The Socialist Legacy of Jean Jaurès and Ikon Blum

1022

The Socialist Legacy of JeanJaurès 

and Ikon Blum

Benjamin T. Tolosa, Jr.

The tradition of socialist theory and practice associated with the

Frenchmen Jean Jau* and Lbn Blum is virtually unheard of in the

Philippines. In a way, this is not surprising in a polity where ideological distinctions are not fully understood and appreciated, and

where "socialism" is often equated with the "communism" espoused

by the underground Communist Party of the Philippines and its

allies. But such a gap in knowledge, while understandable, is most

unfortunate.

The aim of this note is to help fill this intellectual void in Philippine political-economic literature. The note also intends to show

that this particular French contribution to socialist thinking can bc

used as a prism through which the current dilemmas facing the

Phlippine political economy may be discerned-particularly by those

who have a deep commitment to both political democracy and socioecor~omic justice.

We should, of course, guard against any facile comparisons between the French and Philippine experiences. Certainly, there is no

comparing February 1986 in the Philippines with the French Revolution of 1789, nor can we simply compare the Philippine Democratic Sociali,st movement with its counterpart in France. At the same

time, however, if we were to study carefully the complex political

position of those whose twin commihncnts to democracy and socialism have led them to defend the Aquino regime against extremist

challenges--despite this government's obvious limitations and failures-perhaps a comparison with the dilemmas of French Socialism

may not be as pointless as it may seem initially.

A thoroughly revised and updated version of a lecture originally delivered on

"Aspects of the French Development Experience" as part of the French Studies Lectur; Series, "France and the Philippines; Partners in ~Dcvelopment," on 7 Dccember

1987, Ateneo de Manila University.

LEGACY OF JAURES AND BLUM

The contemporary political project of both "defending" the genuine "democratic gains" of the popular victory against the Marcos dictatorship and at the same time of "transforming" the very limited

and formal nature of democracy restored under the Aquino regime,

finds a parallel in the French experience. The desire "to complete an

unfinished revolution"-to extend democracy from the political to

the socioeconomic sphere-is at the heart of the theory and practice

of that strand of French Socialism identified with JaurGs and Blum.

It is an important element in the heritage of international Democratic

Socialism which no serious student of political economy can afford

to ignore.

The French Revolution and Its Legacy

It has been said that no individual French socialist thinker has

exercised as much influence as the British Owen, the Germans Marx

and Engels, the Russian Lenin, or even the Chinese Mao. But collectively, the French have had the most influence (Cole 1954-55).

Any discussion of the French socialist legacy and even of socialism in general, cannot but take as its starting point, the great French

Revolution of 1789. It was the political expression of the Enlightcnment, the assertion of the democratic ideal, the belief in the "sovereignty of the people." It was a revolution against traditionalism and

absolutism embodied in the French monarchy-the ancien rigime.

Socialism, to the extent that it sees itself as a revolutionary movement, owes its heritage to the French Revolution.

Even though the French revolution was founded basically on liberalism, it also became the catalyst for the emergence of socialism.

C.D.H. Cole in his history of socialist thought, has argued that while

the philosophy behind the French Revolution may have stressed

individualism, at the same time because of it,

. . . the "social question" forced its way for the first time to the front,

not merely as a moral problem for a limited group of intellectuals and

reformers of manners, but as an insistent practical issue involving a

real and menacing conflict between the rich and the poor, between the

propertied and propertyless, between the privileged orders of the old

society and the underprivileged (Cole 1954-55, 12).

The very limitations of that revolution paved the way for socialist ideas. The continuing poverty of urban workers, in particular,

PHILIPPINE STUDIES

showed the conflict between the political and social implications of

revolutionary principles. It led to an insistence, as early as 1796 in

the "conspiracy of equals" led by Gracchus Babeuf, on a "further

social revolution" in the form of common ownership of the means

of production (Thomson 1964, 19). This theme was to become central in the writings of the early French socialists: Saint-Simon,

Fourier, Blanc and Proudhon. Their works all demonstrate a disillusionment with continuing poverty and inequality in the face of

political "freedom" and "liberty."

Another legacy of the French Revolution and its aftermath was

a consciousness of 'The Republic" as an institution to be defended

against monarchists, Bonapartists, clericalists, anarchists, faxist-militarists and other forces who might wish to destroy it. One must

recall that the chaos which followed the French Revolution gave way

eventually to the despotism of Napoleon Bonaparte and to the restoration of the monarchy. Later on, even the Second Republic collapsed in favor of another Bonaparte. In the 19305, the Third Repub

lic was threatened by a military coup d'etat and the rise of international fascism. The surrender of this same Republic to Germany

during World War I1 led to the Vichy government's collaboration

with Hitler. The Fourth Republic, in turn, was marked by continuing instability and imminent collapse in the postwar years.

Liberal democracy in France has had a history of coming under

threat from various anti-republican forces. It is therefore seen by

French democrats as a precious heritage, a treasure that must be

protected. Thus, many French socialists saw it as their duty to defend the Republic and the formal institutions of "liberty" which it

represented. Republican democracy would be the framework from

which socialism in France was to be constructed.

The traditional political notions of "Left" and "Right" in France

were defined originally with reference to the Republic (i.e., "Left"

signifying pro-republicanism and "Right" signifying anti-republicanism). In the past, both ardent defenders of liberal capitalism as well

as committed advocates of socialism could be classified as part of

the French "Left." Thus, French Socialism, to the extent that it is a

legacy of the French Revolution also has at its core a republican

heritage. These twin legacies have become a source of both dynamism and tension in the socialism of Jaures and Blum.

There are other important traditions of socialism in France. There

is the anarcho-syndicalist tradition, which has emerged from early

French socialism and which has permeated the labor movement

LEGACY OF JAURES AND BLUM

since then. This tradition has historically been suspicious, if not

hostile, to the state and to political action, particularly, parliamentary activity. Instead, it has advocated the direct action of the workers through the ultimate weapon of the general strike.

Even before 1914, there was a distinct strand of French socialism

identified with the French Marxist Jules Guesde and guided by

orthodox historical and dialectical materialism. And after the Russian Revolution of 1917 and the 1920 Congress of Tours, the machinery of the unified French Socialist Party was taken over by its left

wing to form the French Communist Party along Marxist-Leninist

lines and aligned with the Third International.

But as stated earlier, this note shall concern itself only with that

strand of French socialism which, while critical of the limitations of

the French Revolution especially in the socio-economic realm, was

also concerned with preserving the liberal and humanistic achicvements of that "bourgeois revolution" in the political and cultural

realm.

