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THE NEW KOREA BY | ALLEYNE IRELAND ©
THE NEW KOREA
Books by Alleyne Ireland
Mr. Ireland, one of the foremost living author-
ities on government, is particularly well known
for his works on Colonial Administration.
“ Nothing i in the English b language i in the
same field can compare with them for monu-
meatal fullness of design and execution.”
—The Springfield Republican.
Democracy and the Human Equation
Mr. Ireland earnestly considers the problem of
making Government responsive to the needs of
modern civilization.
“Every book like this which is sincere and
honestly thought out is of value to all who
are thinking at all upon the great problems
of today.” —The Boston Post.
An Adventure with a Genius
Recollections of Joseph Pulitzer.
«One of the most graphic portraits of a man
that could be created.”
—The Boston Evening Transcript.
“The book holds its readers like a vise and
haunts them like a vision.” — Life.
THE NEW KOREA
By ALLEYNE IRELAND, r.z.e.s.,
Author of “Democracy and the Human Equation,”
“An Adventure with a Genius,” cic.
NEW YORK
E. P. DUTTON & COMPANY
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PREFACE
About twenty years ago I published three
volumes dealing with colonial administration in
the Far East. They related to British rule in
Burma, the Federated Malay States, the Straits
Settlements, Sarawak, British North Borneo,
and Hong Kong, American rule in the Philip-
pines, Dutch rule in Java, and French rule in
Indo-China.
It had been my intention to include an account
of Japanese rule in Formosa; but by the time I
had turned back east after two years of westerly
travel the Russo-Japanese war was in progress,
and @ visit to Formosa was out of the question.
When, in 1922, the opportunity presented itself
to spend the greater part of the year in the Far
East, I decided that a volume describing Japan-
ese administration in Korea would make a more
interesting contribution to the study of Govern-
ment than a similar work about Formosa.
Formosa is merely one example among many
of a civilized race ruling a people in a very low
stage of development. Korea, on the other hand,
presents the rare spectacle of one civilized race
ruling another civilized race. It is true that at
the time Japan annexed Korea, in 1910, the
actual conditions of life in the Peninsula were
extremely bad. This was not due, however, to
any lack of inherent intelligence and ability in
the Korean race, but to the stupidity and corrup-
tion which for five hundred years had, almost
continuously, characterized the government of
the Korean dynasty, and to the existence during
that period of a royal court which maintained
throughout Korea a system of licensed cruelty
and corruption.
Such was the misrule under which the Koreans
had suffered for generation after generation that
all incentive to industry, thrift, and social prog-
ress had been destroyed, because none of the com-
mon people had been allowed to enjoy the fruits
of their own efforts.
The title of the present volume gives the key
to its contents. What I have attempted is to
present in some detail the aims, the methods, and
the results of Japanese administration in Korea.
Of the right of the Koreans to govern them-
selves, of the right of the Japanese to govern
them I have said but little, for the subject has
been discussed exhaustively by other writers,
both from the point of view of the Korean na-
tionalists and from that of the Japanese imperi-
alists, and is in any case of such a nature that a
judgment one way or the other can reflect noth-
ing but the individual temperament of the judge.
There is already in existence a voluminous lit-
erature relating to Korea, much of it of great
interest and importance. Most of it, however,
falls under one of two heads—writing descriptive
of the country and of the people, or polemical
writing in which Japanese administration in
Korea is attacked or eulogized on the basis of
material specially selected to serve one purpose
or the other. ;
To the English-reading public there is avail-
able at present only one source of statistically-
based information covering every phase of
Japanese rule in Korea—the Annual Report
on Reforms and Progress in Chosen, compiled
and published by the Government-General. A]-
though these reports contain a great deal of
valuable comment and a considerable body of
statistical data, a careful perusal of the volumes
covering the past ten years convinced me that a
work such as I had in mind could not be written
from that material alone. It was clear that a
good deal of the matter appearing in the reports
had been condensed from departmental reports
in which various subjects had been treated in full
detail. Both as to data and to comment a large
proportion of the contents of the present volume
is taken from translations of official material
which has not hitherto been accessible in English.
