Calculated Nationalism in Contemp S Korea 9

 9 Concluding Remarks

Abstract

Contemporary Korea is much represented by individual desires to fulfil their personal aspirations, making the best use of all the available structural and cultural properties. Calculated nationalism, in particular, has become a naturally emergent property, which is more prevalent in the affluent context of Korean democracy and economic development. It is a people’s right but has been halted by authoritarian governments as well as the vested interest groups within Korean society. More individual rights should be advocated and supported, so the vested interest groups are encouraged or coerced to share political and economic benefits produced in the society.

Keywords: Democracy Index 2020, calculated nationalism, grassroots nationalism, political democratization, economic democratization

Going through a compressed development, South Korea has been at a crossroads at various times every decade since the end of the Korean War (1950–1953). South Korea is known to be one of a very few nations achieving both democracy and economic development since the Second World War (Lee 2018). It was the 10th-strongest economy in the world in 2020. However, the most conspicuous feature of Korean society is that its people are ideologically, politically, and economically divided. It is grassroots Koreans as much as political leaders who all have been striving to bring about a better nation-state for the people of Korea. Korean people’s perceptions of their national identities are still in formation. This book is an effort to provide an analytical snapshot at a particular point in time. There is still much to be done for political and economic democratization. South Korea as a nation-state and the people’s psyches remain held back as a colonial state domestically and internationally.1 South Korea has not been able to reconcile with the legacies of its colonial history and the Korean War.

1 Kyunghyang Shinmun. 2019. “미국 학자 ‘일본이 과거사 속죄 않는 것이 세계경제 위협’” 

(An American Scholar: Japan’s Unapologetic Attitude to the Past Mistakes Threatens the World 

 

Han, G.-S., Calculated Nationalism in Contemporary South Korea. Movements for Political and Economic Democratization in the 21st Century. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press 2023 doi: 10.5117/9789463723657_ch09

Further, political and economic elites have exploited the people they are supposed to serve. Top-down nationalism has lingered, and this has prevented bottom-up nationalism from maturing (Storm 2018: 116). Undoubtedly, Korean elites pursued “fostering solidarity among the members of the nation” to create “a close-knit community” (p. 116), and this has contributed to the coherence of the Korean nation-state. However, top-down nationalism only is not sufficient enough to grow a strong and constructive nationalism. Bottom-up nationalism has occasionally been supported and successful, but in general, has not been fully fostered despite prevalent attempts of grassroots social movements for decades.

An implicit, but important and personal goal of this book project was to look for and analyse the ways in which South Korean people with different ideological and socio-economic backgrounds communicate, which seems to have caused division within the nation over the last one hundred years (Chang 2018: 359). Every nation-state faces its own challenges in supporting the people to stay united, despite their plural characteristics. The challenges of each nation depend upon its unique history and contemporary socio-economic context. South Korea is a relatively newly industrialized nation-state, and its people are ideologically and economically divided. The economic discrepancy between the haves and have-nots and also between the generations is serious. Those with secure jobs and those with insecure and lower-paying jobs, often undertaking the same tasks, divide the workers in the neoliberal context. According to media reports, these lingering problems and the spirit of neoliberalism are reflected in the high suicide rate of young people in particular, and in the internationally popular TV series, Squid Game.2 In contemporary Korea, with these structural and cultural properties, what are the ways in which these socio-economic elements preoccupy the grassroots of South Korea, especially in terms of their perception of South Korea as a nation-state, current national identities, and also their desired future directions of the nation-state?

Economy). August 12, http://news.khan.co.kr/kh_news/khan_art_view.html?artid=2019081211

01001&code=970100#csidx86938235b77d2f0ac271d9c61a89240, accessed 12/8/2019; Ecumenian. 

“누가 대한민국을 만들었는가?” 미국의 역사학자가 쓴 미국의 대한민국 만들기의 역사” 

(Who Shaped the Republic of Korea? A History of Making the Republic of Korea), http://www. ecumenian.com/news/articleView.html?idxno=9573, accessed August, 12, 2019.

2 ABC News. 2021. “Squid Game, the Most Popular Show on Netflix, Was Inspired by South Korea’s Crippling Debt Crisis.” October 16, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-10-16/squid-gameon-netflix-inspired-by-koreas-debt-crisis/100533282, accessed October 19, 2021. The popularity of the show reflects the downsides of the neo-liberal world, of which South Korea is a part.

In this book, as a way of understanding bottom-up nationalism, I have gathered news reports and data stored in a range of social media, containing rich information about significant social movements and events. I have selected six influential major events, concerns, and phenomena which have initiated significant social movements at a Korean national level. Analysing media reports and the media representations of the grassroots voices, I have attempted to ascertain the emergent structural and cultural properties which are in operation in the selected concerns and phenomena in Korean society. Further, I have also searched the agents’ active responses as ways to ascertain their political and economic rights, which mirror their desired directions for the nation’s future. Broadly following the tradition of critical realism and deploying Margaret Archer’s morphogenetic approach, in particular, I am confident about the value of identifying the structural and cultural contexts of each phenomenon and tracing the individual agents’ articulation and reconfiguration of their desired structure and culture.

The victims of the Japanese military “comfort women,” discussed in Chapter 3, were women and girls whom imperial Japan forcibly recruited into sexual slavery before and during the Second World War. It is deeply disturbing to hear the victims’ descriptions of what they went through for the sake of the relentless Japanese imperial efforts to conquer the world, which involved extremely inhumane and disturbing breaches of human rights. Following the end of the war, many of the “comfort women” were either killed or abandoned on the war fields. Returning to their home nation-state that was too helpless to protect them before and after the war, these victims lived voiceless for half a century. It was South Korea’s growing economic power and status in the international community and the emergent cultural properties that encouraged the victims to speak out. They lost so many of their life opportunities, but they wanted to hear formal apologies from the Japanese government as a way to regain their most basic human dignity. A large proportion of young and older Koreans have participated in a range of nationwide movements to help the victims have their dignity recovered. In this process, many Koreans have experienced a transformation from primary agents to corporate agents, and then corporate actors engage in the change of the structures—i.e., double morphogenesis not only within South Korea but beyond. Many victims and Korean activists have understood that the issue of the “comfort women” is not simply a Korean historical incident, but what has happened to many girls and women during wars and conflicts in many parts of the world. Kim Bok-Dong, a victim and activist, has extended the social movement to similar victims elsewhere. Indeed, many victims have demonstrated their extraordinary transformation into the activists and peacemakers who cared for those who have experienced similar traumatic life experiences. The Korean activists have been leading this human rights movement nationally and internationally. The Statute of Peace has been a symbol of the movement, and a dozen statues have been erected outside South Korea, including in Sydney and Melbourne. South Korean activists are raising their voices against Japan and demanding apologies. As Korean economic power and influence continue to grow, the hope is that Japan may not be able to continue to resist apologizing. If this happens, it will be a significant and remarkable moment in recognition and respect of human rights.

As discussed in Chapter 4, some Korean industries unexpectedly faced the Abe-led Japanese trade provocation, and this incident attracted the attention of the whole nation of Korea. Under the Park Geun-Hye regime, the December 28, 2015 Korea-Japan agreement to settle Japan’s critical war crime of sex trafficking for over a quarter-million women angered a large proportion of Koreans. The Moon Jae-In government (2017–2022) took steps to have recovered the dignity of the victims, who were forcibly recruited Korean labourers, during Japanese imperialism. Prime Minister Abe brought this historical matter into international trade and instigated the trade provocation against Korea, i.e., expressing political frustration through trade. This trade provocation suddenly involved Japan, making it a very difficult process for some Japanese companies to supply key chemical products to South Korean companies producing electronic devices. This was an unwise business tactic beyond comprehension in the business world, bluntly breaching business ethics. All the grassroots voluntarily participated in the “No Japan, No Abe” movement in all the possible ways they could.3 The sluggish trade due to COVID-19 became an added burden that negatively affected Japanese industries.

It was difficult to predict how the boycott was going to unfold. However, Prime Minister Abe was confident in being able to bring the Korean regime and related industries to their knees with apologies, and then the Japanese chemical products could return to sale as usual. The boycott unfolded in unexpected directions from the viewpoints of both South Korea and Japan, in comparison to other boycotts in the past, due to the tensions between the two nations. Since the Independence from Japanese colonialism, Korean presidents have rarely stood against Japanese leaders in relation to political 

3 TheWorld. 2019. “South Korea’s ‘No Japan’ Boycott Is New. But the Wounds Are Old.” August 12, https://www.pri.org/stories/2019-08-12/south-korea-s-no-japan-boycott-new-wounds-are-old, accessed October 14, 2021.

or economic conflicts between the two countries. President Moon Jae-In did on this occasion.

