11 South Korea’s Internal Division over Humanitarian Aid to North Korea and North Korean Human Rights - :: KOREA FOCUS ::

South Korea’s Internal Division over Humanitarian Aid to North Korea and North Korean Human Rights - :: KOREA FOCUS ::

South Korea’s Internal Division over Humanitarian Aid to North Korea and North Korean Human Rights

Jhe Seong-ho

Professor of Law at Chung-Ang University;
Former Human Rights Ambassador
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade

I. Introduction

The question of humanitarian aid to North Korea has become a major social and political issue in South Korea, pitting liberals against conservatives, and moderates against hard-liners. These groups have taken sharply different positions regarding the distribution of aid to the North, suspected diversion of aid to the North's military and linking material assistance to other matters concerning inter-Korean relations. These conflicts derive from North Korea's uncommon status as an entity that will eventually have to be reunified with the South and as a threat to the South's security. If assistance was intended for a country stricken by natural disaster, there would be no such discord.

In view of the current status of South-North relations, unconditional delivery of aid to the North is certainly problematic. On the other hand, it cannot be denied that an indefinite halt is also detrimental to stable inter-Korean relations. Aid should be provided in an adequate manner but, of course, this is easier said than done.

As long as North Korea refuses to adopt reforms and economic openness, the regime cannot be expected to resolve its problems alone. Thus, determining the optimal level of humanitarian aid to North Korea remains one of the most crucial issues in Seoul’s North Korea policies.

This study examines the ongoing division in South Korean society over humanitarian aid to the North, especially large-scale food aid, and the impact of aid in improving human rights in the North. It is aimed at suggesting a desirable way to offer assistance to the impoverished communist state.

II. Liberals versus Conservatives on Humanitarian Aid to North Korea

South Korean society has clear differences regarding the question of aid to North Korea. Serious debate about providing formula milk to feed North Korean infants or malaria vaccines is skirted, but general food assistance programs have caused severe controversies between those with different ideologies.

1. Aid Fatigue and the North’s Agricultural Failure

Advocates of the “Sunshine Policy” insist that South Korea cannot remain indifferent to North Korea’s dire shortage of more than one million tons of grain every year. They argue that food aid is the most effective means of winning the hearts of North Koreans, easing their antagonism against the South and creating a mood of reconciliation and cooperation between the two divided peoples. They further opine that aid programs for the North are essential to stable inter-Korean relations. They call for government measures to ensure consistent humanitarian aid or bilateral trade with North Korea to lay the groundwork for eventual reunification. Professor Kim Yeon-cheol makes an interesting argument on “politics of rice” as follows:

“If the South had not provided rice aid to the North 10 years ago, there would have been no progress in the inter-Korean relations. There would have been no reunion of separated families, no discussions between military authorities to build trust, no removal of propaganda broadcasting facilities along the Demilitarized Zone, and no consultations on ways to prevent inadvertent naval clashes in the West Sea. How can we establish trust with them if we do not help our brethren in the North while we are troubled by surplus rice production? We cannot resolve the pending problems while fomenting hatred.” (Hankyoreh 21, Vol. 827, September 10, 2010)

In contrast, skeptics point out that North Korea has failed to fundamentally address its food shortage problems over the past 15 years since the South began delivering food aid to the North. This suggests that South Korea will have to help feed the North indefinitely until reunification as long as the North fails to adopt agricultural reforms that boost harvests. The skeptics believe that annual supply of 400,000 to 500,000 tons of grain will only be a waste leading to no fundamental improvement of the food situation in the North.

While there is a consensus that humanitarian aid may be provided “exceptionally” in the event of emergencies such as floods and other disasters, the absence of reform efforts in the North has led to a sense of aid fatigue among South Koreans. Furthermore, the skeptics say, resumption of food shipments will not promote reforms in the North. In short, they argue that continued food aid to the North is synonymous with the North’s chronic food shortage and its mendicant behavior toward the South.

2. Adequacy of ‘Humanitarian Purposes’

1) Humanitarian Aid to Brethren vs. Support for Dictatorship

Advocates of massive food aid to the North, including private aid groups, tend to justify it as humanitarianism for suffering North Koreans. Some even cite “moral propriety” as members of the same nation. There is no doubt few would have any objection if food aid is assuredly delivered to the underprivileged population in the North.
However, criticism has been raised about North Korea’s own responsibilities and about food aid from South Korea failing to serve its original humanitarian purposes. The North Korean regime is responsible for feeding the people. If food production is insufficient, foreign currency reserves should be used to purchase food in international markets. Providing food for North Korea will help the regime save its foreign exchange and prevent the worsening of its fiscal situation. If food aid from the South is funneled to the North Korean ruling elite in the party, government and military instead of the starving residents, it would be tantamount to directly supporting Kim Jong-il’s dictatorial regime, according to the critics, who call for prudence in food aid to the North.