Where I have expressed my own opinion of
Japanese administration in Korea, it has been
derived from the consideration of what I saw in
the country, what I have read about it in official
and in unofficial publications, and from discus<
sions with persons—Japanese, Korean, and for~
eign—who were living in the Peninsula at the
time of my visit.
ALLEYNE IRELAND,
CHAPTER
1, Inrropuctory . . . Pare o. 1
Korea's Position in Far Bastern ‘Affairs, 1, Annezation by
Japan, 1; Imperialism and Nationalism Contrasted, 2;
Self-rule and Dependent Rule Contrasted, 10; Japanese
Rule in Korea Characterised, 17.
2. Dsscniprive anp Historican. . . . . . . 18
Descriptive, 18; Population, 28; Railways, 27; Roads,
31; Streets, 82; Maritime Transportation, 34; Postal,
Telegraph, and Telephone Communications, 34; His-
torical, 36.
3 Summary. © 2. 1. ee ee
Relations between Japan and Korea, 62; Governor-
General Saito Appointed, 69; New Spirit Introduced in
Administration, '70; Material Progress, 73; Reorganiza-
tion of Government, 77; General Progress of the
Country, 80.
４ Government ORGANIZATION . . . . «6 ss 88
I. Taw Government-GENERAL .. . w 1 1 we 88
Provincial Government . . 88
The Present Organization of the Government of Korea - 96
The Civil Service. + 6 « 104
Appointment and Salary, ‘104; Pensions, 105
5 GovERNMENT ORGANIZATION.
Tl. Loca, ApMimsrraTiION . ly . 108
Introductory, 108; Formation of Local Councils, 114;
Inspection of Local Administration, 120; Local Finance,
121; Municipalities, 126; Villages, 128; School Associa-
tions for Japanese, 131; District Educational Bodies for
Koreans, 133; Water-utilization Associations, 135.
6 Taz Laws anp Courts or Korpa. . . . . . 187
Historical, 187; The Sources of Law in Korea, 143; Civil
Procedure, 145; Crimina] Procedure: The Judiciary, 150;
Courts of Law, 152.
7 Pouce anp Paisons. . . . . 2. 1... 186
I. Pottce ApMINiBTRATION .. 154
Historical, 154; After the ‘Annexation, 158; ” Summary
Police Jurisdiction, 160; Cost of the Police Force, 161.
8 Pamwon ApmivistRaTION . . 162
Control and Administration of, 163; “Number of prisoners,
164; First Offenders, 165; Recidivism, 165; Pardons, 166;
Prisoners’ Labor, 167; Morbidity and Mortality of
Prisoners, 167.
VIII. Govennmenr Fivanck . . . . 169
Historical, 169; Subsequent to the Annexation of 1910,
178; Sources of Government Revenue, 175; Monopolies
and other Government Undertakings, 178; Lumber Under-
taking Station, 179; Objects of Government Expendi-
ture, 181; The Korean National Debt, 184.
9 Epvcation . . . een as . 188
Principles of, 188; Objects of, 190; Rules for Guidance
of Teachers, 190; Historical Development, 191; Present
State of the Educational System, 197; The School Cur-
riculum, 24; Salaries of Teachers, 205; Religion in the
Schools, 206; Educational Finance, 208.
10 Meprcan, Sanrrary, anp Socian Service . . . 212
Historical, 212; Epidemic Diseases, 217; General Causes
of Death, 218; Sanitary Equipment, 219; Expansion of
Medical Organs, 222; The Central Health Society, 228;
Hygienic Inspection, 223; Bacteriological Service, 224;
Opium Control, 224; Relief Work for Lepers, 226;
Hospitals, 227; The Severance Union Medical College,
228; Health Practitioners, 280; Vital Statistics, 231;
Social Service, 231.