With the support of their government, Korean industries quickly identified new sources to import the required industrial resources, as well as implemented technologies to produce the products in short supply. A huge number of Japanese businesses experienced a significant setback due to the Korean grassroots’ boycott of Japanese goods and travel to Japan. An informed economist and commentator noted that the collective masses are much more patriotic and effective than Korean politicians.4 Towards the end of the trade war between Korea and Japan, Koreans surprisingly and unexpectedly found that their nation-state had improved status and power in the international community. Awkwardly, some pro-Japanese groups of Korean people emphasized the importance of maintaining diplomatic relations with Japan and heavily criticized the Korean government’s support of the victims of the forced labour and military “comfort women” who had been seeking the recovery of their fundamental human dignities after having their human rights transgressed. Those Korean standpattists even offered apologies to Prime Minister Abe for the Korean government’s “misdeed,” which left many ordinary Koreans dumbfounded.5

Undoubtedly, the Japanese trade provocation was designed by Prime Minister Abe and his cabinet which had been moving towards the extreme right for decades for the sake of domestic politics, and in looking for the justification for military armament again. The conservative party’s prolonged ruling of the Japanese nation-state has shaped its present politics. Korea and Japan are neighbouring countries and must separate the legacy of history from socio-economic and cultural cooperation, which will yield mutual benefit to each other. This is easier said than put into practice due to the complicated history between the two nations. There are many lessons to take from Europe in relation to the victims of the Nazi regime. Japan’s lack of any apologies to the victims of forced labour will continue to strain Korea-Japan 

4대  경제학과Kim Hyun-Jeong’s News Show. 2019. “ 최배근 교수” (50 Days of Boycott Japan, the Evidence That the People Are Better https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x-jdmOfH3Wo,日불매 50일, 정치인보다 국민이 낫다는 증거 accessed : 건국

Than Politicians). August 23, October 20, 2021.

5 BBC News Korea. 2019. There was a reliable report that Korean soldiers sexually assaulted hundreds of Vietnamese women during the Vietnam War (1955–1975) and that the offsprings 

suffered discriminatory treatment. Korean presidents Kim Dae-Jung, Roh Moo-Hyun and Moon 

Jae-In expressed a regret. 베트남 전쟁: “성폭행범 군복을 봤어요. 한국의 백마부대였죠” 

(The Vietnam War: I Saw the Rapist’s Uniform. It Was a Korean Soldier from the White Horse). 

January 19, https://www.bbc.com/korean/news-46896179, accessed October 18, 2021.

diplomatic relations. I am in search of emergent personal properties amongst the Japanese people, as to date they have demonstrated little concern for human rights. As noted earlier, there are many groups of Japanese people who continue to advocate universal values regarding the military “comfort women” and Japan’s role in the peace of East Asia. Such properties of the Japanese may be largely suppressed under the given structure and culture of Japan, which is unfortunate for the sake of the people of Japan in the first place. Other scholars have delved into these important questions, too.

As discussed in Chapter 5, reunification has been a long-time desire of 

every South Korean, singing the song, “Our Wish is Reunification” (의 소원은 통일 우리

  ). Every Korean had a strong wish for reunification in the first few decades after the Korean War. In those days, the dictatorial leaders demonized the Northern regime and its people for the sake of national security and to legitimize the military government, and the Korean economy was relatively poorer, compared to recent decades. In addition to the many divided families, South Koreans’ ethno-nationalism might have strongly held them together with a sense of the same people sharing the ancestry between North and South Koreans. However, ethno-nationalism has been declining, and individualism has been on the rise in the contexts of economic affluence, improved democracy, and neo-liberalism. Calculated nationalism prevails, and therefore how individuals benefit under the state’s support and protection is particularly important.

My analysis of the news reports on the possibility of reunification indicates that South Korean perceptions are closely related to the cost and benefit of the reunification rather than unquestioningly advocating ethno-nationalism (i.e., sharing the same ancestors with fellow North Koreans). Kang Won-Taek (2011: 26) suggests that this is not only because of the long time that has brought about different cultures in the North and South, but more because South Koreans are much more proud of South Korea’s advanced political governance, which has improved their sense of belonging, loyalty, and togetherness. In the midst of the sweeping neo-liberal economic context, most young people are preoccupied with an extreme form of calculated nationalism and have become indifferent to the need for reunification. The younger generation would like to see tangible benefits out of the reunification if it were to happen. Some older generations still feel closely affiliated with ethno-nationalism and would like to see reunification occur in the foreseeable future.

Nonetheless, cost-benefit nationalism or calculated nationalism is a fundamentally new form of nationalism now held by many. It is probably fair to say that structural properties have always been the backbone of Korean nationalism with reference to reunification. There is so much to gain from reunification economically, then leading to emergent cultural properties that all the Koreans can enjoy and appreciate, which enrich the quality of the life of the component members of the whole Korean peninsula.

The analysis in Chapter 7 of national flag-carriers confirms Seo JoongSeok’s (2004) argument that Korean extreme right-wingers are pro-Japanese (Chinilpa), and they pursue anti-nationalism and anti-North Korea. They are toadies and heavily rely on the power of the USA and Japan. This is the reason that the flag-carriers, who are extreme right-wingers, carry the flags of the USA and Japan. This was also apparent in 2019 when the Liberty Korea Party (now People Power Party) prioritized American and Japanese national interests over Korean interests in regard to the three-way defense treaty, i.e., GSOMIA (the General Security of Military Information Agreement). The problem arose as Japanese Prime Minister Abe removed Korea from the Japanese whitelist to receive fair treatment when Korea imports particular products such as electronic devices. The Korean government lost confidence in Japan and warned Japan that GSOMIA might not be renewed. Despite Korea’s little gain from GSOMIA, the members of the Liberty Korea Party and extreme right-wingers campaigned against the Moon government’s decision and spoke clearly for the interests of Japan. This is the reason why the Liberty Korea Party was called Tochak Waegu-dang (토착왜구당), literally meaning Japanese Party indigenized in Korea.

The chapter illustrates the legacy of the vested interest groups which might have originated from the Japanese colonial period or professional elite groups, or specific religious groups. At times, groups such as these or other interest groups incorporate into each other in order to preserve their economic advantages or cultural elitism, which are generally closely intertwined. Some Korean regimes under strongly determined leaders have vigorously pursued a range of large-scale reformations to overcome many of the longstanding social evils, including corruption, improve the quality of life for all, and seek ways for everyone to co-prosper. This is a struggle against the vested interest groups who continue to renew the structural properties that are operated with different features at different times, but for their benefit. Diverse interest groups who enjoy profiting from the social evils or pitfalls of the prevalent structural properties continue to resist any changes to disturb their secure profits. Some individual agents may pursue their structural benefits blindly, and others may be guided by their self-centred cultural properties. When they ignore the common good for the sake of personal interest, they hinder the process of progress towards building a community of transparency, mutual respect, and support. The result is regress rather than progress. Then the dilemma is the question of who has the right to determine what progress is and how it will be pursued. Or is there such a thing as the common good? I have my own answers, but others have the right to disagree with me. These are the simple but important questions that need to continue to be debated freely in the Korean community. This is about free-flowing communication, for which the role of the press is crucial here. Ensuring such debates take place publicly should be a certain and essential function of democracy (Dobson 2014). Unfortunately, the traditional news media in Korea is highly distrusted.6

In Chapter 8, I have discussed several cases of workplace bullying, characterized by inhumane relationships that are observed in many sectors of Korean society, i.e., the employer-employee relations in the Army, in the airplane, in the apartment, in the department store, and in the Prosecution Service. Korean society has rapidly urbanized and industrialized since the 1960s, along with The Five-Year Economic and Social Development Plans, the first of which commenced in 1962 and continued till 1996 with the completion of the seventh. A significant proportion of the rural population left their farming behind and shifted to urban areas. Adjusting to urban life and looking for their livelihood, the migrants or urban poor became the sources of labour for the export-oriented economic development, in the 1970s and 1980s. There was little room for the workers’ rights in the factories. Workers’ rights guaranteed in the constitution are one thing, but in practice completely another. Workplace environments were heavily favourable towards employers, and the severe exploitation of the workers was common (e.g., see Cho 1983).