Jaures: Socialism as the Completion of Democracy

Jean Jaures (1859-1914) was the acknowledged leader of the

French Socialists from the time of their unification in 1905 under one

party-the Section Fran~aise de l'lnternationale Ouvn'ere (S.F.I.O&unti1 his assassination in 1914. He was "the outstanding figure in the

French Socialist Party, and also the greatest single figure in the

Congresses of the Second International" (Cole 1953, 373). He was.a

professor of philosophy, a gifted orator, a prolific journalist and a

master politician responsible for bringing together the various factions of French Socialists under one party. For Jaures, the mission

of socialism was to continue the work of the French Revolution of

1789-to complete rather than destroy its achievements:

The triumph of socialism will not be a break with the French Revolution but the fulfillment of the French Revolution in new economic

conditions. uaurhs in Przeworski 1980, 31)

The French Republic which was an achievement of the revolution

was, thercfore, not an enemy but an instrument of socialism. Democracy was not in its essence a bourgeois institution. For JaurGs, dc

mocracy was:

PHILIPPINE STUDIES

. . . the largest and most solid terrain on which the working class can

stand . . . the bedrock that the reactionary bourgeoisie cannot dissolve

without opening fissures in the earth and throwing itself unto them.

Uaurb in Przeworski 1980, 33)

Socialism was necessarily to be built on democratic foundations.

Socialism was the completion of democracy, not its destruction and

replacement by an alternative class dictatorship.

The socialism which Jaur&s represented was deeply humanistic

and democratic. He continually stressed the moral and ethical bases

of socialism. His lifelong philosophy was thus an attempted synthesis of materialism and idealism (see Jaures 1895 in Fried and Sanders 1964). "His passion for the free life enriched the socialist tradition, endowed it with a deep human value" (Goldberg 1968, 136).

Though conscious of the inevitable tension between authority and

freedom under socialism, Jaures believed that this dilemma could

and should be resolved, because socialism without freedom would

bc devoid of true meaning.

We socialists, we also have a free spirit; we also feel restive under

external restraint . . . If we couldn't walk and sing and meditate under

the sky, if we couldn't drink in the air and pick flowers when we

chose, we would even accept the present society, despite its misery

and incoherence; for though its freedom is a deception, it is a dcccption which men still agree to call a truth and which sometimes grips

their hearts . . . ath her-solitude with all its perils than coercion, rather

anarchy than despotism, whatever its disguise. (Jauri?~ in Goldberg

1%8, 136)

Jaurcs saw socialism as a revolutionary project. But since it was

rooted in republicanism, socialism was a revolution that was "well

on its way." It was not necessary to make a new revolution. Jaur+s'

revolutionism was "fully consistent with reformism and quite inconsistent with any doctrine of destructive violence . . ." (Cole 1953,

375). Reform and revolution were thus not mutually exclusive in his

worldview. In a famous statement during the S.F.I.O. Congress at

Toulouse in 1908, Jaures declared:

Precisely because we are a party of revolution, we are the most deeply

reformist party, the only one which can give response to the demands

of the workeis, and make each conquest a point of departure for further conquests. (Jaurb in Goldberg 1968, 551)

LEGACY OF JAURES AND BLUM

Jaures, however, did not fully embrace the ideas of the German

"revisionist" theoretician Eduard Bernstein, nor did he completely

approve of the actions of the French socialist parliamentarian Alexandre Millerand. He believed that Bernstein's fundamental rejection

of the central tenets of Marxism transformed socialism into "a reformism without identity and substance." On the other hand, the

parliamentary tactics of Millerand and the "Independent Socialists" had "scrapped Marxism for a vague pragmatism." Though

Jaures "deeply believed in amelioration through reforms, he was

equally convinced that no social system short of collectivist socialism could permanently provide full employment and fair distribution" (Jaures in Goldberg 1968, 26869). While he was prepared to

accept reforms, he was not willing to accept them on terms which

would lead to the "domestication" of the workers' movement

and to the destruction of their power (Cole 1953, 375). G.D.H. Cole's

very perceptive insight into Jaurcs' politics deserves lengthy quotation here:

By disposition he was a parliamentarian, and he was by no means

prepared to regard the state as simply the cxccutivc committee of thc

ruling class. Yet this did not mean that he belonged to the constitutionalist right wing: he insisted that the workers, in their struggle for

power, could not allow themselves to be shut up within the confines

of bourgeois legality. They might, he agreed, have to act unconstitutionally, to flout the law, or to rise in rebellion; but he regarded such

a prosp~~t, not with the jubilation of the instinctive revolutionary, but . .

as an unpleasant necessity to be avoided as far as possible, because

he was very anxious that the growing pains of the new society should

not destroy the human and cultural values that were worthy of being

taken over into it. (Cole 1933, 379)

Blum: Socialist "Exercise of Power"

Leon Blum (1872-1950) was in many respects the successor of

Jaures, both in mind and spirit. But in one sense, Blum surpassed

his mentor by forming the first Socialist-led Popular Front govemment in France in 1936. Blum was the leader of the French Socialists from 1920 until the years immediately following the Second

World War. But the party he led was no longer the same S.F.I.0 that

Jauri?s had so carefully and painstakingly put together. The Russian

Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 had led to the setting up of the Third

International which forced a split in the S.F.I.O. in their 1920 Con-

PHILIPPINE STUDIES

gress at Tours. The new Moscow-based International secured the

adherence of the left wing majority of the French Socialists based on

the "21 points" imposed by Lenin and Zinoviev for admission. The

minority Center and Right factions refused to accept the conditions

unconditionally, left the Congress and launched a new Socialist Party

but used the prewar party's old name and statutes.

Blum was particularly opposed to the principles of the Third

International and in a speech before the Congress of Tours denounced Bolshevism as a narrow creed specific to the Russian experience and inconsistent with European socialist traditions. Blum

noted that Communism, among its many errors, wrongly equated

the seizure of power with social revolution, perverted the democratic

process with its concept of party organization, threatened the traditional independence of trade unions which it sought to put under

party control, and denied that workers could fight to defend their

nation (Greene 1969, 2).

Like Jaurh, Blum's socialism represented a synthesis of the French

democratic tradition with selected aspects of Manism. The product

was a socialism propelled by a moral impulse-a socialism in a

humanist mould. He also believed that political and social democracy were inseparable. The goal of socialism was to realize "the great

ideals of 1789 . . . and infuse the economic and social order with

political, civil and personal liberty" (Blum in Greene 1969, 14).

Consistent with the social democratic tradition, Blum did not

dichotomize reform and revolution. Reforms contained the seeds of

revolution. He did not equate socialism with gradual capitalist re

form, however. To achieve socialism, the conquest of power by the

working classes was necessary. "I do not recognize two kinds of

socialism, revolutionary and nonrevolutionary. There is only one

socialism, and it is . . . inherently revolutiona~ (Blum in Halperin

1946, 250).

