The Jungle Grows Back: America and Our Imperiled World
by
"An incisive, elegantly written, new book about America's unique role in the world." --Tom Friedman, The New York Times
A brilliant and visionary argument for America's role as an enforcer of peace and order throughout the world--and what is likely to happen if we withdraw and focus our attention inward.
Recent years have brought deeply disturbing developments around the globe. American sentiment seems to be leaning increasingly toward withdrawal in the face of such disarray. In this powerful, urgent essay, Robert Kagan elucidates the reasons why American withdrawal would be the worst possible response, based as it is on a fundamental and dangerous misreading of the world. Like a jungle that keeps growing back after being cut down, the world has always been full of dangerous actors who, left unchecked, possess the desire and ability to make things worse. Kagan makes clear how the "realist" impulse to recognize our limitations and focus on our failures misunderstands the essential role America has played for decades in keeping the world's worst instability in check. A true realism, he argues, is based on the understanding that the historical norm has always been toward chaos--that the jungle will grow back, if we let it. (less)
A brilliant and visionary argument for America's role as an enforcer of peace and order throughout the world--and what is likely to happen if we withdraw and focus our attention inward.
Recent years have brought deeply disturbing developments around the globe. American sentiment seems to be leaning increasingly toward withdrawal in the face of such disarray. In this powerful, urgent essay, Robert Kagan elucidates the reasons why American withdrawal would be the worst possible response, based as it is on a fundamental and dangerous misreading of the world. Like a jungle that keeps growing back after being cut down, the world has always been full of dangerous actors who, left unchecked, possess the desire and ability to make things worse. Kagan makes clear how the "realist" impulse to recognize our limitations and focus on our failures misunderstands the essential role America has played for decades in keeping the world's worst instability in check. A true realism, he argues, is based on the understanding that the historical norm has always been toward chaos--that the jungle will grow back, if we let it. (less)
Hardcover, 192 pages
Published September 18th 2018 by Knopf Publishing Group
| Review of | ISBN 9780525521655 | |
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| Shelves | to-read ( 1906th ) | |
| Format | Hardcover edit | |
| Status | December 4, 2022 – Shelved as: to-read December 4, 2022 – Shelved | |
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Robert Kagan is among the most capable apologists for the U.S.-led liberal international order. While the crimes and follies of the post-WW2 order weigh heavily on our minds (Vietnam, Iraq etc.), there are also genuine accomplishments that are less noticed by critics. Kagan takes a long view of history to make the case that the last 70 years have in fact been the most peaceful and prosperous in human history. He credits the liberal order with mostly keeping allies by persuasion rather than coercion, unlike its former Warsaw Bloc adversary. Were the U.S. to withdraw from the world, he argues, it would fall back into pre-1945 patterns of behavior. Those patterns including chronic great-medium power conflict, territorial irredentism, authoritarianism as a norm and more terrible things that we felt that we had left in a benighted past.
Critics of American foreign policy, myself included, must take Kagan's arguments seriously. Viewed in the context of history, the achievements of the liberal-order are indeed not so easy to dismiss. This is why it continues to enjoy such powerful support both here and abroad. My problem with Kagan is that he makes arguments at times dishonestly, or at least myopically, which undermines trust in the rest of his case. In making his argument about Vladimir Putin as an unreconcilable wannabe Tsar, he ignores that Putin actually supported NATO moves such as the 2011 No-Fly Zone in Libya. Later behavior, such as the deposing of Gaddafi, clearly embittered him because they appeared as a betrayal. Perhaps if things had been handled better later disputes in Syria and Crimea may not have occurred. Kagan doesn't even mention this possibility in making his case for Russia as a congenitally implacable foe. His attempt to defend the Iraq War as merely a good-faith mistake is also predictably glib. I feel that he is on more solid ground describing China's regional great power ambitions. But he also fails to consider how the behavior of foreign countries may also be motivated by genuine insecurity in the face of perceived threats.
There are many things we take for granted living in a liberal society. Free speech, assembly and conscience are almost like the air we breathe at this point. Such a world is not the norm. Authoritarianism may indeed be a more "natural" human state, as history strongly suggests. Communism and liberalism ironically have a lot in common as children of the Enlightenment, with Communism being the more radical sibling. With Communism's collapse, the challenge to liberalism today comes from anti-Enlightenment forces. They would like to replace liberal freedoms with much older forms of authoritarian rule, communal and spiritual. From what we know such governments are often easily corrupted by lack of oversight, as well as prone to war. They do not have the fellow-feeling that liberal societies do and frequently are at odds with one another. There are old grudges to settle that go back hundreds of years, stemming from the unchanging geography of the world. This is the "jungle" that Kagan warns is growing back as the liberal-order recedes.
I would take liberalism, with all its flaws, over authoritarianism. I also do not relish a worldwide security vacuum where Japan and Germany feel compelled to arm themselves with nuclear weapons and the Baltic States and Southeast Asia are devoured by local hegemonic powers. Such a world would inevitably draw the United States back into war as well. Ideally, it would be better if a third way that deprivileged the United States to some degree emerged. However the Non-Aligned Movement and Bandung Conference style politics of the past seem to have fizzled out. There is no global liberationist movement ready to manage the international system, at least not yet. Today we have a choice between bad and ugly options. We don't have the luxury of tossing out the bad in a spirit of moral outrage.
I suspect that Americans have a deeply-held feeling that they do not really need a foreign policy. The world is distant and messy, separated from them by two wide oceans. This solipsistic worldview is what leads to the election of people like Donald Trump, who rebuked the idea of even having a coherent foreign policy. It was also more subtly expressed by Barack Obama and even the early years George W. Bush, both of whom seemed to view foreign policy as a headache to be managed. Americans do need a foreign policy, however. The post-WW2 order has been in some limited sense a vacation from history. As the order falters, we see history reawakening. It already does not look pretty. I share Kagan's pessimism about what the future could hold, especially when looking at the broad scope of human history before 1945. I'm not as sanguine about the status quo as we he is. However I appreciate that unlike many other neoconservatives he has been sincere about democracy promotion, even in places like Egypt where the governments voted into power have not been to American taste. He is a genuine believer in Enlightenment universalism, not an opportunistic one.
A short and extremely relevant book about the most important issues of world order playing out today. You do not have to accept Kagan's case to understand the gravity of what he is arguing.
(less)
Critics of American foreign policy, myself included, must take Kagan's arguments seriously. Viewed in the context of history, the achievements of the liberal-order are indeed not so easy to dismiss. This is why it continues to enjoy such powerful support both here and abroad. My problem with Kagan is that he makes arguments at times dishonestly, or at least myopically, which undermines trust in the rest of his case. In making his argument about Vladimir Putin as an unreconcilable wannabe Tsar, he ignores that Putin actually supported NATO moves such as the 2011 No-Fly Zone in Libya. Later behavior, such as the deposing of Gaddafi, clearly embittered him because they appeared as a betrayal. Perhaps if things had been handled better later disputes in Syria and Crimea may not have occurred. Kagan doesn't even mention this possibility in making his case for Russia as a congenitally implacable foe. His attempt to defend the Iraq War as merely a good-faith mistake is also predictably glib. I feel that he is on more solid ground describing China's regional great power ambitions. But he also fails to consider how the behavior of foreign countries may also be motivated by genuine insecurity in the face of perceived threats.
There are many things we take for granted living in a liberal society. Free speech, assembly and conscience are almost like the air we breathe at this point. Such a world is not the norm. Authoritarianism may indeed be a more "natural" human state, as history strongly suggests. Communism and liberalism ironically have a lot in common as children of the Enlightenment, with Communism being the more radical sibling. With Communism's collapse, the challenge to liberalism today comes from anti-Enlightenment forces. They would like to replace liberal freedoms with much older forms of authoritarian rule, communal and spiritual. From what we know such governments are often easily corrupted by lack of oversight, as well as prone to war. They do not have the fellow-feeling that liberal societies do and frequently are at odds with one another. There are old grudges to settle that go back hundreds of years, stemming from the unchanging geography of the world. This is the "jungle" that Kagan warns is growing back as the liberal-order recedes.
I would take liberalism, with all its flaws, over authoritarianism. I also do not relish a worldwide security vacuum where Japan and Germany feel compelled to arm themselves with nuclear weapons and the Baltic States and Southeast Asia are devoured by local hegemonic powers. Such a world would inevitably draw the United States back into war as well. Ideally, it would be better if a third way that deprivileged the United States to some degree emerged. However the Non-Aligned Movement and Bandung Conference style politics of the past seem to have fizzled out. There is no global liberationist movement ready to manage the international system, at least not yet. Today we have a choice between bad and ugly options. We don't have the luxury of tossing out the bad in a spirit of moral outrage.
I suspect that Americans have a deeply-held feeling that they do not really need a foreign policy. The world is distant and messy, separated from them by two wide oceans. This solipsistic worldview is what leads to the election of people like Donald Trump, who rebuked the idea of even having a coherent foreign policy. It was also more subtly expressed by Barack Obama and even the early years George W. Bush, both of whom seemed to view foreign policy as a headache to be managed. Americans do need a foreign policy, however. The post-WW2 order has been in some limited sense a vacation from history. As the order falters, we see history reawakening. It already does not look pretty. I share Kagan's pessimism about what the future could hold, especially when looking at the broad scope of human history before 1945. I'm not as sanguine about the status quo as we he is. However I appreciate that unlike many other neoconservatives he has been sincere about democracy promotion, even in places like Egypt where the governments voted into power have not been to American taste. He is a genuine believer in Enlightenment universalism, not an opportunistic one.
A short and extremely relevant book about the most important issues of world order playing out today. You do not have to accept Kagan's case to understand the gravity of what he is arguing.
(less)
This book is like one of those pharmaceutical commercials you see that portrays the happy, healthy life circumstances of people because they take Brand X pill to treat whatever condition afflicts them and that would otherwise lay them low. Meanwhile, the calming voice of a narrator ticks off all the possible side effects from taking the pill. What do I mean by this? Let’s start with a quote from the author himself:
Members of Congress from both parties have underfunded the military since the beginning of the post-Cold War era, but especially over the last decade.
And that’s it. That’s the active ingredient that is lacking in American foreign policy. It doesn’t project enough military power. However, no mention is made of the fact that the United States spends more for defense than any other country -- more than most every other significant country combined with every other significant country -- by a large margin. And what are the side effects of that mammoth spending? An underdeveloped welfare state whereby the citizenry of the U.S. are reduced to a state of economic bellum omnium contra omnes, that Hobbesian hellscape of “the war of all against all” Kagan warns against in the international sphere, excepting that it’s hardly fair because your typical U.S. citizen has neither the resources nor recourse to any intervening remediating influence, unlike those nations that have flourished because of American largesse. The fact that the past 70 years have been relatively peaceful worldwide is small consolation to the man or woman who is reduced to bankruptcy because he or she lost his or her job.
Kagan also indicts the tenure of the last presidential administration (Obama, for those of you keeping score at home) as being a principle culprit in both underfunding the military and not applying it to maintain the international order, despite that administration inheriting the biggest shit show, economic and foreign policy-wise, this side of WW II. And what precipitated that shit show? Well, largely the overreach of the preceding administration, what with its unilateral invasion of Iraq. An invasion that squandered international goodwill toward America, particularly in the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Does Kagan actually believe that Obama, who won the presidency by promising to extricate the U.S. from Iraq specifically and the Middle East generally, could have committed the military to Syria, itself reduced to a years-long, regionally destabilizing war because of the missteps in Iraq? Kagan would have us spiral further down the intervention rabbit hole, exhausting an already exhausted military and populace. Exhausting a military staffed by a populace which joined the military because it was the only job available. While other liberal democracies enjoy the benefits of a welfare state because they haven't had to invest in their military to any meaningful degree, the only welfare state available to U.S. citizens IS the military.
But Kagan doesn’t see the invasion of Iraq as an overreach. Or Vietnam. He sees them as the type of natural consequence resulting from America living up to its obligation to police the world because it inherited a leadership role in the wake of WW II. What’s more, it benefits from establishing and enforcing an international order. I agree with Kagan on these points, but I also contend that, as other liberal democracies take root and flourish (read: Germany, Japan), they can contribute to the maintenance of international peace to a degree that allows the U.S. to focus more on its domestic affairs; after all, not only those liberal democracies that have been allowed to take root and flower under the American umbrella, but all of Western Europe, have well-developed welfare states that are able to flourish because of the guarantee of American military protection. Is it too much to expect that America divert some of that budget earmarked for defense to domestic development and those other countries increase their contributions to the mutual defense that guarantees international peace that they, and the entire global community, benefit from? America can certainly maintain its position as hegemon in such a scenario. (less)
Members of Congress from both parties have underfunded the military since the beginning of the post-Cold War era, but especially over the last decade.
And that’s it. That’s the active ingredient that is lacking in American foreign policy. It doesn’t project enough military power. However, no mention is made of the fact that the United States spends more for defense than any other country -- more than most every other significant country combined with every other significant country -- by a large margin. And what are the side effects of that mammoth spending? An underdeveloped welfare state whereby the citizenry of the U.S. are reduced to a state of economic bellum omnium contra omnes, that Hobbesian hellscape of “the war of all against all” Kagan warns against in the international sphere, excepting that it’s hardly fair because your typical U.S. citizen has neither the resources nor recourse to any intervening remediating influence, unlike those nations that have flourished because of American largesse. The fact that the past 70 years have been relatively peaceful worldwide is small consolation to the man or woman who is reduced to bankruptcy because he or she lost his or her job.
Kagan also indicts the tenure of the last presidential administration (Obama, for those of you keeping score at home) as being a principle culprit in both underfunding the military and not applying it to maintain the international order, despite that administration inheriting the biggest shit show, economic and foreign policy-wise, this side of WW II. And what precipitated that shit show? Well, largely the overreach of the preceding administration, what with its unilateral invasion of Iraq. An invasion that squandered international goodwill toward America, particularly in the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Does Kagan actually believe that Obama, who won the presidency by promising to extricate the U.S. from Iraq specifically and the Middle East generally, could have committed the military to Syria, itself reduced to a years-long, regionally destabilizing war because of the missteps in Iraq? Kagan would have us spiral further down the intervention rabbit hole, exhausting an already exhausted military and populace. Exhausting a military staffed by a populace which joined the military because it was the only job available. While other liberal democracies enjoy the benefits of a welfare state because they haven't had to invest in their military to any meaningful degree, the only welfare state available to U.S. citizens IS the military.
