3 The Movement to Redress the Japanese Military “Comfort Women”
Grassroots’ Concerns and Responses Today
“우리 스스로가 역사를 잊어버리면, 이런 사실이 있었다는 것 조차 없어질 수 있다
.”
(If we forget history, this horrific incident could be wiped away),
Park Soo-Nam, Director of Silence: The Rising Voice of “Comfort Women.”
Abstract
Chapter 3 analyses grassroots’ concerns about the Japanese military “comfort women,” who were forcibly recruited to military “comfort stations” during the Second World War. Gyeongsang-Namdo Province had the greatest number of victims of this type of forced labour. Citizens of Tongyeong and Geoje cities in Gyeongsang-Namdo Province developed a website to support the victims from the communities. The website represents the contemporary citizens’ nationalism and national identities with reference to the crimes committed by imperial Japan and the community’s efforts to seek redress. South Korea’s advanced economic status and increasing power in the international community make important elements in the efforts.
Keywords: Japanese military “comfort women,” forced labour, sexual slavery, “comfort station,” Dagagagi website
Introduction
The legacies of Japanese colonialism have been lingering and deeply embedded in Korean society. How Korea can overcome the negative memories and impact, which is real, has been an important national mission. Forced
Han, G.-S., Calculated Nationalism in Contemporary South Korea. Movements for Political and Economic Democratization in the 21st Century. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press 2023 doi: 10.5117/9789463723657_ch03
labour and sexual slavery have caused trauma and horror to the victims, supporters, and the nation. Between 1932 and 1945, the estimated number of sexual slavery victims reached around 200,000; these women were coercively recruited, and most of them have now died (Hicks 1995; Yoshimi 1993). Since 1992, 234 victims have been reported to the Korean government (Choi 2010: 3). Beyond this period, a large number of the pro-Japanese (친일) Koreans sustained the high status and wealth that they gained at the expense of fellow Koreans, which led them to form a wealthy and powerful group. This has been a national concern for decades and provided an impetus to redressing the pro-Japanese traitors (친일청산).1 Apart from North Korea, Japan is the foreign nation-state with the shortest distance from Korea, but emotionally the farthest. Contrasting the Japanese condescending perception of the Korean peninsula since the 19th century, Koreans have considered Japan the competitor to fight against in terms of economy, technology, and sports. Korea-Japan Football Rivalry attracts the whole nation’s emotional attachment to the games (Mangan, Park, and Ok 2018; Ok and Mangan 2018). The Korean media, in general, and the conservative ones in particular,2 have reportedly underestimated Korea’s achievement in most areas in comparison with Japan, making the psyche of Korean people overwhelmed with an inferiority complex for decades, largely based on flunkeyism.
However, the changes to Korean perceptions of Japan have been accumulative. This chapter examines contemporary Korean nationalism and identities concerning the Japanese military “comfort women” (Military Sexual Slavery by Japan), a term agreed by the victims in broader Asia. A particular focus is the socio-historical contexts that enabled Koreans to reformulate their attitudes towards the “comfort women” and undertake a closer examination of contemporary Korean views of the matter. Theoretically speaking, the national and structural context has been transformed and has engendered emergent cultural properties, in the process of which the agents have been enabled and have actively pursued the elaboration and re-elaboration of the changes to further structural and cultural changes.
Two major controversial matters are sitting at the heart of the difficulties in resolving the case of “comfort women” between contemporary Korea and Japan. One is about whether the girls were forcibly removed from their home,
1대하는 민족문제연구소 10가지 ‘궤변’들 (The Centre for Historical Truth and Justice). 2016. “‘” (The Center for Historical Truth and Justice, Ten Mad Reasons against https://www.minjok.or.kr/archives/54971,친일파 청산’을 반 accessed
Cleansing the Pro-Japanese). March 23, January 3, 2020.
2 Chosun Ilbo and Donga Ilbo are conservative and pro-Japanese from the time of the colonial period.
which consequently led them to the “comforting stations” in Manchuria, China, Myanmar, Malaysia, Indonesia, Pacific Islands, Japan, and Korea. The other is that the Japanese government and military admit that they were involved in operating the “comforting stations,” however, they argue that it was the managers and recruiters of the “comforting stations,” who directly engaged in illegal activities such as human trafficking (Seo 2016: 212–214). Questioning this enforcement has instigated much debate. In regard to the legality of the military “comfort women,” the “service” clearly breached not only the law within Japan but also the related international conventions that Japan joined at the time of the Second World War (Korean Women’s Development Institute 2016).
Unfortunately, the Japanese government’s intention to raise the legality was simply to avoid its responsibility and also dilute the central issue of the problem. The Japanese government is missing the point by raising the legality of it, rather than paying attention to the irreversible damage inflicted against the women (Seo 2016: 214). Kawata Humiko is a Japanese author and activist who has been sympathetic to the “comfort women” victims and wants to see the Japanese government’s sincere effort to restore the victims’ dignity. Kawata argues that the crux of the matter is not whether or not imperial Japan had a role in operating the “comforting stations,” but the assault was by force as the “comforting stations” were under the auspices of the Japanese government.3
The issue of “comfort women” is sensitive and complex, and the attempt to understand and redress it has considered racism, nationalism, human rights, masculinity, war, and colonialism. It cannot be reduced to one or two elements. However, the most tragic of all is how a deeply sovereign agent’s dignity has been violently trampled down. With the end of the Second World War, the “comfort women” were either murdered or abandoned in the war fields. Some remained there for different reasons and some returned to Korea. Many returnees could not return to their hometowns and stayed silent about their stories of victimhood. The victims lived with acquired diseases, psychological pains, and social prejudice. A list of important questions here is: Why did it take half a century for the victims to speak out? Why did the individual victims take so long before demanding apologies from Japan? From the viewpoints of contemporary Korean grassroots, what are their core concerns? My immediate assumption is about their sympathy towards
3 신동아 (Shin Dong-a). 2017. “가와타 후미코 일본전쟁 책임자료센터 공동대표” (Kawata
Humiko, Co-Representative of Japan’s War Documents). May 15, https://shindonga.donga.com/ Print?cid=532646, accessed January 9, 2020.
the victims and anger towards imperial Japan. It has been the grassroots movement to redress the “comfort women” since the 1990s that has kept the “comfort women” as a socio-historically important matter to resolve especially when the Japanese government denied its responsibility and reparation and when the Korean government downplayed it (Lee 2017: 80; Kim 2018b: 120; Son 2018). The movement was sustained by the Wednesday demonstrations in front of the Japanese Embassy in Seoul, leading to the construction of the Statue of Peace (소녀상) and recording the history in textbooks (Chung 2013). This chapter discusses grassroots perspectives towards the phenomenon, the public perceptions of which have changed, influenced by the improvement of the national economy and the Korean nation-state’s international status.
Literature Review
There have been four key strands of the scholarship on the Japanese military “comfort women” (Lee and Bae 2019). First, the victims’ life trajectories as portrayed in the memorial museum and through interviews (Kim 2010; Choi 2010; Son and Cho 2009). Second, media report frames social movements about the “comfort women” in Korea and/or Japan (Lee and Min 2011; Kim and Woo 2016). Third, memories and discourses as represented in documentaries, school texts, and the Statue of Peace (Jeong 2016; Kim 2018b). Fourth, reparation for the victims as it relates to diplomatic relations between Japan and Korea (Kim 2018a; Kwak 2006; Do 2008; Choi 2005).
First, the earlier research on the “comfort women” started with an attempt to describe the victims’ life journey, of which forced sexual slavery was the most painful incident. The exhibition of relevant incidents of the “comfort women” in the museum recreates the memories under the current context and distributes them widely. In this process, the memories are recontextualized at present, which may be influenced by the current socio-cultural context (Kim 2010: 179; Kim 2005). Kim E. (2010: 183–184) notes that the Independence Hall of Korea (독립기념관) is a particular outcome of political leaders’ implementation of top-down nationalism to stimulate bottom-up nationalism, which contributes to the political legitimacy. Kim E. (2010: 183–184) also contends that the Independence Hall needs to better represent “gender and class dimensions,” and the patriarchal view of gender and sex needs to be corrected, and that peaceful solidarity with the “comfort women” survivors of other countries needs to be displayed. Much attention is given to “observing the exhibition of past incidents today” to redress the problematic practice of the past and present. This is in part what I will further explore by analysing the grassroots’ views on the incident, including the views of the younger generation today.
Kim E. (2010: 181) was concerned with the non-existence or the limited exhibitions of the issues of the “comfort women,” which restricts further research of the related exhibitions. The Women and War Museum (과 여성 인권박물관 전쟁
) was opened in 2012 and this led to further research (Chun 2018; Park 2014a; Kim et al. 2013). The research of the exhibitions necessarily links the past incident to contemporary Koreans. However, as the memories are recreated to remind contemporary Koreans, what are the ways in which the memories affect Korean nationalism in the 21st century, as opposed to the early 20th century?
Second, studies have examined media report frames of social movements about the “comfort women” in Korea and/or Japan (Lee and Min 2011; Kim and Woo 2016). Lee and Min (2011: 42), in their study of the media reportages on social movements about the “comfort women,” attempt to overcome the limitations of the analysis of the media text, by taking into consideration the politico-historical contexts—employing “collective action frames” (Benford and Snow 2000; Snow 2007; both cited in Lee and Min 2011). The approach aims to reveal the level of seriousness, unfairness, and immorality of the social condition, ascertain who or what the origins of the problem are, and how to redress the problem (Snow and Benford 1992; cited in Lee and Min 2011: 43). In brief, the level of strength of a social movement and the media’s effective report of it can influence the success of the movement (Gamson 2007; Cooper 2002; Lee and Min 2011: 46). These research findings reiterate that the issue of the “comfort women” is not only concerned with the victims, but it needs to be understood in the social, national, and international context.
Park (2014b) found that the Japanese newspapers’ common framing in their reports on the “comfort women” is that private recruitment companies coerced the girls into sexual slavery, but denied the Japanese government’s direct involvement in the coercion (Kim and Woo 2016: 85). The Japanese news has been particularly concerned that the Japanese diplomatic effort to have the issue of the “comfort women” resolved has unintendedly led to the impression that the Japanese government had a key role in causing all the inhumane conduct during the Second World War (Nam 2014). I argue that Japan’s and the Japanese news’ continuing denial of the historical incident has been in part due to the unequal power relations between Korea and Japan. There is a sign of change with this, which in part I explore in this chapter and the volume. Kim and Woo (2016: 112) find that Korean newspapers have a primary focus on the origins of the problem and Japan’s appropriate apologies and compensation, whereas Japanese newspapers are tired of lingering on the problem and want to move forward. Thus, the tension between the two nation-states over the problem continues. Again, the unequal power relations between the two seem to be an obstacle to the resolution.
