Calculated Nationalism in Contemp S Korea 5

 5 Taking a Free Ride on the Reunification Train

Grassroots’ Cost-Benefit Nationalism

Abstract

The impact of the divided Korean peninsula has been destructive, and the cost has been astronomical to both South and North Korea. Most South Koreans used to dream of a reunified Korea without reservation until the 1980s, singing, “Our Wish is Reunification.” A good portion of South Koreans had family and relatives living in the North, and ethnonationalism was a prevalent form of nationalism, through which South Koreans perceived North Koreans and the Northern regime. However, the 21st-century South Korean wish for reunification is quite different, and Chapter 5 analyses the grassroots’ “cost-benefit nationalism” towards reunification.

Keywords: reunification, the Korean peninsula, reunification tax, costbenefit nationalism

Introduction

Upon the end of the Korean War (1950–1953), many Koreans yearned for the reunification of North and South Korea so that their separated families and clans could live together in one nation-state. The two Koreas have technically been at war, and they have spent a significant portion of their GDPs to fund their military and arms race, with young men conscripted to defend the nation from possible aggression from each other. Conservative political parties and elites in the South generally took an anti-communist stance to legitimate their regimes during the Cold War to better protect South Korea from possible invasion from the North. Fundamentalist Christians, many of whom fled the North during the war, have well embraced the 

 

Han, G.-S., Calculated Nationalism in Contemporary South Korea. Movements for Political and Economic Democratization in the 21st Century. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press 2023 doi: 10.5117/9789463723657_ch05

anti-communist approaches to the North. North Korea’s nuclear tests to produce weapons of mass destruction have hindered the peace process and the reunification of the two Koreas. Vested interests of the neighbouring superpowers, such as the United States, Japan, China, and Russia, could not come to terms with the ways to facilitate the peace process (Park 2011: 141).

Under progressive governments, in particular, South Korean presidents have initiated North-South Korean Summits, which significantly boosted South Korean aspirations for reuniting the two Koreas. The desire has also been fuelled by South Korea’s drive to take advantage of human and natural resources available in the North for economic development, the benefit of which could have a flow-on effect on the poor quality of life under the slow economic growth in recent decades. If there were to be a reunification of the two Koreas in a decade or two, the younger generation would experience the tangible benefits. This is what the older generation would like to offer if possible. However, the younger generation in particular, and South Koreans in general, increasingly lack aspirations for a reunified Korea (Kim 2014). This chapter aims to analyse media reports and narratives as to why Koreans are increasingly indifferent to, or disinterested, in the possible reunification concerning the costs of reunification.

Literature Review

South Korean perception of reunification and fellow Koreans in the North has fluctuated, especially in recent decades, depending upon the influence of events such as natural disasters, nuclear arms development in the North, the North-South Summits in 2007 and 2018, and the 2018 Pyeongchang Winter Olympics. The 2018 North-South Summit brought about a heightened interest in reunification (Yang 2019: 48). The characteristics of South Korean government policies towards North Korea and reunification have also heavily driven the public perception of reunification. For example, under the progressive Moon Jae-In’s presidentship, a survey in May 2018 reported that 83.5 per cent considered reunification possible and 64.6 per cent anticipated many benefits of reunification.1 However, unlike the common assumption that progressive news outlets will support the reunification and conservative outlets not support it, Kim Jae-Han (2009) had earlier found that whether a media outlet is progressive or conservative is irrelevant to their viewpoints towards North Korea (Park et al. 2020: 168). This indicates that 

1 Hankook Research (www.hrc.co.kr 2018, cited in Park Jong-Min et al. 2020: 167).

understanding the issue with North Korea is complex and its understanding needs to be contextualized. There are three broad strands in my interest areas in research of the reunification of two Koreas. First, the research on the variables explains South Koreans’ diverse perceptions of reunification. Second, reunification education is designed to inform the citizens of a better understanding of reunification. Third, some studies have discussed unification tax as a way to fund reunification.

First, past studies have suggested several different independent variables in explaining South Koreans’ varied perceptions of the reunification of the two Koreas (Kim 2019a; Choi et al. 2016; Lee 2014). They include demographics (e.g., age, gender, education, income, and birthplace), ideology, political party identity, ethnonational identification with North Koreans, socio-cultural elements, and cost-benefit calculations (individual and national levels). Older persons and men feel the need for reunification more than younger persons and women. The Ministry of Reunification conducted a survey of school students in 2014. Responding to the question, “Reunification is necessary,” 53.5 per cent of them “agreed”—i.e., 71 per cent of primary-school, 54.3 per cent of middle-school and 47.8 per cent of high-school students (Institute of Reunification Education 2014: 6; Park and Seo 2018: 440). Another survey by the Ministry of Reunification in 2017 showed that 62.6 per cent of the school students agreed with the same question whereas 47.9 per cent of university students agreed with it (The Ministry of Education December 29, 2017, cited in Park and Seo 2018). Park and Seo (2018: 456) and other researchers report an increasingly significant difference between the generations in terms of their desires for reunification. Young people are increasingly indifferent to reunification and more young people are questioning the need for reunification (Oh and Yun 2015: 113; Han 2016: 139; Seo 2017: 116). This may be partly because their life experiences have always been with a relatively affluent Korea and they do not see a convincing reason to share their wealth with fellow North Koreans. This equally applies to those suffering from relative deprivation. Consequently, especially young people question reunification rather than desiring it if ethnonational identification is put forward as a reason.

People with more education tend to recognize better the need for reunification (Park et al. 2020; Chang and Kim 2015; Kim 2019a: 107). Those earning higher income tend to perceive reunification negatively (Cho and Han 2014: 166; Kim 2019a: 107; Park et al. 2020: 188),2 as they may not feel 

2 Gang Ju-Hyun (2013) found that gender and income are not meaningful elements to influence one’s perception of the reunification.

comfortable sharing the wealth they are currently enjoying. Those with politically progressive ideology and those who support progressive political parties perceive reunification to be necessary. Conservatives are less likely to desire reunification (Lee 2014: 195; Park 2013: 434–436).

The more study participants consider fellow North Koreans as the same Korean people, the more they positively perceive reunification (Lee 2014). The significance of ethnic nationalism in terms of reunification of two Koreas is decreasing. According to a 2019 survey by the Christian Institute for the Study of Justice and Development (cited in Kim 2019b: 64), 24.4 per cent of Korean Protestant church-goers and 19.6 per cent of non-Protestants3 agreed that the reunification should occur because North and South Koreans are people with the same ancestors. Interestingly, both groups of Protestants (44.6 per cent) and non-Protestants (48.2 per cent) agreed with the need for reunification for the sake of providing a new dynamic for economic growth (p. 64). The economic reason for reunification is approximately double the ethno-nationalistic reason. In contrast, Jung et al. (2018) conducted a survey of 1,200 participants in 2018 and found that respondents picked the ethno-nationalistic reason for the need for reunification (45.1 per cent), followed by the eradication of the threat of war (31.4 per cent)—(Kim 2019b). The same survey found that 34.67 per cent selected the economic burden caused by reunification, followed by potential social problems to arise due to reunification (27.67 per cent), as the reason why reunification should not proceed. I argue that Koreans want to see the reunification for economic benefit, but are reluctant to pay the related cost during and after reunification. They would like to enjoy all the potential benefits of reunification, provided that there will be no personal burdens to bear. Kim (2019b: 64) adds that respondents are sensitive to their gain or loss, which might occur due to reunification, rather than concerned with ideological or ethno-nationalistic reasons.