Nevertheless, Blum argued that without "revolutionary preparation," a premature seizure of power (as advocated by the Communists) could only lead to tyranny and repression. This long process

of preparation for social revolution could be attained only through

participation in the institutions of the Republic (Greene 1969, 15).

Thus, following Jau+s, Blum strove to integrate the French Socialist Party into the country's parliamentary system. Like his revered

master, he saw that the defense of democracy was consistent with

the struggle for socialism. It was in this light that he developed his

theory of the "exercise of power."

LEGACY OF JAURES AND BLUM

As an added background, it must be pointed out that the 1904

Congress of the Second International at Amsterdam explicitly forbade socialist participation in bourgeois governments as a general

rule. This resolution was made as a direct response to a crisis in

French Socialism triggered by Millerand's acceptance of a Cabinet

post in the liberal regime of RenC Waldeck-Rousseau. While critically

supportive of Millerand's actions as crucial for Republican defense,

Jaures had accepted the Amsterdam resolution as a necessary condition for socialist unification. In the 1920s, the S.F.I.O. continued to

adhere to this principle, partly to demonstrate their revolutionary

commitment in the face of the mounting challenges coming from the

French Communist Party.

During the latter half of the 1920s, however, there was increasing pressure on the Socialists to accept positions in the Cabinet, since

they had become the second leading party in the country next to the

Radical Socialists. It was in this context that Blum made a distinction between the "conquest of power," which was a revolutionary

notion designed to bring about socialist transformation, and the

"exercise of power" in a capitalist regime, which was nonrevolutionary and merely the "consequence of parliamentary action itself." As

he noted in a speech in 1926:

If through thc operation of parliamentary institutions, we were callcd

upon to exercise powcr within the framework of cxis~~ng institutions

and of the present constitution, wc would exercise it legally and loyally without committing any chicanery like attempting to profit by our

prcsencc inside the government in order to transform the exercise of

power into a conquest of power. (Blum in Colton 1953, 522)

Blum was aware of the inherent risks and contradictions of a

Socialist "exercise of powcr" which he foresaw as "a particularly

painful and difficult experience:'--"an experience to which the party

can be subjected even inspite of itself" (Blum in Colton 1953, 523).

This was true, not only in a situation where the Socialist Party

would find itself as a minority partner in a "bourgeois" Cabinet, but

also even in the case of a "balanced" governmental coalition with

nonsocialists. Much later in his career, he wrote:

Perhaps there is no more arduous task in the world than that of a

Socialist government acting within the framework of the capitalist

system, which it has neither the power nor the mandate to transform

in its legal essence. It embodies at the same time the working class

and the statc. (Blum in Colton 1933, 540)

PHILIPPINE STUDIES

Blum believed, however, that such an involvement in government,

while exceptional, was justified when the Republic itself was threatened by counter-revolution, which during Blum's time was epitomized by fascism. It was precisely this right-wing threat which

opened the possibility for a Cabinet role for the Socialists as early

as 1932 and paved the way for the creation of the Popular Front

government in 1936 which Blum headed in coalition with the Radical Socialists. Even after the defeat of Blum's government, it was this

same belief in the socialist responsibility to defend the democratic

Republic-in the "vital connection between the preservation of political democracy and the advance of socialism" (Blum in Colton 1953,

533)-which led to Socialist participation in other nonsocialist governments in the years preceding and following the Second World War.

The Dilemmas of Democratic Socialism

What were the political implications of the socialism of Jaurb and

Blum? The discussion above shows that central to their conception

of socialism was their republicanism. Both of them were of the firm

belief that a genuine socialist commitment required full participation

in the life of the (bourgeois) Republic which also meant its active

defense during times of crisis.

Thus, for example, during the Dreyfus Affair of the late nineteenth century when French society was polarized into two campsthe anti-Dreyfusard monarchists and militarists on one side, and the

Dreyfusard liberal republicans on the other-Jaures supported the

entry of the then socialist Millerand into a Radical Cabinet. Jaures

was also instrumental in the creation and maintenance of an active

alliance among the bourgeois and socialist "Left"4espite this bloc's

nonsocialist objectives. Jaures subsumed socialist goals under the

banner of "Republican defense."

While such a perspective and approach was responsible for the

growth of French Socialism as a parliamentary force and rooted its

politics and ideology firmly in the democratic tradition, Jaures'

"political Radicalism" was also a major cause of instability within

the Socialist Party. It "encouraged Frenchmen of the left to swing

to and fro between Socialism and Radicalism, or at all events between Socialist self-sufficiency and alliance with the bourgeois left"

(Cole 1958, 496). As Jaurh himself was to discover painfully in the

LEGACY OF JAURES AND BLUM

case of his former colleagues and friends in the "Independent Socialist" tendency (e.g., Millerand, Aristide Briand and Rene Viviani),

the lines between Republicanism and Socialism could become

blurred beyond recognition. Reforms, and worse, the pursuit of highranking government positions, could become the ends, not the

means, of some self-proclaimed "socialists" (see Goldberg 1968).

Similarly, in the case of Blum, it was the fascist threat of the

1930s and the double threat of Gaullism and Communism in the

1940s, which justified socialist participation in "defensive" govemment coalitions which were hardly committed to socialist transformation. Because the country's democratic liberties were being threatened, "the Socialist party had to subordinate everything to the overriding duty of defending those liberties" (Blum in Colton 1953, 536).

For Blum, what had happened was not simply the subordination of

Socialist loyalties to Republican loyalties. He was convinced until

the end of his life that thc socialist program "rested first and foremost upon the safety of the democratic republic" (Blum in Colton

1953, 542).

This complete identification of the Socialist Party with liberal

democratic reformism and sometimes, even with conscrvativc policies, led to widespread disillusionment among its former supporters, which was manifested in elections throughout the 1950s and

1960s. Jean Rous, a Socialist deputy in parliament who resigned from

the party in 1947, revealed the extent of disillusionment when he

attacked the S.F.I.O. for acquiescing to "pro-capitalist, pro-imperialist

and anti-labor" policies in the name of defending the Republic.

