Showing posts with label NK escapee. Show all posts
Showing posts with label NK escapee. Show all posts

2021-10-11

15 ISIS Enshrines a Theology of Rape - The New York Times

ISIS Enshrines a Theology of Rape - The New York Times
Daham Chong
이건 아무리 보아도, sex slavery 또는 "comfort women" 또는 "위안부" 문제가 
경계를 넘어 프랙탈하게 분열/확장하는 대표적인 양상으로 보이는데...
"알라께서 가라사대 곧휴가 영원히 불타오르는 고통을 받으리라" 같은 심판을 받아도 할 말 없을만 한...

A 12-year-old girl in the Kurdistan region of northern Iraq.Credit...Mauricio Lima for The New York Times




ISIS Enshrines a Theology of Rape

Claiming the Quran’s support, the Islamic State codifies sex slavery in conquered regions of Iraq and Syria and uses the practice as a recruiting tool.

2567



By Rukmini Callimachi
Aug. 13, 2015


QADIYA, Iraq — In the moments before he raped the 12-year-old girl, the Islamic State fighter took the time to explain that what he was about to do was not a sin. Because the preteen girl practiced a religion other than Islam, the Quran not only gave him the right to rape her — it condoned and encouraged it, he insisted.

He bound her hands and gagged her. Then he knelt beside the bed and prostrated himself in prayer before getting on top of her.

When it was over, he knelt to pray again, bookending the rape with acts of religious devotion.

“I kept telling him it hurts — please stop,” said the girl, whose body is so small an adult could circle her waist with two hands. “He told me that according to Islam he is allowed to rape an unbeliever. He said that by raping me, he is drawing closer to God,” she said in an interview alongside her family in a refugee camp here, to which she escaped after 11 months of captivity.

The systematic rape of women and girls from the Yazidi religious minority has become deeply enmeshed in the organization and the radical theology of the Islamic State in the year since the group announced it was reviving slavery as an institution. Interviews with 21 women and girls who recently escaped the Islamic State, as well as an examination of the group’s official communications, illuminate how the practice has been enshrined in the group’s core tenets.


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The trade in Yazidi women and girls has created a persistent infrastructure, with a network of warehouses where the victims are held, viewing rooms where they are inspected and marketed, and a dedicated fleet of buses used to transport them.

A total of 5,270 Yazidis were abducted last year, and at least 3,144 are still being held, according to community leaders. To handle them, the Islamic State has developed a detailed bureaucracy of sex slavery, including sales contracts notarized by the ISIS-run Islamic courts. And the practice has become an established recruiting tool to lure men from deeply conservative Muslim societies, where casual sex is taboo and dating is forbidden.

A growing body of internal policy memos and theological discussions has established guidelines for slavery, including a lengthy how-to manual issued by the Islamic State Research and Fatwa Department just last month. Repeatedly, the ISIS leadership has emphasized a narrow and selective reading of the Quran and other religious rulings to not only justify violence, but also to elevate and celebrate each sexual assault as spiritually beneficial, even virtuous.

“Every time that he came to rape me, he would pray,” said F, a 15-year-old girl who was captured on the shoulder of Mount Sinjar one year ago and was sold to an Iraqi fighter in his 20s. Like some others interviewed by The New York Times, she wanted to be identified only by her first initial because of the shame associated with rape.


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“He kept telling me this is ibadah,” she said, using a term from Islamic scripture meaning worship.




ImageA 15-year-old girl who wished to be identified only as F, right, with her father and 4-year-old brother. “Every time that he came to rape me, he would pray,” said F, who was captured by the Islamic State on Mount Sinjar one year ago and sold to an Iraqi fighter.Credit...Mauricio Lima for The New York Times


“He said that raping me is his prayer to God. I said to him, ‘What you’re doing to me is wrong, and it will not bring you closer to God.’ And he said, ‘No, it’s allowed. It’s halal,’ ” said the teenager, who escaped in April with the help of smugglers after being enslaved for nearly nine months.
Calculated Conquest

The Islamic State’s formal introduction of systematic sexual slavery dates to Aug. 3, 2014, when its fighters invaded the villages on the southern flank of Mount Sinjar, a craggy massif of dun-colored rock in northern Iraq.

Its valleys and ravines are home to the Yazidis, a tiny religious minority who represent less than 1.5 percent of Iraq’s estimated population of 34 million.

The offensive on the mountain came just two months after the fall of Mosul, the second-largest city in Iraq. At first, it appeared that the subsequent advance on the mountain was just another attempt to extend the territory controlled by Islamic State fighters.

Almost immediately, there were signs that their aim this time was different.

Survivors say that men and women were separated within the first hour of their capture. Adolescent boys were told to lift up their shirts, and if they had armpit hair, they were directed to join their older brothers and fathers. In village after village, the men and older boys were driven or marched to nearby fields, where they were forced to lie down in the dirt and sprayed with automatic fire.

The women, girls and children, however, were hauled off in open-bed trucks.

“The offensive on the mountain was as much a sexual conquest as it was for territorial gain,” said Matthew Barber, a University of Chicago expert on the Yazidi minority. He was in Dohuk, near Mount Sinjar, when the onslaught began last summer and helped create a foundation that provides psychological support for the escapees, who number more than 2,000, according to community activists.

Fifteen-year-old F says her family of nine was trying to escape, speeding up mountain switchbacks, when their aging Opel overheated. She, her mother, and her sisters — 14, 7, and 4 years old — were helplessly standing by their stalled car when a convoy of heavily armed Islamic State fighters encircled them.


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“Right away, the fighters separated the men from the women,” she said. She, her mother and sisters were first taken in trucks to the nearest town on Mount Sinjar. “There, they separated me from my mom. The young, unmarried girls were forced to get into buses.”

The buses were white, with a painted stripe next to the word “Hajj,” suggesting that the Islamic State had commandeered Iraqi government buses used to transport pilgrims for the annual pilgrimage to Mecca. So many Yazidi women and girls were loaded inside F’s bus that they were forced to sit on each other’s laps, she said.

Once the bus headed out, they noticed that the windows were blocked with curtains, an accouterment that appeared to have been added because the fighters planned to transport large numbers of women who were not covered in burqas or head scarves.

F’s account, including the physical description of the bus, the placement of the curtains and the manner in which the women were transported, is echoed by a dozen other female victims interviewed for this article. They described a similar set of circumstances even though they were kidnapped on different days and in locations miles apart.




Image
Sunset over Dohuk, in the Kurdistan region of northern Iraq. Islamic State militants have conquered large areas of Iraq, and the systematic rape of women and girls from the Yazidi religious minority has become deeply enmeshed in the group's organization and theology.Credit...Mauricio Lima for The New York Times


F says she was driven to the Iraqi city of Mosul some six hours away, where they herded them into the Galaxy Wedding Hall. Other groups of women and girls were taken to a palace from the Saddam Hussein era, the Badoosh prison compound and the Directory of Youth building in Mosul, recent escapees said. And in addition to Mosul, women were herded into elementary schools and municipal buildings in the Iraqi towns of Tal Afar, Solah, Ba’aj and Sinjar City.

They would be held in confinement, some for days, some for months. Then, inevitably, they were loaded into the same fleet of buses again before being sent in smaller groups to Syria or to other locations inside Iraq, where they were bought and sold for sex.


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“It was 100 percent preplanned,” said Khider Domle, a Yazidi community activist who maintains a detailed database of the victims. “I spoke by telephone to the first family who arrived at the Directory of Youth in Mosul, and the hall was already prepared for them. They had mattresses, plates and utensils, food and water for hundreds of people.”

Detailed reports by Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International reach the same conclusion about the organized nature of the sex trade.

In each location, survivors say Islamic State fighters first conducted a census of their female captives.

Inside the voluminous Galaxy banquet hall, F sat on the marble floor, squeezed between other adolescent girls. In all she estimates there were over 1,300 Yazidi girls sitting, crouching, splayed out and leaning against the walls of the ballroom, a number that is confirmed by several other women held in the same location.

They each described how three Islamic State fighters walked in, holding a register. They told the girls to stand. Each one was instructed to state her first, middle and last name, her age, her hometown, whether she was married, and if she had children.

For two months, F was held inside the Galaxy hall. Then one day, they came and began removing young women. Those who refused were dragged out by their hair, she said.

In the parking lot the same fleet of Hajj buses was waiting to take them to their next destination, said F. Along with 24 other girls and young women, the 15-year-old was driven to an army base in Iraq. It was there in the parking lot that she heard the word “sabaya” for the first time.


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“They laughed and jeered at us, saying ‘You are our sabaya.’ I didn’t know what that word meant,” she said. Later on, the local Islamic State leader explained it meant slave.

“He told us that Taus Malik” — one of seven angels to whom the Yazidis pray — “is not God. He said that Taus Malik is the devil and that because you worship the devil, you belong to us. We can sell you and use you as we see fit.”

The Islamic State’s sex trade appears to be based solely on enslaving women and girls from the Yazidi minority. As yet, there has been no widespread campaign aimed at enslaving women from other religious minorities, said Samer Muscati, the author of the recent Human Rights Watch report. That assertion was echoed by community leaders, government officials and other human rights workers.

Mr. Barber, of the University of Chicago, said that the focus on Yazidis was likely because they are seen as polytheists, with an oral tradition rather than a written scripture. In the Islamic State’s eyes that puts them on the fringe of despised unbelievers, even more than Christians and Jews, who are considered to have some limited protections under the Quran as “People of the Book.”

In Kojo, one of the southernmost villages on Mount Sinjar and among the farthest away from escape, residents decided to stay, believing they would be treated as the Christians of Mosul had months earlier. On Aug. 15, 2014, the Islamic State ordered the residents to report to a school in the center of town.

When she got there, 40-year-old Aishan Ali Saleh found a community elder negotiating with the Islamic State, asking if they could be allowed to hand over their money and gold in return for safe passage.

