Calculated Nationalism in Contemp S Korea 4

 4 “No Abe, Yes Japan” Movement in 2019

Bolstering National Pride and Identity

The era of elitism whereby elites teach the masses is over since progressive intellectuals are no better than the mass.

Bae (2019: 271)

Abstract

Park Geun-Hye’s hasty and inadequate agreement to settle the Japanese military “comfort women” issue with the Japanese government led by Abe Shinzo in December 2015 turned out to be devastating to the victims and the majority of socially and historically conscious South Koreans. Following Park’s impeachment and the election of Moon Jae-In, the Korean government faced a few ongoing related legal cases and attempted to redress the matter, which then angered Japan’s Prime Minister Abe who appeared to look down upon the Korean nation-state. Abe instigated a trade provocation, creating obstacles for some Japanese corporations exporting a few key products to Korean electronics companies. As a response to this trade provocation, Koreans initiated a large-scale boycott against Japan—the “No Abe, No Japan” movement.

Keywords: trade provocation, Abe Shinzo, “No Japan” movement, boycotting Japan

Introduction

“No Abe, No Japan” was a South Korean grassroots social movement to boycott Japanese products and also Japan as a tourist destination. It began on July 2, 2019 as a protest against Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo’s July 1, 2019 announcement of a trade provocation against Korea. This trade provocation restricted the export of three chemicals from Japan to South Korea; the chemicals were critical for the manufacturing of semiconductors 

 

Han, G.-S., Calculated Nationalism in Contemporary South Korea. Movements for Political and Economic Democratization in the 21st Century. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press 2023 doi: 10.5117/9789463723657_ch04

and display screens. The three chemicals were: fluorinated polyimide, resist, and hydrogen fluoride. Intending to support the Korean government’s reluctance to be subservient to the provocation, Korean grassroots, without the government’s intervention, launched a counter-attack against the Japanese government’s trade restriction.

Following the Japanese announcement, the restriction became effective on July 4, 2019 and required Japanese exporters to seek permission each time they wanted to export any of the three chemicals to South Korea. It took ninety days to obtain permission.1 In addition, Tokyo removed South Korea from the so-called “white list,” stripping away some of South Korea’s preferential treatment in Japan’s trade with South Korea (Korea hereafter unless specified).

The “No Japan” movement was a nationwide movement not to buy Japanese products, nor to travel to Japan. What was unique about Japan’s trade provocation was that Japan was willingly giving up the profits out of the export items to Korea. Tokyo’s abrupt imposition of the restriction caused significant turmoil to many electronic manufacturers in Korea, disrupting the closely linked network of neighbouring economies of Korea and Japan. Korea’s semiconductor manufacturers, Samsung Electronics and SK Hynix “supplied 61 per cent of components used in memory chips globally in 2018.”2 If they were unable to source alternatives to supply the chemicals, a global disruption in memory chip supply was predicted inevitable. This would eventually lead to affecting the production of mobile devices, PCs, and other electronic products, causing a price hike.

Prime Minister Abe blamed Korea’s inadequate management of the chemicals and was concerned with the possible smuggling of the chemicals to North Korea and its usage of them for developing military weapons. The Korean government denied this.  The “No Japan” Movement needs to be contextualized in the broader national and international context as well as the Japanese colonialism in the past. How the grassroots responded to an international dispute in their mass protests is of particular interest. This chapter has the following aims: (1) to identify consumer boycott motivations, 

1 CNBC. 2019. The Japan-South Korea Dispute Could Push up the Price of Your Next Smartphone. July 22, https://www.cnbc.com/2019/07/23/japan-south-korea-dispute-impact-on-semiconductorsupply-chain-prices.html, accessed November 17, 2020.

2 The Japan-South Korea Dispute Could Push up the Price of Your Next Smartphone.

(2) to ascertain the modes of the grassroots movement to boycott Japanese products or travelling to Japan, and (3) to analyse news reports of the movement with reference to structure, culture, and agency (Archer 1995).

Literature Review

International trade is a crucial element for the well-being of a nation-state and its people. Past and/or contemporary political, economic, or cultural conflicts between nations can cause economic animosity which may lead to boycotting products from particular countries. Surveying the literature on boycotting foreign products, Kang (2019) found five major influential factors that can cause boycotting of foreign products. First, consumer ethnocentrism can take a social-psychological and emotional role in purchasing behaviour of foreign products (Klein, Etterson, and Krishnan 2006). According to Shimp and Sharma (1987), ethnocentrism can influence consumers’ intention to purchase foreign products and can also negatively affect their perception of the quality of foreign products (Klein, Ettenson, and Morris 1998). Hostile relationships in the past, due to war or colonialism, such as the ones between Korea-Japan, China-Japan (both resulting from Japanese imperialism) and the tension between Australia-France (due to French nuclear tests in the South Pacific) caused consumer ethnocentrism (Guo and Kwon 2015; Park and Jang 2012; Yoon 2014; Etterson and Klein 2005; Heslop, Lu, and Cray 2009). Second, closely related to consumer ethnocentrism and the focus of this chapter is consumer animosity, which refers to “remnants of antipathy related to previous or ongoing military, political, or economic events” (Klein, Ettenson, and Morris 1998). Kuwaitis developed a strong animosity against Denmark due to the depiction of the Prophet Muhammed in the Danish press (Maher and Mady 2010). Klein et al. (1998) pointed out a key difference between the two concepts that consumer ethnocentrism determines the judgment of the perceived quality of and intention to purchase foreign products, whereas consumer animosity affects only the intention to buy. In this respect, what is observed in the boycott under examination in this chapter is consumer animosity in tandem with ethnocentrism. That is, there is a significant overlap between them (Chan, Chan, and Leung 2010).

Third, “identification with the victim” can occur when a particular product has caused damage to its customers, thus other customers fear being the victims as well. This cognitive or emotional fear can make one identify with the victims, which then motivates them to support the victims and potentially participate in boycotting the product (Park and Park 2018; Kang 2019: 201). Fourth, as customers become aware of a company’s involvement in misdeeds such as unethical actions or causing damage to its customers, they could develop a sense of “perceived egregiousness” of the company and participate in the boycott (Klein, Smith, and John 2004). A company’s engagement in egregious actions against nature, such as catching whales or seals, can make the products made in the relevant country the targets of international boycotting. Fifth, “perceived efficacy” refers to the extent to which potential boycott participants believe in achieving a successful boycott of a product. The higher the level of perceived efficacy is, the more likely a customer will join the boycott.

Since the trade dispute was related to historical and contemporary conflicts between Korea and Japan, all of these five intentions are relevant. Korean grassroots were centred on patriotic nationalism and voluntarily put their efforts into fighting against Japan’s economic imperialism. The literature on the above-discussed five key motivations in “mobilizing boycott foreign products” point to two main factors: (1) wishing the boycott target to discontinue its egregious behaviour or policy (Braunsberger and Buckler 2011) and (2) consumer animosity towards a specific country (Etterson and Klein 2005; Klein 2002). Boycotting foreign products may involve either one of these two broad factors or both of them. In the case of Korea’s boycott of Japanese products, Japan chose to restrict the exports of the chemicals to Korean industries as a way to rebuke the Korean court rulings. Korean grassroots expressed no complaint against Japanese products but against the Japanese government’s restrictions on the chemicals. Therefore, animosity is at the heart of the trade dispute under examination. Moreover, the “No Abe, No Japan” campaign tended to blur the distinction between Japanese products, the manufacturers, and Japan as a nation-state. That is, the animosity was directed at Abe and Japan without disliking the product. I draw on Lee and Lee’s (2013) concepts of “multidimensionality of animosity: historical and contemporary” for my analysis of the “No Abe, No Japan” Movement. Multidimensionality of Animosity: Historical and Contemporary

Studies have empirically proven the lasting impact of war animosity and military conflicts on the boycotting of foreign products (Ang et al. 2004; Chan, Chan, and Leung 2010), which is relevant to Korean animosity towards colonial Japan. The animosity has been passed from previous to current generations (Lee and Lee 2013). As Lee and Lee (2013: 274) aptly argue, economic animosity has direct relevance to the everyday needs of Korean grassroots and can be easily triggered and intensified (Riefler and Diamantopoulos 2007). Indeed, historical animosity which remains vividly real can be a deadly fuel. Any international sports match between Korea and Japan draws the attention from the whole nations of Korea and Japan. Koreans feel it is completely unbearable to lose a match. Korea’s “No Japan” movement poses a worthwhile case to review as it involves the interaction between sustained historical animosity and abrupt contemporary animosity. Korea has been an “underdog” for decades and there is a prevalent sense of attempting to overcome Korea’s economic inferiority complex. Historical animosity works much like sustained (intransitive) structural relationships and it is not likely to change quickly. Lee and Lee aptly suggest that historical or contemporary animosity is not linear, but entails “different temporal characteristics” (Lee and Lee 2013: 274), which originate from war atrocities, and economic and political animosity, and can be manifested differently depending upon the specific nature of a boycott. Japanese products are generally popular and have been trusted in the Korean market for decades. How this high “valence of product judgment” was affected by, or affects, different dimensions of historical and contemporary animosity during the boycott is of particular interest. In other words, how did Korean consumers temporarily withdraw from their purchasing habits and needs during the boycott (cf., Shoham et al. 2006)?

Research Methods

Studies of product boycotts have predominantly employed quantitative methods (Shin 2001; Klein 2002; Nijssen and Douglas 2004; Ahn, Kwak, and Hwang 2014). As I am interested in analysing the manifestation of historical and contemporary animosity in a grassroots mobilization, my primary intention is not to measure quantitatively the weight of each dimension in terms of its significance. Considering the aims of this chapter, including a descriptive analysis of the process of the “No Japan” movement, a qualitative approach is suitable. The chapter provides an analysis of “what factors are important and why” to the Korean grassroots protestors, to demonstrate the intertwined complexity of historical and contemporary Korean animosity towards Japan. For this purpose, I analyse Korean news reports and relevant websites such as the “No Japan” site. In this respect, I employ the method of “netnography” to a degree (Kozinets 2002).

There were 894 news reports registered by KINDS (Korea Integrated News Database System), based on search words, “노 재팬” (No Japan), covering from July 1, 2019 to December 31, 2020. The bulk of the news reports was published in the first two months—July and August 2019. I wanted to track this issue over time while intending to obtain a manageable data set. From September 2019, 10 to 40 news reports were published per month. I have downloaded news reports covering the period from July 1 to August 31, 2019 (n: 545), and alternate months after that. That is, 2019 October (n: 38), December (n: 42); and 2020 February (n: 31), April (n: 11), June (n: 7), August (n: 15), October (n: 6), December (10). This provided 

705노노재팬 news reports in total. I have also reviewed 노재팬 (No Japan)4 and 

 (No No Japan)5 sites. The analysis focuses on what the grassroots did, their boycott intentions, and participation. The boycott was not just a domestic matter which may only attract attention from particular sectors within Korea, but also a national protest against Japan’s trade provocation, and therefore reported about Korean national animosity with a limited portion of dissident voices.

While my primary interest is about grassroots views and activities, I found it difficult to separate elite perspectives from the grassroots due to a close intersection between them. For this issue, the former affects the latter and vice versa. I have made a conscious effort to prioritize the grassroots perspectives and activities. I have attempted to reduce the representations of elites’ (e.g., intellectuals and reporters) views on “what to do” but included elites’ views of what the grassroots are doing.