11 Tas Economic Devevorment or Korra. . . . 287
I, AcaicutrurE . + 227
Historical, 237; Yield of Principal ‘Crops, 249; Value of
Agricultural Products, 243; Sericulture, 244; Land
Tenure, 246; Financing the Farmer, 249; Official
Encouragement of Agriculture, 251; Irrigation, 254;
Agricultura] Labor, 256,
12 Economic Deverorment or Korza. . . . . . 260
11. Forzstey, Fisnery, anpD Mining . . . . « +. 260
Forestry . 260
Historical, 200: Condition of the Forests, 262; Atfores-
tation, 264.
Fishery . . 266
Experiments i in 2 Aquatic Products, 260; Development of
the Fishing Industry, 270; Economic Progress of the
Fishing Industry, 272.
Historical, 278; Present State of the Mining Industry
275.１３
13 Economic Devetorment or Konra . . . . . 278
ID. Commmncn, Manuracturss, AnD Banging . . .. 278
Currency, 278; Economic Development, 282.
Commerce . . + 3
The Foreign Trade of Korea, 938; Distribution of For
eign Trade, 285; Gold and Silver Bullion, 285; General
Character of the Export Trade, 287; General Character
of the Import Trade, 289.
Manufactures. 6 1 1 ee ee ew ew. OOO
Banking - 8 294
Historical, 204; Banking Statistics, 209; ‘The Bank of
Chosen, 800; The Chosen Industrial Bank, 302; Ordi-
nary Banks, 302; People’s Banking Associations, 802;
The Oriental Development Company, 303; Mutual
Credit Associations (Mujin-Ko), 804.
APPENDICES:
Appendix A. Treaty of Annexation. . . . . . 310
Appendix B. Imperial Rescript on Annexation - . . . $18
Appendix C. The Late Korean Emperor's Rescript on
Ceasion of Sovereignty . . 315
Appendix D. Imperial Rescript Concerning the Reorgani-
zation of the Government-General of
Choen . 2. we . 317
xii CONTENTS
Paan
Appendix E. Governor-General’s Instruction to High Offi-
cials Concerning Administrative Re-
forms . 9
Appendix F, Governor-General’s Proclamation | to the Peo-
ple of Chosen. . - 322
Appendix G. Governor-General’s Address ‘to * Provincial
Governors. . $25
Appendix H. Administrative Superintendent’ 4 Instruc-
tions to Provincial Governors . . . . 328
Appendix J. Rules for Teachers . $87
GEOGRAPHICAL "PLace. Nawea . 354
Invex . De 8
Mar or Korea (Caosen) . : : : ‘Facing Page 354
CHAPTER I INTRODUCTORY.
Korea is destined to occupy a position of con-
stantly increasing importance with reference to
the general problem of the Far East. Her geo-
graphical situation predetermines for her a
future indissolubly linked with that of China, of
Asiatic Russia, and of Japan, with two of which
she has land frontiers, and from the third is sep-
arated only by a narrow strait. It is impossible
to foresee any political, social, or economic devel-
opments in northeastern Asia in which Korea
will not fill a réle as significant as that of Turkey
in respect of the Near East, of Egypt in respect
of the British Empire, or of the Panama Canal
Zone in respect of the United States.
The annexation of Korea by Japan in 1910
made waste paper out of bales of laboriously
compiled reports and of ingenious predictions
about Far Eastern affairs. It reflected, in brief,
the determination of Japan to forestall any at-
tempt which might be contemplated by China to
reassert, and to make active, its former suzerainty
over Korea, or on the part of Russia to secure in
the Korean Peninsula a position of such domi-
nance as would create the temptation, and fur-
nish the instrument, to take the control of the
country out of the hands of its weak, incompe-
tent, and corrupt rulers.
Looking forward from 1910, one thing was clear
where many things were obscure, namely that
Japan, having decided to make Korea part of
her Empire, would deem the permanence of her
occupation to be a major element of her national
policy, to be held intact, at whatever cost, against
internal revolt or foreign intrigue.
In the field of international policy the Japan-
ese annexation of Korea is perfectly suited to
serve as a demarcating issue between two schools
of political conviction—the imperialist and the
nationalist—and according to whether the reader
belongs to one or to the other of these schools, so
will he convince himself that Japan has the
“right” to rule Korea, or that the Koreans have
a “right” to independent nationhood.