But Kagan doesn’t see the invasion of Iraq as an overreach. Or Vietnam. He sees them as the type of natural consequence resulting from America living up to its obligation to police the world because it inherited a leadership role in the wake of WW II. What’s more, it benefits from establishing and enforcing an international order. I agree with Kagan on these points, but I also contend that, as other liberal democracies take root and flourish (read: Germany, Japan), they can contribute to the maintenance of international peace to a degree that allows the U.S. to focus more on its domestic affairs; after all, not only those liberal democracies that have been allowed to take root and flower under the American umbrella, but all of Western Europe, have well-developed welfare states that are able to flourish because of the guarantee of American military protection. Is it too much to expect that America divert some of that budget earmarked for defense to domestic development and those other countries increase their contributions to the mutual defense that guarantees international peace that they, and the entire global community, benefit from? America can certainly maintain its position as hegemon in such a scenario. (less)
In this essay Kagan prosecuted his case with such aplomb that if you have a marginal understanding of geopolitics you might wonder why his position is not the default position. The problem or lets say disagreement comes when you have a prior position...
I agree with Kagan that America has a big role to play in the global stage but I differ with him on the extent and the methods used. A lot of times Kagan seems to be a war monger and stopping short of calling for preemptive strikes. The tone was also a tad be condescending, Kagan talking about countries as if they are kids and America the good baby sitter who saw to it that they grew into good adults. All the good in those countries was somehow credited to America and lets not forget the book title that seems to suggest anything unamerican is a thicket deep in the jungle.
I could go on and on about my disagreements with Kagan but he had some good points. A lot of times he was telling it like it is and he gave conflicting positions a fair hearing. He is also a superb essayist with a good grasp of foreign policy and though you might not like his positions you will learn a lot about the open positions out there in the current geopolitical environment. (less)
I agree with Kagan that America has a big role to play in the global stage but I differ with him on the extent and the methods used. A lot of times Kagan seems to be a war monger and stopping short of calling for preemptive strikes. The tone was also a tad be condescending, Kagan talking about countries as if they are kids and America the good baby sitter who saw to it that they grew into good adults. All the good in those countries was somehow credited to America and lets not forget the book title that seems to suggest anything unamerican is a thicket deep in the jungle.
I could go on and on about my disagreements with Kagan but he had some good points. A lot of times he was telling it like it is and he gave conflicting positions a fair hearing. He is also a superb essayist with a good grasp of foreign policy and though you might not like his positions you will learn a lot about the open positions out there in the current geopolitical environment. (less)
If nothing in Kagan’s book surprises or terrifies you, then you’ve been unhappy for a long time.
The Jungle Grows Back teaches and motivates without consoling anyone who believes in any version of “world peace.” It is bad news all around, and Kagan bluntly says that all of us who want a stable world order have to step up and start actually doing something to keep our children and our grandchildren out of harm’s way.
“The past seven-plus decades of relatively free trade, growing respect for individual rights, and relatively peaceful cooperation among nations—the core elements of the liberal [world] order—have been a great historical aberration.”
Kagan says that fearful, competitive, militaristic, geopolitical competition among nations is stoked by regrettable elements of human nature, and that the deadly conflicts that have characterized all of modern human history are the default conditions of mankind’s dominion all over the world.
The Jungle Grows Back explains how the United States, with unique economic and geographic strengths, imposed and nurtured the relatively peaceful world order that has existed during the lifetimes of almost all of us.
For some years America has been withdrawing from its leadership role around the globe. Weaker nations are starting to revert to the combative, competitive, multipolar power struggles that they practiced for centuries.
If American continues to pull back, our world will become more dangerous.
Regardless of all the bad things that go on in the world, we enjoy the relative comforts and security of a world without world war. Kagan writes the bald truth in a blast: this world order “is as precarious as it is precious. It is a garden that needs constant tending lest the jungle grow back and engulf us all.”
Read more of my book reviews and poems here:
www.richardsubber.com (less)
The Jungle Grows Back teaches and motivates without consoling anyone who believes in any version of “world peace.” It is bad news all around, and Kagan bluntly says that all of us who want a stable world order have to step up and start actually doing something to keep our children and our grandchildren out of harm’s way.
“The past seven-plus decades of relatively free trade, growing respect for individual rights, and relatively peaceful cooperation among nations—the core elements of the liberal [world] order—have been a great historical aberration.”
Kagan says that fearful, competitive, militaristic, geopolitical competition among nations is stoked by regrettable elements of human nature, and that the deadly conflicts that have characterized all of modern human history are the default conditions of mankind’s dominion all over the world.
The Jungle Grows Back explains how the United States, with unique economic and geographic strengths, imposed and nurtured the relatively peaceful world order that has existed during the lifetimes of almost all of us.
For some years America has been withdrawing from its leadership role around the globe. Weaker nations are starting to revert to the combative, competitive, multipolar power struggles that they practiced for centuries.
If American continues to pull back, our world will become more dangerous.
Regardless of all the bad things that go on in the world, we enjoy the relative comforts and security of a world without world war. Kagan writes the bald truth in a blast: this world order “is as precarious as it is precious. It is a garden that needs constant tending lest the jungle grow back and engulf us all.”
Read more of my book reviews and poems here:
www.richardsubber.com (less)
https://www.economist.com/the-america...
From the piece:
Canada’s instinct is to redouble its commitment to old principles rather than to adopt new ones. It remains a vocal defender of human rights, which pleases idealists but annoys despots. Ms Freeland says that one of her favourite new books is Robert Kagan’s “The Jungle Grows Back: America and our Imperilled World”, a gift from Germany’s foreign minister, Heiko Maas. It argues that jungle-like chaos is taking over the ordered garden created b ...more
From the piece:
Canada’s instinct is to redouble its commitment to old principles rather than to adopt new ones. It remains a vocal defender of human rights, which pleases idealists but annoys despots. Ms Freeland says that one of her favourite new books is Robert Kagan’s “The Jungle Grows Back: America and our Imperilled World”, a gift from Germany’s foreign minister, Heiko Maas. It argues that jungle-like chaos is taking over the ordered garden created b ...more
A journalistic writing- without methodological framework- in defence of the current "liberal world order". (less)
An extended essay in which Kagan passionately argues that America must continue in its role as the world's policeman. After WW II, American economic, military and political power secured a "liberal world order". In Western Europe and the Far East democracy flourished and the war ravaged economies were rebuilt. Although this was achieved in the context of the Cold War, Kagan states that American leadership was planned by leaders like President Truman and Dean Acheson before the confrontations with the Soviet Union began in 1946. It was a reaction to the results of American isolationism after WW I. To Kagan the most significant event in post WW II was not the fall of the Soviet empire, but the democratization and pacification of Germany and Japan. However, the threat of international Communism justified, to many Americans, the enormous cost of defending allies who had by 1989 grown prosperous. After the collapse of the Soviet Union we adopted a naïve belief that we had reached the "end of history" and allowed the world to slip into its current confused and perilous state. The threat now is from revanchist, nationalistic and intolerant states and non-state actors. Authoritarianism, a more comfortable form of government in stressful times, is now ascendant. Russia, China, Eastern Europe, the Mid East are dominated by leaders who disparage democracy and individual rights and promise a return to past glories.
Kagan doesn't see either democracy or autocracy as inevitable. However, even in the U.S., the golden child of the Enlightenment, we have elected a president who is as illiberal and tribalistic as Hungary's Viktor Orban. More constrained domestically, but far more dangerous to the world's future. Kagan posits a world much like that in the first half of the 20th century. Without the guarantee of American protection, Germany and Japan will return to militarism. Their neighbors will form alliances to protect themselves. We will be back to a Hobbesian world, this time with nuclear weapons.
Kagan takes a too expansive view of America's capabilities and responsibilities. He blames every bad thing in the world on our failure to act. He sees Vietnam and Iraq as justified efforts undone by poor execution. I see them as being based on false premises . These adventures reduced the credibility of the American people in their government. He doesn't mention our previous support of jihadists in Afghanistan. Blowback does not seem to concern him, failures of omission are much worse than those of commission. It's possible that the world is now evolving towards a rejection of the post war "liberal world order" or neo-liberalism as it's often termed. The U.S. has to develop new strategies involving greater flexibility. Unfortunately we have a president with no knowledge or sense of history, who has apparently no idea of the fire he is playing with. Kagan sees Obama as being weak, but that Trump is an unmitigated disaster.
Overall, I agree with Kagan that because of her geography, wealth and democratic experience, America is "the indispensable nation" as Bill Clinton put it.. If any other nation aspires to the title, no one should trust them. (less)
Kagan doesn't see either democracy or autocracy as inevitable. However, even in the U.S., the golden child of the Enlightenment, we have elected a president who is as illiberal and tribalistic as Hungary's Viktor Orban. More constrained domestically, but far more dangerous to the world's future. Kagan posits a world much like that in the first half of the 20th century. Without the guarantee of American protection, Germany and Japan will return to militarism. Their neighbors will form alliances to protect themselves. We will be back to a Hobbesian world, this time with nuclear weapons.
Kagan takes a too expansive view of America's capabilities and responsibilities. He blames every bad thing in the world on our failure to act. He sees Vietnam and Iraq as justified efforts undone by poor execution. I see them as being based on false premises . These adventures reduced the credibility of the American people in their government. He doesn't mention our previous support of jihadists in Afghanistan. Blowback does not seem to concern him, failures of omission are much worse than those of commission. It's possible that the world is now evolving towards a rejection of the post war "liberal world order" or neo-liberalism as it's often termed. The U.S. has to develop new strategies involving greater flexibility. Unfortunately we have a president with no knowledge or sense of history, who has apparently no idea of the fire he is playing with. Kagan sees Obama as being weak, but that Trump is an unmitigated disaster.
Overall, I agree with Kagan that because of her geography, wealth and democratic experience, America is "the indispensable nation" as Bill Clinton put it.. If any other nation aspires to the title, no one should trust them. (less)
Kagan is predictable in his likes, dislikes, and beliefs. He speaks and believes in absolutes and absolutely believes that what he believes is the only logical thing for anyone not foolish to believe. He is a believer in the absolute right of capitalism as the best and truest form of government.
Like most conservatives of his flavor, he can't see the forest for the trees. He wrote an entire book about the political aspects of war, foreign policy, and American power projection, and never once mentioned climate change (which the Department of Defense has said is a major threat for over a decade) or any number of other real world threats.
“Democracy has spread and endured because it has been nurtured and supported: by the norms of the liberal order, by global pressures and inducements to conform to those norms, by the membership requirements of liberal institutions like the EU and NATO, by the fact that the liberal order has been the wealthiest part of the world, and by the security provided by the world’s strongest power, which happens to be a democracy.”
All of that is true, and as I sit here reading this I think more and more that this book is a response to Trump's attacks on the liberal order and should probably be seen as such. That said, this book will likely lose relevancy faster than most because of that very fact. Trump is not an anachronism. (I despise him) What he is, is the product of a confluence of everything bad in American culture made manifest. He's a monster that wouldn't have been possible without the American values of the time. He's greedy, immoral, capitalism run wild and Kagan's absolute defense of the system that created Trump while condemning him is hypocritical at best. Don't like Trump? Fix the system that created, nurtured, and rewarded him. Otherwise, you're a part of the problem.
I cannot in good conscience recommend this title while there are other truly good books left unread. (less)
Like most conservatives of his flavor, he can't see the forest for the trees. He wrote an entire book about the political aspects of war, foreign policy, and American power projection, and never once mentioned climate change (which the Department of Defense has said is a major threat for over a decade) or any number of other real world threats.
“Democracy has spread and endured because it has been nurtured and supported: by the norms of the liberal order, by global pressures and inducements to conform to those norms, by the membership requirements of liberal institutions like the EU and NATO, by the fact that the liberal order has been the wealthiest part of the world, and by the security provided by the world’s strongest power, which happens to be a democracy.”
All of that is true, and as I sit here reading this I think more and more that this book is a response to Trump's attacks on the liberal order and should probably be seen as such. That said, this book will likely lose relevancy faster than most because of that very fact. Trump is not an anachronism. (I despise him) What he is, is the product of a confluence of everything bad in American culture made manifest. He's a monster that wouldn't have been possible without the American values of the time. He's greedy, immoral, capitalism run wild and Kagan's absolute defense of the system that created Trump while condemning him is hypocritical at best. Don't like Trump? Fix the system that created, nurtured, and rewarded him. Otherwise, you're a part of the problem.
I cannot in good conscience recommend this title while there are other truly good books left unread. (less)
This is one of that books that I love because it makes me really wonder if maybe a bunch of things I believe are ill-founded while bolstering a strain of thought that I think I've "secretly" harbored for a long time. But I also think the book leaves out a lot. Sure, a "unipolar" world, a US-led liberal order, is safer and more stable (for many... or at least for some.) And, sure, a "balance of powers" between "great powers" has a 100% terrible history. And a China-led illiberal order seems like it would be the worst of the US-order, writ large.
But there is a part of me that just... pushes back and says, "There's got to be a better way." I think part of that comes from the (obvious) admission from Kagan that of course the US, as global cop, will have to make choices: we can't be everywhere, we can't "fix" things, so we have to pick where and how much and how long and how hard. And all those choices leave a lot of room to f* up. Which Kagan also admits.
I guess it come comes down to the "Communism" question. I.e., communism is great on paper, it just turns into a disaster when you actually do it in the real world. I don't think the US ever did anything even approximately Stalin-scale, so I'm not drawing a false equivalency here. That said, maybe the US-led unipolar world is "great on paper" only. Maybe the alternatives aren't a US-led liberal order or a new "Great Game." Maybe we can actually have a truly multi-polar world... but I suspect that might be more a wish than a reality. (less)
But there is a part of me that just... pushes back and says, "There's got to be a better way." I think part of that comes from the (obvious) admission from Kagan that of course the US, as global cop, will have to make choices: we can't be everywhere, we can't "fix" things, so we have to pick where and how much and how long and how hard. And all those choices leave a lot of room to f* up. Which Kagan also admits.
I guess it come comes down to the "Communism" question. I.e., communism is great on paper, it just turns into a disaster when you actually do it in the real world. I don't think the US ever did anything even approximately Stalin-scale, so I'm not drawing a false equivalency here. That said, maybe the US-led unipolar world is "great on paper" only. Maybe the alternatives aren't a US-led liberal order or a new "Great Game." Maybe we can actually have a truly multi-polar world... but I suspect that might be more a wish than a reality. (less)
There's not much new in The Jungle Grows Back. The main argument is relevant and accurate. The liberal world order is pretty darn good and a return to a Hobbesian world would be awful. No question. However, the first half of the book meanders between the pros and cons of America's Cold War strategies and the world they created with an overall thumbs up. This is muddled with a few too many cliches and numerous "wrinkles in time." The last section rambles about the necessity of military interventions to help preserve the "garden" of the postwar world. The author seems to excuse some of the biggest blunders of our time by cloaking his point in "just think of what could have happened" or "you never know." Plus, I don't think an accurate assessment of nuclear weapon strategy was reflected in his analysis of the Cold War nor in his comments on contemporary policy. (less)
This essay was fascinating and really disected the outcome of WWII and the lasting world order since. At times, some parts seemed to be redundent, but the flow made sense and kept me interested. It's also interesting to me that most past presidents haven't necessarily been at either end of the spectrum. Most have agreed to the same type of foreign policy, and simply package it differently. I think if we were all students of our own country and history as well as it's role in the world, we would be more willing to put aside petty politics and maintain our global status. (less)
What kind of foreign engagement is best for United States in the 21st century?