Findings and Discussion

A Morphogenetic Background of the “No Japan” Movement

In the Korea-Japan relationship, there is historical animosity towards Japan, which is deeply embedded in the Korean psyche. When the contemporary relationship between the two countries becomes hostile, the related structurally and culturally embedded properties resurface immediately and exacerbate the hostility. This does not mean that Koreans are unconditionally hostile towards Japan or Japanese products. Once the contemporary concern is resolved, the inherent structural and cultural animosity subsides until the coming of another dispute (cf., Heslop, Lu, and Cray 2008). In fact, the founder of the “No Japan” website contended that we live in the era of trade globalization and that we ought not to mix up the issue of history 

4 노재팬노노재팬, https://nojapan.kr, https://nonojapan.co/ m 5 

and contemporary trade.6 In other words, the “No Japan” campaign is not about revenging Japan’s colonialism. Indeed, Korean society is affluent and cosmopolitan enough to accept that purchasing foreign products is by no means considered inappropriate or immoral—i.e., consumer ethnocentrism is not normally in operation in Korea (Shimp and Sharma 1987). Some have argued that Koreans are not against the Japanese but Prime Minister Abe, thus the movement should be called “No Abe.”7

The hostile relationship between Korea and Japan was apparent during the Chosun dynasty (1392–1910) which included the Japanese invasion of Korea (1592–1598). The Japanese colonialism in Korea (1910–1945) left the peninsula devastated and remains bitter memories in the minds of the Koreans and their descendants. Korea and Japan signed “The Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea” in 1965. This treaty allowed Japan to wash off its past misdeeds against Korea and for Park Chung-Hee, the military coup d’etat leader, to receive ransom money to inject into the economic development of Korea, which assisted in legitimizing his unlawful regime. However, since the 1990s (or soon after the 1988 Seoul Olympics), in an increasingly affluent and democratic Korea, there have been newly emergent structural and cultural characteristics. That is, there was a remarkable difference between the time of signing the treaty in the 1960s, and the 1990s in terms of structural and cultural contexts. The individual and national economies have made remarkable improvements. Travelling in personal vehicles and travelling overseas became common. The culture of seeking individual rights became prevalent and explicit. South Korea’s national status in the international community also improved significantly. It was in this context that the victims of the Japanese military “comfort women” and forced labour sought a legal challenge for compensation, risking the revelation of their traumatic personal struggles (see Chapter 3). What the 1965 Treaty settled and what it did not have become highly controversial.

On October 30, 2018, South Korea’s Supreme Court handed down two rulings that two Japanese companies—Nippon Steel & Sumitomo Metal and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries—compensate fifteen Korean wartime forced 

6Is Up to the Individuals).  “일본제품 불매운동은No Japan 개개인의, July 14, 2019,  자유입니다https://nojapan.kr/notice/2?page=2” (Participating in Boycott Japanese Products , accessed 

November 13, 2020.

7 Hankyoreh Shinmun. 2019. “사설: ‘노 재팬’ 아닌 ‘노 아베,’ 지혜롭고 성숙한 대응을 http://www” (Editorial: .

‘No, Abe.’ Rather Than ‘No, Japan.’ in Support of Wisdom and Maturity). August 6, hani.co.kr/arti/opinion/editorial/904760.html, accessed November 18, 2020.

labourers.8 Japan rejected the court ruling and this court ruling has widely been reported as the reason that Prime Minister Abe initiated the retaliation against Korean industries in July 2019.9 As noted, this trade dispute between Korea and Japan was a result of the intertwining of historical and contemporary animosity between the two nations. Japan continues to exert its superior control towards Korea and the latter resists. Jeong (2013) points out that Japan’s hatred towards Korea is based on Japan’s deep-rooted superiority complex, Japanese politics’ shifting to the far right, historical trauma, the distorting of historical facts, the anti-Korean Wave, and Korea’s remarkable economic progress (Park and Choi 2019; Lee and Lee 2020). When Japanese representatives or individuals attempt to manifest some of these in their interactions with Koreans, the latter strike back. “No Abe, No Japan” movement is one of them. The campaign was a way to bolster Korea’s national pride and identity as Korea exerts its growing power over Japan. In what follows, I analyse how new structures and cultures evolve, influencing each other over time, and how they can be mobilized by the agents.

Seeking historically based causal relations between contemporary and past animosities, I find useful the methodological processes of abduction (reinterpretation) and retroduction (tracing the causal elements from the realm of “the real”)—(Sayer 1992).

Continuity of Japanese Imperialism, and the Recent Economic Invasion

The predominant majority of Koreans, young and older, are aware of the problem of forced labour during Japanese colonialism, and how Japan has vehemently denied reparation for the victims. This eventually led to Prime Minister Abe’s trade provocation against Korea and consequently Korea’s boycott of Japanese products. Koreans were well informed of the continuing dispute between Korea and Japan regarding the reparation for the Japanese military “comfort women” and forced labour during the colonial period. This included the Korean Supreme Court’s ruling to dispose of the assets of the crime-committed Japanese corporations in Korea to compensate 

8 Reuters. 2018. “South Korean Court Angers Japan With Order to Compensate Wartime Laborers.” November 29, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-japan-forcedlabour-southkorea/ south-korean-court-angers-japan-with-order-to-compensate-wartime-laborers-idUSKCN1NY05D, accessed November 18, 2020.

9 “The Japan-South Korea Dispute Could Push up the Price of Your Next Smartphone,” CNBC.

the victims. Koreans have been reminded of the past Japanese invasions of Korea and the maltreatment of Koreans, which were at the heart of the trade provocation. Five students in Sanae High School in Hwacheondistrict announced, “We shall boycott all the Japanese products until Japan withdraws the trade provocation.”10 They produced information leaflets about forced labour during colonialism and the victims, to inform their peers at the school. They displayed a banner across the school gate: “Not going, Not buying—No, Boycott Japan.” Yun So-Eun, one of the students noted: “I have learned a lot and become highly conscious of Korean history. We will continue to publicize correct history to fellow Koreans around us.” On July 20, 2019 one thousand five hundred people gathered in front of the Japanese Embassy in Seoul to protest against Abe’s trade provocation, arguing that “the Supreme Court’s decision was a token to redress Japan’s abuse of human rights. They also accused Japan of preparing to become a military superpower again.”11

Abe’s trade provocation inflamed the pre-existing animosity towards Japan. Koreans recalled Japanese invasions of Korea (1592–1598) and Japanese colonialism (1910–1945). Kyeongnam Shinmun reported that ordinary Koreans (or the grassroots) regarded the trade provocation as Japan’s second invasion of Korea following the first one 420 years ago.12 On August 6, 2019, small and middle-size shop owners and nineteen civic organizations in Incheon, formed the “No Abe, No Japan Action Group,” and accused Japan’s economic invasion of history distortion and argued that Korea’s economic independence will complete Korean national Independence from Japan. They have mobilized the actions of boycotting Japanese products and travelling to Japan as a way of achieving economic self-reliance.13

Since 2000, there have been four boycotts against Japanese products, in response to Japan’s history textbook distortions and territorial claims 

10 Gangwon Ilbo. 2019. “日 경제보복 불매운동 확산: ‘NO, 안사요 안가요 안먹어요’” (Diffusion of Boycott Against Japan’s Economic Revenge: ‘NO, Not Buying, Not Going, Not Eating’). July 19, http://m.kwnews.co.kr/nview.asp?s=501&aid=219071800018, accessed January 3, 2021.

11회까지Holding Candle-Light Protests).” July 22, Asia Kyeongje. 2019. “아베 나와라! 일본 https://www.asiae.co.kr/article/2019072209264441894, 불매운동 끝까지 간다, 욱일승천기 찢고 촛불집 

” (Come on Abe! ‘Boycotting Japan Will Continue’ Tearing Up the Rising Sun Flag and 

accessed January 3, 2021.

12 Kyeongnam Sinmun. 2019. “No Abe.” August 9, http://www.knnews.co.kr/news/articleView. php?idxno=1298342&gubun=, accessed January 3, 2021.

13 Hankyoreh Shinmun. 2019. “인천지역Chonsun Ilbo ‘노 재팬’ 운동).” Hankyoreh Shinmun ‘조선일보’ 절독으로, August 6,  확산” (No Japan http://

Movement in Incheon and Boycotting 

www.hani.co.kr/arti/area/capital/904704.html#csidx78f41f1b55bead5a15c4f8398216747, accessed January 4, 2021.

of ownership of Dokdo Island in the East Sea of Korea.14 All the boycotts have faded away, as the one in 2019 would eventually. However, unlike other boycotts in the past, the 2019 boycott was triggered by Japan’s trade provocation directly threatening the economic well-being of Koreans. What makes the boycott particularly different is the emergent structures and cultures within Korean politics and the economy, consequently leading to the people’s emergent properties. Since Park Geun-Hye government’s humiliating resolution on the Japanese military “comfort women” in 2015 and the Korean Supreme Court ruling for the crime-committed Japanese corporations to compensate the victims of forced labour, the political orientation of the government has changed. The Korean peninsula has been up to now under a progressive President since 2017, and the ruling Democratic Party won a significant majority in the April 15 general election in 2019. Moreover, during the boycott period (since July 2019), Korea enjoyed a relatively strong economic strength and productivity nationally and internationally, including in the middle of the COVID-19 pandemic. The Korean government’s successful control of COVID-19 and the ever-increasing popularity of Korea’s cultural products such as K-Pop (e.g., BTS) and films (e.g., Parasite) have provided Koreans with added confidence. This level of national pride is real and something that Koreans have rarely perceived previously.15

Ever since the hastily signed 1965 Basic Treaty between Korea and Japan, Korean citizens and progressive political figures have argued the need to revisit the Treaty. However, Japan has maintained the legitimacy of the 1965 Treaty, which has continued till the 2015 Korea-Japan negotiation on the Japanese military “comfort women,” who were excluded from the process.16 Then came the Korean Supreme Court ruling for Japanese companies to compensate the fifteen wartime forced labourers, which angered the Abe regime igniting the trade war. Neither the Korean 

14 e-Daily. 2019. “新한일전쟁https://www.edaily.co.kr/news/read?newsId=01331686622587320④역대 日불매운동은?” (New Korea-Japan War, Past Boycotts &

Against Japan). August 14, mediaCodeNo=257, accessed January 4, 2021.

15 NewsOne. 2020. “국가열등감에 빠져있던 한국, 우린 선진국이야?” (Koreans Suffering  http://

from National Inferiority Now Ask, Korea is Now an Advanced Nation, Isn’t It?).” May 8,

진국임에newsone.co.kr/?p=20558,to ‘Learn Korea as an Advanced Nation’ … TBS’s Kim Eojun Cites). April 17,  놀라’…TBS 김어준 accessed January 4, 2021;  뉴스공장 언급하기도TBS News” (The New Yorker. 2020. “더: Koreans Are Surprised  뉴요커http://tbs.seoul.kr ‘한국인들 선/

news/newsView.do?typ_800=4&idx_800=2391506&seq_800=10385611, accessed January 4, 2021.

16험August 14, Hankyoreh Shinmun http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/politics/diplomacy/905667.html,. 2019. “아베, 한국을 2015년으로 되돌리려 해 accessed Jauary 5, 2021.… ‘타협적 화해’는 위

” (Abe Trying to Take Korea Back to 2015 … A Compromising Reconciliation is Dangerous). 

government, nor the Korean grassroots, stepped back, but confronted Japan, saying, “We will never be defeated by Japan again!,” which President Moon first stated, and which became a popular slogan among the grassroots.17 I contend that this is not a top-down slogan, but a bottom-up, when considering recent political movements such as the Candlelight Revolution 2016–2017 (see Chapter 6). Koreans are aware of the power of the Japanese economy; however, they were willing to protest against Japan and establish a new order. Koreans did not want to accept Prime Minister Abe’s efforts to discipline Korea and get away without compensating the wartime labourers.

Instead of regretting and apologizing for the imperial invasion of Korea in the past, Japan is imposing economic sanctions on Korea. This is no less than a second invasion of Korea. Going against the current flow of peaceful relationships in East Asia, Japan is arming itself with military power. It transpired that Japan is attempting to discipline Korea as an inferior economy and military partner (People’s Solidarity for Social Progress, Gwangju).18

As of late 2021, Korea had the fourth largest GDP in Asia after China, Japan, and India, and the tenth largest in the world. However, Japan could still not overcome its superiority complex against Korea, and Japanese imperialism persists. Japan has become conscious of Korea’s increasingly influential economy and power in the international community. According to a Japanese expert on Korea, Professor Kimura Kan at Kobe University,

In Japan, there is an increasing perception of Korea as a competing nation. Those Japanese who had a superiority complex over Korea are unable to accept this. Japanese support for Abe’s trade provocation is based on their desire to have confirmed that “Japan is much stronger than Korea.”19

17 News 1. 2019. “다시는 일본에 절대 지지 않겠다” (We Will Never Be Defeated by Japan  accessed January 5, 2021. Again). August 14, https://www.news1.kr/photos/details/?3777878,

18Whitelisting of Korea—Angering Korean Grassroots Which May Explode in a Mass Protest).  Jeonnam Ilbo. 2019. “ ‘화이트 리스트 제외’ 들끓는 민심, 광장서 폭발할까” (Japan’s De-

August 4, https://jnilbo.com/view/media/view?code=2019080417351034735, accessed January 5, 2021.

19도Resolved or Even Get Worse).  Hanguk Kyungje. 2019. “Hanguk Kyungje극우 아베 물러나도, August 13, 韓·日문제 https://www.hankyung.com/politics 해결 안돼…더 ‘먼 나라’ 될 수/

” (Even After Departure of Abe, an Extreme Right Winger, Korea-Japan Issue May Not Get article/2019081326731, accessed January 6, 2021.