The common employment of the word “right”
in this connection has done much to befog the
actual matter in controversy between the imperi-~
alists and the nationalists, since the “rightness”
of either doctrine when applied to a particular
case can only be measured with reference to the
particular circumstances,
The most extreme imperialist would balk at
the suggestion that the United States should, on
account of its great power and of its advanced
social development, annex every backward and
undeveloped country south of the Rio Grande.
The most extreme nationalist would ridicule the
idea that the “right” of the Australian aborigi-
nes to self-determination justified an effort to
emancipate the island-continent from white rule.
The pinnacle of absurdity would be reached if
anyone should start a movement to restore the
control of the North American Continent to the
Indian tribes. Grotesque as these instances ap-
pear when viewed from the practical standpoint,
they suffice to expose the fallacy of basing either
an imperialist or a nationalist policy upon a prin-
ciple of abstract right.
It is my purpose to examine Japanese rule in
Korea as a concrete example of colonial admin-
istration, without reference to the legal or moral
sanctions upon which it rests. The reasons for
thus limiting the inquiry will be obvious to all
serious students. I state them here in the hope
that they will be accepted as valid by the general
reader.
The annexation of weak countries by strong
countries is a phenomenon which has persisted
since the beginning of recorded time; practically
every strong nation has practiced the habit.
The arguments for and against such a pro-
cedure have been stated and re-stated thousands
of times in every country, and have been ex~
pressed in almost every language. They are
familiar to, or accessible to, every person who
will read this volume. I have nothing to add to
them. A discussion of the moral, ethical, legal,
political, social, and economic problems raised by
an act of annexation, as such, is irrelevant to a
presentation of the facts descriptive of a working
system of colonial government, since the charac-
ter of an administration is what it is, and can be
fairly judged only on the basis of the data of
its operation.
To combine a description of a colonial governs
ment with an essay on the moral quality of the
imperialist principle would be to invite confusion
of thought. Thus, in any given case, if the admin-
istration of an imperial government is found to
be bad in fact, this badness will be used by
nationalists as an argument against imperialism,
whereas if bad administration is found in a popu-
lar government, nationalists will not tolerate any
use of this badness as an argument against popu-+
lar rule.
Conversely, with reference to good adminis-
tration; if nationalists find that it exists in fact
under a system of popular self-government, they,
will welcome the finding as a justification of that
system; but if good administration is found in an
imperial dependency, nationalists will not allow
the finding to stand to the credit of the imperial-
ist system; they will then shift the issue from the
quality of the administration to the quality of the
sanctions from which the government derives its
authority.
In a word, to the nationalists good government
is good government if it is self-government, and
even bad government is good government if it is
self-government—in the first case because both
good government and self-government are good;
in the second case because, under self-govern-
ment, bad government will certainly lead to a
demand for, and to the instituting of, good gov-
ernment, Thus, so runs the argument, bad self-
government is merely a passing phase in the evo-
lution of good self-government.
This attitude of the nationalists is perfectly
logical so far as it affects their desire for nation-
hood, since it enables them to use bad colonial
administration as an argument in support of an
independence agitation, and at the same time
undercuts the position of those imperialists who
seek to justify colonial rule by appealing to the
visible evidences of what good colonial adminis-
tration can do for the safety, health, cultural
advancement, and prosperity of a colonial
domain.
It is clear, then, that with reference to an
accepted group of facts, a totally different evalu-
ation will be made by a nationalist and by an
imperialist. Japanese rule in Korea, and the
opposition to it on the part of the Korean nation-
alists, furnish an excellent illustration of the
point. The Japanese refer with pride to their
road-building, to their great extension of educa-
tional facilities, to their effective protection of
life and property throughout a country but re-
cently overrun by bandits, to their rapid develop-
ment of agriculture, trade and industry, to their
technical training schools, to their scientific
experiment stations which serve the farmer, the
fisherman, the stock-breeder, and the manufac-
turer, to the enormous increase during the past
fifteen years in every branch of production, with
its connotation of increased employment for
Koreans, to the constantly mounting number of
Koreans appointed to the Government service.