The fighters initially agreed and laid out a blanket, where Ms. Saleh placed her heart-shaped pendant and her gold rings, while the men left crumpled bills.


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Image
Aishan Ali Saleh, 40, at a refugee camp on the outskirts of Dohuk. She had lived in Kojo, one of the southernmost villages on Mount Sinjar, which was overrun by Islamic State fighters.Credit...Mauricio Lima for The New York Times



Instead of letting them go, the fighters began shoving the men outside, bound for death.

Sometime later, a fleet of cars arrived and the women, girls and children were driven away.
The Market

Months later, the Islamic State made clear in its online magazine that its campaign of enslaving Yazidi women and girls had been extensively preplanned.

“Prior to the taking of Sinjar, Shariah students in the Islamic State were tasked to research the Yazidis,” said the English-language article, headlined “The Revival of Slavery Before the Hour,” which appeared in the October issue of the magazine, Dabiq.

The article made clear that for the Yazidis, there was no chance to pay a tax known as jizya to be set free, “unlike the Jews and Christians.”

“After capture, the Yazidi women and children were then divided according to the Shariah amongst the fighters of the Islamic State who participated in the Sinjar operations, after one fifth of the slaves were transferred to the Islamic State’s authority to be divided” as spoils, the article said.


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ISIS ‘Slave Market Day’
In a video posted in October 2014 on YouTube, a group of men believed to be Islamic State fighters are shown sitting in a room bantering about buying and selling Yazidi girls on “slave market day.”

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0:53ISIS ‘Slave Market Day’In a video posted in October 2014 on YouTube, a group of men believed to be Islamic State fighters are shown sitting in a room bantering about buying and selling Yazidi girls on “slave market day.”CreditCredit...via YouTube user BreakingNews


In much the same way as specific Bible passages were used centuries later to support the slave trade in the United States, the Islamic State cites specific verses or stories in the Quran or else in the Sunna, the traditions based on the sayings and deeds of the Prophet Muhammad, to justify their human trafficking, experts say.

Scholars of Islamic theology disagree, however, on the proper interpretation of these verses, and on the divisive question of whether Islam actually sanctions slavery.

Many argue that slavery figures in Islamic scripture in much the same way that it figures in the Bible — as a reflection of the period in antiquity in which the religion was born.

“In the milieu in which the Quran arose, there was a widespread practice of men having sexual relationships with unfree women,” said Kecia Ali, an associate professor of religion at Boston University and the author of a book on slavery in early Islam. “It wasn’t a particular religious institution. It was just how people did things.”

Cole Bunzel, a scholar of Islamic theology at Princeton University, disagrees, pointing to the numerous references to the phrase “Those your right hand possesses” in the Quran, which for centuries has been interpreted to mean female slaves. He also points to the corpus of Islamic jurisprudence, which continues into the modern era and which he says includes detailed rules for the treatment of slaves.

“There is a great deal of scripture that sanctions slavery,” said Mr. Bunzel, the author of a research paper published by the Brookings Institution on the ideology of the Islamic State. “You can argue that it is no longer relevant and has fallen into abeyance. ISIS would argue that these institutions need to be revived, because that is what the Prophet and his companions did.”


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The youngest, prettiest women and girls were bought in the first weeks after their capture. Others — especially older, married women — described how they were transported from location to location, spending months in the equivalent of human holding pens, until a prospective buyer bid on them.

Their captors appeared to have a system in place, replete with its own methodology of inventorying the women, as well as their own lexicon. Women and girls were referred to as “Sabaya,” followed by their name. Some were bought by wholesalers, who photographed and gave them numbers, to advertise them to potential buyers.

Osman Hassan Ali, a Yazidi businessman who has successfully smuggled out numerous Yazidi women, said he posed as a buyer in order to be sent the photographs. He shared a dozen images, each one showing a Yazidi woman sitting in a bare room on a couch, facing the camera with a blank, unsmiling expression. On the edge of the photograph is written in Arabic, “Sabaya No. 1,” “Sabaya No. 2,” and so on.

Buildings where the women were collected and held sometimes included a viewing room.

“When they put us in the building, they said we had arrived at the ‘Sabaya Market,’” said one 19-year-old victim, whose first initial is I. “I understood we were now in a slave market.”




Image
A woman, who said she was raped by Islamic State militants, at a refugee camp in the Kurdistan region of northern Iraq.Credit...Mauricio Lima for The New York Times


She estimated there were at least 500 other unmarried women and girls in the multistory building, with the youngest among them being 11. When the buyers arrived, the girls were taken one by one into a separate room.

“The emirs sat against the wall and called us by name. We had to sit in a chair facing them. You had to look at them, and before you went in, they took away our scarves and anything we could have used to cover ourselves,” she said.


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“When it was my turn, they made me stand four times. They made me turn around.”

The captives were also forced to answer intimate questions, including reporting the exact date of their last menstrual cycle. They realized that the fighters were trying to determine whether they were pregnant, in keeping with a Shariah rule stating that a man cannot have intercourse with his slave if she is pregnant.
Property of ISIS

The use of sex slavery by the Islamic State initially surprised even the group’s most ardent supporters, many of whom sparred with journalists online after the first reports of systematic rape.

The Islamic State’s leadership has repeatedly sought to justify the practice to its internal audience.

After the initial article in Dabiq in October, the issue came up in the publication again this year, in an editorial in May that expressed the writer’s hurt and dismay at the fact that some of the group’s own sympathizers had questioned the institution of slavery.

“What really alarmed me was that some of the Islamic State’s supporters started denying the matter as if the soldiers of the Khilafah had committed a mistake or evil,” the author wrote. “I write this while the letters drip of pride,’’ she said. “We have indeed raided and captured the kafirah women and drove them like sheep by the edge of the sword.” Kafirah refers to infidels.

In a pamphlet published online in December, the Research and Fatwa Department of the Islamic State detailed best practices, including explaining that slaves belong to the estate of the fighter who bought them and therefore can be willed to another man and disposed of just like any other property after his death.


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Recent escapees describe an intricate bureaucracy surrounding their captivity, with their status as a slave registered in a contract. When their owner would sell them to another buyer, a new contract would be drafted, like transferring a property deed. At the same time, slaves can also be set free, and fighters are promised a heavenly reward for doing so.

Though rare, this has created one avenue of escape for victims.

A 25-year-old victim who escaped last month, identified by her first initial, A, described how one day her Libyan master handed her a laminated piece of paper. He explained that he had finished his training as a suicide bomber and was planning to blow himself up, and was therefore setting her free.




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A woman from the village of Tojo washing dishes in a refugee camp in Kurdistan. She was held by the Islamic State from last August until June and says she was sexually abused.Credit...Mauricio Lima for The New York Times


Labeled a “Certificate of Emancipation,” the document was signed by the judge of the western province of the Islamic State. The Yazidi woman presented it at security checkpoints as she left Syria to return to Iraq, where she rejoined her family in July.

The Islamic State recently made it clear that sex with Christian and Jewish women captured in battle is also permissible, according to a new 34-page manual issued this summer by the terror group’s Research and Fatwa Department.

Just about the only prohibition is having sex with a pregnant slave, and the manual describes how an owner must wait for a female captive to have her menstruating cycle, in order to “make sure there is nothing in her womb,” before having intercourse with her. Of the 21 women and girls interviewed for this article, among the only ones who had not been raped were the women who were already pregnant at the moment of their capture, as well as those who were past menopause.

Beyond that, there appears to be no bounds to what is sexually permissible. Child rape is explicitly condoned: “It is permissible to have intercourse with the female slave who hasn’t reached puberty, if she is fit for intercourse,” according to a translation by the Middle East Media Research Institute of a pamphlet published on Twitter last December.


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Image
A 25-year-old Yazidi woman showed a “Certificate of Emancipation” given to her by a Libyan who had enslaved her. He explained that he had finished his training as a suicide bomber and was planning to blow himself up, and was therefore setting her free.Credit...Mauricio Lima for The New York Times


One 34-year-old Yazidi woman, who was bought and repeatedly raped by a Saudi fighter in the Syrian city of Shadadi, described how she fared better than the second slave in the household — a 12-year-old girl who was raped for days on end despite heavy bleeding.

“He destroyed her body. She was badly infected. The fighter kept coming and asking me, ‘Why does she smell so bad?’ And I said, she has an infection on the inside, you need to take care of her,” the woman said.

Unmoved, he ignored the girl’s agony, continuing the ritual of praying before and after raping the child.

“I said to him, ‘She’s just a little girl,’ ” the older woman recalled. “And he answered: ‘No. She’s not a little girl. She’s a slave. And she knows exactly how to have sex.’ ’’

“And having sex with her pleases God,” he said.
Correction: Aug. 13, 2015

An earlier version of this article misstated the location of Matthew Barber when the invasion of Mount Sinjar began in August 2014. He was in Dohuk, near Mount Sinjar, not on the mountain itself.
Correction: Aug. 25, 2015

Because of an editing error, an article on Aug. 14 about the Islamic State’s codification of sexual slavery in the regions of Iraq and Syria that it has conquered referred incorrectly to the author of an editorial in Dabiq, the group’s online magazine, that lamented the fact that some ISIS sympathizers were questioning the institution of slavery. The author, who was not named, is a woman.
A version of this article appears in print on Aug. 14, 2015, Section A, Page 1 of the New York edition with the headline: Enslaving Young Girls, the Islamic State Builds a Vast System of Rape. Order Reprints | Today’s Paper | Subscribe
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Kidnapping and Sex Slavery: Covering ISIS’ Religious Justification for RapeAug. 14, 2015


2021-09-30

Japan-China Business Relations: Symbiotic Pragmatism for the Asian Century? - TheJapanologist.com

Japan-China Business Relations: Symbiotic Pragmatism for the Asian Century? - TheJapanologist.com



Japan-China Business Relations: Symbiotic Pragmatism for the Asian Century?
Jun 17
Written By Ulrike Schaede


The trade war between U.S. and China expands and extends almost daily, giving the word “decoupling” a new, and for some increasingly scary, meaning. Today’s news is that China’s two leading technology universities can longer purchase or access U.S. equipment and software without U.S. government approval. While many find these measures justified to level the playing field, others worry that the U.S. decoupling moves may backfire. One doomsday scenario is that trade relations in Asia are becoming more independent from U.S. markets and companies, and the post-COVID recovery in Asia may happen without the United States. It has long been forecast that the 21st century will be the Asian century. If America doesn’t pay attention, it may well be left hung out to dry while Asia reorganizes and grows its own trade relations and consumer markets.