Workers’ movements to seek their rights and economic democratization over a few decades have been efforts to accomplish structural and cultural elaboration. Despite the continuing development of the national economy and GDP per capita, workplace bullying has improved little. It went from bad to worse, especially since the IMF’s intervention through structural adjustment programmes due to the Asian economic crisis in 1997 and the neo-liberal economic environment advocated by the conservative regimes of the presidents Lee Byung-Bak and Park Geun-Hye. However, with the continuing improvement of the international status of the national economy, the public has been seeking their own share out of the economic prosperity (cf., Park 2021). That is, these are the emergent cultural properties, which then further stimulate the individual agents to mobilize their emergent personal properties (Archer 2007). Standing against workplace bullying or 

6 Hankyoreh. 2021. “How S. Korean Media Can Regain Trust.” April 18, accessed April 15, 2022.

unfair treatment of the workers is slowly settling as a new cultural trend that is likely to continue. The coming of “Workplace Bullying 119” represents the frustration and desire of the grassroots, especially in the era of ubiquitous media.

Main Findings

Many social movements in contemporary Korea are about catching up with and levelling up political and economic democratization, which directly or indirectly affects the life quality of ordinary people in particular. These movements have been in operation ever since the start of industrialization and urbanization, which were mobilized by the economic development plan under Park Chung-Hee’s dictatorial leadership. Park’s commitment to the national development planning was to bring up the living standards, which, on the other, could “naturally” help legitimize his own leadership (Han and Sharp 1997). His export-oriented economic development has largely been successful in the favourable context of international trade in the 1970s and 1980s (Lie 1998). However, the development was heavily focused on growth, and the workers’ remuneration and welfare were severely compromised. The continuing gap between the haves and have-nots has long been a concern to the latter. An increasingly growing proportion of young people with limited prospects for their future life opportunities and their parents of the “industrialization generation” are frustrated. In this context, the well-educated Korean workforce is well aware of their impoverishment largely resulting from the lack of proper economic and welfare policies, lack of political will, and economic inequalities prevalent in the industries and wage systems. These are some of the ongoing topics at the time of all local and national elections, but the urgency of the matters fades as each election is over. According to Cho Kuk (2022), South Korea’s achievement of the status of an advanced nation-state has been brought in advance at the cost of these shortcomings, which continue to be ignored.

According to the Democracy Index 2020 report, South Korea was ranked the 20th most democratic country globally—ranking it the 16th in the 2021 report.7 However, like any other democracy, there is much room to improve, especially the operation of the National Assembly in regard to legislating the policies in every sector for the sake of improving the quality 

7 https://www.democracymatrix.com/ranking & https://www.jagranjosh.com/generalknowledge/democracy-index-2021-1644567197-1, accessed May 3, 2022.

of life. The difficulty is in part due to the conservative nature of political parties as well as the majority of Korean people. As a relatively young democratic nation-state, South Korea has conservative and progressive political parties whose polities are significantly different from most other democratic parties in the West. Korean conservative party (i.e., People Power Party in 2022) tends to be standpattist, and the Korean progressive party (i.e., Democratic Party of Korea in 2022) is conservative enough compared to Western democracy. It is the public understanding as often publicized in the public media in Korea that some members of the Democratic Party of Korea are also extremely conservative in terms of their political ideology. In this context, it is difficult to introduce or reform the legislation targeted to improve the life quality of the lower-middle or disadvantaged populations.

As discussed in the earlier chapters, the legacies of Japanese colonialism and the Korean War have impacted Korean politics. Many pro-Japanese Koreans (친일파) and their descendants are enjoying significant wealth. And the standpattist politicians and conservative Christians have targeted progressive reform bills and progressive politicians in the name of “commies” (빨갱이). To make this worse in the last couple of decades, the Korean Prosecution Service, which is supposed to be politically neutral, has been working in cooperation with some members of the National Assembly, especially those who worked in the prosecution office in the past. Under the military regimes, the government and the National Intelligence Service (NIS) worked closely, and the former granted the latter a plenipotentiary administrative power to carry out the duties. This was possible especially because the Korean peninsula has technically been at war, and the NIS has engaged in criminalizing many civilians for the sake of legitimizing the military and conservative regimes. The NIS has been in the process of reconfiguring its key roles in recent decades, during which the Prosecution Service has grown to be an influential group serving its own needs in cooperation with conservative leaders and bureaucrats in diverse sectors of Korean society. As part of these corrupt groups, some standpattists have been the beneficiaries of the nation’s misfortunes, such as Japanese colonialism and the Korean War.

As has frequently been reported in the Korean media, some prosecutors have been convicted of engaging in prosecutorial misconduct, and a good number of prosecution officers have been in support of these illegal activities. The majority of prosecutors, standpattists or conservative electorates, or parliamentarians have nothing to do with these illegal conducts or the legacy of Japanese colonialism. Yet, there are numerous pro-Japanese collaborators and their descendants, some of whom actively pursued their personal gains at the cost of fellow Koreans during the colonial period, and others did rather “naively” for the sake of survival. The national effort to liquidate pro-Japanese traitors commenced, following the National Independence in 1945, but has not been successful; this failure has been highly negative for the political and economic democratization of South Korea (Kang 1993; Yi 2004). Those conservative Christians who fled from North Korea’s persecution of Christians have been absorbed and incorporated into the military and conservative politics. They believe the progressive regime is at the forefront of efforts to communize South Korea. Their experience of religious prosecution has turned them against progressive politics because progressives are willing to have a dialogue with the North Korean regime. These are the legacies of history, and they are halting the continuing efforts for the democratic and political emancipation of the broader Korean population.

Component members of any society display a hugely different range of ultimate goals (Archer 2007). Individual agents may go through constant tension and conflict in their life as they strive to be selective among their different goals and make the best out of their life chances. There are also a group of people who will take advantage of the political and economic difficulties of the nation at particular times. Others may pursue the status quo of the given socio-economic context for their benefit, which then delays the required reformations and political and economic democratization. These have been vividly demonstrated in Korean society for the last several decades of the unprecedented rapid changes in every sector of Korean society.

Reflecting the ideological division within the National Assembly, Korean electorates are broadly divided into conservatives and progressives. However, I have to note that whether parliamentarians or electorates, there is a broad range of political ideologies, and they cannot be easily categorized into a few as the researchers may like to see. I have selected the chapters’ topics, with which a significant proportion of South Korean grassroots have long been greatly concerned. However, theoretical approaches to and interpretations of the analysed data may not necessarily represent the viewpoints of the significant majority of Koreans, but largely those of the progressives. I may also be biased towards the progressives. It was my deliberate effort to include and analyse the national flag carriers’ social movements. So that one of the notable conservative groups can be introduced to the readers. Flag carriers are not a homogeneous group of people with a clear set of political ideologies and commitments. The core members of flag carriers consist of the supporters of Our Republican Party (우리공화당), of which one of their commitments was to free the imprisoned president Park Geun-Hye.8 However, when the flag carriers held the rallies, they attracted thousands of supporters of the major opposition and conservative party, the People Power Party. Thus, they worked in solidarity to fight against the Democratic Party of Korea. As indicated in the chapters about the protests by flag carriers and candlelight holders, I found it difficult to make a completely objective analysis. Nonetheless, other scholars argue that the candlelight holders’ protests were culturally rich in their repertories, whereas those of flag carriers were culturally poor, rigid, and past-oriented (Yi 2017: 47). These are the reflection of the goals of these different protesting groups, and the latter group is nostalgic and outdated in their cultural and ideological commitments.

During and after the Independence of Korea from Japanese imperialism, there have been ongoing efforts to bring back national freedom, justice, and peace to the nation-state and its people’s life (Baker 2019). However, those who have advocated such values have been sidelined for decades (Kim 2016: 7). Instead, those who were anti-nation, such as the pro-Japanese traitors during the Japanese colonialism, have stubbornly sustained their vested-interest positions as the nation’s elites. The Candlelight Revolution was a campaign against such groups, the accumulated socio-historical evils, and their mal-practices, which lingered for many decades. The 2016 Candlelight rallies in the winter were people’s direct expression of their outcries against President Park Geun-Hye’s influence-peddling, which characterized the elites’ misappropriation of power and profiteering at the expense of the people that the elites are supposed to serve. The Candlelight Revolution replaced the conservative president with a progressive one in the hope that the lives of ordinary people would start to improve rapidly. There was another presidential election on March 9, 2022, and a good portion of progressive electorates was disenchanted with the loss to the conservative president-elect. Further democratic and economic democratization will be halted or slow in the next five years, which has been evidenced by what the president-elect and the Presidential Transition Committee have pursued during the eight weeks after the election. The progressive grassroots realize that a notable change in the quality of their lives may still be far away (Kim 2016: 11).