By carrying out the policy of 'others' . . . the S.F.I.O. has now become

a party of 'others,' a party that still has perhaps a rolc of republican

center to play, the heritage of the old Radical party to pick up and

exploit, but a rolc that has nothing in common with that of a workers' party. (Rous in Colton 1933, 539)

It is a sad fact, indeed, that the mainstream of French Socialism,

in common with the other parties of the Second International, had

in due course abandoned their maximum goal of "socialization" in

favor of "republican dcfcnse" and "welfare promotion." To be sure,

many social reforms were real working class gains-as was true of

the reforms achieved during Blum's Popular Front government. But

what became a significant deviation from thc tradition of Jaurk and

PHILIPPINE STUDIES

perhaps even of Blum, was that the reforms were no longer seen in

the context of an eventual transition to "full socialism." The logic of

electoralism and parliamentary participation had a natural moderating influence (see Przeworski 1980 and 1985). The dramatic rise to

power of Francois Mitterand's Parti Socialiste (formed in 1968)

marked a new turn in the history of French Socialism and deserves

separate discussion elsewhere. What is apparent, however, is that the

current socialist vocabulary of "technocratic modernism'' and "superior economic management" seems even more removed from the

Jaurcs-Blum conception of socialism and of the role of the Socialist

Party than the welfare state ideology of post-World War I1 social democracy (see Ross and Jenson 1988; Kesselrnan 1986; and Petras 1984).

The defense of democracy has not led to its completion. The revolution has remained unfinished.

The Aquino Regime and Philippine Democratic Socialism

Much space has been devoted towards an understanding of the

socialism of Jean Jaures and Lkon Blum because the French experience finds a striking parallel in the contemporary Philippine situation-in the theory and practice of the so-called "Democratic Socialist" tendency. While an extended discussion of the nature and

history of this political grouping and of the even broader "Democratic Left" in the Philippines is beyond the scope of this note, it is

possible to gain some insights into this distinct ideological tendency

by appreciating the complex political stance taken by its adherents

towards the 1986 EDSA revolution and the formally liberal democratic system restored under the Aquino government.'

One must remember that the "Democratic Left" participated in the

1986 elections in support of Cory Aquino, in marked contrast with

the national democrats. "Participation without illusions" meant

making common cause with Center-Right groups and individuals

(including Aquino herself) who while anti-Marcos and anti-dictatorship, did not share the commitment to far reaching political and

social reform. But the creation of a broad centrist democratic alliance

was seen as a necessary condition for bringing abouf a more socially

just order through relatively peaceful means.

Thus when victory came in February 1986, the response of this

tendency was not, as in the case of the mainstream national democrats, to dismiss it outright as meaningless, but to describe the EDSA

uprising as an "unfinished revolution." What this position meant

LEGACY OF JAURES AND BLUM

was that its supporters considered the ouster of the Marcos dictatorship as a genuine gain for political democracy. But they also be

lieved that the real meaning of "people power" lay in authentic

popular empowerment through independent mass organizations and

social transformation via redistributive government programs. The

democratic struggle was seen as a continuing process.

Such a position has meant the active defense of the so-called

"democratic space" which also implied critical support for a generally conservative Aquino government, since it was the only legitimate and concrete vehicle of the democratic transition. Thus the

various nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), sectoral organizations and political groups associated with the "Democratic Left" lent

their full support to the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, the

consolidation of liberal democratic representative institutions and the

continued defenx of the constitutional order against violent threats

from both the extreme Right and Left. Much in the spirit of Jaurcs

and Blum, they believe that the deepening of democracy presupposes its strength.

The evolution of the Aquino regime, however, away from any

bold initiatives for both political and social reform towards policies

catering to established political and business interests, has resulted

in much dissatisfaction with the government among many segments

of the "Democratic Left." Moreover, this has led ti i general suspicion of and distaste for the Aquino government's offers of collaboration (as illustrated by the NGOs' lukewarm response to Kabi~ig).~

But here lies precisely the dilemma for Democratic Socialists. The

paralysis and conservatism of the Aquino government in the face of

crisis has fueled the insurrectionist ambitions of political extremists.

But even more worrisome is the fact that even within mainstream

political and business circles, there are people who are attracted to

an authoritarian solution to the problems of the country. The weakness of the Aquino governmcnt has been interpreted as the weakness of democratic governance itself. There are those who seem to

be willing to discard the gains of the popular victory against dictatorship in the name of political stability, economic growth and national security.

Conclusion

The survival of democratic institutions continues to be at stake in

the current period of politicoeconomic transition in the Philippines.

PHILIPPINE STUDIES

Thus, a significant number of Filipino progressives, consistent with

their conception of socialism as anchored in a continuing process of

democratization, accept that the preservation of liberal democratic

institutions is an essential component of their socialist commitment.

It appears from the experience of France, however, that the challenge of such a commitment lies in translating "defensive" action

into an "offensive" project which does not surrender the interests of

workers and other oppressed sectors to the prerogatives of conservative democrats, but instead advances socialist influence in the

formal power structures of society.

Surely, socialist politics in the tradition of Jaures and Blum is

fraught with many tensions and even contradictions. Success demands much hard-nosed organizing and political creativity which

combines both exh-a-parliamentary and parliamentary activity. Filipino Democratic Socialists have recognized that the challenge in 1992

and beyond lies in being able to penetrate effectively into the Philippine political mainstream, which obviously means electoral and

governmental participation3 But perhaps the greater and more difficult challenge is to accomplish this objective without abandoning

the more fundamental and long-term structural goals.

Despite accusations of "utopianism" and "eclecticism" from both

political conservatives and radicals, the commitment to both democracy and socialism in the Philippines remains a compelling vision.

That vision defines today's task for Filipino Democratic Socialists to

complete the unfinished revolution.

Notes

1. Democratic Socialism in the Philippines dates back to the Christian Socialism

of Raul Manglapus and the "moderate" activism of the pre-1972 era. But the codification of Philippine Democratic Socialist theory and practice owes much to the pains

taking work of Jesuit socialist theoretiam, Romeo J. Intengan, during the martial law

period. "Democratic Left" is also understood in the broader sense of all the various

groups and individuals who are critical of the dogmatic and centralist tendencies of

the National Democratic Left. For discussions of this tendency, see Karaos (1987);

Abinales (1986); Tadem (1986); and Tolosa (1990).

2. The brief and difficult experience of Florencio "Butch" Abad-a mu&-respected

"Demomatic Left" personality-as a member of the Aquino Cabinet, contributed much

to the NGOs' disillusionment with Cory Aquino. For an insider's view of this "DAK

experience," see Tolosa (1992).

3. Social development NGOs identified with the "Democratic Left" have, in fact,

initiated "Projmt 2001"-a collective undertaking with the aim of making massbascd

pcople's organizations a significant electoral force in the twenty-first century. It involves strategic and creative participation in electoral cxerciscs bcginnin): In 1992.

LEGACY OF JAURES AND BLUM

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Philippine Politics and Society 1 (1).

