알라딘: 하야시 다다스 비밀 회고록 신복룡 변역

알라딘: 하야시 다다스 비밀 회고록


하야시 다다스 비밀 회고록 - 1900~1910년 일본 외교의 내막 
A.M.풀리 (지은이),

나홍주,신복룡 (옮긴이)건국대학교출판부2007-11-30

The Secret Memoirs of Count Tadasu Hayashi, G.C.V.O. 

Paperback – 28 March 2017

by Tadasu Hayashi (Author), A. M. Pooley (ed)

https://archive.org/details/secretmemoirsco01poolgoog/page/n11/mode/1up?view=theater

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옮긴이 재판 머리말｜7
옮긴이 초판 머리말｜9

엮은이의 머리말｜17
하야시 다다스 백작의 생애｜17 하야시 다다스 백작의 저술 활동｜35
청일전쟁｜44 대련항의 반환｜57 영일동맹｜66

부록 A
1. 은밀히 동쪽을 정벌할 계책을 정할 것을 청하는 상소문 78
2. 장패륜(張佩綸)의 정번복접(靖藩服摺)을 논하는 상소문 84

제1장 영일동맹에 관한 의견의 기원
3국 간섭｜96

제2장 영일동맹의 전야
유산된 예비 교섭｜107
니시-로젠 협상｜109
러시아의 서툰 처사｜110
누가 먼저 개입했나?｜112
위테 백작의 계획｜113
교주 점령｜115
권력 투쟁｜118
러시아의 친영정책｜119
영국에 대한 위테 백작의 제의｜120

부록 B
일본 외교 정책의 미래(요지)｜122

제3장 영일동맹의 동지들
영국의 친일 감정｜132

제4장 영일동맹의 체결을 위한 교섭
《지지신보》의 소견｜155
이토 히로부미의 소견｜157

제5장 영일동맹에 관한 그 후의 기록
영일동맹의 기원｜206
러일동맹에 관한 의견｜207

부록 C
영일동맹｜210

제6장 프랑스·일본 협정
프랑스·일본 협정의 진정한 의미｜217

부록 D
프랑스·일본 협정 전문｜226

제7장 러일협정

부록 E
러일협정｜242

제8장 미일협정
미국과의 문제｜251

부록 F
미일협정 전문｜257

제9장 외교정책(1) 매수할 것인가, 말 것인가?

제10장 외교정책(2) 친구 간의 거래

제11장 열강과 청국

참고문헌｜308
찾아보기｜310
접기



저자 및 역자소개
A.M.풀리 (지은이)
저자파일
신간알림 신청

최근작 : <하야시 다다스 비밀 회고록>

나홍주 (옮긴이)
저자파일
신간알림 신청

<일본의 독도 영유권 주장과 국제법상 부당성>

최근작 : <독도의용수비대의 독도주둔 활약과 그 국제법적 고찰>,<독도의 영유권에 관한 국제법적 연구>,<일본의 독도 영유권 주장과 국제법상 부당성> … 총 4종 (모두보기)

신복룡 (옮긴이)
저자파일
신간알림 신청

정치학자. 번역가.
충북 괴산 출신으로 건국대학교 정치외교학과를 졸업하고 동 대학원에서 박사학위를 받았다. 건국대 정외과 교수 및 동 대학 석좌교수를 역임했으며 미국 조지타운대학교 객원교수를 맡은 바 있다. 한국정치외교사학회 회장, 건국대학교 중앙도서관장과 대학원장, 대한민국학술원상 심사위원, 한국·동양정치사상사학회 회장, 국가보훈처 독립유공자심사위원(장) 등을 역임했으며 한국정치학회 학술상 및 한국정치학회 인재학술상을 수상했다.

저서로는 <아침의 메아리>, <한말 개화사상 연구>, <한국의 정... 더보기

최근작 : <한국현대사관계 미국관문서자료집 - 전2권>,<전봉준 평전>,<해방정국의 풍경> … 총 105종 (모두보기)


출판사 제공 책소개
이 책의 초판 번역을 낼 무렵만 해도 나의 의도는 대한제국 멸망에 대한 지적 탐구심 정도였고, 흔히 태프트-가쓰라 밀약(Taft-Katsura Agreement)에 의존하여 망국의 이유를 설명하려는 기존의 사관이나 학설에 대한 저항 심리가 크게 작용했던 것은 사실이다. 그런데 이제 나이 들어 원고를 개고하다 보니 이 책이 주는 함의(含意)도 다르게 느껴진다. 그래서 황산곡(黃山谷)이 말하기를, “어려서 책을 읽는 것은 문틈으로 달을 보는 것과 같고, 젊어서 책을 읽는 것은 툇마루에 나와 달을 보는 것과 같고, 늙어서 책을 읽는 것은 노대(露臺) 위에서 달을 보는 것과 같다.”고 말했는지 모르겠다.

젊어서 이 책을 읽을 때는 망국에 대한 회한(悔恨)과 열강의 먹이가 된 조국의 운명에 대한 분노, 그리고 노회(老獪)한 일본의 한 외교관에 대한 원망 같은 것이 나를 사로잡았었다. 우리로서는 망국의 아픔이 절절한 시기에 일본의 외무대신으로서 그 아픔의 중앙에 있었던 하야시 다다스(林董)의 회고록은 특히 한국인에게 많은 회한을 느끼게 해준다. 그런데 이번에 이 책을 읽는 기분은 예전과는 전혀 다른 것이었다. 이제는 원망이나 분노보다는 필자의 혜안(慧眼)에 대한 감탄과 그의 조국애에 대한 경외심이 나를 압도했다. 특히 중국인에 대한 심리 분석이나 장차에 다가올 미·일 관계에 대한 진단은 놀라움을 자아낸다.

지성이 핍박당하지 않는 것을 높은 가치로 인정하는 일본에서 왜 아직도 이 책의 번역판이 출판되지 않았는지를 거듭 생각해 보게 된다. 접기

===

Full text of "The Secret Memoirs of Count Tadasu Hayashi, G. C. V. O..: Ed. by A.M. Pooley."

====

The Secret Memoirs of 

Count Tadasu Hayashi 

G.CV.O. 

EdBaihy 

A. M. Pootey 

Contents 

XNTB£a>ucnoN: 

The Cakeeb of Count Hayashi 3 

Count Hatasbi's Ljtssart Wokk 34 

The Chino- Japanese War . 37 

The Anglo- Japanese Alliance . 61 

I. — Origin of an Opinion fok an Anglo- 

Japanbse Alliance. The Three- 

Power iNTratvENnoN, 1895 . 77 

II. — Preliminaries op the Alliance 86 

Appbmdix: The Pdtuxk Poucv of Jatam I09 

in. — The Prienim of the Alliance 115 

IV. — The Negotiations for the Con- 

clusion OF the Anglo-Japanese 

Alluncb 119 

V. — Later Notes on the Alliance . 200 

VI. — ^Tbb Franco-Japanese Agrbehent, 

1907 213 

VII. — The Russo-Japanesb Convention, 

1907 224 

iti 

Digi-izedbyGoOglC 

Contents 

VIII. — The American-Japanese Agreement, 

1908. Hayashi on the Auekican 

Question 339 

IX. — Foreign Pchjcy. Part I. To Bribe 

OR Not to Bribe .... 255 

X. — Foreign Policy {CtnUinut^. Part II. 

Friend "Pidgin" .... 285 

XI.— The Powers and China . . . 296 

Appendices 309 

A. MeuorulofChang-peI'Lunand 

THE Board of Censors, 1882. 311 

B. Text of Anglo-Japanese Al- 

UANCB, 1902 . . 323 

0. The Franco-Japanese Agree- 

ment, 1907 . -325 

D. The Russo-Japanese Con- 

vention, 1907 . 327 

E. The American- Japanese Agree- 

ment, 1908 .... 329 

idbyGooglc 

Illustrations 

CouKT Tadasd HATASm Frontispiece 

From ft pbotogtaph 

General Marquis Katsura, Proi b Minxstbr 

OF Japan 126 

Pmn a photograph by Topical 

Count KcsfURA, Japanese Minister for 

Foreign Affairs 133 

Frmn a photograph by G«rechd, Pftris 

The Late Prince Hirobuhi Ito .210 

Japan's Greatest Statesman 

Map AiEnd 

Digi-izedbyGoOglC 

D„.;„.db,G00glc 

INTRODUCTION 

D„.;„.db,G00glc 

idb,Googlc 

The Career of Count Hayashi 

Hatashi Tadasu was bom in the second 

month of the third j^ear of Kaei (1850), at 

Yedo. His father, Sato Taisen, was a native 

of the village of Kozu in the feudal fief of 

Salnira, where he had been adopted into the 

family of Hayashi Kaisha imder the name of 

Hayashi Dokai. He followed his adoptive 

father's profession of physician, and became 

one of the best-known doctors of the pre- 

Restoraticm period, rising to the post of body- 

physidan to the Shogmi. 

At an early age the yoimg Hayashi, in 

company with Ito Masimosuke, was placed in 

the house of an American missionary at 

Yokohama, where he quickly learned to 

adapt himself to the ways of the "barbarians" 

and acquired a good grounding in the English 

language. 

In 1866, on the recommendation of Sir 

Harry Parkes, the bakufu decided to make an 

Digi-izedbyGoOglC 

==

The Career of Count Hayashi 21 

should have been the reward of his eminent 

services. The alleged cause of his exclusion, 

it wUl be recollected, was that he had become 

a Freemason, during his residence in London. 

The Saionji Cabinet fell. It had never 

been intended to live- The ostensible causes 

of the fall were the finances, the real cause 

was the ambition of Katsura to return to 

power. But Hayashi left a legacy at the 

Gaimusho in a carefully considered policy of 

expansion, on the success of which the integ- 

rity or disintegration of China hangs, and the 

position of Japan amongst the Powers. 

In the second Saionji Cabinet (1911-12) 

Hayashi held office ad interim as Foreign 

Minister, pending the return of Viscoimt 

Uchida from Wadiington, and permanently 

the portfolio d the Ministry of Communica- 

tions. 

During the military crisis in 1912, he stead- 

fastly supported Marquis Saionji in his oppo- 

sition to the Choshu demands. When the 

Cabinet resigned he was scathing in his 

denunciation of the Katsura dique. On his 

journey to Hajrama he refused to occupy the 

special coach placed at his disposal by Baron 

Goto, his successor, travelling with his ser- 

vants and family in an overcrowded second- 

class carriage. 

Digi-izedbyGoOglC 

22 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

He had for some time been suffering from 

acute diabetes, and from December, 1912^ 

lived in strict retirement at his villa at Ha- 

yama. In June of the following year he was 

thrown out of a ricksha whilst returning 

from KamaJoira, and fractured his thigh. 

He was removed to the Jutendo Hospital, 

where amputation was found to be necessary. 

He never properly rallied from the operation, 

and died in the hotir of the Snake (lo-i i a.m.) 

on July ID, 1913. 

He was buried at the Aoyama Cemetery 

in the Foreign Office comer on July 13th. 

It is pleasant to recall that his eminent 

services to Japan received a somewhat be- 

lated recognition from his sovereign, who 

donated Y.5000, a quite exceptional amoimt, 

to the cost of the funeral expenses. 

Hayashi is said to have been rather soured 

towards the close of his career and is alleged 

to have complained because his services were 

not sufficiently requited. The claim seems 

to rest on but fiimsy evidence. Hayashi was 

a man who was strictly honoxuable in all his 

dealings, and he scorned to use his official 

position for his private well-being. Like 

General Nc^ he was deeply concerned at the 

course of events in Japan, and was much 

wraried as to the future of internal politics. 

Digi-izedbyGoOglC 

The Career of Count Hayashi 23 

He saw that the country was rapidly falling 

tinder the control of men whose only use for 

power was profit, their own not the nation's, 

and he was deeply grieved at the prospect. 

In a country where it has become the rule 

for statesmen to amass fortunes, he was a 

brilliant exception. He had no private means 

and never acquired any. When he retired 

he sold his house in Tokio and Hved on his 

small pension in the cotmtry. 

His death was a loss to Japan. He was 

one of the old school, one of the few statesmen 

remaining who had been trained in the atmos- 

phere of the Restoration. He has heea 

described as an Edokko' to the backbone; 

quiet and impretentious, a scholar and a 

gentleman, he was a man of strong opinions, 

and a good fighter. An excellent host, a 

good conversationalist, he was an authority 

on art and music and an expert at go. 

His favourite recreations were singing and 

dancing, and he was a patron of many of the 

leading geisha, whilst as a calligraphist his 

manuscripts and writings were highly prized. 

' EdMo — B term used frequently hj novelists to denote ft 

■pecul type of character, of which boldness, fortitude, chivalry, 

hospitality, b)t;b cnhure, and lavish piodigali^ were the principal 

Digi-izedbyGoOglC 

n 

Count Hayashi's Literary Work 

The late Count Hayashi pubKshed a novel 

in English (For His People, Harper, 1903), 

and also contributed the introductions to 

Mr. Alfred Stead's Mysteries of China, and 

to Mr. Arthur Lloyd's Everyday Japan. 

The first of these was a romance dealing 

with a local episode in the feudal history of 

Sakura, the author's legal birthplace. Kinchi 

Sogoro, headman of Kozu, one of the villages 

on Lake Inoa, in the fief of the Lord Hotta» 

rouses his fellows against the tyranny of their 

feudal chief. Failing to obtain redress for 

their wrongs, Sogoro determined on the ex- 

treme and unforgivable step of appealing 

directly to the Shogun, counting the inter- 

vention of the bakufu on behalf of the peasants 

as wortii more than the death wfaidi Hotta 

would mete out to him according to law for 

addressing the Shogun. Sogoro carried out 

Digi-izedbyGoOglC 

Count Hayashi's Uterary Work 25 

his plan and actually succeeded in handing 

his petition to Tokugawa. He, his wife, and 

children were condemned to death, crucified 

and beheaded. In his last moments Sogoro 

vowed revenge and ordered his spirit to haunt 

Hotta till his family should be wiped out, a 

curse which was duly ftilfilled. 

Count Hayashi's object in publishing the 

story was to teach the West the spirit that 

animated his countrymen: prestunably their 

persistence in a cotu-se once determined on, 

their revenge for slights and wrongs. 

The novel is noteworthy for the excellent 

English in which it is written, which contrasts 

most favourably with the so-called "quaint" 

English with which Anglicized Japanese au- 

thors of to-day harass their readers. As a 

picture of pre-Restoration times For His 

People is without doubt a faithful likeness. 

The dose connexion of the Hayashi family to 

Sakura and the Shogunate ensures that the 

descriptions of Yedo and the customs of the 

court and people are faithfully reproduced. 

The introductions to Mr. Stead's and Mr. 

Lloyd's volimies are brief and to the point. 

In the former the reader is able to surmise 

the writer's profound knowledge of Chinese 

character. He practically summarizes the 

Chinese as necrologists, blind worshippers of a 

izedbyGoOglC 

26 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

dead past, but he frankly admits the brilliance 

of that past, ev^i thotigh it is a hindrance 

to a decent present or future. 

He sajrs: "The essential feature of the poli- 

tical teaching of the great sages is the supreme 

importance attached to the individual moral- 

ity of the ruler, and its prevailing spirit is that 

intense reverence for antiquity which con- 

stitutes the extreme form of conservatism." 

"The Chinese mind was utterly enslaved 

by the influence of these doctrines, so that 

the idea of instituting a comparative study 

of political or ethical questions was banished 

therefrom." 

"The inevitable result was careful preserva- 

tion of a civilization acquired during a period 

of greater receptivity but a complete cessation 

of all further progress." 

In iatroducing Mr. Uoyd's book, Count 

Hayashi emphasizes the impcaiant part Japan 

must play in Far Eastern aSairs and the 

necessity of the world at large knowing every- 

thing possible about her. As is evident fnun 

parts of the Memoirs he fully realized the 

power of the pen, but he did not sympathize 

with the views of most of his colleagues, that 

books on Japan should reveal only the bright 

side of life in that cotmtry. He had mixed 

too much with foreigners, both in Japan and 

Digi-izedbyGoOglC 

Count Hayashi's Literary Work 27 

abroad, not to know that in every country 

there must be dark spots, and in every govern- 

ment some abuses requiring correction. As 

he says, "Fish do not see water," and the 

ability to "see ourselves as others see us" is 

as valtiable a one in a nation as in individuals. 

It has been asserted that if he had lived 

Count Hayashi would not have published his 

Memoirs. There is no evidence whatsoever 

for such a statement. He left explidt in- 

structions that they were to be published. 

His whole course of life was a proof that he 

was not ashamed to criticize his nation. In 

a conversation I had with him in January, 

1912, soon after I arrived in Tokio, he said: 

"Don't be afraid to handle thorns. It will 

be good for you and tis!" He himself was 

not afraid, as his articles in the Jiji Shimpo 

on the Korean Conspiracy Trial and the pre- 

valence of torture in prisons in Japan and 

Korea and on the fall of the Saionji Cabinet 

in 1912, fully show. 

In Japanese, Hayashi published Itarii Ski 

{History of Italy), and a translation of Mill's 

Political Economy. 

So far as I have been able to learn, Hayashi, 

on account of his official rank, rarely contri- 

buted signed articles to the Japanese Press, 

but he was practically respcmsible during 

Digi-izedbyGoOglC 

28 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

many years for the attitude of the Jiji Skimpo 

on foreign questions, and wrote a great num- 

ber of anonymotis articles in that paper and 

in the Chuo Koron. The consistently high 

standard which %h%Jiji Skimpo has maintained 

on all matters of foreign policy and its out- 

and-out pro-British stand was in no small 

degree due to the relationship between 

its proprietor, M. Ftikuzawa, and the 

diplomat. 

I have referred on an earUer page to the 

connexion which Hayashi practically initiated 

between oflBdaldom and the Press. It is a 

matter of the utmost importance. For many 

years the British and American Press have 

been so slovenly represented in Tokio, and 

indeed is so to-day, that the close connexion 

between the Government and the vernacular 

Press has been sadly overlooked. If it were 

realized that such institutions as the Bank of 

Japan, the Finance Department, and the 

Foreign OfiBce have each their own organ of 

publicity, whilst every leading statesman has 

some paper wedded to his views, the naive 

dSmenHs of vernacular statements issued in 

London would not receive so much credence 

as they do. 

After the fall of the second Saionji Cabinet, 

I travelled in the same carriage with the late 

Digi-izedbyGoOglC 

Count Hayashi's Literary Work 29 

Count from Toldo to Yokohama. He was 

then on his way to his villa at Hayama. In 

the course of conversation he said that he 

would like to be younger, when he would 

adopt a joiunalistic career. 

About a year later I was travelling from 

Oiso to Toldo in company with Baron Kato, 

the present Foreign Minister. Discussing 

the late Cotmt, Baron Kato said that Hayashi 

had actually intended to enter journalism 

and had hoped to become a regular contri- 

butor on Japanese affairs to The Times, which 

paper had a year before lost the services, 

through death, of its veteran correspondent, 

Captain Brinkley. 

The Memoirs which are published hereafter 

were written during 1902, 1903, 1906, 1907, 

and 1908. The intention of the late Count 

had been to write a history of Japanese diplo- 

macy from the time when he began in 1871, 

"as a small potato of the diplomatic world," 

down to his retirement from office at the fall 

of the first Saionji Cabinet in 1908. 

Such a work would have been, in fact, a 

complete history of the whole of that remark- 

able period of the Meiji Era, during which the 

enormous changes in Japan itself and in 

Japan's fcweign relations occurred, which 

raised that country from being an unknown 

Digi-izedbyGoOglC 

30 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

and rather discredited island to one of the 

Powers of the world. 

Unfortunately, methodical as he was in his 

diplomatic work the Count was most un- 

methodical in his literary work. He obvi- 

ously intended to base his history on his own 

diary and on the niunerous articles which he 

contributed to the Press. He planned out 

the whole of the proposed volimie but never 

actually wrote more than the chapters dealing 

with the Anglo- Japanese Alliance and the 

chapters dealing with his own tenure of the 

Foreign Office. Even these latter were not 

complete, for the portions dealing with the 

American Immigration question and with the 

Fakumen Railway are not available. This is 

a matter of considerable regret, as on both 

of these some pleasing indiscretions might 

from the circumstances of the case have been 

reasonably looked for. 

In the Memoirs as they are published here 

certain material has been included which was 

not in the completed manuscript, but was 

ccmtained in unfinished chapters or in articles 

contributed to the vernacular Press. It has 

been considered advisable to insert this mate- 

rial for the piupose of roimding oflE the Count's 

story. 

From May, 1913, the Chuo Koron, a reput- 

Digi-izedbyGoOglC 

Count Hayashi's Literary Work 31 

able but little known monthly review in 

Tokio, began the publication of a series of 

disjointed paragraphs which were described 

as the reminiscences of a retired diplomat. 

On July 29, 1913, the Jiji Shimpo heig&n 

to publish a series of articles embodying the 

paragraphs from the Ckuo Koron and en- 

titled "History of the Anglo- Japanese Alli- 

ance." The paper announced that these 

articles were narrative stories dictated by 

Coimt Hayashi. The following day a second 

article appeared which was much more de- 

tailed in the information which it conveyed 

and was obviously the diary of the late states- 

man. A footnote added by the editor stated 

that ttie article was, in fact, a reproduction 

from the diary of the late Cotmt Hayashi 

which had been placed at the disposal of the 

newspaper by the executors, and that it was 

proposed to continue its publication. On 

the foCowing day, July 31st, the Jiji 

Shimpo announced that it had received the 

following letter from the Japanese Foreign 

Office: 

"The matter under the heading of the 'His- 

tory of the Anglo- Japanese Alliance' is con- 

sidered objectionable, and you are requested 

not to publish any more articles of the series. 

Digi-izedbyGoOglC 

32 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

I write this at the instruction of t^e Minister 

of Foreign Affairs. 

(Signed) "Yoshida Yosaku, 

" Confidential Secretary to the Minister of 

Foreign Affairs." 

On August 2ist, the Jiji 5Hm/>o rushed out 

a supplement containing a sununary of the 

continuation of the articles. It was immedi- 

ately seized by the police and suppressed, and 

every eflfort made to prevent any translation 

of the same going abroad, both telegrams 

and letters being stopped. I was fortunate 

enough to smuggle a translation to London, 

where it was published and created no small 

surprise. 

At that time it was not to be expected that 

any further parts of the Memoirs would be 

available, as the Foreign Office seized all the 

material which the Hayashi family or the 

Jiji Shimpo held, and extracted an under- 

taking that they would not countenance t^ 

encourage any further publication. 

In October, 1913, I was approadied by a 

certain Japanese, who held a manuscript 

written by Count Hayashi and specifically 

given by bim to the owner with instructions 

for it to be published. The owner had ob- 

tained a loan on the manuscript, which was a 

Digi-izedbyGoOglC 

Count Hayashi's Literaiy Work 33 

wonderful example of calligraphy, and if I 

paid oH the loan I could have the use of the 

manuscript. An undertaking was given me 

at the same time that the manuscript was 

■ the legal property of the gentleman in ques- 

tion. On receiving the manuscript I found 

a letter from Count Hayasbi to the owner as 

follows: 

"I give you this manuscript with the inten- 

tion that you shall publish the same after 

my retirement from ofiQce or at some pr(^>er 

occasion. 

(Signed) "HAYAsm." 

I had the most important parts of the 

manuscript translated and my translations 

were on their way to London and Shanghai 

within forty-eight hours. A few days later 

I was able to borrow this manuscript again 

to complete and check my translation. 

The day before the publication of the 

selected extracts, I was approached by a re- 

presentative of the Hayashi family, who 

desired to suppress the publication. How 

they learned about it I never knew, but I 

suppose somebody talked. This gentleman 

informed me that they believed that the 

manuscript I had used was a copy made by 

Digi-izedbyGoOglC 

34 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

an employ^ of the Jiji Shimpo, and was very 

much surprised to find it contained material 

of which he had neve* heard, and was one of 

which the Hayashi family had no knowledge 

whatever. 

To prevent any charge of breach of faith 

being made against any members of the 

Hayashi family or any members of the stafE 

of the /*;* Shimpo, I addressed the letter 

given below to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. 

It is perhaps not a matter for surprise that I 

received no acknowledgment of it. 

"H. E. Baron Maeino, 

"HJ.J.M.'s MinistCT for Foreign Affairs, 

"Tokio. 