Park and Seo (2018: 454) asked their study participants about their perceptions of potential gains and losses from the possible reunification of two Koreas. The students’ responses to the question, “North Koreans are the same people (minjok) who share the ancestors with South Koreans” were 5.88 out of 10. This indicates that the respondents saw a gulf of socio-historical differences between North and South Koreans and that ethnonational identification is not as significant as it was in the past. Park and Seo (2018: 456) argue that the university students anticipate that actual reunification 

3교인 This is a comparison of Protestant church-goers (개신교인) with non-Protestants (비개신

).

will cause a high related cost and tax and that the current discrepancy in living standards between North and South Korea will lead to a high cost of social welfare, and consequently worsen the quality of their life. Park and Seo contend that reunification education should emphasize teaching the students about socio-political benefits. In the same vein, Yang (2019) suggests that reunification education should incorporate the benefits of “the social stability and development” that was experienced in the case of the German Reunification. The question is whether the university students, who are increasingly facing reduced life opportunities (Han 2019: Ch.3), will be persuaded by the speculative and intangible socio-political benefits that might come through reunification.

The second strand of reunification research is about educating citizens to provide them with a vision of a prosperous reunified Korea. There are three areas of reunification education: (1) education about reunification, (2) education for reunification, and (3) post-reunification (Park 2012: 187). Researchers have argued for the importance and relevance of reunification education for the following reasons. First, education aims to provide the public with an understanding of the need for reunification and future direction, which would lead to a broader public consensus for reunification. Second, education would provide the public with an accurate picture of North Korea (Chung 2014: 161). When younger people, in particular, are relatively indifferent to reunification, it is challenging to carry out effective education for reunification. Although education for reunification is well intended for the benefit of the younger generation, the latter could perceive it as a biased effort to inject a desire for reunification. Seo Hyun-Jin (2017) hypothesizes that the generational differences regarding aspirations of reunification result from the different reunification education that people have received during their youth. Middle-aged Koreans received an ideologically based education during their youth, which led them to think of the interest and necessity of reunification and consider fellow North Koreans as originally the “same” Koreans. However, reunification education for the younger generation was much more based on reality and practicality in the information era, which encouraged them to question the possible problems that might occur upon reunification (p. 122). Seo Hyun-Jin partly considers some dimensions of structural and cultural contexts under which different generations of Koreans have considered reunification. However, the primary concern remains unresolved with reference to the individual agents and reunification education. The relevant structure and culture are yet to be fully considered.

Finally, reunification’s expected costs and benefits have significantly influenced individual perceptions of reunification. Those who think of more benefits and less costs tend to consider reunification necessary. South Koreans commonly assume that the reunification will cause an exponential expenditure to fund the education and social welfare of Koreans in the North. Studies show that the expected costs and taxes are the discouraging elements across the generations (Woo 2017: 218). After the war threat discouraged Koreans from anticipating reunification, the possible cost and tax were the following main reasons discouraging reunification (Oh and Yun 2015: 114; Yang 2019: 52–53). Many studies agree that the socio-economic costs and disruptions will be high on the one hand (Yi 2000: 319–320; Yi 2008; Son 2009; Yun 2011: 252–289), and others argue that the media has ignored the relevance of the German reunification model to Korea and the possible high cost of reunification is the main viewpoint the Korean public has absorbed (Han 2015: 335; Yang 2019: 54; Yun 2011). In contrast, Yun (2011) and Son (2016: 310) argue that the costs and disruptions would be temporary, and the benefits would be for generations to come. However, there is much uncertainty about the socio-economic status of both Koreas at the time of reunification, which makes it difficult to measure the costs and benefits of reunification (Lee 2012).

There is a clear recognition that reunification’s expected costs and benefits are the key influential elements determining people’s perceptions of reunification. According to the prospect theory, people are more sensitive to costs or losses than the benefits (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). There has been little examination of public discourse around reunification in the media, especially the kinds of concerns that individuals may have. TV and online news are key sources of information about the possible reunification (Kim 2019b: 68) and as such it is worth analysing the relevant media narratives.

Kim Do-Kyung (2019a) contends that the division of the Korean peninsula has been prolonged and that ethno-nationalistic sentiment is unable to persuade university students in their 20s of the need for reunification. Consequently, the cost-benefits of the reunification for individuals and the nation-state have become essential criteria for young people. A difficulty with the research on reunification, in general, is that it is speculative. For example, Kim Do-Kyung (2019a: 112–113) found in his survey of 1,060 university students in Busan that 63.8 per cent considered reunification beneficial to the nation-state and that 42.6 per cent considered the reunification to be beneficial to them individually. Kim (2019a: 121) interprets the statistical finding in haste that young people prioritize national interest rather than personal interest. This interpretation seems to be the researcher’s desire and far from reality. The difficulty in this leads me to examine the broader discourse about reunification concerning the costs of reunification and tax. Despite ideology being a factor in all kinds of debates in Korea, it is now possible that ideology has little to do with the public perception of reunification, but more to do with cost-benefit.

Whether a South Korean is willing to pay reunification tax or related-costs depends on how they perceive and approach the possible reunification. Those who strongly desire reunification are willing to meet the related-costs. Kim (2019a: 118) also noted that how his study participants perceived the reunification costs and benefits determined whether or not they considered the reunification necessary. Those who considered the reunification beneficial to the South Korean nation-state or individuals think it is necessary to have the two Koreas reunified (Kim 2019a: 115–116). Other studies have investigated possible costs of reunification, appropriateness of reunification tax (Kim and Shin 2016b), ways to introduce a reunification tax with public consensus (Kim 2010), and the correlation between awareness of reunification tax and support for it (Sim and Park 2013). Kim and Shin (2016a: 26) point out that the people will have to pay the tax, but most Koreans are not well informed of the need to establish a reunification tax, which is problematic. Under these circumstances, it seems unfeasible to establish the reunification tax. Even if it was established, people’s tax payments might not be based on a rational (informed) choice (Slovic and Peters 2006; cited in Kim and Shin 2016a: 26).

In brief, numerous studies have analysed the trends of media reports on the perception of North Korea and reunification (Yi et al. 2015; Choi and Ha 2016). These indicated that the cost-benefit impacts of reunification at the personal and national levels are crucial considerations. Instead of repeating the studies, I shall investigate the public debate on the reunification cost and tax, as these are influential elements that affect how individuals perceive the national identity of a reunified Korea. The Korean media has voiced both supportive and negative views towards reunification over the years, depending on the political stance of a media outlet and given political context. Thus, prevalent views in the media may not necessarily represent the majority of consumers of the media (Kim 2003; Park et al. 2020: 167). I intend to elaborate on the media narratives concerning reunification cost and tax—both supportive and negative. This is to understand where the public debate is, rather than how to inject the importance of reunification tax into the minds of the public.

A Morphogenetic Background of the Reunification of the Korean Peninsula

South and North Korea have been hostile to each other since the Korean War as they have technically still been at war. However, inter-Korean dialogues have developed over the years, and South Korean political parties have become diverse, with a spectrum and combination of progressive and conservative viewpoints regarding North Korea and reunification. Over this time, the socio-economic conditioning has been under the tight control by conservative anti-communist governments and ideology, along with followers such as the national flag-carriers. Citing Carl Schmitt (2006), Kim Sang-Jun (2017: 71) notes that “the permanent emergency state system” has placed the whole nation-state in emergency systems that allow for the control of behaviours of the citizens. Both Koreas have been antagonistic to each other. However, both Koreas simultaneously joined the United Nations as members in 1991, which led the Korean peninsula to a new context. Around the late 1980s and the early 1990s, East and West Germany were reunified, and the Cold War moved to a stage with supposedly less tension. In December 1991, both Koreas signed the Inter-Korean Agreements (남북기본합의서), stating to recognize each other’s political governance, not to attack each other, and to increase the inter-Korea relations (p. 82). According to Kim (p. 87), putting aside what North Korea wanted, the NGOs and the governments in South Korea, irrespective of whether they were conservative or progressive, hastily put out their plans and activities for post-reunification of the peninsula. However, both Koreas’ recognition of each other’s governance as they are has to be given priority as the immediate action to take. Kim (2017, 2019c) refers to the so-called “One Nation, Two States.” This idea involves fundamental changes to the North and South relationship (i.e., structural shift) and how to perceive possible reunification (i.e., cultural shift). Many individuals (agents) in South Korea cannot comprehend these shifts, which has made the public debate difficult and less than productive.