Third, Jeong (2016) investigates the films and documentaries on the records and narratives of the “comfort women” victims produced since the 1990s, and the documentaries’ impacts on public discourses on the topic. Jeong contends that because of the filmmakers’ close rapport with the victims, the documentaries brought about a significant awareness and even led the public to demand an apology from the Japanese government (p. 160). The “1987 June Struggle” was also a turning point when the Korean public became much more aware of the gendered perspective of the “comfort women” (e.g., women’s rights), raising awareness of the problems of patriarchy (Jeong 2016: 168; Jung 2013). I would add that the broader political and economic development of the Korean nation-state in the 1990s is another significant element which made those films impactful in terms of developing the public discourse and social movements on the topic.
Kim M. (2018b) examines the transformation of the historical incident into public trauma, then leading to the massive grassroots movement of the citizens and high-school students to protest against the Japanese government. The movement has been global in solidarity with the victims in other countries as well as advocates for women’s rights. Kim M. (2018b) finds that the interactions between the victims and the public, the memory of the victims’ narratives as represented on the Statue of Peace, and the formation of the public/social memories have resulted in the massive grassroots movement. Again, why have these movements taken place since the 1990s, and not before? I argue it is due to the emergent structural and cultural contexts nationally and internationally that enabled the movements and the expression of calculated nationalism.
Fourth, Kim C. (2018a: 231) notes it is the complexity of the “comfort women,” which makes the resolution of the matter difficult. The problems around the “comfort women” at the time of, and later, the crime, encompasses Japanese imperialism, patriarchy and authoritarianism of Korean society, historical and diplomatic conflicts between Korea and Japan, and the breach of human rights of the women during the war. This is why it took over forty years before the Korean women publicly raised the matter for the first time for a resolution in the late 1980s. The 2015 Japan-South Korea “comfort women” Agreement was a hastily and ill-prepared agreement, in which the victims’ needs and sufferings were not considered. The Agreement was to reword the Kono Statement on August 4, 1993, which included, “The then Japanese military was, directly or indirectly, involved in the establishment and management of the comfort stations” (p. 234). The activists’ and victims’ frustration with the slow progress for the resolution led to their appeal to the international community. In July 2007 the U.S. Congress adopted a resolution that the Japanese government restore the victims’ dignity and human rights, and provide apologies and compensation. The Parliaments of the Netherlands, Canada, and the European Union followed the suit. The Japanese government continues to refuse to offer full apologies or legal reparation. The “comfort women” have now become a transnational mission to resolve in solidarity with the relevant transnational organizations to “protect the universal value of human dignity and human rights” (Doh 2008: 67). Elizabeth Son’s (2018: 19, 21) work focuses on “the process of redress, of remedial actions” for the survivors by analysing their “actions of remembrance,” emphasizing the victims’ deep commitment toward women’s rights in a transnational context.
Many research projects have so far been somewhat “past-oriented” or “static” in the sense that “why and what happened” needs to be better understood and also the studies have paid attention to how the “comfort women” are depicted in an exhibition, film, and textbooks. They are all interested in revealing Korean nationalism against Japan to some degree. Past studies of memorial museums, media reports of social movements on the topic as well as public memories of the topic have reflected the grassroots’ concerns or their nationalistic sentiment over the issues to a significant degree. It is also fair to note that past studies represent academic concerns more than public awareness. There is an opportunity to build further on these past studies in terms of contemporary Korean perception of the issues of the “comfort women.”
Yuki Tanaka (2002) demonstrates that Japan’s racism and nationalism were intertwined symbolically in male soldiers’ gang-rape during the Second World War (Damousi 2003: 1122). This is a form of exertion of nationalist superiority against the members of the subordinate nations—a typical example of nouveau-riche nationalism (Han 2016). How about the experiences of the victims and their fellow countrymen/women over a long period? These are not simply the topic of tensions between the victims and perpetrators, but involve domestic and international relations and contexts. These are the precise questions that Damousi raised:
Further consideration could have been given to considering shifts over time. It is indisputable that political and sexual domination are interlinked; at what point, and under what circumstances, did these issues begin to be contested, challenged, brought into question? What impetus gave rise to these critiques? (Damousi 2003: 1123)
The response to these questions becomes complex when the nation-state of the victims has significantly gained its power and influence in the international community. A specific question that I raise in this chapter is what are the contemporary Korean people’s responses to the Japanese soldiers’ mass sexual crimes against Korean women during the Second World War? Such a question involves Korean nationalism in a shift in the context of the new international order, especially with reference to Korean people’s perception of Japan.
In brief, a few remaining questions resulting from the identified shortcomings of current literature are as follows. (1) Under what circumstances have the victims and fellow Koreans been able to raise the concerns? That is, what have been the socio-historical contexts that have enabled contemporary Koreans to raise concerns over the “comfort women?” (2) What do contemporary Koreans make out of the Japanese military “comfort women,” with reference to Korean nationalism and national identities? These questions are still relevant to contemporary Korea and Japan. Japan has never offered formal apologies to the “comfort women.” Korean economic and political development in recent decades and also a heightened awareness of human rights have made a large proportion of Koreans aware of the sufferings that the victims experienced, as illustrated in numerous contemporary cultural artefacts such as films.
Research Methods
The internet portals such as Daum.net and Naver.com host numerous online cafés, but they have a relatively small number of members ranging from five to seventy. For example, The Site to Remember the Military “Comfort Women” (기억연대 일본군정의연 “위안부위안부” 기억의할머니들께 터),4 and To the Military “Comfort 정의
Women/Grandmas” (“ ” ).5 The Korean Council for Justice
and Remembrance for the Issues of Military Sexual Slavery by Japan ( or )6 is the leading and significant non-profit organization
4 https://cafe.naver.com/peacememory
5 https://cafe.naver.com/lymbhj2?iframe_url=/ArticleList.nhn%3Fsearch.
clubid=24177822%26search.menuid=17%26search.boardtype=L)
6 http://womenandwar.net/kr/
at the national level to restore the dignity of the victims. Its website is rich and informative. The Council receives some limited funding from the Korean government and supportive citizens. The Council’s achievements are significant and many researchers have written about them. The question of these sites is about whether or not they represent the views of the grassroots.
Between 1992 and 2006, 234 “comfort women” survivors were registered with the Korean government. Of the 192 registered in 2001, 56.5 per cent of them were from Gyeongsang-do Province and 31 per cent from GyeongsangNamdo Province, in which Tongyeong and Geoje are two cities. These regional areas located at the bottom of the peninsula and close to Japan were some of the most severely affected. I have selected the Tongyeong Geoje Citizens Community Website that Supports the Japanese Military “Comfort
Women” (일본군 “위안부”할머니와 함께하는 통영거제시민모임, http://
dagagagi.org) for analysis as I considered it to be one of the best and most significant to represent contemporary grassroots perspectives.7 This group is well represented through its local media but has been given no scholarly attention despite its potential to represent grassroots nationalism in regional districts, in which social movements are less active. This community, Dagagagi (literally meaning, getting closer to the grandmas), was formed on August 15, 2002 to relieve the pain of the survivors and to have their dignity restored. At the time, there were four survivors in Tongyeong and two in Geojedo. All of them were in their 80s and the community provided them with welfare support such as birthday parties, picnics, human rights camps, and seeking redress from the Japanese government for the crimes and reparate for the damage. The website’s front page indicates the contents of the online community: introduction, names of the six local survivors, activities to restore their dignities, community bulletin to inform and share, resources, advocate/donation. The community bulletin had 280 posts as at May 18, 2020, including high-school students’ petition postcards to the members of the Japanese Diet (parliament) calling for Japan to compensate the victims. The victims also had a visit to Japan and delivered the students’ postcards. The bulletin’s first posting was written on October 15, 2010 and continued till June 24, 2019. I downloaded the contents of the whole website in February 2020 and continued until March 1, 2020. The amount of data reached single-spaced 360 pages in A4. The community website includes the postings from other regional and national associations concerned with
7 A similar website to support the “Comfort Women” victims in Gyeongsang-Bukdo Province is 정신대 할머니와 함께 하는 시민모임 (Daegu Citizens Forum for Halmeoni—Grandmas), http://www.1945815.or.kr/
the “comfort women” as well as from the local actors residing in Tongyeong and Geoje cities. The “external” postings reflect the thoughts of local actors and agents, so they are posted on the website. As a way of substantiating and triangulating the Dagagagi website, I have consulted academic literature, media, and relevant websites.8 Most of the related official websites on the “comfort women” represent the viewpoints of governments, the learned, or researchers rather than the grassroots, although there is significant overlap amongst them. Thus, the website of Dagagagi is particularly meaningful and represents grassroots perspectives.
A descriptive and analytical analysis of data has been undertaken based on the principles of the grounded theory methodology, involving open-, axial-, and selective coding. Open coding is to analyse sentences and paragraphs, which leads to developing concepts and categories. Axial coding is to identify the connections between subcategories to larger categories and ascertain the links among major categories, the latter of which may have the structure and context of the society. Selective coding mainly deals with the main categories and how they are supported by subcategories (Glaser and Strauss 1967; Strauss and Corbin 1990).
A Morphogenetic Background of the Military Sexual Slavery by Japan
The 1965 film, Sunset on the Sarbin River (사르빈강에 노을이 진다, dir.
by Jung Chang-Hwa), depicting the Second Sino-Japanese Warfield in the late 1930s, has a short segment of conversation between two Koreans in China: a Japanese military “comfort woman” and a “supposedly voluntary” student soldier. The soldier asks the woman how she ended up in China. The woman said, “I was misled on the way to be a nurse.” The soldier responded, “You must be confused yourself. Imperial Japan would not mislead you like that.” The woman replied, “Have you not been cheated by imperial Japan so far?” Professor Park Yu-Ha notes that the woman is precise to the point that the soldier might have felt that he was not forcibly recruited, but in
8 They include: Digital Museum, The Comfort Women Issue and the Asian Women’s Fund
(디지털 기념관 위안부 문제와 아시아 여성기금 Ministry of Gender Equality and Family: e-Museum of the Victims of Japanese Military ), http://www.awf.or.jp/k3/oralhistory-00. html;
Sexual Slavery (연구소 여성가족부 일본군 “위안부동북아역사재단”피해자 e-역사관), https://www.nahf.or.kr/main), http://www.hermuseum일본군 “위안부”문제..
go.kr/; Northeast Asian History Foundation (
do; Research Centre for the Japanese Military “Comfort Women” Issue ( ), http://www.kyeol.kr/.
fact, he was indeed under the given structure of imperial Japan at that time despite his lack of knowledge about it.9 The social climate in the 1960s was that the majority of Koreans were preoccupied with meeting their basic needs for everyday life, distancing themselves from anything beyond, such as human dignity. The Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea, signed on June 22, 1965, was an attempt to make up the relationships between the two nations in tension resulting from Japanese colonialism. However, President Park Chung-Hee’s primary interest was financing from Japan to rebuild the national economy (Hicks 1995), which was a way to legitimize his leadership acquired through a military coup d’état. They paid little attention to the victims of the forced labour who suffered during Japanese colonialism.