The foregoing facts cannot be gainsaid, as will
be proved by the data contained in subsequent
chapters. But the Korean nationalists attribute
to them a sinister significance. The roads, they
say, are built solely for the purpose of facilitat-
ing the movement of Japanese troops; the educa-
tional system is nothing more than an ingenious
scheme for destroying Korean nationality; the
protection of life and property is merely an ex-
cuse for maintaining a large Japanese police
force; the economic development of the country
is simply a device for swelling the profits of
Japanese capitalists; the technical schools and
the scientific bureaus have no other aim than to
make Japanese rule profitable to the Japanese;
the employment of Koreans in the Government
service is an insidious form of bribery calculated
to secure support for the Japanese occupation
of the country.
The situation thus created is familiar to all
students of colonial government. If the local
administration builds roads, erects schools, and
so on, it is wrong, because the motive is base; if
it fails to do these things it is wrong, because it
is the obvious duty of an imperial ruler to confer
such benefits upon a dependency. So also in
relation to developing the resources of a depend-
ency; if the sovereign power invests money in the
colony, it is wrong because all it amounts to is
capitalist exploitation; if it does not invest
money in the colony, it is wrong because the
failure to do so reflects a determination to keep
the people poor and weak in the interest of an
easy domination; if it employs natives in the
government service it is wrong because such @
policy tends to weaken nationalist sentiment; if
it fails to do so it is wrong because such a course
discloses the purpose of making the colony the
happy hunting ground of imperial officials,
To all colonial governors this is an old story.
All sincere and humane colonial governors—and
none is more worthy of such a description than
is Viscount Saito, Governor-General of Korea
since 1919—are compelled to close their ears to
the mutually destructive criticisms to which I
have alluded, and must content themselves with
carrying out from day to day measures designed
to improve the general conditions of their de-
pendencies.
The bulk of the present volume is devoted to
a description of the administrative system of the
Japanese in Korea, and to a statistical account
of its results. The author feels it incumbent
upon him to furnish his readers with a brief state-
ment of the point of view from which he has
approached his task.
During the past forty years he has lived about
half the time in self-governing countries—Eng-
land, the United States, Canada, Australia,
Japan, France, Germany, and Denmark—and
the other half in colonial dependencies—India,
the British West Indies, the French West
Indies, British and Dutch Malaya, French Indo-
China, British Borneo, the Philippine Islands,
and in a few scattered dependencies of various
powers,
This experience has left him without any trace
of prejudice in respect of forms of government,
for he has seen government wisely and honestly
administered under every form, and stupidly and
dishonestly administered under every form; he
has seen freedom cherished under a monarchy
and destroyed under a republic, and vice versa;
he has seen justice dispensed with an even hand
under popular rule and under autocratic rule;
he has seen judicial decisions bought and sold in
self-governing countries and in the dependencies
of imperial powers. In each class of territory
he has seen, living side by side, persons content
with their government (whilst favoring reforms
in this or in that particular) and persons who are
so discontented with the same government that
nothing short of its complete destruction appears
to offer an adequate guaranty of desired reforms.
When the strongly dissatisfied group exists in
a sovereign state, its members become socialists
of one kind or another, or communists, or syn-
dicalists, or fascists, or anarchists, according to
their individual temperaments; when the group
exists in a dependency, its members create a
party aiming at the achievement of independence
from the sovereign state.
It is one of the most curious matters forced
upon the attention of a student of comparative
government that the chief object of the national-
ist party in a dependency should be to obtain the
status of an independent sovereign nation, since
the obvious fact is that in most of the countries
which already exist as sovereign states there are
to be observed all the evil conditions for which
a colonial independence party deems independ-
ent sovereignty to be the unfailing panacea.
If the opponents of imperially imposed rule
could point to the self-ruled countries and say:
“In these countries there are justice, toleration,
honest and efficient administration, social equal-
ity, adequate protection of life and property,
equal economic opportunity, and freedom from
the exploitation of the weak by the strong, and
of the poor by the rich,” the argument against
imperialism would rest upon solid foundations.