It is apparent that many Americans, observing a world that appears to be growing steadily more unsafe, are so gravely dissatisfied with what our foreign aid and seemingly unending military engagements have achieved that they believe “we have done enough” and that from now on other nations are going to have to pick up the burden of defending themselves without “taking advantage” of the US.
However, citizens are unclear about precisely what our future foreign policy should be.
Gaining Perspective
These sentiments are very similar to those that surfaced during and after the Vietnam war. And, just like then, I fear that the pendulum of public opinion is swinging too far and too fast, lacking the perspective that a longer-term view helps provide.
It is not a coincidence that as the generation that lived through the Great Depression and the Second World War recedes into history, we once again see the emergence of ugly nationalism and yearning for isolationism. We no longer have the testimony of living witnesses from the early 20th century who could warn us of the horrors that can so easily flow from such attitudes.
Besides, while the impulse to leave the rest of the world to itself may be strong, it is an illusion. In the 21st century, our fates are inextricably linked and the beliefs and actions of other nations will inevitably impact us. Moreover, absent our attention and engagement, we will have no way to ameliorate their decisions.
Robert Kagan — a Nationalist Internationalist
Using clear and elegant language Kagan, offers a powerful and cogently argued case for why a liberal international order has been, and remains, the best means to preserve peace and stability throughout the 21st century. [In this context, “liberal” means the guiding conviction that open, candid, and respectful communication, free trade, and mutual cooperation among nations is the best way to maintain peace and ward off a return to the inter-state competition that regularly led to war between and among the nation-states of Europe for hundreds of years.]
Like many, Kagan fears that Trump and the nationalist populists of Europe are using the kind of rhetoric and divisive tools that, however unwittingly, will recreate the kind of poisonous atmosphere of suspicion and rivalry that create conditions more favorable to war than to peaceful relations between nations.
Since Kagan’s internationalism flows from his nationalism – he believes that a commitment to a stable world order is desirable precisely because this benefits the United States – his perspective should interest Americans despite their political leanings.
Kagan demonstrates how both our foreign policy has always been guided by what appeared to be best for us and that a strong isolationist sentiment has been part of the American mindset from the very beginning of the Republic. (After all, George Washington in his Farewell Address to the nation warned against the difficulties that would flow from becoming involved in “entangling alliances.”)
Despite the popular conception that America remained aloof from other nation’s affairs until World War I, we have always been involved with other countries. After all, the colonial rebellion against Great Britain could not have possibly succeeded had not Britain been fighting a world war at the same time. France decided to aid us not because it favored a democratic republic but because it was one of the powers at war with Great Britain. By helping the American rebellion continue they ensured that thousands of British soldiers and sailors would be needed there rather than in Europe.
Moreover, within 50 years of our independence we boldly extended our mantle of protection over all of the Western Hemisphere — symbolically, since we were unable to enforce it — in what became known as the “Monroe Doctrine.”
Throughout our history we have been both idealistic and generous, although a healthy component of both has been guided by our own perception of self-interest. The Marshall Plan after World War II, for example, was bighearted, but it was born out of the necessity that unless Japan and Western European countries returned to economic prosperity from the vast destruction of World War II they: a) might well fall back into the sort of warring, nationalistic states they had been for most of their existence, and b) would be unable to resist the westward thrust of the Soviet Union.
On the other hand, American idealism has also often morphed into a selfish, even ugly, self-righteousness, as we frequently lectured others on how they should behave — including in their domestic affairs — while brushing aside, sometimes angrily, their critical observations about our own behavior and domestic problems.
Throughout his book, Kagan candidly stresses that any action — even inaction — will entail costs, many of which are unforeseeable as well as uncontrollable. From our recent experiences, we today are very aware of the dangers of hubris; Kagan urges us to remember that there dangers of equal or greater magnitude that often arise when we avoid or turn aside from engagement.
While citizens’ reaction to the debacles of Iraq and Afghanistan behind today’s “get out and leave ‘em alone” sentiment is understandable, Kagan notes that failing to act can also have terrible outcomes. He notes, for example, two costly occasions when President Obama hesitated to act forcefully when, had he done so, it would likely have forestalled worse chaos later: the devastating civil war in Syria and the desolation in Libya following Gaddafi’s fall. as consequences of American failure to act.
The Jungle that Threatens the Garden
The greatest accomplishment of American foreign policy, he asserts, was the creation of a liberal world order in which she and her partners sought win-win outcomes. The major reason why Europe since the Second World War has not experienced the kinds of violence it had known for centuries, he asserts, is a consequence of the protective barrier maintained by the United States. Within this sphere, in which military defense played a significant protective role, nations were able to pursue mutually advantageous political and economic policies that reduced inter-state suspicion and violence and promoted widespread prosperity.
He contrasts this flourishing garden with the always present danger of allowing the jungle — an environment of unrestrained inter-state competition that was the primary cause of World War I and which post-World War II policies sought to keep at bay.
That seventy-five-year-old order has been fraying for years and, with the rise of nationalist populist forces in Europe and a similar sentiment in the United States that gave us Donald Trump, is in serious threat of collapsing entirely.
Kagan forcefully argues that despite the false promises of today’s demagogues, though, the loss of the liberal order will not bring prosperity or maintain peace but, much more likely, the opposite.
He recognizes that the conditions upon which the liberal order was originally built have undeniably changed. New world actors, such as China, have arrived and demand their deserved place at the table. But that is no reason to abandon this successful order but, rather, to adapt it anew.
China will likely not agree to the same terms and conditions that Western Europe and Japan signed on to after WW II, but because China also has prospered from this order in the past it is in her own interest to work to continue this prosperity as long as she participates is an equal player.
The real question is not whether or not the 21st will be “China’s century” but whether the United States has necessary wisdom and confidence to work with China — and Russia and Europe and the Middle East and Asia, too — in making the 21st century one in which rivalries remain primarily economic and in which regional and international forums can be modified or created to resolve more contentious issues.
We must abandon the illusory bravado of the win or lose binary framework and, instead, embrace a genuine desire to achieve win/win solutions.
This will take renewed vision, hard work, and a willingness to endure — and accept — criticism.
The failure to do so is too awful to comprehend.
A couple of caveats
I mean in no way to detract from the wisdom and ultimate direction of the kind of future foreign policy Mr. Kagan supports by noting a couple of personal yes, but… comments, yet there are two main areas that I wish he had devoted some attention to:
1) He does not discuss the failure of the United States to remain supportive of the United Nations
One of the gravest failures of the US, I my opinion, over the past 50 years has been how we have both undermined – and backed away from – our dream/creation of the United Nations. Mr. Kagan notes how the failure of the United States to join the League of Nations – President Wilson’s chief mechanism to end the kind of war among all that was the First World War – was a major factor in the return to balance-of-power international politics so soon after that war’s ending. Had the United States been a participating member, Kagan argues, the world community might have had the will and force to both resist Japanese aggression in China and to thwart Hitler’s initial tentative moves when Germany was still militarily weak. Furthermore, that engagement might also have given the Weimar Republic both the means and the time to outlast the right-wing demagogues so prevalent in Germany in the 1920s who served to prepare the way for Hitler’s later moves.
Given that, and also because the United Nations was every bit as important to Franklin Roosevelt’s hopes for a more peaceful, war-free future, the fact that the United States so often chose to “got it alone” despite world opinion or in disregard of United Nations’ positions is one of the major failures of American foreign policy in the past 70 years.
Our plotting with the British to oust Iran’s democratically elected Mossadegh occurred years before our Vietnam involvement, but it was an early example of how we thought nothing of end-running the United Nations – or even going against our much-vaunted rhetoric supporting democratically elected leaders.
Post-Vietnam we continued our military incursions in smaller countries, including Panama and Nicaragua infused with Cold War fervor and a conviction of the righteousness of our cause.
Yes, there were times when the Soviet Union – often joined by China – vetoed proposed American resolutions or suggested actions in the United Nations’ Security Council, but even then we were able to present our case to the world community, both giving others insights into our reasoning and allowing others to offer their own perspective, criticisms, and suggestions.
This failure is all the more alarming given the range of issues facing the world community that are beyond the ability of any one nation to “solve” on its own. Just for starters, these include climate change and its many economic, demographic, political and even military consequences, the ongoing threat of terrorist factions around the world, increasing food and water scarcity in highly populated areas of the world, and managing the continuing desire – and even need, as coastal waters rise and global warming unsettles agriculture – for immigration.
Clearly, the United Nations needs to be part of the solution for our future foreign policy.
2) Relatedly, he does not creatively re-imagine how current economic and political rivalries might be harnessed in new ways to confront common problems.
In this context, I am thinking of the possible roles both Russia and China might play in joining the United States in de facto alliance projects to tackle some of the major regional and international challenges.
Some have written of the Thucydidean challenge posed by the rising power of China and the – relative, at least – declining power of the United States. As famously discussed in Thucydides’ account of the Peloponnesian War, Athens mishandled the grievances of others against its de-facto empire and, in particular, allowed itself to be drawn into military conflict with long-time rival Sparta.
Current US foreign policy thinking appears to be rooted in past paradigms: either we prevail, for instance, or they will.
But in today’s world, what in the world does “prevail” mean? We are slipping back into 19th century ways of thinking about power: an all or nothing struggle in which, in order to “win,” some other has to “lose.” But that is not the only possible framework!
I agree with Kagan that maintaining a united Europe is extremely important, both in order to avoid returning to the “my state vs. your state” mentality that prevailed prior to World War II, and which was responsible for European inter-state violence for hundreds of years, and as a means of peacefully resisting Russia’s current interest in destabilizing individual countries in the hopes of weakening the united European alliance. It may be that, in such a stable environment, Putin’s successors might once again review whether Russia wishes to be a true participating partner in an alliance of prosperity and peace.
But until Russia makes such a decision, Russia must always be invited to participate, observe, and share with the rest of us as a means of lessening false apprehensions on Russia’s part about Western and US intentions, and as a means of enriching the common good.
And China offers the greatest hope – and challenge – of all.
Currently, not only are we caught in a tit-for-tat exchange in the military field – in which our warships continue to assert the right of passage in waters China regards as “sensitive” and China continues to modernize and expand her military forces – but Trump’s idiotic tariff wars are not only having damaging economic consequences – here, in China, and in Europe – but give those in China already inclined to view the US as a hostile force further reason to believe their conclusions are correct.
China need not be our “friend,” but it is crucial that she not become our “enemy.” We must examine all the ways that we currently are giving Chinese authorities reasons for believing the latter: is everything we are now doing necessary and/or successful?
How are the two powers, bristling with expanding militaries and refined nuclear weapons, going to deal with global warming, with immigrant populations fleeing the consequence of rising waters, of the nationalist-populist demagogues seeking to capitalize on current chaos in order to further their own interests?
We should not kid ourselves into believing that these larger developments will not continue to increase pressures on us. Furthermore, it should be obvious that we are incapable of really solving any of these macro-issues on our own.
(less)
It is apparent that many Americans, observing a world that appears to be growing steadily more unsafe, are so gravely dissatisfied with what our foreign aid and seemingly unending military engagements have achieved that they believe “we have done enough” and that from now on other nations are going to have to pick up the burden of defending themselves without “taking advantage” of the US.
However, citizens are unclear about precisely what our future foreign policy should be.
Gaining Perspective
These sentiments are very similar to those that surfaced during and after the Vietnam war. And, just like then, I fear that the pendulum of public opinion is swinging too far and too fast, lacking the perspective that a longer-term view helps provide.
It is not a coincidence that as the generation that lived through the Great Depression and the Second World War recedes into history, we once again see the emergence of ugly nationalism and yearning for isolationism. We no longer have the testimony of living witnesses from the early 20th century who could warn us of the horrors that can so easily flow from such attitudes.
Besides, while the impulse to leave the rest of the world to itself may be strong, it is an illusion. In the 21st century, our fates are inextricably linked and the beliefs and actions of other nations will inevitably impact us. Moreover, absent our attention and engagement, we will have no way to ameliorate their decisions.
Robert Kagan — a Nationalist Internationalist
Using clear and elegant language Kagan, offers a powerful and cogently argued case for why a liberal international order has been, and remains, the best means to preserve peace and stability throughout the 21st century. [In this context, “liberal” means the guiding conviction that open, candid, and respectful communication, free trade, and mutual cooperation among nations is the best way to maintain peace and ward off a return to the inter-state competition that regularly led to war between and among the nation-states of Europe for hundreds of years.]
Like many, Kagan fears that Trump and the nationalist populists of Europe are using the kind of rhetoric and divisive tools that, however unwittingly, will recreate the kind of poisonous atmosphere of suspicion and rivalry that create conditions more favorable to war than to peaceful relations between nations.
Since Kagan’s internationalism flows from his nationalism – he believes that a commitment to a stable world order is desirable precisely because this benefits the United States – his perspective should interest Americans despite their political leanings.
Kagan demonstrates how both our foreign policy has always been guided by what appeared to be best for us and that a strong isolationist sentiment has been part of the American mindset from the very beginning of the Republic. (After all, George Washington in his Farewell Address to the nation warned against the difficulties that would flow from becoming involved in “entangling alliances.”)
Despite the popular conception that America remained aloof from other nation’s affairs until World War I, we have always been involved with other countries. After all, the colonial rebellion against Great Britain could not have possibly succeeded had not Britain been fighting a world war at the same time. France decided to aid us not because it favored a democratic republic but because it was one of the powers at war with Great Britain. By helping the American rebellion continue they ensured that thousands of British soldiers and sailors would be needed there rather than in Europe.
Moreover, within 50 years of our independence we boldly extended our mantle of protection over all of the Western Hemisphere — symbolically, since we were unable to enforce it — in what became known as the “Monroe Doctrine.”