Jung Kwan-Yong, a long-time observer and informed journalist, argues that Koreans advocating ideologically different political parties are deeply divided and reluctant to listen to each other (Jung 2009; Dobson 2014). As 

8 President Moon released her in December 2021 after giving her a special pardon.

Jung argues, this culture of “no listening” has to change. Being prepared to listen to each other will be a starting point in overcoming the complicated structural and cultural emergent properties. These complicated economic and cultural properties, due to the tangled problems surrounding the legacy of Japanese imperialism and the divided peninsula, are likely to prevail for some time. Nonetheless, as the Democracy Index 2020 and 2021 suggest, South Korea is becoming more democratic, and ordinary people, such as employees and other disadvantaged people, are able to speak about their concerns and grievances much more openly than in the past. These are not small changes, but a notable improvement to establish good communication in the community. As discussed in the chapters, the potential of grassroots nationalism is that it will continue to promote high values such as liberty, equity, justice, peace, and fraternity, which will then contribute to building a better civil society in Korea and beyond.

This book has investigated the Korean grassroots’ perception of contemporary South Korea as a nation-state, how it is overcoming some legacies of history, such as the desire for the reunification of the Korean peninsula, the Japanese military “comfort women,” and other concerns that have been influential to the life quality of Korean people. Undertaking the project between 2018 and 2022, Korean society has been under the progressive regime, which has been prioritizing the elimination of “accumulated bad conventions” and also the reform of the Prosecution Service to ensure it observes human rights in its undertaking its activities and remains neutral to politics. In brief, South Korea’s Prosecution Service’s monopoly on both investigation and prosecution (indictment) is outdated. This makes the prosecution process unjust and exposed to corruption, as illustrated by its intervention in presidential and general elections. These goals are partly achieved towards the end of the Moon Jae-In government in May 2022, but still in progress rather than complete. As noted above, these reforms could be halted under the conservative government to be led by the prosecutorturned-president, Yoon Suk-Yeol.

South Korea has made remarkable progress with economic development, dialogue with North Korea for a peaceful Korean peninsula, international relations, its COVID-19 response, and an increasing reputation of Korean cultural products and industries, such as the music artists BTS (단 방탄소년

) and the Academy Award-winning film Parasite, and President Moon Jae-In’s diplomatic achievements, such as being invited to the 2021 G7 Summit in the UK. Indeed, there have been numerous occasions to support the elevated national pride of Koreans. However, all the conservative news outlets of online news, radio, and television have either minimally reported the achievements or even negatively reported the national achievements, essentially distorting the news and consequently blinding and deafening the audiences. Those in the conservative camp, such as flag-carriers, would see these matters completely differently. Nonetheless, the following are some of the newly observed phenomena discussed in some of the progressive media outlets.

There are continuing and persistent changes occurring to the structure and culture of the Korean society and Korea’s power and influence in the international community, which have accompanied the agents’ increasingly positive perception of the Korean nation-state domestically and internationally (cf., Kang 2011). This has been apparent during the whole period of this book-writing project which coincided with the outbreak of COVID-19. South Korea seems to be in a clear transition to a fully-fledged developed country, as evidenced by the international media attention to how the Korean government and medical sector methodically dealt with COVID-19 without closing the national border.9 International media outlets first reported positively about the advanced and professional practices, and then a few limited Korean media outlets reproduced them, which took Koreans by surprise. This is because Koreans have lived with an inferiority complex, or the mediocre syndrome, despite South Korea’s international reputation in many areas that the Korean nation-state had been achieving even before the Moon Jae-In regime. That is, they knew South Korea was rapidly developing economically, politically, and culturally, but they were rarely ranked as one of the top-performing nations. South Koreans have admired Japan, the US, Canada, Australia, and Northern European countries as model countries to emulate. However, Koreans have been well informed of those countries’ struggles to fight COVID-19. For example, a large number of COVID-19 patients have not been able to receive adequate medical care in the US and Japan. Koreans will continue to maintain their admiration of the advanced democratic countries with high living standards and well-established welfare policies; however, they are becoming increasingly aware of the limited and biased domestic media reporting about their nation’s elevated status, which is better known, in the international community. I think this is likely to have an apparent influence on Korean people’s perception of their nationstate and consequently the national identity of the present and future, i.e., grassroots nationalism.

9 The Guardian. 2020. “South Korea: From Early COVID Success to Fears Over Ferocious Spread of Virus.” The Guardian, December 15, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/dec/15/ south-korea-how-early-covid-competence-gave-way-to-a-second-wave, accessed October 16, 2021.

Of the many social phenomena, I have difficulty understanding Japan’s recalcitrant refusal to offer sincere apologies to the victims of the forced labour, including the Japanese military “comfort women.” Instead of offering apologies, Japan dared to instigate the awkward trade provocation against Korea and its electronic corporations. The provocation was completely against history and humanities. Unless serious human rights crimes are redressed, similar problems are likely to be repeated. There are a good number of Japanese civilians demanding the Japanese government undertake the steps to redress past mistakes. However, their cries have fallen on deaf ears. Again, many Koreans have difficulty understanding other fellow Koreans and standpattist politicians blindly advocating for the Japanese government led by prime ministers like Abe Shinzo, Yoshihide Suga, and Kishida Fumio, who might only cultivate further crimes against humanity in the future and exacerbate the animosities between the two nations.

Calculated nationalism is not a term opposite to ethno-nationalism. As discussed in relation to the prospect of the reunification of the Korean peninsula, previously, most South Koreans embraced ethno-nationalism. And it was sufficient for the southern state to pursue reunification with the northern state in the 1970s and 1980s when there was a relatively less economic discrepancy between them. It was especially those South Korean populations who were from lower socio-economic status and who had less to lose from a possible reunification compared to those Koreans who were much better off. In this respect, both calculated nationalism and ethno-nationalism might have been prevalent among people from different socio-economic backgrounds in the 1970s and 1980s. However, ethno-nationalism seemed considered socially desirable somewhat more than calculated nationalism in those times. In a similar vein, a Gemeinschaft is a prevalent form of a community in fishing and farming communities. This does not mean everyone in those communities is strictly oriented towards Gemeinschaft rather than Gesellschaft. It is the structural properties of a community, which then produce the affinitive cultural properties, in which individual agents continue to either reproduce or transform the community, depending upon the external elements to which the community is exposed, and their individual agents’ consequent reactions.

Calculated nationalism seems a natural and apparent feature in the development of nationalism at this point in time in South Korea. It may not be appropriate to attach any moral judgment to it. After all, it is fair to acknowledge the continuing toils of the workers with a huge range of skills, and it is appropriate to return and distribute the nation’s wealth back to the workers rather than have it concentrated on the relatively privileged. Moreover, the workers have the right to ask for their share of the wealth, just as Rhyu Si-Min (2021) argues that contemporary Korean history is represented by the Korean citizens’ ongoing pursuit of their own cravings. However, the best form of calculated nationalism should not be about individual agents seeking their personal gains only, but that they collectively strive towards incorporating the common good into their individual pursuits or vice versa. These collective efforts will provide feedback on the continuing reformation of the structural and cultural properties of the community.

Theoretical Implications

A refreshed discussion of globalization around the turn of the 21st century predicted that nationalism would gradually lose its grip. For Ulrich Beck (2006), globalization provided the context to advance individualism, consumerism, and cosmopolitanism. Zygmunt Bauman (2002: 84) noted that neo-liberalism promotes individuals as individualistic consumers rather than citizens of particular nation-states (cf., Malešević 2018: 553). Wimmer and Glick Schiller (2002: 301) rightly observe that it has been made obvious that “nation-states and nationalism are compatible with globalization … We witnessed the flouring of nationalism and the restructuring of a whole range of new states in Eastern Europe along national lines in the midst of growing global interconnections.” An analysis of grassroots nationalism in Korea implies that the relationship between globalization, individualism, and nationalism is not as straightforward as one would have anticipated. The case of Korean nationalism illustrates that individualism has strengthened, and the sense of national identity of a distinct nation-state has also increased.

Moreover, new forms of nationalism have emerged, and “calculated nationalism” in Korea is one. Its properties seem to encompass both individualism as well as nationalism, of which the nature of the latter is collective (Cichocka and Cislak 2020). In the intensively nationalistic context, people of a modern nation-state continue to advocate nationalism as it is characterized by, and serves, a need for international recognition. This is a reason the people of a nation hang on to nationalism, but they cautiously calculate the possible benefit of what their nation-state or nationalism can offer them at an individual level domestically and internationally.