Koreans considered Abe’s trade provocation as attempting to collapse Korea’s major, as well as future industries, and as a proven continuity of Japanese imperialism over Korea. Abe’s goal was to see the “Korean economy kneel in front of the Japanese economy.”20 According to Chun Woo-Yong, a historian, central to Abe’s trade provocation was Japan’s intention to return to militarism eventually and to humiliate the Korean government, taking advantage of anti-Korean sentiment in Japan.21 A Korean reporter based in Japan revealed a reputable Korean politician’s first-ever encounter with a 

Japanese bureaucrat of foreign affairs,

The Japanese bureaucrat argued that Japan is a politically advanced society with mature democracy and Korea is a politically underdeveloped society under authoritarianism. The Korean politician was also told about the resolution of the current conflict between Korea and Japan that “Do not ask Japan about how Korea and Japan can come up with a solution, but Korea should come back to the negotiation table with a right resolution.”22

The Japanese suggestion was so condescending and arrogant, suggesting that Korea and Japan cannot negotiate a solution on an equal footing. Korean grassroots could not accept Japan’s approach and instead started the boycott. In this process, some Koreans became further politically aware, and others became newly conscious political actors—i.e., changing from primary agents to social (corporate) agents.

No Buy, Sell, Visit, Eat, Ride or Speak Japanese Products

In recent decades, Japanese products have flooded into the Korean market and have become part of everyday Korean consumption. A news reporter observed the products she comes across in a day: they included Japanese hand soap for children’s use, two out of three pens in her office are made by Mitsubishi (a war crime-committed company), a spray medicine to relieve 

20 Choongcheong Today. 2019. “냉철한 지혜와 http://www.cctoday.co.kr/news/articleViewAmp 단합된 국민의지로 돌파하자” (Let Us Overcome .

with Wisdom and the Nation’s Unity). August 4, html?idxno=2016506, accessed January 6, 2021.

21 YTN Radio. 2019. “전우용, 주옥순 대표 발언…역사공부 30년 넘게 이런 경우 못 봤어” 

(Chun Woo-Yong Finds Joo Ok-Soon’s Comments Extremely Unusual in 30 Years).” August 7, https://www.ytn.co.kr/_ln/0101_201908081049119961, accessed January 7, 2021.

22Bureaucrats Take Submissive Attitudes to Abe Shinzo). February 3,  Joongang Ilbo. 2020. “아베 앞에 알아서 기는 日 관료들…그들은 ‘호모https://news.joins.com 손타쿠스’” (Japanese / article/23696070, accessed January 7, 2021.

pain in her mouth due to a cut, and Asahi beer.23 Asahi beer has been the most popular beer in Korea for the last ten years and 45.3 per cent of the beer consumed in Korea is imported from Japan.24 Koreans generally distinguish Japan’s invasion of Korea in the past from their use of Japanese products. However, a large proportion of Koreans was determined to live without their many familiar Japanese products in pursuit of economic independence. Korean grassroots launched a national boycott against Japanese products, deploying diverse methods, e.g., “5 Nos Movement”: No buying or selling Japanese products, No going to Japan, No riding Japanese vehicles, and No wearing Japanese clothes.

In June 2019, 3,946 Japanese cars were sold, but by July 2019 sales had reduced to 2,674, which is a 32.2 per cent reduction.25 Sales again reduced in October 2019 to 1,977, which was a 58.4 per cent reduction in comparison to October 2018. As of October 2019, Japanese export of foods and drinks to Korea was reduced by 58.1 per cent, chemical products by 28.3 per cent, motor vehicles by 70.7 per cent, and beer by 99.9 per cent—compared to the exports from January to October 2018. A large amount of beer in stock passed its use-by dates and was returned to the distributor for destruction. Since June 2005, Korea has been the third most important export market for Japan, but the boycott pushed Korea to the fourth.26,27 Nissan Motor withdrew from the Korean market after sixteen years of operation.28 A large number of shop owners throughout the country decided to remove or not sell Japanese products. For example, 5,000 members of the association 

23 Donga Ilbo. 2019. “24시간 일상 속 일본https://www.donga.com/news/Economy/article 제품 관찰기” (An Observation of Japanese / Products in Our Everyday Life).” August 10, all/20190810/96909848/1, accessed January 7, 2021.

24 e-Daily. 2020. “지난해 日맥주 수입량 ‘반토막’…韓수제맥주가 빈자리e-Daily 차지, January 23, ” (Import of 

Japanese Beer Halved Last Year… Korean Beer Becomes an Alternative). https://www.edaily.co.kr/news/read?newsId=01308726625640672, accessed January 7, 2021.

25Popular in the Globe, Not in Korea).  Digital Times. 2019. “세계 시장서 ‘Digital Times씽씽’ 일본차…, August 8, 한국서는 ‘http://www.dt.co.kr/contents찬밥’ 신세” (Japanese Vehicles . html?article_no=2019080802109932052006, accessed January 8, 2021.

26 Money Today. 2020. “아무도 안 사니 결국 전량 폐기…일상이 된 日맥주 불매” 

(Japanese Beer Destroyed Due to No Demand). August 15, https://news.mt.co.kr/mtview. php?no=2020081415452916188, accessed January 14, 2021.

27 Daily Hankook. “10월 일본 수입맥주 작년보다 99% 감소, 日수출대상국 한국 3위→4위” 

(Import of Japanese Beer 99% Reduced… Korea Shifts from 3rd to 4th Place for Japan’s Export Market). December 6, http://daily.hankooki.com/lpage/industry/201912/dh20191206111349147950.

htm, accessed January 8, 2021.

28 BusinessKorea. 2020. “Nissan to Withdraw from Korean Market after 16 Years of Operation. BusinessKorea.” May 29, http://www.businesskorea.co.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=46627, accessed January 8, 2021.

of traditional shops, consisting of twenty-two markets located in Suwon City, joined the boycott to not buy nor sell Japanese products. Some of those twenty-two markets placed a banner—“Boycott Japan: Let us Not Go, Eat, Buy or Sell.”29 Online shopping sites recorded lower rates of search or sale of Japanese products. For example, 11Street Korea (11번가) saw a 30 per cent decrease in the sale of Nintendo Games (from July 7 to August 6, 2019), a 45 per cent decrease in the internet search of UniQlo clothes (from June to July 2019), and a 43 per cent decrease in an internet search of UL-OS, which are Japanese cosmetic products. SSG.COM, a prestigious internet department store of Shinsegae, saw a 12 per cent decrease in the sale of Japanese golf products by Honma and Xxio.30

Many Koreans gave up their travel to Japan and those who had prebooked tickets mostly cancelled. Moreover, in the collective cultural context, Koreans are very conscious of what their friends think of their activities. Paying the cancellation fee is not pleasant; however, they did not want to proceed with their planned trip to Japan, as it would not be an enjoyable trip if they were unable to openly talk about their travel with others.31 Those who cancelled often took a photo of the cancellation proof and shared it through their social networking sites, which demonstrates solidarity and has a “policing effect” within each social network. Some proceeded with their planned trip since they could not afford the heavy penalties.32 Travel agencies noted that new bookings for travel to Japan decreased by 50 to 70 per cent, and the cancellation rates of travel bookings to Japan ranged from 50 per cent to 400 per cent.33 Before the trade provocation, 69.4 per cent of Koreans were willing to travel to Japan, but with the trade provocation, 

29 Maeil Kyungje. 2019. “지방서도 일본 제품 불매 운동 격화” (Boycotting Japanese Products Become Heated in Regional Areas as Well). Maeil Kyungje, August 6, https://www.mk.co.kr/news/ society/view/2019/08/602344/인들Or Sell Japanese Products). , 일본제품 사지도, 팔지도Kyunggi Ilbo, accessed January 8, 2021;  않겠다, August 6,” (Shop Owners in a Traditional Market, We Won’t Buy  http://www.kyeonggi.com/news/articleViewKyunggi Ilbo. 2019. “수원 전통시장 상.

html?idxno=2143991, accessed January 8, 2021.

30 Seoul Kyungje. 2019. “닌텐도, 군 기저귀도… 쉽게 못끊는 취미·육아용품도반日 https://sedaily.com” (Nin-/

tendo, Japanese Products for Hobby and Infants, All Boycotted). August 11, NewsView/1VMXGCA71I, accessed January 8, 2021.

31 Segye Ilbo. 2019. “카드 이용액 감소 뚜렷…일본 가는 여행객 확실히 줄었다” (A Clear 

Decrease in the Credit Card Usage with the Reduced Travellers to Japan). Segye Ilbo, August 8, http://m.segye.com/view/20190808507241, accessed January 11, 2021.

32ties, Travellers to Japan Are Lost).  Digital Times. 2018. “수수료 때문에Digital Times…일본 여행, August 22,  예약자들http://www.dt.co.kr/contents 전전긍긍” (Due to Penal-. html?article_no=2019082202109932052007, accessed January 11, 2021.

33 Digital Times. 2019. “노 재팬 쇼크 일파만파… 日식료품·여행 매출 뚝Digital Times” (Big Impact of No , July 21, Japan Shock…the Sale of Japanese Food and Travel Products Collapses). 

this figure decreased to 16.2 per cent. On the other hand, 28.1 per cent of Koreans were not interested in travelling to Japan before the trade dispute and this figure increased to 81.3 per cent.34

Cancellation of the booked trips was exacerbated by domestic travel agents who offered discounted prices for domestic travel when the customers presented proof of cancellation of trips to Japan. For example, Ulleungdo, Dokdo, and Gyeongju were some of the popular domestic destinations to attract a discount on travel costs for those who cancelled their travel to Japan.35 In July and August 2019, Gyeongju had a 202 per cent increase in the number of visitors compared to the same period in 2018 (50,394 to 152,216).36 Eight hundred and fifteen such travel products were introduced to commemorate the Independence date of August 15. Some accommodations offered a discount of 50 to 75 per cent.37 The cancellation of the trips to Japan led to large profit reductions for tour companies, many of which were also hit by COVID-19, and some eventually collapsed.38 Instead of Japan, South East Asian countries (especially Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia) and Taiwan became popular destinations for overseas holidays.39

As part of the boycott, some petrol and service stations refused to serve Japanese cars. Some delivery staff agreed not to deliver Japanese products such as UniQlo products.40 The planned screening of Japanese films was put off (e.g., “Doraemon: Nobita’s Chronicle of the Moon Exploration”) and the films that 

http://www.dt.co.kr/contents.html?article_no=2019072202101032060001, accessed January 11, 2021. 34 YTN News. 2019. “日 여행 생각없다 81%…있었지만 철회 56%” (Not Interested in Travel-https://www.youtube.com/ ling to Japan…Was Interested, but Withdrawn 56%).” August 4, watch?v=1EpU8T3hMIg, accessed January 11, 2021.

35Spread Like a Wild Fire: No Japan Movement, Boycott and Removing Japanese Names of District  Kookmin Ilbo. 2019. “들불처럼 번지는 지자체의 ‘노 재팬’ 운동, 불매·지명 지우기…” (A 

Names). July 31, http://news.kmib.co.kr/article/view.asp?arcid=0924090942&code=11131100&si d1=prj, accessed January 11, 2021.

36 Segye Ilbo. 2019. “경주엑스포 7~8월 관광객 작년 대비 3배 껑충” (Gyeongju Expo in July/

August, 3 Times More Tourists). August 28, http://www.segye.com/newsView/20190827506832 ?OutUrl=google, accessed January 12, 2021.

37 YTN News. 2019. “여행업계, ‘노 재팬’ 고객에 할인 혜택 제공.” July 31, https://www.ytn. co.kr/_ln/0102_201907310958474802_, accessed January 12, 2021.

38동39.”   August 5,Digital TimesAsia Kyungje.  https://www.asiae.co.kr/article/2019080510461444270,. 2019. “2019. “제日2 대체노선의 8.15 광복 통했다, 우리가…불매운동 마무리, SNS  딛고타고 3분기 들불처럼 accessed January 11, 2021. 항공여객 번지는 역대 accessed  최고치 반일 운.” 

October 29, http://www.dt.co.kr/contents.html?article_no=2019102902109932052009, January 11, 2021.