Soon after the Korean War, the discrepancy between South and North Korean economies was far less than that in the following years. Thus, before the war, the two Koreas were structurally not dissimilar to each other, but the culture of animosity to each other was extreme, despite a strong belief in the one people with the same ancestors. The increasing structural and cultural discrepancy between the two Koreas has increasingly made reunification difficult. South Korea’s key drive to pursue reunification seems based on its desire to live in peace or without the threat of war and to further its economic prosperity. Whether South Koreans are willing to pay the costs of reunification demands analysis.

Research Methods

News reports for this chapter are sourced from the KINDS (Korea Integrated News Database System), developed by the Korean Press Foundation, and covers local, national newspapers, TV reports, and magazines with full texts since 1990. Regarding reunification cost and tax, I have searched “통일비용” (reunification cost) and “통일세” (reunification tax) on news titles and texts, covering from January 2011 to December 2021. The search produced 162 news reports, which amounted to 253 pages in single-spaced A4. I have also searched “통일인식” (awareness of reunification) on news titles, covering from January 2011 to March 22, 2021. This produced 85 news reports, amounting to 93 pages in single-spaced A4. It is tempting to limit the analysis to news editorials and columns in the interest of time and convenience. They may primarily represent the intellectual groups rather than the broader public discourse, which led me to broaden the types of news items that I include and analyse. I have used NVivo12 to facilitate the analysis of the data on the basis of the principles of grounded theory methodology, going through open, axial, and selective coding (Strauss and Corbin 1990).

Findings

Focusing on the data on reunification costs and tax, the analysis shows that there are many complex structural and cultural properties beyond the costs per se. Obstacles to reunification include the geopolitical interests of the neighbouring superpowers and economic discrepancies between the North and South. The only way to go seems to have a thorough preparation with a strong economy. President Lee Myung-Bak formally raised the need to establish a reunification tax in his speech to commemorate the 65th anniversary of Independence Day on August 15, 2010. However, little has been done due to external factors, including North Korea’s negative response. Most Koreans want reunification for economic benefit, but they want to pay minimum “reunification costs” if such tax is introduced (Choi et al. 2016: 99). The media notes that the bulk of the reunification costs will be used to elevate the living standard of North Koreans to that of South Koreans. In the following sections, I present data analysis to discuss emergent economic and cultural properties which encourage or discourage Koreans from paying for the reunification costs. Followed are the individual agents’ efforts to orchestrate the given structural and cultural contexts (i.e., structural and cultural elaboration) to achieve or prevent reunification.

Possible Scenarios of Reunification

Experts note that a possible scenario in North Korea, resulting from reunification, could be unexpected politico-economic turmoil. The impacts on the South would be well beyond the geopolitical risks that have occasionally caused temporary impacts on financial markets. The impacts would be apparent in politics, military crisis, and social disruption, which could cause astronomic reunification costs and total panic for the domestic and international investors in the Korean market.4 Grassroots may be aware that they have little control over how they react to the disruptions.

Concerning the preparation for Korean reunification, there are numerous references to the lessons from the German experience. Rainer Eckert, a German historian, contends that “Germany faced its reunification without preparation, but was able to cope with the turmoil thanks to the ongoing interactions between East and West Germany.” Eckert advises that South Koreans need to be alerted with more awareness of the need for reunification.5 Rolf Mafael, German ambassador to Korea, points out that South Korean youth should consider reunification to be a crisis rather than an opportunity because they are worried about the reunification costs.6 The German reunification is now assessed as successful in nation-building, thanks to a massive investment (e.g., Solidarity Surcharge) to reduce the 

4 Hankook Ilbo. 2011. “한국 경제 새로운 10년, 새로운 도전: 북한 그리고 통일 https://m” (Korean .

Economy Next 10 Years, New Challenges: North Korea and Reunification). January 6, hankookilbo.com/News/Read/201101061221938481, accessed April 5, 2021; Herald Kyungje. 2011. 신평사 한국보는 눈 달라졌다…금융보다 통일비용에 포커스 (Credit Rating Agency’s New Way 

to Assess Korea: Focus on the Reunification Cost Rather Than Finance). December 22, http:// news.heraldm.com/view.php?ud=20111222000399&mod=skb, accessed April 5, 2021.

5서Youth). September 27. 관심Kangwon Ilbo가져야 . 2013. “ http://www.kwnews.co.kr/nview.asp?s=501&aid=213092600142젊은이에게 통일에 대한 인식 심어주기는 쉽지 않을 것 정치권에, accessed 

” (A Challenge in Creating Awareness of the Need for Reunification Among the 

April 5, 2021.

주한Young Koreans See It As a Risk Rather Than an Opportunity). October 23, 6 Kookmin Ilbo 독일대사, 한신대. 2014. “ 특강한반도” (German Ambassador: Need to Prepare for a Sudden Reunification…  갑작스런 통일 염두에 둬야… 한국 젊은이 기회보다http://news.kmib 위기 인식., 

co.kr/article/view.asp?arcid=0922821783, accessed April 5, 2021.

income discrepancy between East and West Germany. Professor Yoo Ho-Yeol warns that the German experience entailed a high cost, and the process to overcome political and psychological effects took a while, and these issues raise concerns to South Koreans.7 Whether through a tax, national bond, or fund, it is the people’s burden to bear, and they are resisting it. Thus, it is critical to persuade the people to contribute to the costs.8 Time to Prepare the Costs or Is It Pointless?

There are competing views on how to fund the reunification costs. The first is establishing a reunification tax or fund to reserve the required costs. President Lee Myung-Bak claimed in his speech to commemorate National Independence Day on August 15, 2010 that the reunification ought to take place someday and raised the need to collect the reunification tax.9 According to a commonly cited cost of reunification, it could cost South Korea up to $2 trillion or every South Korean $50,000 over thirty years. Dr. Kim Young-Yun argues that South Korea has to save at least the reunification cost of the first year so that the related laws could be legislated in that period. The first twelve months will cost $6 billion to provide basic welfare for the disadvantaged in the North, systems integration into one nation-state, and investing in the economic structure.10 The advocates argue that just as purchasing a home and preparing a wedding require appropriate savings, reunification definitely requires the preparation of a fund, accompanying the government’s seeking consensus from the people.11 Different government departments, such as the Ministry of Reunification and the Ministry of Economy and Finance, have deliberated on the ways to collect the fund for the reunification. For example, the Ministry of Reunification could create a Reunification Pot (통일항아리), which 

7 Hankook Ilbo. 2011. “한나라https://www.hankookilbo.com/News/Read/201103061183683242, 통일정책 TF 논의 방향은” (Hannara Party’s Directions for  

Reunification). March 6, accessed April 6, 2021.

8Reunification?). December 20,  Money Today. 2011. “갑작스레https://news.mt.co.kr/mtview.php?no=2011122013375371420 통일 닥치면 그 돈은 어떻게…” (How to Fund a Sudden , accessed April 6, 2021.

9 Hankook Ilbo. 2011. “강경기조 틈새 대화 가능성 열어놔…MB 남북관계 발언 변화” (President 

Lee Myung-Bak Keeping Open the Inter-Korea Dialogue Option in the Midst of a Tension). January 27, https://news.v.daum.net/v/20110127023708098?f=o, accessed April 7, 2021.

1011  Hankook IlboMaeil Sinmun. 2011. “. 2011. “한국민주당 경제 , ‘새로운통일세 10 년반대, 새로운’ 설득력 도전http://news.imaeil.com/InnerCol 없다: 북한” (Democratic Party’s Op- 그리고 통일.” position to the Reunification Tax is Baseless). January 6, umn/2011010607050147966, accessed April 7, 2021.

would put together the unused South-North Exchange Fund (기금 남북교류

) and the new voluntary donations.12 The Ministry of Economy and 

Finance argues that the current South-North Exchange and Cooperation Project Fund (남북협력기금, $1.007 billion) and a contingency fund of 

$2.8 billion would not be enough, and therefore it is necessary to establish reunification tax.13 The Ministry of Economy and Finance also expresses serious concerns about burdening the taxpayers, which may weaken the national financial situation, and instead suggests a reunification fund, national bond, or reunification lottery tickets.14 The debates on how to save for reunification costs continued for several years, and the fairest ways to fund the costs were hotly debated, but these have not resulted in any concrete decisions.