Throughout our history we have been both idealistic and generous, although a healthy component of both has been guided by our own perception of self-interest. The Marshall Plan after World War II, for example, was bighearted, but it was born out of the necessity that unless Japan and Western European countries returned to economic prosperity from the vast destruction of World War II they: a) might well fall back into the sort of warring, nationalistic states they had been for most of their existence, and b) would be unable to resist the westward thrust of the Soviet Union.
On the other hand, American idealism has also often morphed into a selfish, even ugly, self-righteousness, as we frequently lectured others on how they should behave — including in their domestic affairs — while brushing aside, sometimes angrily, their critical observations about our own behavior and domestic problems.
Throughout his book, Kagan candidly stresses that any action — even inaction — will entail costs, many of which are unforeseeable as well as uncontrollable. From our recent experiences, we today are very aware of the dangers of hubris; Kagan urges us to remember that there dangers of equal or greater magnitude that often arise when we avoid or turn aside from engagement.
While citizens’ reaction to the debacles of Iraq and Afghanistan behind today’s “get out and leave ‘em alone” sentiment is understandable, Kagan notes that failing to act can also have terrible outcomes. He notes, for example, two costly occasions when President Obama hesitated to act forcefully when, had he done so, it would likely have forestalled worse chaos later: the devastating civil war in Syria and the desolation in Libya following Gaddafi’s fall. as consequences of American failure to act.
The Jungle that Threatens the Garden
The greatest accomplishment of American foreign policy, he asserts, was the creation of a liberal world order in which she and her partners sought win-win outcomes. The major reason why Europe since the Second World War has not experienced the kinds of violence it had known for centuries, he asserts, is a consequence of the protective barrier maintained by the United States. Within this sphere, in which military defense played a significant protective role, nations were able to pursue mutually advantageous political and economic policies that reduced inter-state suspicion and violence and promoted widespread prosperity.
He contrasts this flourishing garden with the always present danger of allowing the jungle — an environment of unrestrained inter-state competition that was the primary cause of World War I and which post-World War II policies sought to keep at bay.
That seventy-five-year-old order has been fraying for years and, with the rise of nationalist populist forces in Europe and a similar sentiment in the United States that gave us Donald Trump, is in serious threat of collapsing entirely.
Kagan forcefully argues that despite the false promises of today’s demagogues, though, the loss of the liberal order will not bring prosperity or maintain peace but, much more likely, the opposite.
He recognizes that the conditions upon which the liberal order was originally built have undeniably changed. New world actors, such as China, have arrived and demand their deserved place at the table. But that is no reason to abandon this successful order but, rather, to adapt it anew.
China will likely not agree to the same terms and conditions that Western Europe and Japan signed on to after WW II, but because China also has prospered from this order in the past it is in her own interest to work to continue this prosperity as long as she participates is an equal player.
The real question is not whether or not the 21st will be “China’s century” but whether the United States has necessary wisdom and confidence to work with China — and Russia and Europe and the Middle East and Asia, too — in making the 21st century one in which rivalries remain primarily economic and in which regional and international forums can be modified or created to resolve more contentious issues.
We must abandon the illusory bravado of the win or lose binary framework and, instead, embrace a genuine desire to achieve win/win solutions.
This will take renewed vision, hard work, and a willingness to endure — and accept — criticism.
The failure to do so is too awful to comprehend.
A couple of caveats
I mean in no way to detract from the wisdom and ultimate direction of the kind of future foreign policy Mr. Kagan supports by noting a couple of personal yes, but… comments, yet there are two main areas that I wish he had devoted some attention to:
1) He does not discuss the failure of the United States to remain supportive of the United Nations
One of the gravest failures of the US, I my opinion, over the past 50 years has been how we have both undermined – and backed away from – our dream/creation of the United Nations. Mr. Kagan notes how the failure of the United States to join the League of Nations – President Wilson’s chief mechanism to end the kind of war among all that was the First World War – was a major factor in the return to balance-of-power international politics so soon after that war’s ending. Had the United States been a participating member, Kagan argues, the world community might have had the will and force to both resist Japanese aggression in China and to thwart Hitler’s initial tentative moves when Germany was still militarily weak. Furthermore, that engagement might also have given the Weimar Republic both the means and the time to outlast the right-wing demagogues so prevalent in Germany in the 1920s who served to prepare the way for Hitler’s later moves.
Given that, and also because the United Nations was every bit as important to Franklin Roosevelt’s hopes for a more peaceful, war-free future, the fact that the United States so often chose to “got it alone” despite world opinion or in disregard of United Nations’ positions is one of the major failures of American foreign policy in the past 70 years.
Our plotting with the British to oust Iran’s democratically elected Mossadegh occurred years before our Vietnam involvement, but it was an early example of how we thought nothing of end-running the United Nations – or even going against our much-vaunted rhetoric supporting democratically elected leaders.
Post-Vietnam we continued our military incursions in smaller countries, including Panama and Nicaragua infused with Cold War fervor and a conviction of the righteousness of our cause.
Yes, there were times when the Soviet Union – often joined by China – vetoed proposed American resolutions or suggested actions in the United Nations’ Security Council, but even then we were able to present our case to the world community, both giving others insights into our reasoning and allowing others to offer their own perspective, criticisms, and suggestions.
This failure is all the more alarming given the range of issues facing the world community that are beyond the ability of any one nation to “solve” on its own. Just for starters, these include climate change and its many economic, demographic, political and even military consequences, the ongoing threat of terrorist factions around the world, increasing food and water scarcity in highly populated areas of the world, and managing the continuing desire – and even need, as coastal waters rise and global warming unsettles agriculture – for immigration.
Clearly, the United Nations needs to be part of the solution for our future foreign policy.
2) Relatedly, he does not creatively re-imagine how current economic and political rivalries might be harnessed in new ways to confront common problems.
In this context, I am thinking of the possible roles both Russia and China might play in joining the United States in de facto alliance projects to tackle some of the major regional and international challenges.
Some have written of the Thucydidean challenge posed by the rising power of China and the – relative, at least – declining power of the United States. As famously discussed in Thucydides’ account of the Peloponnesian War, Athens mishandled the grievances of others against its de-facto empire and, in particular, allowed itself to be drawn into military conflict with long-time rival Sparta.
Current US foreign policy thinking appears to be rooted in past paradigms: either we prevail, for instance, or they will.
But in today’s world, what in the world does “prevail” mean? We are slipping back into 19th century ways of thinking about power: an all or nothing struggle in which, in order to “win,” some other has to “lose.” But that is not the only possible framework!
I agree with Kagan that maintaining a united Europe is extremely important, both in order to avoid returning to the “my state vs. your state” mentality that prevailed prior to World War II, and which was responsible for European inter-state violence for hundreds of years, and as a means of peacefully resisting Russia’s current interest in destabilizing individual countries in the hopes of weakening the united European alliance. It may be that, in such a stable environment, Putin’s successors might once again review whether Russia wishes to be a true participating partner in an alliance of prosperity and peace.
But until Russia makes such a decision, Russia must always be invited to participate, observe, and share with the rest of us as a means of lessening false apprehensions on Russia’s part about Western and US intentions, and as a means of enriching the common good.
And China offers the greatest hope – and challenge – of all.
Currently, not only are we caught in a tit-for-tat exchange in the military field – in which our warships continue to assert the right of passage in waters China regards as “sensitive” and China continues to modernize and expand her military forces – but Trump’s idiotic tariff wars are not only having damaging economic consequences – here, in China, and in Europe – but give those in China already inclined to view the US as a hostile force further reason to believe their conclusions are correct.
China need not be our “friend,” but it is crucial that she not become our “enemy.” We must examine all the ways that we currently are giving Chinese authorities reasons for believing the latter: is everything we are now doing necessary and/or successful?
How are the two powers, bristling with expanding militaries and refined nuclear weapons, going to deal with global warming, with immigrant populations fleeing the consequence of rising waters, of the nationalist-populist demagogues seeking to capitalize on current chaos in order to further their own interests?
We should not kid ourselves into believing that these larger developments will not continue to increase pressures on us. Furthermore, it should be obvious that we are incapable of really solving any of these macro-issues on our own.
(less)
1.5 stars.
I appreciated this insightful work because it helped crystallize thoughts I possessed without any understanding beyond instinct. Although a registered independent, I am in the liberal camp and despite recognizing Obama as the best choice, always held distaste for his reluctance to exercise international authority. In particular, I felt the Syrian crisis and Russian aggression towards Ukraine (and Kosovo, which merits no mention in the book) deserved greater responses.
The beauty of this book was ...more
The beauty of this book was ...more
I knew this would be an important book, because Robert and I went to grad school together and he was always the smartest person in the room. The first 2/3 of the book represent a comprehensive review of global history since WWI (which we certainly need in the age of Trump) and which sets the stage for the policy analysis and prescriptions of the final 1/3. To Kagan’s credit he avoids the obvious name-calling that the current state of foreign policy deserves, with its Know-Nothingness, broken treaties, tariff wars, and jingoism. Instead he contextualizes the current president’s antics and Pres. Obama’s distaste for foreign policy in the current decline of respect for the liberal world order. He and I might disagree about the roots of that, but it’s a useful way to think about this administration and how to combat his wild swings of pique when dealing with the world. Kagan is clear-eyed about the threat of fascism—at home and abroad—and he concludes with a reminder of our responsibility to defend what we believe in. Bravo, Robert—the world is better for your book. (less)
Both history and analysis of where we are globally and how we got there. It is a spirited defense of liberalism against authoritarianism, as we face the next few years. I appreciated his citation from Reinhold Niebuhr, whose theological perspectives were so acute, at least in my mind. The end notes offer resources to engage for further study.
A great book title sticks in the head and accompanies the reader from the first to the last page. The Jungle Grows Back is the perfect metaphor for Kagan’s argument and is a powerful and reminiscent image across the chapters. The United States has dedicated during decades unprecedented effort and resources to clear the jungle and build the prosperous liberal village in defiance of nature. However, the comfort of the cabins and the flourishing crops has made America forget the responsibility of wielding the machete. The dark dense Jungle never rests. Nature creeps back, full of dangerous beasts and uncertain threats.
Robert Kagan’s perception of international politics is realist at its best and fatalistic and paternalistic at its worst. The Jungle Grows Back has a clear underlying sense of American exceptionalism and tends to overestimate the successes of US foreign policy since 1945 while omitting or rushing through some of its most notable failures and abuses. For someone inexperienced in the subject, a quick read of Kagan’s work could be sufficiently convincing of the American infallibility in its role of savior of the international order or, on the other hand, could be enough to arouse repulse and even fear to those that regard the relationship between peace and conflict in absolute terms. Unfortunately, reality is far more complex than that. After separating the wheat from the chaff, The Jungle Grows Back presents an overall sound argument with several points worth taking into consideration.
Kagan starts the book with a simple idea: International liberalism is a rarity. He puts it this way: “The American-led liberal world order was never a natural phenomenon. It was not the culmination of evolutionary processes across the millennia or the inevitable fulfillment of universal human desires. The past seven-plus decades […] have been a great historical aberration.” (p. 1). For anyone with a basic understanding of history and politics, it seems fairly obvious that the liberal world order is something exceptional. Kagan does not spend too much time arguing why this is the case nor does he try to justify extensively why the liberal world order is more desirable than any other alternatives. This book is not about these questions. For that purpose he cites authors like Steven Pinker, who has conducted much more rigorous research on the wonders of liberalism. The Jungle Grows Back takes the desirability of the liberal world order for granted. Therefore, readers who are not convinced of that premise might find the rest of the book irrelevant. However, once you accept that 1) the formation of a liberal world order such as the current one is not an inevitable process but a historical rarity and, 2) the liberal world order is something valuable and worth sustaining, Kagan has relevant things to say about the role of the United States on this issue.
The idea of natural rights, democracy, or international law are not post- World War II inventions. The fact that these ideas have only truly prospered in the last decades suggest that something relevant has changed. According to Kagan, that significant event would be that, for the first time in history, the international dominant power has had the means and the will to enforce liberal ideals to the rest of the world. It is not a particularly contested theory that liberalism in the form of Wilson’s 14 points and the League of Nations failed during the 1930’s due to a lack of means to enforce the commitment to international law and the overall system. Appeasement failed terribly. Trust in human nature resulted naïve. In the 30’s the jungle could not be contained. If liberalism survived the Cold War and stands still today, it surely is not because of a drastic transformation of human nature from decades prior, but because of a constant struggle of the United States and allied liberal nations to defend such order.
This idea may not seem too controversial. However, Kagan often paints a very narrow picture of the American role in international affairs. I would argue that the most relevant asset of the US is its deterrent effect in the international community. The mere existence of strong economic, political and military power tied to a firm commitment to the defense of the liberal order has an enormous impact in preventing the jungle from growing back. Kagan, however, focuses excessively in the purely militaristic role of American foreign policy. It is undeniable that war is part of US internationalism and sometimes it is a necessary price to pay. Nonetheless, the scarce mentions of other means of international action such as diplomacy or economic pressures makes Kagan’s argument look excessively bellicose in The Jungle Grows Back.
Along the book, Kagan’s idea of the risks that the world order faces are portrayed as coming from the outside in. The way in which he presents the argument seems to imply that America is in some way safe from any sin other than failing to fulfill its duty to protect international liberalism. For a book published in 2018, The Jungle Grows Back should have taken more seriously the idea that, with liberalism in itself failing domestically, there is not much left to defend overseas. Russia’s return to a belligerent nationalist foreign policy or China’s growing ambitions are worrying prospects. Kagan takes care of pointing that out extensively. However, Trump’s United States is increasingly far from setting an adequate example and it goes far beyond the decision to withdraw troops from the Middle East.
To be fair, Kagan does criticize US foreign policy during the time in which internationalism was the norm, and does so much more harshly than it may seem at first. In the last chapter of the book, “Protecting the Garden”, Kagan reiterates a powerful idea: authoritarianism is not a step in evolution, it is at the very core of human nature, and regression to authoritarianism is far easier than it may seem. From this, Kagan criticizes the American tough stand against communism during the Cold War when it meant the support of worse authoritarian regimes. He states the following: “Authoritarianism has shown itself less susceptible to internal pressures for reform than communism did at the end, and more capable of withstanding the liberal pressures from outside. One reason may be that communism sprang from the same Enlightenment roots as liberalism.” (pp. 146-147) This is criticism of decades of American Foreign policy. Even today, the United States continues supporting authoritarian regimes mainly in the Middle East in the pursuit of short-term objectives hoping they will eventually transform into liberal democracies.
Kagan’s book is written in a very accessible manner. There is a deliberate lack of complex theoretical terms or technicalities. Depending on the reader’s expectations this could be appreciated or disappointing. However, it seems clear that the purpose of The Jungle Grows Back is predominantly informative and designed to reach the broadest public possible. As stated at the beginning of this review, I found the jungle metaphor that frames the book particularly effective. Nonetheless, the book could probably be improved by adding some sort of visual aid in the form of maps or graphics to bring Kagan’s argument down to earth from his occasional subjective or loose thoughts.