Professor Yun Jeong-Ok, during her youth, saw some of her friends being taken away to be the Japanese military “comfort women.” Yun published her research findings on the “comfort women” over four reportages in Hankyoreh Shinmun in January 1990 (Yoon 2015: 124).10 These reportages came as a humiliating shock and erupted a wave of anger in the Korean nation-state. Ms. Kim Hak-Sun first spoke about her victim history and accused the Japanese government on August 14, 1991, following the Japanese government’s denial of the war crime (Choi 2010: 18). These open reports and accusations waited for forty-five years after the National Independence in 1945. I argue that there were some emergent structural and cultural factors in operation that conditioned the given contexts, which discouraged the victims to speak out.11 First, Japan’s cooperation with, and technological support for, the Korean industries, was a stimulus for the continuing economic development of South Korea. However, in the 1970s and 1980s, Sex Tours (기생관광) were an important source of foreign monies. Kang Jun-Man reported that there were 100,000 Japanese tourists to Korea in 1971 and the number increased to 650,000 in 1979, 85 per cent of which were men (Kang 2017; Lie 1995; Bishop and Robinson 1998; Norma 2019). One could argue that this was a new version of the “comfort women” in operation although its features are not totally comparable.
Second, it was in the authoritarian Korean governments’ interests to keep up with the industrialization and modernization of the nation, which
9 “제국의 위안부 2” (The ‘Comfort Women’ under Imperial Japan 2). June 5, 2015, accessed January 7, 2020. https:// www.youtube.com/watch?v=iwEWxaA20_Y,
10Labour). The report was entitled, “정신대 원혼의 발자취” (In Search of the Origins of the Forced
11 The “comfort women” victims in China could not “come out” for the related structural reasons.
also provided an important element to legitimize the military dictatorial leadership (Yoon 2015: 214; Choi 2010: 13; cf., Han and Sharp 1997). The government and patriarchal Korean society avoided dealing with the issue (Lee and Min 2011: 46), and there was no social momentum to raise it. However, in the early 1990s, the Korean government became proactively supportive of the victims, providing housing and medical needs.12 In 1997–1998 the government requested that the Japanese prime minister send an official letter of apology to the individual victims (Choi 2005: 21). These changes in national policies led to further changes in the social milieu, in that the victims were given the channel to share their victimhood narratives and the public elevated the individual trajectories into the public and national discourses (Choi 2010: 21–22; Kim 2000). According to Lee and Min (2011: 50), before 2000, the newsletters of The Korean Council for the Women Drafted for Military Sexual Slavery by Japan (정대협)13 described that the
“comfort women” were the people of a colony of the Japanese imperialism and they were the rape victims of the imperial soldiers. That is, a primary focus before the 2000s was on the helpless nation-state of Korea as the chief cause of the misfortune of the victims—bashing the victim nation-state. Since then, the interpretation of the “comfort women” has been extended to consider feminism, the Korean government’s inability to resolve the matter with the recalcitrant perpetrator, Japan, and the U.S.’s indifference and unequal relations in the broader world system (Lee and Min 2011: 52–53). The movement to restore the victims’ dignities has become international, reaching out to national assemblies in some foreign countries. For instance, there was the U.S. House of Representatives’ resolution that Japan formally apologize and accept responsibility. In April 2008, other countries followed suit in demanding an apology, such as France, the Netherlands, North Korea, China, and the Philippines, despite Japan’s continuing refusal (Choi 2010: 22).14
Third, during the Japanese colonial period, women’s rights enjoyed some degree of nationalist support, e.g., advocating for the abolition of the Confucian legacy which looks down on women (Kim 1996). However, in the 1980s, Korea was going through rapid westernization and there were mixed views about feminism especially from the viewpoints of elites. It appears that as
12 Each received $21,000 from the Korean government and $4,344 from a civilian fund (Min
2003: 946).
13 한국정신대문제대책협의회.
14 The Guardian, “Japan Rejects US Calls for Apology over ‘Comfort Women.’” July 31, 2007, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/jul/31/usa.japan, accessed April 16, 2020.
far as grassroots were concerned their significant expression of women’s rights was relatively limited. Korean society was much more conservative in the 1970s and 1980s than it is now, and it was not conducive enough for the victims to speak about what they had gone through. “Speaking out” or confessing the experiences would have only caused victim-blaming. For example, a “comfort woman” victim, Ms. Kim Hak-Sun’s husband ridiculed her in front of their son about her life trajectory (Yoon 2015: 92; Kim 2010: 189). Importantly, the individual agents, who were clearly able to “calculate” what was most gainful, would naturally be reluctant to speak out in the given cultural context. Thus, calculated nationalism was in operation. According to a survey, following the Independence in 1945, four out of six victims returned to Korea but chose not to return to their hometown (Yoon 2015: 89–92). Some had to leave their hometowns due to the shame put on them or the community’s accusation of them, reflective of the socio-cultural context. Returning from gender oppression in the brutal “comforting station” under the Japanese military government, Korea’s patriarchal ideology prolonged the victims’ suffering (Min 2003: 948). Fourth, the Japanese military “comfort women” turned up as a topic of scholarly attention in 2007, and an in-depth and broader academic debate commenced in 2013 (e.g., Park 2013; Yoon 2013).
Since the 2000s, the Korean economy has significantly grown and South Korea has emerged as a notable middle-power in the international community. This structural change of Korean society enabled the government provision of financial support for the “comfort women” and the active social movements to have restored the dignity of these women. This was under the cultural climate of an increasing institutionalization of women’s rights especially from 1997 to 2007 (Kim and Kim 2011). The social actors became aware of the contextual change and have demanded that the Korean and Japanese governments work separately, as well as collaboratively, for a resolution. The Japanese government has been non-responsive.
Findings
Margaret Archer’s (1995) critical realist approach to the understanding of social change and social movement analyses the intersections between structure, culture, and agency. The structural properties reflect unequal relationships, e.g., the relation between a company owner and her employees or the relation between imperial Japan and the annexed Chosun. The level of unequal relationship is not static but fluctuates, and influences the characteristics of the emergent cultural properties. Then, the actors mobilize the ideas and bring about change to, or reproduce, structure or culture, i.e., bring about change to the society or maintain the status quo.
Let me briefly illustrate the broader interactions between structure, culture, and agency to bring about changes regarding the “comfort women.” The 2015 Korea-Japan agreement on the Japanese military “comfort women” was an attempt to facilitate the diplomatic structure and relationship without any effort to acknowledge or resolve the legacy of the “comfort women.” This was in part for the sake of economic benefit at the expense of the victims’ rights. The year 2015 happened to be the time for “reboot feminism” and there was a clear social milieu or a culture not to persevere with any kind of sexual harassment (Lee 2017: 89). Further, the Statue of Peace brought out a large number of citizens to the grassroots protests all around the regions of South Korea against the Japanese government. The erection of over one hundred statues all over Korea particularly encouraged high-school boys and girls to participate in the grassroots movement—igniting the changes of the primary agents to social actors. “The Statue of Peace,” involving grassroots’ participation and financial donations as well as artistic work, was much more influential than the commemorative statues erected by the government (Kim 2018b: 127–128, 136).
Structural Emergent Properties
The Power Imbalance between Chosun Korea and Imperial Japan:
Revisiting the Past to Discuss the Present
The 1965 Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea was the Japanese imperial admission of its past misconduct to Korea on the one hand, and an attempt to erase the misconduct on the other hand.15 Overcoming the destruction and the loss of life through Japanese imperialism and the Korean War, the bruised Korean nation-state and its leaders occupied a subordinate position to Japan. The victims, like the Japanese military “comfort women,” were not given space to complain or ask for any compensation. As argued earlier, the trajectory of the social movement to restore the victims’ dignities indicates that they considered their misfortunes as part of their sorrows because they were the people of the impoverished nation-state in the past, but that they anticipated seeing their better off nation-state offer its people what is commensurate with the wealth and power of the nation (The Korean Council for the Women Drafted for Military Sexual Slavery by Japan 2004: 8). Thus, the victims’ reproach against the
15 평화를 만드는 여성회등, August 29, 2005. (Peace Making Women’s Association, etc.), August 26, 2005, cited in Dagagagi
nation-state was kept silent for as long as possible, but has been expressed publicly in recent decades (The Korean Council for the Women Drafted for Military Sexual Slavery by Japan 1996: Ch.2).16 It took half a century for Korean victims and their fellow countrymen/women to speak out and this is the time taken for Korea to bring up its political and economic development to a stage strong enough to enable the victims to speak out. That is, structural emergent properties grew influential enough to bring about emergent cultural properties, which in turn enabled primary and corporate agents to take social actions. Why it took half a century for the victims to speak out is clear based on the critical realist method of retroduction. Moreover, the method of abduction illustrates how the victims and primary/corporate agents in affluent South Korea speak out and demand apologies from the Japanese government. This is an important task of this chapter.
The community website (i.e., Dagagagi) under analysis contains informative knowledge and is full of passion to restore the dignities of the women and the nation. The forced sexual slavery took place in the past, and was an epitome of Japan’s “barbaric rule and a crime against humanities, based on violence, oppression, and the survival of the fittest.” Referring to the past crime is inevitable as part of the contemporary movement to redress the effect of the crime. Indeed, Japanese imperialism was full of “national oppression and discrimination, political oppression, economic exploitation, and obliteration of every human right.”17 Any kind of Korean movement to gain national Independence or any resistance movement accompanied by minor criticisms faced unrelenting violence and horrific control. Deceptive assimilation policies were pursued to erase Korean identities, and the Japanled Second Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945) and the Pacific War (1941–1945) drew all the available material and human resources from Korea to the Warfield, leaving the Korean peninsula devastated. The Japanese military
“comfort women” were part of the forced human resources (Min 2003: 945).18
Once the past crime is raised today it has become a present issue that necessarily requires the consideration of the past and present structures of
16정부 탓 Hankook Ilbo. 2020https://www.hankookilbo.com/News/Read/202005121297320429.. “최봉태 변호사, 이용수 할머니의 분노, 위안부 청구권에 소홀한 May 12,
” (Grandma Lee Yong-Su’s Anger about the Government’s Timid Approach to Seeking the Compensation). accessed May 15, 2020.