North Korea was vehemently against the South-North Exchange and Cooperation Project Fund and another tax or fund to prepare for reunification because the funds were based on anticipating the collapse of the North Korean regime. Thus, North Korean media labelled the South Korean funds “the tax of fighting and war.”15 Undoubtedly, there is a need to reserve a significant amount of funds to prepare for reunification. However, the whole issue of reunification is discussed at events, such as a North-South summit, or presidential comments on the matter. Nonetheless, there is little effort to keep it an ongoing public debate, including what both Koreas can do here and now.

The second view on the preparation for the reunification costs is that it will not positively impact achieving reunification. Fifty per cent of the respondents of a 2011 survey agreed that “a reunification fund will be required in the future, but too early for now. About twenty per cent (19.7) responded that the tax is unnecessary and not the right time to discuss 

12 Money Today. 2011. “류우익 통일부 장관, 통일기금 20년 동안 55조원 조성” (Minister of Reunification Argues for the Reservation of a Fund of $55 Billion in the Next 20 Years). November 23, https://m.mt.co.kr/renew/view.html?no=2011112315585167488&MVR_T#_enliple, accessed April 8, 2021.

13 Aju Kyungje. 2011. “통일비용 문제 급부상, 다음 정권 증세 불가피” (A Sudden Surge of the 

Cost of Reunification—Inevitable for the Next Government to Establish a Tax). December 21, https://m.ajunews.com/amp/20111221000500, accessed April 8, 2021.

14 Financial News. 2011. “정부, 통일세https://www.fnnews.com/news/201103221709330067?t=y 사실상 폐기” (The Government Virtually Discarding , the Reunification Tax). March 22, accessed April 8, 2021.

15 Kyunghyang Sinmun. 2011. “남북 대화없이 가진 않을 것…쌀 빼고 밀가루는 지원 가능” 

(Humanitarian Support for North Korea is Possible but a Inter-Korea Dialogue Essential). July 17, http://news.khan.co.kr/kh_news/khan_art_view.html?art_id=201107172204195, accessed April 9, 2021.

it.”16 A Research & Research’s survey revealed that 73.6 per cent agreed with the need to reserve some resources for reunification. However, despite the support to create a fund for the purpose, only 10 per cent (9.8) agreed to establish a reunification tax.17 The Democratic Party, in particular, opposed the reunification tax, since it angers North Korea and is burdensome to the South Korean taxpayers. Instead, the Democratic Party argued for the North-South interchanges to reduce the difference in living standards, which could reduce the reunification costs. For example, providing railway services in North Korea connecting to China, Russia, and Europe could be a significant economic stimulus.18 A broader context of not supporting the reunification tax is that taxpayers are reluctant to pay the tax since they do not see persuasive reasons and tangible benefits. Yun Sang-Hyun, a parliamentarian, argues that the current South-North Exchange and Cooperation Project Fund ($1.2 billion) could be used for cooperation first before more funds are collected.19 According to an editorial, pushing for a reunification tax without people’s consensus or consideration of the tax burden for ordinary people could divide the nation rather than be constructive.20 As the reunification tax became politicized and turned out to be a concern for the taxpayers, the Korean Blue House expressed that President Lee Myung-Bak’s raising the issue was meant to “listen to the people from diverse groups and encourage them to participate in the debate.” Kim Jin, the reporting columnist, noted, “the president isn’t doing his duties and contemplating what the next tax to collect will be.”21 Facing the general and presidential elections, the ruling party abandoned the reunification 

16 Seoul Sinmun. 2011. “통일기금 http://www.seoul.co.kr/news/newsView.php?id=20110101004008, 필요해도 아직 일러, 50%” (50% says, Reunification Fund is Re- quired, But Too Early). January 1, accessed January 1, 2011.

17 Naeil Sinmun. 2011. “통일세, 대북정책 공감없인 조세저항” (Without National Empathy https://www. About Policies Towards the North, Reunification Tax Will be Resisted). July 18, naeil.com/news_view/?id_art=23190, accessed April 14, 2021.

1819  Herald KyeongjeMaeil Sinmun. 2011. “. 2011. “민주당통일재원 ‘통일세 어떻게 반대?…통일세’ 설득력 놓고 없다 당정.” January 6. 미묘한 온도차” (How to Prepare 

the Resources for Reunification: Political Parties’ Subtle Differences Over Reunification Tax). February 28, http://news.heraldcorp.com/view.php?ud=20110228000346&mod=skb, accessed April 13, 2021.

20 Seoul Kyeongje. 2011. “통일세 신설, 국민적 공감대 뒷받침돼야https://www.sedaily.com” (The Establishment / of Reunification Tax Requires National Empathy). July 18, NewsView/1HRO25BPE6, accessed April 13, 2021.

21 Jeonbuk DominIlbo. 2011. “개콘보다 더 웃기기” (High Level Bureaucrats’ Nonsensical Com- accessed ments). July 27, http://www.domin.co.kr/news/articleViewAmp.html?idxno=829353, April 14, 2021.

tax, agreeing with the priority to strengthen the national fiscal capacity, unburdening the taxpayers.22

While there was a significant emphasis on the cost of reunification that South Korea has to bear, an equally strong counter-argument was that the benefit of reunification was more significant than the cost, which was one of the several most argued points in the data. Notably, the benefits of reunification are long-lasting, whereas the costs are for a relatively short period. Common justifications for the benefit include an increase in the value of stocks and real estate, the abundant natural resources in the North, and an increase in the size of the domestic market, enabling economies of scale, which means the utilization of fellow North Koreans as the consumers of South Korean industries. A critique of such justifications contends that those benefits may have little to do with the ordinary Koreans.23 The advocates for the benefits argue that the costs of division will be cancelled out by $16.6 billion (i.e., compared to the gain from the reunification), economic vitality will generate $16.4 billion, and a non-economic benefit to generate $16.2 billion, making $49.2 billion in total.24 The reduction of defence costs and the removal of conscription will contribute to economic growth. Technologies in the South and labour power and natural resources in the North will create a synergy for economic growth. The removal of the risks based on the division will push up the credit rates of the nation.25 Yu Ik-Seon, an investment researcher, argues that the reunification costs will turn out to be a long-term investment for a better life.26 News reports have also cited overseas news. For example, the Economist noted that the reunification cost could be $1 trillion. Still, the value of natural resources from the North is many times more than that, and JP Morgan predicted that 

22 Seoul Kyungje. 2011. “통일세는 치적 https://www.sedaily.com/NewsView/1HQUV1O2YU; 쌓기용? ” (Reunification is Only for the Sake of National  Financial 

Leaders’ Performances?). October 9,

News. 2011. “정부, 통일세. 2016. “ 사실상통일대박론보다 폐기.” March 22. 중요한 건 객관적 현실인식” (Objective Reading 

23 Hankyoreh Sinmun

of Reality is More Important Than an Uninformed ‘Reunification as an Incredible Fortune’).” November 17, http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/culture/book/770830.html, accessed April 15, 2021.

24 Money Today. 2011. “통일비용 https://news.mt.co.kr/mtview.php?no=2011100713432251568, 10년 간 최대 2800兆 소요” (Reunification Cost, Up to $2.8  

Trillion Over 10 Years). October 7, accessed April 15, 2021.

25 Maeil Kyungje. 2012. “남북통일 손익계산서 두드려보면” (Calculating the Cost and Benefit  accessed April 16, of Reunification). https://www.mk.co.kr/news/society/view/2012/01/31192/, 2021.