2) Claims of Aid Diversion to the Military

An outstanding example of food aid failing to serve its original purpose is its alleged diversion to the military. Regarding this question, an editorial of the Munhwa Ilbo in its February 14, 2008 edition argued as follows:

“The (South Korean) military authorities have frequently detected that aid rice from the South has been delivered to the North’s forward units since the inauguration of the government of President Roh Moo-hyun in 2003. According to government sources, at least 400 bags of rice in more than 10 batches have been supplied to North Korean forward units. South Korean soldiers at units on the eastern and central frontline areas have taken pictures of rice bags marked “Republic of Korea Red Cross” or “The Republic of Korea” as they were unloaded from supply trucks or stacked at corners of North Korean army compounds. These pictures are sufficient evidence of the North’s turning humanitarian aid rice into military supplies.”

Do we have to continue food aid to the North knowing that it is becoming military provisions? That was a subject of serious discussions in academic and political quarters throughout Roh Moo-hyun’s tenure. Some proponents asserted that it did not really matter if South Korean rice was consumed by North Korean military personnel, who they said deserved to share the aid food with civilian populace, as all of them were the same brethren of ours. They emphasized that humanitarian aid to the North should not be reduced or suspended because of the fact that part of it was diverted to the military.

However, material aid to the North can no longer be defined as humanitarian aid if it is used for military purposes. Rice can be used either by the military or civilians. Supply of rice to be consumed by the military constitutes military aid, not humanitarian aid, eventually supporting Kim Jong-il’s “Military First Policy.”

It is absurd that the food for the North Korean military is provided with South Korean taxpayers’ money; the North Korean military or government authorities are responsible for feeding their own personnel with their own resources, not with humanitarian aid from the South. Therefore, it is imperative that the South has secure means to prevent the diversion of its food aid to the North Korean military if it is to resume food shipments to the North.

3. Unconditional Aid to the North vs. Principle of Reciprocity

Another important question is whether any conditions should be attached to humanitarian aid. Those who argue for no quid pro quo tied to rice or fertilizer say trade-offs for military action or non-action and other demands would be counterproductive in the long run. They further assert that assistance with food or medicine should be separated from strategic policies on North Korea and that it is unrealistic to link humanitarian aid to any new international developments or any change in emotional attitudes.

Those who disagree see sentimentalist faults in these arguments which they claim ignore the special nature of the South-North relations. Professor Nam Sung-wook and Pastor Suh Kyung-suk point out that “unconditional humanitarianism” could not be applied to relations between the two Koreas, emphasizing the need for simultaneous adherence to humanitarianism and human rights and the principle of reciprocity.

As to the question of linking humanitarian aid to improving the human rights situation in the North, Professor Bae Seong-in said: “If the South raises the human rights question at this time when inter-Korean relations have yet to be systemically stabilized, there can be no guarantee that the North will take part positively in any form of dialogue with the South. The urgent task at the moment is to facilitate North Korea’s entry into the international community, after which it would not be too late to start discussion of human rights problems in North Korea. While continuing efforts to help North Koreans attain the basic human rights of eating through economic cooperation and humanitarian aid, we should explore ways to practically improve their overall human rights situation.”

4. Arguments over Transparency in Distribution

Securing transparency in the distribution of humanitarian aid from the South is yet another important question. For a successful continuation of humanitarian aid, it is essential to secure measures to prevent the diversion of aid to the military and ensure transparent distribution. However, the Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun administrations, which both ardently pursued cooperation and reconciliation with the North, were not particularly enthusiastic about securing transparency in the distribution of food assistance.

The advocates of the Sunshine Policy, adhering to the “no-strings” principle, are generally reluctant to emphasize transparency. They regard transparency as a rigid prerequisite and consider it as a sign of conservative or Cold War legacies. At the same time, they cite the cases of diversion of aid that has gone to Third World countries to argue that the demand for perfect transparency has been used as an excuse to obstruct humanitarian assistance to the North as well as further reconciliation and cooperation.
On the other hand, the proponents of transparency warn that a lack of it allows the funneling of aid food to those who already enjoy affluence at the expense of ordinary citizens. They call for effective monitoring of distribution to see if food shipments actually are being used to support Kim Jong-il’s Military First Policy. Some experts on international aid say that the demand for transparency is a reasonable principle and norm in humanitarian aid activities designed to enhance responsibility and effectiveness.