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The Socialist Legacy of Jean Jaur2s and Ikon Blum Benjamin T. Tolosa, Jr. The tradition of socialist theory and practice associated with the Frenchmen Jean Jau* and Lbn Blum is virtually unheard of in the Philippines. In a way, this is not surprising in a polity where ideological distinctions are not fully understood and appreciated, and where "socialism" is often equated with the "communism" espoused by the underground Communist Party of the Philippines and its allies. But such a gap in knowledge, while understandable, is most unfortunate. The aim of this note is to help fill this intellectual void in Philippine political-economic literature. The note also intends to show that this particular French contribution to socialist thinking can bc used as a prism through which the current dilemmas facing the Phlippine political economy may be discerned-particularly by those who have a deep commitment to both political democracy and socioecor~omic justice. We should, of course, guard against any facile comparisons between the French and Philippine experiences. Certainly, there is no comparing February 1986 in the Philippines with the French Revolution of 1789, nor can we simply compare the Philippine Democratic Sociali,st movement with its counterpart in France. At the same time, however, if we were to study carefully the complex political position of those whose twin commihncnts to democracy and socialism have led them to defend the Aquino regime against extremist challenges--despite this government's obvious limitations and failures-perhaps a comparison with the dilemmas of French Socialism may not be as pointless as it may seem initially. A thoroughly revised and updated version of a lecture originally delivered on "Aspects of the French Development Experience" as part of the French Studies Lectur; Series, "France and the Philippines; Partners in ~Dcvelopment," on 7 Dccember 1987, Ateneo de Manila University. LEGACY OF JAURES AND BLUM The contemporary political project of both "defending" the genuine "democratic gains" of the popular victory against the Marcos dictatorship and at the same time of "transforming" the very limited and formal nature of democracy restored under the Aquino regime, finds a parallel in the French experience. The desire "to complete an unfinished revolution"-to extend democracy from the political to the socioeconomic sphere-is at the heart of the theory and practice of that strand of French Socialism identified with JaurGs and Blum. It is an important element in the heritage of international Democratic Socialism which no serious student of political economy can afford to ignore. The French Revolution and Its Legacy It has been said that no individual French socialist thinker has exercised as much influence as the British Owen, the Germans Marx and Engels, the Russian Lenin, or even the Chinese Mao. But collectively, the French have had the most influence (Cole 1954-55). Any discussion of the French socialist legacy and even of socialism in general, cannot but take as its starting point, the great French Revolution of 1789. It was the political expression of the Enlightcnment, the assertion of the democratic ideal, the belief in the "sovereignty of the people." It was a revolution against traditionalism and absolutism embodied in the French monarchy-the ancien rigime. Socialism, to the extent that it sees itself as a revolutionary movement, owes its heritage to the French Revolution. Even though the French revolution was founded basically on liberalism, it also became the catalyst for the emergence of socialism. C.D.H. Cole in his history of socialist thought, has argued that while the philosophy behind the French Revolution may have stressed individualism, at the same time because of it, . . . the "social question" forced its way for the first time to the front, not merely as a moral problem for a limited group of intellectuals and reformers of manners, but as an insistent practical issue involving a real and menacing conflict between the rich and the poor, between the propertied and propertyless, between the privileged orders of the old society and the underprivileged (Cole 1954-55, 12). The very limitations of that revolution paved the way for socialist ideas. The continuing poverty of urban workers, in particular, PHILIPPINE STUDIES showed the conflict between the political and social implications of revolutionary principles. It led to an insistence, as early as 1796 in the "conspiracy of equals" led by Gracchus Babeuf, on a "further social revolution" in the form of common ownership of the means of production (Thomson 1964, 19). This theme was to become central in the writings of the early French socialists: Saint-Simon, Fourier, Blanc and Proudhon. Their works all demonstrate a disillusionment with continuing poverty and inequality in the face of political "freedom" and "liberty." Another legacy of the French Revolution and its aftermath was a consciousness of 'The Republic" as an institution to be defended against monarchists, Bonapartists, clericalists, anarchists, faxist-militarists and other forces who might wish to destroy it. One must recall that the chaos which followed the French Revolution gave way eventually to the despotism of Napoleon Bonaparte and to the restoration of the monarchy. Later on, even the Second Republic collapsed in favor of another Bonaparte. In the 19305, the Third Repub lic was threatened by a military coup d'etat and the rise of international fascism. The surrender of this same Republic to Germany during World War I1 led to the Vichy government's collaboration with Hitler. The Fourth Republic, in turn, was marked by continuing instability and imminent collapse in the postwar years. Liberal democracy in France has had a history of coming under threat from various anti-republican forces. It is therefore seen by French democrats as a precious heritage, a treasure that must be protected. Thus, many French socialists saw it as their duty to defend the Republic and the formal institutions of "liberty" which it represented. Republican democracy would be the framework from which socialism in France was to be constructed. The traditional political notions of "Left" and "Right" in France were defined originally with reference to the Republic (i.e., "Left" signifying pro-republicanism and "Right" signifying anti-republicanism). In the past, both ardent defenders of liberal capitalism as well as committed advocates of socialism could be classified as part of the French "Left." Thus, French Socialism, to the extent that it is a legacy of the French Revolution also has at its core a republican heritage. These twin legacies have become a source of both dynamism and tension in the socialism of Jaures and Blum. There are other important traditions of socialism in France. There is the anarcho-syndicalist tradition, which has emerged from early French socialism and which has permeated the labor movement LEGACY OF JAURES AND BLUM since then. This tradition has historically been suspicious, if not hostile, to the state and to political action, particularly, parliamentary activity. Instead, it has advocated the direct action of the workers through the ultimate weapon of the general strike. Even before 1914, there was a distinct strand of French socialism identified with the French Marxist Jules Guesde and guided by orthodox historical and dialectical materialism. And after the Russian Revolution of 1917 and the 1920 Congress of Tours, the machinery of the unified French Socialist Party was taken over by its left wing to form the French Communist Party along Marxist-Leninist lines and aligned with the Third International. But as stated earlier, this note shall concern itself only with that strand of French socialism which, while critical of the limitations of the French Revolution especially in the socio-economic realm, was also concerned with preserving the liberal and humanistic achicvements of that "bourgeois revolution" in the political and cultural realm. Jaures: Socialism as the Completion of Democracy Jean Jaures (1859-1914) was the acknowledged leader of the French Socialists from the time of their unification in 1905 under one party-the Section Fran~aise de