26 Seoul Kyungje. 2011. “통일 비용 부각땐  https://www.sedaily.com/NewsView/1HOZA5F177급락 올수도 (An Over-Emphasis Could Cause a , Sudden Drip of the Stock Price).” December 21, accessed April 15, 2021.

North Korea has been a key geopolitical risk for the Korean stock market. The reunification is likely to rectify this.

Professor Ahn Chang-Nam, a tax expert, has provided an analogy of the cost of surgery for a sick child compared to the divided Korean peninsula, causing high costs and risks. He argues that no parents will give up on their sick child who requires expensive surgery, and the parents know their recovered child will bring them happiness well beyond their imagination.27 Nonetheless, South Koreans seem to question what the immediate losses and benefits for them would be, and what taxes they would have to pay in the present. They think that reunification would bring many benefits to fellow Koreans in the North and little for “me.”28 KBS TV reports a view from a citizen, Ihm Jeong-Hyun, that “the reunification is certainly the way to go, but there is a disadvantage to the South as well.” Professor Kim Yong-Hyun notes that in the wake of the North-South Summit in 2018, South Koreans are ambivalent between anticipation and the burden of paying the costs.29 Interestingly, a survey of 1,000 adults, 19-years and older, reports that 31 per cent of those in their 20s to 40s have chosen economic growth out of a few options as the first reason for reunification and that 44 per cent of those in their 50s and 60s have chosen “the same ethnic people” as the first reason.30

People’s Consensus Is a Key

Preparing an adequate fund to support reunification is crucial. However, preparation without people’s clear awareness and vision is problematic. A sense of a supportive climate at the grassroots level is required. There has been limited people diplomacy between the North and South. There is ideological division about North Korea and reunification in the South, making it challenging to generate a national consensus. Reunification and 

27 Asia Kyungje. 2021. “통일비용과 통일세, 남북이 함께 조성하자https://www.asiae.co.kr” (Reunification Costs / and Tax: Can the North and South Collaborate on This?). January 29, article/2021012913003009358, accessed April 16, 2021.

28만원Than $100 Per Year). July 18. Seoul Sinmun이하 . 2018. “[나에게 https://www.seoul.co.kr/news/newsView.php?id=20180718005005 통일이란] 통일세 도입엔 아직 냉랭… 75%, 지갑 연다면 年 10, 

 ” (Still Indifferent to Reunification Tax… 75% of Those Willing Would Contribute Less accessed April 18, 2021.

29 KBS TV. 2018. 통일의식조사, 北 호감 ↑ 통일 필요성 인식 ↓” (A Survey of Reunification 

Awareness: Good Feeling About North Korea Up, Awareness of the Need of Reunification Down). August 15. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=P9CUAF6lQhk, accessed April 18, 2021.

30 Seoul Kyungje. 2014. “통일에 대한 인식도 세대차이” (Generation Difference of Reunification 0 Awareness).” April 8, https://news.naver.com/main/read.nhn?mode=LSD&mid=sec&sid1=10 &oid=011&aid=0002495483, accessed April 18, 2021.

the fund to support it should be a bi-partisan matter but continues to be politicized. Lee Myung-Bak government’s attempt to create the reunification tax without people’s consensus faced a backlash and finished with little achievement. There are numerous cultural challenges to overcome.

In addition to the economic burden to meet the cost of reunification, the seventy-year division has caused differences in the language, culture, and political systems. Reunification may cause high unemployment, crimes, and social unrest.31 South Korean democracy and North Korea’s totalitarian dynasty may be difficult to reconcile. How can reunification be possible unless one side gives up power? North Korea is now nuclear-armed.32 A national survey indicated that South Koreans consider ideological differences (89.5 per cent) and cultural and customs differences (74.9 per cent) to be obstacles to reunification and that half the respondents (51.3 per cent) thought that reunification would worsen class hierarchies.33 According to Kim Yong-Hyeon, a reunification expert, in order to minimize the cost and reduce social conflicts, a gradual but constant effort for North-South cooperation can absorb the shocks well before the eventual reunification.34

The Lee Myung-Bak government labelled the previous two progressive governments “the wasted decade” and described Kim Dae-Jung’s Sunshine Policy as no more than unconditional support diplomacy. Then, President Lee Myung-Bak raised the need to introduce a reunification tax when there was great tension between the North and South. Opposition parties and political commentators had difficulties understanding Lee’s underlying thoughts and assessed them to be reckless.35 Political parties hastily discussed how to create a reunification tax without a due public debate.36 The important issue of reunification has been turned into a matter to gain political advantages. The culture of a top-down approach rather than being prepared to listen to 

31 Financial News. 2015. “무리한 증세는 역효과… 금융정책시스템부터 정비해야” (Unreason- https://

able Tax Brings a Reverse Effect… Financial System to Be Maintained First). January 29, busan.fnnews.com/news/201501291743135994, accessed April 19, 2021.

32Paradigm for Peace Is Required). August 8, Gyeonggi Ilbo. 2018. “분단 73년, 평화로 http://www.kyeonggi.com/news/articleView.html? 패러다임 대전환 필요” (Divided for 73 Years, A New i dxno=1506606&replyAll=&reply_sc_order_by=I, accessed April 19, 2021.

33 Seoul Sinmun. 2018. “통일세

3534  Seoul SinmunJeonbuk DominIlbo. 2018. “. 2011. “통일세개콘보다  도입엔도입엔   아직아직더 웃기기  냉랭냉랭… 75%, … 75%, ” (Ridiculous More Than a Comedy). July 27, 지갑지갑  연다면연다면  年年 10 10만원만원  이하이하.” July 18..” July 18.

https://www.domin.co.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=829353&sc_section_code=S1N2, accessed April 19, 2021.

36 Segye Ilbo. 2011. 통일비용 걱정할 필요 없다” (No Need to Worry About the Reunification Costs). August 17, https://m.segye.com/view/20110816004548, accessed April 19, 2021.

the grassroots is of little help. This is not desirable leadership when there are other challenging geopolitical situations.

Instead, there have been many talks with little action. The reunification and the costs are ignored due to other urgent matters such as increasing welfare costs, and the costs and issues associated with low birth rates and aging populations.37 The experts noted the importance of people’s consensus and participation in the whole preparation process; however, such an effort was lacking. Nevertheless, the movement to save the fund, called the Reunification Pot, attracted donations from more than 100,000 people and accumulated about $1 million. Under the Park Geun-Hye government, the discussion of the reunification fund disappeared. As the Reunification Pot was not utilized, a donor retracted his/her donation of $96,000. This is how “the Reunification Pot was broken.”38 It has been repeatedly argued that national leadership is required to persuade the people and engage them with the reunification movement.

Diverse Anticipations towards Reunification

With the flow of time since the Korean War, different models of reunification have been suggested. However, South Koreans perceive the reunified nation-state as similar to Germany. When South Koreans were provided with a few models of reunification in a 2014 survey, 43.4 per cent chose “one state two systems,” 22.9 per cent “free visits between the North and the South,” and 33.7 per cent chose a complete reunification.39 In fact, different generations have different preferences towards reunification. Younger generations generally prefer the peaceful coexistence of the North and the South over a complete reunification. This implies that reunification needs to be redefined in a broadly acceptable way to South Koreans.40 Yu 

37($27 Billion Required in the First Year of Reunification… Indirect Tax and Lottery Ticket Discussed  Financial News. 2011. “[김정일 사망] 통일후 첫 1년간 최소 27兆필요…간접세·복권 등 거론” as the Ways to Support). December 20, https://www.fnnews.com/news/201112201732159801, accessed April 20, 2021.

38가는January 12, Segye Ilbo길 http://m.segye.com/view/20200109517880. 2020. “MB때 ‘통일항아리’ 반짝 모금운동, accessed April 20, 2021.… 사회적 논의 실종 [신통일한국으로 

] ” (Reunification Pot as a Brief Movement of Fund Raising…Public Discourse Missing). 