제시민모임1718the Loss of Sovereignty), April 24, 2020, cited in 진실과미래진실과미래, , 국치국치 100 100년사업공동추진위원회년사업공동추진위원회Dagagagi일본군 (Truth and Future Commission to Remember (Truth and Future Commission to Remember , April 24, 2009, accessed May 17, 2020. ‘위안부’ 할머니와 함께하는 통영거 the Loss of Sovereignty), April 24, 2009, cited in “
.” http://dagagagi.org/, April 24, 2009, accessed May 17, 2020.
Korea and Japan, and their political and economic relations. Contemporary Koreans’—i.e., primary and corporate agents’—identifying the “women’s violated human rights” as their own makes the crime “the present problem there and now.”19 Structural emergent properties have been the underpinning factor that has enabled the agents’ properties to stand against past wrongdoings. That is, as soon as the Korean economy has strengthened enough and Korea has more to say in the international economy, the problem of the past is not simply a problem of the past, but the present. Korean civilians and scholars have made sincere efforts to have the dignities of the “comfort women” restored since the 1990s when the victims first spoke out, and there has been significant progress. However, the Japanese government offers no official apologies for their imperial invasion of Korea, and Japan has even justified the past history and their invasive war, which has exacerbated the tension between Korea and Japan.20 Japan’s continuing distortion of history is still a stumbling block in developing any harmonious relationship between the two nations.21
Japan has been indifferent to the fact that the core of the resolution of the “comfort women” is about Japan’s revelation of the full details of imperial Japan’s planning and operation of the military “comfort women,” apologies, legal reparation, and the prevention plan of the same in the future.22 In brief, being aware of the emergent structural properties of Korea and Japan, and their relationship, the social actors and victims demanded that the dignities of the “comfort women” be restored.23 Yet, Japan in particular is reluctant to accept the new reality of the emergent structural properties.
Japan is Reluctant to Apologize, Accept a New Structure and Relationship The Japanese governments have argued for the ownership of Dokdo Island and have continued to pay tribute to the war criminals at the Yasukuni Shrine which has memorialized thousands of innocent victims of East Asia. The
19 “일본군 ‘위안부’ 할머니와 함께하는 통영거제시민모임.” http://dagagagi.org/, July 20,
2004, accessed May 17, 2020.
20 “일본군 ‘위안부’ 할머니와 함께하는 통영거제시민모임.” April 25, 2009, accessed May 17,
2020.
21 Japan has a long record of distorting history regarding its imperialism. Based on Lee Min-Jin’s historical fiction novel Pachinko (2017, Grand Central Publishing), the American produced series, Pachinko, is internationally popular in early 2022 and ironically educating the world how imperial Japan inhumanely treated Koreans in Japan and also how Koreans courageously fought against the brutality.
22 평화를 만드는 여성회등 (Peace Making Women’s Association, etc.), January 3, 2006, cited in Dagagagi, April 24, 2009, accessed May 17, 2020.
23 Dagagagi, August 31, 2011, accessed May 17, 2020.
dangerous imperial mindset is still in operation in the minds of the present politicians in Japan.24 There is an active rejection of a new structure and relationship. Japan’s continuing exertion of power towards victimized nations, causing the prevalent power imbalance, is the obstacle to having the past crime resolved and having the women’s dignities restored. The social actors in support of the victims are well aware of the economic disparity between Japan and many Asian countries which also suffered under Japanese imperialism. The actors argue that all the affected Asian nations must actively demand that the Japanese government attend to the resolution of the military “comfort women,” illustrating what happened in Europe after the Second World War. The nations around Germany actively searched for the Nazi war criminals and brought them to justice. However, the Asian nations with war victims have actively avoided even reporting the war criminals. Especially, the issue of the Japanese military “comfort women” has been a taboo not to raise in their own nation-states. Unfortunately, this has been an impetus for Japan to smother the war crime and ignore its legal responsibilities. In fact, Japan is trying hard to regain the superior military and imperial power that it had in the past, which is a potential threat to world peace.25 Korean activists/actors have commanded that the well-off Japan apologize, legislate, and reparate in regard to the military “comfort women.” In a mass-petition-writing-campaign to Japan, high-schooler Kim Bo-Yun writes to a member of the Japanese Diet that “it is not only the economy which represents a nation-state but also its capacity to acknowledge and rectify the mistake.”26 I contend that such a writing campaign has been in part enabled by the growing economic status of Korea and the nation’s international influence, which have engaged even the youth. Although Korean social actors are working in solidarity with the victims in other Asian nations, those nations with lesser economic achievement have not been as active as Korea. In fact, even the Korean governments have been treading carefully in their dealing with Japan, not proactively representing the interests of the “comfort women” victims.
The Korean government should not be an onlooker, turning a blind eye to the victims who have been rancorous throughout their lives and now
24 진실과미래, 국치 100년사업공동추진위원회Dagagagi (Truth and Future Commission to Remember , April 24, 2009, accessed May 17, 2020. the Loss of Sovereignty), April 24, 2020, cited in
25가하고 연대하는 2006년 3월 15일 세계 각국에서 일본군 단체와 시민들 (Activists and Civilians from around the World, Participating “위안부” 문제 해결을 위한Dagagagi, March 17, 2006, accessed 700차 수요시위에 참
in the 700th Wednesday Meeting), March 15, 2006, cited in May 17, 2020.
26 Dagagagi, October 31, 2010, accessed May 17, 2020.
dying. This new year, 2006, the government should set the “comfort women” as the key diplomatic concern and pursue aggressively the solution to the problem.27
The Korean government totally ignores the victims’ sorrowful screams, and does not protect its own people. Pragmatic diplomacy disregards the victims’ human rights and dignities and invites shame from the international community.28
The Korean government’s inactive pursuit of the resolution is partially due to the victims’ poor family backgrounds with limited politico-economic influence (Min 2003). Watching President Roh Moo-Hyun’s making no progress in his summit with Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi in July 2004, the “comfort women” victims cried out to Roh, “Are you president of Koreans or Japanese?” The social actors argued that “the crushed human rights were run over again, and that the victims were put to death again.”29 The actors’ and victims’ disappointments continued recurrently not only because the Korean government lacked the will for the resolution, but also because the Japanese government has not given priority to it.30 The local social actors in Tongyeong and Geoje cities were dismayed at the Korean National Assembly’s not even deliberating the legislation to resolve the matter in conjunction with Japan.31 The local actors and the members of the Geoje City Council were particularly anxious as more victims were dying.32 The local activists maintain close links with the local “comfort women” victims, crying out for a resolution to the Korean and Japanese governments, but their demands fall on the deaf ears.33
27 평화를 만드는 여성회등 (Peace Making Women’s Association, etc.), cited in Dagagagi, January 3, 2006, accessed May 17, 2020.
28 Song Do-Ja in Dagagagi, October 30, 2009, accessed May 17, 2020.
29 한국정신대문제대책협의회(or 정대협) (The Korean Council for the Women Drafted for
Military Sexual Slavery by Japan), cited in Dagagagi, July 23, 2004, accessed May 17, 2020.
30 평화를 만드는 여성회등 (Peace Making Women’s Association, etc.), cited in 정대협Dagagagi, January 3, 2006, accessed May 17, 2020.; The 125 Victims of the “Comfort Women,” , and the Concerned Civilians at the 700th Wednesday Meeting, March 15, 2006, cited in Dagagagi, March 17, 2006, accessed May 17, 2020.
31 Song Do-Ja in Dagagagi, January 7, 2008, accessed May 17, 2020. This is complicated by a significant number of the members of the Korean National Assembly who oppose a stance against Japan. However, my primary focus here is an analysis of the contents of the website. 32 Dagagagi, November 2 and December 24, 2009, accessed May 17, 2020; 거제인터넷신문. 2009.
“일본군 ‘위안부’문제해결 촉구결의안 채택 (Passing the Resolution for the Japanese Military
‘Comfort Women’ Issue).” December 25, http://www.gjn.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=3316, accessed July 10, 2020.
33 Dagagagi, December 24, 2009, accessed May 17, 2020.
Japan Should Legislate and Establish a Set of New Standards, Starting with Apologies
Tongyeong and Geoje cities are relatively near Japan. The civilians and actors of Dagagagi have close interactions with the local “comfort women” victims and have hosted the campaigns to write letters to the Japanese National Diet (parliament). Again, these campaigns presuppose the improved power, status, and structure of the Korean nation-state in the international community. However, Japan has ignored the Korean request that Japan legislate and reparate to have the victims’ dignities restored. Unless Japan accepts the new reality and relationships and is able to realize potential benefits from a new relationship, Japan may not be forthcoming with the resolution.
Ji Yejin, a senior high-school student, has an earnest plea to the Japanese National Diet. Ji said that she has kept in touch with the “comfort women” victims and is deeply concerned with the sufferings and sorrows that they have been through. Ji cannot help weeping when thinking of the “grandmas” who were taken overseas for sexual slavery when they were Ji’s age. She went on to say:
I do not hate Japanese. It’s wrong to hate contemporary Japanese because of what their forefathers did. However, it is wrong to deny and cover-up past mistakes. What would you think if your daughter were taken away overseas and worked as forced sexual slavery? That is exactly what happened to the military “comfort women” and that is the feeling we suffer as the descendants of the “grandmas.” Revenge or money is not at the centre of the grandmas’ protests, but sincere apologies from the bottom of the heart. Historical facts can’t be erased. … Please, the Japanese National Diet, have the issue resolved, so that the grandmas can forgive you and can “go to sleep” in peace.34
The Japanese government has not come to the table to have a meaningful discussion and resolution of the issue of the military “comfort women.” However, from the viewpoint of Korea, its social actors want past misconduct rectified and are persistently demanding apologies and reparation for the victims. These represent the cultural emergent properties. Cultural Emergent Properties: Projection of the Prevalent Ideas
The Korean government has provided the victims with the costs of living and healthcare, which they gratefully received. However, the injured dignities,
34 Dagagagi, October 15, 2010, accessed May 17, 2020.
which are non-material, can be restored from apologies and forgiveness, which are yet to occur. There have been ongoing cultural activities aiming to re-establish the importance of the ideas and values to promote human rights and peace, reflecting the economic and cultural changes nationally and internationally. Further, along with the economic development, women’s rights have led to the establishment of a relevant government sector since the 1980s and the formation of the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family in 2005. International feminist movements such as the so-called third-wave feminism in the early 1990s were part of the broader background and a source for providing an impetus for cultural values.