The Japan-China Connection

The main – and often overlooked – engine feeding into this scenario is the newly emerging Asian trade dynamics, anchored on pragmatic and symbiotic business relations between China and Japan. Perhaps needless to say, these are the world’s second- and third-largest economies. Pre-COVID, their joint GDP was about $15 trillion, compared to $18 trillion in the U.S.. What is more, the two economies are increasingly intertwined by way of a new type of trade dependencies in the Asian supply chains. As U.S. policy-making remains based on 20th century, bilateral, market-to-market thinking, Asia is building its own 21st century network and trade economy. Clearly, both countries still need U.S. market and technology ideas as well as consumer spending. But, should those dry up, it is conceivable that Asia will just turn to or build greener pastures without the U.S.

Relations between China and Japan are as complicated as they are long, dating back to the 7th century at least. Japan has borrowed much from Chinese culture: the written language, Buddhism, and even ramen noodles were originally China imports. In contrast, Japan’s spoken language and grammar, Shintoism and sushi are as homegrown as the Toyota Production System. There are many painful scars from this history, in particular World War II, that run deep and continue to challenge diplomatic relations. There is also a new geopolitical angst concerning China’s rising military power and apparent appetite for expansion. And, the two peoples are quite different in terms of social norms of behavior, preferences and mindset.

But, as much as history is complicated, when it comes to money and trade the two countries have found a new, mutual beneficial equilibrium ruled by pragmatism, as I argue in Chapter 5 of my new book. Perhaps ironically, this situation is symbiotic and stable, not in spite of but because it is highly unequal. Both sides have something the other side needs. While the people may not be best buddies – though more on Gen-Z below – there is a lot of mutual pragmatic give-and-take in business relations, as companies are finding ways for both to win.

Trade and FDI Between Japan and China: A Pre-COVID Snapshot

In 2018, the bilateral trade between Japan and China was almost balanced, with roughly $178 billion in exports and imports when trade through Hong Kong is included. For Japan, China is by far the largest trading partner, accounting for about 25% of both exports and imports. And 2018 data suggest that for China, Japan was the second largest export destination and third largest import source, after the U.S. and South Korea.




The point with this table is to highlight that over the past two decades, a new situation has emerged whereby China and Japan rank first for each other in a variety of categories. It is still true that the U.S. has long been the largest destination for Japanese foreign direct investment (FDI), dating back to the U.S.-Japan trade wars of 1980s and 1990s when the U.S. established trade rules that incentivized Japanese companies to open production sites in the U.S.. But more recently, Japan has recently become by far the largest foreign operator of business sites in China, with over 32,000 sales offices, factories and partial stakes in companies in China. Conversely, for Japan this number means that China accounts for 43% of Japan’s offshore businesses sites (even though the scale of Japan’s operations in the U.S. is still larger).

The Northeast Asia Trade Triangle: Japan - China - Taiwan - Korea

This new China-Japan relationship does not exist in a vacuum. Rather, it is part of a larger web of business relations that has been built over the past two decades in Northeast Asia. It is fair to say that there is a new division of labor in Asia: China has become Asia’s assembler, and Japan the specialized manufacturer of high-tech components and the source of innovation and ideation. As more and more Japanese companies are pursuing an aggregate niche strategy, they lead important product categories in the provision of deep-tech input components and materials. These deep-tech input materials reach China mostly via the route of Taiwan and South Korea. There, advanced films, adhesives, and components are built into input parts, such as the screen of your cell phone or computer. Japanese companies look back on over 50 years of experience in these difficult-to-make and difficult-to-imitate inputs, and to this are now adding new capacity-building in deep-tech innovation.

So we get a trade triangle: South Korean and Taiwanese firms buy the input resources, turn them into parts (often using highly advanced Japanese production machinery), and then sell these to companies in China for assembly.





Trade Relations in Northeast Asia in 2018,


in US-$ billion

, constructed from UN Comtrade and Taiwan Bureau of Trade,



see my book for details.

The Business Reinvention of Japan: How to Make Sense of the New Japan and Why It Matters 1st Edition
by Ulrike Schaede (Author)



Even as the trade between China and Japan has been quite level for a few years now, South Korea and Taiwan have a growing trade deficit with Japan, and China has a growing trade deficit with South Korea and Taiwan.



Japan-China Symbiosis

The reason that this trade mesh has been growing continuously over the past two decades is that its two cornerstones, China and Japan, both need it and enjoy it. Two factors make this new relationship symbiotic. The first is sheer size, including the size of China’s consumer markets and the amount of trade that flows between the two countries. And the second is their different positions in the global value chains. And it is this difference that creates valuable synergies.

China, not unlike Japan in the 1960s and 1970s, achieved rapid growth through export promotion and low-cost manufacturing of consumer goods. Government subsidies, high domestic savings, and technology adaption were the main drivers, though with the obvious differences that China is not a democracy and most of its large firms are state-owned enterprises. However, whereas Japan in the 1960-1980s had closed down its markets to any foreign investment, China’s growth has depended critically on foreign capital and knowledge, and China happily became the world’s assembler. This means that Japan grew by developing its own, entirely domestic vertical production capabilities, with constant upgrading and organizational learning. In contrast, Chinese companies copied the technologies that foreigners brought into the country, but then specialized in the lower value-added, lower cost parts of value creation, i.e., final assembly. Thus, China developed a system built for import, assembly, and reexport, whereas Japan had developed a complete domestic value chain from product design to final sale.






This put Japan at an advantage when companies decided to relinquish low-tech consumer end product markets and move upstream into deep-tech technologies and advanced materials – from the assembly of toaster-ovens to advanced components and sensors, so to say. Few Japanese companies make semiconductors today, but there are certain steps in the global production of semiconductors that rely to 100% on a technology from Japan. Having built capabilities across the entire value chain in its version of the “developmental state” means that Japanese companies can in fact exit the lower value-added activities and switch into the higher margin, upstream niches. China now wants to do something similar, and turn from the “factory of the world” to its own, independent economic powerhouse. This was proposed in its 2015 industrial policy program “Made in China 2025”, which identifies industries such as pharmaceuticals, automotive and aerospace industries, semiconductors, IT and robotics as growth sectors. All of these are large-scale industries and encroach on Japan’s bailiwick. However, today China does not have the capabilities to produce all inputs at global quality levels. Enter Japan.

In the medium run, the industrial structures and goals of the two countries are more complementary than competitive. Given China’s population size and pressures to scale fast, China’s focus for 2025 is on industries that promise large volume and huge manufacturing installations. The areas that Japanese companies are focusing on in the aggregate niche strategy are small and demand different innovation and manufacturing capabilities. Given Japan’s shrinking population and labor shortages, scale is no longer as important as profit margins, so it can afford to zoom in on these smaller niches.

A second, perhaps quite obvious, reason for the symbiotic pragmatism underlying the China-Japan business relations is that China’s #1 aspiration right now is not be dependent on the U.S.. Being dependent on Japan for a set of critical input parts may not be desirable, but it is much preferable over being depending on the United States.

Will this last? Naturally, some Chinese companies are exploring the technologies and processes that are currently procured from Japan. It is unlikely that Japan’s aggregate niche strategy will last forever, as markets are dynamics and coalitions shift constantly. But as of 2020, this situation seems to be in a medium-run equilibrium. Chinese companies still lag behind Japanese companies in some of these advanced materials and components, and of course none of these competitors is sitting still. Even though from the distance a rising China may look like a threat to Japan, currently the aggregate niche strategy affords Japan’s leading companies a nice competitive advantage. Even under “Made in China 2025”, China still needs Japan. And for Japan with its aging and shrinking society, China has already become the largest export and consumer market.







Asia’s Gen Z: “What history?”

And, finally, there is also the generational shift, and the new “hipness” factor that Japan enjoys in Asia. The table above showed that China is Japan’s largest trading partner in tourism, and almost half of foreign students in Japan hail from China. And, Japan’s stellar reputation for high-quality products and brands, from cosmetics to shoes, has turned “Made in Japan” labels into the new aspiration of upward-bound young Asians, and young Chinese are no exception. These growing cultural ties are underlying the broader economic nexus in East and Southeast Asia. First, there is a cultural affinity and shared fashion preferences among up-and-coming young Asian. And, the milennials — and certainly Gen-Z that was born after China had already launched its rise in the 1990s – carry less of a history grudge.

Many have wholeheartedly embraced Japanese pop culture, beauty products, and fashion, as the quality of Japanese products has made Japanese cosmetics, movies, and brands the #1 symbol of luxury and accomplishment. Travel to Japan, eating raw fish, getting a Japanese-style haircut, and wearing made-in-Japan Uniqlo are signs of accomplishment across Asia. Many quietly, and some even openly, agree with this observation of an industry executive in Asia: “Japan is the place the kids are looking up to”.

The Post-COVID Asia Trade Triangle

Then what does this mean for post-Corona economic recovery in Asia? Given the structure and stickiness of the supply chain network in Asia, barring a huge disaster or war, it appears that decoupling is effectively impossible in Asia. Too many economies are too dependent on each other and the supply chain network they have created over the past three decades, for anybody to be interested in breaking these down. Each of these countries has their own domestic baggage to carry, but in terms of regional recovery of economic activity, it appears that Asia is tied together. A recent IMF forecast predicting vastly differential growth rates in Japan, Korea and China seems somewhat implausible.