I would definitely recommend The Jungle Grows Back to be read by anyone with any interest on the world’s affairs. I find value in challenging myself with conflicting arguments and opinions as a learning process. Kagan’s ideas increasingly serve that challenging purpose in a context in which interventionism/internationalism is more and more misunderstood and vilified.
The Jungle Grows Back: America and Our Imperiled World
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Robert Kagan’s perception of international politics is realist at its best and fatalistic and paternalistic at its worst. The Jungle Grows Back has a clear underlying sense of American exceptionalism and tends to overestimate the successes of US foreign policy since 1945 while omitting or rushing through some of its most notable failures and abuses. For someone inexperienced in the subject, a quick read of Kagan’s work could be sufficiently convincing of the American infallibility in its role of savior of the international order or, on the other hand, could be enough to arouse repulse and even fear to those that regard the relationship between peace and conflict in absolute terms. Unfortunately, reality is far more complex than that. After separating the wheat from the chaff, The Jungle Grows Back presents an overall sound argument with several points worth taking into consideration.
Kagan starts the book with a simple idea: International liberalism is a rarity. He puts it this way: “The American-led liberal world order was never a natural phenomenon. It was not the culmination of evolutionary processes across the millennia or the inevitable fulfillment of universal human desires. The past seven-plus decades […] have been a great historical aberration.” (p. 1). For anyone with a basic understanding of history and politics, it seems fairly obvious that the liberal world order is something exceptional. Kagan does not spend too much time arguing why this is the case nor does he try to justify extensively why the liberal world order is more desirable than any other alternatives. This book is not about these questions. For that purpose he cites authors like Steven Pinker, who has conducted much more rigorous research on the wonders of liberalism. The Jungle Grows Back takes the desirability of the liberal world order for granted. Therefore, readers who are not convinced of that premise might find the rest of the book irrelevant. However, once you accept that 1) the formation of a liberal world order such as the current one is not an inevitable process but a historical rarity and, 2) the liberal world order is something valuable and worth sustaining, Kagan has relevant things to say about the role of the United States on this issue.
The idea of natural rights, democracy, or international law are not post- World War II inventions. The fact that these ideas have only truly prospered in the last decades suggest that something relevant has changed. According to Kagan, that significant event would be that, for the first time in history, the international dominant power has had the means and the will to enforce liberal ideals to the rest of the world. It is not a particularly contested theory that liberalism in the form of Wilson’s 14 points and the League of Nations failed during the 1930’s due to a lack of means to enforce the commitment to international law and the overall system. Appeasement failed terribly. Trust in human nature resulted naïve. In the 30’s the jungle could not be contained. If liberalism survived the Cold War and stands still today, it surely is not because of a drastic transformation of human nature from decades prior, but because of a constant struggle of the United States and allied liberal nations to defend such order.
This idea may not seem too controversial. However, Kagan often paints a very narrow picture of the American role in international affairs. I would argue that the most relevant asset of the US is its deterrent effect in the international community. The mere existence of strong economic, political and military power tied to a firm commitment to the defense of the liberal order has an enormous impact in preventing the jungle from growing back. Kagan, however, focuses excessively in the purely militaristic role of American foreign policy. It is undeniable that war is part of US internationalism and sometimes it is a necessary price to pay. Nonetheless, the scarce mentions of other means of international action such as diplomacy or economic pressures makes Kagan’s argument look excessively bellicose in The Jungle Grows Back.
Along the book, Kagan’s idea of the risks that the world order faces are portrayed as coming from the outside in. The way in which he presents the argument seems to imply that America is in some way safe from any sin other than failing to fulfill its duty to protect international liberalism. For a book published in 2018, The Jungle Grows Back should have taken more seriously the idea that, with liberalism in itself failing domestically, there is not much left to defend overseas. Russia’s return to a belligerent nationalist foreign policy or China’s growing ambitions are worrying prospects. Kagan takes care of pointing that out extensively. However, Trump’s United States is increasingly far from setting an adequate example and it goes far beyond the decision to withdraw troops from the Middle East.
To be fair, Kagan does criticize US foreign policy during the time in which internationalism was the norm, and does so much more harshly than it may seem at first. In the last chapter of the book, “Protecting the Garden”, Kagan reiterates a powerful idea: authoritarianism is not a step in evolution, it is at the very core of human nature, and regression to authoritarianism is far easier than it may seem. From this, Kagan criticizes the American tough stand against communism during the Cold War when it meant the support of worse authoritarian regimes. He states the following: “Authoritarianism has shown itself less susceptible to internal pressures for reform than communism did at the end, and more capable of withstanding the liberal pressures from outside. One reason may be that communism sprang from the same Enlightenment roots as liberalism.” (pp. 146-147) This is criticism of decades of American Foreign policy. Even today, the United States continues supporting authoritarian regimes mainly in the Middle East in the pursuit of short-term objectives hoping they will eventually transform into liberal democracies.
Kagan’s book is written in a very accessible manner. There is a deliberate lack of complex theoretical terms or technicalities. Depending on the reader’s expectations this could be appreciated or disappointing. However, it seems clear that the purpose of The Jungle Grows Back is predominantly informative and designed to reach the broadest public possible. As stated at the beginning of this review, I found the jungle metaphor that frames the book particularly effective. Nonetheless, the book could probably be improved by adding some sort of visual aid in the form of maps or graphics to bring Kagan’s argument down to earth from his occasional subjective or loose thoughts.
I would definitely recommend The Jungle Grows Back to be read by anyone with any interest on the world’s affairs. I find value in challenging myself with conflicting arguments and opinions as a learning process. Kagan’s ideas increasingly serve that challenging purpose in a context in which interventionism/internationalism is more and more misunderstood and vilified.
The Jungle Grows Back: America and Our Imperiled World
(less)
Mr. Kagan has written a very convincing tribute to the world order out together by the US and other democratic governments at the the end of World War II. He points out that it has brought the world 75 years of unprecedented peace and prosperity. He now fears that many beneficiaries of that world order have forgotten the international free-for-all that preceded, and ultimately led to, World War II. He makes the case that America is the essential nation in this world order and that if the US tire ...more
The Jungle Grows Back was published in 2018, but feels prescient in the context of Russia's invasion of Ukraine. In this book, Robert Kagan reminds us that the liberal world order, in which peace is the default and countries resolve their disputes through the use of international institutions, is not the natural state of affairs but one that requires substantial commitment to maintain. The world does not have a natural tendency to become more democratic/peaceful/open-minded over time. Rather, authoritarianism, tribalism, and violent competition are the norm, but people who grew up after WWII tend to forget that. Kagan makes a compelling case for the institutions, however imperfect, that uphold liberalism and for a more active American role abroad. I enjoyed reading it and would highly recommend it to anyone who wonders why the Russian invasion of Ukraine is any of our business. (less)
Jul 22, 2019Ronan added it
Think America is the main cause of the world's problems? While Kagan admits nobody's perfect he convincingly argues that American primacy has been the main reason we havent returned to the dog eat dog world of pre-1945. A worthwhile read for defenders and critics of American foreign policy, particularly at a time where calls for America to "do less" can be heard on the left and right. (less)
The Jungle Grows Back, by Robert Kagan
To agree with the ideas in this book, one first has to accept the premise that liberalism is the reason for the lack of an outbreak of a major conflict for the last 7 decades. I do not believe it was simply geoeconomics vs. geopolitics. I do not believe that the other countries decided America was the kindly “Green Giant”, but rather that it served the political needs of the countries involved, the United States included. The accidental byproduct was a lack of a major violent conflict. Many countries were floundering after the war. They had lost much in human treasure and in value, they had been decimated by battles and the occupation by the enemy. The way forward was uncertain, and it simply played out the way it did because of mutual concerns for survival; there was no real movement to support each country’s need. The spoils of war dominated the playing field of ideology. There were weaker and stronger countries. The weaker ones were in no position to reorganize and fight, as Germany had already done twice before. The European countries were suffering from a lack of almost everything they required, food, shelter, military strength, and the resources to rebuild.
One could just as easily have taken the opposite point of view and proved that it was the values of conservatism, perhaps the idea of charity, of faith in something higher than oneself, that had prevented outbreaks of violence in these same places, and that it was the decline of these same conservative values that has heralded in a time in which peace may come to an end, with many countries returning to their nationalist beliefs and their worship of their leaders rather than in something greater than themselves, even if the view was unscientific. Certainly in more tribal countries, there were violent outbreaks, as in Libya, Somalia and Syria. If it was Liberalism, why were these areas unaffected. The author provides no scientific evidence of his theory, but it makes for a good talking point. American schools and media are controlled by the left, so the prevalent view has been force fed into the public’s diet. The view that liberalism is good and conservatism is bad is learned. The view that the right is fascist and the left is compassionate leaves out the very current history. Where is the mention of the Black Panthers, Antifa, Occupy Wall Street, Pink, and other organizations that promulgate violence in some way or another to contradict the liberal viewpoint? Because it is on the left, it has been purged.
Liberalism, as a way of life is not quite the liberal think of today, but it was credited by the author and other liberal scholars who follow this way of thinking, with keeping the peace we have enjoyed since World War II. For seven decades, there has been a mutual goal to prop each other up, rather than to compete with each other with the end result being winners and losers. The idea that it is the approach the leader takes that is more important, using a silver tongue, like Obama who had the gift of gab, rather than plain speaking Trump, who does not, has been supported. The ultimate goals have taken a back seat so that the plain speaking Trump is demonized although he is proving successful in leveling the playing field for all those who have been forgotten by those with the mastery of political speak. The end results have largely been ignored to promote a process which has failed in some cases. Why has the Middle East not followed suit and remained peaceful? Certainly leaders have used their politically correct speech to try and broker a peace there. Is it because they have not suffered a large enough defeat and been abandoned to fend for themselves? Is it because they do not have faith in something larger than themselves that is judging them, but rather judges the rest of the world and praises their warlike behavior?
The enormous strength of the United States has enabled this atmosphere of peace to prevail because it is said that the weaker countries felt they could rely on us to protect them and guarantee their security. However, what choice did they have in the matter? Was it that we offered police protection or was it simply the byproduct of America’s hubris that they intervened in countries they found were weaker in an attempt to bring democracy to them, whether or not hey wanted it. For 70 years, peace more or less prevailed, and after awhile, was it simply taken for granted as a state of being that would always be? Are we simply being faced with the fact that it was circumstance rather than ideology that prevailed?
Lately, there are factions growing up and gaining support that want the United States to stop being the policeman of the world, to stop providing military assistance when it deems it necessary. They believe that America is overstepping. As the “so-called” liberal world order suffers, and cracks form in its veneer, one can only wonder if it presages a return to violence to settle disputes and usher in more conflict and wars to resolve our differences. Will we continue with the prevailing largely peaceful world, working seemingly together to improve each other’s economies without having a winner or a loser, or will reality set in pointing to the fact that there have been winners and losers with America being the largest winner of that lottery!
Suddenly, there are people clamoring for socialism and abandoning capitalism. They are rejecting the idea of assimilating large numbers of immigrants that want to come to their country because they are discovering they bring their problems with them and often try to recreate the country they left. They are discovering there are huge costs when outsiders do not melt into the existing framework. They refuse to assimilate and continue to maintain their own identities as members of another culture, country and religion. Is the recognition of the reality of the cost a conservative, fascist point of view or simply reality?
Have we ceased to encourage a liberal order to the world? Instead, are we are fostering illiberalism which can cause chaos? Is it a liberal vs. a conservative view or simply a changing world view based on the needs of different realms. Have we grown soft and selfish? Do we want to isolate ourselves and not be bothered with the outside world, or do we want to do it without having a negative effect on our own country and its structure. If we prefer to support our own country first, in addition to supporting others, does that mean we do not want to share the wealth and embrace all people? If we no longer want to be the world’s watchdog, but rather the world’s conscience, if we have expended an effot to rebuild failed economies and those wracked by war for seven decades, is it time to see a reward on our investment?
Large numbers of us do not seem to be aware of the fact that it is liberalism that has nurtured our society into a state of peaceful coexistence. Is that because it is not the sole catalyst and inspiration? It is true that wars have been kept away from our shores. Are the reasons geographical and not ideological? With the evolving tools of war so improved, have we lost our advantage? Will peace remain a constant if we stop being the superman of the world? Will America be able to protect its allies if it continues to weaken its own armed forces and lowering its own defense budget in an effort to prop up our potential enemies? Have they gotten so used to our help that they are like spoiled children chomping at the bit for more. No one ever seems to want equality, though the clamor for it. In the end, they choose superiority and commit the same sins they rally against.
Does liberalism mean that you cannot fight back to gain some better terms for your own existence? Does America have to only be on the giving end and never the receiving end? As China and Russia demand more recognition, as they develop their military and their economy, will America become less relevant, emboldening them to attack our allies, to make a power grab for their own hegemony? Will that loss of the ideals we have called liberalism, usher in a new era of violence? Will war return to Europe, Asia and the United States? Will the Middle East explode together with us, literally and figuratively?
As we withdraw from our position of beneficent power, will weaker nations remember their former desires for greater control and vie for more of a face on the geopolitical stage? Will the breakup of the European Union be a necessary byproduct? Will Brexit foretell doom for what has been a largely peaceful Europe, even as Africa and India/Pakistan and the Middle East explode anew with outbreaks of violence, as tribes war with each other for dominance? As we begin to calculate the cost of our effort to protect others, as we try to make the playing field more level, are we creating gaps in the fabric of our world which will be filled in by the hostile actions of countries that want not necessarily a better economy or better conditions for its citizens but more control and power? Already, some countries are beginning to resent America’s presence and a large contingent of Americans do as well. Partisan politics is on center stage. Jealousy begins to reign over the reality of the results achieved over the last seventy years in so many places. With the advent of technology, everyone can see what they are missing, and they want to have what we have. How can they achieve that goal without conflict, especially if we back away from our position of watchdog?