"Your Excixlencv, 

"With reference to the continiiation of the 

late Coimt Hayashi's Memoirs, which my 

company (Reuter's) are now publishing in 

London and Shanghai, I take the liberty of 

informing Your Excellency that no member 

of the Hayadii family nor any member of the 

staff of the Jiji Shimpo has had any connexion 

whatsoever with the same. 

"The manuscript from which I have had 

the advantage of working is one of which they 

knew nothing, and of the existence of which 

they were totally imaware. 

Digi-izedbyGoOglC 

Count Hayashi's Literary Work 35 

"I write this letter in order that no charge 

of breach of faith may be brought against 

them. In fact, they have done everything 

possible to prevent publication of the same. 

"I am, 

"Your Excellency's obedient servant, 

(Signed) "Andrew M. Pooley." 

To protect the reputation of the Hayashis 

and their friends I had a copy of this letter 

sent out to every newspaper in Toldo. 

In April, 1914, 1 learned through Japanese 

friends that there was yet another manuscript 

in existence, actually in the possession of a 

pawnbroker. I obtained access to this, and 

was enabled to compare it with the other 

material in my possession. It was a very 

incomplete affair of some forty sheets, and 

but comparatively little of it was in a suffi- 

ciently finished state to be of value. It 

consisted mostly of articles contributed to 

the Press. 

The most interesting point in connexion 

witii the suppression of the Memoirs is that 

on the day of King George's Coronation, 

Hayashi published a summarized and in- 

nocuous account of the negotiations for the 

Alliance in The Japan Times. Three days 

later he published a raoce extensive and dis- 

Digi-izedbyGoOglC 

36 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

tinctly non-ofBcial version in the Asahi Skim- 

bun, but did not sign it. This latter version 

created some interest, but was pooh-poohed 

by everybody as being a fiction of journalistic 

imagination. Even so shrewd a critic as 

The Japan Chronicle headed its translation: 

"What passes fw history!" 

Digi-izedbyGoOglC 

Ill 

The Chino-Japanese War 

By the Treaty of 1885, known as the Tientsin 

Convention, signed by Li Hung-Chang and Count 

Ito, the relative positions of China and Japan 

towards China's vassal State, Korea, were defined. 

The final clause of the treaty stipulated that 

neither Power should send troops into Korea 

without notifying the other signatory. Each 

Power should have the right to send an equivalent 

number of troops to that sent by the other, in 

case either side should consider such a measure 

The Tientsin Convention was regarded by 

Japan as a diplomatic triumph, annulling China's 

suzerainty over Korea, and giving Japan equal 

r^ts in that country. Nevertheless it did 

nothing to modify the strong dislike of the Korean 

Court and people for the Japanese, a dislike which 

was steadily fostered by ^e Chinese Resident, 

Yuan-Shi-Kai, and by the Russian Minister at 

Seoul, M. PavloS, who in 1888 concluded the 

"Overland Commercial Treaty" with Korea. 

Digi-izedbyGoOglC 

38 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

Tlie Japanese authorities had ever since that 

yeas been preparing to settle the Korean question 

by force of arms, in the event of a peaceable 

settlement proving impossible. The army and 

navy had been steadily improved both in mate- 

rial and personnel, and, as events were soon to 

show, had reached a remarkably high state of 

^dency. 

Nevertheless it is improbable that the Japanese 

statesmen would have pushed matters to a crisis 

in 1894, ^^^ ^*^ ^ fortunate concatenation of 

circumstances. 

In February, 1894, a certain Kim-ok-In, a 

Korean political refugee, who had for some years 

been Uving in Japan, was enticed to Shanghai on 

the pretence of negotiating with representatives 

of the Korean Comt, and was there murdered. 

Rumour was strong that the murder of Kim origi- 

nated in the brain of Yuan-Shi-Kai. Whether 

tiiis was so or not, his death removed from the 

scene a very usefid pawn, on whom the Japanese 

Foreign Office had been able to rely as a go- 

between between itself and the Korean reformers. 

His murder was made the opportunity for the 

formation of a political association called the 

"Anti-KcM-ean Association," which had for its 

avowed object the forcing of an active Korean 

policy on the Imperial Government, It was 

largdy financed by semi-official institutions, 

and was kept in touch with the authorities 

by a certain Ryonosuke Okamoto, who has been 

Digi-izedbyGoOglC 

The Chino-Japanese War 39 

well described as the stormy petrel oi Korean 

politics.' 

Owing to the intrigues of the "Anti-Korean 

Association" and the financial support accorded 

from Japan, the Tong-haks started an insurrec- 

tionary movement in Southern KOTea towards the 

end of May, 1894. The insurrection in itself was 

of little importance, and there does not ever ap- 

pear to have been any real danger to either the 

Korean dynasty or to the foreign residents of the 

coimtry. Both China and Japan availed them- 

selves of the terras of the Tientsin Convention 

to send troops into Korea, each country formally 

notifying the other of its intention. China took 

this step first. Li Hung-Chang undoubtedly was 

amdous not to send troops into Korea, and it was 

only after considerable delay that he deferred to 

the opinion of Yuan-Shi-Kai, who was naturally 

afraid that the Japanese forces would arrive first 

on the scene. Tlrere is little doubt but that both 

li and Yuan were worked on by Russian influence, 

the former by Count Cassini and the latter by 

M. PavlofE, for neither of these extremely astute 

diplomats had any desire to see Chinese influence 

at Seoul replaced by Japanese domination. li 

accordingly dispatched 3000 men to Asan. On 

■ Ryonosuke OkaiiK>to was subsequently forced on the KoKan 

Court as Military Adviser; he led the band of gpaauMtui who 

murdered the Oueen of Eorea in 1896. Later be was one of the 

leaders of the Japanese partidpatii^ in the Chinese Revolution 

at 1911, and died at RhiiTighiii in 1912, 

Digi-izedbyGoOglC 

40 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

June 9th a mixed divisioa of 8000 Japanese troops 

landed in Korea, although, as The Eastern World 

ai Yokohama pointed out, nothing had as yet 

happened in Korea to necessitate the dispatch of 

such a large force. 

On Jtme i6th the insurrection was declared to 

have been suppressed, and China notified Japan 

that she was about to withdraw her forces, and 

requested Japan to do the same. 

A week later it became known that Japan had 

refused to comply with this proposal, and the 

situation between the two coimtries was declared 

by the Tientsin correspondent of The Times to be 

critical. On June 24th a Chinese squadron was 

ordered to Chemulpo. On the 25th a Japanese 

ojEBcial statement claimed that the Tong-hak 

rebellion had not been suppressed, and alterna- 

tively that even if it had been steps must be taken 

to prevent a recurrence of the trouble and that 

such steps were of vital impcnrtance to Japan, as 

her economic interests in Korea were greater than 

those of China. A jcnnt intervention and the 

establishment of a scheme of fiscal reform were 

proposed by Japan. China replied that it was 

contrary to traditional policy to interfere with 

the internal afEairs of a vassal State, a reply that 

elicited the retort that unless Qiina agreed to 

intervene, Japan would have to do so alone. 

The Korean situation was, as a result of the 

Tong-hak trouble, favourable to Japanese policy. 

Ccmditions in that country, especklly in the parts 

Digi-izedbyGoOglC 

The Chino-Japanese War 41 

proximate to Japan, gave a nominal justification 

for intervention, even though the rebellion itself 

was but a poor thing as rebellions go, and without 

doubt fostered by Japanese. The internal situa- 

tion in Japan was also not without its arguments 

in favour of drastic action. For' many years the 

strongest movement in the political world bad 

been that which demanded the revision of the 

Japanese treaties with foreign Powers, and the 

retrocession of the treaty ports. Cabinet after 

Cabinet had fallen on accotmt of failure to accom- 

plish this. It was perhaps unfortunate that cdn- 

cident with the rise of the revision movement 

came the efforts of Count Itagaki to establish 

government by political parties. This at once 

made the question one of internal politics. The 

Diet, composed as to a large majority of men who 

had no knowledge of foreign affairs, and ignorant 

of the very A B C of politics, was unable to co- 

ordinate the expenditure of large sums erf money 

on armaments with the continuation erf extra- 

territoriality. This resulted in bitter fights 

between the Cabinet and the Parliament, and the 

period from December, 1893 to June, 1894, saw 

the dissolution of two Diets, the first of which only 

sat for a month, and the second for only eighteen 

days. The dissolution of both was due to the 

insistence by an Opposition more powerful than 

the Ministry on the pursuit by the latter erf a 

strong foreign policy. 

The large force thrown into Korea was primarily 

Digi-izedbyGoOglC 

42 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

a sop to popular feding. The withdrawal of the 

expedition at the request erf China would have had 

most serious results in Japan, for the situation 

would have resolved itself diplomatically into a 

slalus gm ante, whilst politically it would have 

meant ruin for Ito and Mutsu. 

Besides the Korean situation and the condition 

erf internal politics there was another impulse erf 

which notice must be taken. Since 1893 Mutsu 

had been negotiating with the British Government 

for a revision of the Anglo- Japanese Treaty. The 

conduct of the negotiations had been entrusted 

to Viscount Aoki, Japanese Minister at Berlin. 

When the Korean crisis arose, the draft of the 

new treaty had been agreed upon by both sides, 

but Lord Kimberley refused to allow the new 

treaty to come into force until the codes had been 

revised and were operating satisfactorily. A re- 

vision of the treaty with Britain was a diplomatic 

success on which Ito could have justifiably de- 

manded praise from the Diet. A revision, the 

action of which could be indefinitely postponed, 

would be worse than useless. On the other hand, 

a successful Korean campaign would not only 

unite all parties, but would distract public atten- 

tion from the question c^ the treaty revision, and 

probably help forward the revision of the other 

treaties. 

The above were the immediate reasons for 

Japanese action. There were, however, greater 

issues at stake than the future of Parliamentary 

Digi-izedbyGoOglC 

The Chino-Japanese War 43 

government in Japan or the Parliamentary future 

of Ito or Mutsu. For years Japan bad bad tbe 

nin of every secret document in Cbina. In 1882 

the Board of Censors had raised in a memorial 

to the Throne the problem of Korea. Chang- 

Pei-Lun, afterwards the son-in-law of Li Hung- 

Chang, in a very cleverly argued report, urged on 

the Throne the necessity of China thoroughly 

reforming her army and navy , finding a satisfactory 

accuse for war with Japan, and then thoroughly 

crushing the wqjen, a contemptuous term for the 

Japanese. He advanced reasons for the belief 

that Great Britain and tbe Powers would support 

China. This memorial was sent by tbe Throne 

to Li Hung-Chang for his opinion. The Viceroy 

approved in the main the argument for reforming 

the army and tbe navy, but was more inclined to 

brieve that the Loochoo Islands would form a 

better excuse for a war with Japan than tbe ques- 

tion of Korea. He thought, contrary to Chang- 

Pei-Lun, that the European Powers would support 

Japan against China.' Tbe Japanese Foreign 

Office had a copy of this memorial, and was con- 

sequently fully aware of tbe intention of China to 

pick a quarrel one day with Japan and fight. 

The Japanese Government had thereiore for years 

been preparing for the day, and was determined 

itself to decide the time of the confiict. The late 

Captain Brinkley, The Times correspondent in 

'Appendix A. 

Digi-izedbyGoOglC 

44 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

Toldo, and a close friend of Count Ito, entirely 

endorses this view, both in the columns of his 

own paper, The Japan Mail, and also in the cor- 

respondence which he contributed to The Times. 

He says that Japan was prepared to the last but- 

ton, and "as for cartridges, she has stacks more 

than she could possibly use in a war against China." 

He admits that Japan's actions were not dictated 

by philanthropy but were intended to transmogrify 

Korea into a profitable neighbour for Japan. 

"Japan," he writes, "weis ambitious to annex 

Korea, but knew that her ambitions would be 

restrained by the Powers, and Japan fears nothing 

so much as European compUcations." 

The manner in which Japan fomented trouble 

in Korea and fixed a quarrel on China was ugly, 

but at the worst ^e was only forestalling a similar 

course of action by China. Her policy was oppor- 

tune in view of the situation at home and abroad, 

especially in China, where a closer rapprochement 

with Russia was being effected. After all, the 

Korean question as between China and Japan was 

dne Machtfrage. Japan forced the Issue, and 

because she was prepared, whilst China had only 

talked preparation, she wcm. 

From June 25th, when Japan declared her in- 

tention of continuing her intervention in Korea, 

matters became critical. Some doubt existed in 

Japan as to the attitude of the European Powers 

in the event of war breaking out. The Memoirs 

left behind by the late Count Mutsu give an ac- 

Digi-izedbyGoOglC 

The Chino-Japanese War 45 

count of the diplomatic conversations which todc 

place in order to clear up this doubt. It is a 

matter for regret that the Japanese Foreign 0£Sce 

seized and destroyed as many copies of this work 

as it was able to, and forbade further pubUcation 

of the same. It is from one of the few remaining 

copies that I obtained the following summary of 

these conversations. 

There were only two Powers from whom Japan 

had to fear hostile action. They were Great 

Britain and Russia. Of these two the fonner was 

by far the more important. If Great Britain could 

be persuaded to maintain a neutral portion it was 

highly improbable that Russia would take any 

steps beyond diplomatic representations. The 

first point to be elucidated was as to whether 

Great Britain had any secret agreement with 

China, whidi would necessitate her taking naval 

or military action on China's behalf. 

The Japanese Minister in London was instructed 

to ascertain the views of Downing Street. The 

result of the interview was a warning to Japan 

that Great Britain would deprecate any outbreak 

of hostilities, and would most certainly refuse to 

tolerate any actions which infringed her own in- 

terests in China or the integrity or independence 

of Korea. The Japanese representative was in- 

structed that this information was insufficient, 

and was ordered to try and obtain a further state- 

ment as to how far Japan could go without tres- 

passing on the limits prescribed by Great Britain, 

Digi-izedbyGoOglC 

46 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

limits which Mutsu described as being "very 

ambiguous," He was instructed to point out 

that Japan's only object was to obtain a settle- 

ment of the Korean question by reforming her 

internal administration. The reply to this was 

that Great Britain would weclome any ameliora- 

tion of the internal conditions of Korea, but she 

would not be able to regard with indifference any 

material change in the foreign regulations of 

Korea, nor would she acquiesce in the transfer 

to Japan of any of the territorial possessions of 

the King of Korea. This very definite exposition 

of the British point of view was accompanied by 

the warning that any attempt of the Japanese 

to control the peninsula would certainly lead to 

Russian intervention, and possibly the seizure 

of a Korean harbour by Russia. On the receipt 

of the above statement Mutsu instructed the 

Japanese Minister at London to give a formal 

assurance to the British authorities that whatever 

the outcome of the existing situation, Japan had 

no intention whatsoever of seizing any Korean 

territory. 

This assurance was very timely, as the general 

impression in foreign drcles in the Far East was 

that Japan really wanted to grab Korea, or as 

Bishop Corfe more politely expressed it, "Japan 

only wants to annex Korea." 

There was good reason for Japanese fear of 

opposition from Russia. Li Hung-Chang practi- 

cally disclosed in his farewell speech to Count 

Digi-izedbyGoOglC 

The Chino-Japanese War 47 

Cassini that the dispatch of Chinese troops to 

Korea had been the result of the tatter's advice, 

whilst the identical note presented on June 25th 

by the atrps AiplomaXique at Seoul to Yuan-Shi- 

Kai, and M. Otori, the Japanese Minister, calling 

on both parties to withdraw their forces, was 

drafted by M. PavlofiF, though it was nominally 

presented at the request of the King. China 

agreed immediately to the request, but Japan 

never answered the note. 

On Jione 28th Li Himg-Chang issued the fol- 

lowing manifesto : 

"China is Korea's suzerain; she receives tribute 

and confers investiture, and therefore she owes 

protection to the vassal State. Accordingly at 

the King's request she dispatched b'oops to quell 

the Tong-hak rebellion, informing Japan thereof 

in accordance with the Convention of 1885, and 

engaging to withdraw her troops on the suppres- 

sion of the rebellion. There was no need for the 

interference of Japan, though Japan, too, has the 

right to send troops to Korea. 

"On the appearance of the Chinese forces the 

rebels dispersed. China now desires to withdraw 

from Korea, but Japan refuses to evacuate Korea 

simultaneously with China, and proposes joint 

occupatioD, administration of the finances, and the 

introduction of reforms. These are tasks which 

China cannot accept, though she is willing to join 

Japan and other nations interested in recommend- 

ing the reforms necessary to the King of Korea. 

Digi-izedbyGoOglC 

48 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

"J^poii's attitude threatens to cause a crisis in 

Eastern Asia and may prove dangerous to both 

countries, as well as deplorable to general commerce. 

"The Viceroy, Li Hung-Chang, considers the 

action of Japan to be inconsistent with the law 

of nations, and with existing treaties. He will 

nevertheless endeavour to preserve peace without 

dishtmour to China." 

The reply of Ito and Mutsu to this protest was 

to present to the King of Korea a series of ftuther 

demands, including the abandonment of Chinese 

suzerainty, the dismissal of the Chinese Resident, 

the reform of the civil, military, and legal systems, 

and the grant to Japan of certain railway, mining, 

and loan concessions. 

Li Himg-Chang turned to Russia for advice. 

Russia was in no mind and in no condition to draw 

the sword to assist China, but she was willing to 

go as far as possible in moral support, in order to 

maintain the status quo in Korea. M. Hitrovo, 

the Russian Minister at Tokio, called on Count 

Mutsu and handed him a note in which the Rus- 

dan Government expressed the point of view that 

China had explicitly fulfilled all the conditions of 

the Tientsin Convention; further, that she was 

prepared to evacuate Korea, and that Japan should 

do the same; further, that if Japan declined to 

follow this advice and a breach of the peace should 

be caused thereby, Japan alone could be held 

responsible. The Japanese Minister tried to draw 

M. Hitrovo, by asking him whether he was to 

Digi-izedbyGoOglC 

The Chinojapanese War 49 

understand by the last clause of the note that 

Russia was prepared to support China otherwise 

than diplomatically, but the Envoy only answered 

that he had no tostructions beyond those contained 

in the note. 

Mutsu was still in doubt as to how far Russia 

would go, when a quite unforeseen turn was g^ven 

to events by a bellicose statement in the Novoye 

Vremya, that if Japan went too far, Russia would 

declare a joint protectorate over Korea with 

China. This brought Germany into the field, 

with a declaration that any attempt to introduce 

Russia into the settlement of t^ Korean question 

would result only in the creation of a Far Eastern 

Egypt, a threat which was followed by the dispatch 

of warships to the North Pacific. 

On July 1 6th, the Anglo- Japanese Treaty was 

signed, and on the 19th the Japanese Minister 

in London informed Lord Kimberley that Japan 

would insist even by force on a satisfactory solu- 

tion of the situation. As a result Lord Kimberley 

telegraphed to Rome, Berlin, Paris, and St. Peters- 

burg, asking the Governments of the Powers to 

instruct their representatives at Pekin and Tokio 

to use all their efforts for the maintenance of peace. 

At the same time Mr. Gresham, the American 

Secretary of State, telegraphed to Mr. Dunn and 

Mr. Poster, the United States representatives at 

Tokio and Pekin, o£Eering the services of the 

United States as mediator. These dispatches 

were held up by the Japanese authorities. 

Digi-izedbyGoOglC 

so Secret Memoirs of Count Hayasbi 

On July 22d, the King of Korea acx:epted the Jap- 

anese demands, contingent on the immediate evac- 

uation of the country by Japan, a condition which 

was prompUy refused. On July 23d, the Japanese 

troops in Seoul seized the person of the King, and 

in a riot which ensued killed a number of Koreans. 

War was thereafter inevitable. Great Britain, 

with the view of limiting the area of hostiUties, 

demanded, and Japan agreed, to the neutraliza- 

tion of Shanghai. The Kowshing incident imme- 

diately followed, and war was formally declared 

cm August 1st. 

The Retrocession of Port Arthur. 

As Coimt Hayadii remarks, the action of Russia 

was by no means unexpected. The note of M. 

Hitrovo, before the outbreak of war, had clearly 

shown that Russia would side with China, and it 

is possible that only the death of Alexander III. 

and the assassination of President Camot pre- 

vented her taking more effective measures than 

diplomatic representations. In January and 

February, 1895, when the overwhelmii^ victory 

of the Japanese forces was obvious to the whole 

world, Russia b^an military preparations of some 

importance. Numerous transports were dis- 

patched from Odessa to the Par East, the survey 

c^ the Siberian Railway was ordered to be hurried 

on, and preparations made for strengthening the 

Vladivostock squadron. 

Digi-izedbyGoOglC 

The Chino-Japanese War 51 

Oq February ist, a circular vras sent by the 

Russian Foreign Office to the Russian ambassadors 

at Paris, London, and elsewhere, outhning Hxe 

views of the Czar's government, as to the tenns 

of peace which Japan should be pennitted to 

make with China. In the circular it was su^^^ted 

that France had already agreed to the Russian 

proposals, and that both England and America 

would agree to them. This surmise proved to be 

painfully incorrect. In the dreular it was further 

stated that the terms which Japan would be al- 

lowed to impose would be limited to the cession 

of islands, the imposition of a war indemnity, the 

opening of certain ports and trading places, and 

the grant of certain commercial concessions, but 

under no circumstances would she be allowed to 

hold permanently one inch of Chinese territory 

on the mainland, though she would be allowed 

temporarily to remain in possession of certain 

districts, which might be mutually agreed on, to 

be held as security for the payment of the indem- 

nity and to be evacuated as the indenmity was 

paid off. 

Count Hayashi assumes that Germany had had 

the intention of intervening from the very bepn- 

ning of the war, whatever terms of peace might 

be made. This assumption does not altogether 

appear to be justified. In March, 1895, the Ger- 

man Minister at Tokio had been instructed by 

Berlin to warn Japan that any permanent occupa- 

tion of a portion of the Chinese mainland, as a 

Digi-izedbyGoOglC 

52 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

ccmdition of peace, would provoke the interven- 

tion of Russia. To this Count Hayashi specifically 

refers. Germany, at the time she gave this 

warning, was in receipt of the terms of the Russian 

circular of February ist, and suspecting that 

Russia would be only too pleased to take advantage 

of any incident whidi might give her the oppor- 

tunity of interfering and arrogating to herself a 

decisive position in the Far East, warned Japan 

in the most friendly spirit. In addition to this 

Germany, certainly if she had any ambitions 

herself in the Orient, could not afford not to join 

Russia and France, after the threat made in July, 

1894, that any interference by Russia would result 

in the Bgyptianizing of the Korean question. 

In addition there were other motives for Ger- 

many joining the Russian protest. Cotmt Caprivi 

had allowed the "Reassurance Treaty" with 

Russia to lapse, and that country had made an 

alliance with France. Since the beginning of the 

Chino- Japanese War, Prince Hohenlohe had 

succeeded Count Caprivi as Imperial Chancellor. 

Hohenlohe was a good deal in touch with Bismarck 

through his reliance on Count Herbert Bismarck. 

The early days of the Hohenlohe regime were 

devoted to trjTng to regain the Russian position 

which Caprivi had thrown away, and one of the 

steps taken towards this end was an almost touch- 

ing acquiescence in the Russian proposals. 

Yet another reason was the Kaiser's personal 

attitude. It was at this period that he was coming 

Digi-izedbyGoOglC 

The Chinojapanese War 53 

iato notice as an earnest advocate of a strong 

colonial policy and a strong navy. It was on 

January 9, 1895, that he invited to a soiree at 

Potsdam all the members of the Reichstag, and 

delivered to them a vehement lecture on the 

pressing need of a powerful fleet. As was an- 

nounced at the time, he worked into this lecture 

numerous references to the lessons of the war in 

the Far East. A month later he re-delivered Has 

lecture with further references to the Asiatic 

situation before the ofiScers of the Marinamt. 

Then again he demanded more colonies. It is 

dear that William 11. was fully alive to the posa- 

bilities of future German development in the Far 

East, and realized that by having a say in the 

resettlement of the Treaty of Shimonoselri Ger- 

many would be entitled to a voice in all further 

dealings of Europe with Asia. It certainly does 

not appear to have ever entered the heads of any 

of the German statesmen that Japan was a nation 

whose friendship might one day be of value to 

Germany. This, however, is not to be wcmdered 

at in view of the published opinions of the Kaiser 

on the coloured races. 