릴39All Immature’… 64% says, Reunification Won’t Be Possible in 11 years). September 4,   것Seoul Kyeongje’ 64%” (Korean Peninsula Economic Forum, ‘Social Integration and Required Conditions . 2014. “한반도경제포럼, ‘사회통합 등 여건 성숙 안돼… 통일 11년 이상https:/ 걸/

www.sedaily.com/NewsView/1HKUKIG75A, accessed April 20, 2021.

40화 Aju Kyeongje. 2020. “하노이 노딜후 통일 인식 하락세… ‘김정은 못믿어’ 대북인식 악

” (Reunification Awareness Down After the Hanoi No-Deal…Decreased Trust in Kim 

Ho-Yeol, a reunification expert, notes that “one state two systems” is likely to offer substantial cost savings and accompany a consequential effect of it and that South and North Korean politics could be integrated into one, but administration and economy could be under separate control, which may better suit the North’s adjustment to a gradual change.41 Professor Moon Chung-In aptly reminds us that South Korea cannot impose reunification, but can only be achieved by the North-South cooperation. Moon also notes that cooperation between the two Koreas, and South Korea’s development of the infrastructures in and out of Korea to encourage North Korea to come to the negotiation table must precede the reunification.42

Moon Chung-In recalls that former East and West Germany, following their Basic Treaty in December 1972, pursued interactions and cooperation and that West Germany provided East Germany with a development fund of $32 billion before the reunification. In this respect, the German reunification was carefully prepared and negotiated.43 If North and South Korea could interact with each other, especially if North Korea gives up the nuclear programme and opens up its economy to the international community to bring in international investments, this would be a stimulus for the North Korean economy and a gradual and desirable future reunification.44 President Kim Dae-Jung’s Sunshine Policy most represents this German model of gradual reunification.45 How to keep the momentum to pursue this peaceful and desirable method remains a complex task in the geopolitical context. For example, according to a 2018 survey, younger Koreans in their 20s are concerned about the neighbouring superpowers’ positions on reunification. Nearly 50 per cent (46.7 per cent) of the respondents think the United States does not want the reunification of two Koreas, and 70.1 per cent, 73.9 per cent, and 63.3 per cent of the respondents, respectively, think China, Japan, and Russia do not want the reunification.46

Jongun and Perception of North Korea Worsens). June 25, 2021, https://www.ajunews.com/ view/20200625201827985, accessed April 20, 2021.

41 Money Today. 2011. “현인택, 통일 로드맵https://news.mt.co.kr/mtview.php?no=2011022817, 5월이면 나와” (Hyun In-Taek, Reunification 2

Roadmap to Be Out by May). February 28, 

21075613&outlink=1&ref=https%3A%2F%2Fsearch.daum.net, accessed April 20, 2021.

42on Common Sense and Reason). January 24,  Joongang Ilbo. 2011. “통일 논의 상식과 순리https://news.joins.com/article/4964905 따라야” (Reunification Debate to Be Based , accessed 

April 20, 2021.

44 Herald Kyeongje. 2011. “

434645Reunification Awareness: 5 Out of 10 Think the US Also Wants the Reunification). November 27,    Seoul SinmunJoongang IlboSegye Ilbo. 2011. “. 2018. “. 2011. “통일비용청년들의통일통일재원 논의 걱정할 통일 상식과 어떻게  인식필요 , 10순리 ? …없다명통일세  중따라야.” 5명 , 놓고美도.” 당정 남북통일 미묘한 원할 온도차 것” (Young People’s .” February 28.

In contrast to the peaceful and gradual reunification is an abrupt and sudden reunification, which partly characterizes the German reunification and is an expensive pathway. President Park Geun-Hye’s phrase, “the reunification is an incredible fortune (통일은 대박),” was a populist and empty comment. Professor Jin Chung-Kwon interpreted the comment to imply that despite all possible disruptions, the reunification by absorption must proceed; short-term confusions ought to bring about long-term fortunes, and there is no need to fear reunification. In brief, Jin contends that the desire to see the North’s collapse as a shortcut to achieving reunification is a fantasy.47 Strongly wishing the reunification, many South Koreans often expressed their wish to see the North Korean regime collapse. Any prediction on the possible collapse is hard; however, it is unlikely, and the regime may instead strengthen over a period.48 In fact, some conservative scholars predicted the downfall of North Korea within five years after the death of Kim Il-Sung in 1994, which proved to be wrong. Professor Kim Keun-Sik observes that the Lee Myung-Bak government anticipated the pressure to and isolation of North Korea would make it surrender, which proved wrong again.49 Ethno-nationalism is a fundamental element to initiate reunification, and the market economy and democracy are the preconditions for any dialogue for reunification. However, reunification by absorption is a prevailing thought for some political leaders; however, it is unlikely. Even if the North Korean regime falls, its sovereignty will survive and is the counterpart, with which South Korea will negotiate the reunification.50 I think it may be inevitable that the eventual Korean reunification will be both gradual and abrupt in its characteristics in terms of time and process, and South Korea has to prepare for both, together with the required funds.

https://www.seoul.co.kr/news/newsView.php?id=20181128003006, accessed April 21, 2021. 47 Hankook Ilbo. 2014. “진중권, 北 붕괴하면 통일된다는 인식은 환상” (Jin Jung-Kwon, It’s a  https://m.

Fantasy to Think the Collapse of the North Regime Leads to Reunification). January 23, blog.daum.net/garisan/15749037, accessed April 21, 2021.

48Educate the Young People with the Positives of Reunification from Their Young Age). December 22,  Segye Ilbo. 2015. “학생들에게 어릴때부터 통일에 대한 긍정적 인식 심어줘야” (Need to http://m.segye.com/view/20151222003583, accessed April 21, 2021.

49 Kyunghyang Sinmun. 2011. “연평도 이후, 긴장의 한반도: 종합위기세트” (Since the 

Yeonpyeong-do Incident: The Korean Peninsula under Crisis in Every Dimension). January 4, http://weekly.khan.co.kr/khnm.html?mode=view&artid=201012301100041&code=113, accessed April 21, 2021.

50 Joongang Ilbo. 2011. “통일 논의 상식과 순리 따라야.”

Want the Reunification, but Don’t Want to Pay for It

What contributions are the people prepared to make? Limited public awareness of the complexity of reunification and geopolitical fluctuations remain obstacles. Ongoing media messages promoting an economically challenging time do not help (Han 2019: Ch.3). A good portion of people positively acknowledge the need for reunification, but their willingness to pay the costs is a different matter. No one can blame them as they strive to make ends meet. As noted, national leadership needs to handle the reunification discourse better.

People are diverse in terms of how they want to contribute to reunification. It is worth citing an amazing story from grassroots in Goheung Town in Jeolla-Namdo Province. Thirty-three older persons, including Kim Gap-Su (82-years-old), accumulated $22,000 due to their ongoing saving of 30 cents per day, the worth of a cup of coffee from a vending machine. Each person saved up to $9 per month, and their saving continued for four years. Some members put aside part of the monthly pocket money they received from their children, and others brought their earnings from selling the vegetables. These older people dream of being able to pass down the reunified Korea to the next generation, and they are determined to continue saving till their dreams come true.51 On the other hand, Hong Soon-Jik, an economist, points out that the majority of Koreans agree with the need for reunification and also creating of a tax, but 93.7 per cent of the survey participants want to contribute less than $100 per year, i.e., less than $10 per month, which he calls a phenomenon of NOOMP (Not Out of My Pocket).52

At the time of the 2018 North-South Korean Summit, according to a 2018 May survey, 70.7 per cent of the respondents across different generations agreed to contribute to reducing the gap in living standards in the North and South. This increase in the supportive attitude is based on the assumption of an increase in shares and stock values in the event of reunification. That is, reunification was considered a stimulus for economic opportunities.53 

51 Joongang Ilbo. 2012. “통일기금 2200만원https://news.joins.com/article/8013742 모은 고흥 노인 33인” (Goheung’s 33 Older Koreans: , accessed 

Saving a Reunification Fund of $22,000). April 22, 2021.