As long as there no unexpected major shocks – an extension of the pandemic, an earthquake, etc. — it is in the interest of both Japan and China to keep a good thing going, and if need be, without the querulous U.S.. And as U.S. consumer markets fall flat due to a severe recession, they view the exploration and growth of new markets, such as in South East Asia, as ever more important. Of course, counterbalancing this business bliss is the growing fear about world peace and world order stability, as well as global health. But ceteris paribus, just in business terms, it may just so happen that Asia will launch its economic recovery without the U.S. consumer as their core address.


Ulrike Schaede





How Japanese Companies have Reacted to the Rise of China

To escape the growing price competition for consumer end products in Asia, over the past two decades Japan’s leading companies have pivoted away from those markets and into advanced upstream input materials and components. While there is no “Japan Inside” label on the final products, this has made Japan a critical technology anchor of many global supply chains. The leading Japanese companies have adopted an “aggregate niche strategy” that allows them to occupy large market shares in a series of deep-tech niches. And, to switch to these new positions on the technology frontier, they have also begun to change their internal management processes and HR practices. At a time of decoupling, shifting trade regimes and the digital transformation, Japan continues to be a global manufacturing force to be reckoned with.



For a related op-ed piece, see Brad Glosserman in the Japan Times

Book reviews:

Dec 18, 2020

A business book about Japan that is both practical and polemic.

Stephen CoxClick here to view Stephen Cox’s profile
Stephen Cox
Japan market strategist / business transformer
Published Dec 18, 2020
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An excellent book that looks from the granular to the great to illustrate how Japan’s slow-but-sure re-processing of innovation and evolution will tame change and return it to the leading edge of the global economy.

This is a tortoise & hare story of the challenges and opportunities of Japan’s business world.

In it, Professor Ulrike Schaede (UC San Diego) makes a convincing case that it is the tortoise’s granular attention to defining detail, to creating consensus, and to patient on-boarding that enables it to design an economic model for the future. Indeed, it is Japan’s in-it-for-the-long-run mindset, seeking long-term corporate and social benefit while eschewing the outside world’s overwhelming focus on short-term shareholder return, that will ensure Japan’s staying power, and allow change without the social disruption seen elsewhere. 

Professor Schaede artfully describes the underlying, difficult to define, but ever-present cultural and social drivers of business that I believe anyone contemplating the market must come to understand (though few actually do). This extremely useful practical guide occupies much of the early part of the work, and serves to set the context for the weightier new insights that form the premise of her book later on.

Her premise is an emerging reinvention of business that will reposition Japan’s global and domestic businesses as unique suppliers of critical new components in global value chains. She posits that these ‘aggregate-niche strategies’ will carve out new value in the world economy for Japan.

She further argues that it will do so while leveraging its traditional strengths and products even as they wane in the face of new competition and commoditization. To illustrate this deliberate duality of purpose, she references Harvard Business School Professor Michael Tushman's ‘explorers and exploiters’ concept.

For transparency, I should note that part of my admiration for the book stems from Dr. Schaede’s nod to this concept, which has long informed my own approach to innovation in managing businesses in fast changing environments.

Whether the aggregate niche strategy exists as a deliberate design, coordinated enough to rejuvenate Japan Inc, or is more of a coincidental convergence of institutional initiatives (which would require a healthy dose of serendipity to succeed), is still an open question for me. However, when held up to the light of Abenomics, and the reforms of Prime Minister Koizumi before that, Professor Schaede’s premise seems more than plausible. It could even be the inevitable outcome of the slow, purposeful and opaque movements of the faceless dancers that make up what Karel Van Wolferen called ‘The System’ in his book The Enigma of Japanese Power.
===



After two decades of reinvention, Japanese companies are re-emerging as major players in the new digital economy. They have responded to the rise of China and new global competition by moving upstream into critical deep-tech inputs and advanced materials and components. This new "aggregate niche strategy" has made Japan the technology anchor for many global supply chains. Although the end products do not carry a "Japan Inside" label, Japan plays a pivotal role in our everyday lives across many critical industries.

This book is an in-depth exploration of current Japanese business strategies that make Japan the world's third-largest economy and an economic leader in Asia. To accomplish their reinvention, Japan's largest companies are building new processes of breakthrough innovation. Central to this book is how they are addressing the necessary changes in organizational design, internal management processes, employment, and corporate governance. Because Japan values social stability and economic equality, this reinvention is happening slowly and methodically, and has gone largely unnoticed by Western observers. Yet, Japan's more balanced model of "caring capitalism" is both competitive and transformative, and more socially responsible than the unbridled growth approach of the United States.


Editorial Reviews
Review
"Ulrike Schaede's new book combines an invaluable primer on Japanese business culture with a striking analysis of Japan's little understood strategy for producing enduring economic strength based on manufacturing excellence and constant, managed change. I came away with renewed admiration for the country's political and corporate leadership, and Japan's ability to forge a successful economic future despite the many daunting challenges one often hears about." -- Ambassador Ira Shapiro, former U.S. Trade Negotiator with Japan ― former Chairman of the National Association of Japan-America Societies

"This authoritative and sophisticated account of how Japanese companies have quietly reformulated how they compete in the global economy is a timely reminder why we need to pay attention to Japan. Japanese companies and their technologies remain, and will continue to remain, critically relevant in our fast-changing world." -- Alberto Moel ― VEO Robotics

"For more than a generation, the outside world has been ready to write off Japan's economy as yesterday's story, in contrast to the tomorrows being created elsewhere, especially in China. Ulrike Schaede clearly and convincingly lays out how out-of-touch that judgment is―and how much more impressive the creativity, flexibility, and re-invention of the Japanese business system look when examined up close. The crispness and concision of the book make it a pleasure to read, and its originality will make it useful for anyone who wants to understand the next stage in global business." -- James Fallows ― The Atlantic

"Schaede truly understands Japanese business strategy and culture. With deep insights and keen analysis, she offers an update on how Japanese companies are evolving to compete in the new global economy. And, she shows how they carefully harmonize social stability with economic success." -- Kyota Omori, Chairman ― Mitsubishi Research Institute

"A gem! Schaede links corporate culture to incentives and outcomes, and shows how Japanese firms have kept the tight corporate culture that makes things right, but add elements of the loose culture that makes the right things. She gives concrete examples of Japanese firms that got it right and how they did it." -- Robert Alan Feldman ― Tokyo University of Science

"Japan's economy and its evolving business systems matter, and this insightful evaluation explains how and why. A definite read." -- Hugh T. Patrick, Chairman, Center on Japanese Economy and Business ― Columbia Business School

"Schaede's book offers an up-to-date, intriguing, rich, and easy to read account of changes in Japanese business over the last 20 years. As such, it deserves a wide readership and it will definitely enter my reading list for students." -- Harald Conrad ― The Journal of Japanese Studies
About the Author
Ulrike Schaede is Professor of Japanese Business at the School of Global Policy and Strategy, and Director of the Japan Forum for Innovation and Technology, at the University of California San Diego. She is the author of seven books, including Choose and Focus: Japanese Business Strategies for the 21st Century (2008).
Product details
Publisher ‏ : ‎ Stanford Business Books; 1st edition (June 16, 2020)
Language ‏ : ‎ English
Hardcover ‏ : ‎ 280 pages
ISBN-10 ‏ : ‎ 1503612252
ISBN-13 ‏ : ‎ 978-1503612259
Item Weight ‏ : ‎ 1.3 pounds
Dimensions ‏ : ‎ 6.3 x 1.2 x 9.1 inches
Best Sellers Rank: #767,206 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
#133 in Comparative Economics (Books)
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#272 in International Business (Books)
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Steven Forth
5.0 out of 5 stars An important study of national industrial strategy and change management with broad relevance
Reviewed in the United States on August 22, 2020
Verified Purchase
Who should read this book?
- Business and technology leaders of companies with a wide portfolio of technology offers
- Business and technology leaders of companies that compete to control supply chains (companies compete within supply chains for profit share; supply chains compete for market share)
- Investors, especially those in private equity
- National policy and strategy leaders working on the creation and implementation of national industrial policies
- Those interested in the economic dynamics of East Asia (China, South Korea, Taiwan, Japan)
- Those interested in the evolution of technology and technology based economies
- Those interested in the impact of demographics on economic structure and performance
- Anyone who lives and works, or who has lived and worked in Japan

I tick a number of these boxes and found this book completely engaging. I spent a decade in Tokyo during the 1980s bubble and left in part because of the hubris of Japanese business leaders at the time. I have made a number of investments in Japanese software and media companies over the years. My wife is Japanese and we visit Japan most years.

Ulrike Schaede has a deep knowledge of the Japanese economy, politics, companies and culture, but wears this knowledge lightly and let's the facts and story tell itself.

Many people have written off Japan and see it as a declining power, with a shrinking economy, mired in debt, suffering from lost decades. China absorbs almost all the attention and there are some analysts who think that Japan (and the EU) have little role to play in the future of technology (see AI Superpowers by Kai-Fu Lee). This book shows how much has been changing in Japan over the past two decades. Japanese companies have emerged as the control centers for many of the key supply chains that global technology depends on. This became apparent after the 2011 Tohoku earthquake. This is not an accident but a strategy, one that Schaede refers to as niche aggregation (supply chain control might be a better term).

Enabling this strategy is requiring major cultural change. Schaede analyses this using Michele Gelfand's tight-loose theory of culture. Some countries, like Japan, have tight cultures where conformity is highly valued. Others, like the US, have loose cultures where people have more freedom to challenge norms (if you read this as a value judgement you are too deeply embedded in your own culture to understand the strengths of the other approach). Schaede looks at how society, government and leading companies in a tight culture are making the changes needed to execute on a strategy that requires continuous innovation.