l'lnternationale Ouvn'ere (S.F.I.O&unti1 his assassination in 1914. He was "the outstanding figure in the French Socialist Party, and also the greatest single figure in the Congresses of the Second International" (Cole 1953, 373). He was.a professor of philosophy, a gifted orator, a prolific journalist and a master politician responsible for bringing together the various factions of French Socialists under one party. For Jaures, the mission of socialism was to continue the work of the French Revolution of 1789-to complete rather than destroy its achievements: The triumph of socialism will not be a break with the French Revolution but the fulfillment of the French Revolution in new economic conditions. uaurhs in Przeworski 1980, 31) The French Republic which was an achievement of the revolution was, thercfore, not an enemy but an instrument of socialism. Democracy was not in its essence a bourgeois institution. For JaurGs, dc mocracy was: PHILIPPINE STUDIES . . . the largest and most solid terrain on which the working class can stand . . . the bedrock that the reactionary bourgeoisie cannot dissolve without opening fissures in the earth and throwing itself unto them. Uaurb in Przeworski 1980, 33) Socialism was necessarily to be built on democratic foundations. Socialism was the completion of democracy, not its destruction and replacement by an alternative class dictatorship. The socialism which Jaur&s represented was deeply humanistic and democratic. He continually stressed the moral and ethical bases of socialism. His lifelong philosophy was thus an attempted synthesis of materialism and idealism (see Jaures 1895 in Fried and Sanders 1964). "His passion for the free life enriched the socialist tradition, endowed it with a deep human value" (Goldberg 1968, 136). Though conscious of the inevitable tension between authority and freedom under socialism, Jaures believed that this dilemma could and should be resolved, because socialism without freedom would bc devoid of true meaning. We socialists, we also have a free spirit; we also feel restive under external restraint . . . If we couldn't walk and sing and meditate under the sky, if we couldn't drink in the air and pick flowers when we chose, we would even accept the present society, despite its misery and incoherence; for though its freedom is a deception, it is a dcccption which men still agree to call a truth and which sometimes grips their hearts . . . ath her-solitude with all its perils than coercion, rather anarchy than despotism, whatever its disguise. (Jauri?~ in Goldberg 1%8, 136) Jaurcs saw socialism as a revolutionary project. But since it was rooted in republicanism, socialism was a revolution that was "well on its way." It was not necessary to make a new revolution. Jaur+s' revolutionism was "fully consistent with reformism and quite inconsistent with any doctrine of destructive violence . . ." (Cole 1953, 375). Reform and revolution were thus not mutually exclusive in his worldview. In a famous statement during the S.F.I.O. Congress at Toulouse in 1908, Jaures declared: Precisely because we are a party of revolution, we are the most deeply reformist party, the only one which can give response to the demands of the workeis, and make each conquest a point of departure for further conquests. (Jaurb in Goldberg 1968, 551) LEGACY OF JAURES AND BLUM Jaures, however, did not fully embrace the ideas of the German "revisionist" theoretician Eduard Bernstein, nor did he completely approve of the actions of the French socialist parliamentarian Alexandre Millerand. He believed that Bernstein's fundamental rejection of the central tenets of Marxism transformed socialism into "a reformism without identity and substance." On the other hand, the parliamentary tactics of Millerand and the "Independent Socialists" had "scrapped Marxism for a vague pragmatism." Though Jaures "deeply believed in amelioration through reforms, he was equally convinced that no social system short of collectivist socialism could permanently provide full employment and fair distribution" (Jaures in Goldberg 1968, 26869). While he was prepared to accept reforms, he was not willing to accept them on terms which would lead to the "domestication" of the workers' movement and to the destruction of their power (Cole 1953, 375). G.D.H. Cole's very perceptive insight into Jaurcs' politics deserves lengthy quotation here: By disposition he was a parliamentarian, and he was by no means prepared to regard the state as simply the cxccutivc committee of thc ruling class. Yet this did not mean that he belonged to the constitutionalist right wing: he insisted that the workers, in their struggle for power, could not allow themselves to be shut up within the confines of bourgeois legality. They might, he agreed, have to act unconstitutionally, to flout the law, or to rise in rebellion; but he regarded such a prosp~~t, not with the jubilation of the instinctive revolutionary, but . . as an unpleasant necessity to be avoided as far as possible, because he was very anxious that the growing pains of the new society should not destroy the human and cultural values that were worthy of being taken over into it. (Cole 1933, 379) Blum: Socialist "Exercise of Power" Leon Blum (1872-1950) was in many respects the successor of Jaures, both in mind and spirit. But in one sense, Blum surpassed his mentor by forming the first Socialist-led Popular Front govemment in France in 1936. Blum was the leader of the French Socialists from 1920 until the years immediately following the Second World War. But the party he led was no longer the same S.F.I.0 that Jauri?s had so carefully and painstakingly put together. The Russian Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 had led to the setting up of the Third International which forced a split in the S.F.I.O. in their 1920 Con- PHILIPPINE STUDIES gress at Tours. The new Moscow-based International secured the adherence of the left wing majority of the French Socialists based on the "21 points" imposed by Lenin and Zinoviev for admission. The minority Center and Right factions refused to accept the conditions unconditionally, left the Congress and launched a new Socialist Party but used the prewar party's old name and statutes. Blum was particularly opposed to the principles of the Third International and in a speech before the Congress of Tours denounced Bolshevism as a narrow creed specific to the Russian experience and inconsistent with European socialist traditions. Blum noted that Communism, among its many errors, wrongly equated the seizure of power with social revolution, perverted the democratic process with its concept of party organization, threatened the traditional independence of trade unions which it sought to put under party control, and denied that workers could fight to defend their nation (Greene 1969, 2). Like Jaurh, Blum's socialism represented a synthesis of the French democratic tradition with selected aspects of Manism. The product was a socialism propelled by a moral impulse-a socialism in a humanist mould. He also believed that political and social democracy were inseparable. The goal of socialism was to realize "the great ideals of 1789 . . . and infuse the economic and social order with political, civil and personal liberty" (Blum in Greene 1969, 14). Consistent with the social democratic tradition, Blum did not dichotomize reform and revolution. Reforms contained the seeds of revolution. He did not equate socialism with gradual capitalist re form, however. To achieve socialism, the conquest of power by the working classes was necessary. "I do not recognize two kinds of socialism, revolutionary and nonrevolutionary. There is only one socialism, and it is . . . inherently revolutiona~ (Blum in Halperin 1946, 250). Nevertheless, Blum argued that without "revolutionary preparation," a premature seizure of power (as advocated by the Communists) could only lead to tyranny and repression. This long process of preparation for social revolution could be attained only through participation in the institutions of the Republic (Greene 1969, 15). Thus, following Jau+s, Blum strove to integrate the French Socialist Party into the country's parliamentary system. Like his revered master, he saw that