5. Types of Food Aid

Under the Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun administrations, a few different financial methods were applied in aid to the North. In the case of fertilizer, the government’s South-North Cooperation Fund was used to provide grant-type assistance. On the other hand, the North was obligated to pay for rice over 30 years after a 10-year grace period. Professor Kim Yeon-cheol proposed that the surplus rice in South Korea be provided to the North in long-term loans and its payments used as unification fund.

There remain questions about the appropriateness of providing humanitarian food aid in the form of commercial loans. It is preferable that food supply to the North take the form of grant aid, although the amount of humanitarian aid should be of limited scale at the moment.

6. Scope of Humanitarian Aid

Items for humanitarian aid to the North include food, fertilizer, instant noodles, powdered milk, cookies, medicine and clothes. There are different views regarding rice aid. Some argue that by providing the North as much as it wants, South Korea can attain reciprocal action from the North. Others call for the shipment of the minimum amount possible, citing the possibility of South Korean rice being diverted to the military. They favor wheat flour, potato and maize, because they are harder to store and are more likely to be consumed by the general population rather than the privileged.

7. Increase of Surplus Rice in the South

Rice consumption in South Korea falls far short of production, resulting in a steep rise in reserve storage. Rice prices keep falling and the storage of surplus rice amounting to 1.47 million tons, twice the optimum amount, requires huge costs. Some politicians and media commentators have asserted that shipment of the surplus rice to the North could ease farmers’ difficulties by supporting rice prices while facilitating inter-Korean reconciliation.

However, objectors argue that rice aid to the North should not be considered as a means of resolving the domestic surplus. The government can approach this problem by promoting rice consumption by the people, purchasing the surplus rice and releasing it to poor households, and encouraging rice farmers to grow other crops. Continuing cash purchases of surplus rice with the taxpayers’ money could eventually weaken South Korean farmers’ global competitiveness.

The objectors further argue that if the South Korean government listens to the North Korean call for humanitarian aid with the growing surplus rice in the South, it can distort relations between the two sides. Shipment of huge amounts of surplus rice to the North could somewhat resolve the problem of excess rice production in the South, but it would eventually help Kim Jong-il in his current effort to stabilize his rule to complete the dynastic succession process in favor of his son.

III. Aid Effect on Human Rights in North Korea

1. Position of the United Nations

The U.N. General Assembly, since December 2005, has adopted resolutions annually calling for improved human rights in North Korea. The Commission on Human Rights and its successor, the Human Rights Council, have repeatedly extended the term of the special rapporteur on North Korean human rights since March 2004. The U.N. resolution on human rights in North Korea adopted in November 2009 calls for improvement in civil and political rights as well as basic rights in the economic, social and cultural aspects. It emphasized improvement of human rights along with humanitarian aid as the path to realize humanism.

It should be noted that the U.N. resolution manifested an integrated concept of human rights without prioritizing any of the various basic rights concerning civil, political, economic, social and cultural aspects in the lives of North Korean residents. The U.N. resolution attached as much importance to civil and political rights to equality and suffrage as to the right to food. This contrasts the arguments of some Koreans who advocate “first food and then human rights.” They emphasize humanitarian aid but pay little attention to improvement of civil and political rights in North Korea.

These people show a lack of balance in their attitude toward the human rights situation in the North. They ignore the extreme plight of the majority of the North Korean population and forget that the chronic food shortage in the North has resulted from the rigidity of the monolithic ruling system, its refusal to accept reforms and openness, and repression of dissent. Human rights activists point out that the leftist assertion of “food aid first, human rights next” for the North is as inadequate as the past logic of “economic development first, civil and political rights next” during military dictatorship in the South.

2. Desirable Way of Humanitarian Aid to the North

Humanitarian aid to North Koreans can help improve the human rights situation in the isolated communist state, especially with regard to their basic living needs. Food helps them keep starvation at bay; clothes and blankets keep them from cold; and medicine and medical equipment protect their right to healthy living. Such humanitarian aid requires effective monitoring systems to ensure that the aid goods reach their end users.
Humanitarian aid can go to unintended targets. If the aid is delivered to the privileged class in the party and military, which already is fed and clothed well, the humanitarian aid will only help consolidate Kim Jong-il’s dictatorial rule under the Military First Policy. Thus, there can be good humanitarian aid and bad humanitarian aid. South Korea and the international community should make utmost efforts to meet the needs of the suffering population in the North and thereby realize their genuine humanitarian objectives.