40 KBS News. 2019. “일본차 정비·주유 거부까지…확산일로 불매운동https://www.youtube.com 어디까지 합법?” (No /

Petrol or Service for Japanese Vehicles…Is It Legal?). July 30, 2019, watch?v=6eFH-gCQS5c, accessed January 12, 2021.

were screening did not attract the expected audience numbers, e.g., Korean parents discouraged their children from watching the children’s movie “Butt Detective The Movie.” These incidents reflected the social circumstances and people’s sentiment during the boycott, contended film experts. In contrast, “Shusenjo: The Main Battleground of Comfort Women Issue” had an unusual success for a documentary reaching an audience of 10,000 within a week of opening.41 However, Jecheon International Music & Film Festival 2019 proceeded with the original inclusion of seven Japanese films after strong opposition based on Abe’s trade provocation. Jecheon City Mayor’s view prevailed that the seven films were not politically motivated, but purely artworks and that the festival is for people’s cultural exchanges, which should continue despite political conflicts.42 The “No Japan, No Abe” movement also spread to overseas Korean communities, such as those in Hochiminh and London.43

Boycott participants were not only pursuing “economic revenge” but also seeking to rectify the “wrong” history or stop its continuity. For example, Gwangju City found sixty-five historical monuments, building signboards, school hymns, and military facilities had their origins to do with Japanese collaborators, and forthwith the city authority will publicly specify those with pro-Japanese origins.44 Kim Jeong-Woo, a member of the Korean Assembly, found that national institutes such as Korea Investment Corporation invested $463.4 million into Japanese war crime-committed companies as of August 2019 and Korean Public Procurement Service spent $909.8 million over 219,244 contracts, purchasing products from war crime-committed companies for the last ten years. Kim argued that these investments and purchases were not appropriate when 7.5 million Koreans suffered from forced labour by those war crime-committed companies during the colonial period. 

41 Yonhap News. 2019. “[한일 경제전쟁] 극장가도 ‘노 재팬’… ‘ https://www.yna.co.kr/view도라에몽’도 쓰러졌다” (‘No /

Japan’ Affects Film Industries…Doraemon Falls Over).” August 2, AKR20190802138100005, accessed, January 12, 2021.

42 Financial News. 2019. “이상천 제천시장이 옳다.” August 8, https://www.fnnews.com/ news/201908071740520883, accessed, January 13, 2021.

43 Aju Kyungje. 2019. “베트남서도 日불매운동…아세안서 , accessed, January 13, 2021; 한국이 日 압도한 유일한Yonhap  나라.” 

August 5, https://www.ajunews.com/view/20190805141457644

Newswww.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20190813001500085. 2019. “해외서도 ‘노 재팬’…런던 한인들, , accessed, January 13, 2021.의사당 인근서 日 규탄 집회.” August 13, https://

44 Kookmin Ilbo. 2019. “들불처럼 번지는 지자체의 ‘노 재팬’ 운동, 불매·지명 지우기…” (A 

Spread Like a Wild Fire: No Japan Movement, Boycott and Removing Japanese Names of District Names). July 31, http://news.kmib.co.kr/article/view.asp?arcid=0924090942&code=11131100&si d1=prj, accessed January 11, 2021.

UniQlo is a popular Japanese clothing brand with 187 branch shops in Korea. It started trading in Korea in September 2005. The business lost $1.2m in its first twelve months of operation in Korea, however, sales reached $1.1169 billion by 2014.46 In response to the boycott, the sale of products was decreasing in July 2019, but Mr. Okazaki, Chief Financial Officer from UniQlo’s headquarters in Japan claimed that “the [Korean] boycott will not influence the sale in the long run.” This angered Korean netizens who interpreted the comment “to underestimate the Korean customers.” The boycott against UniQlo accelerated and the profit for the period (September 2019 to August 2020) was reduced by 44 per cent compared to the previous twelve months. The reduction in both sales and profits occurred for the first time in seventeen years.47 UniQlo’s flagship store, the Myeongdong franchise, was set to close its business on January 31, 2021.48 Since July 2019, the Myeongdong shop has been a focal point of anti-Japan sentiment and some activists have filmed the shop entrance, discouraging shoppers from entering. By the end of November 2020, due to the boycott and COVID-19, twenty-two UniQlo shops in Korea had ceased operations.49

I contend that the boycott of Japan was a manifestation of the intersection of grassroots ethnic as well as economic protests. Korea had a current account balance deficit (goods and services) of $24.7 billion from the trade with Japan in 2018 and this decreased to $18.82 billion in 2019. Especially the deficit from reduced goods, including the types of equipment to produce semiconductors, was reduced from $17.26 billion in 2018 to $13.41 billion in 2019.50

August 11, http://www.joongboo.com/news/articleView.html?idxno=1378087, accessed, January 13, 2021.

46 Chosun Ilbo. 2015. “유니클로, 한국Chosun Ilbo 진출 10, December 1,년 만에 年매출 https://biz.chosun.com/site/data 1조 돌파” (UniQlo, Reaching $1 / Billion Sale in 10 Years Operation). html_dir/2015/11/30/2015113003730.html, accessed January 14, 2021.

47 Joongang Ilbo. 2019. “韓 불매운동 오래 못간다던 유니클로 ‘대단히 죄송’” (UniQlo Once 

Ridiculing the Korean Boycott, ‘Now Very Sorry’). July 17, https://news.joins.com/article/23527409, accessed January 14, 2021.

48 Maeil Kyungje. 2020. “유니클로 명동중앙점 내년 1월 폐점…운영사는 매출 반토막” (UniQlo  https://

Myeongdong Shop to Close in January…the Company’s Sale Halved). December 5, 2020, www.mk.co.kr/news/business/view/2020/12/1250863/, accessed January 14, 2021.

49 Hankyoreh Shinmun. 2020. “개업날 20억 매출, 유니클로 명동중앙점도 문 닫는다” (Once 

Flourishing, UniQlo to Close the Myeongdong Shop). December 4, http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/ economy/consumer/972809.html, accessed January 14, 2021.

50는 Kookje Sinmun. 2020. “지난해 대중국 경상 흑자 반토막, 일본 수출 규제로 대일 적자

 감소” (Current Account Balance Profit from China Halved, But the Deficit from Japan Decreased).” June 22, http://www.kookje.co.kr/news2011/asp/newsbody.asp?code=0200&k ey=20200623.22011007964, accessed January 14, 2021.

Political Cultures in Korea and Japan Today

With the instigation and progression of the boycott, what were the emerging political cultures in Korea and Japan, as perceived by the Korean grassroots and reported in the Korean media? What were the cultures resulting from the history, and also the contemporary influential and emergent cultures? Undoubtedly, throughout their school education, Koreans were reminded of Japan’s egregiousness against Koreans during the colonial period. All contemporary Koreans know this history. However, in recent decades Korea and Japan have maintained peaceful relationships, which have been underpinned by close and interdependent economies. However, the issue of forced labour under the war crime-committed companies has continued to adversely affect the friendly relationships at all levels—economic, diplomatic, and cultural. When conflicts occur, the suppressed anti-Japan sentiment resurfaces. Ihm Woon-Taek, a sociologist, argues that Japan has not apologized for its past misdeeds and the recent de-whitelisting of Korea from Japan’s favourite trade nations hurt Korean self-esteem.51 Diverse ideas emerged to combat the conflicts. As noted, one of the catch-phrases was, “We will never be defeated by Japan again!” This manifests the combination of the past and contemporary animosity towards Japan. President Moon Jae-In used this phrase initially and firmed up Korean determination to boycott Japan. Other sentiments shared on social networking sites were as follows:

As we want to win against Japan, we are willing to persevere the similar economic struggles that we went through during the IMF’s restructuring of the Korean economy in the late 1990s. … This is a major task that our ancestors left with us and we have to accomplish the mission and gain the Second Independence. … I couldn’t participate in the independence movement during the colonial time, but I join the boycott.52

Contemporary Koreans are full of pride that they have accomplished a miraculous and compressed economic development, known as the “Miracle of Hangang River”; however, they are strongly reminded by a respected independence activist and historian Shin Chae-Ho that “there is no future 

51동SNS). August 5, Asia Kyungje https://www.asiae.co.kr/article/2019080510461444270,. 2019. “제2의 8.15 광복, 우리가 마무리, SNS 타고 들불처럼 accessed January 11, 2021. 번지는 반일 운

” (We Will Complete the Second Independence: Anti-Japan Movement Like Wild Fire through 

52동 Asia Kyungje. 2019. “제2의 8.15 광복, 우리가 마무리, SNS 타고 들불처럼 번지는 반일 운

.” Asia Kyungje, August 5.

for the people of a nation that lost its history” in his book, Ancient History of Joseon. Thus Koreans have their history, and the experience of Japanese imperialism in particular, deeply ingrained in their psyche. A cultural artist is puzzled by the high volume of the sale of “Animal Forest,” a Nintendo Game, and argues that “true” independence from Japan is yet to be achieved.53 This kind of reminder through the media not only indicates the present status of the Korean psyche against Japan but also reinforces Koreans as historically conscious. This process is a continuing intersection between the shame in the past, and the confidence at present, the latter of which has been enabled by the emergent political and economic prominence of Korea.

The level of financial damage caused to Japan may not have been as high as the Koreans intended. However, some Japanese industries and regions felt its impact. On August 19, 2019, a few officers from Hokkaido Prefecture stood at the airport arrival holding a banner, “Welcome to Hokkaido” in Korean, which was repeated several times. At the Okinawa Airport, a few tour industries hosted the ceremonies to welcome and see off foreign tourists. Simoji Yoshiro, President of Okinawa Convention & Visitors Bureau announced that “despite the deteriorating Korea-Japan relations, the tourists to Okinawa will be respected.”54 However, there is also a portion of Japanese with strong anti-Korean sentiments. A Korean professor who has lived in Japan says that “Japanese are most irritated about Koreans these days in my 15 years in Japan.” Former diplomat of Korea also noted, after attending a recent conference in Tokyo, that “it would be difficult to revert to the friendly Korea-Japan relationship by any means. My Japanese acquaintances that I had friendly relations with for decades have changed. I could feel the whole atmosphere in the conference was different.”  A Korean employee of a Korean corporation in Tokyo had a Japanese acquaintance whom he had met for a drink for more than fifteen years: “The Japanese acquaintance does not initiate the meeting anymore for the last three months. I can’t contact him as he is avoiding me.” In another case, he was informed that his business lunch appointment with a Japanese person from 

53Sang-Hwa). April 27,  Maeil Sinmun. 2020. “[http://news.imaeil.com/OuterColumn/2020042710124370287,매일춘추] 닌텐도 스위치와 이상화” (Nintendo Switch and Lee  accessed 

January 15, 2021.

54원August 30, Asia Kyungje https://www.asiae.co.kr/article/2019083019342800733,. 2019. “노 재팬, 韓관광객 감소에 급했나…日지자체 accessed January 16, 2021., ‘환영합니다’ 현수막 동

” (Japan’s Reaction to the Reduction of Korean Travellers… a Local Government’s Welcome). 

a local company was cancelled, saying that he felt it was burdensome to lunch with a Korean under the current climate.56 According to a survey undertaken by Fuji TV and Sankei News on August 3–4, 2019, 67 per cent of Japanese supported Abe’s de-whitelisting of South Korea and 19.4 per cent did not.57 Seo Seung-Uk, a Tokyo-based reporter of Joongang Ilbo noted that the current status of anti-Korean sentiment in the Japanese Social Networking sites is serious. As there is “NO Abe” movement in Korea, there is “NO Moon Jae-In” movement in Japan. Seo cited a reputable nonfiction writer, saying that “current anti-Korean sentiment is much similar to Japan’s slogan in the 1930s and 1940s—‘Let us get rid of China as well as the United States that supports China.’” Seo aptly points out that the crux of the problems is not necessarily the conflict between the political leaders of Korea and Japan, but the people from both nations are crossing the bridge of no return.58 This potentially hurts “people diplomacy.”

No Abe, Yes Japan

Just as there is strong anti-Korean sentiment in Japan, so there is anti-Japan sentiment in Korea. The suppressed anti-Japan sentiment could not find a better time to resurface than with Abe’s trade provocation. The anti-Japan sentiment is a prevalent culture for Koreans and is carefully managed, concealed, or emergent depending upon the characteristics of diplomatic relationships between Korea and Japan.