But the anti-imperialists cannot say with truth
that the kind of dispensation described above
exists in any marked degree in the general cate-
gory of self-ruled states; nor can they say with
truth that, in whatever degree it does exist any-
where, this degree is higher in self-ruled coun-
tries than it is in imperial dependencies,
No informed person would be prepared to
maintain that Spain, Mexico, the Central Amer-
ican Republics, Russia, Rumania, and Bulgaria
—all of them self-governing, independent states
—en joy asuperior general social condition, or are
better administered, than Burma, Java, British
Guiana, the Federated Malay States, Korea, and
the Philippine Islands—all of them ruled as
dependencies.
Self-rule and dependent rule each have in-
herent in them the possibility of misrule. In self-
ruled countries the danger lies in the dishonesty
and incompetence of which partisan politics and
political machinery are the supple instruments
and the staunch defenders. As between the good
of the country and the good of the party, the
latter is usually—by the liberal use of patronage,
and by the unrestrained employment of sophisti-
cal oratory—accorded in practice the leading
position.
In dependencies the threat to good govern-
ment comes from another source—the stupidity,
the incompetence, or the arrogance of colonial
officials. In the matter of corruption I am con-
vinced beyond all doubt that, allowing for an
occasional exception, the government of self-
ruled countries is much more corrupt than that
of colonial dependencies, and that, in the latter,
malversation in public office is of very rare oc-
currence. In the twenty-five years during which
I have kept in touch with the dependencies con-
trolled by the India Office and by the Colonial
Office in London I have not heard of a dozen
cases of graft on the part of non-native govern-
ment officials above the rank of mere clerks.
There exists, of course, in each type of govern-
ment an obligation to govern well. This respon-
sibility is rooted in morals, and where moral
considerations do not operate with sufficient force
to compel the ruling authority to govern well,
the promptings of expediency will usually suffice
to dip the scale on the side of reasonably humane
and efficient administration.
It seems to me that these two factors, morality
and expediency, act with greater effectiveness in
colonial dependencies than in self-governing
countries, and this chiefly for two reasons, In
self-governing countries the moral responsibilty
is split up among thousands, or millions of
voters; in dependencies it is centered in a single
person, the Governor-General, the Governor, the
Chief Commissioner, or whatever the title may
be. In the former case every voter can shift the
blame for bad government on to some one else’s
shoulders; each political party can shift it on to
the shoulders of the other party, one branch of a
legislature can make a gift of it to the other;
both branches can leave it on the doorstep of the
Chief Executive; the Chief Executive can hand
it back to the voters with the comment that he
is but the servant of the people, that they had
demanded certain legislation, certain administra-
tive measures, and that he had carried out their
wishes; finally, the Chief Executive and the
Legislature can combine to Jay the blame upon
incompetent or corrupt officials, who will pres-
ently be disciplined, reformed, dismissed, or de-
nied re-election, as the case may be.
In a dependency the situation is totally differ-
ent.
A Colonial Governor, vis-a-vis his colony
and his Colonial Office in the home country, occupies a position analogous to that of a ship’s captain vis-d-vis his ship and his owners. He is
directly responsible for the conduct of affairs; he
takes the credit for success, he must accept the
penalties of failure; he can never plead an alibi.
Furthermore, the Colonial Governor looks for
his advancement to the distant authority of a
Secretary of State at the national capital. Pro-
motion and other rewards will depend upon the
way in which he administers his charge. He is
little likely to earn them if, from preventable
causes, his territory fails to advance in its health,
prosperity, and general social condition; he is
almost certain to miss them if, in consequence of
harsh and incompetent administration, the people
rise in revolt against his rule, or sink into the
apathy and sloth which are the assured products
of prolonged misgovernment. Briefly, the suc-
cess of his rule will be the measure of his personal
success.
Since he is directly responsible for the conduct
of his subordinates, and for the appointment of
most of them, and has in addition the power of
promotion and dismissal, his officials have every
incentive to earn their own advancement by ren-
dering such service as will redound to the credit
of the Governor.