Kagan is an equal opportunity basher when it comes to Presidents, although he does make Trump out to be the worst villain of all, after he trashes Bill Clinton, George H. W. Bush and Obama, all of whom he believes have dropped the ball, bringing about the weakening of the liberal order that previously existed. Their weakness has opened the door for bad actors to walk through, attempting to restore the world to the state it was in when wars were common and competition rather than cooperation was the rule. After reading the book, one realizes that Obama ushered in a period which allowed the decline of liberalism on a greater scale because he was weak; he did not intervene when necessary, and he always wanted to avoid a fight. If liberalism, with the United States as the policeman of the world, was an effective way to help all and to keep Europe, Asia, the Middle East and the Western world safer, than Obama was unqualified, unfit for the job, and he failed. He had the gift of gab and was able to give a good speech and inspire people to follow him, however, which was his greatest strength. It made him larger than life but reduced America’s profile in the eyes of the world. Liberalism once worked well, but now, it is fraying at the edges and people are clamoring for socialism and abandoning capitalism. They have grown soft, lazy and selfish, and they do not want to be bothered with the needs of the outside world; they believe they can exist alone. Has isolationism made a comeback? The silver tongue of Obama mesmerized the world, but failed to strengthen it. As the watchdogs of the world, we may have kept wars away from our shores, but without a strong military, can it continue? Will peace prevail if we drop the mantle of responsibility for the rest of the world? But have we protected all equally? How have the enemies and friends been chosen?
We have ceased to elect diplomatic Presidents. We have disregarded character in favor of charisma. We now have an entire population that believes they are capable of being President, regardless of the skills required. Obama, a weak, but highly revered President, let go of the reins that provided protection for the balance of power in the world. He drew red lines and never followed up. He made threats but didn’t follow through. He hoped that by attrition he could avoid conflict. He allowed public opinion to rule and provided poor leadership. He ushered in an era of partisanship which has only grown worse and Trump neither has the gift of gab or the diplomatic personality to reverse the trend, rather he exacerbates it with his acid tongue and tweets. Often his behavior overshadows his accomplishments. A complicit media, supporting liberals, ignores his strengths and stresses his weaknesses, giving fodder to the discontented of the world.
So what is the preference America, war or peace, strength or weakness, compassion or selfishness, greed or generosity, silver tongue or acid tongue? Is it better to have the gift of gab that smoothes ruffled feathers but accomplishes nothing or the uncultured tongue that steps on toes, but gains benefits and a fairer playing field for America and the rest of the world. If America has been abused in its attempt to benefit the rest of the world, must that policeman personality be a condition which remains forever or can negotiations to even the playing field take place? Why would negotiations be termed as winning rather than bargaining? Why not emphasize the benefits of a different approach, instead of the negatives? Why not present a more positive picture of America to the world, instead of propping up liberalism which appears to have run its course. To continue to remain at peace, America has to be viewed as a strong partner, not one constantly faced with the chaotic scenes now presented by the left and the media. They obstruct for their own personal hegemony! Isn’t that the problem that causes unrest? Can no one see the forest for the trees?
The author has presented his theory about the existence of a largely peaceful world for the past seven decades. There are many liberal scholars who agree with his synopsis. Although he attempted to present a fair and non partisan presentation of his ideas, it was obvious from his bio and employment history that he identifies with the left. Therefore, the book sings the praises of liberalism and fairly soundly trashes the ideals of conservatives, identifying them even as fascists. Does this largely one-sided view, albeit subtly presented, in which Kagan believes that the world was better off after 1945 because countries were working toward a common goal and not for themselves alone, which he identifies with liberals who do not want to gain more power on the geopolitical stage, but rather want to foster the economies of all countries, hold water? Does he ignore the reality we are now faced with, that I believe was simply that circumstances were ripe for and responsible for that rising tide that was intended to lift all ships rather than a liberal world order? Did it lift all ships equally? NO! So is that liberalism? Have we encouraged the large differences between the haves and the have nots, that have only grown wider in our attempt to control the idea of a more democratic world? Have we played G-d in our attempt to foster its creation? Are these not the reasons for the current indifference to America’s power? Are we now viewed, not only because of media presentation, but because of results, as the evil Goliath trying to destroy David?
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To agree with the ideas in this book, one first has to accept the premise that liberalism is the reason for the lack of an outbreak of a major conflict for the last 7 decades. I do not believe it was simply geoeconomics vs. geopolitics. I do not believe that the other countries decided America was the kindly “Green Giant”, but rather that it served the political needs of the countries involved, the United States included. The accidental byproduct was a lack of a major violent conflict. Many countries were floundering after the war. They had lost much in human treasure and in value, they had been decimated by battles and the occupation by the enemy. The way forward was uncertain, and it simply played out the way it did because of mutual concerns for survival; there was no real movement to support each country’s need. The spoils of war dominated the playing field of ideology. There were weaker and stronger countries. The weaker ones were in no position to reorganize and fight, as Germany had already done twice before. The European countries were suffering from a lack of almost everything they required, food, shelter, military strength, and the resources to rebuild.
One could just as easily have taken the opposite point of view and proved that it was the values of conservatism, perhaps the idea of charity, of faith in something higher than oneself, that had prevented outbreaks of violence in these same places, and that it was the decline of these same conservative values that has heralded in a time in which peace may come to an end, with many countries returning to their nationalist beliefs and their worship of their leaders rather than in something greater than themselves, even if the view was unscientific. Certainly in more tribal countries, there were violent outbreaks, as in Libya, Somalia and Syria. If it was Liberalism, why were these areas unaffected. The author provides no scientific evidence of his theory, but it makes for a good talking point. American schools and media are controlled by the left, so the prevalent view has been force fed into the public’s diet. The view that liberalism is good and conservatism is bad is learned. The view that the right is fascist and the left is compassionate leaves out the very current history. Where is the mention of the Black Panthers, Antifa, Occupy Wall Street, Pink, and other organizations that promulgate violence in some way or another to contradict the liberal viewpoint? Because it is on the left, it has been purged.
Liberalism, as a way of life is not quite the liberal think of today, but it was credited by the author and other liberal scholars who follow this way of thinking, with keeping the peace we have enjoyed since World War II. For seven decades, there has been a mutual goal to prop each other up, rather than to compete with each other with the end result being winners and losers. The idea that it is the approach the leader takes that is more important, using a silver tongue, like Obama who had the gift of gab, rather than plain speaking Trump, who does not, has been supported. The ultimate goals have taken a back seat so that the plain speaking Trump is demonized although he is proving successful in leveling the playing field for all those who have been forgotten by those with the mastery of political speak. The end results have largely been ignored to promote a process which has failed in some cases. Why has the Middle East not followed suit and remained peaceful? Certainly leaders have used their politically correct speech to try and broker a peace there. Is it because they have not suffered a large enough defeat and been abandoned to fend for themselves? Is it because they do not have faith in something larger than themselves that is judging them, but rather judges the rest of the world and praises their warlike behavior?
The enormous strength of the United States has enabled this atmosphere of peace to prevail because it is said that the weaker countries felt they could rely on us to protect them and guarantee their security. However, what choice did they have in the matter? Was it that we offered police protection or was it simply the byproduct of America’s hubris that they intervened in countries they found were weaker in an attempt to bring democracy to them, whether or not hey wanted it. For 70 years, peace more or less prevailed, and after awhile, was it simply taken for granted as a state of being that would always be? Are we simply being faced with the fact that it was circumstance rather than ideology that prevailed?
Lately, there are factions growing up and gaining support that want the United States to stop being the policeman of the world, to stop providing military assistance when it deems it necessary. They believe that America is overstepping. As the “so-called” liberal world order suffers, and cracks form in its veneer, one can only wonder if it presages a return to violence to settle disputes and usher in more conflict and wars to resolve our differences. Will we continue with the prevailing largely peaceful world, working seemingly together to improve each other’s economies without having a winner or a loser, or will reality set in pointing to the fact that there have been winners and losers with America being the largest winner of that lottery!
Suddenly, there are people clamoring for socialism and abandoning capitalism. They are rejecting the idea of assimilating large numbers of immigrants that want to come to their country because they are discovering they bring their problems with them and often try to recreate the country they left. They are discovering there are huge costs when outsiders do not melt into the existing framework. They refuse to assimilate and continue to maintain their own identities as members of another culture, country and religion. Is the recognition of the reality of the cost a conservative, fascist point of view or simply reality?
Have we ceased to encourage a liberal order to the world? Instead, are we are fostering illiberalism which can cause chaos? Is it a liberal vs. a conservative view or simply a changing world view based on the needs of different realms. Have we grown soft and selfish? Do we want to isolate ourselves and not be bothered with the outside world, or do we want to do it without having a negative effect on our own country and its structure. If we prefer to support our own country first, in addition to supporting others, does that mean we do not want to share the wealth and embrace all people? If we no longer want to be the world’s watchdog, but rather the world’s conscience, if we have expended an effot to rebuild failed economies and those wracked by war for seven decades, is it time to see a reward on our investment?
Large numbers of us do not seem to be aware of the fact that it is liberalism that has nurtured our society into a state of peaceful coexistence. Is that because it is not the sole catalyst and inspiration? It is true that wars have been kept away from our shores. Are the reasons geographical and not ideological? With the evolving tools of war so improved, have we lost our advantage? Will peace remain a constant if we stop being the superman of the world? Will America be able to protect its allies if it continues to weaken its own armed forces and lowering its own defense budget in an effort to prop up our potential enemies? Have they gotten so used to our help that they are like spoiled children chomping at the bit for more. No one ever seems to want equality, though the clamor for it. In the end, they choose superiority and commit the same sins they rally against.
Does liberalism mean that you cannot fight back to gain some better terms for your own existence? Does America have to only be on the giving end and never the receiving end? As China and Russia demand more recognition, as they develop their military and their economy, will America become less relevant, emboldening them to attack our allies, to make a power grab for their own hegemony? Will that loss of the ideals we have called liberalism, usher in a new era of violence? Will war return to Europe, Asia and the United States? Will the Middle East explode together with us, literally and figuratively?
As we withdraw from our position of beneficent power, will weaker nations remember their former desires for greater control and vie for more of a face on the geopolitical stage? Will the breakup of the European Union be a necessary byproduct? Will Brexit foretell doom for what has been a largely peaceful Europe, even as Africa and India/Pakistan and the Middle East explode anew with outbreaks of violence, as tribes war with each other for dominance? As we begin to calculate the cost of our effort to protect others, as we try to make the playing field more level, are we creating gaps in the fabric of our world which will be filled in by the hostile actions of countries that want not necessarily a better economy or better conditions for its citizens but more control and power? Already, some countries are beginning to resent America’s presence and a large contingent of Americans do as well. Partisan politics is on center stage. Jealousy begins to reign over the reality of the results achieved over the last seventy years in so many places. With the advent of technology, everyone can see what they are missing, and they want to have what we have. How can they achieve that goal without conflict, especially if we back away from our position of watchdog?
Kagan is an equal opportunity basher when it comes to Presidents, although he does make Trump out to be the worst villain of all, after he trashes Bill Clinton, George H. W. Bush and Obama, all of whom he believes have dropped the ball, bringing about the weakening of the liberal order that previously existed. Their weakness has opened the door for bad actors to walk through, attempting to restore the world to the state it was in when wars were common and competition rather than cooperation was the rule. After reading the book, one realizes that Obama ushered in a period which allowed the decline of liberalism on a greater scale because he was weak; he did not intervene when necessary, and he always wanted to avoid a fight. If liberalism, with the United States as the policeman of the world, was an effective way to help all and to keep Europe, Asia, the Middle East and the Western world safer, than Obama was unqualified, unfit for the job, and he failed. He had the gift of gab and was able to give a good speech and inspire people to follow him, however, which was his greatest strength. It made him larger than life but reduced America’s profile in the eyes of the world. Liberalism once worked well, but now, it is fraying at the edges and people are clamoring for socialism and abandoning capitalism. They have grown soft, lazy and selfish, and they do not want to be bothered with the needs of the outside world; they believe they can exist alone. Has isolationism made a comeback? The silver tongue of Obama mesmerized the world, but failed to strengthen it. As the watchdogs of the world, we may have kept wars away from our shores, but without a strong military, can it continue? Will peace prevail if we drop the mantle of responsibility for the rest of the world? But have we protected all equally? How have the enemies and friends been chosen?
We have ceased to elect diplomatic Presidents. We have disregarded character in favor of charisma. We now have an entire population that believes they are capable of being President, regardless of the skills required. Obama, a weak, but highly revered President, let go of the reins that provided protection for the balance of power in the world. He drew red lines and never followed up. He made threats but didn’t follow through. He hoped that by attrition he could avoid conflict. He allowed public opinion to rule and provided poor leadership. He ushered in an era of partisanship which has only grown worse and Trump neither has the gift of gab or the diplomatic personality to reverse the trend, rather he exacerbates it with his acid tongue and tweets. Often his behavior overshadows his accomplishments. A complicit media, supporting liberals, ignores his strengths and stresses his weaknesses, giving fodder to the discontented of the world.
So what is the preference America, war or peace, strength or weakness, compassion or selfishness, greed or generosity, silver tongue or acid tongue? Is it better to have the gift of gab that smoothes ruffled feathers but accomplishes nothing or the uncultured tongue that steps on toes, but gains benefits and a fairer playing field for America and the rest of the world. If America has been abused in its attempt to benefit the rest of the world, must that policeman personality be a condition which remains forever or can negotiations to even the playing field take place? Why would negotiations be termed as winning rather than bargaining? Why not emphasize the benefits of a different approach, instead of the negatives? Why not present a more positive picture of America to the world, instead of propping up liberalism which appears to have run its course. To continue to remain at peace, America has to be viewed as a strong partner, not one constantly faced with the chaotic scenes now presented by the left and the media. They obstruct for their own personal hegemony! Isn’t that the problem that causes unrest? Can no one see the forest for the trees?
The author has presented his theory about the existence of a largely peaceful world for the past seven decades. There are many liberal scholars who agree with his synopsis. Although he attempted to present a fair and non partisan presentation of his ideas, it was obvious from his bio and employment history that he identifies with the left. Therefore, the book sings the praises of liberalism and fairly soundly trashes the ideals of conservatives, identifying them even as fascists. Does this largely one-sided view, albeit subtly presented, in which Kagan believes that the world was better off after 1945 because countries were working toward a common goal and not for themselves alone, which he identifies with liberals who do not want to gain more power on the geopolitical stage, but rather want to foster the economies of all countries, hold water? Does he ignore the reality we are now faced with, that I believe was simply that circumstances were ripe for and responsible for that rising tide that was intended to lift all ships rather than a liberal world order? Did it lift all ships equally? NO! So is that liberalism? Have we encouraged the large differences between the haves and the have nots, that have only grown wider in our attempt to control the idea of a more democratic world? Have we played G-d in our attempt to foster its creation? Are these not the reasons for the current indifference to America’s power? Are we now viewed, not only because of media presentation, but because of results, as the evil Goliath trying to destroy David?
(less)
It is unfortunate to read Robert Kagan today as it seems his books have become not about insight and relevancy but more about getting published in order to maintain his position in Washington writing as a columnist and working for various lecture tours.