In the enaction to Abe’s trade provocation on July 1, 2019, Korean grassroots reacted throughout the whole nation. For example, many local governments felt pressured to go along with the grassroots actions. Minjung Party59 in Ulsan City and many local citizens against Abe Shinzo made financial contributions to produce 130 banners—“No Abe; Japanese Collaborators Out,” which were each 70cm in width x 120cm in length. The banners were displayed at regular intervals along the two streets—respectively 1.3km and 0.25km long. The activists called the streets “No Abe Streets.”60 Similar banners were displayed throughout the nation. Also in front of the Whale Museum in Ulsan City, there 

5657  Joongang IlboJoongang Ilbo. “. “자발적자발적글로벌  불매운동불매운동 아이  나선나선] 일본  Joongang Ilbo한국인한국인 태풍과, , 조용히조용히 때아닌 October 15.   한국친구한국친구 라면 논쟁https://news.joins.com  끊는끊는” (Japanese Typhoon   일본인일본인.”.” /

58 Seo Seung-Uk. 2019. “[ and an Unexpected Debate on Ramyeon). article/23603871, accessed January 25, 2021.

59 On June 20, 2020, Minjungdang was Renamed Jinbodang (Progressive Party).

60 Kyungsang Ilbo. 2019. “울산지역 일본 불매운동 확산…동구에, NO 아베 거리” (Spread of 

Boycotting Japan in Ulsan… No Abe Street in the Eastern District). June 1, http://ksilbo.co.kr/ news/articleView.html?idxno=710195, accessed January 26, 2021.

stood a banner, “August Special Price of a Sea Trip for Japanese: Only $8,150,” the price of which originated from August 15, the Korean independence day. This banner is to protest against Abe, however, Japanese customers were actually free of charge although its normal charge was $20.61

Every Korean province and their cities have established sister relations with their many counterparts in Japan for regular exchange programmes. For example, Gyeongsang-Namdo Province and its cities have twenty-two such sister cities in Japan.62 Choongcheong-Namdo Province’s Seosan City and Nara Prefecture’s Tenri City have maintained sister relationships since 1991. Seosan City informed its counterpart Tenri City of the cancellation of welcoming a group of visiting students from the City.63 However, Goseong Town Youth Exchange Programme went ahead with its pre-planned invitation of Japanese students.64 Yet, all the sister city relationships between Korea and Japan came under severe pressure and many suspended their exchange programmes. Amid troubled Korea-Japan relationships, many local governments explored new sister cities in China.65 Korea-Japan sports exchanges were also cancelled. Chuncheon City Hall’s Women’s Curling Team cancelled its participation in the 2019 Hokkaido Bank Curling Classic scheduled to take place on August 1–4 in Sapporo, Japan.66 Gangreung City was planning a friendly game of Curling on August 16–18, inviting China and Japan, at the time of the trade dispute between Korea and Japan.67 The 

61 Money Today. 2019. “노(NO) 아베 거리에, ‘일본인 요금 815만원’ 현수막도…” ($8,500, an 

Admission Charge for Japanese—A Banner in the Street of No Abe). August 2, https://news. mt.co.kr/mtview.php?no=2019080213454024529&MRH_P, accessed January 27, 2021.

62ments under a Torment Regarding Their Sister Cities). July 26, Gyeongnam Domin Ilbo. 2019. “자매도시 어찌할꼬 고민에 https://www.idomin.com/news 빠진 지자체” (Local Govern-/ articleView.html?idxno=703742, accessed January 27, 2021.

63 Money Today. 2019. “[日, 경제도발]日 언론, 한 달새 https://news.mt.co.kr/hotview.php?n 35건 한일교류 중단” (Japanese News: o

35 Korea-Japan Exchanges Halted in a Month). August 2,

=2019080215423240164&type=1&sec=O&hid=201908021731472936&hcnt=69&vgb=hot, accessed January 27, 2021.

64 Gyeongnam Domin Ilbo. “자매도시 어찌할꼬 고민에 accessed January 27, 2021. 빠진 지자체.” July 26, https://www. idomin.com/news/articleView.html?idxno=703742,

a Sister Relationship with Jilin Sheng, China). August 22,65 Segye Ilbo. 2019. “충남도, 중국 지린성과 자매결연 체결 http://www.segye.com/newsView/2” (Choongcheong Namdo, Signing 0

190821513790?OutUrl=google, accessed January 27, 2021.

응Economic Provocation). August 4, 66 ” (Citizens, Social Organizations, Local Governments Strongly React against the Japanese Hankyoreh Shinmun. 2019. “전국http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/area/yeongnam/904440.html, 시민, 사회단체, 지자체 등 일본 경제 도발에 강력 대 

accessed January 27, 2021.

67 Gangwon Domin Ilbo. 2019. “체육계부터 맘카페까지 ‘NO 재팬http://www.kado.net/news’ 확산” (Sport Clubs and / Mum’s Internet Cafes All Join ‘No Japan’ Movement). August 7, articleView.html?idxno=981654, accessed January 27, 2021.

City initially noted the non-payment of honorarium for the participation of the Japanese team, but later completely withdrew the invitation to the Japanese team.68 Deteriorating cultural and sports exchange programmes such as these raised significant concerns at all levels. Yi Hae-Chan, the leader of the Democratic Party of Korea contended that sports exchanges between Korea and Japan have to continue despite the trade dispute.69

Some local governments took an initiative in the “No Japan, No Abe” campaign especially among the civil servants in the office, arguing that this was the time for all Koreans to demonstrate a united force against Japan.70 However, grassroots reacted against central or local government’s involvement in the boycott. Seoul’s Junggu district office decided to display 1,100 banners on the major streets of Myeongdong, Euljiro, and Namsan, which attract a large number of tourists. The grassroots, shop owners in the district, and social commentators protested against the “No Japan” banners on the streets as the workers were displaying the banners. A petition against the banners appeared in the President’s Bulletin Board. The grassroots protesters provided the following responses to the local government’s plan for the banners, on social networking sites:

The banners will upset Japanese tourists and create the misleading impression that the boycott is government-led. … The business of boycotts should be left to the people and any government’s intervention in the movement will tarnish its essence. … The banners in the middle of downtown will speed up the deterioration of the Korea-Japan relationships. … It will end up producing more Japanese to support Abe’s trade provocation. Creating the image of the government’s partaking in the people’s voluntary boycott will negatively influence the image of South Korea in the international community. … We have no intention to destroy the Korea-Japan relationships and the District office must stop displaying the banners.71

68 Yonhap News. 2019. “한일관계 악화에…강릉 컬링친선전서 일본 제외” (Korea-Japan 

Relationship Deteriorates…Gangreung Friendly Curling Games to Exclude Japan). 5 August, https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20190805128100007, accessed January 28, 2021.

69 Seoul Kyungje. 2019. “노 재팬 대신 노 아베, 與, 反日공세 수위조절https://www.sedaily.com” (No Abe Instead /

of No Japan, the Leading Party Adjusts the Wording). August 8, NewsVIew/1VMW2YLFMH, accessed January 28, 2021.

70철거ners Removed). August 6, Chosun Ilbo” (“No Japan” Banners in the Centre of Seoul: A Bureaucratic Influence Accused and the Ban-. 2019. “서울 https://www.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2019/08/06/2019080601147 도심에 ‘No재팬’ 깃발 내건 중구청, ‘관제 반일 논란’ 커지자 뒤늦게. 

html, accessed January 28, 2021.

71 Kookmin Ilbo. “명동에 ‘노 재팬’ 깃발 걸겠다는 중구… 시민들 “오버 말라” 질타 http://news” (Citizens .

Accuse the Local Government Wishing to Display “No Japan” Banners). August 6, kmib.co.kr/article/view.asp?arcid=0013573865, accessed January 28, 2021.

Observing the banner incident, Park Jeong-Hun (29-years-old), a salaryman, mentioned that the District office had gone too far and the citizens were well managing the boycott process. Others said that the District officials did not know what they are doing, that it would only make small shop owners the losers (Kim Sang-Hyun, 34-years-old), and that there was nothing to gain by treating Japanese visitors badly (Mr. Lee, 25-years-old).72 In brief, the citizens said, “We will do the fighting, and the government must stand aside.”73 Despite some supportive voices to support the display of “No Japan” banners, the prevailing view was not to display the banners in those streets of Seoul and the banner project failed.74

Seoul Metro Union produced and displayed posters in the Seoul Subway Trains, condemning Japan’s distortion of Korean history, Abe’s trade provocation, and disturbance of the peace process in the Korean peninsula.75 Numerous bus drivers in Daegu City displayed this poster in the buses—“No Japan, Boycott Japan,” thinking that this was the minimum they would like to engage individually in the protest against Abe’s trade provocation. Public complaints against the sticker display were registered at the Daegu City government, which then wrote to twenty-six Bus Corporations and asked for the removal of the stickers. The randomly interviewed citizens, i.e., grassroots, then argued that the city authorities were concerned about the possibility of misrepresentation of the local government and the possible reduction of Japanese tourists to the city, however, that the drivers’ individual freedom of expression must not be tampered with.76

It is worth noting the level of maturity of the grassroots in terms of their approaches and attitudes to the boycott which demonstrated calculated nationalism. Following the Seoul Junggu district office’s withdrawal of “No 

72Banners in the Centre of Myeongdong: ‘Gone Too Far’ vs. ‘Appropriate’). August 6, Money Today. 2019. “명동 한복판에 ‘노 재팬’ 깃발… ‘너무 나갔다’ vs ‘시의 적절 https://news’” (‘No Japan’ . mt.co.kr/mtview.php?no=2019080609124858931, accessed January 28, 2021.

73(Citizens Say, We Will Do the Fighting, and the Local Government Please Stay Restrained).  Herald Kyungje. 2019. “시민들 ‘싸움은 우리가 할게요’…지자체 ‘반일기류’에 자제 당부” 

August 6, http://news.heraldcorp.com/view.php?ud=20190806000398, accessed January 28, 2021.

74철거Them Due to the Controversy Over the Bureaucratic Intervention).” August 6,  Chosun Ilbo. 2019. “서울 도심에 ‘No재팬’ 깃발 내건 중구청, ‘관제 반일 논란’ 커지자https://www 뒤늦게. 

” (The Local Government’s ‘No Japan’ Banners in the Middle of the District Now Removed 

chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2019/08/06/2019080601147.html, accessed January 29, 2021. 75 Money Today. “지하철에도 ‘NO재팬’ 스티커…일각에선 ‘https://news.mt.co.kr/mtview도넘었다’” (‘No Japan’ Stickers .

in the Subways… Some Argue, It’s Gone Too Far). August 1, php?no=2019080115350580641, accessed January 28, 2021.

76 MBC News. 2019. “버스에 붙은 ‘노 재팬’ 논란…반일 범위 어디까지?” (Controversy Over ‘No  https://

Japan’ Stickers in the Buses… What Is the Appropriate Level of Protesting?). August 29, www.youtube.com/watch?v=pU0KP_zJPbs, accessed January 28, 2021.

Japan” banners, the People Diplomacy staff (within the Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs) made a special welcome to ten Japanese students from Kaisei High School on August 6, 2019 under the Korea-Japan students’ exchange programmes organized by the Korean Embassy in Japan. Despite the tensions between the two countries, Koreans, whether from the governments or grassroots, strongly argued that Korea-Japan people’s diplomacy must stay strong. It is hoped that people’s diplomacy will help them understand each other’s culture and history, which could contribute to improving the overall Korea-Japan relationship.77 According to Money Today, citizens reiterated the importance of people’s diplomacy and that there were plenty of Japanese tourists enjoying themselves in Myeongdong in early August 2019, and that Koreans must welcome them and continue to treat them with the best hospitality.78 The grassroots have strongly rebuked local government offices for taking any serious roles in the boycott or discouraging any types of cultural, sports, and art exchange programmes.79 It was heartening to learn that Suwon City and Asahikawa City honoured their thirty-year sister city relations and proceeded with their sixteenth friendly soccer match of primary and middle-school students in Suwon City on August 23–26, 2019.80 Similarly, two soccer teams of Japanese children had friendly matches with local children in Gyeongju City on August 25, 2019. In addition to the presentation of souvenirs to the Japanese teams, Koreans prepared supportive banners for and cheered up the Japanese players on the ground. Yun Seok-Jun, one of those Koreans cheering up the Japanese team, recognized the invaluable 

77 Chosun Ilbo. 2019. “한일戰 격화되는 와중에도…외교부 청사 찾은 日고교생들” (Some 

Japanese Students Visit the Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the Middle of Korea-Japan Conflict). August 6, https://www.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2019/08/06/2019080601959.

html, accessed January 29, 2021.

78Welcome the Japanese Tourists Rather Than Unwelcoming Them). August 7,  Money Today. 2019. “日 관광객 배척? 이런 때 일수록 더 환영해야” (Really the Time to https://news.

mt.co.kr/mtview.php?no=2019080715370261134&type=2&sec=society&pDepth2=Stotal&MSC

_T, accessed January 29, 2021.