The new strategy also required a new approach to corporate financing and Schaede looks at how the main bank led debt financing approach that served Japan well during the postwar boom contributed to the 1980s asset bubble and then slowed the transformation to new models for wealth creation. Private equity now plays a much more important role, but that this is private equity Japan style with goals, values and behaviors quite different from US funds.

The book include some mini case studies of companies that have succeeded in the transformation and others that are struggling. AGC (formerly Asahi Glass), Recruit, Sony, Keyence, Fanuc, etc. are all mentioned. I would like to go deeper on these studies and I am hoping that there are cases available.

All of the mature economies (including China and soon India and Brazil) are entering a period of population decline. This could be one of the most hopeful developments in history and lead to wealthier, more humane, creative societies that live as constructive parts of the environment. Or it could by a dystopian wreck. Japan is farther along this road than any other country and it is important that we study and learn from it. This book is a good place to begin that learning.
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L. Wang
5.0 out of 5 stars Award winning book!
Reviewed in the United States on May 10, 2021
Verified Purchase
This book just won the Ohira Memorial Prize. Better buy a copy before it sells out. Great insights about contemporary Japan. Even tells you things about the escapee Carlos Ghosn. Written by someone who really knows the country, the society and the economy.
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2021-08-31

Performing Death and Memory: Ancestral Rites of North Koreans in Exile Markus Bell

 Performing Death and Memory: Ancestral Rites of North Koreans in Exile

 

Markus Bell

While there is an increasing interest in the economic and political relationships of North Koreans in exile to the homeland, little has been said on the significance of North Koreans’ everyday cultural practices in the places they resettle. Based on a year of interviews and participant observation, this article examines an oftenoverlooked aspect of North Korean spiritual life: the performance of Confucian commemorative practices in North Korea and in the homes of North Koreans now living in South Korea and in Japan. Specifically, this article asks what North Koreans’ commemorative practices tell us about the seismic economic, political, and social changes that have occurred in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) since the collapse of the bi-polar cold war world order. How has the political economy of the DPRK, established with the Kim family at its heart, shaped the relationship of the living to the dead? And how do individuals who survived traumatic experiences, such as the North Korean famine, draw on ritual practices to make sense of the experience of living in exile? I suggest that acts of remembrance help divided families negotiate feelings of guilt and sorrow and enable members of the growing North Korean diaspora to foster a collective sense of self and reconnect to the country they were forced to leave.

Keywords: migration, diaspora, North Korea, ancestor worship, kinship, memory

Korean Studies, Volume 45. © 2021 by University of Hawai‘i Press. All rights reserved.

Introduction

In North Korea, my sons performed the ancestor worship after my husband died. Then they also died. Now, since my daughter and two grandchildren have arrived in Japan, I do it with them in my house. When I do ancestor worship I feel very lonely. We can tell the spirits what we’ve been doing and apologize for not looking after them properly, but we still miss them.—Yamamoto Hiroko (2014)

In the mid-1990s, out migration from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (hereafter DPRK/North Korea) increased dramatically, provoked largely by a famine that is estimated to have caused the death of some 600,000 to one million people by starvation and malnutrition related diseases (Haggard and Noland, 2007:11). Citizens of the country who left during the famine years usually headed north, crossing into China in search of food and economic support. A small number continued their journey to the Republic of Korea (hereafter South Korea/ROK), and in some cases Japan. As the North Korean diaspora has grown in number, it has also reached beyond East Asia. Escapees from the DPRK now live in countries such as the United Kingdom, Canada, the United States, Australia, and Germany, to name a few (Song and Bell, 2018).

When people migrate they do not cut themselves off from friends and family, nor do they abandon cultural practices peculiar to their homeland. On the contrary, through transnational practices, specifically, “the fluidity with which ideas, objects, capital, and people now move across borders and boundaries” (Basch et al., 2000:27), migrants build multistranded social relationships that have both instrumental and emotional purposes: transferring capital, goods and ideas, while maintaining familial and organizational relationships and shaping new identities and understandings of belonging on the other (Skrbiš, 2008; Bell, 2013, 2018:6–7). Subsequently, in the age of globalization, highly mobile people are facilitating the cross-fertilization or “creolization” of diasporic identities and cultural practices on an unprecedented scale (Hannerz, 1987; Cohen, 2007).

For some 32,000 North Koreans in South Korea (Ministry of Unification) and an estimated 300 returnees from North Korea now in Japan,1 transnational connections to North Korea have not been limited to globally connected political activists (cf. Yeo and Chubb, 2018), nor to underground networks moving economic remittances, information, and goods that are destined for North Korean black markets (Baek, 2016).2 While there is an increasing interest in the long-distance economic and political relationships within the North Korean diaspora to the homeland, little has been said on the significance of North Koreans’ everyday cultural practices in the places they resettle and how, through these practices, ordinary people attempt to resist and avoid the state and its mechanisms of surveillance (Choi, 2013:657). Cultural practices here refer to such activities as the preparation and consumption of North Korean food (Bell, 2013), the performance of North Korean song and dance (Koo, 2016; Sands, 2018), the participation of North Koreans in religious and secular civic institutions (Han, 2013; Jung, 2015; Bell, 2016), and otherwise overlooked interactions that take place in daily lives and living spaces (Choi, 2013). Based on a year of interviews and participant observation, this article examines an often-overlooked aspect of North Koreans’ spiritual life: the performance of commemorative practices in North Korea and in the homes of North Koreans now living in South Korea and in Japan.

Religious practices occupy a central role in the life of a community. Emile Durkheim (1964), in his study of Australian Aboriginal totemism, described religious life as a system of ideas for individuals to represent themselves and their intimate social relations. Religious rites in particular, according to Durkheim’s (1964:219–227) functionalist perspective, offer a time when communal life attains its greatest intensity, and the bonds within a clan are strengthened. Durkheim called the energy of communal rituals a “collective effervescence” that subsumes the individual into the group, thereby promoting social cohesion. Paul Connerton (1989:50) extended Durkheim’s symbolic interpretation, suggesting that rituals be understood as representing “particular concepts of what a society is and of how it functions” in contexts in which power is distributed unequally. In other words, the power dynamics, rules, and taboos that structure rituals are contingent on broader societal changes. The shifts in communal rituals that occur over time are best read as a symbolic text through which a group embodies and performs communally identifiable narratives. Such group narratives contribute to fostering a “collective self-definition” (Hall, 1992:292) among participants, and reinforce a connection with the past that shapes group memory in the present.

The relationship of religious practices to transnational mobility is by no means a new or under-researched phenomenon. As with other forms of exchange, the global transference, diffusion, and emergent cultural heterogeneity of religious ideas have accelerated with the intensification of modern forms of travel and communication (cf. Csordas, 2009; Vertovec, 2009:145). In the era of globalization, the relationship between mobility and religion in Asia has been made salient by ethnographic research into people displaced by both an expanding market economy and regional political turmoil (cf. Cao and Lau, 2013; Tapp, 2013). Religious practices have been framed as a means by which diasporic communities imagine a collective identity through transtemporal and translocative symbols connecting them to the homeland (Tweed, 1997:10). Such practices contribute to the resettlement and stability of people displaced across multiple locations. The experiences of Karen refugees displaced in the border regions of Thailand and Myanmar, for example, underline how religion can be mobilized in the context of displacement, as people “[d]raw upon familiar cultural schema to create a sense of place, security, and belonging in a new home” (Rangkla, 2013:10).

In this article, I do not claim that North Korean defectors’ longdistance commemorations are entirely unique from, for example, those of South Korean labor migrants in Japan. Nor do I suggest that their commemorative rituals are only controlled and mediated within North Korea—Judy Han has successfully shown that some North Koreans who escape their country are subsequently controlled and shaped by the custody of faith-based missions in China (Han, 2013). Rather, this article highlights the creative and often overlooked means that migrant families from the DPRK reconnect to ancestors and ancestral lands by imagining the joining of intimate spaces in the host society to emotionally charged sites in the homeland.

In this article, I understand religious rituals as a means for individuals to foster a sense of communal belonging and strengthen kinship ties that have been fragmented by forced migration. I theorize that the performance of ancestor worship supports the belief that the spirit makes the journey from North Korea to kin now in places like Seoul or Osaka. Participants’ belief that they are meeting with the spirits of deceased family subsequently helps them to negotiate feelings of guilt and regret associated with being unable to tend to ancestors buried in the hillsides of villages and towns they left behind. The findings of this article highlight that the transnational connections of diasporic communities, in this case North Koreans in exile, are manifest in ways beyond the material and the political. I suggest that the imagined reunions taking place between ancestors from North Korea and their living kin in South Korea and Japan suggests that the spiritual realm is just as important as earthly forms of exchange between displaced, divided families.

Performing rituals are a particularly significant way to reaffirm membership to a kin lineage and provide a sense of order to the dislocating experience of migration and resettlement. But to what kind of historic past do such traditions reconnect? Specifically, what do North Koreans’ commemorative practices tell us about the seismic economic, political, and social changes that have occurred in the DPRK since the collapse of the bipolar cold war world order? And how has the political economy of the DPRK shaped the relationship of the living to the dead? Finally, how do individuals who survived traumatic experiences, such as the North Korean famine or state persecution, draw on ritual practices to make sense of the experience of living in exile?