The Ideas and Values That Promote Peace and Non-Violence
With the development of new structures and relationships, prevalent ideas, values, and relevant cultural activities have been reformed and settled as consequences. These cultural activities are also backed by a series of agents’ protests. Also, nationally and globally, in regard to the broader cultural milieu, the value of human rights is much more strictly observed than it was decades ago. At the crux of the protests is the hope that the sacrifice of the “comfort women” is not to be forgotten in history, and there will be no repetition of it against the future generations.35 In addition to the structural changes discussed earlier, it is this cultural context with new properties encouraging to the victims who could not help stand against the Japanese government which attempts to hide their violent misconduct, expresses no apologies, and rather prepares itself to be able to ignite another war.36 Japan is active in distorting the history book on their past invasion and igniting the wars and engages in cleansing those misdeeds by paying tribute to the Yasukuni Shrine.37 This represents Japan’s persistent refusal to accept the new cultural emergent properties in place today.
Along with the social movements focused on derailed justice and human rights, there are the so-called pro-Japanese traitors (or 친일파), or the Korean standpattists, who staunchly disagree with the social actors. The standpattists argue that the Korean modernization is attributed to Japanese colonialism and the military “comfort women” were not forced but volunteered (Lee 2019). I argue those standpattists’ thoughts are outdated
35 Dagagagi, October 28, 2004, accessed May 17, 2020.
36 The “Comfort Women” Victims at the 700th Wednesday Demonstration, March 15, 2006, cited in Dagagagi, March 17, 2004, accessed May 17, 2020.
37 진실과미래, 국치 100년사업공동추진위원회 (Truth and Future Commission to Remember the Loss of Sovereignty), February 26, 2009, cited in Dagagagi, April 24, 2009, accessed May 17, 2020.
and they refuse to observe the emergent cultural properties in the new era (Lee 2019). Also, importantly, Korean society has not been able to fully reconcile with the Japanese imperialism, e.g., holding the pro-Japanese Koreans accountable for their ill-informed or treacherous behaviours against their fellow Koreans during the colonial period, followed by their continuing benefits. A good portion of them has formed part of the dominant group of contemporary South Korea.38 Consequently, the continuing tension between the majority of Koreans and the pro-Japanese (by birth or post-birth) has been extremely destructive and wasteful. This means that a rejection of, and an inability to embrace a new culture, new values, and a new structure, is a continuing problem within Korean society.39
Those Koreans who learn about the Japanese treatment of Koreans during the colonial period are determined that the abused human rights, through the “comforting stations,” have to be restored and that the world of justice and peace has to be rebuilt through Japanese apologies and reparation.40 The social actors and the victims are distressed when they learn about the wars continuing around the world. The most vulnerable in war are women and children. They desire that no one deserves the sorrows and injuries that the Japanese military “comfort women” experienced.41 A new culture to appreciate the dignity of human rights has arrived irrespective of whether one is prepared to accept it or not. This certainly persuades the social actors to say that the victims’ injuries must not be repeated ever, and they continue their protests against the Japanese government.42 Under the new culture, Junichiro Koizumi, former Japanese Prime Minister (2001–2006), once wrote to the victims, “As Prime Minister of Japan, I thus extend anew my most sincere apologies and remorse to all the women who underwent immeasurable and painful experiences and suffered incurable physical and psychological wounds as ‘comfort women.’”43 Unfortunately, the victims see this as no more than lip service. What they want is “truthful apologies representing the Japanese government rather than an individual, and other
38 The examples are Park Chung-Hee, General Baek Sun-Yeop.
39 진실과미래, 국치 100년사업공동추진위원회 (Truth and Future Commission to Remember the Loss of Sovereignty), February 26, 2020, cited in Dagagagi, April 24, 2009, accessed May 17, 2020.
40 Dagagagi, March 17, 2004, accessed May 17, 2020.
41 The “Comfort Women” Victims at the 700th Wednesday Demonstration, March 15, 2006, cited in Dagagagi, March 17, 2004, accessed May 17, 2020.
42 Dagagagi, October 15, 2010, accessed May 17, 2020.
43 VAWW-NET Japan, July 2004, cited in Dagagagi, August 9, 2004, accessed May 17, 2020; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2001, https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/women/fund/pmletter. html, accessed July 14, 2020.
actions to reflect their sincerity, such as apologies, reparation, investigating the truth, education and historical awareness.”44 Importantly, these notes are written by “Violence Against Women in War-Network, Japan,” a Japanese activist group.
The Cultural Platforms to Publicize the Ideas through Film, Play, and
Exhibition
The films, plays, and exhibitions have become relatively new and prevalent platforms for demonstrating emergent cultures and communicating them to the public. These platforms are part of the contemporary cultural activities dealing with past events, which are of present concern. These activities offer the public historical and cultural reflections. They are also designed to pave a way for the resolution of the issue of the military “comfort women,” and particularly for a peaceful world. On November 24 and 25, 2007, Tongyeong International Music Foundation Concert Hall hosted a human rights film festival, screening some of the most successful and popular documentaries on the topic of the “comfort women” and the legacy of Japanese imperialism.
They included 사 일본군 위안부The Murmuring: A History of Korean Women안녕 사요나라아직도 아물지 않는 상처들우리학교지울수 없는 역 (낮은 목소리,
1995), Goodbye ( , , 2005), Our School ( , 2006), The Sorrow Yet to be Healed ( , 2003), History that
Can’t be Erased: The Japanese Military “Comfort Women” (
: , 2005).45
The Murmuring, a documentary film, depicted the lives of six victims in their shared house, concerning their past experiences in a “comforting station,” and witnessing their painful memories in many protesting rallies, such as the Wednesday meetings in front of the Japanese Embassy in Seoul. Another film, Goodbye, is meant to see off the unfortunate past and welcome a peaceful future. Many victims of the Second World War were “forcibly” memorialized at the Yasukuni Shrine, without the victims’ consent, which dishonours them. The documentary narrates the story of a descendant of a Korean victim as she fights to have her ancestor’s memorialization removed from the Yasukuni Shrine, and also a Japanese activist’s struggle to fight for the Japanese government’s reparation for injustice against the “comfort women.” The sorrows do not end with the victims but continue with their descendants; however, they are concealed. There are also many Japanese who are seeking justice as a universal value.
44 VAWW-NET Japan, July 2004, cited in Dagagagi, August 9, 2004, accessed May 17, 2020.
45 Dagagagi, November 15, 2007, accessed May 17, 2020.
Chosun School in the documentary film, Our School (우리학교) was established by the first-generation Koreans in Japan—the only such school in the whole Hokkaido. Despite their upbringing in Japan, the students (and their parents) choose to study in the Chosun School for the sake of maintaining their Korean identity in Japan which remains particularly hostile against Koreans.
The ticket for each of these documentary films costs $13 for adults and $5 for students. There were also exhibitions of the artwork painted by the “comfort women.” Dagagagi, the community movement organization, hosted a film festival (with eight films different from the ones screened in the 2007 film festival) and a photo exhibition on the theme of the “comfort women” at the Tongyeong Marine Tour Park on August 23 and 24, 2008.46 This human rights film festival hosted in 2008 was the sixth as such in the Geoje-Tongyeong community.
The human rights film festival is extraordinary in the sense that the contents on display are about the deep injuries that cannot be easily healed and that destroyed the lives of many. The festival is an expression of hope for a future without violence. All the funds raised through the festival were used to support the wellbeing of the “victim grandmas.”47 The films and artwork, as cultural mediums, attracted a broad range of audiences and had a significant effect on spreading and realizing the value of human rights and peace.48 The community members, agents, and social actors hosting the human rights film festival were determined that the Japanese government’s formal apologies and reparation will repair the distorted history and heal the victims’ injuries.49 It must be a significant struggle for the local agents and actors to see the victims carry the vestiges of the sexual abuses in the community. However, it is seen that the ways to support them to overcome the pain and open a peaceful world for the next generation are through cultural activities to inform the community members and especially young students.50
Dagagagi’s annual “Peace and Human Rights Cultural Festival”51 is a continuing reminder of the values of national sovereignty, independence, human rights, and human life, as conveyed on the website. According to Song Do-Ja, a social actor,
46 Dagagagi, August 10, 2008, accessed May 17, 2020.
47 Dagagagi, November 15, 2007, accessed May 17, 2020.
48 Dagagagi, August 10, 2008, accessed May 17, 2020. 49 Dagagagi, August 10, 2008, accessed May 17, 2020.
50 Dagagagi, August 10, 2008, accessed May 17, 2020.
51 “일본군 ‘위안부’피해자기금마련 평화인권문화제.”
Koreans, hoping the national Independence from Japanese imperialism in 1945, would remove all the pains resulting from the Japanese oppression for 36 years. However, national Independence was not an outcome of Koreans’ blood and tears. In the 65 years after the Independence, deeply remaining are the girls’ blooded tears due to the sexual slavery, the forced coal-miners’ moaning to death, the boys’ screaming to death at the front of the warfields, the Koreans’ sorrow under the Japanese systematic discrimination, and those suffering from the inherited diseases caused from the atom bomb in Hiroshima and Nagasaki.52
However, Song Do-Ja believes that the national movement, of which Dagagagi is one, will eventually ensure the recovery of justice, human rights, democracy, and peace, and that we will be able to see the girls’ and the grandmas’ smiling.53 The girls may refer to the girls suffering in the “comforting station” and the girls in the peaceful future, and the grandmas to the “comfort women” victims waiting for the apologies and reparation.