79 Kookmin Ilbo. 2019. “여행업계, 與에 쓴 소리 ‘한일 민간교류 막지 말라’” (Travel Industry  http://

Accuses the Leading Party and Asks Them Not to Interrupt People Diplomacy).” August 7, news.kmib.co.kr/article/view.asp?arcid=0013581056&code=61111511&sid1=i, accessed January 29, 2021.

80최City).” August 7,  ” (Suwon City Proceeds the Boys’ Soccer Match with the Japanese Team from Asahikawa Joongboo Ilbohttp://www.joongboo.com/news/articleView.html?idxno=1377365,. 2019. “수원시, 日 아사히카와시 유소년 축구팀과 교류전 예정대로 accessed  개

January 30, 2021; “한일 유소년https://newsis.com/view/?id=NISI20190824_0015522452, 축구 교류전” (Korea-Japan Match of the Boys’ Soccer Teams).  accessed 

Newsis, August 24, 2019. 

January 30, 2021.

event, but could not give up “No Abe.”81 People diplomacy such as this is possible due to mutual efforts from the grassroots in Korea as well as Japan.

A notable portion of the Japanese public was in solidarity with the Korean grassroots’ efforts. When the Statue of Peace was under threat from Japanese political leaders and extreme activists, peace movement activists were at the forefront of protecting the statue, demonstrating in the street and releasing a statement. A counter-response from Korea was, for instance, when a Japanese swimmer won a gold medal from Gwangju 2019 World Aquatics Championships, July 12–18, a Korean spectator turned to a Japanese visitor and congratulated them on the achievement. The visitor’s eyes were filled with tears.82 According to Munhwa Ilbo, many of those Japanese tourists who came to Korea during this time as a response to overcome Abe’s trade provocation.83 Those Koreans and Japanese in solidarity led the hashtag movement, exchanging “#Love_Korea” and “#Love_Japan.” A clear consensus between them was “No Abe, but Yes, Japan.”84 Kim Ui-Young, a professor of political science and diplomacy rightly observed that ordinary Koreans participating in the boycott were well aware that they were not protesting against Japan or the Japanese, but against Prime Minister Abe and extremists. And Koreans boycotted Japanese products and travel to Japan but highly valued cultural and friendly exchange programmes with Japanese people.85 Indeed, Korean grassroots were self-conscious of what they protested against, as well as told local and central governments not to intervene in the grassroots movement as the grassroots attempted to cultivate better relationships between Korea and Japan.86 Political party 

81Japanese Boys’ Soccer Team). August 29.  Gyeongju Sinmun. 2019. “일본유소년축구단http://m.gjnews.com/view.php?idx=65670, 올린 유석준씨” (Yu Seok-Jun in Support of the  accessed 

January 30, 2021.

82Korean and Japanese Citizens Ought to Converse More). August 9, Hankyoreh Shinmun. 2019. “평범한 한국과 일본 시민들, 더 많이 http://www.hani.co.kr/arti 대화해야 한다” (Ordinary / culture/entertainment/905230.html, accessed February 1, 2021.

83 Munhwa Ilbo. 2019. “日 관광객마저 내쫓는 지자체” (Mad Local Governments 

Driving Away Japanese Tourists). August 9, http://www.munhwa.com/news/view. html?no=2019080901071303025001, accessed February 1, 2021.

84 Hankook Ilbo. 2019. “‘노 재팬 아닌 노 아베(NO ABE)’ 해야… 커지는 http://www1.hankookilbo 자성 목소리” (No Abe . Rather Than No Japan: More Koreans Suggest the Way To Go). August 7,

com/News/Read/201908071024752584?did=PA&dtype=3&dtypecode=2502, accessed February 1, 2021.

85 Joongang Ilbo. 2019. “[중앙시평] 일본 사람들의 마음을 사자 accessed February 1, 2021.” (Let Us Buy the Japanese Minds). August 9, 2019, https://news.joins.com/article/23547724,

86 KBS News. “성숙하고 신중하게…도 넘은 반일에 균형 잡은 시민의 힘https://mn.kbs.co.kr” (Mature and Cau-/ tious…Citizens Show Balanced Ways Against Reckless Ways). August 9, news/view.do?ncd=4259215, accessed February 1, 2021.

leaders took positive approaches towards sports and cultural exchanges and travel to Japan,87 toning down from “No Japan” to “No Abe.”88 Social networking sites such as Facebook saw an exponential increase in messages to welcome and treat Japanese visitors well.89

The hashtag movement brought some Koreans and Japanese together in solidarity. A Japanese Twitter user uploaded several photos of Koreans campaigning to support the victims of the 2011 East Japan earthquake and argued that there is a good number of Japanese who appreciate Koreans and are in solidarity with them despite the Japanese government’s dislike of Korea. Others shared their memorable trips to Korea, for example, a few Koreans kindly guided them when s/he got lost a few times. Additionally, a group of Japanese held an anti-Abe rally at Aruta-mae, Shinzuku on August 4, 2019.90 Five-thousand intellectuals, including Wada Haruki, an emeritus professor at Tokyo University, released and signed a statement against Abe’s trade provocation.91 Shiraishi Takashi, the representative of Japan’s Alliance of Hope pointed out that the Supreme Court of Korea had a judgment on the reparation of the forced labour induced by Japanese corporations during the Second World War and that the Japanese government’s rejection of the judgment was to ignore the verdict based on the judicial independence in Korea and indicates the immaturity of Japanese democracy. Mr. Shiraishi contended that Japanese NGOs were partly responsible for Abe’s ill-informed policy and this makes it critical for Japanese and Korean NGOs to continue their exchanges.92

87 Gwangju Ilbo. 2019. “지도부, 올림픽 보이콧·여행 금지 등 반일 정서http://www.kwangju 과열 제동” (Leaders .

Rightly Oppose Boycotting the Olympic and Trip to Japan). August 9, co.kr/print.php?aid=1565293800673541004, accessed February 1, 2021.

88 Segye Ilbo. 2019. “與, 反日 수위 조절… 野, 외교적 해결 촉구” (Leading Party Hopes the 

Control of the Level of Protesting Japan…Opposition Party Wants a Diplomatic Solution). August 8, http://m.segye.com/view/20190808511760, accessed February 2, 2019.

89들www.hankyung.com/economy/article/201908078409i, Hankook Kyungje. 2019. “[조재길의 경제산책] 일본인 accessed February 2, 2019. 환영…정치인보다 수준높은https:/ 시민/

” (Citizens’ Treatment of Japanese Is Higher Standard Than Politicians). August 7, 

90‘Like_Korea’ Amidst Korea-Japan Economic Conflict).” August 10,  Segye Ilbo. 2019. “한일 경제대립 속 일본 국민들은 ‘좋아요_한국http://www.segye.com’” (Many Japanese Tweet / newsView/20190809506048, accessed February 2, 2019.

91 Joongang Ilbo. 2019. “[중앙시평] 일본 사람들의 마음을 사자.” August 9, https://news.joins. com/article/23547724, accessed February 1, 2021.

92못해for Not Being Able to Stop Abe’s Provocation & We Should Learn from Korean Democracy).  Kyunghyang Sinmun죄송 한국 민주주의. 2019. “[배워야인터뷰” (Shiraishi Dakashi of Hope Solidarity from Japan: Sorry ]시라이시 다카시 희망연대 대표 ‘아베 폭주 막지 

···  

August 8, http://news.khan.co.kr/kh_news/khan_art_view.html?art_id=201908081657001, accessed February 2, 2021.

It is the grassroots that wanted and led a constructive movement, and they taught the government and elites what approach to take. The grassroots did not interfere with the government’s diplomatic efforts to have the issue of forced labour resolved, nor did they want the government to interfere with the grassroots’ voluntary boycott. The grassroots want to continue people’s diplomacy at all levels including their opportunities for their businesses to sell their goods to the Japanese tourists. These activities are examples of calculated nationalism. They were advocating both personal and national interests, and these different interests were pursued in parallel rather than in conflict.

Social Media-Based Boycott

An important reason that the grassroots could lead a boycott based on a clear rationale and civility is that they are netizens, with connectivity through online spaces and shared goals (Heimans and Timms 2018).93 Social media such as social networking sites and KaKaoTalk effectively and rapidly expanded the support group for the boycott. The news and social media conveyed pieces of colonial histories and the background of the boycott, especially for school students,94 who then engaged with their parents and diverse age groups.

In 2019 Korea was celebrating the 100th anniversary of the March First Independence Movement and the establishment of the Korean Provisional Government based in Shanghai during the Japanese colonial rule. Seongnam Arts Centre contracted Daum Webtoon Business to create a series of webtoons about thirty-three Independence Movement activists and distribute them through the top-ranked Daum portal (cf., Yecies and Shim 2021). The webtoons provided easy access to the colonial history for young people, and they were a reminder for adults.95 According to Seo Yong-Gu, a professor of management, unlike past boycotts often led by older populations, the “No Abe” boycott was much more dynamic due to young people’s sustained participation and related online activities such as netizens’ sharing of 

93 Cited in Choi Sun-Young. 2019. “보이콧 재팬, SNS 항일운동의 힘” (Boycotting Japan and the Power of Protesting Japan through SNS). Hankyoreh Shinmun, July 23. http://m.hani.co.kr/ arti/opinion/column/903047.html#cb, accessed February 2, 2021.

94 Choongcheong Today. 2019. “대전 학원가 NO JAPAN 선언” (Private Academies in Daejeon Announces ‘No Japan’). August 14, https://www.cctoday.co.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=2018223, accessed February 3, 2021.

95 Jeonja Sinmun. 2019. “웹툰 독립운동” (Webtoon-Based Independent Movement). August 18, https://m.etnews.com/20190814000300?obj=Tzo4OiJzdGRDbGFzcyI6Mjp7czo3OiJyZWZlcmVy IjtOO3M6NzoiZm9yd2FyZCI7czoxMzoid2ViIHRvIG1vYmlsZSI7fQ%3D%3D.

information about boycotting Japanese products or purchasing alternatives. Cho Chun-Han, another professor of management, reported that information sharing on Japanese products changed the consumption patterns of many products.96

“No No Japan” site97 lists thousands of Japanese products and Korean-made substitutes in the broad categories of foods, electronic goods, cosmetics, medicine, apparel, hobby-related, motor vehicles, infants’ products, pet products, musical instruments, etc. The site also has sections on news and bulletin board, which bring the boycott-related news and facilitate exchanging the relevant information. Web-based communities with diverse foci, such as CLIEN,98 also actively encourage their members to join the boycott. Many young people prepare a hand-written promise to themselves that their boycott will continue until Japan regrets and apologizes for the misdeeds. The message is shared on the online spaces, which is a way to earn recognition from their peers and the wider community.99

As already noted, the hashtag movement was active, spreading #Love_ Korea and #Love_Japan. Twitter users from Korea and Japan shared the sentiment that political leaders may argue against each other to resolve the trade dispute, but the people should not. In online spaces, Koreans emphasized the need to distinguish “No Abe” from “No Japan.” A Japanese netizen shared, “Despite the rough political relations of Japan and Korea, I love Koreans, food, and music. I hope the people will remain friendly to each other.”100

Emergent Counter-Cultures

Ever since the Japanese colonial period, Japanese cultures have been deepseated in Korean society. Reviving the awareness of Japanese imperialism was an unexpected but apparent outcome of the Japanese trade provocation, without which younger Koreans would have continued to embrace 

96 Asia Kyungje. 2019. “예전과 다른 일본 불매운동 100일…국민 스스로의 참여가 효과 더 높여” 

(100 Days of an Unusual Boycott of Japan…Grassroots Voluntary Participation Has Been Effective). October 11, https://www.asiae.co.kr/article/2019101115242825994, accessed February 3, 2021.

97 https://nonojapan.com

98 https://www.clien.net

99 Seoul Sinmun. 2019. “짱구 대신 검정고무신, 일본어 안쓰기…밀레니얼 세대의 불매 운동” 

(Black Rubber Shoes Instead of Jjanggu, Avoid Japanese Words: New Generation’s Boycotting Japan). July 21, https://www.seoul.co.kr/news/newsView.php?id=20190721500070, accessed February 3, 2021.

100 Money Today. 2019. “日 ‘#좋아요_한국’ 확산…韓서도 ‘반일https://news.mt.co.kr/mtview.p 말고 반아베’” (‘#Like_Korea’ h Spreads in Japan; Anti-Abe Instead of Anti-Japan). August 8, p?no=2019080718065972195&EMBA, accessed February 3, 2021.