52 Seoul Kyungje. 2014. “통일세 https://www.sedaily.com/NewsView/1HSFQKU1TZ 연 10만원 이하가 적당” (Reunification Tax, About $100 is , accessed the Right Amount). September 4, April 22, 2021.

53 Seoul Sinmun. 2018. “통일 인식 달라져… 30~50대 더 적극” (Perception of Reunification Is http://www.seoul. Changing… People in 30s to 50s Are More Interested Than Others). May 10, co.kr/news/newsView.php?id=20180510005002, accessed April 23, 2021.

Similarly, in a 2018 November survey, 53.5 per cent of the respondents were willing to pay a reunification tax, whereas 42.3 per cent were not. More than 60 per cent (63.6 per cent) were interested in reunification, and 36.7 per cent were not.54 However, following the Hanoi No-Deal at the 2018 Kim-Trump Summit, a 2018 survey reports that 47.3 per cent of 1,011 participants responded that they, especially those in their 20s and 30s, are against reunification, which is an increase from 36 per cent in 2016. About 30 per cent (29.2 per cent) responded that reunification may be possible in twenty years from the time of the survey, and 26 per cent responded it is not possible.55

From my news analysis, it is apparent that a supportive climate with the North-South dialogue and a hopeful public discourse can easily swing the public support, and this is what the national leaders have to manage and steer the mass with. There is broad agreement that there is little preparation for reunification, which could be disastrous. Instead, the government or political leaders are cautious in contributing to the public discourse and awareness, saving them from political risks. In addition, political leaders’ less proactive approach and people’s reluctance to pay for the reunification cost are affected by the ongoing economic uncertainty based on the sluggish economy after the high-growth rates in the 1970s and 1980s. The media’s sensationalizing of the sluggish economy, and negative reports on the possible impact are also related (Han 2019, Ch.3). Germany’s experience of a high cost of reunification seems to negatively impact the Korean grassroots’ perception of reunification. As noted, the majority of grassroots Koreans see the benefit for the nation, but not for themselves. Hong Yong-Pyo, the Minister of Reunification, assumes the young people’s position is as follows: “As I live a comfortable life with a good job, I don’t see a point of seeking the reunification.”56 In this environment, Hana Financial Management 

54통일세 Seoul Sinmun. 2018. “청년들의 통일 인식: 청년층, 경제·안전 위해 통일 필요… 절반 이상  내겠다” (Young People’s Perception of Reunification: Reunification Is Required for the 

Sake of Economy and National Security… Half the Population Willing to Pay the Reunification Tax). https://www.seoul.co.kr/news/newsView.php?id=20181128003004, accessed April 23, 2021.

55 Joongang Ilbo. 2019. “통일해야 한다, 인식https://news.joins.com/article/23592865, 50.8%…2년새 11%p 하락” (50.8% Agree Reunifica- accessed tion is Essential… 11% Decrease in 2 years). April 23, 2021.

56로  北대화제의Kookmin Ilbo시간. 2015. “통일 ” (If the North and South Are Willing to Discuss Reunification,  논의 가능하다면 남북 정상회담도 가능, 홍용표, 지뢰도발

걸릴듯

the Inter-Korea Summit Should Be Possible as Well; Minister Hong Yong-Pyo Says, the North’s Minecraft Provocation to Make Their Response Slow to the South’s Request for a Dialogue). August 16, http://news.kmib.co.kr/article/view.asp?arcid=0009755532&code=61111111&sid1=i, accessed April 23, 2021.

Research Institute suggests that a method of saving the reunification cost is to establish a Reunification Lottery ticket, of which advantage is not establishing a reunification tax.57 To me, such a method is the epitome of calculated nationalism in the context of a free market, representing the willingness to donate only if there is personal benefit.

Karl Friedhoff in the Asian Institute for Policy Studies points out that young Koreans in their twenties regard themselves as individual “citizens” rather than as part of ethno-nationalism. Observing North Korea’s aggression, such as the attacks on the ROKS Cheonan Corvette and Yeonpyeongdo Island, they question, “Why should we try so hard to reunify with those who threaten us with death?” This questioning implies that reunification may not be a priority when they have the authority to make decisions on national policies.58 This aligns with Emma Campbell (2016) anticipating limited scope for the peninsula’s reunification due to the young people’s adoption of individualism rather than continuing collective and communal values to embrace fellow North Koreans. On the other hand, at the time of the friendly April 27 Inter-Korea Summit in 2018, a survey of 5,274 students at primary, middle, and high schools reported that what they most like to try for reunification is a railway trip through North Korea, China, Russia, and to Europe.59 Young people hope to ride the “reunification train” without purchasing a ticket. Some may be concerned about younger generations’ thoughts on reunification. Notably, a good proportion of those in their 20s–30s and 50s–60s share their somewhat indifferent attitudes to reunification and complacency with the current status.60 A positive side is that the public is aware of their apparent lack of interest in reunification despite its importance and the topic has to continue to be discussed in the public discourse.

57 Digital Times. 2015. “하나금융경영연구소: 통일자금 복권사업으로 충당 가능” (Hana 

Finance Management Research Institute: Lottery Ticket Business Can Meet the Reunification Costs). July 7, http://www.dt.co.kr/contents.html?article_no=2015070702109958739005, accessed April 23, 2021.

58 MBC. 2014. “한국 20대, 통일이 필요하다는https://imnews.imbc.com/news/2014/world 인식 약해져” (Koreans in 20s Now Perceive / of the Less Need for Reunification). May 9, article/3459983_31662.html, accessed April 28, 2021.

59으로 Hankook Kyungje남북관계개선됐다고. 2018. “초중고교생생각” (73% of Primary, Middle and Highschool Students Perceive  73%, 통일 긍정적으로 인식… 90%가 남북정상회담

   

Reunification to be Positive… 90% of Them Think the Inter-Korea Relations Have Improved). May 18, https://www.hankyung.com/society/article/201805188410i, accessed April 29, 2021. 60 Maeil Kyungje. 2013. “2030 vs 5060 인식 비교해보니” (People in Their 20s and 30s vs. 50s https://www.mk.co.

and 60s: A Comparison of Their Perception of Reunification).” January 7, kr/news/economy/view/2013/01/12613/, accessed April 29, 2021.

Fluctuating Feel about Fellow North Koreans and Reunification Tax

Depending on North Korea’s activities, such as North Korea’s nuclear test or North Korean delegates’ visit to the 2018 Pyeongchang Winter Olympics, South Koreans feel differently about North Korea, reunification, and the tax. When Kim Jong-Il died, South Koreans thought reunification was at the doorstep, and the whole nation of South Korea seemed enthusiastic. However, when the urgency went, it subsided quickly, rather than continuing the preparation consistently. That is, the debate heats up quickly and cools down quickly with no effective action plan. Nonetheless, there seem to be understandable reasons as discussed.

According to an analysis of social media-based big data, the social media news is encircled by reunification as the national fortune, the North-South Korea Joint Statements, and the reunion of separated families after decades. This news then significantly affects the media consumers’ support of reunification. The support rate is 4.57 times more than the situation in which those news items are not mentioned. Similarly, when social media is exposed to the North’s nuclear programme, the sinking of the ROKS Cheonan Corvette, reunification cost, the media consumers oppose the reunification 5.92 times more than otherwise.61 C&R Research reports that the 2018 North-South Summit and the improved inter-Korea relationships significantly influenced South Koreans’ level of affection towards the North Korean regime, increasing from 1.8 per cent in 2017 to 20.6 per cent in 2018. The Summit also increased the anticipation rate in having the North’s nuclear programme resolved, to 55.3 per cent or by 30 per cent. Curiously, those who responded positively to survey questions that reunification must occur (20.4 per cent) and reunification is better, if without too much burden (45.6 per cent), have decreased from 72.7 per cent in 2017 to 66 per cent in 2018.62 I think much calculation of the cost-benefit is in the minds of South Koreans. The inter-Korea summit and the Northern delegates’ visit to the South relieved South Koreans from the fear of war. They also develop some degree of trust in the North Korean regime. However, many 

61율  낮아져Herald Kyungje. 2016. “소셜 빅데이터로 본 통일인식, 박근혜 정부http://biz.heraldcorp 출범후 통일찬성비.