The first Wednesday Demonstration (수요시위/집회) in front of the
Japanese Embassy in Seoul took place on January 8, 1992, as Japanese Prime Minister Miyazawa Kiichi was about to visit Korea. The demonstration, which was in solidarity with the movements in regional Korea, still takes place every Wednesday, marking the 1,534th on March 11, 2022. The Wednesday Demonstration has become an internationally unique and long-running movement for human rights and peace. The demonstration is a cultural event to educate future generations. It is a cultural event in the sense that, despite the level of pain due to the human rights abuse through sexual slavery being enduringly high, the victims and contemporary Koreans want to express their concerns clearly and peacefully through cultural activities. For example, Lee Tae-Hee, a university student, notes that “I have learned what peace and human rights are through the voices of the grandmas such as Kim Bok-Dong, Gil Won-Ok, and Lee Yong-Su, for the last five years and right on this venue.”54 The values they advocate are so crucial and fundamental that thousands of protesters have joined and shouted for justice and peace for thirty years without skipping one week. The protesters’ passion continues to grow stronger despite their requests falling on deaf ears. Every demonstration
52 Dagagagi, July 28, 2010, accessed May 17, 2020. 53 Dagagagi, July 28, 2010, accessed May 17, 2020.
54Wednesday Protests Must Continue Bearing in Mind the Original Intentions). May 13, Hankyoreh Shinmun. 2020. “[사설] 수요시위, ‘초심’ 기억하며 앞으로 나가야 한다” (Editorial: http:// www.hani.co.kr/arti/opinion/editorial/944822.html, accessed July 21, 2020.
has been a struggle for the old, sick, and suffering victims in particular. The protesters’ cries and messages for peace are directed toward the Japanese Embassy, the Japanese government, and all the war criminals.55 There have been no meaningful responses from Japan. For instance, Okuno Seiske, a member of the Japanese Diet, argued that the “comfort women” were not forced, but were voluntary and that the Japanese military provided them with transport to the “comforting stations”; this has consequently led to distortions in history texts in Japan.56 A Japanese gynaecologist working in the Japanese army examined 100 women and found that twenty of them were Japanese prostitutes and eighty of them were “Korean virgins.” Those Korean women were told they were going to work in factories.57
Tongyeong-Geoje cities co-hosted the 1,000th Wednesday Demonstration in the community in solidarity with many other protests throughout the country. On December 8, 2011, thousands of members of Tongyeong-Geoje cities gathered at the Gangguan Beach where the victims (soon to be “comfort women”) boarded the ship and were forcibly taken away during the colonial period. One thousand individuals either prepared their own banners filled with protesting words and artwork or received ready-made banners. One thousand individuals holding their own banners stood connected to each other, making a U-shape to indicate their united minds in seeking justice and peace. A living “comfort woman,” Kim Bok-Deuk, stood in the middle, i.e., 500th of the U-shaped line of the protesting agents.58 Media reports showed that the participants represented boys and girls, and young and older members. Completing the cultural event, the representative social actor, Song Do-Ja, recalled that she was worried about how to meet the expenses for the event, but she had to proceed as she was looking into the sorrowful eyes of the 94-year-old grandma, Kim Bok-Deuk, who was the only remaining survivor in the region at the time. The single most important reason to host such an event is the hope to have the victims’ basic human dignity restored as soon as possible or before they all die out.59 What else is more sacred than
55 Dagagagi, November 17, 2004, accessed May 17, 2020.
56 Dagagagi, March 17, 2006, accessed May 17, 2020.
57 Cited in Miki Dezaki, producer of the film, Shusenjo—The Main Battleground of the Comfort
Women Issue않는다 , https://www.shusenjo.com/, “일본은 더 이상 학교에서 위안부 문제를 가르치지
| 영화 주전장” (Japan Does Not Teach about the ‘Comfort Women’ at School). July 26,
2019, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ukSkNAJ5Ka0, accessed August 20, 2020.
58보 Dagagagi, December 8, 2011, accessed July 17, 2020; “통영거제 1000명한산신문 정의의 인간띠잇기 화
” (1000 Tongyeong-Geoje Citizens of Justice Connected to Each Other). , December 15, 2011, http://www.hansannews.com/news/articleView.html?idxno=32003, accessed July 22, 2020.
59 Dagagagi, January 7, 2012, accessed May 17, 2020.
the basic human dignity of one single human? The same event was repeated in March 2015, accompanying the 98-year-old grandma Kim Bok-Deuk, to commemorate the 70th anniversary of the National Independence.60
These cultural events such as the Wednesday Demonstration continue to encourage the corporate actors and even the grassroots to revisit human rights and peace as universal values in human history. Irrespective of whether it has been cold and windy, humid and hot, rainy or snowy, the social actors and the “comfort women” victims with their ill-health continue their protests in front of the Japanese Embassy in Seoul and at other venues. They find it unbearable to think even for a short moment about the once prevalent culture of deceiving the young girls and women, forcibly taking them away to put them under sexual slavery, and completely depriving them of their human dignity, happiness, and freedom. It was the Japanese imperialism and the invasive wars inflicted by Japan that underpinned all the anti-human criminal activities. The social actors and community members are still crying out to the Japanese government to apologize and reparate, and to the Korean government to take proactive action against Japan. In fact, the social actors are well informed of the prevalent culture of humiliation and secret dealing that the Korean government occasionally employed in their diplomatic relationship with Japan in terms of resolving the issue of the “comfort women” ever since Independence in 1945.61 On August 30, 2011, Korean Constitutional Court ruled it unconstitutional that “the Korean government has taken up no action to develop systematic ways to have the ‘comfort women’ issue resolved, leaving the victims’ abused basic rights abandoned.” The social actors were adamant in urging that the Korean government be aware that the victims were desperately running out of time to have their basic dignities restored, and that the government should carry out its duty. I think these represent the social actors’ lamentation that the Korean government is not developing new ideas to deal with the concern. In August 2011, there were sixty-three victims alive although 234 of them were initially registered in South Korea.62 As at May 26, 2020, there remained seventeen survivors.63
60명 인간띠잇기 개최 Geoje Nyuseu Kwangjang (Geoje News Plaza). 2015. “‘위안부’ 일본정부 배상촉구 1000
” (The Military ‘Comfort Women’ Seeking the Japanese Government’s Reparation: 1000 Community Members Demonstrate Human Connections). March 31, http:// www.gjnewsplaza.com/news/articleView.html?idxno=1826, accessed July 22, 2020.
61 Dagagagi, December 26, 2011, accessed May 17, 2020.
62 Dagagagi, December 26, 2011, accessed May 17, 2020.
63 Hankyoreh Shinmun. 2020. “일본군 ‘위안부’ 피해자 별세…생존자 17명” (Passing of the
‘Comfort Women’ Victims … Now 17 Remaining Alive). May 26, http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/ society/women/946565.html, accessed July 23, 2020.
More Cultural Programmes to Promote the Ideas: A Scholarship
Programme, Erecting the Statues
Analysis of Dagagagi, the website of the community movement, shows that there has been widespread community support for the resolution of the unresolved legacy of the “comfort women.” The social actors in Tongyeong-Geoje cities have been part of the national level movement to influence the U.N. (United Nations), ILO (International Labour Organization), the American Congress, Korean and Japanese governments, which led to significant success, e.g., The U.S. House of Representatives House Resolution 121, passing on July 30, 2007 (Lee and Halpin 2020). Dagagagi initiated and achieved a similar resolution in the Tongyeong and Geoje City Councils, and also Gyeongsang-Namdo Provincial Council.64 As noted, there are also ongoing local initiatives. The students at local schools engage in fundraising to support Dagagagi’s local activities.65 Dagagagi had its tenth anniversary on April 27, 2012, and the commemoration was filled with reading poems, Tongyeong Flute Ensemble’s presentations, dancing and singing performances by Tonyeong Girls High-school, a victim’s speech (by Kim Bok-Deuk), acknowledging those individuals and local business/labour association donating funds and skills to Dagagagi’s activities. Mobilizing virtually the whole community, the commemoration was all geared towards restoring the dignity of the Japanese military “comfort women” and opening the days of justice and peace someday, and many participants in the evening had their eyes filled with tears.66 The Memorial Statue of Justice (정의평화의 비) was also erected in Tongyeong, 소녀상 and The Standing Statue of Peace ( ) in Geoje, through fundraising supported by the members of the cities.67 The aims to erect the statues were to commemorate the victims, record the history and pave the road for human rights, justice, and peace.68 Following the erection of the statues, there followed a youth competition to create a three-minute video clip to promote the statue. The competition was open to all the youth in the whole nation and entitled, “Justice for the Japanese Military ‘Comfort Women,’ Resolving It with Our Own Effort.”69 The prize-winning
64 Dagagagi, December 24, 2009, accessed May 17, 2020.
65 Dagagagi, April 16, 2007, accessed May 17, 2020.
66 Dagagagi, May 3, 2012 and August 23, 2012, accessed May 17, 2020.
67 Dagagagi, July 17, 2012, accessed May 17, 2020.
68 Dagagagi, November 6, 2012, accessed May 17, 2020.
69 Dagagagi, September 5, 2012, accessed May 17, 2020. The first prize clip is entitled “Kkochi Pinda” (The Flowers are Blossoming), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=thP4J4FkczM, January 3, 2014, accessed July 25, 2020. The two clips that shared second prize are entitled, “미래에
high-school students brought their impressive digital skills to the video production, historical knowledge, and their passion to have the “comfort women” problem resolved.70
On November 4, 2013, the grandma Kim Bok-Deuk (96-years-old) donated her personal saving of $20,000 to the scholarship fund of Tongyeong Girls High-school, which was “in support of the disadvantaged students’ translating their personal dreams into reality.” I think this action is not only a support for the future generation to enjoy a peaceful world, but an active protest against violence. Kim also donated another $20,000 to the construction of Gyeongsang-Namdo Province’s Historical and Memorial Hall of the “Comfort Women.”71 Kim’s donation of the latter $20,000, which was all the asset she had at the time, became the seeding grant to plan the “citizens-initiated” first such construction. The community fund-raising contributed $0.5m, the Korean central government $0.5m, and the provincial government $0.5–$1.5m in total.72 It was not only Kim but all the rest of the community at different levels who shared the value of justice and peace.
There were many other cultural events such as book talks with the authors on history or the “comfort women.” For example, a book talk with the author of The House with Red Tile Roof (빨간 기와집, 2014), which Gawata Humiko wrote based on the life story of a military “comfort woman,” Bae Bong-Gi, who became the first witness of her own experience. Another book talk is with Morikawa Machiko, the author of Mun Ok-Ju, the Japanese Military “Comfort Woman” in the Burmese Warfield옥주 (버마전선 일본군 “위안부” 문
). The book talk flyer notes that the event is about “the contemporary Koreans talking about the past problem in order to imagine a peaceful future.”73 In August 2018 and August 2019, Dagagagi hosted the National Youth Competition for Poems and Painting on the “comfort women.” The items that won the prizes were on display at the citizens’ gallery in Nagoya and Kyoto.74
우리가watch?v=rApDJEwG7Q4, 꼭 보고싶은 뉴스 January 3, 2014, accessed July 25, 2020 and “Gaehwa (Blossoming),” ” (The News We Are Anxious to Watch), https://www.youtube.com/ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aGqtpqPsgGU, January 3, 2014, accessed July 25, 2020.