The one thing I did enjoy was the rehash of history. Nothing is incredibly novel but it is fun to poke around well established histories. In his older works Kagan was able to do this and bring relevance to the present by insightful comparisons. His works on Afghanistan, Yugoslavia, and to some extent the books on the military post 9/11 were focused enough for him to make a coherent point. Since those books he has increasingly drifted, providing little evidence for the majority of his assertions and even contradicting himself.
An example would be his stance on the Iraq War. He began as supporting the war and then subsequently in a later book stated he was wrong. Now in this book he doesn't outright say he is for or against the war but outlines many reasons why it was correct, including one of the main supporting arguments for his book's thesis. He then goes on to nebulously describe how it is impossible to determine if a war is correct until in hindsight but then repeats that to not defend the world order's stability (by going after bad guys) is inexcusable. How is this guy still against the Iraq War? He even goes on to describe the failure of Bush one and Clinton to clean up a mess there that would continuously cause problems for world stability. It makes me feel like he doesn't have all the courage of his convictions.
If you want to see a more concise, entertaining, and useful presentation on preserving world stability and the liberal world order one should watch Barnett's hour-long Pentagon's New Map presentation on Youtube. On the same lecture circuit but years earlier than Kagan, Barnett starts his lecture with some wisdom. People want to hear the diagnosis more often than the prescription. He provides both. Kagan's attempt at a comprehensive understanding of his environment and the prescription are dubious. The modern world is more complicated than he would have you believe where political environments are undermining treaties and world leadership to bolster world stability (through the US leadership primariliy).
Kagan scoffs at Fukuyama's lessons in Clash of Civilizations and dismisses all problems arising from massive immigration as some kind of ethnocentrism of white privilige. He doesn't think there are any fiscal, cultural, or legal issues from any of the European countries and the US that are causing this political backlash. As a supposed historian he must not have read how the Roman Empire ended. A recent political survey publicized by a prominent democrat mouthpiece recently actually showed the identitatrian politics are actually much, much, much more prevalent on the left. In fact it appears this issue is driving a wedge in the democratic party more so than driving the right in the US.
Another area Kaplan glosses over in his prescription is the failure of the institutions he is so avid to support. The United Nations, the anti-semitic conclave of totalitarian states, has become solely a receptacle of corruption. The main purpose it was founded for, to prevent and mediate in interstate conflicts is largely irrelevant to today's world. Most wars are instigated via intrastate rather than interstate conflict, with rebels, terrorists, jihadists, narcothugs, and paid proxies fighting between borders of nations and with loyalty often to only themselves. This is not something the UN is designed to combat. The EU, ICC, and other world bodies are self-appointed arbiters of domains they have no authority to control. I know Kagan is familiar with these arguments but he chooses to avoid them rather than tackle them and this I view as a strategic withdrawal on his part.
In short, this book was not thought provoking, rehashes an existing argument that has merit, but provides even weaker support for the argument with his new material. I would not recommend the book unless you have nostalgia for when Kagan used to write good books. (less)
The one thing I did enjoy was the rehash of history. Nothing is incredibly novel but it is fun to poke around well established histories. In his older works Kagan was able to do this and bring relevance to the present by insightful comparisons. His works on Afghanistan, Yugoslavia, and to some extent the books on the military post 9/11 were focused enough for him to make a coherent point. Since those books he has increasingly drifted, providing little evidence for the majority of his assertions and even contradicting himself.
An example would be his stance on the Iraq War. He began as supporting the war and then subsequently in a later book stated he was wrong. Now in this book he doesn't outright say he is for or against the war but outlines many reasons why it was correct, including one of the main supporting arguments for his book's thesis. He then goes on to nebulously describe how it is impossible to determine if a war is correct until in hindsight but then repeats that to not defend the world order's stability (by going after bad guys) is inexcusable. How is this guy still against the Iraq War? He even goes on to describe the failure of Bush one and Clinton to clean up a mess there that would continuously cause problems for world stability. It makes me feel like he doesn't have all the courage of his convictions.
If you want to see a more concise, entertaining, and useful presentation on preserving world stability and the liberal world order one should watch Barnett's hour-long Pentagon's New Map presentation on Youtube. On the same lecture circuit but years earlier than Kagan, Barnett starts his lecture with some wisdom. People want to hear the diagnosis more often than the prescription. He provides both. Kagan's attempt at a comprehensive understanding of his environment and the prescription are dubious. The modern world is more complicated than he would have you believe where political environments are undermining treaties and world leadership to bolster world stability (through the US leadership primariliy).
Kagan scoffs at Fukuyama's lessons in Clash of Civilizations and dismisses all problems arising from massive immigration as some kind of ethnocentrism of white privilige. He doesn't think there are any fiscal, cultural, or legal issues from any of the European countries and the US that are causing this political backlash. As a supposed historian he must not have read how the Roman Empire ended. A recent political survey publicized by a prominent democrat mouthpiece recently actually showed the identitatrian politics are actually much, much, much more prevalent on the left. In fact it appears this issue is driving a wedge in the democratic party more so than driving the right in the US.
Another area Kaplan glosses over in his prescription is the failure of the institutions he is so avid to support. The United Nations, the anti-semitic conclave of totalitarian states, has become solely a receptacle of corruption. The main purpose it was founded for, to prevent and mediate in interstate conflicts is largely irrelevant to today's world. Most wars are instigated via intrastate rather than interstate conflict, with rebels, terrorists, jihadists, narcothugs, and paid proxies fighting between borders of nations and with loyalty often to only themselves. This is not something the UN is designed to combat. The EU, ICC, and other world bodies are self-appointed arbiters of domains they have no authority to control. I know Kagan is familiar with these arguments but he chooses to avoid them rather than tackle them and this I view as a strategic withdrawal on his part.
In short, this book was not thought provoking, rehashes an existing argument that has merit, but provides even weaker support for the argument with his new material. I would not recommend the book unless you have nostalgia for when Kagan used to write good books. (less)
This review has been hidden because it contains spoilers. To view it, click here. 2.5/5
As 2021 brings in the transition of the Biden Administration, the United States is once again at a point of a radical policy shift. One of the topics that President Biden needs to start taking into consideration is what the U.S.’ foreign policy stance will be in the next four years. Despite being one of the most crucial and formative issues facing the new Administration, it’s one that the public doesn’t seem to have much of an opinion on (myself included). In a brief but thorough book, Robert Kagan’s The Jungle Grows Back reflects on America’s history with foreign policy and argues why we need to have a strong stance on it today. It works to outline the country’s stance during large global events like World War II and the Cold War while starting to make suggestions about today. The Jungle Grows Back introduced me to the foundation of America’s foreign policy approach. As a Communications student unfamiliar with international relations, I was glad to have the opportunity to build a targeted foundation of the U.S.’ history in this field. Despite not having much background information, however, I read Kagan’s book just as critically as I would any text.
To start, Kagan highlights that America’s presence in the rest of the world is important and that he believes there is still “a liberal world order to be salvaged if the American people decide it’s worth salvaging” (154). This highlights the call to action at the very core of the book: liberal democracy and the world order have only lasted this long because they’ve been supported and nurtured. If the U.S. continues to ignore the troubles of the rest of the world for long enough, our entire way of life will disappear. My opinion on the U.S.’ role in the rest of the world is the humble approach. I believe that this country is so polarized and divided that we can’t agree on anything let alone when to interfere in international politics. Especially with the stark differences in the Trump and Biden administrations back-to-back, even the policymakers at the White House aren’t sure what a good foreign policy stance looks like. While I believe that the U.S. needs to sort out its domestic approach before it should start enacting its will on other countries, I still found Kagan’s insights interesting. They gave me something to think about moving forward in policy discussions and in my coursework at American University.
One of the most surprising takeaways I found was that Americans didn’t feel the need to be involved in World War I when it erupted: “frightening, fascinating, far away, and... none of their business” (17). This highlights the belief of a lot of Americans today when they look at the news. Even media outlets focus primarily on U.S. centric news with very little stake in international news or politics. It makes sense, to an extent, that Americans a hundred years ago would have felt the same, but hindsight is key. I can say that it made total and complete sense for the U.S. to get involved in the World Wars now that I know their lasting effects, but who’s to say that future generations won’t say that about the U.S.’ involvement in Myanmar or something similar?
Another one of Kagan’s strengths in this book is in framing this much information in a relatively concise way. He could have drawn out 300 years of history into a 500-page textbook and I wouldn’t have been able to complain too much. It’s a lot of history. So, despite The Jungle Grows Back being only 163 pages, he introduces a lot of minute detail and historic perspectives in an attempt to make the information less boring. The way he frames a lot of this information is unique and the analogies he introduces helped me think about the issues in a different way. Despite the book being shorter than a history textbook’s length, Kagan did follow the basic format of one: chronological with the occasional aside at the end of a section. To be blunt, I don’t find this entertaining or engaging as a reader. Especially considering that I’m a student who’s constantly required to read academic texts, I selfishly wish he had done something more exciting.
Something I found troubling while reading this book, however, was the lack of clear author analysis. Going into it, I expected Kagan to do more work to convince me of the path that U.S. foreign policy should take than he did. While I could draw conclusions based on what information he chose to include, I feel that he only offered a framework for all of this history in the last section: Protecting the Garden. He insists that “We can’t quit having a foreign policy” (159). While I do agree with this point, I believe that the book in its entirety would have been stronger if Kagan had asserted that statement multiple times throughout the book.
To be honest, there could have been subtle nods to this throughout the text that I didn’t pick up on. That’s because in covering such a large expanse of history, Kagan utilizes quotes, perspectives, and opinions from a whole host of world leaders; some of whom I agree with and others I don’t. It was unclear in a lot of these places if Kagan was speaking for someone else or himself. This is a great weakness, I believe, in writing a book that’s supposed to convince readers to think a certain way about foreign policy. Because if I can’t tell if the author is the one speaking or an international relations theorist who was proven wrong, I’m hesitant to take anything in the book at face value. It’s an easy fix, though. If Kagan spent more of his book working through his own analysis of historical issues and connecting lines of logic for his readers, I think I’d be more engaged throughout.
Finally, I also noticed a few places in the book where Kagan’s rhetoric made me uncomfortable. For example, when Kagan talks about the dangers of the U.S. recognizing Russia as a sphere of influence, he says that “even if we sacrificed Ukrainian independence...in the hope of sating Russians’ ambitions, such concessions would not solve the problem” (114). This highlights language of ownership. The U.S. making a decision to sacrifice Ukrainian independence implies that it is the U.S.’ independence to surrender. It reads as imperialist. And Kagan doesn’t address that kind of mindset as an issue, but works that thinking into a lot of his points. In this way, the book's tone sometimes bordered on condescending. Kagan’s nationalist lens of the U.S. toed the line of arrogance. At one point, Kagan illustrates his view that America’s current era of peace and prosperity could not have been achieved without the “costs and failures” of the “Vietnam War, Bay of Pigs, McCarthyism”, etc. (82). While he does emphasize that these events were errors and evils in history, I don’t agree with his wording. It feels like Kagan is attempting to justify this; I don’t believe that war should ever be necessary or inevitable, especially not in pursuit of peace. This is not the only time Kagan asserted something similar throughout the book; that if only the U.S. had been more involved in the world and had more of a say in world events, then maybe World War II wouldn’t have happened. I believe that that kind of speculation does more harm than good.
In terms of relevance, The Jungle Grows Back adequately compliments the coursework of COMM-443: Foreign Policy and the Press. I appreciate that this book can start the semester off with a comprehensive overview of foreign policy. Moving forward in class, I’ll have a greater wealth of understanding of the topic to fall back on. It sets a good foundation that I can build upon in discussions. If the course should continue to use this book, however, I recommend pushing its place in the semester back a week or two. A lot of my issues with this book revolved around not being able to identify the author’s position let alone their bias on the issue. While I trust that Kagan’s reporting of facts was accurate, I am hesitant to believe any advice or opinions of his own he included at face-value. I don’t like that this is the only perspective I currently have on a lot of these topics. If a portion of COMM-443 were devoted to a lecture on the basics of U.S. foreign policy, and The Jungle Grows Back served as a more in-depth companion, I’d feel more secure in my understanding of it. I’d love the chance to talk through this book with my peers more than anything.
So, while Kagan’s book The Jungle Grows Back served as a decent introduction to all matters foreign policy, his arguments for why the U.S. should stay heavily involved in every matter of global importance often fell flat. I feel better educated on the topic, but I can’t wholeheartedly say I’m convinced. (less)
As 2021 brings in the transition of the Biden Administration, the United States is once again at a point of a radical policy shift. One of the topics that President Biden needs to start taking into consideration is what the U.S.’ foreign policy stance will be in the next four years. Despite being one of the most crucial and formative issues facing the new Administration, it’s one that the public doesn’t seem to have much of an opinion on (myself included). In a brief but thorough book, Robert Kagan’s The Jungle Grows Back reflects on America’s history with foreign policy and argues why we need to have a strong stance on it today. It works to outline the country’s stance during large global events like World War II and the Cold War while starting to make suggestions about today. The Jungle Grows Back introduced me to the foundation of America’s foreign policy approach. As a Communications student unfamiliar with international relations, I was glad to have the opportunity to build a targeted foundation of the U.S.’ history in this field. Despite not having much background information, however, I read Kagan’s book just as critically as I would any text.
To start, Kagan highlights that America’s presence in the rest of the world is important and that he believes there is still “a liberal world order to be salvaged if the American people decide it’s worth salvaging” (154). This highlights the call to action at the very core of the book: liberal democracy and the world order have only lasted this long because they’ve been supported and nurtured. If the U.S. continues to ignore the troubles of the rest of the world for long enough, our entire way of life will disappear. My opinion on the U.S.’ role in the rest of the world is the humble approach. I believe that this country is so polarized and divided that we can’t agree on anything let alone when to interfere in international politics. Especially with the stark differences in the Trump and Biden administrations back-to-back, even the policymakers at the White House aren’t sure what a good foreign policy stance looks like. While I believe that the U.S. needs to sort out its domestic approach before it should start enacting its will on other countries, I still found Kagan’s insights interesting. They gave me something to think about moving forward in policy discussions and in my coursework at American University.
One of the most surprising takeaways I found was that Americans didn’t feel the need to be involved in World War I when it erupted: “frightening, fascinating, far away, and... none of their business” (17). This highlights the belief of a lot of Americans today when they look at the news. Even media outlets focus primarily on U.S. centric news with very little stake in international news or politics. It makes sense, to an extent, that Americans a hundred years ago would have felt the same, but hindsight is key. I can say that it made total and complete sense for the U.S. to get involved in the World Wars now that I know their lasting effects, but who’s to say that future generations won’t say that about the U.S.’ involvement in Myanmar or something similar?