3. Securing Transparency in Distribution

Transparency in distribution is not a condition for humanitarian aid but is the natural norm and principle inherent to all humanitarian activities. The U.N. General Assembly resolution on the “Strengthening of the Coordination of Humanitarian Emergency Assistance of the United Nations” adopted in 1991 provides humanity, neutrality and impartiality as the guiding principles for humanitarian assistance. The World Food Program also offers the principle of humanity to “seek to prevent and alleviate human suffering wherever it is found and respond with food aid when appropriate… and provide assistance in ways that respect life, health and dignity.”

Transparency is required to prevent the diversion of aid goods to the military and frustrate the attempts of corrupt officials to steal aid food items and sell them in the market. Some concerned people suggest that the South Korean authorities deliver aid to nongovernment organizations instead of directly handing it over to North Korean officials. Yet, the nongovernment aid groups have yet to prove their capabilities in ensuring transparency. It is desirable to produce a basic agreement on transparency with the North Korean authorities before the South Korean government resumes humanitarian aid to the North.

4. North Korea’s Opening of Information on the Use of Aid Goods

In order to ensure that humanitarian aid to North Korea achieves its purposes and contributes to improving human rights conditions in the North, the North Korean authorities should disclose who have received aid and how the aid has been used.

Regrettably, North Korea has failed to provide such information or any kind of feedback since it started receiving humanitarian aid from South Korea and the international community. The South Korean government should continue to pressure North Korea to release information on the use of humanitarian aid. It could link the volume of aid to the level of information disclosure on distribution. This kind of effort can push North Korea toward reform and openness as well as accepting the established norm of international relations.

5. Reduction of Food Aid, Expansion of Development Cooperation

Food and fertilizer constituted the largest portion of emergency humanitarian aid offered to the North between 1995 and 2007. But emergency aid in the coming years will have to be shifted to development support such as building food factories and agricultural training facilities in the manner of teaching how to catch a fish instead of giving a fish. This approach, aimed at inducing economic reform and openness, can be a part of the broad unification policy.

In the event of natural disasters such as floods or typhoons, a certain scale of emergency aid will have to be made, preferably through NGOs. The involvement of civic organizations will broaden the contacts between the North and South Korean people, which can promote private-level communication over such matters as agricultural reforms.

6. Other Issues

The best way to improve human rights in North Korea will be the North Korean authorities’ shift from their current Military First Policy to “People First Policy.” The North should also show efforts to increase transparency in its distribution of humanitarian aid as demanded by the international community. No less important is for the North Korean authorities to exhibit greater accountability for stable livelihoods of their people and ensure accuracy of information as to the state of affairs in their country.

Aid organizations, for their part, should try to avoid unnecessary competition, waste of aid goods, geographical imbalance in aid distribution and ineffective allotment of resources.

IV. Conclusion

The implications of humanitarian aid for the improvement of human rights in North Korea can be summed up as follows:

First, it is not right to approach humanitarian aid and the human rights issue in North Korea as conflicting concepts. The basic spirit of both humanitarian aid and human rights calls for an attitude to look at the two issues as mutually complementary. The U.N. General Assembly and Human Rights Council also share the position that humanitarian aid is implemented to promote, protect and improve the basic human rights of victims and other relevant parties and that efforts to improve human rights at international or national levels should focus on the realization of humanitarianism.

Second, it is not appropriate to dichotomize those who stress humanitarian aid to North Korea and those who debate the North’s human rights situation, labeling the former as liberal, nationalistic and pro-unification and the latter as conservative, Cold War-oriented, confrontational and anti-unification. If humanitarian aid from South Korea fails to provide practical benefits to the average North Koreans, while benefiting only the North’s regime, the aid could be defined as extremely conservative, anti-unification and least beneficial to the nation. On the contrary, if continued pressure on North Korea regarding its human rights issue helps to improve the situation in the North, such effort can be considered liberal, nationalistic and pro-unification.

Third, the South Korean government should not implement unification policies that emphasize any one of the two issues while neglecting the other. The South’s authorities need to provide humanitarian aid to the North and at the same time continue to raise the human rights issues in the North to create a virtuous cycle of mutual enhancement. They should devise wise strategies to simultaneously accomplish the two interrelated causes through consistent efforts and effective public education to raise awareness in the mutually complementary nature of the issues.
In short, one should not look at humanitarian aid for North Koreans and their human rights as two separate issues because they are closely interconnected. The South Korean government should implement mature and balanced North Korea policies that provide humanitarian aid on one hand and continuously raise the human rights issues in the North on the other so as to address inter-Korean relations in a comprehensive and integrated manner.

[Strategic Studies, March 2011, Vol. 51,
published by the Korea Research Institute for Strategy]