I do not intend to imply that a home govern-
ment may not, even in modern times, be actuated
by the base motive of ruthlessly exploiting a
colonial dependency—the earlier history of the
Belgian Congo is a case in point—or that in
such circumstances the administration may not
be as bad as the motive. But such a situation is,
year by year, falling in the scale of statistical
expectation because, international relations being
what they now are, the influence of publicity
being what it now is, and party tactics in home
countries demanding, as they now do, a diligent
assemblage of material on which to base attacks
on the party in power, the ventilation of grave
abuses in colonial administration presents a very
serious political problem to the home government
which is responsible for them or which tolerates
them.
The other important factor, which has to be
taken into account when estimating the proba-
bility of government being competently admin-
istered in a dependency, is one to which recent
political events in Europe have imparted a strik-
ing significance. It is that as social and eco-
nomic conditions increase in complexity under
the combined influences traceable to industrial
development, to the growing size of commercial
and banking enterprises, and to the gradual sub-
stitution of the community for the individual as
the unit of social progress, the problems of gov-
ernment are, day by day, becoming less amenable
to political solutions—to legislative debate, long
ballots, and the popular election of public officials
—and more clamorous of solutions dependent
upon highly expert technical knowledge.
The assumption that politics would be the com-
petent and all-sufficient handmaid of social
service was given authoritative currency through
the propaganda associated with the American
War of Independence, the French Revolution,
and the fight for Parliamentary Reform in Eng-
land. These movements were spread over @
period of about a century and a quarter, roughly
from 1760 to 1890, a period during which public
sentiment was strongly averse to the idea of
government regulation, and was totally blind to
the possibility that Government might become,
as it has since become, not only the trustee of
social progress but also its most powerful instru-
ment. What these revolutionary and reform
movements were chiefly concerned with was, in
fact, settling what Government should not do to
people, not with what Government should do for
people.
It is safe, indeed, to infer that the liberal-
minded statesmen of the eighteenth and nine-
teenth centuries would be horrified if they could
witness the extent to which Government today
intrudes upon everything, and regulates almost
everything which happens to a citizen, or is done
by him whilst he is moving from his cradle to
his grave.
Whether or not Government should under-
take its vast business of regulation and of social
service is a question upon which opinions may
well differ; but the obstinate adhesion to the
belief that politics, whose life-blood is a mixture
of contention, intrigue, and self-interest, can and
will furnish the spirit, the knowledge, and the
technique essential to the effective handling of
social and economic problems is what has brought
parliamentary government into disrepute in
almost every country in which it is practiced.
The establishment of Fascism in Italy, the
support which that principle is receiving in other
countries, the adoption of the City-manager plan
in the United States, the setting up, by the
mutual consent of opposing interests, of “Czars”
to administer the affairs of certain great Ameri-
can industries (baseball and the movies, for in-
stance), and the recent dictatorship in Spain,
are all in their essence revolts against the open-
to-all system of guidance and control.
If my observation has led me to believe that in
countries where authority is vested in a small
group of trained public officials there will, as a
rule, be found a better administration of govern-
ment than in countries where administration is
subject to the influence of an uninformed and,
ad hoc, unintelligent public, I do not from that
belief infer that, because a country is ruled under
a system of concentrated authority and of fixed
responsibility, it is, therefore well governed.
So, with reference to Korea, there can be
found in its history under Japanese rule in-
stances of the abuse of power, of official incom-
petence, to some extent of corruption; but
whether or not Korea has on the whole been well
governed can be determined only from a study
of the available data. From such a study, which
has occupied me for more than three years, and
of which the results are presented in this volume,
I have formed the opinion that Korea is today
infinitely better governed than it ever was under
its own native rulers, that it is better governed
than most self-governing countries, that it is as
well governed as any of the British, American,
French, Dutch, and Portuguese dependencies
which I have visited, and is better governed than
most of them, having in view as well the cultural
and. economic development of the people as the
technique of administration.
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