief democratic spring by declaring martial law. That U.S. decision was made by President Jimmy Caner on the coumtl ofWarrcn Chris-lopher, now the departing Sccrdary of Statc but then Deputy Secretary, and the Assistant Secretary of Sure for East Asia. Richard Holtrooke, who is being touted as apossibk replacement tbr (luistopher 10 Bill Clinton's new C8bU1VL.

In Seoul. where Kwangju has come to s)mbolize the birth of South Koreas modem liberation movement and the nadir of its miliiaiigk pm the incident has been put to rest. On August S. a Korean court convicted Chun of treason and murder for his takeover and role in the Kwangju nwsaerc. and later sentenced him to death. But them has been no such accounting hero. where Christopher and Holbroo4cc. who "as President Clintons chief negotiatoron Bosnia. reface to accept any U.S. responsibility for what happened in Kwangju.

This is an obvious tragedy for the indhiduais involved, and

it obviously an internal mailer for the people of the Republic

of Korea. said Nicholas Ruins, chrhlophc's chief spokesman. after the verdicts from Seouls "trial of the century' way an-nomced this summer. 'Kwangju was an explosively dangerous situation, the outcome was tragic, but the long-tam results for Kocca we democracy and economic stabilitC said Iloibrooke whet, I questioned him recently aboui his policies in Kowa.

Tht SJonocX an imwsrigadve reporzr w*o cow', tn,de and tatr A-suesfor The JOUTmI orCoinncp.t. sn,, £4' ni pan .v,dsowk &o,to a4 ha been iwiNng about Korcan affuirs for many winy A foncr

•trüon .jthzf story 7*at thchide.v fall qsuzu11osfrm 1hx d1asc4fic1 doctwwnts os, Kwan&n. can hefrnrd an the Intenset at Korea 1$b5 H&klv MispJMnwtconvkorraQt-&ing/u3.hn.).  "The idea that we would actively conspire with the Korean gcr.ds in a niascrt of udcnts is. fianMy, hiiarrc; it's obsccne and couiger to evny political value s'e aniculatcd$ When the Caner Mminktration heard Chun was scnding Special Forces to Kwangju, "we made cvay cifort Ia stop wiur 'ns happeraine IloIbrooke said.

But documents I recently obtained tSc the 1rcdotn ofinformationAci show that the Caner Administntions oomplkity with Qurn ran much deeper than simply approving a military opera-Sn to zctake KwarI& According to the newly declassified doc-umait,. which include hundreds of top-secret Stale Department and ljefase Tntdligaice Aencv cables. on May 9. 1980. the Ad-minim.ñon gavv prior approval to Chin to use military forec to cxuckdo'.sn on cudcnt and labor uw1; ('bun declared mania! law on May 17.The cables also show that US. officials; knew as far back as Fcbruay 1980 that Chun uw mobikdng Special Wkifut Command troops. tamed to fight behind the lines in a vrapin North Korea in bis1pion of dissent in Kwangja

The documents (which I Mw also described in The .Mun,ai of Comment and the Korean press) directly contradict a 1989 White Paper on Kwangju prepared by the Btmh MmMi'ctntion. It concluded that -jU.S. officials were alarmed by report, of plans to use military units to back up the police in drtmg with student danosnlions" and 'had neither authority over nor prior knowledge of the movemeni of the Special Warfare Command units to Kwungju?'

The most important F.O.I.A. documents describe scad

com-

marmcafions between William (ikysteen. the U.S. Amba&cador to South Korea from 1978 to 1981. and the team assembled in No ti.bcr 1979 by Secretary of State Cyrus \4mce In monitor the crisis that cruptod in South Korea after President Park Cbtmg live was shot to death by the head oIthc Korean C.I.A. In Washing-toa Vanoc, team was headed by Holbrooke. whom Givysteen called the "ehiefappantchik of Caner's Korea policy. Other key players were Chrislopher and Donald Gregg.the former C.I.A. station chief in Seoul who was head of A3ian intelligence under Zbigniew BrzczMts National Security Council.

On May 9. 1980, the cables shout Glenleen met with Chin

20 The Nation, flccemkr9, 1996

at the request of Hoibruoke and Christopher to di., bow to

handle nationwide student demonstrations. The protests were organized after (bun, who shot his way to control of the mill-tmy on December 12, 1979. appointed himself head of the )Z.CI.A. inApril 19saAithougb Chun and Gleysteen bad clasbed frcqutiv over human riabts. this time they agreed on a common p011ey.