Japanese products uncritically.101 “Boycott Japan” brought about new ideas and cultures to combat Abe’s trade egregiousness. Much of the emergent cultural phenomena reflected the given Korean context of material success. A supermarket in Daegu City held a special sale campaign for several Japanese products, e.g., beer, cigarettes, and biscuits, of which the prices were one thousand times normal prices. The price of a can of beer ranged from $990 to $1,980.102 This campaign was meant to be a witty and sarcastic marketing strategy and may have indicated that the supermarket owner cares little even though the Japanese products do not generate any profit. Convenience stores such as GS25 have franchise stores throughout the nation. GS25 produced stickers to disseminate the history of the national flag and attached one to every lunchbox sold in their franchise shops. GS Supermarket, Lalavla, GS Fresh have produced 11,415 shopping bags with the map of the Korean peninsula and Dokdo Island, the latter of which Japan illegitimately claimed its ownership.103

Participating actively in the boycott, Yangju, Daegu, and Anyang cities checked the names of facilities and districts to identify any legacy from the Japanese colonial period in order to recover the original Korean names.104 Some businesses had the names of their enterprises in Japanese or sold Japanese cuisine without any association to Japanese-made products. The owners were conscious of possible public suspicion of any close association with Japan. The business owners adopted new Korean names for their enterprises and shop owners replaced their old signboards.105

101Boycotting Japan and a Surge of the Colonial History… Thoughtful Consumption). July 30,  YonhapNews TV. 2019. “불매운동 넘어 과거사 관심도 ‘쑥’…신념소비” (Going Beyond https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BuQ7k6STPzk, accessed December 6, 2020.

102$1,580 in a shop). July 29,  Maeil Kyungje. 2019. “아사히https://www.mk.co.kr/news/society/view/2019/07/577077/, 맥주 한 캔에 158만원에 파는 슈퍼” (A Can of Asahi Beer Sells  accessed 

February 10, 2021.

103 Digital Times. 2019. “‘국산입니다’… ‘노 재팬’ 반사이익 노린 애국마케팅 http://www.dt.co.kr” (Patriotic Marketing / Says, ‘Made in Korea’ to Take Advantage of No Japan Movement). August 1, contents.html?article_no=2019080102101032060004&ref=jeadan, accessed February 10, 2021.

키로104 K” (Yangju City Promotes No Japan Movement Broadly in the City). August 5,yunggi Ilbo. 2019. “양주시, 일본의 경제침략에 대응 노재팬운동 범시민운동으로 추진

kyeonggi.com/news/articleView.html?idxno=2142565략Abe Government’s Economic Provocation). 규탄… 지역 정치권·지자체 한목청” (Local Politicians and Governments All Protest Against  August 5, ; http://www.kyeongin.com/main/viewKyungin Ilbo. 2019. “아베  https://www정권, 경제침..

php?key=20190804010000970곡hani.co.kr/arti/PRINT/903879.html,으로되돌리자 ; Hankyoreh Shinmun all accessed February 11, 2021.. 2019. “일제가 붙인 ‘왜관,’ 본래 http://www 지명인 ‘칠.

’ ” (‘Waegwan’ Named by Japanese to Change to ‘Chilgok’). July 30,

105 MBC News. 2019. “노 재팬 간판부터 메뉴까지…계약서는 중개보조원https://imnews.imbc? 공인중개사?” .

(Loving Korean: Business Names, Restaurant Menus etc.). February 17, com/replay/2020/nwtoday/article/5661678_32531.html, accessed February 11, 2021.

Some films with anti-Japanese sentiments, which were screened at the time of the boycott, attracted large audiences. For example, a documentary film, Shusenjo: The Main Battleground of the “Comfort Women” Issue (2019), directed by Miki Dezaki, a Japanese-American, attracted 20,000 attendees within two weeks when screened in a small number of cinemas in July and August 2019, which was significant. Netizens gave much support to another forthcoming documentary movie, Kim Bok-Dong, based on a Japanese 

“comfort woman” victim and human rights activist. The Battle: Roar to Victory (봉오동 전투, 2019) is a film based on Korean independence fighters against Japanese soldiers in the 1920s and started screening on August 7, 

2019, attracting an audience of 4.7 million.106

In August 2019, in an art exhibition to commemorate the 100th anniversary of the March First Independence Movement, ten artists presented their artworks depicting the sufferings of ordinary Koreans under Japanese hands. The artists noted that they were compelled to partake in the “No Japan” campaign with the skills they have and that they wished to stimulate the spirit of Korean nationalism as part of the boycott.107 An art group, “Together with the Mountains” (산과함께), hosted an unplanned interactive debate with their audiences at the exhibition and discussed the ways to boycott Japan through artwork. Choi Hyung-Soon, an art critic, contended that the government’s lead in the boycott could send the wrong messages to the international community, and that there is much that the power of culture and artwork can achieve. There were many similar exhibitions and performances in other parts of Gangwon-do Province and beyond.108

“Wasn’t Part of the Independence Movement, But I am Part of the Boycott”: 

Prevalent Anger Towards the Trade Provocation

I have already discussed how the agents elaborated on the emergent structures and cultures. Now I discuss further the grassroots’/agents’ direct actions to bring about changes to the given structure and culture. Individual determination about, and participation in, the boycott was remarkable. 

106 Segye Ilbo. 2019. “[한일 경제전쟁] 극장가도 ‘노 재팬’…’http://www.segye.com/news도라에몽’도 쓰러졌다” (No -

Japan in Film Industry…Even Doraemon Falls). August 2, View/20190802509824, accessed February 12, 2021.

107 Gangwon DominIlbo. 2019. “강원문화계, 8월 ‘민족 애환’ 예술로 꽃피워” (Culture Industry in Gangwon Province: Turning the Nation’s Sorrow to a Cultural Work). August 1, http://www.

kado.net/news/articleView.html?idxno=980706, accessed February 12, 2021.

108 Gangwon DominIlbo. 2019. “문화예술계 민간 주도 ‘노 재팬 www.kado.net/news/articleView 운동’ 확산 움직임” (People-Led . Culture and Art Industry Leads No Japan Movement). August 3, html?idxno=981110, accessed February 13, 2021.

According to a Realmeter survey in early August 2019, 61.8 per cent of Koreans had participated in the boycott.109 By November 2020 this participation rate had reached 71.8 per cent. Also, nearly 60 per cent (57.6 per cent) of Koreans anticipated that the boycott would likely continue for a long time, whereas 18.8 per cent expected it to dwindle.110 Young people’s participation in the boycott has been especially notable. A well-known phrase from young people was that “I could not be part of the national independence movement from Japan, but I am part of the boycotting of Japan.” Once a small number of students in a school took initiative in the boycott, it spread rapidly to the whole school, and then to the students’ parents. Students typically encouraged each other to purchase Korean-made stationery and consume Korean-produced foods.111

Consistent with the 1929 Gwangju Students Independence Movement from Japan, four-hundred students, supported by their 1,000 peers, wore the 1920s-style school uniforms to recall the spirit of the independence movement and made an anti-Abe announcement in front of the Japanese Embassy in Seoul on August 10, 2019.112 Yu Min-Seo (17-years-old) condemned Abe’s shameless behaviour of refusing apologies to the Japanese military “comfort women,” noting that Abe initiated the trade provocation and that Abe must withdraw it and apologize to the victims immediately. Choi Min-Gyeong (18-years-old) could not comprehend the abuse of the women for the soldiers’ sexual gratifications and demanded Japan’s sincere apologies to the victims.113 One-hundred-and-fifty students, their parents, and 250 teachers from the Association of Private Academies in Korea, which has its teaching venues in the seventeen cities, gathered in front of the Japanese Embassy in Seoul to condemn prime minister Abe. The teachers claimed to be disappointed and betrayed by Abe’s trade provocation as they taught 

109 Realmeter. 2019. “3주 연속국민 60% 이상 ‘일제 불매운동’ 참여 중…” (60% of the People 

Continue to Participate in Boycotting Japan over 3 weeks). August 8, http://www.realmeter. net/3주-연속-국민-60-. 2020. “10이상-일제명 중-불매운동 7명은 일본-참여 불매운동-중/?ckattempt=1, accessed February 13, 2021. 참여…42%, 지속하겠다https://www” (7 Out of .

110 Maeil Kyungje

10 Koreans Participate in Boycotting Japan…42% Will Continue). December 22, 

mk.co.kr/news/business/view/2020/12/1307874/, accessed February 13, 2021.

111 Joongang Ilbo. 2019. “고교생들도 ‘노 재팬’…광주 학생들, 일본産 볼펜 버린 이유는?” 

(Highschool Students in Gwangju Join ‘No Japan’…Why Trashing Japanese Ballpens?). July 17, https://news.joins.com/article/23528003, accessed February 13, 2021.

112 https://www.facebook.com/watch/live/?v=503215127091278&ref=search, accessed February 14, 2021.

113 Hankyoreh Shinmun. 2019. “일본 아베 정부 규탄···소녀상 앞 대규모 촛불 물결” (Condemning the Abe Government…A Massive Candlelight Vigil in Front of the Statue of Peace). 10 August, http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/society/society_general/905269.html, accessed February 14, 2021.

Japanese languages and cultures for years. The students publicly read “The March First Declaration of Independence” and reminded themselves of the brutality of Japanese colonialism.114 Students consciously refused to purchase the Japanese sportswear that they used to love. The shop owners in Yangdong Dried Seafood Market in Gwangju City agreed that action is much more than talking and that they completely quit dealing with any Japanese produced seafood and instead recommended Korean products to their customers.115

The participants treated the boycott as their personal, as well as national, movement as they tended to personalize the significance of the boycott and engaged in changing the diplomatic and trade relations between Korea and Japan. It is worth noting the participants combined personal and national interests, which is evidence of double-morphogenesis and calculated nationalism. It is difficult to assess whether the participants gave priority to national needs or personal gains. Yet, what is clear is that they were willing to give up their immediate gains for the sake of long-term individual and national gains. For example, some owners of grocery stores returned Japanese products, e.g., beer, cigarettes. According to one of the street vendors, participating in the boycott, she “wants to be a small additional support to the boycott at this time of national crisis.”116 Nonetheless, Jeong Hae-Rang, a representative of 682 organizations (e.g., YMCA, Korean Confederation of Trade Unions, Korea Alliance For Progressive Movement) which were protesting against Abe Shinzo in front of the Japanese Embassy in Seoul, called the 15,000 participants “the 21st-century independence activists” and requested that “we must treat Japanese with kindness and we are fighting against only Abe and Japanese militarism.”117 The observers of the boycott noted that past boycotts differed from the 2019 campaign 

114한 Seoul Kyungje. 2019. “일본어 배우는 게 창피해…소녀상 앞에서 기미독립선언문 낭독

 학생들” (Students Are Ashamed of Learning Japanese…They Read Gimi Declaration of 

Independence). August 9, 2019, https://www.sedaily.com/NewsVIew/1VMWIS6T22, accessed February 14, 2021.

115 Gwangju Maeilsinmun. 2019. “한 달째日 불매운동 더 확산된다 ” (Boycott 

Japan Has Been Spreading for a Month). August 1, www.kjdaily.com/news_view. php?n=478678&tmp=20190801&s=5, accessed February 14, 2021.

116 Chungcheong Today. 2019. “중소상인도 보이콧 재팬” (Small-to-Middle Shop-Owners Join  Boycott Japan). July 30, https://www.cctoday.co.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=2015640, accessed February 15, 2021.

117들었다the Forced Labour). August 3, Hankyoreh Shinmun. 2019. “ http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/society/society_general/904398.html아베 정권 규탄, 강제징용 사죄하라, 시민 1만5천명 촛불을,  

” (15,000 Citizens Condemn Abe Government and Demands Apologies for Recruiting of accessed February 15, 2021.

as the latter demonstrated smart and considerate approaches in terms of how and what to boycott. Initially, the boycotted items included everyday products like clothing, beer, and cosmetics and then soon expanded to motor vehicles, heavy industry types of equipment, and fishing tools. For example, S-1 is a company with a small portion of its ownership by Japanese shareholders, and produces electronic goods for security (e.g., CCTV), and employs 6,500 Korean workers. S-1 was not subject to the boycott. Also, Ministop is a Japanese convenient store with 2,400 chain stores in Korea. The branch managers run the stores as their only livelihood and therefore Ministop was not subject to the boycott.118 The boycott strategy was highly calculative.