the defense of democracy was consistent with the struggle for socialism. It was in this light that he developed his theory of the "exercise of power." LEGACY OF JAURES AND BLUM As an added background, it must be pointed out that the 1904 Congress of the Second International at Amsterdam explicitly forbade socialist participation in bourgeois governments as a general rule. This resolution was made as a direct response to a crisis in French Socialism triggered by Millerand's acceptance of a Cabinet post in the liberal regime of RenC Waldeck-Rousseau. While critically supportive of Millerand's actions as crucial for Republican defense, Jaures had accepted the Amsterdam resolution as a necessary condition for socialist unification. In the 1920s, the S.F.I.O. continued to adhere to this principle, partly to demonstrate their revolutionary commitment in the face of the mounting challenges coming from the French Communist Party. During the latter half of the 1920s, however, there was increasing pressure on the Socialists to accept positions in the Cabinet, since they had become the second leading party in the country next to the Radical Socialists. It was in this context that Blum made a distinction between the "conquest of power," which was a revolutionary notion designed to bring about socialist transformation, and the "exercise of power" in a capitalist regime, which was nonrevolutionary and merely the "consequence of parliamentary action itself." As he noted in a speech in 1926: If through thc operation of parliamentary institutions, we were callcd upon to exercise powcr within the framework of cxis~~ng institutions and of the present constitution, wc would exercise it legally and loyally without committing any chicanery like attempting to profit by our prcsencc inside the government in order to transform the exercise of power into a conquest of power. (Blum in Colton 1953, 522) Blum was aware of the inherent risks and contradictions of a Socialist "exercise of powcr" which he foresaw as "a particularly painful and difficult experience:'--"an experience to which the party can be subjected even inspite of itself" (Blum in Colton 1953, 523). This was true, not only in a situation where the Socialist Party would find itself as a minority partner in a "bourgeois" Cabinet, but also even in the case of a "balanced" governmental coalition with nonsocialists. Much later in his career, he wrote: Perhaps there is no more arduous task in the world than that of a Socialist government acting within the framework of the capitalist system, which it has neither the power nor the mandate to transform in its legal essence. It embodies at the same time the working class and the statc. (Blum in Colton 1933, 540) PHILIPPINE STUDIES Blum believed, however, that such an involvement in government, while exceptional, was justified when the Republic itself was threatened by counter-revolution, which during Blum's time was epitomized by fascism. It was precisely this right-wing threat which opened the possibility for a Cabinet role for the Socialists as early as 1932 and paved the way for the creation of the Popular Front government in 1936 which Blum headed in coalition with the Radical Socialists. Even after the defeat of Blum's government, it was this same belief in the socialist responsibility to defend the democratic Republic-in the "vital connection between the preservation of political democracy and the advance of socialism" (Blum in Colton 1953, 533)-which led to Socialist participation in other nonsocialist governments in the years preceding and following the Second World War. The Dilemmas of Democratic Socialism What were the political implications of the socialism of Jaurb and Blum? The discussion above shows that central to their conception of socialism was their republicanism. Both of them were of the firm belief that a genuine socialist commitment required full participation in the life of the (bourgeois) Republic which also meant its active defense during times of crisis. Thus, for example, during the Dreyfus Affair of the late nineteenth century when French society was polarized into two campsthe anti-Dreyfusard monarchists and militarists on one side, and the Dreyfusard liberal republicans on the other-Jaures supported the entry of the then socialist Millerand into a Radical Cabinet. Jaures was also instrumental in the creation and maintenance of an active alliance among the bourgeois and socialist "Left"4espite this bloc's nonsocialist objectives. Jaures subsumed socialist goals under the banner of "Republican defense." While such a perspective and approach was responsible for the growth of French Socialism as a parliamentary force and rooted its politics and ideology firmly in the democratic tradition, Jaures' "political Radicalism" was also a major cause of instability within the Socialist Party. It "encouraged Frenchmen of the left to swing to and fro between Socialism and Radicalism, or at all events between Socialist self-sufficiency and alliance with the bourgeois left" (Cole 1958, 496). As Jaurh himself was to discover painfully in the LEGACY OF JAURES AND BLUM case of his former colleagues and friends in the "Independent Socialist" tendency (e.g., Millerand, Aristide Briand and Rene Viviani), the lines between Republicanism and Socialism could become blurred beyond recognition. Reforms, and worse, the pursuit of highranking government positions, could become the ends, not the means, of some self-proclaimed "socialists" (see Goldberg 1968). Similarly, in the case of Blum, it was the fascist threat of the 1930s and the double threat of Gaullism and Communism in the 1940s, which justified socialist participation in "defensive" govemment coalitions which were hardly committed to socialist transformation. Because the country's democratic liberties were being threatened, "the Socialist party had to subordinate everything to the overriding duty of defending those liberties" (Blum in Colton 1953, 536). For Blum, what had happened was not simply the subordination of Socialist loyalties to Republican loyalties. He was convinced until the end of his life that thc socialist program "rested first and foremost upon the safety of the democratic republic" (Blum in Colton 1953, 542). This complete identification of the Socialist Party with liberal democratic reformism and sometimes, even with conscrvativc policies, led to widespread disillusionment among its former supporters, which was manifested in elections throughout the 1950s and 1960s. Jean Rous, a Socialist deputy in parliament who resigned from the party in 1947, revealed the extent of disillusionment when he attacked the S.F.I.O. for acquiescing to "pro-capitalist, pro-imperialist and anti-labor" policies in the name of defending the Republic. By carrying out the policy of 'others' . . . the S.F.I.O. has now become a party of 'others,' a party that still has perhaps a rolc of republican center to play, the heritage of the old Radical party to pick up and exploit, but a rolc that has nothing in common with that of a workers' party. (Rous in Colton 1933, 539) It is a sad fact, indeed, that the mainstream of French Socialism, in common with the other parties of the Second International, had in due course abandoned their maximum goal of "socialization" in favor of "republican dcfcnse" and "welfare promotion." To be sure, many social reforms were real working class gains-as was true of the reforms achieved during Blum's Popular Front government. But what became a significant deviation from thc tradition of Jaurk and PHILIPPINE STUDIES perhaps even of Blum, was that the reforms were no longer seen in the context of an eventual transition to "full socialism." The logic of electoralism and parliamentary participation had a natural moderating influence (see Przeworski 1980 and 1985). The dramatic rise to power of Francois Mitterand's Parti Socialiste (formed in 1968) marked a new turn in the history of French Socialism and deserves separate discussion elsewhere. What is apparent, however, is that the current socialist vocabulary of "technocratic modernism'' and "superior economic management" seems even more removed from the Jaurcs-Blum conception of socialism and of the role of the Socialist Party than the welfare state