Many sectors in Korean society and individuals often experience tension resulting from potential consequences of morphostasis and morphogenesis (Edwards and Brehm 2015: 287), that is, change or not to change; adopt new principles of action, or seek the status quo. In the Candlelight rallies, there was largely one group of agents or social actors. They were all attempting to change the given structure and culture to bring about a fairer community and to lead to human emancipation as much as possible. In the flag carrier’s rallies, the agents attempted to hold on to the prevalent structure and culture, which included many socially undesirable evils, corruption, and privileges for vested interest groups. In the incidents of workplace bullying, the instigators hold on to the given structure and culture, whereas the potential targets with less power and authority want the best treatment by the vested interest group, who have better control over structure, culture, and agency. Or potential targets hope to eventually hold positions with more power and authority so that they are better able to avoid being bullied.

Empirical Implications

The nation is divided and how to bring them together is an important political and economic task in contemporary Korea. Political and economic democratization is one way to start achieving this effectively. Learning and embracing the differences will be a key task to accompany, and also learn to accept the “common recognition of a set of ethical-political values” (Jacka 2003: 183). I think this is part of cultural properties which individual agents can cultivate out of the given structural properties. As Archer notes, structural and cultural changes are mutually reinforcing (1995: 323). For example, in this process, individual agents’ social interaction enables structural elaboration, i.e., the structure is modified. Similarly, individual agents’ socio-cultural interaction enables cultural elaboration, i.e., the culture is modified. Undoubtedly, this is generally a slow process. Still, it is worth remembering that all social actions are characterized by “probable fallibility” (Archer 2007; Wimalasena 2017: 399), that is, some aspects of social movements will lead to success and others not be achieved.

In contemporary Korea, there is a strong focus on individuals seeking their personal aspirations and desires, and making the best use of all the available structural and cultural properties to do so (Rhyu 2021). Through this, calculated nationalism has become a naturally emergent property, which is more prevalent in the affluent contemporary context of Korean democracy and economic development. It is a people’s right, but it has been halted by authoritarian governments as well as the vested interest groups within Korean society. More individual rights should be advocated and supported; thus, vested interest groups can become encouraged or coerced to share the political and economic benefits produced in the society.

The bulk of the contents in this book is about the people’s emergent properties (PEPs) of ordinary Koreans around the time of the 2016–2017 Candlelight Revolution, which is a continuation of the April 19 Revolution in 1960 and the 1987 June Struggle to pave the road for economic and political democratization. The Candlelight Revolution is not over, and we do not know how long the revolution will continue. During the dictatorial periods by Park Chung-Hee, Chun Doo-Hwan, and Roh Tae-Woo, a large portion of Koreans seemed to have remained primary agents with passivity to the need to reform the society rather than corporate agents to pursue the reform. Importantly, during those periods, structural and cultural emergent properties were not fertile enough for the bulk of the population to exert power to change. Or, structural and cultural conditioning was not ready to absorb the people’s desire for structural and cultural elaboration.

To put it differently, the economy and culture were such that the bulk of the Korean population could not afford to engage in the social change and that they continued to restrain their active agency. Since the 1988 Seoul Olympics, an increasing number of Koreans have readily transformed themselves from primary agents to corporate agents and eventually to corporate actors, coupled with calculated nationalism. The successful economic growth and the ubiquitous media have been influential factors in these processes. The process of improving democracy, economic democratization, and human rights improvement is ongoing, as Koreans lead their lives and develop a sense of the need for improvements and exert their agency to the specific situation for a change.

Korea as a Developed Nation?

South Korea gained OECD membership in 1996. Since then, South Korea has continued to develop politically and economically. Its power and influence have also grown significantly in the international community. Nonetheless, there has been an ongoing debate about Korea’s fully-fledged membership of the OECD, in terms of what Korea is capable of, especially with reference to the welfare of its significant proportion of the lower-middle demographics of the nation. In addition, CALD (culturally and linguistically diverse) migrants and other minorities face many difficulties in accessing fair life opportunities. South Korea has also accepted a relatively smaller number of refugees than it is expected to.10 The legislation of anti-discrimination law is yet to be accomplished. A nightmare that is likely to haunt the whole nation is its low birth rate, reflecting the highly challenging socio-economic conditions. These are indeed discouraging elements.

Conversely, there is an equally strong argument that South Korea has, in many ways, already achieved a more advanced democracy and socioeconomic prominence, compared to other developed countries, such as Japan and the United States. This was especially evident during the COVID-19 pandemic, in how the South Korean medical system cared for the infected populations and sustained the whole nation without closing the nation’s border. Korea was often referred to as one of the best exemplars in the fight against COVID-19.11 Indeed, there is no fully-fledged developed country without room for further improvement. In recent years, a good number of popular media personnel and broadcasters have advocated the idea that South Korea has now reached its highest achievement in terms of the standards expected of the developed countries. For example, in early July 2021, UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development) categorized South Korea as part of Group B, and this means Group A supported South Korea to better represent the needs of Group A, and Group B realized the need to work together with South Korea. This change in Korea’s status would not have occurred without its economic and international trade achievements. Park Tae-Woong illustrates South Korea’s achievement in his book, 눈떠보니 선진국  (Awoke in a Developed Country, 2021). Park argues that South Korea is an exemplary model itself, and it does not need to look for a model to emulate anymore.12 Indeed, foreign reporters seem increasingly prepared to recognize South Korea as an advanced and sophisticated democratic nation-state.13 However, Park Tae-Woong points out that South Korea is a developed country “already, but not yet.” South Korea has achieved a condensed development, and in that process, there are many by-products, which need to be redressed.

10 Reuters. 2020. “South Korea Takes in 164 Asylum Seekers from Nearly 6,000 Applicants.” Reuters, November 2. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-southkorearefugee-idUSKBN27I0AA, accessed August 22, 2021.

11 Bloomberg. 2021. “The COVID Resilience Ranking: The Best and Worst Places to Be as Winter Meets Omicron.” November 30, https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/covid-resilience-ranking/, accessed December 13, 2021.

12태웅13이  TBS FM/ TBS TVKTV People’s Broadcasting. 2020. “ Kim Ur-Joon’s News Factory. 2021. “‘우리나라를 오랫동안눈떠보니 취재했던 선진국,’ 한빛미디어 3명의 외신기자들 accessed  의장 박

” (Awoke in a Developed Country, Hanbit Media Chair, Park Tae-Woong). January 20, 2021.

 보는 대한민국은?” June 1, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Lbmn-8amj8w,

October 20, 2021.

Particularity and Universality of the Project

This book project has primarily focused on political and economic democratization in South Korea from the viewpoints of the progressive grassroots. However, the key ideas and values that I have in mind are universal such as liberty, equality, fraternity, and justice. There is no point in denying that these values are relative. However, this is not the space to dwell on relativity. At the time of writing, the world is full of human suffering such as child labour, no primary education for children, human rights breaches, nations under extreme dictatorship, religious extremism, the Russo-Ukrainian War (2022), and climate change. Unfortunately, the world has become highly indifferent to fellow humans suffering from these troubles and misfortunes.

Finally, I reiterate that political and economic democratization is a process. South Korea has made significant achievements on these for the last half a century. However, the substantial inequalities between the haves and have-nots, and between the more and less educated, and between the regions remain. The level of inequality is far more than acceptable, and it keeps increasing every year. The grassroots have worked diligently but have not been able to enjoy the full benefits of their labour. This is because democracy is not working properly, i.e., the lack of appropriate political democratization. Democracy under high economic inequality is of limited value for the people of a nation-state. Individual self-indulgence in a highly unequal society will make it go from bad to worse (George 1932). We do not expect the perfect days will ever arrive; however, we would like to think we are making good progress towards the days. The grassroots would like to live in a nation-state where common sense prevails in terms of what they receive for their labour, where wealth is shared more fairly, and where there is a much fairer legal system for every accused. They want to live free of the threat of possible aggression from North Korea. There are still too many people who are unable to receive appropriate remuneration for their labour and who are fatigued with the unfair treatments that they experience in their everyday life. Far too many people still die at work. There is also a range of minorities who are discriminated against for their identities.14 It is time to understand and consider seriously implementing numerous guides and lessons, for the South Korean people, such as Roh Moo-Hyun’s Future of the 

14 MBC News Desk. 2020. “동물 취급하고 때리고…한국 선원은https://www.youtube.com 악마였다” (Treated as / Animal and Bashed Up … Korean Sailors Were Demons). June 8, watch?v=FNnbDx1731Q, accessed October 20, 2021.