” (Perception of Reunification Through Social Big-Data, Support for Reunification Is 

Down Since the Inauguration of President Park Geun-Hye). October 30, com/view.php?ud=20161029000001&cpv=1, accessed April 27, 2021.

62on the Perception of Reunification: Affectionate Feeling Towards the North Sharply Increases,  KBS. 2018. “2018 통일의식 조사…北 호감 급상승, 통일 필요성 인식 줄여” (A 2018 Survey the Necessity for Reunification Decreases). August 15, https://news.kbs.co.kr/news/view. do?ncd=4024757, accessed April 27, 2021.

South Koreans want peaceful relationships to remain, but do not want to proceed to reunification as they fear the high cost of it.

While the views of news reports are not the same as those of grassroots, some reports seem to represent the latter closely. The Institute of Peace Affairs surveyed 1,008 persons (19-years-old and older) in 2011 and reported that 58.4 per cent felt North Korea as part of the Korean people in the past, but not anymore and that they felt North Korea seemed to be as foreign as China. In regard to fellow North Koreans, 52.9 per cent of the survey respondents regarded them as “the same people as us” belonging to one ethnic group (동포), and 38 per cent were willing to pay the reunification tax.63 Kim Han-Ki, a columnist, contends that South Koreans believe that reunification has to be achieved. Citing the information that 80 per cent of East Germany and 82 per cent of West Germany consider their reunification positive twenty years after the incident, Kim concluded that the same applies to both Koreas, and their reunification is a must. This indicates that the need for reunification is deep-seated in the Korean psyche. Kim goes on to cite some experts saying that the reunification could come much earlier than thought and argues that the initial costs of reunification have to be ready together with a longer-term plan to finance the reunification process. Kim makes further comments which are based on ethno-nationalism as follows:

Reunification is an ethno-national priority, and its costs should not be at the centre of public debate. It is an investment opportunity for our people. … New Germany has now been created after a generation of Germans paid an astronomical cost, which was painful. Most Germans are proud to have paid the cost to offer freedom to their 15 million brothers and sisters in East Germany. We could take up the lesson from the German experience. Reunification is not simply about a territorial reunion, but a political, economic, and cultural reunion so that we could create a recalibrated nation-state. North and South Koreans are coming to feel that they are the same people in their hearts; that is the reunification we aim for. Reunification will come only if we work for it.64

I think a good proportion of South Koreans, including young people, despite the broad trend of calculated nationalism, would not totally ignore these sentiments, which indicates that ethno-nationalism is not dead. Public debate 

63 Kookje Sinmun. 2011. “발언대, 남북통일, 민족끼리 풀어야 할 과제” (Expression of Views: 

Reunification Is for the Koreans to Resolve). September 6. Source: KINDS.

64 Kookje Sinmun. 2011. “발언대, 남북통일, 민족끼리 풀어야 할 과제.”

on reunification needs to continue. One such effort is the Grand Debate for Awareness of Reunification, which is an annual event for primary, middle, and high school students to debate and raise awareness of reunification as they will make the backbone of a reunified Korea. It is hosted and supported by Korean Council for Reconciliation and Cooperation and co-hosted by different organizations such as universities. In its second convention in 2015, 96 teams consisting of 288 students from throughout the nation participated. Two primary school teams at the final round debated against and in support of the question, “Do we have to reopen the North Korea tour programmes?” Two teams of high school representatives debated the question, “Does the government have to put aside a portion to the reunification fund?” News report of the occasion indicates that the final teams demonstrated a high standard in their understanding of the complexity of reunification. A winning middle school team member, Kang Won-Jung, noted that he participated because he aspires to a reunified Korea. Lee Seong-Heon, a co-chair of the Council, hoped that the participants become more aware of the reunification and be an active part of the preparation. The seventh convention took place in 2020.

The Centre for Unified Korean Future was built in Yeoncheon close to the DMZ in August 2014. The Centre aims to facilitate exchange programmes, especially for young people between the North and South, to learn and consider what a unified Korea might be like. North Korean Boys Football team and their counterpart from the South had a game in Koonming, China in 2008, Yeoncheon in 2014, Pyongyang in 2015, etc., some of which were at the time of great tension between the North and South.65 Many constructive academic seminars contribute to public debate about and awareness of reunification, e.g., “2011 Academic Seminar for Reunification and Security,” Choongnam University, August 26. Jeong Ju-Shin argued that finding the best ways to support North Korean defectors’ settlement in South Korea would be an asset to deploy at the time of the reunification. According to Kim Chang-Hee, being able to place the notion of reunification at the centre of public discourse is a great starting point to facilitate diverse views on reunification to debate and negotiate. Kim Keun-Sik argued for the 

65터Centre for Unified Korean Future 3rd Year Anniversary to Lead the North-South Exchanges).   3주년Kyunggi Ilbo . 2017. “청소년들 통일 인식 심고… 남북교류 확대 앞장, 한반도통일미래센 기념식” (Encouraging Young People to Improve Their Perception of Reunification: 

November 10, http://www.kyeonggi.com/news/articleView.html?idxno=1411775; Tongil Sidae. 

2018. “北 4·25유소년축구단 10년 카메라 http://webzine.nuac.go.kr/tongil/sub.php?number=2208 앵글에 담다” (North Korean 4.25 Boys Soccer Group’s , 

10-Year Activities Filmed). Vol 146, No 12, accessed April 28, 2021.

necessity for the progressives and conservatives to narrow the gap in their views on reunification.66

Concluding Remarks

Since the Korean War, South Korea has gone through much change in its structure and culture. So have the wants of individual agents, depending upon what each individual agent has been through personally and nationally. In the early part of the 21st century, many older generations maintain ethno-nationalist sentiment as a reason for reunification. However, some older generations and a good proportion of younger generations think first about what dimensions of reunification will be beneficial or burdensome to them. That is, cost-benefit nationalism or calculated nationalism is a new form of nationalism firmly held. South Koreans are generally supportive and enthusiastic about reunification and willing to make a modest financial contribution to the costs of the reunification. However, their contribution is under the condition that there are national and especially individual benefits from costly reunification. In fact, their assumption of the national and individual benefit precedes their willingness to contribute. Their willingness to contribute fluctuates depending upon the national leadership and the (non)presence of North Korea’s aggression, including nuclear tests.

For South Koreans, ethno-national sentiment is becoming an increasingly vague reason to support reunification. Costs and benefits are much more important in terms of their awareness of, and interests in, reunification. Individual interests seem much more important than broad-based national interests. Individuals hardly attempt to identify their personal interests with national interests, which typifies calculated nationalism. In this respect, “two systems in the peninsula” is a possibility, not the one system in one state (Kim 2017). National leadership is seriously required to facilitate the public debate on the realities of reunification. The public debate on the topic is only occasional at times of significant events such as the North-South summit, while such debate is the starting point to be ready for the reunification, which will be inevitably gradual as well as sudden. At the time of completing this chapter, South Korea is about to see the conservative People Power Party 

66 Daejeon Ilbo. 2011. “대전일보 후원, 2011 통일안보Daejeon Ilbo 학술세미나)” (2011 Reunification and . August 27, http://www. National Security Academic Seminar, Sponsored by daejonilbo.com/news/newsitem.asp?pk_no=967692, accessed April 28, 2021.

come to power. The president-elect has expressed a hard-line approach to the North and clouded the Korean peninsula peace process.

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