Commemorative practices reveal much about social structure and cosmology both within the sovereign borders of the DPRK and the emergent North Korean diaspora. Yamamoto Hiroko, whose quote opened this article, returned to Japan in 2001 after living in Ryanggang province, North Korea, for forty years. Ethnically Japanese, Hiroko had emigrated to North Korea with her Korean husband and his family in 1961 as part of a mass repatriation organized by the Japanese and North Korean governments between 1959 and 1984 (cf. Morris-Suzuki, 2007; Bell, 2018). Displayed on a shelf in the living room of Hiroko’s Osaka apartment sit five wooden boards, no more than a foot long and a few inches in width. Each of these boards, known as shinwi in Korean, is engraved with the name of a deceased family member in Chinese characters. Hiroko explained to me that the wooden boards are placed on the ritual table at the beginning of a commemoration ceremony:

We lay out everything on the table, the pictures of my husband and children, and the food and alcohol that we get from the local supermarket. Each wooden tablet has the names and death day of a family member written on it. We burn incense and greet our ancestors, telling them about our lives in Japan. We apologize for not looking after them properly and let them know how much we miss them.

(2014)

Similar to interlocutors I spoke with in Seoul and Tokyo, Hiroko has modified traditional Korean ancestor worship rites, known as chesa in Korean, to maintain emotional connections to deceased family members interred in mountains near her former home in North Korea. These rituals are a time when her daughters and grandchildren who also escaped North Korea for Japan meet in Hiroko’s apartment to share food and memories with what they imagine as the visiting spirits of their family. Commensality— meeting and sharing food with others—is a way in which members of the NorthKoreandiasporiccommunitycreatespacesforfamilyunificationsthat are not otherwise possible.

In the sections that follow, I discuss the relationship between the broader changes in Korean ancestral rites and modernity and social change in East Asia. I subsequently turn my focus to commemorative rituals in North Korea, historically positioning these practices within the political economy of the DPRK and the famine of the 1990s. I show that the realm of the dead in North Korea has been subsumed into a political economy characterized by veneration of the DPRK leadership. As a result, the famine that was so devastating to ordinary North Koreans also affected the world of the dead, a space I refer to as a “spiritscape.” In the concluding sections, I use ethnographic evidence to illustrate the significance of religious practices for North Koreans outside of the DPRK. I argue that the individuals with whom I shared conversations and commemorations in South Korea and in Japan use commemorative practices as a means to conceive of what Benedict Anderson referred to as an “imagined community” (2006:6) with the people and places they left behind, and to mitigate the corrosive effects of communally experienced trauma, exile, and division on the kinship group.

Methodology

The research for this article was carried out using qualitative, ethnographic methods, including participant observation, some 30 semi-structured interviews and two focus groups, to understand the experiences of North Koreans migrating from the DPRK. Interviews took place in Seoul, Osaka, and Tokyo and lasted from one to two hours and were conducted in Korean, though several of my interlocutors mixed Korean, English, and Japanese. The two focus groups were organized through North Korean friends and held in Seoul in 2012. Participants were not financially compensated for their contributions.

The data for this article comes from separate research projects in South Korea (2011–2012, 2013) and in Japan (2014–2015) that were part of ethnographic studies into the experiences of North Koreans resettling outside of the DPRK. As such, the main focus of my interviews was not specifically commemorative rituals in North Korea. Rather, my interest in these cultural practices grew out of attending a commemoration in the home of a North Korea in Seoul in 2011. From that point on, I included questions on death and commemoration in my interviews as a point of personal interest.3

Ideally, I would have been able to visit burial sites in person, but due to the restrictions on carrying out ethnographic work in North Korea, I had to rely on interviews and informal conversations with interlocutors, as well as my own experiences participating in commemorative ceremonies in Seoul, Kobe, Osaka, and Tokyo, to build a picture of how commemorative rituals are performed for people who cannot return to the grave mounds of their departed. Satellite analysis of grave mound distribution in North Korea complemented my participant observation and interviews.

Commemorative Practices in the Post-Cold War Period

Religious practices have long been a subject of interest for social scientists. Ancestor worship, in particular, has provided an entry point for indigenous and foreign researchers to unpack the complexities of the East Asian family and kin-group organization. A large body of scholarship has explained the function of ancestral rites within the Confucian cosmology, explicating both the ideals and everyday practices associated with death and death rituals in Taiwan, Korea, and Japan (cf. Wolf, 1976; Kendall, 1977; Janelli and Janelli, 1982; Lee, 1984; Deuchler, 1992; Danely, 2015). Korean ancestor worship organizes the agnatic kin group by delineating who belongs and who does not. Specifically, the kin group is defined by who participates in the ancestral rituals, while hierarchical status within the group is symbolized by the role a participant plays during a ceremony.

Filial piety (hyo, in Korean) allocates each person a specific place in the political sphere of the community (Deuchler, 1992:129), and the death of an elder does not sever a person’s relationship to the deceased. Janelli and Janelli (1982:58) explain, “In the Korean ancestor cult, deceased parents retain their dependency on offspring; filial obligations are perpetuated through ritual services.” Indeed, even after death, a family member is imagined to influence the lives of the living, bringing either fortune or affliction, depending on the person’s life experiences and the nature of their death.

While filial piety is still widely regarded as central to contemporary Korean identity (Park and Müller, 2014:1), practitioners in both Koreas modify ancestor worship rituals to suit their changing circumstances. Modifications are influenced by the state and by the economic, cultural, and social capital of a family. For example, as the Pak Chŏnghui government mechanized farming practices in the 1960s–1970s, rural Koreans’ reliance on family labor lessened, subsequently pushing young people to migrate to urban areas in greater numbers. Divided between urban and rural settings, many families were compelled to adapt their filial practices accordingly (Sorensen and Kim, 2004:159–160). Around the same time, the South Korean state also introduced austerity measures designed to curb lavish expenditure on practices that the Park government branded as backward and wasteful, such as ancestor worship, weddings, and funerals (Moon, 1974:72). More recently, cremation has replaced burial in South Korea as the common mode of managing the deceased. Park Chang-Won

(2010:93–112) suggests that the shift in funerary practices reflects the disappearance of areas used for outdoor celebrations (madang in Korean), as South Koreans adopted apartment living and the government legalized funerals at hospital mortuaries.

During South Korea’s democratic transition, ancestral rites also played a role in healing the wounds of ideological conflict. On Cheju Island, for example, commemorations of the violent 1948 Uprising have been represented in the Islanders’ relationship to the dead. Seong Nae Kim (1989) argues that the relationship between the dead and their descendants and the performance of this relationship through shamanistic ritual was a way of converting a history of violence into social healing. Heonik Kwon (2013) builds on Kim’s study to show how Cheju Islanders created spaces for reconciliation by reshaping commemorative rituals into an inclusive form that united previously fragmented communities. In other words, participants forged new forms of ancestral rituals as a means of healing fractured interpersonal relations on the island.

Bureaucratic Ghosts: Ancestral Rites in the DPRK

Pyongyang (P’yŏngyang), North Korea’s capital, was once known as the center of Protestant Christianity in Korea. Although there are now both Christian and Buddhist places of worship, these institutions are stateoperated and do not allow for citizens to worship freely (Jang, 2014:185). Instead, North Koreans are taught to revere the Kim family, with former leader Kim Il sung (Kim Ilsŏng) and his son, Kim Jong Il (Kim Chŏngil), regarded as demi-gods, and Kim Il sung’s revolutionary thought codified and transmitted as ideological principles structuring everyday life (Jeon, 2000; Richardson, 2017).

The reality is that even the everyday is politicized in the DPRK and state socialist ideology overlaps with and informs commemorative practices. The death of Kim Il sung in July 1994, for example, was followed by a traditional three-year mourning period, during which time his son, Kim Jong Il, publicly demonstrated his filial piety to his father. The younger Kim’s public observance of traditional Korean mourning practices stressed his dynastic relationship to the founder of the DPRK and legitimized his imminent succession to the leadership role (Jeon, 2000:127–128). Kwon and Chung argue that such theatrical and public displays have been key for facilitating the transferal of charismatic power through three generations of Kims (Kwon and Chung, 2012).

Commemorative rites also reflect the economic and social realities of everyday North Korean life. Interlocutors told me that when a person dies in North Korea, the chief mourner, who is usually the first son of the deceased’s family, is required to inform the deceased’s work unit of the death. The head of the work unit then notifies the local People’s Committee, which in turn notifies the neighbors of the deceased. The name of the deceased is subsequently added to government records and the local hospital then issues a death certificate. Arrangements are subsequently made, through official channels, for family to relocate the deceased to a final resting place. Once the death certificate is issued, the local government office provides money to pay for the funeral costs, as well as food and alcohol for the ceremony. My interviewees explained that these practices vary according to the political standing of the individual and the wealth of the family. Generally, the local government office issues one tenth of the deceased’s monthly salary, approximately 18 kilos of rice and 5 to 6 bottles of rice wine. One interviewee I spoke with in Osaka, recalled the morning she found her father unconscious:

I ran to the hospital and told one of my father’s colleagues [her father was a doctor]. He grabbed his bag and immediately raced to our home. By the time I arrived home the doctor had given my father mouth-to-mouth resuscitation, but it was too late. The doctor returned to the hospital and reported the death. There was no funeral parlor near our home [on the outskirts of Sinuiju, close to the border with China], so we laid out father’s body in the main room of our apartment. We then cleaned the body and dressed him in new clothes. We filled his nose and mouth with cotton wool and pulled a folding screen across where father was laid. In front of the screen we put a small table, on top of which we placed a photo of father, incense, alcohol and drinking glasses. We then started to prepare food for the mourners who would visit for three days following. (2015)

In North Korea, death is as much of a bureaucratic exercise as it is in other countries, with forms needed completed and decisions made on how to manage the remains of the deceased. In the above case, the state was involved in the process in terms of registering the death and issuing necessities for the wake, but the manner in which the corpse was cleaned, dressed, and then displayed for mourners to pay their final respects is similar to how a passing is traditionally managed in South Korea.