Progressives (Roh 2019) and Jeremy Rifkin’s The European Dream (Rifkin 2004; also see Kim 2009).

I have argued for the emergent form of nationalism throughout—calculated nationalism. It is important to recognize that it is not that there was no, or little degree, of calculated nationalism in the past. Grassroots must have always had a significant degree of calculated nationalism in their everyday life, and it is only absurd to deny that. The Korean grassroots love to see their nation-state prosper, as well as seek personally satisfying lives; these are simple desires, but they have been difficult to fulfil. What is at stake is that in the past, despite a relatively high degree of calculated and personal nationalism, grassroots or ordinary people had significant room to care for collectivism and the collective national identity of the imagined community of Korea. That is, the extent to which calculated and personal nationalism becomes much more dominant than collective nationalism reflects the prevalent structural and cultural properties of society. The issue is not about whether one form of nationalism is better than the other. Gemeinschaft is no better than Gesellschaft, but they are different, and each comes with its own structural and cultural properties in terms of how each impacts the lives of its component members and their perception of national identities.

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  Epilogue

This book project coincided with the five-year tenure of the Moon Jae-In government (2017–2022), which was inaugurated following the 2016–2017 Candlelight Revolution. That incident raised the Korean grassroots’ concerns over Park Geun-Hye’s influence peddling and long-accumulated corruption among the elites, which had curtailed the life chances of ordinary Koreans for decades. I have selected six topics that I considered crucial to political and economic democratization for the Korean people. The 2016–2017 Candlelight Revolution was in part an effort to address political and economic democratization, the goals of which are shared with the 1968 Revolution in France. I note in the book that social movements could not blossom in South Korea under its authoritarian regimes. The Moon Jae-In government and the Democratic Party of Korea attempted to facilitate socio-political movements through the legislation of various policies to reform the press, Prosecution Service, and housing plans. The Moon regime’s outcomes fell far too short of the grassroots’ expectations, which led to the loss of the 2022 Presidential election to the conservative party. The loss in part implies that it is a return of vested interest groups which in modern Korean history have represented the tightly organized cartel of the press, elite groups, and the business sectors rather than pursuing justice, fraternity, equity, and meeting the needs of the impoverished members of the community. It is of great concern that the Korean legacy media, in particular, has long forgotten its responsibility as the fourth estate. Indeed, it is the most outdated and the worst performing institution in contemporary South Korea and requires reform urgently. Unless this is addressed soon, the future of democracy and the economy of South Korea is under threat.

I anticipate that the Yoon Suk-Yeol government will continue to respect grassroots nationalism as it relates to the public’s perception of nationalism, national identities, and the grassroots’ desire for the future direction of the Korean nation-state. However, how the Yoon government will handle South Korea’s relations with the North Korean regime and diplomatic relations with Japan remains to be seen. During and soon after the election campaign, Yoon has never provided the Korean public with confidence that he will do a good job. He won the election by 0.73 percentage points or 247,077 votes. Yoon’s victory was found to be primarily based on people’s desire to sustain their wealth of real estate, especially in metropolitan Seoul. Moreover, young men resented the rise of women in the workplace, which challenged their traditional privileged position. Yoon’s conservative party engaged in gender politics for their political gain, dividing the nation rather than uniting them. These represent some destructive and extreme forms of calculated nationalism.

The 2022 presidential election was no different from other elections in Korea and in other democratic countries in the sense that the candidates offered future directions for political and economic policies that influence the prosperity of the nation-state and individual well-being. Nonetheless, I thought that the Moon government’s failure to address the high price and shortage of housing was a central matter with which the grassroots were dissatisfied. Thus, the voters asked themselves, “What has the government done for me?” Again, this question reflects calculated nationalism in the mind of ordinary people. Presidential candidates understood this well. The election catchphrase chosen for the candidate of the Democratic Party of Korea, Lee Jae-Myung, was “나를 위해 이재명” (Lee Jae-Myung for my own sake). President-elect Yoon Suk-Yeol of the People Power Party exploited the Moon regime’s alleged shortcomings and argued for a regime change for the sake of the grassroots’ well-being, better housing policies, and compensation for the financial losses resulting from COVID-19. These election commitments typically reflect the people’s calculated nationalism.

Considering the track record of Yoon’s party, the People Power Party, the newly elected government may not be the greatest facilitator, but neither will it necessarily be able to halt the nation’s political and economic democratization significantly. While the 2016–2017 Candlelight Revolution could be forced into a slow progress mode, it will continue, and no future regime will be able to stop its progress completely. It is hoped that Korean democracy is mature enough and the grassroots are sufficiently determined to guard their democracy and economic democratization. Time will tell. May the spirit of the Candlelight continue to burn for the sake of human rights, dignity, hope, fraternity, and the co-prosperity of all Koreans!

 

  Index

“comfort station” 19, 71, 73, 77, 83, 91–92, 

94–95, 100, 103, 106

1968 Revolution in France, the 15, 21, 301 1997 economic crisis, the 41

1997 IMF Intervention, the 39 2008 Candlelight vigil, the 45

2008 global financial crisis 249–250 2011 East Japan earthquake 140

2016–2017 Candlelight Revolution, the 11, 

15, 17, 18, 20–21, 28, 45–47, 58, 64, 66, 108, 

187, 189, 191–193, 195, 197, 199, 201, 203, 205, 

207–209, 211, 213–214, 194, 301–302

2018 Asian Game, the 45

2018 Kim-Trump Summit, the 175

2018 Pyeongchang Winter Olympics, the 45, 156, 177

abduction 85, 122

Abe Shinzo 19, 115, 126, 134, 146, 213, 291 active citizenry 208 actors 15, 18, 20, 22, 25, 27, 31–32, 35, 49–53, 55–56, 58–59, 61–62, 80–81,83–84, 86–91, 

93, 96–97, 99–105, 107–108, 117–119, 126, 148, 153, 163, 187, 190–192, 196, 200, 208, 219–220, 

238, 241, 243, 249, 251, 254, 258, 267–268, 

270, 272, 274, 279, 293–294

actual domain, the 48 agents 16, 18, 19–20, 22 25–26, 31–37, 49–53, 

55–61, 72, 80, 83–86, 90, 93, 95, 99, 101, 105, 107, 122, 126, 129, 144, 148, 159, 162, 164, 180, 194, 205, 205, 218, 220–221, 224, 245, 246, 

250–251, 254, 263, 267, 269, 279, 283–284, 

287, 290–294 Althusser, Louis 50, 63 analytical dualism 20, 25, 47–48, 50, 195, 209

Anderson, Benedict 36, 207, 218, 236 Andrejevic, Mark 26, 69 anti-communist approaches 156 anti-Japanese sentiment 40, 144 Antonsich, Marco 22–23, 31–32, 38, 63, 66, 

190, 211

April 19 Revolution, the 11, 17, 21, 39, 191, 200, 294

April 27 Inter–Korea Summit in 2018, the 176

Archer, Margaret 31, 36, 48–56, 58–60, 117, 

150, 194–195, 205, 207–208, 213, 221, 229, 233, 250–251, 284, 287, 293

Asian economic crisis, the 33, 39, 193, 169, 284 assimilation policies 85 authoritarian structure and culture 246 axial coding 62–63, 196

Baek Nam-Gi 198–199, 203 Baker, Don 16, 209, 288 banal nationalism 22, 30–31, 37, 190, 209 Bhaskar, Roy 58

blogs 56, 61, 67, 223, 270 bottom-up nationalism 22, 31, 33–34, 74, 278–279

Bourdieu, Pierre 50 boycott against Japan 19, 115, 123, 127, 148

Brubaker, Rogers 31, 33–34, 190

Bryman, Alan 61–62 Butler, Judith 50

calculated nationalism 15, 19–20, 21–23, 25, 

35, 43–47, 76, 83, 108, 137, 141, 146, 151, 176, 

178, 180, 187, 202, 208, 277, 282, 291–294, 

297, 302 Campbell, Emma 46, 176, 189, 192 capital-labour relations 57 causal efficacy 52 causal laws 48 central conflation 48, 195 Chinilpa 283