Diverse Groups’ Participation and Diverse Views

It is widely recognized that the citizens were the backbone of the 2019 boycott and their voluntary participation led the whole process. As discussed, the grassroots at times instructed the local governments and political elites not to participate or intervene in the grassroots’ voluntary activities. Local governments’ participation in supporting the boycott was criticized as an intention to seek political gains.119 Indeed, the grassroots were much more mature and sophisticated than political leaders.120 According to Yi Eun-Hee, professor of consumer science, the primary goal of boycotting Japan was not necessarily to target the Japanese government but to provide the Korean government with extra negotiation power.121 However, Korean political parties could not agree on the strategies to fight against Abe.122 Seo KyungDeok, a professor of marketing, pointed out that specific organizations have initiated boycotts against Japan in the past, however, the grassroots voluntarily initiated the boycotting of Japanese products; these products consequently lost their marketability. Further, Korean consumers changed 

118 Money Today. 2019. “이전과는 다르다…불매운동은 지금 열정과 냉정 사이” (Boycott Japan https://news.

Now Is Different from the Past… It Is a Sharp and Passionate Pursuit). August 19, mt.co.kr/mtview.php?no=2019081910301388201, accessed February 15, 2021.

119 YTN Radio. 2019. “전우용, 주옥순 대표 발언…역사공부 accessed February 16, 2021. 30년 넘게 이런 경우 못 봤어.” 

August 8, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Kb8rocf4Piw,

120First). August 14,  Gyeongnam Sinmun. 2019. “정치권부터 불매(不買)하자” (Let Us Boycott Our Politicians  accessed http://www.knnews.co.kr/news/articleView.php?idxno=1298859, February 16, 2021.

121 Money Today. “이전과는 다르다…불매운동은 지금, accessed February 15, 2021. 열정과 냉정 사이.” August 19, https:// news.mt.co.kr/mtview.php?no=2019081910301388201

122 Mudeung Ilbo. 2019. “무등칼럼-광복절에 비쳐진 우리의 부끄러운https://mnews.sarangbang 민낯” (Our Shame is . Exposed at the Anniversary of the Independence Day). August 14, com/detail/article/1651189, accessed February 16, 2021.

their consumption patterns, using Korean products or alternatives, which ensured a long-term boycott in everyday life.123

Initially, Korean boycotters were informed of a Japanese response to the boycott—that there would be no serious consequences and the campaign would dwindle quickly. Angered by the Japanese response, the boycott further accelerated. Japanese responses were then, “It is lasting longer than expected. The impact is drastic. Korean tourists can’t be easily replaced.”124 Japan’s sarcastic ridicule may not have been baseless when considering that some previous Korean boycotts and independence movements did not often last long enough during Japanese colonialism and many Koreans became Japanese collaborators.125 However, that was also a time with no structural context favourable towards the Koreans. But during the boycott period the given and emergent structural and cultural properties were favourable towards the Korean boycott against Japanese products. New structure and culture must have influenced the agents’ perceptions of Japan, including Japanese products due to high-quality Korean products.126 Japan continues to exercise its colonialism against Korea, although it is a new form of imperialism in the 21st century. However, Korean responses are not the same as in the past. Yang Geum-Deok (90-years-old), a victim of forced labour, publicly spoke at a mass protest against Abe, “Let us fight against Abe until we defeat him unlike our silent protest against Japan in the past. Let us now lead a happy life.”127 Protesters anticipated that the goal of the boycott was to be economically independent of Japan and become a completely free nation-state.128 The protesters were not only the actors to pursue the 

123높여2021. Asia Kyungje. 2019. “예전과 다른 일본 불매운동 100일…국민 스스로의, accessed February 16,  참여가 효과 더 .” October 11, https://www.asiae.co.kr/article/2019101115242825994

124 Segye Ilbo. 2019. “일본 여행 안 간다니까요, 日타격 예상보다 컸다… 3537억 손실” (Not 

Travelling to Japan Has Hit Japan More Than Thought: $353.7 Million Loss to Japan). October 6, http://www.segye.com/newsView/20191006505828, accessed February 16, 2021.

Going to Last). October 8,125 Kyungin Ilbo. 2018. “냄비 http://www.kyeongin.com/main/view.php?key=20191008010002377, 근성 운운 일본에 본때를 보여주자” (Let Us Show Our Boycott is  accessed February 16, 2021.

126높여2021. Asia Kyungje. 2019. “예전과 다른 일본 불매운동 100일…국민 스스로의, accessed February 16,  참여가 효과 더 .” October 11, https://www.asiae.co.kr/article/2019101115242825994

127 Aju Kyungje. 2019. “10만 촛불이 외쳤다, ‘일본규탄’…비 그치며https://www.ajunews.com 하늘도 응답” (100,000 / Candlelighters Condemned Against Japan). August 16, 2019, view/20190815195615243, accessed February 16, 2021.

128 Busan Ilbo. 2019. “부산시민 주말 400여 명http://www.busan.com/view/busan/view 모여, 아베 규탄” (Busan Citizens Con-. demning Abe Over the Weekend). August 18, php?code=20190818000095, accessed February 16, 2021.

recovery of the sovereignty of the Korean nation-state, but the warriors to correct the distorted history of the victims of Japanese imperialism, and to advocate for human rights and the universal values of peace, which the protesters thought Abe and Japanese imperialism continued to ignore.129

Some conservative politicians and activists exploited the boycott for their political gains. For instance, Na Kyung-Won, in-house representative of Liberty Korea Party (now People Power Party) claimed that Japan’s de-whitelisting of Korea as a trade partner resulted from the Moon government’s pro-North Korea and anti-Japan policies.130 The conservatives bluntly contended that Moon and his aides are all commies.131 Ju Ok-Soon, a standpattist political activist, made a statement in front of the Japanese Embassy in Seoul, “Dear prime minister Abe, my whole-hearted apologies to you for the ignorant Korean leader’s bringing down the Korea-Japan relationship.”132 These points were ahistorical, misinformed of the origins of the boycott, and did not represent the majority of the Korean conservatives.

Yeon Seung, a news reporter, shared a personal view that may represent prevalent reasons for participation in the boycott, especially those who often travel to Japan:

I don’t need to travel to and spend my money in Japan when Japan treats Korea so badly. Japan used to be a shopping heaven with high-quality goods. Now Seoul is much better than Japan and lacks nothing by all means. … I used to like Japanese cosmetics, but now there are plenty of alternatives. “No Japan” movement simply brings no inconvenience to my life.133

129 Daejeon Ilbo. 2019. “진천군, 日 경제 보복 규탄대회…제품 불매운동 결의” (Jincheon 

District Holds a Protest Against the Japanese Economic Provocation…Agreeing to Boycott Japan). August 11, http://www.daejonilbo.com/news/newsitem.asp?pk_no=1382219, accessed February 16, 2021.

130들었다February 17, 2021. Hankyoreh Shinmun.” August 3, http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/society/society_general/904398.html,. 2019. “아베 정권 규탄, 강제징용 사죄하라, 시민 1만5천명 accessed  촛불을 

131 JTBC. 2019. “일본은 친구…빨갱이 몰아내자… 외친 보수단체 https://mnews.jtbc.joins.com/News 집회” (Japan is Our Friend…/

Drive Away Commies, Cried the Conservatives). August 16,

Article.aspx?news_id=NB11866365, accessed February 21, 2021.

132 JTBC. 2019. “아베 수상님, 사죄드립니다, 엄마부대 주옥순 발언 파문” (Mom’s Army Leader 

Ju Ok-Soon Causes a Controversy by Saying, ‘Dear PM Abe, My Apologies’). August 6, accessed February 17, 2021.

133 Seoul Kyungje. 2020. “노재팬 실천중에 써본 한국이 만든 일본서 인기 있는 화장품” (Trying https://

Out Korean-Made Cosmetics During No Japan, That Are Popular in Japan). August 15, www.sedaily.com/NewsView/1Z6L8K6NEA, accessed February 17, 2021.

Concluding Remarks

According to Gellner (1983: 11, emphasis in original), “nationalist sentiment is the feeling of anger aroused by the violation of the principle or the feeling of satisfaction aroused by its fulfillment. A nationalist movement is one actuated by a sentiment of this kind” (cited in Haas 1986: 720–721). This precisely reflects the Korean participants of the “No Japan” movement 2019. Pre-existing economic structure134 and culture of the Korean society with reference to the Korean boycott of Japanese products can be understood with reference to Japanese imperialism and the inferior standards of Korean technologies and sciences in comparison to those of Japan. Since independence from Japan in 1945, Korean economic development has partly been dependent on its trade with Japan on the one hand, but Korea has achieved remarkable progress in many dimensions on the other. The accompanying structural and cultural changes in this process have brought about emergent structural and cultural properties. It is these contexts under which the Japanese trade provocation occurred, and which then ignited the Korean grassroots’ boycott in full confidence.

There were a few elite suggestions for a strategic boycott for better outcomes, e.g., to focus on boycotting a limited range of Japanese products to achieve an outcome rather than boycotting a broad range, and to make use of what Japan is and offers rather than be completely “anti-Japan.”135 The outcome of the boycott certainly matters. However, this chapter has primarily focused on what the grassroots had in their minds and how they approached the boycott. According to Kozinets and Handleman (1998: 475), “boycotting serves as a vehicle for moral self-realization” to the boycott participants, and this motivation outweighs the sacrifice of constrained consumption. In a similar vein, even those who maintained some degree of positive attitudes towards Japan and its products seemed to suppress their routine purchasing of Japanese products. Consequently, the “No Japan” movement gave the government confidence in what it does.

The majority of Koreans hold “national animosity” towards Japan’s past and present imperialism. However, when the agent’s animosity is not overwhelmingly high, they may not participate in, or may even disapprove 

134 Main Domains of Structure Include Roles, Organizations, Institutions and Systems (Archer 1996: 1).

135 Kyunghyang Sinmun. 2019. “심승규 日대학 교수, 아베정권을http://news.khan.co.kr/kh_news 상대로 불매운동해야/” 

(Boycott Should Be against the Abe Regime).” August 11, khan_art_view.html?art_id=201908110910001, accessed February 17, 2021.

of, the boycott (cf., Ahn, Kwak, and Hwang 2014: 54), which was the case with a portion of Koreans. The boycott was initially protest-oriented but became mature and sophisticated, as displayed by the grassroots approach to separate civilian campaigns from political struggles, e.g., protesting against Abe and Japanese products, but welcoming Japanese tourists and maintaining people’s diplomacy—this all represents calculated nationalism. For example, shop owners wanted to serve individual interests, as well as protect national pride and identity. In brief, Korean grassroots wanted the human rights of the forced labour victims to be compensated, but also see Japan as a close neighbour to live with in harmony, despite the colonial memories. This is their longer-term plan for world peace and to pursue human rights recognition and support in cooperation with the Japanese.

The Korean grassroots seem confident that they are now able to raise their voices against Japan. The suffering of Koreans under Japanese colonialism is inherent among Koreans ever since their Independence. Koreans are obsessed with their wins against Japan in all aspects such as sports, trade, and art. The “No Japan, No Abe” movement was an exemplar and the Korean grassroots seemed somewhat satisfied without clearly winning or losing the battle. The analysis of the media reports indicated that Japan wishes to continue its imperialism over Korea, whereas Korea wants to remove the imperial link and become completely sovereign. Eventually, Japan should not be seen as an enemy but as a neighbouring partner, which is in line with the wishes of the majority of Koreans. Two years after the start of the boycotting, the movement was not as strong as before and Korean grassroots seemed to look for ways to make up with the Japanese.136

In the context of the trade provocation, no major international concerns arose, as the relationship between Korea and Japan was not permanently broken, and Korea’s national security was not hampered.137 According to William Sposato, a Tokyo-based journalist, “Japan started a war it wasn’t ready to fight.”138

136 The uneasy Korea-Japan relationship needs to be renewed. However, renewing it without rectifying the Japan-led distorted history will only make it resurface and become an obstacle for the relationship again in the future. How the conservative Yoon Suk-Yeol regime will cultivate the relationship remains to be seen.

137 Munhwa Ilbo. 2019. “<뉴스와 시각>혐일(嫌日)도 공일(恐日)도 포퓰리즘이다” (Neither 

Hate Japan Nor Fear Japan Is the Way Forward).” August 8, http://www.munhwa.com/news/ view.html?no=2019080801073030119001, accessed February 2, 2021.

138 Foreign Policy. 2019. “Japan Started a War It Wasn’t Ready to Fight.” August 6, https:// foreignpolicy.com/2019/08/06/japan-started-a-war-it-wasnt-ready-to-fight/, accessed February 13, 2022.

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