Another one of Kagan’s strengths in this book is in framing this much information in a relatively concise way. He could have drawn out 300 years of history into a 500-page textbook and I wouldn’t have been able to complain too much. It’s a lot of history. So, despite The Jungle Grows Back being only 163 pages, he introduces a lot of minute detail and historic perspectives in an attempt to make the information less boring. The way he frames a lot of this information is unique and the analogies he introduces helped me think about the issues in a different way. Despite the book being shorter than a history textbook’s length, Kagan did follow the basic format of one: chronological with the occasional aside at the end of a section. To be blunt, I don’t find this entertaining or engaging as a reader. Especially considering that I’m a student who’s constantly required to read academic texts, I selfishly wish he had done something more exciting.
Something I found troubling while reading this book, however, was the lack of clear author analysis. Going into it, I expected Kagan to do more work to convince me of the path that U.S. foreign policy should take than he did. While I could draw conclusions based on what information he chose to include, I feel that he only offered a framework for all of this history in the last section: Protecting the Garden. He insists that “We can’t quit having a foreign policy” (159). While I do agree with this point, I believe that the book in its entirety would have been stronger if Kagan had asserted that statement multiple times throughout the book.
To be honest, there could have been subtle nods to this throughout the text that I didn’t pick up on. That’s because in covering such a large expanse of history, Kagan utilizes quotes, perspectives, and opinions from a whole host of world leaders; some of whom I agree with and others I don’t. It was unclear in a lot of these places if Kagan was speaking for someone else or himself. This is a great weakness, I believe, in writing a book that’s supposed to convince readers to think a certain way about foreign policy. Because if I can’t tell if the author is the one speaking or an international relations theorist who was proven wrong, I’m hesitant to take anything in the book at face value. It’s an easy fix, though. If Kagan spent more of his book working through his own analysis of historical issues and connecting lines of logic for his readers, I think I’d be more engaged throughout.
Finally, I also noticed a few places in the book where Kagan’s rhetoric made me uncomfortable. For example, when Kagan talks about the dangers of the U.S. recognizing Russia as a sphere of influence, he says that “even if we sacrificed Ukrainian independence...in the hope of sating Russians’ ambitions, such concessions would not solve the problem” (114). This highlights language of ownership. The U.S. making a decision to sacrifice Ukrainian independence implies that it is the U.S.’ independence to surrender. It reads as imperialist. And Kagan doesn’t address that kind of mindset as an issue, but works that thinking into a lot of his points. In this way, the book's tone sometimes bordered on condescending. Kagan’s nationalist lens of the U.S. toed the line of arrogance. At one point, Kagan illustrates his view that America’s current era of peace and prosperity could not have been achieved without the “costs and failures” of the “Vietnam War, Bay of Pigs, McCarthyism”, etc. (82). While he does emphasize that these events were errors and evils in history, I don’t agree with his wording. It feels like Kagan is attempting to justify this; I don’t believe that war should ever be necessary or inevitable, especially not in pursuit of peace. This is not the only time Kagan asserted something similar throughout the book; that if only the U.S. had been more involved in the world and had more of a say in world events, then maybe World War II wouldn’t have happened. I believe that that kind of speculation does more harm than good.
In terms of relevance, The Jungle Grows Back adequately compliments the coursework of COMM-443: Foreign Policy and the Press. I appreciate that this book can start the semester off with a comprehensive overview of foreign policy. Moving forward in class, I’ll have a greater wealth of understanding of the topic to fall back on. It sets a good foundation that I can build upon in discussions. If the course should continue to use this book, however, I recommend pushing its place in the semester back a week or two. A lot of my issues with this book revolved around not being able to identify the author’s position let alone their bias on the issue. While I trust that Kagan’s reporting of facts was accurate, I am hesitant to believe any advice or opinions of his own he included at face-value. I don’t like that this is the only perspective I currently have on a lot of these topics. If a portion of COMM-443 were devoted to a lecture on the basics of U.S. foreign policy, and The Jungle Grows Back served as a more in-depth companion, I’d feel more secure in my understanding of it. I’d love the chance to talk through this book with my peers more than anything.
So, while Kagan’s book The Jungle Grows Back served as a decent introduction to all matters foreign policy, his arguments for why the U.S. should stay heavily involved in every matter of global importance often fell flat. I feel better educated on the topic, but I can’t wholeheartedly say I’m convinced. (less)
I’ll preface this by saying that I’m probably not the target audience of “The Jungle Grows Back.” It’s kind of difficult to imagine who this was actually written for. My guess is that it’s for freaks that work for DC-based think tanks and other self-professed defenders of the liberal world order. Robert Kagan seems to be preaching to an ever shrinking choir. I actually began reading this a couple of years ago, at the recommendation from a podcast host, and gave up about halfway through. Not coincidentally, I stopped listening to that podcast awhile ago, but I’m now trying to finish all the books I own that I never got through so I forged ahead.
Kagan’s basic premise is that liberal democracy and capitalism are the greatest ideas in world history. America’s ascendency as the global hegemonic power, though not inevitable, was positive for the world. The US maintained peace and promoted economic and political freedom worldwide throughout the post-war era. Are you laughing too?
It’s amazing that supposed serious intellectuals continue to defend liberal capitalism despite it nearly collapsing several times in the past century. Kagan totes it as preferable to Communism or fascism, but is unable to understand that those ideologies were responses to the inevitable failure of liberalism to solve humanity’s problems. Capitalism reached its peak and has been in its death throes for decades. Like Fukuyama’s book, “The End of History,”
Kagan claims that liberal democratic capitalism is the pinnacle of civilization, though unlike Fukuyama, he acknowledges that liberalism can’t completely defeat the encroachment of “the jungle.” It’s a constant battle that must be waged by America.
Kagan argues that without America playing global judge, jury, and executioner that the “jungle”, a vague term that he uses over and over to describe illiberalism or authoritarianism (not a real thing), will grow back. It was America’s retreat from the world stage the led to the rise of fascism and communism in the 20s and 30s and “Islamism” in the late 20th-century. His language is oddly Kiplingesque—It’s essentially the “American man’s burden” to rule the world.
Kagan loves to repeat the claim that liberal capitalism lifted more people out of poverty in the 20th-century than had ever happened before under previous modes of production. It’s a cliche at this point and one that’s easily refuted. Remove China from the equation and poverty worldwide has grown in the last century.
Ultimately, Kagan comes across as a rather anachronistic figure. He was part of the neoconservative—He repudiates the label, preferring liberal—movement that grew out of the latter half of the Cold War. Along with ghouls like the Kristols and Charles Krauthammer, he promoted American hegemony and liberal internationalism. A New World Order, if you will. If I were going to put on my Alex Jones tinfoil hat, I might call him a globalist.
When the Soviet Union collapsed and the Cold War came to a close and the “end of history” was nigh, these neocons needed a new bogeyman. Even when history ended, life continued. To paraphrase what Marx said in “The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte,” we’re just living through the farcical events and personages that mimic past tragedies. Thus, “radical Islam” entered the stage. Kagan inadvertently makes the case that the 9/11 attacks were an inside job because it was the thing that gave the US government an excuse to begin large scale military interventions again.
Today he’s probably best remembered for being one of the greatest cheerleaders of the Iraq War. He was calling for an invasion of Iraq during the Clinton administration. As that war dragged on through the mid-‘00s, Kagan became a defender and eventually an apologist for that military quagmire.
He does casually acknowledge that America sometimes makes mistakes like the Vietnam and Iraq Wars or toppling democratically elected governments. But these are necessary mistakes in order to maintain the liberal world order. He conspicuously only mentions how these mistakes affected America. He rarely, if ever, mentions the number of non-Americans who died in these misadventures. He is happy to bring up the deaths caused by Stalin or Mao. Those were caused intentionally by evil dictators he argues. The millions of dead Vietnamese and Iraqis were an unfortunate, yet necessary side effect of America’s foreign policy.
Kagan claims to be a foreign policy expert and historian, but his knowledge of history is equivalent to that of a propagandized high school student. His knowledge of China and Russia is laughable. Continually comparing Putin and Xi Stalin and Mao is a hack trope. He repeats ludicrous claims about the dangers of countries like Iran and North Korea. World events happen discretely and are driven by a clash of ideas, not material conditions or complex socioeconomic systems. “This thing happened and thus America did this and then another country did this.” He skims over decades of history with little nuance or serious examination. The US rose as an empire out of the collapse of the British empire, but there’s no discussion of how that was only possible because of colonial exploitation of North American and later the global south. America became an empire to “protect the seas for trade” and “promote democracy”, Kagan claims, but this is farcical. He comes across as a policy wonk who hasn’t talked to someone that wasn’t a Brookings Institute fellow in decades.
There’s also no attention paid to how the US economy was destroyed by neoliberal policy and out of control military spending that began under Carter and increased under Reagan. Kagan claims this was necessary to contain and defeat the Soviet Union. What the hell is the point of maintaining US hegemony if working people can no longer afford to reap the benefits that came out of the New Deal? Kagan claims that Hillary Clinton’s crowning achievement as Secretary of State was negotiating the Trans Pacific Partnership, yet that collapsed because of its unpopularity. It’s like he doesn’t understand that trade deals like NAFTA were awful for this country. But he just seems to believe the people are too dumb to understand this complex policy!
I could go on criticizing the books points, but it’s not even worth it. I mean, it’s really hard to take this seriously when he cites Steven Pinker and Niall Ferguson with no irony. Kagan is a dinosaur. The Republican Party that he helped shape on the 80s and 90s left him behind. The neocons moved on from the GOP and evolved into the fabled “Never Trumpers.” Now he and his NATO freak wife and guys like Bill Kristol are Democrats. Just avoid this garbage at all costs. (less)
Kagan’s basic premise is that liberal democracy and capitalism are the greatest ideas in world history. America’s ascendency as the global hegemonic power, though not inevitable, was positive for the world. The US maintained peace and promoted economic and political freedom worldwide throughout the post-war era. Are you laughing too?
It’s amazing that supposed serious intellectuals continue to defend liberal capitalism despite it nearly collapsing several times in the past century. Kagan totes it as preferable to Communism or fascism, but is unable to understand that those ideologies were responses to the inevitable failure of liberalism to solve humanity’s problems. Capitalism reached its peak and has been in its death throes for decades. Like Fukuyama’s book, “The End of History,”
Kagan claims that liberal democratic capitalism is the pinnacle of civilization, though unlike Fukuyama, he acknowledges that liberalism can’t completely defeat the encroachment of “the jungle.” It’s a constant battle that must be waged by America.
Kagan argues that without America playing global judge, jury, and executioner that the “jungle”, a vague term that he uses over and over to describe illiberalism or authoritarianism (not a real thing), will grow back. It was America’s retreat from the world stage the led to the rise of fascism and communism in the 20s and 30s and “Islamism” in the late 20th-century. His language is oddly Kiplingesque—It’s essentially the “American man’s burden” to rule the world.
Kagan loves to repeat the claim that liberal capitalism lifted more people out of poverty in the 20th-century than had ever happened before under previous modes of production. It’s a cliche at this point and one that’s easily refuted. Remove China from the equation and poverty worldwide has grown in the last century.
Ultimately, Kagan comes across as a rather anachronistic figure. He was part of the neoconservative—He repudiates the label, preferring liberal—movement that grew out of the latter half of the Cold War. Along with ghouls like the Kristols and Charles Krauthammer, he promoted American hegemony and liberal internationalism. A New World Order, if you will. If I were going to put on my Alex Jones tinfoil hat, I might call him a globalist.
When the Soviet Union collapsed and the Cold War came to a close and the “end of history” was nigh, these neocons needed a new bogeyman. Even when history ended, life continued. To paraphrase what Marx said in “The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte,” we’re just living through the farcical events and personages that mimic past tragedies. Thus, “radical Islam” entered the stage. Kagan inadvertently makes the case that the 9/11 attacks were an inside job because it was the thing that gave the US government an excuse to begin large scale military interventions again.
Today he’s probably best remembered for being one of the greatest cheerleaders of the Iraq War. He was calling for an invasion of Iraq during the Clinton administration. As that war dragged on through the mid-‘00s, Kagan became a defender and eventually an apologist for that military quagmire.
He does casually acknowledge that America sometimes makes mistakes like the Vietnam and Iraq Wars or toppling democratically elected governments. But these are necessary mistakes in order to maintain the liberal world order. He conspicuously only mentions how these mistakes affected America. He rarely, if ever, mentions the number of non-Americans who died in these misadventures. He is happy to bring up the deaths caused by Stalin or Mao. Those were caused intentionally by evil dictators he argues. The millions of dead Vietnamese and Iraqis were an unfortunate, yet necessary side effect of America’s foreign policy.
Kagan claims to be a foreign policy expert and historian, but his knowledge of history is equivalent to that of a propagandized high school student. His knowledge of China and Russia is laughable. Continually comparing Putin and Xi Stalin and Mao is a hack trope. He repeats ludicrous claims about the dangers of countries like Iran and North Korea. World events happen discretely and are driven by a clash of ideas, not material conditions or complex socioeconomic systems. “This thing happened and thus America did this and then another country did this.” He skims over decades of history with little nuance or serious examination. The US rose as an empire out of the collapse of the British empire, but there’s no discussion of how that was only possible because of colonial exploitation of North American and later the global south. America became an empire to “protect the seas for trade” and “promote democracy”, Kagan claims, but this is farcical. He comes across as a policy wonk who hasn’t talked to someone that wasn’t a Brookings Institute fellow in decades.
There’s also no attention paid to how the US economy was destroyed by neoliberal policy and out of control military spending that began under Carter and increased under Reagan. Kagan claims this was necessary to contain and defeat the Soviet Union. What the hell is the point of maintaining US hegemony if working people can no longer afford to reap the benefits that came out of the New Deal? Kagan claims that Hillary Clinton’s crowning achievement as Secretary of State was negotiating the Trans Pacific Partnership, yet that collapsed because of its unpopularity. It’s like he doesn’t understand that trade deals like NAFTA were awful for this country. But he just seems to believe the people are too dumb to understand this complex policy!
I could go on criticizing the books points, but it’s not even worth it. I mean, it’s really hard to take this seriously when he cites Steven Pinker and Niall Ferguson with no irony. Kagan is a dinosaur. The Republican Party that he helped shape on the 80s and 90s left him behind. The neocons moved on from the GOP and evolved into the fabled “Never Trumpers.” Now he and his NATO freak wife and guys like Bill Kristol are Democrats. Just avoid this garbage at all costs. (less)
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