There was undoubtedly some sort of agreement 

between the three Powers as to the price which 

they were to extract from China for assisting her. 

According to a Russian statement' Russia paid 

for the co-operation of Prance with an undertaking 

'Nmoyt Vnmya, April az, 1895. 

Digi-izedbyGoOglC 

54 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayash! 

to support an eventual French demand for a 

rectification of the Indo-Chinese frontier, and 

for Germany's help with a promise to forward 

German demands for industrial and commercial 

Although the three governments were agreed, 

the policy of intervention by no means received 

the imanimous support of the three nations. The 

German industrial circles were much upset by 

the commercial privileges obtained by Japan, the 

Govenmient's reply to an interpellation that the 

concessions were for all nations being met by 

the retort that Japan alone could benefit by the 2 

per cent, commutation tax on cost, owing to the 

cheapness of labour in Japan. The German 

Radicals were loud in their assertion that the 

transfer of Formosa and the Pescadores to Japan 

converted the China Sea and the Gulf of Pechili 

into Japanese lakes. The Vossische Zeitung led 

a very strong campaign against the policy of 

intervention, arguing that as Germany did not 

hold a foot of territory in China she had no interest 

in the business, beyond gratitude to Japan for 

opening markets which eventually would be of 

the greatest value to German industries. "In 

any case," continued the paper, "there is no 

reason for Gennany to strengthen the footing of 

potential enemies, as Russia and France are, in 

the Far East." 

The Neueste Nachrichlen of Berlin became curi- 

ous^ prophetic in its disgust at the Government's 

Digi-izedbyGoOglC 

The Chino-Japanese War 55 

poKcy. It wrote; "In a struggle with France and 

Rtissia Japan would be a very useful ally, and her 

forces are strong enough to distract from her 

Western frontier a good portion of the Russian 

armies. As the end of the affair we seriously fear 

that Germany will pay bitterly for her action, for 

the Japanese will eventually seek their revenge," 

It is to be hoped that the writer of the above 

passage is still living, to see the correctness of his 

deductions. 

In France the Soleil cleverly expressed the real 

object of the German Government — to ciurry 

favour with the Czar. 

The Figaro disapproved of the intervention 

unless Great Britain should agree to join the other 

Powers, llie journal pointed out that after all 

Great Britain had the biggest stake in China, and 

unless she actively acquiesced in the policy of ihe - 

Triumvirate, she would "open up and monopolize 

the markets of the Rising Sun, whilst France will 

be alienated" — another prophecy, which has been 

almost exactly fulfilled. 

Great Britain refused the invitation of Russia 

to join in the intervention, on the ground that 

such intervention would be contrary to the estab- 

lished principles of international relationship, and 

because British interests were in no way menaced. 

On the contrary, they were considerably benefited 

by the industrial and commercial concessions 

extorted from China by Japan for the whole 

world. It may be also that public opinion in 

Digi-izedbyGoOglC 

S6 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

Bngland was to some extent sentimentally influ- 

enced by the evidence of Japanese progress which 

the war had afforded, and commercially by a 

statement from the Japanese Legation that large 

orders would be forthcoming from Tokio, eq>ecially 

for a new fleet. The refusal of the Russian invi- 

tation by Great Britain certainly was of great 

negative value to the Japanese diplomats. It 

limited the intervention programme purely to 

the question of the cession of continental territory 

and entirely knocked on the head Lobano£fs 

progranune of the retrocession of the Pescadores 

and the proclamation of a Russian protectorate 

over Kmrea. 

As the result of the intervention the Mikado's 

Government withdrew the clause ceding Port 

Arthur and accepted instead a further indemnity 

of Tls. 30,000,000, which was raised by a Russian 

loan to China. 

No account of the negotiatitms which accom- 

panied or followed the signature of the Treaty of 

Shimonoseki would be complete without noticing 

a truly Oriental touch in the bargaining cm either 

side. Hayashi points out that both Ito and 

Mutsu anticipated intervention, and it was only 

in accordance with the circumstances that they 

drove a bargain with China from whidi ample 

deduction could be made in the event of foreign 

opposition. Indeed it is not exposing any secret 

to say that Japan was prepared to retrocede 

Port Arthur, even without monetary compensa- 

Digi-izedbyGoOglC 

The Chino-Japanese War 57 

tion, and a statement to this effect was actually 

and o£5cia]ly issued at Tokio. Mutsu was strongly 

opposed to the Liaotung clause but had to give 

way to Ito and the army chiefs. 

On the other hand, Li Hung-Chang was equally 

astute, and, like Count Witte at Portsmouth, 

surrendered nothing which he was not prepared 

and glad to get rid of, except the indemnity. He 

always considered Formosa a curse to China, and 

was exceedingly pleased to hand it over to Japan, 

and he shrewdly guessed that Japan would find 

it a great deal more trouble than it was worth. 

In this he proved himself a true prophetj for even 

to-day (1915} the Japanese have not succeeded in 

pacifying Formosa, and insurrections are frequent, 

in spite of the drastic methods of the Japanese 

gendarmaie. 

As regards Liaotung, the \^ceroy was more than 

willing to sign it away to the Mikado, for he had 

already received very d^nite promises from Count 

Cassini that Russia would never permit Japan to 

keep it. Further, he had actually had a proposal 

from Russia to lease it herself. He was only too 

delighted to let Japan have the sensation of own- 

ing the place as a preliminary to the ch^rin of 

losing it. As for the Pescadores they were and 

always had been useless to China. The commer- 

cial privileges agreed to were bound to come even- 

tually, as the result of the constant knocking on 

the Chinese door by the merchants of Europe and 

America. The permission to import machinery 

Digi-izedbyGoOglC 

58 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

was merdy the translation into law of a custom 

obtained by bribery. 

Li Hung-Chang writes in his Memoirs after his 

return to PeJdn from Japan: "I have pored to-day 

over a mass c^ translated correspondence from 

St. Petersburg, part of which is from my friend 

Count Cassini, and my old frame seems to be 

given thereby a new elixir erf life. 

"I can return Soulii with better feelings if less 

honour. 

"Now once more the Throne feels more friendly, 

but there is an apparent coldness in the treatment 

accorded me by the Empress. Yet she was 

gracious enough to acknowledge that the satis- 

tactory assurances are the result of my representa- 

tions to the Russian Court, last year, when these 

troublous times were approaching. 

"Briefly we discussed the Russian letters, and 

their Majesties are heartily grateful that Japan 

will not be permitted either now or in the future 

to seize upon any part of Manchuria or the Main- 

land. 

"Why did not Z have these assurances before I 

went to Japan?" 

"Had I known the way the Czar's Government 

feels in the matter of Japanese aggressions in Korea 

and Manchuria, after my armistice proposal had 

been answered in the manner it was, I could and 

would have said to Ito, 'Go ahead with the war!' 

' He did hav« them. — Ed. 

Digi-izedbyGoOglC 

The Chino-Japanese War 59 

" Still, there is often a very serious doubt in my 

mind as to the real object of these Europeans, and 

I have found that some of their most able and 

honourable diplomats will lie with as much ease 

as a Nanking bird-hawker." 

Again under date of June ii, 1897, he writes: 

"England has ever asserted that in all my diplo- 

matic work I have had Russia's interests con- 

stantly in view. England is very wrong, just as 

she has been many times before in other matters. 

If I have appeared to be working for Russia's 

interest, it is because in dwng so I have believed 

that I was accomplishing the greatest good for 

China. The British Foreign Office caused me to 

be rated officially over the Manchurian Agreement 

with the Czar's Government; but the British re- 

fused to say that they would help us in the slight- 

est dining our Japsmese conflict or after; while 

Russia, at the close of the war at least, let Japan 

understand that China was not alone. 

" It may not be generally known that as early 

as 1873, when complaints came from the British 

traders at Tientsin I earnestly memorialized the 

Throne to offer Taiwan to the English Govern- 

ment to do with the wretched island as they saw 

fit." "This memorial," the Viceroy continues, 

"nearly cost me my position as well as my head. 

Being summoned to Peking, I was asked by the 

Grand Council what I meant by advocating that 

a part of the Imperial territory be given away, 

to which I replied that it was a hindrance rather 

Digi-izedbyGoOglC 

6o Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

than a benefit to the nation. If the great island 

could not be sold I advocated that it be made a 

present to England. I told the Council that as 

En^and had been so ready to grab Hong-Kong 

we might in a measure get even with her by making 

a. gift of Formosa. 

"It is true that when Marquis Ito made stipu- 

lations as one of the chief terms of peace of the 

cessicm of Formosa, I immediately declared that 

I was willing to agree to aJmost anything except 

that; yet, had I been in another apartment, all 

alone, I would have danced with joy in s^nte of 

my infirmities. As it was, my heart was indeed 

glad, but I requested the chief plenipotentiary at 

least to say that the Mikado would not insist upon 

having the big island. His Excellency agreed to 

put the question over until the next session of the 

commissioners, and during the intervening time 

I was sore afraid that he would change his mind 

and make a declaration that his Government did 

not want it."' 

■ For the above and other details of li Hung-CHiang's n^o- 

tiations with Maiquts Ito and hia views on the Treaty the reader 

ii referred to Mr. Foster's Memoirs of Li Hm»grChant. 

Digi-izedbyGoOglC 

IV 

The Anglo-Japanese Alliance 

Probably no diplomatic instrument has 

been so discussed, so praised, and so abused 

as the Anglo- Japanese Treaty. Count Haya- 

shi's relation of the preparatory prc^}ag;anda 

which he conducted and of the negotiations 

which preceded its signature is in all likelihood 

the only authentic account of tbe intrigues and 

counter-intrigues of that time which England 

shall ever have. 

The whole of Great Britain's relations with 

Japan have been so glossed over and so 

illuminated with a halo that the true condi- 

tion of afiairs in the Far East during the last 

decade of the nineteenth century has been 

almost forgotten. 

With the exception of a comparatively 

small circle, Japan, until the Chino- Japanese 

War, was regarded as being very much of a 

light-opera coimtry, the setting fw dainty 

music and farcical situations. It was princi- 

pally thought of as a mysterious land, which 

Digi-izedbyGoOglC 

62 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

was the home of the musume and the impres- 

sionist painter, where the houses and hand- 

kerchiefs were made of paper, where the 

people wrote with a hmsh and wore gloves 

on their feet, worshipped a strange thing 

called bushido, and had a quaint reputation 

in matters of morality. 

The China War changed all this. It was 

quickly recognized that a new Power had 

arisen in the East. Many recognized it as a 

Power potential of great benefits or of great 

harm. On the whole, there was in England 

a disposition to treat Japan well. The pro- 

gress she had shown and the nerve she had 

displayed created a sentimental feeling in her 

favour, which was well displayed by Tenniel's 

cartoons in Punch. The Japanese Foreign 

Office fostered and developed this attitude 

by the most wonderful Press campaign the 

world has ever seen. 

The very careful manner in which the 

oracle was worked closed the usual avenues 

by which a knowledge of the true sentiments, 

the true policies, and the real intentions of 

Japan could pass to the outer world. 

No man was more intimate with the great 

statesmen who have shaped the country's 

destinies than the late Captain Brinkley. 

Yet, so far as I am aware, it was not until 

Digi-izedbyGoOglC 

The Anglo-Japanese Alliance 63 

1904, when he published his monumental 

work on Oiina and Japan, that he informed 

the public of the real goal at which the 

Mikado's Government was aiming. In that 

book, referring to Japan's object in forcing a 

war on China, in 1894, he said, "Japan is 

fightii^ for the supremacy of the Far East, 

for the hegemony of Asia. A Japanese pro- 

verb say^: 'Better be the tail of the ox than 

the comb of the cock.' By beating China 

she became the comb of the cock of Asia and 

will go on to be the tail of the ox." 

Old residents in Japan laugh cynically 

over Japanese asseverations of friendship for 

England. They recall the days of the war 

with China, when England was loathed and 

foreigners were stc^)ped on the streets and 

asked if they were English, and when the 

reply was in the aflBrmative were impolitely 

told to go to a yet warmer climate. The 

Japanese eqtiivalent of "Gott strafe England" 

was a common saying in the streets c£ Tokio 

then. 

TTie leaders of Japan have always been 

divided into two camps. Sometimes they . 

are called the soldiers and the sailors, some- 

times Choshu and Satsuma, sometimes anti- 1 

Britidi and pro-British. 

Tlie military party, the men of Choshu, 

Digi-izedbyGoOglC 

>^. 

64 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

are even to-day strongly anti-British, just as 

the naval party are pro-British. Their dis- 

like of the British is in part an heritage &om 

Jto and the Briti^ liniitation of the area of the 

Chinese War, and in part a consequence o£ 

their German tr aining and sympathies. 

The people, who had no say in the matter, 

were ratlier well disposed to England as hav- 

ing held aloof in 1895 and as being their 

principal customers from whom they e:q)ected 

much future gain. 

The following, written by Hitomi Ichitaro 

in 1897, gives a fair idea of the situation: 

"Un peu avant la guerre Chino-Japonaise, 

I'Angleterre et le Japon se m6prisaient I'lm 

I'autre: 1' Anglais croyait que la Chine forte 

et riche 6tait la mattresse de TErtr^me Orient, 

et que le Japon pauvre et faible n'6tait rien. 

"Le Cabinet d'lto a toujours cherchg la 

faveur de la Russie, et affects de s'^oigner 

de TAngleterre: mais le peuple Japonais a 

m6pris6 la Russie que le Cabinet craignait et 

S3rmpathis6 avec I'Anglais qu'il repoussait." 

The hakabaisu (white peril) campaign, the 

ioctrine that the whites are ihs curse of the 

yellow race, which was a remarkable accom- 

paniment of the Calif omian agitation two 

years ago, was only a revival of a spleen 

which found an earlier but not less violent 

Digi-izedbyGoOglC 

The Anglo-Japanese Alliance 65 

expreswm eighteen years before and was led 

on both occasions by Tokutonu, Okuma, and 

the Choshu clan. 

So far as Japan is concerned, any alliance 

between herself and a white race must be one 

o£ political e:q)ediency. There can be no 

other ground or justification for it. The 

Japanese are Orientals. It is perfectly futile 

to ai^e that their veneer of Western civiliza- 

tion has made them anything else. If the 

Chinese and Japanese have a vicious deep- 

seated contempt for each other, as th^ have, 

it is nothing in comparison with the innate 

contempt, the btuTiing detestation, which the 

Japanese have in excelsis for all white men. 

Since 1895 this feeling has been deliberatdy 

educated and developed by the Japanese 

authorities, by means of Uiat most extra- 

ordinary religion which ProfessOT- Badl Cham- 

berlain has so ably and relentlessly exposed, 

namely. Mikado-worship.^ 

The idea was sown and fostered and has 

grown into a national creed, that there is no 

country in the world which is so great as 

Japan, and that any and every other country 

is infinitely inferior. This idea has foimd 

utterance on ntunerous occasions in ofl&dal 

■ Tie StaJthe ef a New SMgim. By ProL B. Chambedain. 

London, 191 1. 

izedbyGoOglC 

66 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

documents and in the Diet, both from the 

lips of Ministers and members. One expres- 

aon of it, which is worth remembering in 

these days of land agitation in California and 

British Columbia, is the refusal to allow for- 

eigners to own land, because such ownership 

would be a "pollution of the sacred soil." 

In all matters concerning Japan it has to 

be remembered that public opinion in that 

country is practically non-existent, except 

on such rare occasions as after the Treaties of 

Shimonoseki and Portsmouth and at the 

death of the Meiji Tenno, when the sentiment 

of the whole people was deeply affected. The 

poUtical riots which are now almost an annual 

feature of life in Tokio are not expressions 

of public opinion but the carefully organized 

demonstrations of the "outs" against the 

"ins." 

It is for this reason that the Alliance was 

and is, so far as Japan is concerned, a political 

expedient. I believe that the Japanese people 

themselves would at one time, if they had 

been canvassed and allowed to vote freely 

(which would have been a rarity for them), 

have been foimd to appreciate it deeply. 

But this would not have been for any reasons 

of foreign policy, but because the Japanese 

people are a folk trying to be politically free 

Digi-izedbyGoOglC 

The Anglo-Japanese Alliance 67 

and to attain, themselves, to those he^hts 

of democracy at which they know England 

has already arrived. The time for that is, 

however, past. The Alliance now means to 

them nothing but an increase of expenditure, 

a constant rise in taxes, and a constant soaring 

of the cost of living. 

The great development of reading the 

numerous translations of American and Eng- 

hsh works, is gradually arousing a general 

feeling that the country must be governed by 

the people for the people. The consistent 

disregard for the rights of the individual shown 

by such men as Prince Yamagata, the late 

Prince Katsura, Viscount Oura, and Count 

Okuma, the steadily mounting debt and the 

increasing burden of taxation, are creating a 

social imrest that must before long find an 

escape. In Japan all that is required for a 

popular outbreak on a scale with which Impe- 

rial edicts and Ministerial platitudes will be 

imable to cope is a leader who will prove him- 

self worthy of public confidence and adamant 

against bribes of office and reward. 

When that day comes it will be a duty of 

the British Government to show that the 

Alliance, if still in force, is not only a diplo- 

matic instrument to secure Japan's military 

aid in time of crisis, but is also founded on a 

Digi-izedbyGoOglC 

68 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

ancere regard for the Japanese people them- 

selves and a de^re to see them develop along 

t^e true lines of Western civilization and 

freedom. 

At the present time the Alliance is merely 

a political arrangement between govern- 

ments, which is used by the Japanese bureau- 

crats as an excuse, and a very plausible one, 

for constant additions to armaments, and as 

a safeguard for themselves in a policy of 

aggression and expansion, which has for its 

ultimate object a protectorate over China. 

Whether from the EngHsh point of view 

the Alliance has attained the objects int^ided 

is a matter of doubt! Whether it was ever 

really necessary or advisable is a frequent 

subject of discussion! 

When the first alliance was signed its honest 

uUima ratio, so far as England was concerned, 

was fear of Russian aggression on India and 

Constantinople. So far as Japan was con- 

cerned it was the absorption of Korea and a 

predominating position in China. England 

was to keep the ring whilst Japan attacked 

Russia. 

The net result was that Russia's ambitions 

on the Pacific were checked and diverted to 

Persia, Central Asia, and the Balkans, where 

she is considerably nearer to India and her 

Digi-izedbyGoOglC 

The Anglo-Japanese Alliance 69 

manifest destiny, Constantinople, than ever 

before. The document which provided for 

the integrity of China and the independence 

of Korea handed over the latter country for 

annexation by Japan, and a slice of the Chinese 

Empire as big as India to Japanese controL 

A British Government which had put its seal 

to the Alliance, ostensibly to ensure China's 

sovereignty over her own territories, became 

an active party to the abrogation of that 

sovereignty over a vast stretch of China. It 

is not, perhaps, to be wondered at that Ger- 

many expressed surprise at England's respect 

for a "scrap of paper" in August of last year. 

The second alliance treaty was the reitera- 

tion of the first on a broader basis, except 

that Germany was the enemy feared, and that 

it incltided the enimdation of Japan's reward 

for her services against Russia. 

Hie third alliance treaty was an emascula- 

tion of the second by the removal of any pos- 

sibility of England's being called on to fight 

America. It has been a source of the greatest 

dissatisfaction in Japan, for America is the one 

Power which Japan fears may attempt to annul 

her claims to keep China in leading strings. 

It will be for the historian to decide to what 

extent any of these treaties were necessary, 

and how far they were due to a lack of political 

Digi-izSdbyGoOglC 

70 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

foresight. The ostensible cause of the first 

treaty, namely the integrity and independence 

of Korea, was of course nonsense. Lord 

Lansdowne declared England had no import- 

ant interests in Korea. Then why did he 

mix England up in the affairs of the Hermit 

Kingdom? Why did he sign a treaty which 

he gravely feared was one-sided? 

The British Govermnent was repeatedly 

warned in 1 895 that Japan and Russia must one 

day fight about Korea. England had nothing 

to gain by interference. By being inv«gled 

into the arena she has lost the whole of her in- 

terests in Korea, Manchuria, Shantung, and 

Fukien, and much of her prestige in China. 

Count Hayashi reveals two things of great 

importance. The first that Count Witte in 

1897 and 1898 proposed a rapprochement with 

England, which f^ed on account of the atti- 

tude of the Press and the city. It would be 

interesting to know to what extent Japan 

infiuenced that attittide. 

Secondly, he says Germany proposed a 

Triple Alliance of Britain, Germany, and 

Japan, from which Germany was eventually 

cold-shouldered.' Attempts have been made 

■ This statement has been denied in Bedin. On the other 

hand, I have beard it confirmed by Gernun diplomats of high 

tank. 

Digi-izedbyGoOglC 

The Anglo-Japanese Alliance 71 

\ 

in interested qtiarters to minimize the import- 

ance of this statement. It cannot be mini- 

mized. It is the key to everything that has 

happened since in the Par East, and of mudi 

that has happened in Europe. This exclusion 

in 1902 was the first of a long series of similar \ 

acts, each and every one of which was intended \ 

to shut Gennany out of the Far East. It j 

will be an important duty of the historians 

of posterity to decide to what extent German 

ambitions have been clipped and German 

opposition to England developed by the 

manner of her treatment in the East of Asia. 

The political idealist can find food for thought 

at what woxJd have happened if either of 

these overtiu'es had materialized, and then 

consign his vain reflections to the Umbo of 

diplomatic might-have-beens. 

The only justification of the Anglo- Japanese 

Alliance is that existence inEurope outweighs in- 

terests in Asia. It will be for Time, the inexora- 

ble accountant, to decide to what extent the 

menace to England's existence in Europe was 

due to slovenly diplomacy, and to what ex- 

tent the sacrifices England has made in Asia 

have been recompensed in the moment of trial. 

China is the country which has most reason 

to complain of England's policy in the Far East. 

Instead of the Alliance really safeguarding 

Digi-izedbyGoOglC 

72 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

her rights and territory, the process of ab- 

sorption and the policy of aggression by 

ne^hbouring Powers had been vastly accel- 

erated since 1902. As the Sinwan Poo ex- 

pressed it this year: "If the value of the 

Alliance is only to substitute a lingering death 

for a quick one, then so far as China is con- 

cerned it has no value at all. Beheading is 

infinitely preferable to the thotisand slices." 

That Japan has been the most wanton ^^es- 

sor is now generally recognized. But that she 

has been in a position to cany out successfully 

such a policy is due to the Alliance of 1902 

and its corollaries. 

I shall be very much surprised if within a 

few years England does not realize that her 

money and her support have raised up against 

us in the Far East a Power as powerful and as 

dangerous as Germany has become, and one 

infinitely more difficult to handle on account 

of her geographical position. 

Japan is distinctly a country to be treated 

with cautious courtesy and a country about 

which English statesmen require to know a 

great deal more than they do know. A theo- 

cratic bureaucracy is probably the most effec- 

tive government CMiceivable. Obedience is its 

watchword. In Japan the world hasthe most 

highly organized bureaucratic machine in 

Digi-izedbyGoOglC 

The Anglo-Japanese Alliance 73 

existence. As ex-President Roosevelt would 

put it, " They have Germany beat to a frazzle." 

It must be remembered, too, tiiat the 

Japanese are first-class diplomats, and every- 

thing which that connotes. In Oriental diplo- 

macy there is no room for scruples. 

Diplomacy is war in the council chamber 

instead of on the field. The true diplomat com- 

bines the subtlety of the serpent with the sim- 

plicity of the dove. He may affect to believe 

everything and should, in fact, believe nothing. 

He has his goal marked out and has to get there 

or as near to it as may be humanly possible. 

In Japan the European diplomat lives in an 

atmosphere of blandishment and bushido, but 

he should never forget that the "ethics of bu- 

shido make no distinction between the 'ways 

which are dark and the tricks which are vain* 

so long as the aim is attained." Hence I may 

say again that England's policy in the Far 

East should be one of poUte preparaticm. 

If a study of the late Count Hayashi's 

Memoirs in the light of subsequent events 

opens the eyes of the public to the futility of 

a foreign poUcy which looks only to immediate 

gain and recklessly disregards the future, then 

they will not have failed in the purpose of their 

publication. 

A, M. P. 