70 Dagagagi, November 15, 2013, accessed May 17, 2020.
71 Dagagagi, November 10, 2013, accessed May 17, 2020.
72 Hankyoreh Shinmun. 2019. “경남 일본군 위안부 역사관 건립 추진” (Constructing Gyeon-
gsang-Namdo Province’s Historical and Memorial Hall of the ‘Comfort Women’). October 28, http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/area/yeongnam/914838.html, accessed July 25, 2020.
73 Dagagagi, June 14, 2017, accessed July 25, 2020.
74 Dagagagi, July 30, 2018, August 5, 2019, and June 24, 2019, accessed May 17, 2020.
People’s Emergent Properties: The Capacities of Component Members
Depending upon the emergent structural and cultural properties, people’s emergent properties appear accordingly, attempting to maximize their own life chances in the given context. These three types of emergent properties are conceptually distinct from each other. However, it is not a straightforward task to distinguish one from another when illustrating them empirically. Emergent structural and cultural properties are conditioning the structural and cultural context, in that the component members not only form part of the contextual changes, but also take active roles in calibrating the context to bring about changes. In this process, individual agents go through changes themselves, from primary agents to social actors, thus displaying double morphogenesis. I have already presented many of the protest activities as the social actors have engaged in opening the future of justice and peace. The following sections are to further illustrate their social movements, most of which were underpinned by the above-discussed emergent structural and cultural properties, then enabling the people’s actions
What the Victims Have Gone Through: Turning from the Victims to
Advocates and Voluntary Social Actors
The most proactive actors in the whole movement are the “comfort women” victims themselves. Their personal lives during and after the suffering as the “comfort women” have demonstrated an extreme level of resilience beyond most people’s comprehension. Their resilient lives as well as witnessing what they have gone through have been a strong impetus for the social movement to fight for justice and peace in the future. Despite their age and frailty status, the victims have been the most proactive actors, witnessing their own experiences during the Wednesday Protests, community rallies, and international forums such as the United Nations, which has been well reported on the Dagagagi website and the major news outlets.
Dagagagi informs the community members of the victims’ ailing health, their treatment in hospitals, recoveries, or eventual deaths. Their ill-health is due to the combined impact of the life-long post-traumatic anguishes and old age. During their ill health, the social actors remain the close aides to those grandmas without their own families. Indeed, social activists are much more than the children of the grandmas in terms of caring for them.75 Also critical is the companionship of the co-sufferers who smile and
75 Dagagagi, April 5, 2007, accessed May 17, 2020.
weep at each other’s pain and recovery from ill-health.76 Their unexpected hospitalization raises a great concern among the actors since the movement is making little progress.77
However, every human life is mortal. The death of the victims is one of the few most frequently discussed topics on the Dagagagi website. Losing about one grandma per month throughout the country in 2004 was causing serious concern as the grandmas were dying without receiving apologies from the Japanese government.78 Every posting of their death is accompanied by their brief life trajectory and their final days of ailing health. According to the Dagagagi postings, the victims were typically from disadvantaged families and deceivingly recruited to a factory in their late teens or early twenties. They ended up in “comforting stations” in China, Singapore, New Guinea, and Myanmar, and they slaved for a few to several years. In addition to sexual assault, there was physical and verbal violence against the victims far beyond what one can endure, which has been illustrated in numerous studies and films. At the end of the Second World War, many were killed or abandoned (Yun 1997: 291). Only some of those who returned to Korea were reunited with their families. The health impact of the assault has been lifelong. In the victims’ last moments of life, their supporters and actors have nothing but to say, “We are sorry since we still could not get the apologies from Japan. We will continue to fight to have your dignities restored.”79 Reading the postings, one realizes that these are desperate cries determined to see the resolution of the matter. The social actors’ determination is the last message that the victims leave behind, i.e., ensuring a peaceful world for the next generation.
Grassroots Movement and Community Activities in Support of the Victims and Peaceful Future: Postcard Writing
As discussed, there have been numerous community-based protests in support of human rights and a peaceful future. First, Dagagagi hosted a historical tour for the local citizens on September 1, 2012. It was a guided tour on foot, taking the participants to historically significant places in terms of Koreans’ fighting for national Independence and the “comfort women” issue—the Gangguan Port where the girls were boarded and kidnapped, the post office, district office, fishnet manufacturing factory, theatre, market, and an Independence activist’s memorial site.80
76 Dagagagi, August 5, 2012, accessed May 17, 2020.
77 Dagagagi, October 10, 2006, accessed May 17, 2020.
78 Dagagagi, October 5, 2004, accessed May 17, 2020.
79 Dagagagi, February 19, 2006, accessed May 17, 2020.
80 Dagagagi, August 23, 2012, accessed May 17, 2020.
Second, a notable movement in Tongyeong-Geoje cities is to write postcards to the members of the National Diet of Japan. This campaign to write to the members mobilizes the whole citizens of Tongyeong and Geoje cities, especially the students of middle and high schools. Teaching young people the history of Japanese imperialist behaviours is an important part of the whole social movement and the movement also aims to ensure a peaceful world for them. Having the youth involved in the grassroots movements helps them participate in remembering the dark history, so that the younger and older generations reflect on the history and plan actively for a better future (Kim 2018b; Lee 2016), which is intended for an effect of influencing the participants to change from primary agents to corporate agents, and then to social actors. Then, the reflection on the history offers a meaningful opportunity to think about the value of “public history” (de Groot 2009; Sayer 2015; cited in Kim 2018b). Thousands of students have participated in the writing campaign, and the postcards were beautifully packed and delivered to the National Diet of Japan. The following is an example:
Dear Sir/Madam, I am a high-school student in Korea. I am a member of a support group for the “comfort women/grandmas” and we are their chat companion. Seeing some of them pass away, we are desperately realizing the limited time left before they all die. Can you please legislate for the resolution of the issue of the Japanese military “comfort women?” Please do not forget the grandmas (Kim Ga-Eun).81
The agents’ and actors’ postcard writing reminds the members of the National Diet that Japan forcibly took away the grandmas and that they await sincere apologies and reparation from Japan.
Please, help their human rights be restored. I trust you will respond to my request. Thank you, Sir/Madam (Lee Seong-Hun, Geoje Jeil High-school).82 When taken away, the grandmas were as young as me and with lots of dreams. Their hopes and dreams were all crushed (Kim Ji-Eun, Geoje Jeil High-school).83
I am saddened and angered by all the sufferings the grandmas are still going through (Lee Eun-Jeong, Tongyeong Girls’ High-school).84
81 Dagagagi, October 31, 2010, accessed May 17, 2020.
82 Dagagagi, October 29, 2010, accessed May 17, 2020.
83 Dagagagi, October 30, 2010, accessed May 17, 2020.
84 Dagagagi, November 1, 2010, accessed May 17, 2020.
Dagagagi also organized the campaign to write postcards to the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR) from September to November 2013.85 In conjunction with a good number of Japanese activists with shared interests in justice and peace, members of Dagagagi visited Japanese local governments as well as the National Diet of Japan, exchanging declarations for a peaceful world and raising awareness in the public.86 Mostly working to raise awareness of the issue of the “comfort women,” Dagagagi has only partly accomplished its goals which are still in progress. However, Dagagagi has run into obstacles in making any progress with any meaningful responses from the Korean and Japanese governments. Dagagagi has urged both to work together for the resolution of the matter. Dagagagi members have been particularly disappointed with the Park Geun-Hye government, for showing little understanding of or sympathy for the suffering of the military “comfort women.” Park has not only refused to meet the victims but her government allowed the publication of a misinformed history book, which Dagagagi understands was “for the sake of brainwashing the youth and misleading them. These ahistorical and pro-Japanese approaches are against the restoration of human rights and justice.”87 These misinformed approaches to human rights and justice are disturbing.88
There are numerous community supports and encouragement for the “comfort women” grandmas and Dagagagi activities. For example, donations from anonymous Koreans living overseas,89 birthday parties for the grandmas,90 attending nationwide human rights camps,91 a trip to spa, and Mt. Jiri,92 a local Rotary club inviting the grandmas to a buffet lunch,93 overnight excursions to nature,94 and Dagagagi leaders’ monthly meetings. These activities require a significant level of commitment and sacrifice in terms of time, effort, and financial contribution. These social actors see the grandmas as historical victims, who cannot be forgotten if
85 Dagagagi, September 13, 2013, accessed May 17, 2020.
86 Dagagagi, December 14, 2009, accessed May 17, 2020.
87 Dagagagi, September 16, 2013, accessed May 17, 2020.
88 Hankyoreh Shinmun. 2020. “[사설] 광복절 ‘친일 청산’ 다짐조차 트집 잡는 통합당” (Edito-
rial: United Future Party is Against the Independence Day Speech to Settle the Matter of the Pro-Japanese Fellows). August 16, http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/opinion/editorial/958002.html, accessed August 18, 2020.
89 Dagagagi, August 4, 2004, accessed May 17, 2020.
90 Dagagagi, August 30, 2004, accessed May 17, 2020.
91 Dagagagi, October 4, 2004, accessed May 17, 2020.
92 Dagagagi, November 11, 2004, accessed May 17, 2020.
93 Dagagagi, July 18, 2005, accessed May 17, 2020.
94 Dagagagi, May 23, 2007, accessed May 17, 2020.
justice and peace are to be ensured for future generations. Dagagagi as a social movement raises its voice against pro-Japanese traitors (친일파). For example, Tongyeong Police Station maintained a ritual to commemorate Kim Deok-Bo (1852–1941) as she donated ¥170,000 to the construction of the station. Dagagagi demanded that the commemoration be stopped and the commemoration stone be removed since the police stations under Japanese imperialism were at the forefront of oppressing Koreans.95
International Solidarity with the Victims and Supporters around the World, and Including Those in Japan
Dagagagi is located far from the capital area, but it is a strongly determined, well-connected, and strategic protest group. The victims and social actors make an integral part of the national movement working closely in international solidarity with the victims and supporters in North Korea, Japan, and other continents. First, Dagagagi actors and local victims participated in the 698th Wednesday Demonstration (combined with Human Rights Camp) in Mt. Keumgang in North Korea on March 1, 2006 to commemorate March First Independence Movement. The site was at what was then a South Korean-run resort complex in North Korea. The camp was an opportunity to unload the shared pain and strengthen solidarity with the victims in North Korea, and also improve mutual understanding between the victims and social actors, which would lead to a more effective social movement. The camp also aimed to offer the grandmas a refreshing time in the beautiful Mt. Keumgang, which is a nationally significant place.96
Second, Dagagagi is connected to like-minded Japanese and Koreans in Japan. Grandma Kim Bok-Deuk and two social actors were invited to Nagoya. Kim engaged in describing Japan’s war crime against the “comfort women” to the Japanese public, and the Korean-Japanese associations, and through media interviews.97 Kim Bok-Deuk, Song Do-Ja (the representative of Dagagagi), and the social actors from Gyeongsang-Namdo Province attended public meetings in Tokyo and Osaka, supported by the Japanese activists. Kim’s description of her broken arms due to physical violence and suffering in the “comforting station,” and the screening of a twenty-minute video, Somang (The Hope), made the eyes of all the audience fill with tears. The Japanese activists displayed the Japanese translation of the postcards that the high-school students wrote. The Women’s Active Museum on War