On both sides of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), ancestor worship is performed in a multitude of different ways, with regional variations and personal preferences influencing when and how the rites occur. My interviews with North Koreans and images I sourced from Google Maps (see Figs. 1 and 2) highlight similarities in burial practices between the DPRK and those in South Korea.4 Figure 1 shows two burial sites located between Sangunhung-ni and Unhung-ni, villages in Hamju-gun, Hamgyong-namdo, approximately 35 kilometers from the city of Hamhung. “Site 1” is composed of about 30 eroded burial mounds. These mounds are within walking distance of the village and have a view into the valley. “Site 2” is closer to the village of Undong-ni, above the village in an area that looks to have been cleared for this purpose.

 

Fig. 1. The hills surrounding Sangunhung-ni and Unhung-ni are marked by burial mounds (“1” and “2”).5

 

Fig. 2. Using Google Maps it is possible to make out clusters of burial mounds dotting the hillsides of the DPRK.6

Figure 2 shows two more burial sites, again between Sangunhung-ni and Unhung-ni villages. As is common in both South and North Korea, the burial sites are located on hillsides, away from agricultural areas, but within walking distance of residential sites. I spoke with Kim Sangun, who arrived in South Korea from the DPRK in 2008. As Sangun explained,

There is no god in North Korea. But people still do ancestor worship. To do it they go to the countryside, to the tombs of their deceased. In North Korea, people don’t do cremation; they still make burial mounds. My friend used to go with his father. It’s the father, as the head of the family, who always leads the ceremony. The ceremony is done on the birthday and death day of the deceased, on Liberation Day [15th August], and to celebrate the end of the harvest period (ch’usŏk). When the family arrives at the tomb, they clean the gravesite. They then begin the ceremony, setting out ritual food and incense and greeting the ancestors. (2013)

Throughout South and North Korea, death and the related commemorative practices are usually a patriarchal affair, with men taking the lead in tending to the ancestors on auspicious days. In both Koreas, once participants arrange food and incense at the foot of the grave mound, the dead consume their meal while their living entertain them with family news. Once the meal concludes, the living perform a sending off of what they imagine as now satiated spirits, symbolized by the act of extinguishing the burning incense. The family then begins their own meal.

The North Korean famine (early to mid-1990s) presented an opportunity for the state to modernize death practices in the DPRK. There were too many dead and not enough space for traditional burials. Consequently, the state encouraged people to cease traditional practices and instead cremate the remains of loved ones. In other words, the famine years provided a window of time during which there was an overlap between the state (socialist) modernizing project and the needs of citizens to manage the increasing mortality rate. Discussions with interlocutors confirmed that during the 1990s, in the urban areas of the country in particular, cremation became more common as a way to tackle the sudden rise in mortality and accompanying issues of space for traditional burials. Interestingly, Kim notes that it was also around the 1990s that cremation became socially acceptable in South Korea, losing its association with Japanese imperialist practices (2005:56). North Korean families who choose to see off their dead at a crematorium likely store the deceased’s ashes in a columbarium, also administered by the state. From that point on, visitations to the remains of their loved ones required an application to the state facility.

The state made progress in changing the funerary practices of citizens during the famine years, but it seems that some North Koreans continued to inter their dead in hillsides where, from such modest heights, those freed from the mortal coil might be afforded a favorable view of their village. Interviewees told me that they met with their ancestors several times a year. Once they reached the grave mound of the dead, they placed state awards on the stone alter, alongside food, drink, and other items. If the person was a member of the Korean Workers’ Party, participants would likely position awards from the state in front of a portrait of the deceased. For ordinary citizens, however, a less grandiose ritual is likely. One respondent described his friend’s father’s rituals as follows:

He was an alcoholic and drank himself to death. So every time they held ancestral rites my friend would take a box of soju to the mountain. Once at the graveside, he would pour all the bottles onto the mound, soaking it entirely. “Drink a lot, father,” he would say. He was certain this made his father’s spirit very happy. (2015)

Yang Yŏng-hui’s (2009) documentary, Sona, the Other Myself, presents her own family’s experiences of how these rituals are conducted in North Korea. Some 20 minutes into the film, Yang’s family arrives at a clearing on a hillside overlooking Pyongyang. The relatives gather around as Sona, Yang’s niece, crouches beside her mother’s grave mound. She places flowers on the stone alter and bows to the mound, which looms over her small frame. On the alter is a bottle of alcohol, a carved watermelon, a bowl of fruit, and a color picture of Sona’s mother, Jŏng Jŏngsun. “Mother, auntie is here, too,” Sona calls to her mother, emptying the contents of a large bottle of beer over the grassy mound.

Wearing a summery white dress, Sona’s family encourages her to “sing a song loudly so your mother can hear.” With her arms flat at her side and her body at attention, she sings,

The stream turns left and right, where is it going?

It is going to the wide bosom of the ocean.

My heart’s flying, where is it going?

It’s going over the clouds, to the star of my beloved Great Leader.

The performance is received with admiring coos from her family and Sona, suddenly overcome with shyness, retreats to her father’s side. Elements of the political bleed into the spiritual when songs for the ancestors are couched in praise of the Kim family, and stories of success are embedded within the supposed achievements of the state. In Yang’s documentary, Sona’s recital to her mother is also a song of reverence to North Korea’s former leader, Kim Il sung.

Commemorative practices in the DPRK have been further reshaped by the hardships of the living. Yi Sujin, who migrated to South Korea from North Korea in 2009, recalled:

In North Korea, when things were really hard during the famine, people who didn’t have any food used paper with images of food drawn on. The people were starving and so were the ancestors. But it was still important to carry out the rituals, so instead of real food, people performed the ceremony using images of the food you were supposed to use. (2013)

In times of adversity in North Korea, the dead have been united with the living in their suffering. During a famine that afflicted much of the country, many families had to survive on whatever they could forage from the surrounding countryside. Subsequently, where once they might have enjoyed steamed rice, meat, and vegetables, the dead had to make do with images of food hand drawn on paper.

Diasporic Ancestor Worship

How does the nature of a person’s death affect our relationship to the deceased? In contemporary Vietnam, there are two sides of memory, identified as “house” and “street,” or inside and outside (Kwon, 2006:6). “Death in the street” is understood as a violent, untimely death, often alone, and away from the ancestral home. A traumatic passing has a ripple effect that threatens to fragment the family line and leaves the deceased as an accursed figure (Kwon, 2006:15). By contrast, “Death in the house” is a safe death, a timely death, and a passing considered part of the natural order of things. A safe death allows for kin to take their rightful places in the continuum of descent that extends vertically from the dead to the living and on to descendants yet to be given life (Avieli, 2007:125).

The binary of good death/bad death presents itself in the Korean cosmological system in a manner similar to that of post-war Vietnam. For Koreans on both sides of the DMZ, the difference between death at home, surrounded by family and following a full life, and death outside the home, usually untimely and by violent means, can mean the difference between an ancestor at peace and a restless ghost that wanders in search of resolution.

Many of my North Korean interlocutors had left villages and towns crowded with friends, family, tastes, and smells that contributed to shaping their memories. They had also left behind the burial mounds of family members, some of whom had died under traumatic circumstances. In defaulting on their kinship obligations they carried an emotional burden with them to their new homes, a weight that some of my interlocutors sought to relieve themselves of. Yi Sujin, for example, explained how family deaths affected her:

My father died in a labor camp in North Korea. Neither my mother nor I know my father’s death day, so we do ancestor worship on his birthday and at the harvest festival (ch’usŏk). My brother also died a difficult death when he was a boy. Later, he came to me in a dream and asked for money. So the next day I went to the place where he used to play [while in North Korea] and burned 100 won for him. I thought he would be able to use it wherever he is. From that time on, whenever my brother asks for anything, I always do the same thing. I don’t know if he can use the money, but I know that doing it has made me feel happier. (2013)

Sujin’s father and brother both died untimely deaths and she has relied on commemorative rituals as a means of managing her feelings of loss. In her father’s case, he was a direct victim of state violence. Further, as a result of his arrest and internment in one of North Korea’s political labor camps, Sujin’s entire family was branded as traitors and subsequently forbidden from joining the Korean Workers’ Party, limited in marriage and employment prospects, and exiled to the country’s northern provinces. From that time on, they were under constant surveillance by the state apparatus. This was a major contributing factor in Sujin’s decision to escape North Korea.

Although Sujin does not expect to return to North Korea, she believes that she is not free from the obligation to tend to the spirits of her departed kin. Sujin’s brother regularly appears in her dreams and asks for items that might help him. When she feels it necessary, she burns effigies of items her brother requests, placating his restless spirit. In the living room of her small apartment on the outskirts of Seoul, Sujin believes that she communicates with the spirits of her father and brother through commemorative rituals that she carries out several times each year. Through such intimate practices, Sujin reconnects with her family, living and dead. For Sujin, maintaining a relationship with the spirits of her father and brother is both a cathartic process and a necessary act of filial piety.

A communally experienced tragic death has left an imprint on the memories of many North Koreans. For my interlocutors in South Korea and in Japan, a belief in the ability to relate to the spirits is one wrought with emotional and ritual challenges. Along with Sujin’s father and brother, there are many restless spirits in North Korea, the result of people who suffered death by disease, by starvation, by public execution, and other unnatural means. While the physical remains of the dead lie untended in North Korean soil, their spirits cannot be at peace. The mass death of North Korean citizens has created a nation of restless spirits, unable to seek recourse for the harm inflicted on them while they were alive. The spirits of the dead now express their pain by appearing in the dreams of their living kin and at the commemorative rituals of exiled family.

Feasting with the Dead

Commemorative rituals are a costly business. In North Korea, if the dead are to eat well, participants have to borrow money to provide the required offerings. In contrast, for North Koreans living outside of the DPRK, the table is piled high with expensive alcohol and unusual foods like cake and noodles. My interviewees in South Korea served Korean food and drink to the spirits. In contrast, my interlocutors living in Japan seemed more flexible in the food they served. The rationale was that because their deceased family members were either born in Japan and subsequently emigrated to North Korea, or lived in North Korea and enjoyed Japanese foods when packages arrived from family in Japan, they must have a taste for both Korean and Japanese foods. My interlocutors explained that they believed the spirits enjoy the variety of tastes on offer. Reflecting on this, I imagine that the dead, whose last living memories of sharing food with their kin might have been characterized by a dearth of ingredients, must be impressed at the feasts on offer.