Digi-izedbyGoOglC 

D„.;„.db,G00glc 

THE SECRET MEMOIRS OF 

COUNT HAYASHI 

D„.;„.db,G00glc 

D„.;„.db,G00glc 

CHAPTER I 

Origin of an Opinion for an Anglo- 

Japanese Alliance 

The origin of the desire for an alliance to 

be concluded between Great Britain and Japan 

is to be traced to the feeling existent in poli- 

tical circles in the latter country after the 

close of the Chino-Japanese War, when the 

intervention of the three Powers, Russia, 

France, and Germany, necessitated the retro- 

cessitm of Port Arthiu-. 

Prior to that intervention and during the 

progress of the war with China, France had 

shown herself to be friendly to Japan, a feeling 

which was recijH"ocated by that coimtry. 

As regards the relations between Great 

Britain and Japan, the late Count Ito, who 

was at that time the President of the Coimdl 

of Ministers, before the war with China was 

decided on, entertained great anxiety as to 

the real position which Great Britain would 

Digi-izedbyGoOglC 

78 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

take up. His anxiety was shared by other 

persons occupying important positions in the 

State and at Court. They feared lest Great 

Britain might have a secret agreement with 

China, and in the event of war breaking out 

with Japan, she might render China some 

aid. 

Although Great Britain had tried very 

hard to prevent the outbreak of hostilities 

between Japan and China, when it was certain 

that nothing could hinder such a development 

instructions were given to the British Charg6 

d' Affaires at ToHo at the end of July, 1894, 

to demand from Japan a guarantee that 

Shanghai and its vicinity should be regarded 

as outside the area of hostilities. 

As a result of this demand from the side 

of the British Government, the Japanese 

authwities realized that Great Britain had 

no secret agreement with China, and in con- 

sequence war with Qiina was resolved upon 

on August I, 1894. 

An important matter at this time was that 

the negotiations for the revision of the Anglo- 

Japanese Commercial Treaty had been con- 

cluded, and shortly before the declaration of 

war Great Britain had requested an early 

exchange of ratifications. This appeared to 

signify that, victoiy or defeat, neiUier result 

Digi-izedbyGoOglC 

Origin of Anglo-Japanese Alliance 79 

would affect the question of the revision of 

the treaty. 

The net restilt of this was that Great 

Britain's attitude proved in reality to be the 

^[act opposite of what the Japanese authori- 

ties believed it was. Instead of being bound 

to China and hostile to Japan, Great Britain 

seemed favourably inclined to the latt^ 

country. On the other hand, the interference 

of the three continental Powers after the 

conclusion of the war seriously affecting the 

interests of Japan had the result of drawing 

Japan towards Great Britain, and created 

an opinion very favourable towards a future 

Anglo- Japanese Alliance. 

The Three-Power IntervenHon, 1895. 

The first hint of the possibility of interfer- 

ence with the policy of Japan in connexion 

with the conditions to be imposed by her on 

China as the result of her victcnies came from 

the dispatches sent to the London Times by 

its famous correspondent at Paris, M. de 

Blowitz, during January and February, 1895. 

Both the Premier, Count Ito, and the 

Foreign Minister, M. Mutsu, anticipated such 

action on the part of Russia, France, and 

Germany, but they were quite imable to 

Digi-izedbyGoOglC 

8o Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

anticipate what direction iiitervention would 

take, nor could they guess to what extent it 

wotild be carried. They considered the matter 

and came to the conclusion that even if th^ 

were to make less stringent terms with China 

than those which they had in view, it would 

still be impossible to avoid intervention from 

the side of the Powers, as it was quite certain 

that the latter had made up their minds to 

control China's action and also to deal a deadly 

blow at Japan. 

Consequently the Japanese statesmen de- 

termined to make no alteration in the terms 

of peace which they already had in mind, 

but to go as far as possible without paying 

any immediate attention to the prospect of 

intervention by the continental Powers. 

Of course it was qtiite clear that interven- 

tion from the side of Russia would mean an 

excellent opportunity for that country to 

extend her influence in the Far East, and it 

was very natural that she was at the bottom 

of the whole aSair. France had an Alliance 

with Russia and on account of that Alliance 

was obliged to support Russia's action, in 

^te of her own earlier friendship for Japan. 

The statement of M. Harmand, the French 

Minister to Tokio at the time, fully proved 

the real circumstances actuating French policy. 

Digi-izedbyGoOglC 

Origin of Anglo-Japanese Alliance 8i 

As for Germany, she had no reason what- 

soever for being at enmity with Japan, and 

^e had no obligation whatsoever in Europe 

to oblige her to support Russia, as was the 

case with France. On the occasion of the 

signature of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, 

which concluded the war between China and 

Japan, the German Minister at Tokio, Baron 

von Gutschmid, was the first to dispatch a 

telegram of congratulaticm to the Foreign 

Minist^. Consequently it was a great sur- 

prise to the Japanese when Germany suddenly 

changed her attitude and agreed to talre 

common action with France and Russia, to 

obtain the siurender of Port Arthur by us. 

An inquiry was made by our Foreign Office 

from the German Minister in Tokio as to 

the reason for German action in joining Russia 

and France. Baron von Gutschmid re^^ed 

very composedly that the German Govern- 

ment had given warning to the Japanese 

Government at the banning of 1895, and 

had at that time pointed out that intervention 

by the Powers would be inevitable if Japan 

should take any steps towards the partition 

of Manchuria. In spite of this friendly warn- 

ing the Japanese Government had concluded 

a treaty with China embodying territcoial 

acquisition, and as a c<msequence Germany 

Digi-izedbyGoOglC 

82 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

was forced to stand by the side of Rtisaa 

and France. 

This must indeed be called a strange ex- 

planation. Preliminary notice as to the pos- 

sibility of intervention might possibly be 

listened to, but that a country shoxild join 

in intervention, simply because of non-accept- 

ance of the warning, is to me incomprehensible. 

In short, it must be assumed that Russia 

and France intervened solely on account of 

our territorial E^grandizement, but Germany 

had had the intention of intervening, what- 

ever conditions of peace were made, long 

before the conclusion of the treaty of 

peace. 

With r^ard to the attitude of the German 

Government towards Japan at the time of 

the intervention, the following interesting 

anecdote throws some light. 

At the time of the intervention of the three 

Powers, Cotint Mutsu, the Foreign Minister, 

was absent in the Kyoto district, and the 

management of the Ministry of Foreign 

AfEairs was in my hands, and it was I who 

carried on the negotiations with the Ministers 

of the three Powers. On one occasion (April 

23. 1895) the Russian and French Ministers 

called on me at the Fweign OfBce and brought 

and read to me a memorandum briefly written 

Digi-izedbyGoOglC 

Origin of Anglo-Japanese Alliance 83 

in the French language and left it for my 

further perusal and consideration. 

The same day the German Minister called, 

but later in the afternoon. In spite of a 

sufficient knowledge of English and French, 

the German Minister apparently thought it 

an indignity to draft a memorandum in either 

of these languages, and in consequence of 

my inability to understand German brought 

me a memorandum written in romaji (Japan- 

ese written in Roman letters, according to 

tiie Japanese phonetics), and caused his secre- 

tary, Herr Weipert, to read it out. Now the 

secretary was extremely well acquainted with 

the ordinary Japanese script and was vexed at 

having to read out an unfamiliar transcript 

of the original text, which had been composed 

£rom Chinese ideographs. It was quite clear 

that neitiier the secretary nor the Minister 

understood a single word of what the former 

was reading, whilst I, though paying the 

deepest attention, was barely able to catch 

the meaning of the memorandum. 

The memorandum which had been left 

by the French and Russian Ministers was 

jMractically a brief sentence advising the retro- 

cession of the territory acquired by the Treaty 

of Shimonoseki, and giving as a reason for the 

advice friendship for Uie neighbouring country. 

Digi-izedbyGoOglC 

84 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

The German memorandum, on the other 

hand, said that there was no possibility of 

Japan being able to hope for a victory in 

fighting Russia, Germany, and France, and 

therefore it would be beneficial for Japan if 

the advice tendered by the three Powers 

should be accepted. 

Standing at the table opposite to the Ger- 

man Minister I said, "Your Excellency's 

colleagues, the Ministers of Russia and France, 

have been here and have given friendly advice 

for the purpose of maintaining peace, and in 

doing so they have used a friendly termino- 

logy. But your Excellency's memorandum 

is phrased as if it were the proposal to solve 

the question by force of arms. If you mean 

this then the dignity of the State, as well as 

the feeling of the nation, must be considered, 

let alone the words in which the memorandiun 

is couched. It seems as if the memorandiun 

has been written in the Japanese language, 

with which you are unfamiliar, and conse- 

quently errors have been made in the use of 

The German Minister, in the most awkward 

manner, said that the views expressed by me 

as being in the memorandum were not so 

meant, and if such views occurred in it, it 

was due to errors in the wording of the memo- 

Digi-izedbyGoOglC 

Origin of Anglo-Japanese Alliance 85 

randum in Japanese. He promised to cancel 

tiie memorandum and asked me to regard the 

German memorandum as being identical with 

those of the Russian and French Ministers. 

Note. The following was the text of the Rusaaa 

Note, which was also adopted by the French Minister, 

and, in the drcumstances described above, by the 

German Minister, with, of course, the necessary 

verbal alterations. 

"The Government (rf His Majesty the Emperor 

of All the Russias, in examining the conditions of 

peace which Japan has imposed on China, finds that 

the possession of the Peninsula of Liaotung, claimed 

by Japan, would be a constant menace to the capital 

of China, would at the same time render illusory the 

independence of Korea, and would henceforth be a 

perpetual obstacle to the peace of the Par East. 

"Consequently the Government of His Majesty 

the Empenn* would give a new proof of their sincere 

friendship for the Government of His Majesty the 

Emperor of Japan by advising them to renounce the 

definite possesion of the Peninsula of Liaotong." — Ed. 

Digi-izedbyGoOglC 

CHAPTER II 

Preliminaries of the Alliance 

As the result of the intervention by the 

three Powers after the Treaty of Shimonoseki, 

the interests of the different countries in the 

Far East fell into a new grouping. France 

and Germany stood with Russia on the one 

side; whilst Great Britain, Japan, and the 

United States stood on the other. The result 

of this was that an opinion gradually spread 

both amongst the public and in the official 

world at Tokio that an alliance with Great 

Britain would be beneficial. 

Ilie Alliance was really an epoch-making 

event, when it had been concluded. It 

stands out in the history of the world. The 

glorious victories of our army and navy in 

the Russo-Japanese War and the great fight 

in the Straits of Tstishima were in themselves 

almost imprecedented in the history of war- 

fare, but they could never have taken place 

without the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. 

Digi-izedbyGoOglC 

Prelimmaries of the Alliance 87 

After the war great changes took place in 

the relations between the Powers. Those 

Powers which had previously been antipathetic 

to Japan arranged compromises, and now 

there is no reason to anticipate another war. 

This result has been due entirely to the virtue 

of the alliance. 

Not one of the persons who, after the retro- 

cession of Port Arthur, approved the idea of 

an alliance, ever imagined that it would have 

such far-reaching consequences. They only 

felt at the time of discussing it that without 

some sort of support the pressure of the 

European Powers might be renewed. Indeed, 

there were even different opinions as to 

whether an alliance with Great Britain would 

be the most suitable for our requirements, or 

whether a Russo-Japanese Alliance or even a 

Russo-Franco- Japanese Alliance would not 

be better. Both these latter proposals re- 

ceived the support of minorities in Japan. 

The main point kept in view by everybody 

was, however, that Japan's isolated position 

must be abandoned. 

I admit that I felt most strongly the 

attitude of Germany in the intervention 

question, as I considered that that coimtry 

had no interest whatsoever in the matter. 

On the other hand, I keenly appreciated the 

Digi-izedbyGoOglC 

88 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

joint interests of Rtissia and France, with the 

result that shortly after the interventioa 

question had been settled I wrote an essay 

bearing the title: "Future Policy in Foreign 

ASairs." This was completed towards the 

end of May, 1895, and I presented it to the 

late Mr. Fukuzawa, the proprietor and manag- 

ing editor of the Jiji Shimpo. This gentle- 

man was a great savant, and entirely agreed 

with the views expressed therein, with the 

result that in Jime, 1895, he published the 

essay in the Jiji Shimpo. Shortly aftorwards 

I was appointed Minister to China and left 

Tokio for Peking. A few days after my de- 

parture, on June 2 ist , the Jiji Shimpo published 

yet another article from my pen, again setting 

out my views on the country's foreign policy 

and emphasizing the necessity for the con- 

clusion of some sort of an arrangement with 

Great Britain, The considerable attention 

paid to these two articles by the general public 

is evidence enough that the idea of an alliance 

was beginning to obtain a hold amongst the 

people. 

The then Foreign Minister, Count Mutsu 

(created Count after the Treaty with China), 

was also in favour of an alliance. 

During the whole of my residence in Peking, 

and later in St. Petersburg, having the object 

Digi-izedbyGoOglC 

Preliminaries of the Alliance 89 

of creating the alliance always in view, I 

tried continuously to cultivate the society of 

the British representatives at those places. 

I therefore considered it a matter for self- 

congratulation that Sir Nicholas O'Connor, 

who had been my colleague in Peking, should 

also have been my colleague in St. Petersbui^. 

The idea of the alliance gradually extended 

until, on a obtain day in March, 1898, Mr. 

Joseph Chamberlain, the then Minister for 

the Colonies in the English Cabinet, had a 

conversation with M. (later Baron) Kato, 

who at the time was the Japanese Minister 

in London, at a public banquet, which both 

were attending. Mr. Chamberlain on that 

occasion expressed to M. Kato the readiness 

of Great Britain to enter into an agreement 

with Japan for the settlement of relations in 

the Par East. M. Kato sent a long telegram 

to Coimt Okuma, at that time the Minister 

for Foreign Affairs at Tokio, and urged on 

him the advisability of complying with the 

British statesman's wishes.' 

In 1899 I returned to Tokio from St. 

■ Eftto, Telca-ald, b. 1659. Entered Foreign OfBce, 1887; 

Private Secretary to Porrign Minister, Count Okunm, 1888; 

Minister at London, 1894-99; Ambassador at London, 1906-131 

Minister for Foreign ASairs, 1900-01, 1906, 1913, 1914; G.C.M.G. 

Olnima, Shigenobu, b. 1836. Foreign Minister, 188S, 1896- 

97; 1898-99; Premier, 1897, 1914. — Ed. 

Digi-izedbyGoOglC 

go Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

Petersbtii;g and visited Count Ito at his 

residence on Reinanzaka (one of the resi- 

dential quarters in Tokio). Count Inouye 

was present at that interview, and asked me 

if I would like to go to London as Minister. 

To this inquiry I replied that such was my 

most earnest desire. 

Count Inouye then continued by saying 

that M. Kato was always pressing on the 

Foreign Oflfice the urgent necessity of an 

alliance with Great Britain, and he asked 

for my views on the matter. I replied that I 

considered the alliance to be most advisable 

and important, but pointed out that an 

alliance means something muttial, each side 

bringing something into the bargain. If 

Japan were not able to bring sufficient into the 

alliance as her contribution then indeed it 

might suit Great Britain better to make 

an arrangement with Russia, which country 

could certainly ofifer more than Japan. And 

even if matters shotdd not go so far as an 

Anglo-Russian Alliance, it might well be that 

the idea of an Anglo- Japanese Alliance would 

be blocked. I said that my experience in 

Russia had been that England was very 

popular with certain sections, and therefore 

it would be very difficult to bring about an 

Anglo- Japanese Alliance. To explain this 

Digi-izedbyGoOglC 

Preliminaries of the Alliance 91 

statement I then added certain particulars of 

matters which had happened whilst I was 

Minister in St. Petersburg (March, 1897- 

1899), 

Pourparlers that miscarried. 

At the time when I was Minister at St. 

Petersburg the Russian Government was 

getting more and more interested in Far 

Eastern afiairs. 

It is digressing a little to relate the follow- 

ing story, but as it concerned a very important 

matter and was illtistrative of the above I 

will " strike it in, whilst the iron is hot. " In 

regard to the Korean question in 1897, in 

disregard of the Yamagata-Lobanoflf Agree- 

ment,* the Russian Government, without 

■ The Yomfigata-LobaooS Agreement waa signed at St, Petero- 

burg in 1896 an the occasioa of the visit of Field-Marshal Count 

(now Prince) Yamagata to St. Peteraburg to represent the 

Mikado on the occasion of the coronation of the Tsar and Tsarina. 

The agreement was to all intents and purposes merely a iatifica> 

tion of Qie Kcnnura-Waeber Convention, ngned at Seoul on May 

13, 1896, by the late M. (afterwards Marquis) Jutaro Eomura, 

then Japanese Minister to Korea, and M. G. Waeber, Rusnan 

Minister to Korea. Under the Eomura-Waeber Convention 

both Powers obtained the right to maintain a L^ation guard 

oi 800 men, whilst Japan obtained the further right to malntftin 

a tel^raph guard of 300 men to patrol the cable line between 

Pnsan and Seoul, which was the propertr of a Japoneoe conoea- 

Digi-izedbyGoOglC 

92 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

notifying the Japanese Government, sent 

several military officers to Korea for the 

purpose of training the Korean army, and 

also a financial adviser. Count Okuma, who 

was then the Minister of Foreign Affairs at 

Tokio, protested against this to the Russian 

Government, and I, in accordance with his 

instructions, saw Count Muravieff on the 

matter. He said to me, "That is something 

which happened under my predecessor, and 

I have nothing to do with it." I replied 

that a Government's responsibility could not 

change just because the Foreign Minister 

changed. "Well," he said, "to tell you the 

truth the Korean Emperor desired to have 

some military advisers, and so we sent them. 

We could not refuse the request of the ruler 

of a country with whom we have (diplomatic) 

relations." 

I then asked: "Would you then comply 

with any request made to you by the Emperor 

of Korea? Would you act thus in defiance 

of the convention which you have s^ed 

with us? If so, the agreement you have made 

with Japan is not worth the paper on which 

it is written. I must ask you to let us know 

exactly where we stand." "No," replied 

Count Muravieff. "What I mean is that we 

have sent these officers to K(»ea and we can- 

Digi-izedbyGoOglC 

Preliminaries of the Alliance 93 

not recall them immediately. As a matter of 

fact, we were to have increased their ntunbers, 

but we will not send any mOTe. We will 

correct the matter and make amends to you 

for it as you consider it a violation of the agree- 

ment. But we must have some further time 

for the matter to be settled in." This ended 

the conversation, but there was never any 

definite settlement of the matter. 

Meanwhile there had been a change of 

Ministry at Toldo, and the third Ito Cabinet 

had taken office with Baron Nishi as Foreign 

Minister. 

In January, 1898, the Russian Foreign 

Minister proposed, acting under the direct 

instructions of the Tsar, to negotiate an 

agreement with Japan in regard to Korea. 

I at once telegraphed this information to 

Tokio, and as our Government also wanted 

to have the question settled I received tele- 

graphic instructions to agree. 

Tke Nishi-Rosen Negotiations. 

My own opinion was that if Japan and 

Russia were to make an agreement that 

should require both countries to retire from 

Korea, then Japan's interests being so com- 

plicated she might be obliged to have to stand 

Digi-izedbyGoOglC 

94 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

by, only being able to watch whatever might 

occur internally in Korea. (It ^ould be 

remembered that, since the China War, 

Japan had very materially increased her 

interests in Korea, independently of her 

political situation toward that country. At 

the close of 1897, for example, she obtained 

the concession for the Seoul-Fusan Railway.) 

Russia having fewer interests internally in 

Korea might also be content to stand by and 

watch, but, on the other hand, might, in 

spite of the agreement, interfere if anything 

serious should happen. It appeared to me 

therefore better for both countries to be able 

to send advisers to Korea, a course which, 

as I thought, might work out more advan- 

tageously than any agreement on the other 

lines proposed at the time coiild do. 

There were already a number of Russian 

military advisers in Korea training the Korean 

army, and as their number was laige it would 

be a difficult matter to recall them. There 

was also one financial adviser, M. Alexeieff 

(head of the short-lived Russo-Korean Bank. 

He succeeded Mr. McLeavy Brown as Finan- 

cial Adviser to Korea, in the auttunn <^ 1897). 

His recall would not, however, be a difficult 

matter. I thought that Japan should prefer 

to supply Korea with a financial adviser, 

Digi-izedbyGoOglC 

Preliminaries of the Alliance 95 

rather than with military advisers. I there* 

fore telegraphed to Tokio suggesting that a 

clause might be inserted in the proposed agree- 

ment, that Russia and Japan should mutually 

agree to take over the military and financial 

advisCTships respectively. Later, the negotia- 

tioDS were transferred to Tokio and in April, 

1898, the Nishi-Rosen Convention was agned, 

whereunder military and financial advisers 

to Korea should only be appointed with the 

mutual consent of both countries.' 

Whilst the negotiations for this convention 

were in progress it loolffid as though the 

question of the appointment of the military 

and financial advisers to Korea mi^t create 

some trouble. 

Russian Clumsiness. 

Just at that time the Russian Government 

presented certain demands to the Korean 

Government. The Korean authorities were 

as usual very dilatory in their reply. M. 

Spiers, the Russian Charg6 d'AfEaires, de- 

* The Nishi JloseD Convention stated that both coimtriefl 

racogmzed the sovereignty and entire independen c e of Kom 

and pledged themselves not to interfere in the internal afEairs 

of Korea. Rusaa agreed not to interfere with the derdopment 

of the conunerdal and industrial lelatioos between Korea and 

Japan, and neither country should send advisers to Korea without 

the oonaent of the other party to the Convention. — Ed. 

Digi-izedbyGoOglC 

96 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

manded a reply vithin a certain definite 

time, and threatened if a reply were not 

forthcoming within the time limit to with- 

draw the Russian military and fitianriql 

advisers. The Korean monarch was very 

frightened and confidentially asked the Japa- 

nese Minister, M. Kato, for his advice. M. 

Kato gave him the following opinion : *' Since 

the Russians threaten to withdraw their 

advisers on their own account, it would be 

perfectly correct for you to consent to the 

withdrawal, imless — you are anxious to retain 

their services!" 

The Korean Government at once infcamed 

the Russian representative that Korea had 

no need of the services of the Russian advises 

and consequently he could order their with- 

drawal as soon as he liked. The Russian 

representative was hoist with his own petard. 

He could not very well eat his WOTds. He 

therefore thimdered at the Korean Ministers: 

"If you think that you can take care of your- 

selves, just remember not to get any more 

foreign advisers to come and help you. " He 

then flung out and sent the Russian oABccts 

home.' 

<Wben the Conventaon had been mgned the Russo-Kirean 

Bank put up its shutters, and M. AlezeieS fdlowed his mnitary 

colleagues home. Col. Potiola and the I^^atioa guard foUoned 

flbortljr after.— Ed. 

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Preliminaries of the Alliance 97 

The precipitate action of the Russian 

Chargfe thus solved the difficulty which lay 

in the way of the conclusion of the Convention, 

for the advisers having disappeared it was 

possible to arrange that no others should be 

sent without mutual consent. Later, when I 

met the Russian Foreign Minister, he said 

to me: "We have recalled the military officers 

whom we had sent to Korea. I hope that 

you are now satisfied!" I replied, "I certainly 

should be satisfied, but since you have with- 

drawn them of your own accord, there is no 

special reason for Japan to thank you. " 

Who intervened first ? 

As I have digressed so far from my main 

theme I may as well digress a little further 

to mention another matter which occurred 

about the same time as those events which 

I have just been discussing. I refer to the 

leasing of Port Arthur. 

The Yin-chow (Liaotung) Peninsula had 

once been Japanese territory, imda- the 

terms of the Treaty of Shimonoseki. On 

account of the intervention by the three 

Powers, Russia, France, and Germany, we 

restored it to China, receiving in return an 

indemnity of T!s. 30,000,000. China raised 

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98 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

the loans to furnish this and the war indem- 

nity on guarantees given by Russia. In 

payment far this service China agreed to give 

Russia a concession for & branch of the 

Siberian Railway, which was to penetrate 

Northern Manchuria. Each cme of these 

steps had been planned by Cotmt Witte, the 

Russian Minister of Finance. 

At that time there was living in Paris a 

certain M. Schion, who had formerly been 

a Councillor in the Depart:ment of Finance 

at St. Petersburg. He had resigned his post 

on account of disagreements with the policy 

of Cotmt Witte, and from his retirement at 

Paris published open letters attacking very 

trenchantly the poUcy of his former chief. 