Cho Hyun-A 257–258

Cho Won-Jin 224, 232–233 Cho Younghan 46 Choo Mi-Ae 226

Chun Kwang-Hoon 232

Chun Woo-Yong 126

Cohen, Anthony 22, 31, 33, 36–37, 41, 44, 189, 

193, 217

Cold War, the 16, 155, 162, 187, 203, 216, 225, 

237

comfort(ing) station 19, 71, 73, 77, 83, 91–92, 

94–95, 100, 103, 106

communication 16, 40, 111, 181, 183–184, 189, 

197, 239, 241, 248, 265, 268, 284, 289 communism 216, 219, 230–231 Communist Party of China, the 226 Confucianism 47

Confucianist human relations 202 consciousness 22–23, 32, 50, 53–54, 57, 59, 64, 

66, 205, 211

consumer animosity 117–118, 152–154 consumer ethnocentrism 117, 121 Corbin, Juliet 62–63, 80, 163, 196 corporate agents 25, 52–53, 55, 58, 60–61, 

85–86, 101, 105, 107, 279, 294

cost-benefit nationalism 155, 157, 160–161, 177, 180, 282

Council for the National Movement to Vindicate Park Geun-Hye, the 228

COVID-19 124, 129, 131, 180, 189, 290, 295, 302 Craib, Ian 33, 65

critical realism 13, 25, 48, 63–66, 68–69, 209, 

211, 239, 275, 279, 299

cultural elaboration 50, 56, 164, 284, 

293–294

cultural emergent powers 48 cultural emergent properties (CEPs) 52, 59, 89–90, 246, 250–251, 289, 294

Dagagagi, the website of 71, 80, 99, 100 Damousi, Joy 77–78 decline of unionization 248 Democracy Index 2017 18

Democracy Index 2020 277, 285, 289 Democratic June Struggle, the 39 democratic movements 28, 39 Democratic Party, the 29, 124, 136, 165, 167, 

224, 226, 235, 237, 286, 288, 301–302 Denuclearization 227 descriptive analysis 21, 119 Dezaki, Miki 144 divided Korea 19, 28, 41, 155, 169 division of the peninsula, the 22, 203 Dobson, Andrew 42, 217, 284 Dokdo Island 86, 124, 143 Donati, Pierpaolo 43, 45, 49, 58, 190 double morphogenesis 22, 55, 57, 99, 208, 

267, 279

downward conflation 50, 195

economic democratization 11, 15, 17, 21, 40, 

191, 184, 235, 250, 277, 284–285, 287–288, 

293–294, 296, 301–302 economic rights 45, 279 Edensor, Tim 30, 31, 190 elite nationalism 11, 32, 38 elite-led nationalism 41 elitist nationalistic sentiment 15 embedded nationalism 22, 27, 37–38

emergent structural properties 46, 86, 200, 

269

empirical domain, the 48 ethnocentrism 49, 117, 121, 152-154 ethno-nationalistic sentiment 15, 160 everyday nationalism 30–38, 42–43,

flag-carriers 66–67, 191, 209 flunkeyism 72 foot and mouth disease 45, 204 forced labour 19, 49, 71, 81, 104, 106, 121–124, 130, 132, 140–141, 146, 148, 151, 281, 291 Four Major Rivers Project 188 Fox, Jon E. 30, 35, 64–65, 190, 210–211, 247

fraternity 11, 41, 107, 202, 250, 289, 296, 

301–302

fundamentalist Christians 155

gapjil (bullying) 19, 29, 49, 245–247, 249, 

251, 253, 255, 257, 259, 261, 263, 265, 267, 

269–271, 273–275

Gellner, Ernest 28, 150

Gemeinschaft 44, 291, 297

German reunification model, the 159–160, 164, 172–173, 182, 184

Gesellschaft 44, 291, 297

Giddens, Anthony 50, 65, 195 Glick Schiller, Nina 36, 50, 69, 292

globalization 29, 38–39, 45–47, 68, 120, 248, 

292

globalized cultural nationalism 46, 193 gold-collection campaign 41, 64, 193 Goodman, James 22, 25, 27–29 grassroots democracy 43

grassroots nationalism 15, 19, 22, 25, 27, 36, 

38–43, 46, 79, 188, 191–193, 195, 197, 209–210, 

217, 222, 277, 289–290, 292, 301

grounded theory methodology 62, 80, 163, 196 group elaboration 56 growth-oriented economy 246, 268 GSOMIA 283

Hall, Stuart 32, 65, 68

Hanoi No-Deal, the 171, 175

Hearn, Jonathan 22, 30–32, 37–38, 46–50, 190 Herzfeld, Michael 34, 41, 189, 217 historical animosity 119–120 Hobsbawm, Eric 28, 30 homo sapiens 54 honour killing 106 Horrocks, Ivan 49, 59, 205 human rights 11, 19, 34, 45, 60, 73, 76–79, 86, 

88, 90–94, 96–97, 100–103, 105–106, 109–100, 

112, 123, 144, 149, 151, 219, 250, 273, 279–282, 

289, 291, 294, 296, 302

human/sex trafficking 73, 280 Humiko, Kawata 73, 98,

Hyundai Department Store 260

Ihm Eun-Jeong 263

Ihm Jong-Seok 226

Independence Hall of Korea, the 74 individualism 40, 44, 46, 50, 67, 176, 193, 195, 

212, 282, 292

individuated nationalism 46 Inter-Korean Agreements, the 162 internal conversation 51–52, 55, 63, 108, 210, 250

International Monetary Fund 40, 193 international solidarity (with the victims of the 

“comfort women”) 103

internet news 61 intransitive dimension 22

Japanese colonialism 27, 38, 71, 81, 90, 106, 116, 

121–123, 146, 148, 151, 246, 263, 280, 286, 288 Japanese Diet, the 79, 87, 95, 107

Japanese imperialism 16, 21–22, 40, 76, 82, 

85, 87, 91–92, 94, 96, 103, 111–112, 117, 122, 

125–126, 142, 149–150, 191, 280, 288–289

Japanese military “comfort women,” the 13, 

18–19, 71–75, 77–81, 83–85, 87, 89, 91–93, 

95, 97, 99, 101, 103–105, 107, 109, 111–113, 115, 

121–122, 124, 145, 279, 289, 291

iNdex 305

Jenkins, Richard 32, 37 JP Morgan 168

juche (self-reliance) 39, 227 June Democratic Struggle (1987), the 191

June Struggle in 1987, the 11, 15, 17, 21, 39, 76, 

294

Kaesong Industrial Complex 225, 240

Kaisei High school 138 Kan, Kimura 125

Kaufmann, Eric 32–33, 62, 67 Kiichi, Miyazawa 94

Kim Bok-Dong 94, 144, 279 Kim Hak-Sun 81, 83, 106 Kim Il-Sung 173

Kim Jong-Un 225–226, 232

Kim Sang-Jun 17, 74, 180, 225, 157–158, 

160–162, 204, 263, 271, 297

Kim Sungmoon 47

Kim Yong-Hyeon 170

Kim Young-Sam 42

Kim Dae-Jung 40, 170, 172, 181–182, 193, 219, 

225, 236, 281

Kim Yung-Myung 42

Knott, Eleanor 30, 33–36, 67, 190, 212 Koizumi, Junichiro 88, 91

Korean Air 29, 226, 245, 257

Korean conservatives 17, 149, 187, 216, 236

Korean Constitutional Court 96 Korean diaspora 41

Korean nationalism 15, 21, 35, 38–42, 44, 

46–48, 62, 67–69, 72, 75, 77–78, 144, 188, 

200, 202, 212, 215, 292, 299

Korean reunification 40, 164, 173, 184, 217 Korean Supreme Court, the 122, 124, 259

Korean War, The 11, 15, 38, 41–42, 47, 84, 121, 

155, 162, 171, 180, 218, 277, 282, 286

Layder, Derek 37, 46, 50, 67 Lee Da-Hye 203 Lee Myung-Hee 258 liberal pluralism 47 life chances 34, 48, 51, 55, 99, 195, 198, 

201–202, 287, 301

life opportunities 20, 159, 187, 192, 209, 236, 268, 279, 285, 294

Little, Daniel 56, 67, 152

Ma, Eric 40, 190, 217, 220

Machiko, Morikawa 98

Macpherson, C. Brough 44, 67, 193, 212–213 Malešević, Siniša 62, 67, 292, 298

March First Independence Movement 103, 

141, 144

Marxist political economy, a 49 mechanism 48, 51, 57, 201, 231 media narratives 62, 160–161, 251 media representation 18, 61, 279 methodological collectivism 50 methodological individualism 50, 195 methodological nationalism 36, 50 micronationalism 190

Mill, John S. 35, 195 Mingers, John 48

Ministop 147

Ministry of Economy and Finance, the 165–166

Ministry of Reunification, the 157, 165, 182, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries 121 modernity 27, 46, 65, 209–210