Some families in Osaka, Seoul, and Tokyo go to great lengths to follow practices established while they were in North Korea. For example, Cho Misŏn, who was in her early twenties when she left North Korea in the mid-2000s, explained that her family in Osaka only uses new bags of rice and boiled pork as they did in North Korea. She told me that they place dried corvine fish alongside cooked herbs and pressed rice on the ceremonial table, and she partially peals the top of stacked apples and pears so the visiting spirits can enjoy them more easily (Fig. 3).

In my family we do simple ancestral rites because we don’t have a lot of money. We have odd numbers of everything and we place my father’s picture at the top of the table. We don’t wear makeup, nor do we wear red or white clothes. Our fingernails have to be clean, and any woman who is menstruating is not allowed to take part. (2015)

The layout of the table might also be dependent on the individual needs of the spirit coming to dinner. “When my father was alive he was lefthanded,” Misŏn told me. “So, the rice is placed on the left side and the seaweed soup on the right side. Everything is laid out facing father, taking into account that he was left-handed.” Misŏn and her family set out two bottles of white liquor, along with a packet of cigarettes; these items offer familiar tastes for her father’s spirit.

 

Fig. 3. Food and ceremonial items used during the ancestor worship of a Zainichi returnee family now living in Osaka, Japan. The food items are a mixture of Japanese and Korean. To the bottom right of the table is a packet of the deceased’s favorite cigarettes. At the head of the table is a picture of the deceased (obscured for privacy).

During the ritual, once the food is arranged on the ceremonial table, each person takes a turn to greet the dead by bowing two and a half times before pouring a cup of alcohol for their ancestors to sip. Once the spirit is welcomed into the room it takes up a position behind the table laden with food. Two chopsticks are set upright in a bowl of steamed rice, indicating that the dead are feasting. The living sit back from the table and wait for the dead to finish. Misŏn explained how her family concludes the meal:

Our father used to love smoking so, after he’s finished eating, my younger brother lights a cigarette and places it on the edge of an ashtray to encourage father to smoke it. When father’s finished smoking, we bow to him one last time and turn our bodies to face the door, allowing him to leave. We tell him that it’s time to go back. We sort of shoo him away before we begin eating. (2015)

After the spirits are said to have filled their bellies, it is time for the living toeat.AsPakHyangjin,whosefamilyemigratedtoNorthKoreafromTokyo in the early 1960s, only to return in 2007, explained, “When they have eaten, we talk to the ancestors and tell them what we have been doing. We thank them and let them know we are sorry we cannot be with them in person.”

Inquiries as to the well being of the spirits are accompanied by apologies for not taking better care of them and updates on the successes of children and grandchildren. “While he’s eating, we talk to father, telling him things he might like to hear, letting him know about the events of the year. Even though he’s returned to the ‘sky country’ (hanul nara) we ask him to watch over us,” Misŏn told me. The language spoken during these exchanges, a mixture of Korean and Japanese, is less important than the content of the conversation. After all, as Yi Minji, now running a restaurant in Asakusa, Tokyo, explained, “I’m more comfortable in Japanese language now, so I talk to the dead using Japanese. But that’s no problem because my family spoke both Japanese and Korean” (2015). Bi-lingual exchanges with the spirits of the dead, many of whom while alive would have been unable to communicate in Japanese, is a further indicator of Koreans doing what practitioners of traditional commemorative rituals have done for generations before them: putting practical concerns ahead of dogmatic adherence to the rules. Kim Hyŏnjae, now working in Osaka, offered a pragmatic explanation. “My ancestors—my grandparents—are [buried] in North Korea and of course we can’t go there. So, we have to do ancestral rites a different way” (2015). Despite the departures from tradition, continuing to arrange and perform ancestor worship facilitates the act of coming together in the physical world and of renewing ties to what are imagined to be restless spirits in the DPRK. Instrumentally speaking, these rituals also serve as an emotional valve, enabling participants to relieve themselves of the guilt of having left the lands where their family is buried.

Commensality with the dead, sharing food, and offering stories of a new life in a new home, contributes to a group narrative of migration and separation, loss, and recovery. Central to the transnational relationship of the deadinNorthKoreatotheirdiasporicdescendantsisacompactbetweentwo parties that transcends nation state boundaries. This compact, rooted in the obligationsoffilialpiety,reaffirmsenduringbondsofkinship,keepstheheart in North Korea, even if the body is in Japan or South Korea, and offers hope for the resolution of anxieties about family abandonment.

Conclusion

This article has examined North Koreans’ relationship to death with a focus on the significance of memory practices for people who have endured traumatic loss and family separation. Religious practices are a means for people to reflect back to themselves the intimate relations binding them together. Such rituals allow a person to be submerged within the group, ensuring the community endures, even beyond the life of each of its members. I have suggested that performing commemorative rituals are a way for families divided by geo-political strategies to make sense of the experience of being cut off from familiar locations, friends, and family.

North Koreans’ commemorative practices provide insight into particular political, social, and economic changes that have occurred in East Asia. Ancestor worship as currently practiced in North Korea indicates that, in the DPRK and beyond, the reach of the state is not limited to shaping the worlds of the living. The rules and regulations directing the manner in which the deceased is managed—burial or cremation, for example—and the pervasiveness of state symbols in the form of songs and paraphernalia associated with commemorative rites indicate that the hegemony of the state reaches deep into the spirit world. In this sense, a commemoration of the ancestors could also be construed as a veneration of the DPRK leadership.

The overlap that emerged as the state pulled together the lifeworlds of ordinary North Koreans and the world of the dead meant that events that affected North Korean citizens also affected their ancestors. The collapse of the cold war world order and the gross mismanagement of the DPRK economy were key factors in the nationwide famine of the 1990s. As North Korean citizens starved, so did their ancestors. The impact of the famine on the spiritscape was evident in the physical world, seen in the corpses that reportedly littered some North Korean urban areas, in the foliage that grew up around abandoned grave mounds, and in the efforts of some families to placate their ancestors with sketches of offerings instead of the real thing.

The communal suffering of the North Korean people reached into a spiritscape now overpopulated with troubled spirits and continues to resonate in the domestic commemorative performances of diasporic North Koreans. In Seoul, Osaka, Tokyo, and beyond, families separated by a lasting ideological standoff communicate with restless spirits through long-distance commemorative rituals that emphasize enduring bonds of kinship for people who have lived and died according to the extremes of ideology and state imperative.

For many individuals who emigrate from their homeland, ties to family are created and maintained through the exchange of letters and parcels, the sending of remittances, and when possible, family visits. Yamamoto Hiroko and others who lost loved ones in North Korea are not limited to material exchanges as a means of communing with the dead. For people denied travel to visit their family, communion with the dead takes place in dreams and during the ancestral rites practiced in homes across East Asia. Each time the spirits are imagined as joining their living family in South Korea or Japan, they transcend the confines of the body and the political borders of the nation state designed to prevent such movement.

For some North Koreans outside the DPRK, commemorative practices will however never be enough to make sense of the experience of family separation, not when the physical remains of their kin lie north of the DMZ. “If reunification occurs,” Mrs. Kim confided in me one rainy afternoon in Tokyo, “I’d visit the graves of my father and grandparents [in North Korea].” Pausing before taking a sip of her herbal tea, she added, “I’d collect the bones of my relatives and bring them back to Japan. I want to keep them here” (2015). In the places they resettle, ancestor worship practices are a connection to a past marked with both joy and hardship. In their new homes, North Korean exiles engender spaces for new forms of emotionally and politically charged remembering. The newly emergent diasporic ancestor worship allows families who have endured great suffering to manage the ghosts of the past and provides stability during the challenging process of making home away from home.

Notes

1. This figure is difficult to confirm, as the Japanese government does not release information on returnees from North Korea. As such, the figure of 300 returnees from North Korea is based on many conversations I had with various civic group leaders working with returnees in Osaka and Tokyo.

2. I refer to a South Korean national as “South Korean”; a person born and raised in North Korea as “North Korean”; Koreans who migrated to Japan during the colonial period (1910–1945) and did not return after liberation as “Zainichi Korean”; a person who moved to North Korea during the repatriation project (1959–1984) and has now returned to Japan as a “returnee” and a North Korean living in South Korea after escaping from the DPRK as a “North Korean defector” or “North Korean exile.” I am aware that these are all slippery and somewhat problematic terms.

3. While the conversations and more formal discussions I had with North Koreans on the topic of death and ritual each contributed in their own way to shaping my thoughts on long-distance commemoration, the voices of only nine individuals are directly drawn on in this article. As I interviewed such a small number of individuals, the findings are not supposed to be representative of broader trends, either within the DPRK or within the North Korean diaspora.

4. It appears that at these sites the burial areas have been respected when new construction or development has been undertaken. While we should take care when interpreting satellite data, for future research it would be interesting to look into the relationship between state-sponsored construction and local burial practices.

5. Google Earth: 39°53048.7600 N, 127°25038.9700 E. 6. Google Earth: 39°54002.7600 N, 127°25036.0900 E.

Acknowledgments

I would like to sincerely acknowledge the time and effort of my interlocutors from North Korea; without their help, this research would not have been possible. I also wish to acknowledge the support and contribution of Kyungmook Kim, Ishimaru Jiro, Kato Hiroshi, Deokhyo Choi, Sarah Son, and Sandra Fahy. A special thanks to Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., Benjamin Silberstein, and Max Ernst for their insights on reading satellite data. Finally, I would like to sincerely thank the anonymous reviewers and editors of this special edition for their helpful suggestions.

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