These attacks were the more serious inasmuch 

as they were based on material which he had 

collected when employed at the finance de- 

partment. Amongst other things exposed by 

M. Schion was the fact that it was Count 

Witte who had initiated the policy <rf inter- 

vention at the conclusion of the Chino- 

Japanese War, and further, that he was 

prepared to carry that policy to the point of 

hostilities, if necessary. Indeed (according to 

M. Schion), Count Witte had given Coimt 

Lobanoff, the then Rtissian Foreign Minister, 

assurances that he would guarantee the raising 

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Preliminaries of the Alliance 99 

of sufficient funds to carry on war, if it should 

become necessary. 

Later I heard from my British colleague 

at St. Peto^burg, Sir Nicholas O'Connor^ 

that Count LobanofF had once assured him 

that Count Witte was entirely responsible 

for the intervention and retrocession policy, 

and that he, Coimt Lobanoff, had only been 

entrusted with the execution of the programme 

drawn up by the Finance Minister. I am 

therefore inclined to believe that M. Schion 

was writing the truth in his open letters. 

Count Witte' s Programme. 

M. Schion went even further, however. 

He attacked the scheme for the penetration 

of Northern Manchuria with a railway. He 

pointed out that as part of it would run 

through the territory of another nation it 

would be very difficult for Russia to defend 

that pcHtion of the line. Again, he wrote 

that the primary objects of a railway should 

not be only to connect the termini of the line 

but also to tap the regions through which it 

should pass. The value of a line could not be 

estimated simply by its mileage track. 

In my opinion, however, M. Schion's ar- 

gument on this point is falladotis, because 

Digi-izedbyGoOglC 

loo Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

Count Witte never had any intention of re- 

specting China's sovere^ty over the portion 

of Chinese territory through which the railway 

would pass. 

Count Witte's programme was to build a 

railway, to create cities along that railway, 

to develop the regions through which it 

passed, and, as soon as this had been effected 

in the Sungari district, to move on down to 

the south. By this means the gradual de- 

velopment o£ the line would blind other 

nations, and by the time the crisis in the Far 

East should arrive, Russian power would be 

so fully developed and so strong that no other 

country would or could dare to risk opposing 

her advance. 

Moreover, by this method ^Count Witte 

wotJd have been able to effect considerable 

financial economies in the construction of the 

line, for each section of it would have been 

self -supporting. 

The diplomacy by which the Count created 

the Triple Entente for the purpose of intimi- 

dating Japan had been very striking. The 

Count did not speak any English, and so I 

was never able to talk intimately with him, 

although I met him often. Nevertheless I 

could not do otherwise than admire his ability 

as a statesman. Had his progranmie been 

Digi-izedbyGoOglC 

Preliminaries of the Alliance loi 

carried out as he:.aV first proposed, what 

would not have been' tii&.r«ult? But jtist 

after the prc^iramme Had'-b^en planned an 

event took place which ate -up-'an enormous 

amount of money. This was tlie.-'leasing of 

Port Arthur. ' ■ ,■■ , 

The Occupation of Kiaockow. ■.■} 

However, before I speak of the Riissiari 

occupation of Port Arthur I shall discuss the 

German occupation of Kiaochow. 

As a lecompei^e for the support rendered 

by the Triple Entente to Chhia, Russia ob- 

tained the concession for the construction 

of the Chinese Eastern Railway (August 27th, 

September 8, 1896), France obtained con- 

cessions in Yunnan and along the Yai^^tse, 

but Germany only obtained the concession of 

a portion of the city of Tientsin for the exclu- 

sive use of the German colony at that place. 

This was not enough for Germany. She"^. 

naturally yearned after a concession at • 

Kiaochow.^ 

I EjBcxdiow, BccordtDg to the reputed Cassini ConTentkm, 

had been eannarked by Rosaa. The premature publication 

of this hmous document b; the North China Daily Newt in 

August, 1896, gave the Far East such a shock that both China 

and Russia vehemently denied the authenticity of the document. 

The Chioeae Eastern Railway Agreemeat is, bowever, so obvi. 

Digi-izedbyGoOglC 

102 Secret Memoirs of .QEjUpt Hayashi 

How Germany ijiasoagwi to obtain her 

enormous interests' :m'"Shantung, everybody 

knows!' 

When Gei^li^My first secured the concession 

of KiaochQWj-'die had no idea why she wanted 

it. gfie, took it haphazard, without any 

d^fitfipc'end in view. This is seen by the 

';o«i3ly framed on the Casaiiu Convention that the dental has not 

''.^ined much credence. There is reason to believe that the 

Cosaini CoDventioa was a.dmft agreement intended to bind China 

down an the Manchuiian question, but not intended to be ratified 

or promulgated. — Ed. 

> The Eiaochow Concesmon was extorted from China aa in< 

demni^ for the murder of two German missionaries in Shantung 

in the autumn of 1S97. Kiaochow was seized on November 

14, 1897, pending the settlement of the diplomatic questions 

raised. In order to make the weight of the mailed fist still more 

impresave, Baron von Heyldng, the German Minister at Peldng, 

was ordered to prolong the negotiations by lefuang to accept 

any oSera of reparation made by China. Meanwhile Prince 

Henry U Prussia was dispatched to the For East at the head of 

a strong squadron. On March 6, 1898, the leasing agreement 

was signed. Tangtao, which is the ofGdal German name of the 

colony, has proved itsdf a white dephant bo the German Govern- 

ment, a destiny which was perhaps expected in view of the retro- 

cession clause contained in the agreement. In 1914, on the 

outbreak of the war between the Triple Entente and Japan, and 

Germany and Austria, in response to the request of the British 

Government that Japan should put into force the terms of the 

Anglo-Japanese Alliance, the Mikado's Government sent an 

ultimatum to Berlin demandii^ the unconditional surrender of 

Tsngtao to Japan for eventual retrocesdon to China. The 

demand being unanswered, a^e operations were undertaken 

by a combined British and Japanese naval and military force 

end the fortress surrendered in November, 1914. At the time 

of writing it has not yet been restored to China. — Ed. 

Digi-izedbyGoOglC 

Preliminaries of the Alliance 103 

fifth clause of the lease which provides 

that in the case Germany should desire to 

vacate the concession before the expiration 

of the lease, China shall refund to her any 

money expended on the same, and also 

shall grant to Germany a more appropriate 

territory. 

At the time of the Kiaochow affair, acting 

under instructions frcon the Foreign Office 

at Tokio, I called on the Russian Foreign 

Minister, and asked him for his opinion as to 

Germany's true intentions. Count Mura- 

vieff replied: "Probably the Klaiser wanted 

it in order to encourage the expansion of the 

German Navy." I then asked him: "Was 

your Government consulted about it?" He 

replied: "No, we were not. We were only 

informed of the matter after the place had 

been seized." 

However, the very month after the Kiao- 

chow lease was signed the lease of Port 

Arthur to Russia was signed (March 27- 

April 9, 1898). I cannot help thinking, there- 

fore, that there was a secret agreement 

between Germany and Russia on the mat- 

ter, in spite of Count Muravieff's statement 

tome. 

In that case the negotiations with Japan 

on the Korean question at about that time 

Digi-izedbyGoOglC 

104 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayasbx 

were only intended to blind that country ^ 

to Russia's true intentions on the mainland.' 

What crippled Russia afterwards was the 

useless expenditiire of enormous sums of 

money immediately after her acquisition of 

Port Arthtu-, and with no prospect of getting 

any returns. Having obtained Hiat place 

she at once wanted to occupy Manchuria. 

As the proverb says, "The himter who chases 

■ Connt HayBdii's aasnmptioii does not appear to be justified. 

Not only did both Count Witte and the Ruaman Foreign I^Iin- 

istcr explicitly deny at the time that there was any previous 

arrangement with Germany, but as Count Hayashi has earlier 

pointed out, the acquisition of Fort Arthur at that moment vas 

rather an nnftutnnate event for Rusaa, as it upset Count Witte'a 

railway schemes. Probably the Rus^an statesmen considered 

that tliia inconvenience must be endured for reasons of strategy 

and prestige. In addition to these presumptions there is moie 

direct evidence on the point. After the Boxer Rebellion the 

secret archives of the Tsung-li-yamen fell into foreign hands, 

and completely established the statement that Russia instructed 

her representative at Peldng to do everything possible to block 

the granting of the lease to Germany. In Europe also everything 

was done to try to turn the Kaiser from his objective, as Russia 

had always considered Eiaochow earmarked for an ice-free base 

for her I^cific fleet. To Prince Henry of Prussia is owing the 

information of how the deadlock whs terminated. In a speech 

before the German club at Shanghai he told how the Kaiser had 

met the Tsar, and pointed out that Germany was in Kiaochow 

and intended to stop there. Russia could have no claim to the 

place, because the Cas^ni Convention, which was the only docu- 

ment mentioning it, had been declared by both Russia and China 

to be spurious. He su^ested that Rusma should take Port Arthur 

and Talienwan, which would be far more suitable to her needs, as 

they could be made into great military outposts, and Russia's 

future in the Par East was obviously on the mainland. — Ed. 

Digi-izedbyGoOglC 

Preliminaries of the Alliance 105 

the deer does not see the motintain before 

him." Russia plunged into the absorption of 

Manchuria without regard to the opinions of 

other countries, and this polity led her to the 

war with Japan. 

Rivalry for Power. 

There is no clear evidence to prove it, but 

thrae appears to have been something behind 

the leasing of Port Arthur. Coimt Witte and 

Count MuraviefE were really rivals for power. 

Each wanted to do something which would 

hand his name down to posterity as famous. 

It was this which led to the leasing of Port 

Arthur. Judging icom. the statements current 

in Russian political circles at that time, there 

was a good deal of truth in this story of 

rivalry between the two statesmen. 

About that time I met Cotmt Muiavieff 

accidentally. He said to me: "Hie agree- 

ment for the lease of Fort Arthur has been 

signed. As, however, events have moved so 

rapidly we have no map of that region. Now 

as Japan once held Port Arthur it is probable 

that you have a good map of that territory. 

If this is so, would you be so kind as to lend 

it to me?" I smiled as I looked at the Count, 

and I repUed: "Certainly Port Arthur was 

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io6 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

once occupied by Japan, and we have very 

good maps of that r^on. But we have none 

of them in our Legation here. And even if 

we had I could not awnply with your request, 

though if I can accommodate you in any other 

way I would be glad to do so." The Count 

smiled grimly and said: "You are quite right 

and I don't blame you. " 

The intervention of the three Powers had 

taken place xmder his predecessor, and he did 

not at the moment remember it. Anyhow, the 

leasing of Port Arthur had taken place so 

hurriedly that he had no maps of the district 

and had come to me to borrow one! 

Sometime after when negotiating with the 

British Minister the Cotmt mixed up Dairen 

(Dalny) and Port Arthiu*, and there was a 

bitter quarrel between them, as a result of 

which the British Minister was transferred 

to Turkey. But the cause was most certainly 

Count Miu:aviefE*s extraordinary lack of geo- 

graphical knowledge. 

Russia's pro-British PcUcy. 

After the lease of Port Arthur, Counts 

Witte and Muravieff became estranged. The 

latter was the prot6g6 of the Empress Dowager 

Marie (he was also the son of Muravieff of 

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Pjreliminaries of the Alliance 107 

Amur fame), and had been promoted to be 

Minister of Foreign Affairs from the very in- 

significant post of Minister to Denmark. He 

had therefore considerable influence with the 

Tsar and the Court. His Far Eastern policies 

were very well concaved and executed. Now 

that Russia had by the leasing of Port Arthur 

obtained the much desired ice-free port on the 

Pacific, she must go ftu^er and secure railway 

connexions between the port and the Siberian 

Railway. The construction of the railway and 

the towns along it was estimated to cost about 

R. 100,000,000. 

As the result of Coimt Miu^vieff's policy 

the labotirs of Count Witte, who had sole 

charge of the Russian finances, were doubled. 

It was the ui^ent necessity of obtaining 

money which sent Count Witte to the British 

Minister with a proposal. 

Count Witte's Proposal to Great Britain. 

Count Witte said to the British representa- 

tive: "Hitherto our policy has been to raise 

national loans for pohtical purposes in France 

and Germany exclusively. The markets in 

those countries are tightening, and we must 

therefore seek a market for our national bonds 

in your country. The British Government 

Digi-izedbyGoOglC 

io8 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

appears, however, to have but very little 

influence over the money market, and so to 

malffi any issues a success we must first secure 

the goodwill of the British people. Russia is 

therefore planning to give your countrymen 

greater freedcnn to engage in the Russian 

coastal trade, to introduce British capital 

into industries, and other commercial privi- 

leges. We also propose to send a committee 

to London, to be permanently established 

there, and they too will try to secure the good- 

will of the British pubUc. We should like to 

have the British Government with us and 

give us all the help in its power to achieve 

our end." 

Further developing his idea Count Witte 

proposed that a strong delegation of Moscow 

merchants should visit London f cff the purpose 

of studyii^ the ccMnmerdal situation and 

business amditions, and that later this visit 

should be balanced by a rettim visit from 

English merchants. 

However, this proposal to exchange visits 

was dropped afterwards by reason of the 

attitude of the City of London, where public 

feding ran high on account of indignation 

at the arbitrary methods adopted by the 

Russian Government to quell an insurrection 

in the interior of Russia. 

Digi-izedbyGoOglC 

Preliminaries of the Alliance 109 

Indeed, the whole proposition came to 

nothing at that time, for the British people 

were then very ill-disposed towards Russia. 

Even so, if the Russian statesmen had gone 

about their work in the right way they would 

have been able to reverse this feehng, fcM" 

Russia was in a position to offer many favours 

to Great Britain. 

THE FUTURE POLICY OP JAPAN 

(Summary of Articles in "Jiji Shimpo" in June 

and July, 1S95.) 

Our countrymen must be warned that the Treaty 

of Shimonoseki and its amendments by no means 

end matters. We must be prepared for many years 

to come to carry on both warlike and peaceful 

measures for the assertion of our rights. We must 

not shrink from attacking both to the North and the 

South with that object in view. 

As to the permanent occupation of Port Arthur, 

that port of Pengtien, which the second article of the 

Treaty of Shimonoseki gave to us, we have had to 

surrender it. The Russian, Prench, and German 

Governments considered our possesion of it threaten- 

ing to the peace of the Par East. They therefore 

advised our Government to hand it back to China, 

and as our only object has been the peace of the Par 

East, we decided to accept that advice and to return 

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no Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

the Liaotung Territory. This is made qmte dear by 

the Imperial Rescript. 

It is naturally very unpleasant to relinquish some- 

thing which has once been in our possession, and 

thou^ we did this as the result of the friendly advice 

of the Powers, it seems an insupportable hardship 

that what we have once gwied should be so lost. 

Opinions may difFer in connexion with this matter, 

but as I have always pointed out, the ways of inter- 

national intercourse amongst the so-called civilized 

nations are inconcavably intricate. 

If of course everybody is satisfied with the present 

state of aEEairs, then there is nothing more to be said. 

But as the proverb says, "To each ten men ten 

complexions," and it is only natural to expect that 

there will be many people who will be deeply dis- 

satisfied with the turn which affairs have taken. 

But there is no necessity to advise such people to 

smother thdr discontent, nor to persuade them to be 

contented, nor to seek to turn them to an amiable 

frame of mind. 

It must never be forgotten that discontent is the 

prime factor which incites men to greater activity 

and diligence. We should therefore retain our dis- 

content to spur us on to greater diligence, with a view 

to one day dispersing the gloom around us. We must 

per^tently suffer the insufferable and support the 

insupportable for the sake of what the future will have 

in store for us. In this way we shall truly promote the 

strength and prosperity of our nation. 

We should exert ourselves to develop our commerce 

and our industries, for these are the principal factors 

of national expandon. Commerce and industry 

produce wealth. We must also devote more attention 

Digi-izedbyGoOglC 

The Future Policy of Japan iii 

than ever to btiilding up on sdentific princi{de8 our 

army and navy. 

We must continue to study according to Western 

methods, for the application of science is the most 

important item of warlike preparations that civilized 

nations regard. If new ships of war are con^dered 

necessary, we must build them at any cost. If the 

organization of our army is found to be wrong, it 

must at once be renovated. If advisable our whole 

military system must be entirely changed. We must 

build docks to be able to repair our ships. We must 

establish a steel factory to supply guns and ammuni- 

tion. Our railways must be extended so that we can 

mobilize our troops rapidly. Our oversea shipping 

must be developed so that we can provide transports 

to carry our armies abroad. 

This is the programme that we have to keep always 

in view. We have suffered hard things, and we must 

suffer yet harder things before we arrive at our destiny. 

Whilst our preparations are in the making things will 

not be easy. Our taxes will increase, our people will 

suffer distress, our Government officials must work 

for small salaries, and amidst a discontented populace. 

Political parties will use the distress to raise political 

disputes, and our whole Empire may feel unhappy. 

But if we always keep in view the great ends which I 

have indicated, then we shall endure all these things 

gladly. 

Peace has been restored, but it caimot be a lasting 

peace. We must sacrifice ourselves, we must work 

for those who come after us, we must face di£Bculties, 

even as "combing our hair in the rain and bathing 

in the wind. " Many will be disappointed and dis- 

contented, but they most endure all thdr disappoint- 

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112 SeCTet Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

ment and discoctent in silence and with a brave heart. 

If they were private merchants they would endure 

and continue struggling. As a nation we must do the 

same. The actions of great Powers are like those of 

individual merchants. Each one seeks his own gain, 

and if he cannot at once win continues with increased 

energy until he does so at last. 

The man who misunderstands the attitude of the 

Powers is a stupid clodhopper. It is no good beii^ 

angry with a meixhant because he sets bis prices high. 

It is equally unreasonable to be angry with the Powers 

because their gain is our loss. 

It is not the first time in history that a Power which 

has been strategically successful has been beaten in the 

Council Chamber. Russia beat Turkey, but England 

canc^ed her victory and she returned home empty- 

handedi leaving behind the mountain of treasure for 

which she had fought. 

On another occasion Russia was beaten in the field 

by England, but she was able to nullify all England's 

victories by her diplomacy. 

No modem war except tfae Franco-Prussian War 

has been concluded without interference from some 

outade Power. Even America, whidi boasts of its 

isolation, keeps good watch on the evoits of the other 

States of both North and South America. No Power 

is to be blamed if it takes advantage of the weakness 

fd another and can gain advantages tor itsdf thereby. 

The precedents of history teach us that no sur- 

prise should be evoked because Japan has been forced 

by a combination of Powers to evacuate the Liao- 

tung. Three Powers were banded against her, and it 

was in her own interests as well as to preserve peace 

that she followed their advice. 

Digi-ize'dbyGoOglC 

The Future Policy of Japan 113 

What Japan has now to do is to keep perfectly 

quiet, to lull the suspicions that have arisen ag^nst 

her, and to wait, meanwhile strengthening the founda- 

tions of her naticmal power, watching and waiting 

for the opportuoity whidi must one day surely come 

in the Orient. When that day arrives she will be able 

to follow her own course, not only able to put meddling 

Powers in their places, but even, as necessity arises, 

meddling with the affairs of other Powers. Then 

truly she will be able to reap advantages for herself. 

If, however, the continental Powers are g<Hng to 

continue the Alliance against her in order to curb 

our jitst aspirations, to fulfil which we have poured 

out life and money, then we too must endeavour to 

ourselves make an alliance which shall counteract 

their machinations. 

The recent change of Ministry in England seems 

likely to lead to a still further anti-Russian feeling in 

that country. 

During the war with China, feelings in Japan were 

by no means friendly to England. Her arlntrary 

limitation of the area of hostilities was stroi^ly felt 

by our military men, and it was on account of this 

that our plans for an attadc on Nanking had to be 

based on Shantung. 

England's attitude is, however, not difficult to 

understand, and when it came to the time (rf making 

peace her attitude veered from being strictiy neutral 

to being rather friendly to us. True, she advised us 

to give way before the Three-Power Note, but this 

was not because she approved of the attitude of 

Germany, France, and Russia, but because she fore- 

saw that if we were to resist war would result. But 

on the question of Formosa she strongly resented the 

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114 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

French attitude, and let us know that she preferred 

us to be in occupation of that island and not Prance. 

For this we must be very grateful to her. 

Affairs in the Par East are now only in a pre- 

liminary stage. Russia certainly intends to obtain 

a predominating podtion, and in that case England's 

position in China might well become precarious. In 

this countiy all are agreed that the question must 

finally be settled by the sword, but England is not in a 

good strategical position for such a course, for the 

struggle would be settled on land and not on sea. 

If, however, Enj^and and Japan should make an 

alliance the problems of the Par East would be already 

settled. If the events of the late war have proved to 

the English statesmen that China is merely a big 

idol, then they may in time come to realize that Japan, 

though she is young and inexperienced, is earnest and 

energetic. China is no longer the Power of the Par 

East, nor is Japan yet it. Russia is trying to be it. 

But the real Power in the Par East is England. If 

she casts her lot in with Rusaa she can no longer be it, 

for Russia can coerce China by land, which England 

cannot oppose. But if England casts in her lot with 

Japan, then she will more than ever be the Power of 

the Far East, for ^e is the deciding factor at present. 

England and Japan together can control China and 

ensure the maintenance of peace in the Orient. 

Digi-izedbyGoOglC 

CHAPTER III 

The Friends of the Anglo-Japanese 

Alliance 

I SHALL now go back to the point where I 

I^t ofif discussing the Anglo- Japanese Alliance, 

when I was at Count Ito's house. I had 

then said in reply to a question by Count 

Inouye that an Anglo- Japanese Alliance would 

be most desirable. I had pointed out that 

an alliance was In reality an exchange of 

benefits. But as Russia was a much richer 

country than Japan she would be able to ofiEer 

much better terms to Great Britain, and conse- 

quently it would be a matter of considerable dif- 

ficulty to bring about such an alliance as that 

under discussion. I had the facts about Russia 

which I have now related and I used them as 

the basis of my conclusions. I could only guess 

at the real attitude of Counts Ito and Inouye, 

but I formed the impression t^at they were in 

favour of an alliance with Great Britain. 

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ii6 Secret Memoixs of Count Hayashi 

In 1899 1 was appointed Minister at London, 

and in 1900 took up my post there. 

If I remember rightly it was in March, 1900, 

in the early part of the month, that I discussed 

the proposal for an alliance between Great 

Britain and Japan with Dr. Morrison, the 

famous correspondent of The Times at Peking, 

whom I met in the rooms above the Jiji 

Shimpo oflBce at Tokio.' 

Mr. (now Sir) Valentine Chirol, the Foreign 

Editor of The Times, visited the Far East 

twice whilst I was Minister at Peking, and I 

met him several times there and exchanged 

views with him. When I was returning from 

Peking I travelled on the same steamer with 

him. Ever since I have been in close contact 

with him, and he has always heartily favoured 

the idea of an Anglo- Japanese Alliance. 

I knew a great nimiber of newspaper men 

when I was in London, and the lai^e majority 

have been in favour of an alHance. 

In the year 1900 the Boxer trouble broke out 

in China, and the Legations in Peking were in- 

vested. Troops were mobilized from the differ- 

ent nations for the rescue of the Legations. 

'The Count here refers to the Kojunsha Club, whicli forma 

part of the bufldings of the Jiji Shimpo, end which was also 

founded by the late Mr. Fulnizawa. There is a private entrance 

to the dub imm the editorial offices of the Jiji Skimpo. — Bo, 

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Friends of Anglo-Japanese Alliance 117 

ProrJapanese Sentiment in England. 

At that time England was tired of war, 

that in South Africa having only just been 

concluded.^ She could not very well stretch 

out her arms to the Far East. The people 

of England were very alarmed at ihe reports 

of the situation in China. When, however, 

they found that Japan had mobilized an 

army for the rescue of the Legations they 

were very much obliged to Japan and felt 

very reheved. I was received in audience 

by Queen Victoria at Buckingham Palace ' 

at this time for the purpose of presenting \ 

my credentials, and Her Majesty specially | 

requested me to convey her thanks to the I 

Emperor of Japan for the prtnnpt dispatch ,' 

of Japanese troops to China. 

According to my judgment at that time, 

the pro- Japanese sentiment in Ei^land ex- ' 

tended from Hie highest to the lowest and ,' 

humblest citizen. 

On the other hand, Russia was planning 

to occupy the Manchurian Provinces as a 

set-oS to and as an indemnity for the Boxer 

outrages. Then began the infamous cam- 

paign of bloodshed along the Amur River. 

England could not but feel rather resentful 

■ Tlie Sontli African War bad not been oondnded.— Ed. 