ideology of post-World War I1 social democracy (see Ross and Jenson 1988; Kesselrnan 1986; and Petras 1984). The defense of democracy has not led to its completion. The revolution has remained unfinished. The Aquino Regime and Philippine Democratic Socialism Much space has been devoted towards an understanding of the socialism of Jean Jaures and Lkon Blum because the French experience finds a striking parallel in the contemporary Philippine situation-in the theory and practice of the so-called "Democratic Socialist" tendency. While an extended discussion of the nature and history of this political grouping and of the even broader "Democratic Left" in the Philippines is beyond the scope of this note, it is possible to gain some insights into this distinct ideological tendency by appreciating the complex political stance taken by its adherents towards the 1986 EDSA revolution and the formally liberal democratic system restored under the Aquino government.' One must remember that the "Democratic Left" participated in the 1986 elections in support of Cory Aquino, in marked contrast with the national democrats. "Participation without illusions" meant making common cause with Center-Right groups and individuals (including Aquino herself) who while anti-Marcos and anti-dictatorship, did not share the commitment to far reaching political and social reform. But the creation of a broad centrist democratic alliance was seen as a necessary condition for bringing abouf a more socially just order through relatively peaceful means. Thus when victory came in February 1986, the response of this tendency was not, as in the case of the mainstream national democrats, to dismiss it outright as meaningless, but to describe the EDSA uprising as an "unfinished revolution." What this position meant LEGACY OF JAURES AND BLUM was that its supporters considered the ouster of the Marcos dictatorship as a genuine gain for political democracy. But they also be lieved that the real meaning of "people power" lay in authentic popular empowerment through independent mass organizations and social transformation via redistributive government programs. The democratic struggle was seen as a continuing process. Such a position has meant the active defense of the so-called "democratic space" which also implied critical support for a generally conservative Aquino government, since it was the only legitimate and concrete vehicle of the democratic transition. Thus the various nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), sectoral organizations and political groups associated with the "Democratic Left" lent their full support to the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, the consolidation of liberal democratic representative institutions and the continued defenx of the constitutional order against violent threats from both the extreme Right and Left. Much in the spirit of Jaurcs and Blum, they believe that the deepening of democracy presupposes its strength. The evolution of the Aquino regime, however, away from any bold initiatives for both political and social reform towards policies catering to established political and business interests, has resulted in much dissatisfaction with the government among many segments of the "Democratic Left." Moreover, this has led ti i general suspicion of and distaste for the Aquino government's offers of collaboration (as illustrated by the NGOs' lukewarm response to Kabi~ig).~ But here lies precisely the dilemma for Democratic Socialists. The paralysis and conservatism of the Aquino government in the face of crisis has fueled the insurrectionist ambitions of political extremists. But even more worrisome is the fact that even within mainstream political and business circles, there are people who are attracted to an authoritarian solution to the problems of the country. The weakness of the Aquino governmcnt has been interpreted as the weakness of democratic governance itself. There are those who seem to be willing to discard the gains of the popular victory against dictatorship in the name of political stability, economic growth and national security. Conclusion The survival of democratic institutions continues to be at stake in the current period of politicoeconomic transition in the Philippines. PHILIPPINE STUDIES Thus, a significant number of Filipino progressives, consistent with their conception of socialism as anchored in a continuing process of democratization, accept that the preservation of liberal democratic institutions is an essential component of their socialist commitment. It appears from the experience of France, however, that the challenge of such a commitment lies in translating "defensive" action into an "offensive" project which does not surrender the interests of workers and other oppressed sectors to the prerogatives of conservative democrats, but instead advances socialist influence in the formal power structures of society. Surely, socialist politics in the tradition of Jaures and Blum is fraught with many tensions and even contradictions. Success demands much hard-nosed organizing and political creativity which combines both exh-a-parliamentary and parliamentary activity. Filipino Democratic Socialists have recognized that the challenge in 1992 and beyond lies in being able to penetrate effectively into the Philippine political mainstream, which obviously means electoral and governmental participation3 But perhaps the greater and more difficult challenge is to accomplish this objective without abandoning the more fundamental and long-term structural goals. Despite accusations of "utopianism" and "eclecticism" from both political conservatives and radicals, the commitment to both democracy and socialism in the Philippines remains a compelling vision. That vision defines today's task for Filipino Democratic Socialists to complete the unfinished revolution. Notes 1. Democratic Socialism in the Philippines dates back to the Christian Socialism of Raul Manglapus and the "moderate" activism of the pre-1972 era. But the codification of Philippine Democratic Socialist theory and practice owes much to the pains taking work of Jesuit socialist theoretiam, Romeo J. Intengan, during the martial law period. "Democratic Left" is also understood in the broader sense of all the various groups and individuals who are critical of the dogmatic and centralist tendencies of the National Democratic Left. For discussions of this tendency, see Karaos (1987); Abinales (1986); Tadem (1986); and Tolosa (1990). 2. The brief and difficult experience of Florencio "Butch" Abad-a mu&-respected "Demomatic Left" personality-as a member of the Aquino Cabinet, contributed much to the NGOs' disillusionment with Cory Aquino. For an insider's view of this "DAK experience," see Tolosa (1992). 3. Social development NGOs identified with the "Democratic Left" have, in fact, initiated "Projmt 2001"-a collective undertaking with the aim of making massbascd pcople's organizations a significant electoral force in the twenty-first century. It involves strategic and creative participation in electoral cxerciscs bcginnin): In 1992. LEGACY OF JAURES AND BLUM References Abinales, P.N. 1986. The post-Marcos Regime, the non-bourgeois opposition and the prospects of a Philippine October. Kasan'nlnn 1 (4). Cole, G.D.H. 1953. A history of socialist thought. Vol. 3. London: Macmillan. . 1954-55. A history of socialist thought. Vols. 1 & 2. London: Macmillan. . 1958. A history of socialist thought. Vol. 4. London: Macmillan. Colton, J. 1953. Lfon Blum and the French Socialists as a government party. The Journal of Politics 15 (4). Fried, A. and Sanders, R., eds. 1964. Socialist thought: A documentary history. New York: Anchor Books. Goldberg, H. 1968. The life of Jean JaurPs. 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New Left Review no. 171. Tadem, E.C. 19%. Lessons for the Philippine left. Kasarinlan 1 (4). Thomson, D. 1964. Democracy in France since 1870. (4th cd.) Oxford: Oxford University Press. Tolosa, B.T. 1990. The underpinnings of Pandayan's democratic socialism. Conjuncture (June). . 1992. What difference can three months make: Keflections on the Abad stint at DAK, the Aquino regime and the democratic transition. Philippine Politics and Society 1 (1).