Moon Jae-In 19, 108, 115, 132, 134, 156, 215, 217, 

224–231, 233–234, 236, 238, 242–243, 263, 

280–281, 289–290, 301

morphogenesis 9, 22, 25, 47, 55–59, 65, 67–68, 

99, 146, 208, 211, 213, 242, 267, 279, 292

morphogenetic approach, the 19–20, 23, 25, 28, 38, 46, 48, 63, 66, 108, 195, 210–211, 238, 

250, 272, 279, 297–298

multiculturalism 26, 39, 66, 109, 237, 272

Namyang Dairy Products 252–253

national flag-carriers 18, 21, 162, 216, 283 national identities 15, 19, 21–22, 25–26, 30, 

36–38, 40, 46, 65, 71, 78, 108, 277–278, 297, 

301

national identity 23, 26–27, 32–34, 37, 62, 

64–66, 68, 161, 189–190, 210–213, 290, 292, 

297–298

national imagination 40, 217 National Intelligence Service 286 nation-building 36, 45, 164, 190 nationhood 34, 36, 65, 211 neo-liberalism 40, 46, 282, 292 netizen 40, 131, 141–142, 144 news reportages 62, 251,

NewsTapa 264–266

Nippon Steel & Sumitomo Metal 121 Noh Hyeong-Il 45, 193

North-South Korean Summit 156, 274 North-South Summit in 2018, the 46, 169

nouveau-riche nationalism 28, 66, 77, 109, 272 nuclear-weapons 225

OECD Better Life Index 245 open coding 62–63, 80 open nationalism 28, 39, 41, 67 Our Republican Party 224, 232–233, 238, 287

Pachinko 86, 111

Pacific War, the 85

Park Chang-Jin 257–258

Park Chung-Hee 17, 24, 39, 42, 81, 91, 121, 191, 

217–219, 226, 229–230, 235–236, 285, 294 Park Jeom-Kyu 264–266 patriarchy, the problems of 76 patriotic feelings 22

People Power Party 149, 180, 225, 235, 237, 283, 286, 288, 302

perceived efficacy 118 personal emergent power (PEP) 48, 51, 55 personal identity 37, 52, 54, 190 personal nationalism 22–23, 31–32, 36–38, 64, 

211, 239, 297

persons 51–56, 58, 104, 157, 174, 178, 255, 261, 

265, 268

political legitimacy 41, 74 political-economic nationalism 42 Porpora, Douglas 13, 49–51, 53, 56–57, 68, 

194–195, 200, 213, 222, 242

possessive individualism 44, 67, 193, 212 post-Fordist production regime, a 57 Presidential Transition Committee 288 primary agents 18, 25, 52–53, 60–61, 84, 99, 

101, 107, 126, 218, 251, 279, 294

probable fallibility 293 pro-Japanese Koreans, the 91, 286 pro-Japanese traitors 72, 90, 103, 287–288 pro-Japanese, the 72, 90–91, 102–103, 106, 130, 

281, 283, 286–288, 298–299

propaganda 16, 225

Prosecution Service/Office 29, 198, 235, 260, 

263, 275, 284, 286, 289, 301 Protestant ethic, the 57, 69 pure-blood nationalism 27–28, 39

quality of life 22, 156, 245–246, 274, 283 quality of working life 250

real domain, the 48

reflexivity, reflexivities 52, 69, 238, 250–251, 

271, 297, 299

reparation for the victims of the “comfort 

women” 74, 89, 122

retroduction 85, 122 reunification cost 161, 163–170, 175–177, 

183–185

reunification education 157, 159, 181–182 Reunification lottery ticket 166, 176 Reunification Pot, the 165, 171 reunification tax 155, 157, 161, 163, 165–167, 169–170, 174–178, 182–184

Rhee Syngman 17, 42, 191, 200, 232 Rifkin, Jeremy 297–298

Roh Moo-Hyun 88, 219, 225, 236, 281, 296 Roh Tae-Woo 42, 191, 294

ROKS Cheonan Corvette, the 176–177 Rhyu Si-Min 292–293, 298–299

Sanae High School 123 selective coding 62–63, 80, 163 self-awareness 54 self-consciousness 54 semi-primary data, the 61 Seon Dong-Ryul 45

Seoul Olympics in 1988, the 18 Sewolho-ferry, the 188, 198–199, 201, 208–209 sex tours 81

sexual slavery 13, 71–72, 74–75, 78, 80, 82, 

84–85, 88–89, 94, 96, 105, 109, 111, 113, 279

Shin Chae-Ho 7, 132

Shin Gi-Wook 39, 40, 192 Shiraishi Takashi 140 Shusenjo 95, 130, 144

Sino-Japanese War, the 80, 85

Skey, Michael 34, 36, 68

Smith, Anthony D. 28, 35, 68, 189–190, 195, 

200, 213

social actor 15, 18, 20, 22, 25, 52–53, 55, 83–84, 

86–91, 93, 95–97, 99–102–105, 108, 187, 

207–208, 254, 267, 293

social agent 51–53, 55, 267 social consciousness 22 social constructionist 50 social desirabilities 62 social identity 53–54, 66 social movement 15, 17, 19–25, 27–28, 30, 

32, 34–35, 46–48, 53–54, 56, 59, 61, 65, 68, 75–77, 79, 83–84, 90, 99, 101, 103, 106–107, 109, 111–112, 115, 194–195, 204–206, 213, 

221–222, 239, 245, 278–279, 285, 287, 293, 301 social networking sites 128, 132, 134, 136, 141, 233 social structure 22, 31, 49, 51, 56–57, 68, 187, 

199, 233, 250

sociological holism 50 solidarity 4, 22, 26, 74, 76–77, 87, 94–95, 

103–104, 107, 125, 128, 139–140, 164, 266, 278, 

288, 297

Son, Elizabeth 77

Song Do-Ja 88, 93–95, 103

South-North Exchange and Cooperation Project Fund, the 166–167 South-North Exchange Fund, the 166 sovereignty of a nation-state, the 16 sovereignty 16, 44, 85, 87, 90–91, 93, 149, 173

Soviet Union, the 16

Squid Game 260, 278

Stacey, Emily 22, 24, 26–27, 69, 189, 207, 213

standpattist 16, 90, 149, 264, 281, 286, 291 state-nationalism 38

Statue of Peace, the 74, 76, 84, 97, 139, 145 stratified conception of the self, the 54–55 stratified model of people, a 52 Strauss, Anselm L. 62–63, 68, 80, 109, 112, 163, 

184, 196, 213, 243

structural conditioning 56, 194

structural emergent properties (SEPs) 51, 59, 

84–86

structural properties 46, 55–56, 58, 83, 86, 

200, 260, 262–263, 269, 282–283, 291, 293

structural vacuum 47

structuralism 50

Sunshine Policy, the 170, 172, 182, 219, 225

Sunstein, Cass 221, 243

Tanaka, Yuki 77, 113

The Battle: Roar to Victory 144

iNdex 307

The Five-Year Economic and Social Development Plans 284

toadies 283 toadyism 42 Tochak Waegu-dang 283 top-down nationalism 33–34, 39, 41, 74, 278 trade provocation 19, 62, 108, 115–116, 120, 

122–126, 128, 130, 134, 136–137, 139–140, 

144–145, 150–151, 280–281, 291

transitive knowledge 22 transnationalism 46 Trump, Donald 26, 175, 232

U.S. House of Representatives, the 82, 97 ubiquitous media 32, 270, 285, 294 ultra-nationalistic 42

UniQlo 128–129, 131

United States’ army military government, the 16

upward conflation 50, 195

Vietnam War, the 233, 281 Volčič, Zala 26, 69

Wada Haruki 140

Weber, Max 57, 69, 195

Wednesday Demonstrations/protests 74, 

90–91, 94–96, 99, 103, 109

westernization 11, 47, 82 Wimmer, Andreas 36, 50, 69, 139, 292, 299 Women and War Museum, the 75

Workplace Anti-Bullying Law 268–269

Workplace Bullying 119 (직장갑질 119) 245, 

252, 264, 271, 285

workplace bullying 19, 29, 245–253, 257, 259, 

261, 263–275, 284–285, 295

workplace violence 247 World Happiness Report 245

Yang Eun-Kyeong 45, 193

Yasukuni Shrine, the 86, 90, 92

YouTube 47, 58, 61, 196, 201, 222–223, 228, 

232–234, 252, 264, 270 Yun Bosun 191

Yun Jeong-Ok 81