'lnnonc of ourdiscacsions will we in any say suggest that the (U.S. govcnuncntj opposes (Republic of Korea goveznment) con-thigcncy pbut to maintain law and order, if absolutely nawcc,iy, by reinforcing the police with the 3rmy. (ileysteen cabled WaS irsgtoo. '11 I were tosuggma any complaint on thisscorc I believe we would lose all our friends within the civilian and military leadership." Within twenty-four hours, a cable signed by Christopher went out to (fleysteci. saying. "We agree that we should not Oppose R.O.K. [government] contingency plan?' but urging him to remind the Koreans ofthe dangcrofcscalation if law enforce-mnt respoosibil irks are not carried out with care and resutnC

United States military cables add another crucial piece of e'idcnce. On May 8, the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agate reported to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that Korean Special Forces were on nationwide alert and noted that the 71b Special Forces Brigade—which was responsible for the worst brutalities in Kwaogju \'as probably targeted against unrest" at Kwangju univcmitics. The cable coed that the Special Forces had been receiving extensivc n-s;,,4 inSt control" (ineludingthc use, of CS gas, considered by some military specialists to be a (cnn of chemical warfare) and had been "ready and willing to break heads" in the riots that shook the port ety of Pusan a week before Park was killed.

Hoibrooke was scornful when I asked about those document. 'I\t read them andthey're being completely taken mu of context by people who don't know, what was said on the telephone," be said. "llyou think you have a smoking sun, go out and have tim with it," A senior Stale Department official had a similar rcac-dot "When all the dust settles. Koreans killed Koreans, and the Americans didn't know what ,as going on and certainly didn't approve it,"be said. Although a US. general ld—,nd still has—operational control owr 80 percent of the Korean military, the United Sales "has no moral responsibility" for what happened in Kwangju. be added. In a narrow sense, the claim is partly true: There is no evidence that the United States approved, or  had control over, the vicious attack on Kwangju by the Korean Special Forces. But as IloIbrooke has tried to prove in Bosnia. you don't have Cu pull the trigger to be responsible for a crime.

Ibe events of 1980 wem the logical result of a coven U.S. policy. hatched in the days after Park's assassination, to pxcve the rcmnants of Parfl military-industial security stale and pressure Korean opposition groups 10 moderate vtat U.S. officials believed were "extremist" demands for a complete break with Koreals dictatorial past. In classic cold war fashion. the Carter Administration tried to ercaic a third force of Park holdo'tr friendly gaaali and malleable politicians as an a!-ternativc to the militan' hard-liners around Gum and opposition leaders like Kim flat Jung. who was deeply hated by the Korean military and (as Glcystecn noted in his cables) would be blocked from taking power even if he was elected president.

Part, a key U.S. military ally; was assassinated at a critical point in Cancrs presidency. Just weeks before, Iranian radicals ?LadSC1ZCd*C US. Embassy inTchcnn, aummiatic event tlt wwt followed in December by the Soviet invasion ofAfgharaistan. At the first word of Park's assassination. Carter sent an aircraft carrier to Korean wrcn and bluntly warned North Korea it would face attack if it intervened in the south (Pyongyang nevr made a move). But tensions quickly erupted between the Korean military and the opposition, which continued to push for the complete dismantling of Park's bated dictatorial system, known as Vushin. The continuing unrest caused panic within the Carter Adminisiratk.n.

In the late fall of 1979. the documents show: Holbruoke proposed a '*licate operation' in Seoul lesigned to u5 American influenoc to reduce the chances of confrontation, and to make clear Co the generalf that the Carter Administration s "in fact trying to be helpful to them peoidcd they in ttrn can)' out their commitments to 11tcr3hnb0o.111e overriding coocern in Washington, 1-lolbrooke explainaL was to keep South Korea from turning into 'another ban," meaning any 'action which ouId in any way appear to uninvoct a situation and lead to chaos or instability in a key American ally.

Holbrookc's -delicate operation- was panty succful: under pressure from (iieystccn and his allies in the Korean military. the weak interim Pxcsjdcnc Choi Kyi Ha, lifted some of Park',, emeqency decrees and released Kim Dae Jung from bowt arrest. But by Tate November. there were ominoomsigns that a group of Park k,valhis gathered round Chain were maneuvering for pocr. Chain, who headed a branch of military intelligence known as the Defense Security Command, was deeply suspicious that the United States might bave been involved in Parks death (Kim Jac Kyu, Park's assassin. was the primary contact between Park and the U.S. government).

In late November, flolbrooke began hearing reports that Christian dissiderns were continuing to defy the martial law commandt leading to mass arrests by Chim's security forces. In one of his most significant cables, Hoibrocke lashed out not at the military but at the -potential potarthlion that exists as a re-suIt of the actions of what appear to be a relative handful of Cthtlian extremist dissidents.- He instructed Gleysteen to tell the Christians that they could not count on US. support forever and wssi4 therm not to dicc,bcv manial Law edict,agairt'Z PC-

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lit ical meetings. 'E't, when these (meetings) alt in fact not demonstrations. but xatbcr just meetiop in defiance of martial la% the US. government views them as unhelpful while mathal law is Still in cffcct$ he wrote. (llolbnoke defended the able, saying it "also says we will press the generals vety hard on the constitutional proodures and Ubtxtits, and we will urge. csti. nt on the students because otherwise ifs going to be really ugly and bloody7 Gleybleat told me he refused to transmit suth an 'armchair gjggesSn from WashingtoC)

Hosra. the general,,, understood, rightly, that they were time to do almost anything. On the thghtofuvccmber 12.1979P. Chun pulled the Ninth Army Division from the DM2. separating North and South Korea and s&ed control of the Korean military (the Ninth Division was led by Roh The 'o, a close military ally who succeeded Chun as President and wits sentenced this summer to twenty-two-and.a.half years for his role in the takeover). At first Chm's blatant violation of the U.S-Korean joint command structure stunned the Caner Adminisuation. - went ballistic. beouse it señousiy eodaogered Americans on the line," Hoibrooke told me.