95 Dagagagi, March 3, 2010, accessed May 17, 2020.
96 Dagagagi, February 23, 2006, accessed May 17, 2020.
97 Dagagagi, September 20, 2007, accessed May 17, 2020.
and Peace in Tokyo provided the delegates with ideas on how to build a similar museum in Gyeongsang-Namdo Province.98
Third, the military “comfort women” victims and the voluntary social actors of Dagagagi in Tongyeong-Geoje cities and their counterparts in Changwon City (eleven persons in total) visited the National Diet of Japan in October 2010. The aim was for the victims to convey their messages to the National Diet before they all died. Their messages were to remind the Japanese leaders of the crimes committed during the war, the values of women’s rights and peace, and the need to have the victims’ basic dignities restored. The eventual hope was to seek the possibility of establishing solidarity between Korea and Japan to build a peaceful world.99
Fourth, facing the persistent resistance from Japan to the resolution of war crimes such as the Japanese military “comfort women,” seven relevant representative groups from Asia and the United States formed an international movement in solidarity (Min, Chung, and Yim 2019). The Asian countries included North and South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, and China. Ninety-four social actors, including several victims, from the seven countries attended a forum in Seoul, May 21–22, 2004. The forum was particularly concerned with the victims of Japan’s war crimes, including the 800,000 people under forced labour, 1 million massacred, and 200,000 “comfort women.” The Seoul forum passed the resolution to initiate a massive petition in each country and take the collected petition to the U.N.; the representatives from each country were to work with the Parliament in their own country; hold protest rallies simultaneously in each country; and host the international forum regularly.100 The eighth forum in Seoul included the participants, in addition to those from the seven countries, from Indonesia, the Netherlands, Germany, and Australia.101 Grassroots movements such as these have mixed results, acquiring meaningful support from the parliaments overseas on the one hand, and continuing to face obstacles due to no action from the Japanese government on the other. The U.N. and ILO benefit from receiving Japan’s financial contribution, which may influence their lack of action to resolve the above-mentioned matters.102 Nonetheless, Dagagagi and other national and international movements with the same goal remain determined and continue to pursue their goals.103
98 Dagagagi, December 10, 2010, accessed May 17, 2020.
99 Dagagagi, September 9, 2010, accessed May 17, 2020.
100 Dagagagi, June 2, 2004, accessed May 17, 2020.
101 Dagagagi, May 24, 2007, accessed May 17, 2020.
102 Dagagagi, March 17, 2006, accessed May 17, 2020. 103 Dagagagi, March 17, 2006, accessed May 17, 2020.
I think it is appropriate to finish with a couple of students’ pleas to the Japanese government:
Please apologize and reparate, and enable them to forgive you [Japan] before they die. So that they can go in peace. Please put yourself in the shoes of the grandmas (Kim Su-Bin and Ma Hee-Ju).104
Unlike us studying in an air-conditioned classroom, the grandmas were abused by the Japanese soldiers who were aggressive and violent in the warfield. It is not about money. Please apologize before too late so that the grandmas can forgive you (Kim Min-Ji).105
These are desperate appeals from the high-school girls. How can they refuse to listen to them and respond to their requests? Yet, the requests have constantly been ignored, as the human rights of the “comfort women” have also been. Disappointingly, it is this kind of helpless and desperate feeling that corporate agents and voluntary social actors of the movement find it difficult to overcome. They feel like running into a brick wall, facing the brazen-faced Japanese governments, Korean governments’ indifference, and Korean peoples’ increasing impatience to fight against injustice over a period.106
Discussion and Concluding Remarks
The suffering of the Japanese military “comfort women” is a historical incident inflicted by the powerful Japanese nation-state and its agents, who committed acts of violence against other weaker nation-states and their people. Putting women under sexual slavery is the complete destruction of their human dignity. Even after the end of sexual slavery with the end of the Second World War, the victims had nowhere to complain or ask for compensation because of the continuity of the uneven power relationship between the superpower (Japan) and the weaker nation-state (Korea). These processes greatly differ from Nazi Germany and its victimized neighbouring countries. At the time of Korea’s rapid economic development, the Korean government’s interest was not to disturb the (unequal economic) relationship
104 Dagagagi, October 15, 2010 and October 17, 2010, accessed May 17, 2020.
105 Dagagagi, March 17, 2006, accessed May 17, 2020.
106 Hankyoreh Shinmun. 2005. “정신대 할머니와 함께 하는 시민모임” (The Citizens to Support the ‘Comfort Women’ Victims). August 11, http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/PRINT/56756.html, accessed August 19, 2020.
between Japan and Korea, so that Japan would be “willing enough” to transfer technologies to Korea and support its economic development. A predominant proportion of Koreans was cooperative with the governments’ concerted efforts for the nation’s development, which was used as a source of legitimizing the authoritarian and undemocratic regimes. Therefore, structural development was at the centre of the whole nation, backed up by the people, and there was little room to reflect on the victims of Japanese colonialism such as the military “comfort women” and the forced labourers, till the late 1980s. Further, Koreans under their cultural traditions around gender and sexuality turned their backs on the victims. Many families could not embrace the returned and injured daughters after the Second World War, which has similar features to honour killings from other cultural and historical contexts.
Following the successful hosting of the 1988 Seoul Olympics, which was a turning point for Korean economic development, Koreans started enjoying the fruits of their decades-long diligent work. The restriction on travel overseas was lifted in 1988 and Kim Hak-Sun, a victim of the military “comfort women,” spoke out for the first time in Korea on August 14, 1991. The Japanese government’s official denial, in June 1990, of engaging in the forced recruitment of the “comfort women” and establishing the “comforting stations” angered the victims. Then, the victims’ peace movement had an impetus to commence the long battle to redress the damages (Yoon 2015:
197–198). A private research institute, The Center for Historical Truth and Justice (민족문제연구소)107 was established in February 1991 and launched a massive project to research and reveal a list of thousands of Koreans and their activities, who betrayed their nation and acted pro-Japanese to the Japanese imperialists and their subordinates. With the significant economic development in Korea, the victims have become confident enough to publicly raise their sufferings and demand compensation, and there has been a dramatic culture change to appreciate human dignity and human rights. The level of public protests has exponentially strengthened in the last two decades.
A good number of social movements at the national level have been pursuing ways to rectify the legacies of Japanese colonialism, e.g., the proJapanese continuing to enjoy the privileges acquired as a result of betraying their fellow Koreans. There have been significant efforts by academic and grassroots communities to address these issues for the sake of human rights and justice, which had been ignored for a long period. The Korean National
107 https://www.minjok.or.kr/
Assembly has been a significantly supportive force in this process. However, the turn-coats have been enjoying their privileges for so long and they have caused significant obstacles in re-establishing the values of justice and fraternity. The advanced status of the Korean economy and its place in the international community have made remarkable differences domestically and internationally. However, Japan’s imperialist policies and attitudes, especially towards South Korea, have little changed, and are closely reflected in the Japanese media and school textbooks. Thus, these have blocked any possible breakthrough of a broad range of Korean governments’ or social movements’ seeking the Japanese government’s apologies and reparation for the Japanese military “comfort women.”
Nonetheless, the majority of the Korean public has displayed the change from primary agents to corporate agents to use Archer’s words (2003), increasingly aware of the social problems and making their public commitment. Grassroots social movements have been formed and pursued rigorously, and their commitment has been extraordinary. Dagagagi is a movement within one of the most affected districts—Tongyeong-Geoje cities. The changes in cultural contexts enabled by structural changes have provided the Korean public and grassroots with the confidence to actively engage the local, national, and international movements. The social movements to restore the dignities of the “comfort women” have hosted numerous cultural events such as film festivals, exhibitions, competitions to create video clips, erecting the Statues of Peace, and writing postcards to the Japanese Diet, which have been extremely successful in mobilizing the grassroots and have a large number of them meaningfully engaged in the social movement. The social activists, in cooperation with Dagagagi, and in solidarity with their counterparts in other affected nations have won the hearts of National Assemblies of the U.S., Canada, the Netherlands, and the European Union, which have passed the resolution to demand the Japanese government’s apologies and reparation for the “comfort women” victims. One of the significant aspects of Dagagagi’s grassroots movement is that the older generation encouraged the youth to be involved since all the corporate actors are determined not to see the violence repeated against future generations. This is a concentrated and transcendental form of nationalism deeply embedded in the minds of Koreans today.
Most victims have passed away and only sixteen live as at July 7, 2020,108 but the crimes remain unresolved. The movement has to continue until Japan provides its formal apologies to the victims. However, the Japanese
108 The number is down to fourteen as at May 3, 2021; and twelve as at February 24, 2022.
government and the majority of people have not offered apologies. In recent years with the Moon Jae-In regime, supported by the 2016–2017 Candlelight Revolution, the structure of Korean politics and economy has changed significantly, and so has the relationship between Korea and Japan. Supported by the increasingly strengthening status of the Korean economy and its roles in the international community, Korea’s corporate and voluntary social actors, in particular, want to and are determined to see the impact of the changes through the resolution of the issue of the “comfort women.” As I have discussed, different historical stages have significantly changed the Korean public perceptions of the “comfort women.” The most recent stage is the Japanese trade provocation in 2019 and the Korean people’s protest, the “No Japan, No Abe” movement, which I will analyse in another chapter. I argue that these successful protests against Japan will further galvanize the movement to demand apologies and reparation for the “comfort women.” All these movements are important processes in restoring some degree of the dignity of the victims, and the nation-state as well as national identities in the 21st century. There are enough geopolitical reasons for Korea and Japan to collaborate, but this is unlikely unless the grassroots are provided with the reasons to change their views about Japan.
Calculated nationalism in this chapter is not as apparent, but subtle. Korean grassroots have been calculating “time and space” in terms of choosing the right time and methods to confront the Korean and Japanese governments. Further, the grassroots are not blindly standing against the Japanese in general, but its past misdeeds in history to have rectified. This certainly demonstrates the grassroots’ calculated nationalism.
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