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ii8 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

towards Russia. She realized Ihe necessity 

of joint action with Japan in the Far East, 

and that proved to be one of the most im- 

portant reasons why the Anglo- Japanese 

AlHance was later concluded. 

However, no immediate steps were taken 

by either England or Japan. Although public 

sentiment in both countries greatly appre- 

ciated the idea of an aUiance, the Governments 

of the two countries did not then enter into 

any serious negotiations for such an under- 

standing. 

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CHAPTER IV 

The Negotiations for the Conclusion 

of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance 

It was in March or April of last year (1901) 

that Baron von Eckardstein, who was then 

the German Charg6 d' Affaires in London, 

called on me on several occasions. In the 

course of my conversations with him he 

expressed to me the opinion that nothing 

would prove more effective for the main- 

tenance of peace in the Far East than the 

conclusion of a triple alliance between Japan, 

Great Britain, and Germany. He told me 

also that so far as he could learn many in- 

fluential members of the British Cabinet, 

the Marquis of Lansdowne, Mr. Arthur 

Balfour, Mr. Joseph Chamberlain, and the 

Duke of Devonshire had been of this opinion 

for some time, and that lately the MarqiiJs 

of Salisbury had also accepted the suggestion. 

So far as Germany was concerned, continued 

Digi-izedbyGoOglC 

X20 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

the Baron, the popular feeling against England 

was certainly very strong, but the G^man 

Government itself did not share this feeling. 

The Baron specially mentioned that two c^ 

the most distinguished dignitaries <^ the 

Empire were favourable to the idea <^ malfttig 

an alliance between the three Powers. I 

presume that the two persons to whom he 

referred were the KaisCT and Count (now 

Prince) von Bfllow. On the occasion of the 

funeral of the late Queen Victoria the Kaiser 

met King Edward several times at Osborne, 

and then Baron von Eckardstein always at- 

tended the Kaiser and so he was in a posi- 

tion to know the real circumstances. The 

Baron suggested that if the Japanese Govern* 

ment should take the ioitiative in formally 

proposing to ccmclude such an alliance the 

scheme would most certainly be crowned with 

Even to-day I am still doubtful of the true 

object Baron von Eckardstein had m view 

in making the above proposals to me. Did 

he speak to me, su^esting such an alliance, 

because be had been so instructed by his own 

Government, or had he some other reason? 

There was no doubt in my mind that if 

the British Government had an intention of 

entering into such an alliance as the German 

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Anglo-Japanese Alliance Concluded 121 

Charg6 had outlined, it would prove to be a 

combination of the utmost advantage to Japan. 

I also thought that it would be an advantage, 

and it (xrtainly could do no harm, to find out 

the intentions of the British Government in 

the matter. I therefore applied to my own 

Government for its permission to try to do so. 

I was authorized by a telegram, dated April 

i6th of last year (1901], to sound the British 

Government, but to do so only on my own 

responsibility, and in such a manner as in no 

way to bind my Government, which expressed 

itself as not being in a position to give an 

opinion either for or against the idea. 

The following day, April 1 7th, I had occasion 

to call on Lotd Lansdowne, and in the cotuse 

of the conversation I referred to the situation 

in China, and ejcplained that the future of 

that country was a source of anxiety to myself 

and that I believed that it was a matter of 

urgent necessity for Great Britain and Japan 

to make a permanent agreement for the main- 

tenance of peace in the Far East. I expressed 

this as being my own personal view. I asked 

the opinion of Lord Lansdowne on the point, 

and he agreed that it was advisable to elabc^- 

ate some means for the purpose I had sug* 

gested. Owing, however, to the absence 

from London of the Premier, Lord Salisbury, 

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122 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

the British Government could not at the 

moment consider tius very important matter. 

Lord Lansdowne said, however, that he was 

quite willing to listen to me if I had any good 

suggestion to make as to its solution. As I 

was about to leave him Lord Lansdowne 

added that an agreement such as I had 

su^ested would not of necessity be confined 

to two countries, but any other country might 

be admitted to it. 

Considering this last statement of Lord 

Lansdowne in conjunction with those already 

made to me by the German Charg6 d'Affaires, 

I came to the opinion that the British Govern- 

ment had already had occasion to consider 

the matter, and might even have gone so 

far as to seek the views of the German Govern- 

ment on the same. However, owing to tiie 

absence of Lord Salisbury from London, it 

was impossible to do anything further in the 

matter at t^t time. 

I decided nevertheless to watch the atti- 

tude of the British Government and to renew 

my conversation with Lord Lansdowne when 

Lord Salisbury returned. I accordingly tele- 

graphed in these terms to my Government. 

But I also thought that it would be difficult 

for my Government to form a sufficiently 

concrete idea of the conditions so as to be 

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Anglo-Japanese Alliance Concluded 123 

enabled to send me any precise instructions, 

as so far I had only been able to refer to the 

matter in a vague way. I thought therefore 

that it would be as well to have some sort 

of a basis on which to negotiate, and this 

would tend to hasten any n^:otiations that 

might result. Accordingly I suggested in my 

tel^ram that if my Government should 

decide to try to make an Anglo- Japanese 

Alliance, the following basic principles should 

be adopted, on which to negotiate: 

(i) That the principle of the open door 

and the territorial integrity of China should 

be maintained. 

(2) That no country should be permitted 

to obtain from China any territorial rights, 

beyond those already granted by China in 

published treaties. 

{3) That Japan, having greater interests 

in Korea than any other country, should be 

allowed freedom of action in Korea. 

(4) That should either party to the alliance 

become involved in hostiUties mth any other 

country, the other signatory should maintain 

neutrality in the struggle, but in the event 

of a third nation joining in the struggle and 

attacking a party to the alliance then the co- 

signatory should take up arms to assist her 

ally. 

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124 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

(5) That the existing Anglo-German Agree- 

ment with regard to China remain in force. 

(6) That the terms of the aUiance relate 

exclusively to Eastern Asia, and the sphere 

of its operations shall not extend beyond the 

limits of Eastern Asia. 

The reply which I received from Toldo 

expressed no opinion on the terms which I 

had suggested, but paid particular attention 

to the possibility of an imderstanding having 

already been arrived at between Great Britain 

and Germany on the mattCT. This my 

Government considered very possible, in view 

of Lord Lansdowne's statement that such 

an agreement as I had suggested should not 

necessarily be confined to the two countries. 

I was therefore instructed that it was very 

necessary to find out whether any under- 

standing already existed between England 

and Germany, and I was again ordered to do 

this on my own responsibility. 

It was not until May loth that Lord Salis- 

bury returned to London, and letting a few 

days elapse I again called on Lord Lansdowne 

<Mi May 15th. I asked him for his views on the 

agreement between Great Britain and Japan 

with regard to Far Eastern affairs, which I 

had su^ested at our last meeting. 

Lord Lansdowne said that, first, he would 

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Anglo-Japanese Alliance Concluded 125 

]ike to have some idea as to my c^miion as to 

the lines which such an agreement should 

follow. I rephed that the policy of Japan 

towards China had been repeatedly declared 

and was to-day the same as it was in the 

declarations, namely, the maintenanoe of the 

open door and the territorial integrity of 

China. As regards Korea, we only wished 

to maintain our interests in that country. 

I added that in my opinion the interests of 

Great Britain and Japan in China were 

identical, and I reiterated that I thought it 

of the utmost impcvtance for the two countries 

to stand together against any combination 

of other countries. Lord Lansdowne replied 

that the discussion of the main lines of an 

agreement was easy, but the difBculty would 

arise when details came to be settled. He 

said, however, that he would refer the matter 

to Lord Salisbury, and tell him my views, 

and he again repeated that the proposed 

agreement would not necessarily be confined 

to Great Britain and Japan, but a third 

cotmtiy could also be admitted. 

Next day Baron von Eckardstein called 

to see me, and told me that he had visited 

Lord Lansdowne just after I had seen him 

(Lord Lansdowne) on the previous day. 

The British Foreign Secretary had told him 

Digi-izedbyGoOglC 

126 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

the piuport of the conversation which he 

had had with me. 

I telegraphed to Toldo, reporting the details 

of my conversation with Lord Lansdowne, 

and at the same time recommended that the 

Japanese Cabinet give the matter very careful 

consideration. Meanwhile a Cabinet change 

had taken place in Toldo. The foiuth Ito 

Ministry collapsed and Prince Ito had resigned 

the Premiership on May loth, being replaced 

by Marquis Saionji as temporary Premier. 

His appointment was, however, quickly 

followed by another change, and on June 2d 

Viscount (later Prince) Katsura was appointed 

Premier. M. (now Baron) Kato was replaced 

as Foreign Minister by Viscount Sone, who 

also held the office of Minister of Finance. 

On account of these changes at Tokio and 

the confusion which ensued I received no 

answer to my telegram, and as I received no 

commimication from Lord Lansdowne I was 

obliged to let the matter rest. 

On July 15th, Sir Claude MacDonald, the 

British Minister at Tokio, who was then in 

London on leave of absence, unexpectedly 

called to see me, and told me that in an 

audience which he had had with King Edward 

VIL a few days previously His Majesty had 

expressed the opinion that it was necessary 

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D„.;„.db,G00glc 

Anglo-Japanese Alliance Concluded 127 

for England and Japan to come to an under- 

standing in scune way or another, and it was 

desirable that it should not be a merely 

temporary understanding. Sir Claude even 

went further and said that he had seen Lord 

Salisbiuy, whose views on the matter went 

beyond those of the King. His opinion was 

that an alliance must be made between C^^at 

Britain and Japan which would provide that 

in the event of two or more countries com- 

bining against one of the parties to the 

alliance then the ally should assist the party 

attacked by force of arms. Sir Claude said 

that the British Government had the idea of 

making such an alliance, but as this would be 

a departine from the long-established policy 

of the country in foreign affairs the ne^tia- 

tion^ of such an agreement would take some 

time, and Lord Salisbury was a little afraid 

that in the delay Japan and Rxissia might 

form an alliance. Sir Claude added that 

Baron von Eckardstein had been to the 

Foreign Office and expressed fears that Japan 

might make an alliance with Russia. 

After I had considered my conversation 

with Sir Claude I came to the conclusion that 

his object in calling on me and in referring 

so specifically to the question of ih& proposed 

Ai^o-Japanese Alliance was to pave the 

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128 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

way for the opemng of serious negotiations, 

and that his visit had been inspired by in- 

structions from Lord Salisbury. I therefore 

tel^raphed to my Government the details of 

my conversation with Sir Claude, and added 

that as the British Government was nervous 

of a possible alliance between Japan and 

Russia, if my Government would hint that 

Japan and Russia would combine if there were 

no prospects of the successful concltision of 

the proposed Anglo- Japanese Alliance, the 

British Government would be stimulated into 

making a favourable agreement. 

What Sir Claude MacDonald actually said 

in his conversation with me was: "Whilst 

we are wasting time in discussing the terms 

of an agreement with Japan, the Japanese 

Government might take up the idea of making 

an alliance with Russia. In fact, the German 

Ambassador ( ? Cbarg6) has been to the Foreign 

OfBce and said that there was a possibility 

of such action on the side of Japan. " 

To this I replied: "As you know, the 

feelings of Japan are not friendly to Russia, 

but are Mendly to Ei^land. Of course 

sentiment should be subordinated to con* 

siderations of actual profit, and without doubt 

if Russia should see her way to make sub- 

stantial concessions to Japan, then certainly 

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Anglo-Japanese Alliance Concluded 129 

our feelings of enmity to that country would 

disappear." 

It appeared to me that Sir Claude Mac- 

Donald was expressing opinions formed by 

Lord Lamdowne after a consideration of my 

views, and was striving for the materializa- 

tion of what I had said about an Anglo- 

Japanese Alliance. Considraing his remarks, 

I came to the conclusion that the British 

statesmen sincerely desired an alliance treaty, 

but were fearful of the conclusion of a con- 

vention between Japan and Russia. I 

tho;^ht, ther^ore, that we might take ad- 

vantage of that fear on England's part, and 

by pretending that an agreement would be 

n^otiated with Russia hasten on the con- 

cluaon of the treaty with Great Britain. 

Consequently when I tel^praphed to Tokio 

the details of my conversation with Sir 

Claude MacDonald I also telegraphed my 

own views as I have expressed them above. 

I saw Lord Lansdowne on July 31st, when 

the following conversation took place. He 

said: "We think that the time has come to 

discuss seriously the question of making a 

permanent treaty with Japan. I want, there- 

fore, to ask you what is the view of the 

Japanese Government with regard to the 

relationship of international interests in Man- 

Digi-izedbyGoOglC 

13© Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

churia, and secondly what sort of treaty you 

would want to make with us. " 

My reply was : " In my opinion the interests 

of Japan in Manchmia are only indirect. 

But, if Russia should one day occupy a part 

of Manchuria and extend her influence in 

those parts, then she would be able to absorb 

Korea, against which Japan wotild be obliged 

to protest. What Japan wants is to prevent 

Russia &om coming into Manchuria, and if 

to do this she should be involved in war with 

Russia she wants to prevent a third party 

coming to the help of Russia. As for our 

general policy in regard to China, we wish 

to maintain the principle of the open door 

and to maintain the territorial integrity of 

China, as I said at our last conversation. " 

Lord Lansdowne answered: "As regards 

Korea, England has very httle interest in 

that coimtry, but she does not wish to see 

Korea fall into the hands of Russia. As re- 

gards China, our policy is identical with 

Japan's, namely, the maintenance of terri- 

torial integrity and the open door. I believe 

that in time we might adopt measures for 

the mutual protection of oiu: interests in 

Eastern Asia. Now, please tell me, when 

Russia proposed to make Korea a buffer 

state, why did Japan refuse to agree?" 

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Anglo-Japanese Alliance Concluded 131 

I replied: "With regard to Korea, it is 

qtiite useless to attempt to hold a neutral 

position. The Koreans are totally incapable 

of governing themselves, and we can never 

tell when civil war may not break out. In 

the event of civil war, who will hold the reins 

of government? It is after all very natural 

that the international interests in Korea 

should be conflicting." 

At this point LOTd Lansdowne interjected 

the remark that the situation between Japan 

and Korea was very similar to that which 

had obtained between Great Britain and the 

Transvaal. Lord Lansdowne said that my 

views were a suitable basis for discussion, 

and he would refer them to Lord Salisbury 

with a view to negotiations for a definite 

agreement being commenced. 

I telegraphed this conversation to the 

Foreign OiBce in Tokio, and on August 8th 

received the following telegram in reply: 

"Japanese Government acknowledges the 

purport of the propositions made by England 

regarding a definite agreement and accepts 

in toto your reports of your conversations 

with Lend Lansdowne. It desires you to 

proceed to obtain full particulars of the 

British attitude in this matter. Success or 

failtu« c^ this convention depends on your 

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132 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

carefulness. When our policy is fully decided 

upon the work will be easy. " 

Of course I felt delighted when I received 

this telegram. Indeed, I had never felt 

hapiaer in my life. I had a further interview 

witli Lord Lansdowne and went into further 

details with him. As I had not yet received 

the power of plenipotentiary to conduct the 

negotiations with him, I continued to speak 

with him as a private person. 

On August 1 6th Lord Lansdowne went to 

Irdand for a holiday. Before he left London, 

however, he tcAd me that he would give the 

matter his most careful consideration during 

his holiday, and he asked me meanwhile to 

get the power of plenipotentiary from my 

Government. Matters therefore remained in 

abeyance for a time whilst I telegraphed to 

Tokio for the power of plenipotentiaiy. 

In Tokio a change had taken place at the 

Foreign OfiBice. Chi September 21st Count 

Komura had been appointed Foreign Minister. 

On October 8th he sent me the following 

tel^jam: 

"The Japanese Government has carefully 

considered the question of the proposed 

alliance with Great Britain, and has formed 

a definite policy supporting the same and 

approving the course taken by you as pre- 

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COUNT KOMURA, JAPANESE MINISTER FOR FOREION AFFAIRS 

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D„.;„.db,G00glc 

Anglo-Japanese Alliance Concluded 133 

viously telegraphed. Hereby you are given 

power to exchange officially views with 

the British Government in regard to the 

same." 

Having thus received the formal power of 

plenipotentiary I was ready to commence 

the real n^otiations. 

On October i6th, Lord Lansdowne having 

rettumed to London, I called on him at the 

Foreign Office. Our conversation on that 

day resulted in the drafting of the preamble 

of the treaty. 

Our conversation was briefly as follows: 

"Although," I said, "I have received the 

formal power of plenipotentiary to negotiate 

the treaty, I have not yet received the in- 

structions of my Government about details. 

Under these circumstances would you object 

to my continuing to discuss the matter for 

the present as a private person, which would 

save a loss of time?" 

To tliis Lord Lansdowne replied: "As I 

understand from yoiur remarks that though 

you have the formal power of plenipotenti- 

ary from yoiu: Government to n^otiate the 

treaty, you are as yet not in possession of full 

instructions from your Government with re- 

gard to details, I am therefore quite willing 

to have our conversation regarded as per- 

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134 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

sonal, and that what you may say shaJl not 

be taken as binding on your Government. " 

I thanked him and said that we cotJd 

discuss the matter, and my home Government 

could afterwards instruct me as to any 

alterations which they might desire. 

The Marquis again agreed and then said: 

"As the first thing in making an agreement 

is to ascertain the views and wishes of the 

other contracting parties, I would like to 

know officially what are the wishes of Japan 

in this matter. " 

I said in reply to Lord Lansdowne: "My 

country considers as its first and last wish 

the protection of its interests in Korea, and 

the larevention of interference by any other 

country in Korea. " 

"What, then, next," asked the Marquis, 

"is yotir poUcy in China?" 

I answered: "As I have before stated, we 

entirely agree with the British poUcy in that 

country. That is to say, we wish to maintain 

the territorial integrity of China and the 

principle of equal opportunity. " 

"Very well," said Lord Lansdowne; "now, 

what sort of a treaty do you think that Great 

Britain and Japan should enter into?" 

I said: "The nature of the alliance should, 

in my opinion, be, that in the event of one 

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Anglo-Japanese Alliance Concluded 135 

of the allies appealing to arms to realize the 

above objects, the co-signatory to the treaty 

should maintain and observe neutrality, but 

if another Power or other Powers sboidd aid 

the enemy coimtry, then the allied Power 

should at once take up arms in aid of its 

ally.'" 

To this Lord Lansdowne replied: "What 

you ask appears to me to be reasonable. We 

think, however, that the treaty should be on 

broader hnes than you surest, and that aside 

from the specific conditions which you have 

mentioned and which would be embodied in 

the treaty, Great Britain and Japan should 

alwa3rs maintain the closest friendship and 

connexion, especially in respect to Far East- 

em affairs, and in regard to those we should 

exchange views without reserve and act 

throughout in a concerted manner. We 

think that that is very important. " 

I agreed with this proposal, but I thought 

that Lord Lansdowne wanted to tie us down 

beforehand so as to prevent us from entering 

• There is a striking diSereace between the above MS. vtnka 

oi Count Hayashi's proposed tenna of the alliance and the venioa 

published in the Jiji Shimpo, The latter vemon said: "We 

should like a treaty so that if another country should attack one 

of the allies, and a third country should go to the assistance of the 

hostile country, then the non-belligerent ally shall go to the help 

of the attacked ally."— Ed. 

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i3fi Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

into any engagement with another country, 

once we had signed the proposed treaty of 

alliance with Great Britain. I said that the 

wishes of my country would be the same, 

and the Marquis ended the interview by 

saying that he would report all I had said 

to Lord Salisbiuy, and that as soon as they 

had carefully studied the matter he would 

discuss it with me again. 

Before leaving the Marqxiis I asked him: 

"What are your plans with regard to in- 

cluding Germany in the agreement? " 

He replied: "We think that it will be best 

to negotiate with you first and then later we 

can invite Germany to join in the negotiations 

and come into the alliance. " 

The reason why I asked about Germany 

was becatise I was uncertain as to the re- 

lationship of England and Germany on the 

matter, and I wanted, as my Government 

had instructed me, to find out whether or 

not there was a definite arrangement between 

England and Germany that the latter country 

wotald have to be invited to join in the treaty. 

I had various other conversations with 

Lord Lansdowne following on the one above, 

and I was quite satisfied that the British 

Government r^arded the proposed alliance 

seriously. 

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Anglo-Japanese Alliance Concluded 137 

On November 6th Lord Lansdowne handed 

me the first draft of the proposed treaty. 

It was as follows: 

"Desirous of maintaining the present state 

of the affairs in the Far East, of preserving 

the general peace, and in especial of pre- 

venting the absorption of Korea by another 

country, and of maintaining the independence 

and territorial int^rity of China and of 

seciuing to every coiuatry equal oDmmercial 

and industrial privileges in China, the Govern- 

ments of the two allied nations have agreed 

upon the following articles: 

"(i) If either of the two nations (Great 

Britain and Japan) shall be engaged in war 

with another foreign country for the object 

of protecting the interests mentioned in the 

foregoing, the allied nation shall maintain 

a strict neutrality and shall endeavour to 

prevent any other nation trom supporting 

the hostile country. 

" (2) If, in the conditions mentioned above, 

another foreign country shall join the enemy 

of the allied nation, then the two allied coun- 

tries shall make common war, and peace 

shall only be concluded with the mutual 

consent of the two allies. 

" (3) The allied nations shall not enter into 

any agreement with another coimtry affect- 

Digi-izedbyGoOglC 

138 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayasbi 

ing the interests of the allies in Korea without 

muttial ojnsent. 

" (4) In the event of Great Britain or Japan 

at any time considering the interests men- 

tioned above as being jeopardized, then the 

Governments of the two countries shall com- 

municate together fully and frankly without 

concealment." 

Lord Lansdowne asked that the Japanese 

Government should most carefully study 

this draft and said that he thought that it 

fully covered all I had said about Japanese 

interests in Korea. 

He then said: "In the Cabinet Coimcil, 

when this draft was discussed, two or three 

members expressed the opinion that Japanese 

interests in Korea are very great, in fact 

much greater than British interests in the 

Yangtse. They felt, therefore, that the 

treaty as it is outlined there would be rather 

one-sided and too much in favotir of Japan. 

They suggest, therefore, that its scope be 

extended so as to bring out Indian interests 

under it. I wotJd like you to consider this 

point and later let me know your opinion 

about it." 

The above draft showed no material differ- 

ence from the substance of my conversations 

with Lord Iiansdowne. There was, however, 

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Anglo-Japanese Alliance Concluded 139 

one very important point about it. It said 

that no foreign country should absorb Korea. 

But it did ?iot say that Great Britain recog- 

nized Japan's paramount interests in Korea, 

and it gave no assurance that Great Britain 

would not interfere with Japan in any action 

she might feel called on to take to protect her 

interests in Korea. 

I felt that this was the whole essence of the 

treaty and mtist be made clear, and if Great 

Britain was Utely to feel embarrassed by 

putting a clear statement in the treaty, then 

it must be covered by a secret treaty. I, 

therefore, telegraphed to Toldo, sending with 

Lord Lansdowne's draft my views on the 

same. 

On November 13th I received the following 

instructions from Tokio: 

"Regarding the draft treaty the Govern- 

ment will communicate its decision as soon 

as reasonably possible. In the meanwhile go 

to Paris and meet Marquis Ito and com- 

municate to him all the telegrams exchanged 

with regard to this matter, and try to get his 

support to the British draft. Tel^ra^ the 

result of your conversation with him imme- 

diately. " 

I must now say something in explanation 

of Marquis Ito's a^^earance in Europe. 

Digi-izedbyGoOglC 

140 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

Some weeks previous to this I had recdved 

a private communication from home stating 

that a Genro (Elder Statesmen) Coimdl had 

been held at the residence of Count Katsura, 

the Premier, presumably in connexion with 

the suggested Russo-Japanese Agreement, and 

it had been proposed that on the occasion 

of Marquis Ito's visit to America he should 

be entrusted to proceed to St. Petersburg 

to conduct the n^otiations to conclude the 

proposed agreement. 

I had learned from newspaper statements 

that the intended visit of Marquis Ito to 

America was for the recovery of his health, 

and to receive the honorary degree of LL.D. 

on the occasion of the hundredth anniversary 

of the foundation of Yale University. 