But thanks largely to iloibrooke. the damage to US.4(orc*n relations ww quickly papered over. Within a week of the coup. he instructed (ileysteen to enact a promise from Itdent Choi forcooszitutional rcfcnt lfChoi demurred Holb.uvLsizggcstcd. fl'ou could even point out. if you wcrc a very cynical person, that sdtiog a date now does not necessarily mean that this dale will be kcpC After the Korean govantnvot agreed on a vague Ii n,ctahle for reform. 1{oibrookc promised that the U.S. government-would not publicly contest the RO.K.G. (government) version of recent events" and casually mentioned that it was "not necessarily a disaster that some of the generals tos-cthrown by Chun) are no longer running it:' Caner later promised Choi to o& with you to try to minimize the political damage7

In the montis following, the Caner Administration caxricd on with its effort to build a modaatc, pro-US. center. Yet it reftsed to use its c00c030u5 econornc and military leverage against Chun for fear that would be misinterpreted by North Komi and threaten billions of dollars in U& loans and inwsuncnrs in the South Moreover, as labor tmrest flared up and studot opposition to (Than intnsirie4 US. officials became convinced thitChuns desire for onicrums a safer allanatM to the chaos his (ocs ztprescntcd. Ten days after receiving Glcystoeni assurances that the United States would not oppose his military crackdown. Chun extended martial law throughout the nation. dissolved Choit Cabinet and the National Assembly and or&zvd the jrms6 of Lxry opposition leaders. When students in XanQju defied Cbmc edicts bydemonsoaxing in the su't,. the Special Forces launched the feign of terror that sparked the subsequent uprising. Soldiers burst into houses searching for anyone under the age of 30 and dragged them out to face clubs. bayonets and machine gurLc. The death toll, estimated by city residents in 2,000, may never be knom

Both Christopher and I loibrooke were caught off-guard by the se'eiity offlunk coup and aprcsscd deep resenations about his crackdown. But the cabl show that the Carter Adrninistacioo never seriously consideredanoirniiitary solution to the rebellion, which it feared was about to wrn into a general uprising against military rule. On Ma 22, according toa key memo obtained fiom

22 The Nation. December 9. 1996

the National Security Cowicit. Sccrvtaiy of Statc Edmund Musick convened a high-level meeting s the White House where Ito!-brooke, Christopher and Brzezinski joined with the C.I.A. and the Joint Chick of Staff in the decision to release Kovem.-Army troops to enich the rebellion. The Pcntagon was also instructed to ptqxut for orst case sccvarios" in case the lighting spread beyond Knngju or endangered the joint command's minion to -counter North KoreC—probahly the closesi Qv have come to direct military intervention in Korea since 1953.

With that, the die nscfl In early lure, IIolbcookcapprovcd a visit to Seoul by the president of the U.S. Export-Import Rank. who promised Seoul So® million in apart credits to ptzrchase U.S- nuclear power technology. At the time. Hoibmoke% now a vice president with CS-First Roszon, told a skeptical house corn-minee that blocking the Eximbank guarantees mould have had an almost certain multiplier effect on private lending insñtuüons in New York and clewhne7 Chun went on to seize the presidency in September1980 and w honored at the White Howe by President Reagan five months later. Hoibrooke went on to become an adviser to the Hyundai Group, one olSouth Korea's largest conglomerates, in the I9SOs.

'We managed between 1977 and the 1930s policy that  kept straIec stability and encouraged democracy without losing economic growth,- Hoibrooke told me. it was an astonishing achievement. And that utis both panics—that w& Carter. Reagan and Bush.- Holbrookec parting comment 'ns. flbu ought to talk about the overall policy. Othaim itic simply unfair?'

The episode reminds me of Gtahazn Grccn&s &vastatng par-trail in The QuiesAmaican of Alden Pyle the eager CIA. agent Sent to colonial Vietnam to subvert the Communist-lcd Vienninh. Al the end of the book. Pyle, who has been ccrcLty providing plastic explosive to a Third For"' private army opposed to both the French colonialists and the Vietminh, turns his 'wide campt grc' on a Saigon street where a bomb planted by his allies to disrupt a French military parade has exploded pitma-Direly, killing women and chil&n and blowing the legs off pedicab &wcr.-There wtc to have hecuj paxadC Pyle mmnblcs as he wonders aloud whether he c&idd clean the blood off his shoes before talking tothe policc "I didn't knov.' Thomas Itwi= the cynical Fsglish journalist who narrates the story walks away in disguislle was impregnably armoured by hisgood intentions and his ignorance," Fo'sla concludes. t can't think of a better descriptioo for the tortured liberals who presided over the debacle

in Kwangju, and who sail  direct our forctgn policy. 0