On receiving the above-mentioned {wivate 

communication I felt that as the Acting 

Minister of Foreign Affairs, Viscount Sone, 

had sent me telegraphic instructions on August 

8th to initiate negotiations for the conclusion 

of an Anglo- Japanese Alliance, there should 

have been no reason for the Premier to contem- 

plate a Russo-Japanese Agreement, or even to 

agree to the contemplation of such an agree- 

ment by others. 

Of course the Russo-Japanese Agreement 

might not be irrecondliable with the Anglo- 

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Anglo-Japanese Alliance Concluded 141 

Japanese Alliance, but as the latter was 

already in couise of negotiation it would be 

most inopportune to negotiate simtUtaneously 

with Russia, inasmuch as such an agreement 

as a Russo-Japanese one ought only to be 

concluded after mutual consideration and 

after the conclusion of the alliance. 

I thought, therefore, that the private com- 

mtmication which I have mentioned really 

only dealt with a rumour. At all events if 

Marqxiis Ito should proceed to St. Petersbtirg 

I might have an opportunity of meeting him 

in Europe first, and as there was no necessity to 

keep the matter secret from him, I could speak 

to him fiilly and frankly of the affairs in con- 

nexion with the negotiations with England. 

I did not, therefore, pay much attention to 

the private communication to which I have 

refeired, but went on with the negotiations 

for the alliance, and steady progress was 

made in the pourparlers. Though I had 

informed the British Government that it was 

my private individual opinions which I was 

presenting, all the proceedings were reported 

to my home Government, and the Foreign 

Minister had asstired me that all my actions 

would be duly approved. Still, I felt that as 

long as the instructions sent me on August 

8th and October 8th were in force, whereby 

Digi-izedbyGoOglC 

142 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

I was empowered to exchange views with the 

British Government, the proposal that Mar- 

quis Ito should visit Russia ought to be sus- 

pended, if he had not already left Japan, or if 

he had already started he ought to be recalled 

from America. If the Government wished to 

conceal the Anglo- Japanese negotiations from 

Russia, some other means should have been 

found not involving such dangers and risks. 

Marquis Ito had just arrived in Paris when 

I received the telegram of November 13th, 

quoted above. He had proceeded directly 

from America to France without coming to 

England, presumably as the result of orders 

to hurry on the negotiations for the Russo- 

Japanese Agreement. 

I had thought that the Marquis should 

preferably pass by England, as otherwise it 

might attract public attention. On the fol- 

lowing day, Uierefore, November 14th, I 

proceeded to Paris and submitted all the 

tel^ams to the Marquis and reported to him 

the details of the negotiations I had been 

carryii^ on with Lord Lansdowne in r^ard 

to the proposed alliance. 

In the various manuscripts of the Memotfi there are two 

difierent versions of the conversations with Marquis Ito in Patia, 

As they differ in important details it is conadered best to pye 

tbem both.— Ed. 

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Anglo-Japanese Alliance Concluded 143 

Version as given by "Jiji Shimpo." 

The following is a summary of the conver- 

sations which I had with Marquis Ito in 

Paris. He told me that before he left Japan he 

had seen Marquis Yamagata, Count Inouye, 

and other Genro, and also the Premier, Count 

Katsura, and the Acting Formgn Minister, 

Viscoimt Sone. In his ojanion it was tinpro- 

fitable for Japan and Rtissia to continue to 

look at each other with "cross eyes" in regard 

to Korea. It was urgent that a compromise 

should be effected, and it was therefore decided 

that Marquis Ito shoidd go from Yale to Rus- 

sia, taking with him M. Tsusuki as his diplo- 

matic assistant, and at St. Petersburg discuss 

the Korean problem. At the time of his 

departure from Japan the Government had 

not considered the n^otiations with England 

as being serious. It did not really believe 

that an Ar^lo- Japanese Alliance was possible. 

The terms on which the Marquis was to 

n^otiate in St. Petersbui^ were as follows: 

Russia was to have a &ee hand in Manchuria 

and Japan to have a free hand in Korea. 

Both Powers were to agree not to establish 

a naval base at Masampo. 

This was as much as it was dared to ask for. 

Whilst I was in Paris Mr. Tsusuki told me 

Digi-izedbyGoOglC 

144 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

that M. Kurino had accepted the post of 

Minister at St. Petersbui^ on condition that 

power was given him to conclude a (X>nvention 

with Russia. 

Marquis Ito was much puzzled at my mis- 

sion to him in Paris. He had had no idea 

that the negotiations with Britain had pro- 

gressed so f^ and he was at a loss to know 

what to do. 

I was in the same dilemma. Here was I 

negotiating with Lord Lansdowne, getting 

out plenipotentiary powers from Tokio to 

n^otiate an alliance, and yet the Govern- 

ment at home had sent Ito to n^otiate a 

convention with Russia. If M. Tsusuki's 

statement with regard to Mr. Kurino was 

true, the matter was even more outrageous. 

I thought that it was most inconsistent of my 

Government to have telegraphed accepting 

my views with regard to an Anglo- Japanese 

Alliance and then to take such steps. 

I therefore telegraphed from Paris to ask 

the Government to reflect on the afiair. The 

answer which I received was as follows: 

'"ITie Government has not changed its 

policy and Kurino has been given no such 

mission." 

When I received this telegram and showed 

it to Marquis Ito he was still more puzzled. 

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Anglo-Japanese Alliance Concluded 145 

The Marquis realized, however, that the 

negotiations with Great Britain had reached 

such a point that the Japanese Government 

cotild not withdraw. So after further discus- 

sion it was arranged that he shoiild support 

the Anglo- Japanese Alliance in prindple, and 

I only gained this point after employing much 

persuasive oratory. It was further agreed 

that he should continue his viat to Rima, 

as his coming had already been announced to 

the Russian Government. 

I agreed not to give any reply to the British 

Government with regard to the draft treaty 

until after I had heard from the Marquis, 

after his arrival in St. Petersbtuig. 

MS. Version. 

The Marquis, discussing my report of the 

n^otiations with Lord Lansdowne, said: 

"It had been my intention to proceed to 

America for a visit, and before starting I met 

Marquis Yamagata and Coimt Inouye at the 

residence of the Prime Minister, Count Kat- 

sura. There were ako present at the meeting 

other persona, including Viscount Sone, the 

Acting Foreign Minister. The three states- 

men, Yamagata, Inouye, and Katsura, said 

that a consultation must be made with Russia 

Digi-izedbyGoOglC 

146 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

as furth^ complications with that country 

would not be endurable. They requested 

me to take the opportimity of my visit to 

America to proceed as far as Russia, and there 

to take such measures as might suit the occa- 

aon. I felt it a nuisance to have to go to 

Europe, but I accepted their request, anyhow, 

without considering much what would be the 

outcome. I am now informed by you of the 

Anglo- Japane^ Alliance n^otiations, which 

have made such progress that withdrawal 

from them is no longer possible. It is con- 

trary to my anticipations." 

That evening, November 14th, the Marquis 

dispatched a tele^am to the Japanese Govern- 

ment, stating that he adhered to the principles 

of the proposed Anglo- Japanese Alliance. 

The next day the Marqus told me that as 

the pourparlers for the Anglo- Japanese Alli- 

ance had made such progress he thought that 

he would rather return to Japan without 

proceeding to Russia, but, on the other hand, 

as preliminary notice had been given to Russia 

of his intended visit, he must go to St. Peters- 

burg. He said, however, that he would 

endeavour to do nothing there which might 

disturb the Anglo- Japanese negotiations. 

M. Tsusuki, who accompanied the Marquis 

as his diplomatic assistant, seemed to favotu- 

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Anglo-Japanese Alliance Concluded 147 

a FrancoRussian- Japanese Alliance or Agree- 

ment. Moreover, he informed me that report 

had it that M. Kurino was to be appointed 

Minister at St. Petersburg, and that as he 

(Kurino) had asserted for a long time that 

he would accept the St. Petersburg post only 

on the condition that he were permitted to 

negotiate a triangular treaty, it must be 

presumed that he had received instructions 

to conclude such a treaty. 

I was very greatly surprised at this news. 

As I have stated, it might be difficult to pre- 

dict which would be the more preferable, a 

Franco-Russian- Japanese Treaty or an Anglo- 

Japanese Treaty, but I for my part was 

confident that the latter would be preferable. 

As according to my instructions I had good 

reason to believe that my Government was 

of the same opinion as myself, I had been 

able to make good progress with the negotia- 

tions in London. Since the td^raphic in- 

structions had been sent to me on October 

8th the British Government, in spite of my 

non-committal declaration of October 16th, 

seemed to have recognized that I had certainly 

been acting under instructions from my home 

Government. 

Whilst the Anglo- Japanese n^otiations had 

on the one hand reached to such a point, one 

Digi-izedbyGoOglC 

148 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

of the Elder Statesmai had been dispatched 

to St. Petersburg with the object of condud-, 

ing an agreement with Russia. Even if it 

were pretended that his visit was only an 

ordinary trip in his private capacity, no one 

in England would believe it. 

Then there was also to be considered the 

statement about M. Kurino, that he was em- 

powered to make a triangular arrangement 

between Japan, Russia, and France. If that 

was true the success of the one policy must 

inevitably lead to a loss of confidence in the 

other. 

After carefully thinking the matter over 

I dispatched a telegram to the Foreign Minis- 

ter on November i8th on the subject, and on 

November 19th received the reply. This 

absolutely denied M. Tsusuki's statement, and 

said that the Government had no intention 

whatsoever of withdrawing in any degree 

from the position it had taken up in r^ard to 

the proposed treaty of alliance with Great 

Britain, and that the instructions given to 

M. Kurino had merely been to endeavour to 

obtain a settlement of Korean afEairs, and 

that similar instructions would be given to 

any Minister who might be accredited to 

Russia. 

[End (rf MS. version.] 

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Anglo-Japanese Alliance Concluded 149 

Later I received a commtmication on the 

subject from M. Kurino, but in it he did not 

appear to recognize the true significance of 

the telegram sent me from Tokio. 

I returned to London on November 19th. 

In spite of the reassuring tel^;rams which 

bad been received by Marquis Ito and myself 

from Tokio, I was still much perturbed over 

the business, especially as Marquis Ito was 

still going on to St. Petorsbiu^. After my 

arrival in London, therefore, I telegraphed 

to the Marquis in the following terms: 

"So long as it is our policy to conclude a 

Russo-Japanese Convention we should adopt 

one or other of the following courses: first, 

conclude the Anglo- Japanese Treaty, then 

notify Britain of oiu* intention to negotiate a 

convention with Russia and proceed to ihe 

conclusion of the convention; or, secondly, so 

long as the Anglo- Japanese negotiations in 

London are in progress, you shall not discuss 

a convention with the Russian statesmen, 

unless they first propose it. In that case 

you must put them off as best you can." 

I felt that it would be most risky to attempt 

to introduce Machiavellian tactics into either 

ttie Anglo- Japanese or Russo-Japanese nego- 

tiations. When Marquis Ito received my 

tel^ram he replied assuring me that he would 

Digi-izedbyGoOglC 

ISO Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

adopt the second of the two courses fonnulated 

by me. 

The day after my return from Paris I saw 

Lord Lansdowne, who asked me for the reply 

of the Japanese Government to the draft of 

November 6th. I had to tell him that I had 

not yet received the reply and he then said 

that there was grave danger in delay, as the 

news of the proposed treaty might leak out 

and obstacles might th«i be raised. 

I said that I would telegraph to Tokio, 

asking them to hasten their reply. 

The Marquis then asked me about Marquis 

Ito's visit to Russia and expressed a wish that 

he shotJd come to England. He appeared 

to be rather annoyed that he had not done so. 

He said that if it was the intuition of the 

Japanese Government to negotiate a conven- 

tion or agreement with Russia whilst the ne- 

gotiations with Great Britain were in prc^;ress 

the British Government would be very angry. 

I replied that an alliance was quite a new 

departiue in Japanese policy, and therefore 

it was necessary to study the proposal very 

carefully. That was the reason for the delay 

which had occurred, and as for the visit of 

Marquis Ito to Russia, that had no special 

meaning at all. I said that the Marqms 

could not come to London in November, 

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Anglo-Japanese Alliance Concluded 151 

because in that month the London climate 

was at its worst, and fogs were general, and 

would prejudice Marquis Ito's health, which 

was not good. 

Lord Lansdowne evidently did not think 

very much of my explanation. He knew 

quite well that Marqms Ito had travelled 

across the Atlantic from America to France. 

He (Ito) had given out that he was travelling 

for his health. Why, if he was travelling 

for his health, did he go to St. Petersburg in 

the winter? The British Foreign Minister 

was very dissatisfied with my explanation 

of the Marquis's movements. 

After I had left Lord Lansdowne I met 

Mr. Bertie, the Under-Secretary of State, 

who was much more outspokoi and came 

immediately to the point. He asked me 

straight out if Marquis Ito had any intention 

of trying to negotiate an agreement with 

Russia, and when I denied this he said: 

" If the news of our n^[otiations with you 

were to leak out and come to Russian ears, 

Russia would most certainly try to make an 

agreement with you, and perhaps offer you 

what at first ^ght would appear to be more 

advantf^eous terms. But," he added, "you 

could not rely on those terms, for Russia 

would certainly repudiate them whenever 

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152 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

it a{q>eared to suit her." I said that I thought 

that this was very probable. "Well," said 

Mr. Bertie, "I want to warn you to be very 

careful." I promised that I woxild be. 

It was, of course, very natural for Lord 

Lansdowne, Mr. Bertie, and others to talk 

in this manner, and it was just because I 

knew the state of mind of these men that I 

had telegraphed to Marquis Ito the day be- 

fore to be sure not to make any n^otiations 

with Russia, when he should arrive at St. 

Petersburg. I was strongly convinced, from 

the mere fact of my being approached with 

conversations of the above tenor immediately 

on my return from Paris, that the British 

Government was closely watching the move- 

ments of Marquis Ito in Europe. 

After my return from the Foreign Office 

I tel^;raphed to Tokio, stating what were 

the conditions in England and reporting my 

conversations with Lord Lansdowne and Mr. 

Bertie, and I strongly advised the Japanese 

Government to proceed with the negotiations 

with Great Britain, and to drop all idea of a 

convention with Russia imtil after the con- 

clusion of the treaty of alliance. I also sent 

a copy c^ this telegram to Marquis Ito, in 

order that he might be warned to be very 

careful to confine his conversations with the 

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Anglo-Japanese Alliance Concluded 153 

Russian statesmen to ordinary topics, and 

leave Rtissia as soon as possible. 

Marquis Ito telegraphed to me in reply 

that he fully recognized the necessity of pro- 

ceeding with the Anglo-Japanese n^otiations, 

and that he would be most careful not to 

touch upon any vital issues in the conversa- 

tions which he might have with the Russian 

authorities. 

I also received a telegram from my Govern- 

ment saying'that the Japanese Government 

had no intention of playing a double game as 

between Britain and Russia, and definitely 

stating t^t Marquis Ito had no o£Gcial mis- 

sion in St. Petersbiug, which information I 

was instructed to give to Lord Lansdowne, if 

the matter came up again in the conversa- 

tions between us. The telegram concluded 

with the statement that the Foreign Minister 

was sick and tmable to deal with aSairs of 

State for the moment, but the Government's 

reply to the draft agreement would be seat 

as soon as possible. 

Both these pieces of information I conveyed 

to Lord Lansdowne, and he expressed his 

satisfaction that Marquis Ito's visit to Russia 

was not an official one. 

On November 30th the Tokio Government 

sent me by telegraph the following amend- 

Digi-izedbyGoOglC 

154 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

ments to the draft of the treaty which Lord 

Lansdowne had handed me on Novembo: 

6th. 

In the preamble it was proposed that the 

words "Far East," should be changed into 

"Extreme East," and the words "China" 

and "Korea" into "Chinese Empire" and 

"Korean Empire" respectively, whilst the 

words "or any part thereof being occupied" 

were to be inserted after the words " absorp- 

tion of Korea." 

In the second artide, "another country" 

was to be changed into "one or more foreign 

coimtries." 

In the third article, " affecting the interests " 

should be changed into "jeopardizing the 

interest." 

The following was to be added as a fifth 

article; "The alliance shall continue for five 

years trom the day of signature, and if the 

high contracting parties so desire it may be 

ftirther continued thereafter. In case the 

term of the alliance shall expire during a war, 

then the alliance shall be continued in force 

until peace ^all have been restored." 

The following was to be added as a special 

inovi^on : ' ' Great Britain shall recognize 

Japan's right to take the necessary steps for 

the protection of her interests in Korea." 

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Anglo-Japanese Alliance Concluded 155 

Together with the forgoing amendments 

my tdegraphic instructions from Tokio read: 

"TTie Government has presented the pro- 

posed amendments before the Throne; His 

Majesty the Emperor referred them to the 

Elder Statesmen remaining at this time in 

Tokio for their opinion on them; His Majesty 

also asked for the opinion of Marquis Ito 

now in Europe. You shall attend to this 

matter over there. But in order to keep the 

amendments absolutely secret, you shall send 

a member of the L^ation staff to St. Peters- 

burg, and he shall take to Marquis Ito a copy 

of the amendments in cipher, and this shall 

be deciphered only after his arrival in St. 

Petersbm^. He shall give the amendments 

to Marquis Ito for his advice on them." 

Almost immediately after I had received 

this tei^;ram came another informing me 

that Count Komura had given the following 

note to the British Minister at Tokio, Sir 

Qaude MacDonald: 

" TTie Japanese Cabinet, after making slight 

amendments in the original draft of the treaty 

as proposed by the British Government, has 

decided to accept that draft. The nature 

of the amendments is such as we believe that 

the British Government will not object to 

accept. The Cabinet, before dispatching the 

Digi-izedbyGoOglC 

156 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

amendments to London, had presented them 

before the llirone." 

Obedient to my instructions I sent M. 

Matsui,' Secretary of the Legation at London, 

to Russia to Marquis Ito. M. Matsui arrived 

in St. Petersburg on December 3d, and having 

deciphered them showed all the telegrams to 

Marquis Ito. The latter did not at that time 

make any particular comment on the amend- 

ments, but it was stated to me afterwards 

that he was very pleased indeed with the 

tel^jam in which it was stated that his 

Majesty had asked for his advice. 

Marquis Ito thought that it was rather 

hasty of Count Komura to have commimicated 

with Sir Claude MacDonald with regard to 

the amendments, and he was rather displeased 

about this. He told M. Matsui that he would 

study the amendments very carrfully, and 

let him know his opinion on them when he 

should arrive in Berlin from St. Petersburg. 

He then asked M. Matsui whether he knew 

that there was a telegram from Count Inouye. 

M. Matsui replied that he had not heard 

of such a telegram in London. Marquis Ito 

then showed M. Matsui a telegram from Count 

Inouye to the Marquis in which he advised 

the latter to make a careful study of the rela- 

■ ^noe-MiiuBteT of Foreign AOatis, 1913. — Ed. 

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Anglo-Japanese Alliance Concluded 157 

tions between Germany and Russia before he 

should send home any opinion about the 

Government's proposed amendments. 

Before the Marquis left the Russian capital 

he applied for an interview with Count Lams- 

dorff, and this he received on December 4th. 

That same night he left Russia for Berlin. 

M. Matsui, so as not to attract attention, 

left St. Petersbui^ one day later and rejoined 

the Marquis in Berlin. He remained in 

Berlin with the Marquis for three days and 

returned to London on December iith. 

In Berlin M. Matsui heard for the first 

time of the objections which Marquis Ito 

had not only to the amendments but also to 

the alliance itself. They were as follows: 

"In both the British draft and also in the 

Japanese amendments to it," said the Marqtds, 

"there are words to the effect that the absorp- 

tion of Korea by a foreign country shall be 

prevented. But' in Korea only Japan and 

Russia have interests of any importance. 

England has no int^'ests there. In regard to 

Korea the proper thing to do is to make a 

convention with Riissia, and settle the pro- 

blem of that country. Even if we make an 

alliance with England it is not certain that 

we shall reap much benefit from it. 

"Besides this, according to the draft, Eng- 

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158 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

land will attain the same position in Korea 

as Japan has already. It really means giving 

to England a position in that country which 

she has not now got. From this point of 

view I consider that the proposal is mireason- 

able. 

"Again, evea if we have another country 

ioining in the alliance, as Germany, we shall 

only be giving to that country the same as we 

are giving to England. That country also 

will obtain a new position in Korea which she 

had not got before. Consequently the pro- 

posed instnunent would be doubly bad. 

"The Japanese Govenunent certainly ought 

to malK some proper amendments with regard 

to all that touches Korea. The Government 

at Tokio may have been led to propose such 

hasty amendments by promptings of the 

British Government, but nevertheless such a 

serious matter ought not to be concluded 

without very careful consideration. We ought 

also to study carefully the whole question 

of the intonational relations between the 

European nations. Count Inouye's telegram 

shows that whilst all the members of the 

Cabinet have agreed, he hin^elf has not 

hastily thrown himself on the side of the 

proposed alliance. According to his opinion, 

first, it is difficult to trndo'stand why England 

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Anglo-Japanese Alliance Concluded 159 

has broken her record in foreign politics and 

has decided to enter into an alliance with us; 

secondly, the mere fact that England has 

adopted this attitude shows that she is in 

dire need, and she therefore wants to use us 

in order to niake us bear some of her biu^ens ; 

thirdly, Germany in Count Inouye's view 

may not enter the alliance. It is for these 

reasons that the Count has telegraphed to me 

a^ng me to reconsider the relations between 

the European Powers and only then to form 

my opinions. 

"Now, my views ccandde with Count 

Inouye's, and I have therefore tel^:raphed 

home to the Cotmt that such a serious matter 

as the Anglo- Japanese Alhance should not be 

decided hastily, and also I have telegraphed 

my c^inions on the proposed amendments, 

just as I have expressed them to you, M. 

Matsui. 

"Now," continued the Marquis, "what we 

ought to pay special attention to in connexion 

with this problem is, in my opinion, the atti- 

tude of Russia. I think that all negotiations 

for an Anglo- Japanrae Alliance ought to be 

suspended until we are quite sure that it is 

hopeless to attempt to conclude a convention 

with Russia. 

"I am convinced from what I have seen 

^yGooglc 

i6o Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

and heard in the Rtissian capital that the 

attitude of that country is at least rather 

condliatory towards Japan, and it appears 

to me that she is sincerely desirous of co- 

<q}erating with us to settle the Korean question. 

Count Witte, the very day after I arrived in 

St. Petersburg, came to call on me, and pro- 

posed to me to discuss Far Eastern affairs 

with an open heart. Count Lamsdorff was 

also very polite to me, but especially I was 

struck by the words used by the Emperor 

in the audience which he graciously granted 

to me. At the very beginning he spoke of 

the tirgent necessity of Russia and Japan 

working harmoniously together, and he said 

that it was his wish that some sort of an 

agreement should be arrived at between the 

two cotmtries. 

"I met Count Witte again after the first 

interview, of which I told you. He then 

spoke in the characteristic diplomatic manner 

repeating the stereotyped declaration that 

Russia and Japan should work harmoniously 

together. 

"I, however, cut him short and told ^^im 

that vague generalities would not help matters, 

for the crux of the situation between the two 

countries lay in Korea. I said that if both 

countries were going on struggling for supre- 

Digi-izedbyGoOglC 

Anglo-Japanese Alliance Concluded i6i 

macy in Korea the inevitable result must be 

friction. I said to him: 'If your country 

really wishes to work harmoniously with 

Japan you must give us a free hand in Korea, 

commercially, industrially, and politically. 

And more than that, if civil war breaks out 

in Korea we must have the right to send our 

troops over there to restore order. Without 

that there can be no question of Russia and 

Japan working in harmony. ' 

"Count Witte agreed with my views alto- 

gether. He said to me that Russia would 

recc^tnize our privilege of sending troops to 

Korea, and would give us freedom of action 

in that country. But he said that if Russia 

did that then Japan must undertake not to 

maintain large forces in Korea, which would 

amount to an occupation of the coimtry. 

"When I met Cotmt Lamsdorfi I spoke 

about the same subject. He was not so well 

disposed to my views as Count Witte had 

shown himself. He said that what I wanted 

virtually amounted to a protectorate over 

Korea, from which Japan would gain every- 

tbiag and Russia nothing. He agreed, how- 

ever, to consult his colleagues on the matter 

and promised to send his reply to me at Berlin. 

"In addition to these conversations," Mar- 

quis Ito continued to M. Matsui, "Z have 

Digi-izedbyGoOglC 

i62 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

made an arrangement to commimicate pri- 

vately both with Cotmt I^amsdorff and Count 

^tte, and to write to them on the matter 

from time to time. As the result, therefore, 

of my informal conversations in St. Peters- 

bm^ we are in a position to commence formal 

negotiations with the Russian Government 

through the Japanese Minister at St. Peters- 

burg, and this we can now do at any time. 

That is the situation in regard to Russia at 

this moment, and in my opinion the prospects 

of our being able to make a satisfactory 

convention with Russia are very favourable. 

"I think that the time is premature fco" 

making a co-operative agreement with Eng- 

land. I have, therefore, telegraphed in this 

sense to both Count Inouye and to Count 

Katsura, giving them full details of my con- 

versations with the Emperor and the Rusaan 

statesmen. Why, in the Council of Elder 

Statesmen before the Throne on December 

7th, it has been unanimously decided in favour 

of an Anglo- Japanese Alliance I do not know. 

But perhaps my telegram had not arrived in 

time. Anyhow, please convey my views to 

Baron Hayashi and tell him that I want him 

to let me know what he thinks before he 

presents the Japanese amendments to the 

British Government." 

Digi-izedbyGoOglC 

Anglo-Japanese Alliance Concluded 163 

The foregoing is a summaiy of what Mar- 

quis Ito said to M. Matsui and what M. 

Matsui reported to me. 

In the telegram of August 8th sent me by 

the then Acting Foreign Minister, Viscount 

Sone, it was stated that the Government had 

decided favourably with regard to the British 

proposal for a treaty. I had ^ce been in- 

formed that this sentence had been inserted 

at the express request of Marqius Ito. And 

when I saw the latter in Paris he had in prin- 

ciple approved the Anglo- Japanese Treaty, 

and had prconised to confine his conversation 

in St. Petersburg to generalities. He had 

again repeated this promise in his telegram 

to me after my return from Paris, and again 

in his reply to my telegram reporting Lord 

Lansdowne's stispidons with regard to his 

visit to Russia. Yet, in spite of all these 

promises, as soon as ever he met the Russian 

statesmen he had plunged into conversations 

on the most delicate of matters. It was 

indeed most inconsistent of him. Just where 

his mind really dwelt it is impossible to say. 

I coxild not comprehend his views on the 

Japanese Government's amendments to the 

draft treaty, which he had tel^raphed to 

Tokio and which were sent to me. 

I came to the conclusion that they con- 

Digi-izedbyGoOglC 

i64 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

tained nothing which should affect the desira- 

bility of the alliance, and that the Govern- 

ment, also taking that view, had passed them 

by. 

The. truth with regard to the Marquis was 

that he just changed his mind, which was not 

uncommon for him. In Tokio he was amongst 

persons of conflicting views, some for and 

some against the alliance. When he saw me 

in Paris I had persuaded him to my view. 

When he got to St. Petersburg the statesmen 

told him in diplomatic language how easily 

the Korean question could be settled if he 

had charge of the negotiations, and so he 

changed his mind again. Perhaps he is not 

so much to be blamed. 

I was even more puzzled about Coimt 

Inouye's telegram to the Marquis to study 

German-Russian affairs. As far as I could 

see it had nothing to do with the matter, 

nothing on earth. It raised from the very 

beginning the whole question of the general 

advisability of the alliance, and the time for 

considering the broad general desirability 

of the alliance was long past. So worried 

was I at Marquis Ito's attitude that I tele- 

graphed a statement of the whole matter to 

Cotmt Komura, the Foreign Minister. 

Before, however, my tel^ram was received 

Digi-izedbyGoOglC 

Anglo-Japanese Alliance Concluded 165 

or even dispatched the Government had 

ab-eady obtained the consent of the Elder 

Statesmen, assembled in Coimdl («. e., Council 

before the Throne on December 7th'), and on 

December lOth Count Komura had tele- 

■At tbe tim« <^ tii« public&tkm of Qm summary of these 

Memoirs, by Reuter's A^ocy, the foUowing note was attached: 

In connection with the Council before the Throne on December 

7th, Reuter's Tokio correspondent recently heard from an authen- 

tic source an account of that Council. 

His informant said: "Ito in Europe and Inouye in Tokio had 

been worldnf! hard for a Russo-Japanese agreement. Ito wrb 

dispatching furious tel^^rams daily to the Government and to 

Inouye on the matter. Finally a Council before the Throne was to 

be held to decide the question. 

"Tbe Cabinet were atl in favour of supportinK Hayashi in 

London, and indeed so strong was the sentiment that both 

Eatsnra and_Eoii)ura informed their colleagues that in the event 

of the Emperor deciding against them and in favour of Ito they 

would refflgn office. 

"At the Council, reporla were submitted to his Majea^ with 

i^ard to the Anglo- Japanese negotiations and then with r^ard 

to Ito's Rusaan negotiations. After reading them and studying 

them His Majesty turned to a Secretary and said: 'Go to the 

Imperial Cabinet and get Marquis Ito's report on a proposed 

Anglo-Japanese Alliance when he was Prime Minister.' When 

the report was brought the Emperor looked through it, and then 

turning to the Council Eoid: 'In this report Marquis Ito, when 

Prime Minister, most strongly advised that an Alliance be made 

with Great Britain, and nothing has happened to change the 

situation during the last few months,' The Mikado then ordered 

Komura to instruct Hayashi to go ahead with the negotiations 

and then to telegraph to Ito to stop all negotiations with Russia. 

"The Cabinet were really against Ito's proposals from the 

very bqiinning, but were willing to use him as a lever on England 

in order to hasten the negotiations; besides this, Ito and Inouye 

were far too powerful to be estopped from thdr attitude by 

anything }^v^ f^fin an Imperial command. " — En^ 

D„.;„.db,G00glc 

i66 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

graphed to me instructing me to present the 

amendments to Lord Lansdowne. At the 

same time I received a further telegraphic 

^planation of the amendments. 

Marquis Ito having asked me to communi- 

cate with him before presenting the amend- 

ments, I communicated with him, and at the 

same time telegraphed as stated above to 

Count Komura, also asking the Government's 

views on Marquis Ito's representations. 

The answer which I got from Count Komura 

was as follows: 

"TTie instructions which you have received 

to present the amendments to the British 

Government were sent to you after a consulta- 

tion of the Cabinet with the Elder Statesmen, 

and after careftil consideration of Marquis 

Ito's views, and with the sanction of the 

Emperor. You will therefore fulfil your in- 

structions immediately." 

The meaning of this telegram was very 

clear to me. It signified that the Cabinet 

and the Elder Statesmen had totally rejected 

Marquis Ito's opinions and that the Anglo- 

Japanese Alliance was to be carried through, 

and I was of course very pleased. 

I therefore went to the Foreign Office on 

the next day, December 12th, and presented 

the amendments to Lord Lansdowne, and 

Digi-izedbyGoOglC 

Anglo-Japanese Alliance Concluded 167 

also explained to him the reasons of eadi 

amendment. On December i6th I met the 

British Foreign Minister again, and on Jan- 

uary 30, 1902, the treaty was signed. 

In this manner the opposition of Marquis 

Ito to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance came to 

nothing, although even after his return to 

Japan he had hopes of the conclusion of a 

Russo-Japanese Treaty or Convention, as he 

had suggested in his conversations in St. 

Petersburg. 

On December 12th, after he had received my 

telegram, saying that I was ordered to present 

the amendments, he realized that his opinions 

had been rejected by the Emperor, for he 

telegraphed to Prince Katsura as follows: 

"My proposals appear to have been re- 

jected. I can now only hope that room will 

be left for the speedy conclusion of a Russo- 

Japanese Convention with regard to Korea. 

I hope that you will keep the treaty of alliance 

with Great Britain in strict secrecy. Should 

that instrument be published it would create 

a very bad impression amongst the continental 

nations." 

Now I shall teU a Uttle about the n^otia- 

tions between Lord Lansdowne and myself, 

after I had handed him the amendments to 

the draft treaty. 

Digi-izedbyGoOglC 

i68 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

It would only be confusing to follow the 

proceedings chronologically, and it might be 

difficult to make quite dear the views of the 

two Govermnents if I proceeded by dates. I 

shall, therefore, take the completed tert of 

the Treaty and shall tell you about the articles, 

taking each in turn.* 

In the text of the draft treaty of Novem- 

ber 6th is the following: "Desirous of main- 

taioing the present state of affairs in the Far 

East, of preserving the general peace, and 

in especial of [^eventing the absorption of 

Korea by a foreign country, and of maintain- 

ing the independence and territorial integrity 

of China and of securing to every country 

equal commercial and industrial opportunities 

in China, etc." 

Now the cardinal principle of the alliance 

had been declared by both Japan and Great 

Britain to be that outlined in the above, and 

there had been no question raised on that 

principle during the negotiations. But in 

the wording of the above there was a very 

slight difference of opinion. In the original 

draft of the British Government there was the 

phrase about wishing to preserve Korea from 

being abscarbed by a foreign Power. But 

this referred <mly to the possible occupation 

'AivntdizB. 

Digi-izedbyGoOglC 

Anglo-Japanese Alliance Concluded 169 

of the whole country, and so the Japanese 

Government, wishing to cover the eventuality 

that a portion of the country might be occu- 

pied on some pretext or other, asked that 

words to that eflfect should be inserted, as I 

related in telling of the first amendments sent 

from Toldo. 

Then in the British drafts stood the words 

"China" and "Korea," which we asked to 

be changed into Chinese Empire and Korean 

Empire respectively, so as to cover the whole 

territories of each Empire. 

The British Government made no objecticm 

to these alterations, but as the original word- 

ing, "to prevent the absorption of Korea by 

a foreign Power" and "to maintain the in- 

dependence and the territorial int^^ity of 

China," made some discrimination between 

the two countries, the British Government 

in January, 1902, presented ms with a new 

draft, containing amendments with regard to 

these points, and we accepted their amend- 

Artide I. of the treaty said: "Japan has 

special interests in Korea, politically, com- 

mercially, and industrially," as pr(^)Osed by 

the British Government. But we wanted 

Great Britain to give us a free hand in Korea, 

and therefore when we presented the first 

Digi-izedbyGoOglC 

170 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

amendments in December we inserted, as a 

separate provision : " Great Britain recog- 

nizes Japan's privileges in Korea," as I have 

told you. We considered this recognition 

to be most important. Indeed, it was for 

us the most important thing in the Treaty. 

The discussion of this amendment took up 

most of the time of the negotiations. 

On December i6th I saw Lord Lansdowne 

with regard to the amendments, and the 

following conversation took place. 

Lord Lansdowne said: "This is a very diflB- 

cult matter, because if we put in your special 

provision which you want to cover Japan's 

interests in Korea, it would mean that Japan 

would be virtually given a free hand in that 

country. You know that would mean friction 

with Rus^a and possibly end in a war between 

all the Powers." 

I replied that it was unthinkable that 

Japan would lightly engage in an armed 

confiict with Russia. If we were to lose it, 

then we should find it no easy task to recover 

from the losses which such a stru^le would 

inflict. We wanted the British Government 

to trust to the common sense of the Japanese. 

Besides, according to the new draft a party 

to the alliance is not called on to help the 

other party unless a second or third party 

Digi-izedbyGoOglC 

Anglo-Japanese Alliance Concluded 171 

should attack the ally. Even if Japan and 

Russia should engage in war we thought that 

it would be a little far-fetched to believe that 

it would lead to a general conflagration. 

To this Lord Lansdowne said: "Well, sui>- 

pose now that we put it that Japan pledges 

herself to consult Great Britain with r^ard 

to any action she may take in Korea?" 

I said at once that this would be quite 

impossible. "Rtxssia," I said, "acts spas- 

modically and it is quite impossible to foresee 

or know beforehand what she is going to do 

next. We, too, should have to act promptly, 

in order to be able to meet any emergency 

which might arise. If we had to consult you 

each time there was necessity of action, de- 

lays would ensue and the opportunity to do 

something effective might be lost. For ex- 

ample, a few years ago Russia tried to lease 

a strip of land at Masampo. We, however, 

beat Rtissia in the matter and leased that 

strip of land ourselves so that Russia could 

not have it. The same thing might happen 

again, and time would be the essence of 

Lord Lansdowne said that he was afraid 

there would be criticism of the sphere of 

influence of the alliance, for England would 

gain much less under it than Japan would. 

Digi-izedbyGoOglC 

172 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

He said that the interests of England along 

the Yangtse were far less important than 

those of Japan and Korea. 

I replied to this: "I do not agree to that. 

In the amount of trade done and also in the 

area of territory affected the interests of Great 

Britain are far greater. Besides, those dis- 

tricts are to-day at peace, but danger lies 

dormant there, and it should by no means 

be underestimated. If the present viceroys 

should be removed or die there might easily 

occur along the Yangtse a greater rebellion 

than that of the Boxers. In that case the 

alliance with Japan would be of inestimable 

value to Great Britain." 

Lord Lansdowne said that he would con- 

sult about it and let me know at otu* next 

meeting. 

When I left Lord Lansdowne I telegraphed 

this conversation to Tokio, for I felt very 

doubtful of what the British Cabinet might 

think about the proposal. I suggested that 

our Government should send the British 

Government some definite assurance that we 

did not want a free hand in Korea as a basis 

for future aggression. 

On December 19th, just before the meeting 

of the Cabinet at which the matter was to be 

discussed, I received the following assurance 

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Anglo-Japanese Alliance Concluded 173 

with instructions to hand it immediately to 

Lord Lansdowne: 

"Even if Japan should have free action in 

Korea, the British Government may rest 

assined that the Japanese Government has 

no intention of using that freedom as a means 

of aggression. Until now Japan's policy in 

Korea has not only not been aggressive, but 

has been peaceful. The Japanese Govern- 

ment wishes to point out, however, that dis- 

turbances in Korea are liable to occur with 

great suddenness, and in consequence it would 

be necessary for Japan, in defence of her 

interests, to act equally promptly. Whilst 

the Japanese Government has every desire 

to consult with Great Britain it would not be 

altogether possible to do so, owing to the 

resultant loss of time, whilst communications 

were being exchanged. Japan realizes her 

responsibihties towards Korea, and her policy 

towards that country will be in strict con- 

formity with the Nishi-Rosen Convention." 

Using this assurance as a basis, I at once 

wrote a memorandtun to Lord Lansdowne 

on the subject, and sent it over to him. He 

actually received it whilst at the Cabinet 

meeting. 

When I saw him afterwards, however, he 

said that there was still objection to the special 

Digi-izedbyGoOglC 

174 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

provision which we had proposed. He said 

that the wording of it was not su£5ciently 

clear, and some members of the Cabinet con- 

sidered that the wording might be construed 

as meaning that Great Britain was assisting 

Japan in aggression on Korea. He suggested 

that it might be better to insert some suitable 

words in the preamble and drop the special 

provision altogether. 

I telegraphed home about this, but our 

Government thought that it might be difficult 

to get the matter covered in the preamble and 

telegraphed to me: 

"Instead of putting the provision in the 

preamble, which may be awkward, surest 

to the British Government that there be an 

exdiange of diplomatic notes, wherein it shall 

be declared that neither Japan nor Great 

Britain have any ambitions or designs on 

Korea, but that Great Britain recognizes the 

privilege of Japan to take the necessary steps 

in order to protect and promote her interests 

in Korea." 

I communicated this proposal to Lord haxts- 

downe, but he did not care for it, and he 

made a coimter-imsposal by means of an 

altogether new draft, which was communi- 

cated to me on January 14th, and which I at 

once telegraphed to Toldo. 

Digi-izedbyGoOglC 

Anglo-Japanese Alliance Concluded 175 

Text of the Second British Draft. 

"Great Britain and Japan, desiring the 

present status maintained in the Extreme 

East, and considering that it is imperative 

to preserve the independence and territorial 

integrity of the Chinese Empire and of the 

Korean Empire, and to permit every nation 

to have equal opportunity in commerce and 

industry in China and Korea, hereby agree 

together as follows: 

"Article I. Great Britain and Japan both 

reo^nize the independence of the Chinese 

Empire and of the Korean Empire, and declare 

that they have not any aggressive tendencies 

in those countries, jMovided, however, that 

since the Japanese Government has called 

the attention of the British Government to 

Japan's ^wdal commercial as well as political 

interests in Korea, and the British Govern- 

ment has drawn the attention of the Japanese 

Government to Great Britain's special inter- 

ests in China, in the case of those interests 

being jeopardized by other nations or when- 

ever there is danger of invasion by a foreign 

country, then the two nations shall have the 

privilege of taking the necessary steps for the 

protection of those interests. 

"Article II. If Great Britain or Japan 

Digi-izedbyGoOglC 

176 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

shall engage in war for the protection of Uie 

interests mentioned in the foregoing article, 

the other ally shall keep a strict neutrality 

and shall try to prevent any other nation 

bora joining tiie enemy. 

"Article III. la case the foregoing situa- 

tion arises and another nation shotild join 

the enemy, then the other ally shall imme- 

diately help its ally in war, and peace shall 

be concluded only by mutual agreement. 

"Article IV. The allies mutually agree 

not to conclude any agreement with any other 

nation, which might prejudice the mutual 

interests of the allies, without consultation 

between them. 

"Article V. Whenever Great Britain or 

Japan shall deem that the above-mentioned 

interests are jeopardized, then they shall 

freely and fraiJdy without reserve communi- 

cate with each other. 

"Article VI. This treaty shall be effective 

immediately after its signature, and shall 

continue in force for a period of five years. 

"If neither of the allies should inform the 

other twelve months before the expiration 

oi tiie treaty of its desire to cancel lie same 

on its expiration, then the treaty shall remain 

in force for twelve months from the day of 

expiration, provided, however, that if the 

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Anglo-Japanese Alliance Concluded 177 

oEfMiation shotild occur during a war then 

the treaty shall remain in force until after 

peace be restored. 

"Duly empowered by our respective Gov- 

ernments, we hereby attach our signattire 

and seal to this declaration."^ 

When Lord Lansdowne handed me the 

second draft he said: "This draft has been 

prepared in order to prevent any attack in 

Parliament on the Cabinet on the ground 

that the preservation of the territorial in- 

te^ty of China and the prevention of the 

absorption of Korea are two things which 

cannot be considered as of equal impcntance. 

In addition to this, the actual puixwrt of the 

notes you have handed me at various times 

embodying the views of the Japanese Govern- 

ment, has been embodied in these articles. 

I hope, therefore, that your Govemttnent will 

^ree to thi draft. With regard to the 

signature and publication of the treaty we 

propose to make a public announcement 

after consultation with the Japanese Govern- 

ment. I may add that various members of 

■ It has to be remembered that the drafts given in thia volume 

piobabl; differ from the ofBdal drafts at the Foreign OfBce in 

woidlag, owing to their being translated from the Japanese. As, 

bovever. Count Hayoshi declares that they are based on the 

offidal records, there can be no reasonable doubt of their sub- 

■tantial accuracy as rt^iards tenor. — Bd. 

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178 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

the Cabinet raised objections to l^e special 

provision in Artide I., and I hope you will 

give me credit for having got it put in." 

When I received this draft I thought that 

it embodied all the concessions which the 

British Government was likely to make, and 

as it contained all the points raised by my 

Government, I expected that the Japanese 

Government would agree to it. I, therefore, 

immediately telegraphed it to Tokio and 

asked for the Government's approval. 

To my siuTJrise, however, my Government 

sent me tiie following protest: 

' ' Everything in the new draft is satisfactory 

except Article I. According to the wording 

in that article, 'Japanese Government . . . 

in Korea' and 'British Government . . . 

in China,' it appears as though Japan is to 

abandon her interests in Qiina. Delete, 

therefore, the sentence after 'the Japanese 

Government' and substitute the following: 

' Taking into consideration the fact that Japan 

has special poUtical and commercial interests 

in Korea, and also the fact that Great Britain 

and Japan have special interests in China, 

the British and Japanese Governments allow 

each other to take the necessary steps to 

protect the interests of each, in case there is 

any danger of those interests being jeopard- 

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Anglo-Japanese Alliance Concluded 179 

ized.' In e:q)laimng the reason of the 

amendment to the British Government you 

will say that Japan has at least as many 

interests in China as Great Britain has, and 

you should remember that the Japanese 

Govranment cannot agree to any clause or 

article setting aside Japanese interests in 

China." 

I showed this amendment to Lord Lans- 

downe and e3q)lained to him what my Gov- 

ernment had telegraphed about Japanese 

interests in China. 

The Marquis said: "That is of course true, 

but we want to make it as unnoticeable as 

possible, as otherwise the treaty may meet 

with opposition in Parliament. We shall 

have to consult further about the point." 

The Marquis then continued: "According 

to the Japanese amendment the phrase 'when- 

ever there is danger of invasion by a foreign 

country ' is deleted. This phrase was inserted 

by Lord Salisbury with the special object of 

preventing Great Britain from being dragged 

into the maelstrom in case of Japan, on ac- 

count of an aggressive policy in Korea, being 

involved in war with a foreign country. It 

was approved by the Cabinet, and if we try 

to alter it now, it might prove very difficult 

to secure the approval of the Cabinet." 

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i8o Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

I refuted this argument by saying that 

there was sufficient safeguard against it in 

the first words of Article I., by which both 

nations denied having any aggressive inten- 

tions. 

Still the Marqtus would not agree. He 

said: "If the words at the beginning of Article 

I. really and truly express the desires of the 

Japanese Government, then I think that the 

Japanese Government ought not to raise any 

difficulties with regard to the insertion of the 

words desired by the British Cabinet. I will 

be very pleased if you will inform the Japanese 

Government of our view and obtain thar 

opinion about it before the next meeting of 

the British Cabinet." 

I telegraphed to Tokio exactly what the 

Briti^ Foreign Minister had said and re- 

ceived the following reply: 

"The reason why the phrase r^arding 

the danger of invasion by a foreign country 

has been struck out is because we are appre- 

hensive of the interests of Great Britain and 

Japan being trampled on in the event of in- 

ternal distturbances in China and Korea. In 

that case we are boimd to conader the atua- 

tion created as being the same as if our interests 

were attacked by a foreign country. If, 

however, the British Government is willing 

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Anglo-Japanese Alliance Concluded iSi 

to agree to the inserdon of a phrase covering 

the possibility of internal d^urbances, we 

shall be able to agree to the phrase about 

danger of invasion." 

I at once conveyed the sense of this instruc- 

tion to Lord Lansdowne. He said that there 

would still be a good deal of opposition in the 

Cabinet to a phrase covering internal disturb- 

ances, for such a phrase might be taken to 

signify interference with the internal affairs 

of an independent country, which was an 

attitude entirely foreign to British policy and 

interests. 

I said, however, that China and Kcoea 

could hardly be considered as being in the 

same category with other countries, and 

history had shown that internal disttubances 

were a frequent and peculiar condition of 

those countries. I narrated to Marquis Lans- 

downe the numerous instances of revolution 

in Korea in the 15th and i6th years of Meiji 

(1882-3) and the instances of trouble in Qiina 

from the time of Timg Shue Tong ri^t down 

to the Boxer Rebellion. 

I said to Lord Lansdowne: "These dis- 

turbances may occur at any moment, and if 

Great Britain and Japan are going to make 

an alliance we might as well arrange in it for 

all eventualities." I pdnted out, too, that 

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i82 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

though the words in the draft, "invasion by 

a foreign country," appeared to be quite 

plain, yet in practice tJiey wotdd not prove 

to be so, and it might be very difficult to 

decide whether a certain action by a foreign 

cottntry was or was not invasion. I said: 

" Consider the ancient histories, wherein there 

are many instances in which nations at war 

call the enemy invaders, yet the onlookers 

could not reaUy teU, as we say, 'which crow 

was male, and which female,* and only his- 

torians, hundreds of years afterwards, have 

been able to decide which combatant was 

really the invader. I think that if we do not 

make some sudi provision as that suggested 

we may not be able to accomplish the funda- 

mental object of the alliance." 

Nevertheless the Marquis was still obdurate 

and replied that he would carefully conader 

the matter. He showed me his private draft 

of the amendment, and said that he would 

send me another draft after he had consulted 

with Lord Salisbiuy. 

On January 24, 1902, he sent me another 

draft, which had been approved at the Cabinet 

meeting on that day. In the new draft the 

amended passage read as follows: 

"Whenever there is danger that these in- 

terests are jeopardized by other nations or 

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Anglo-Japanese Alliance Concluded 183 

there is need of intervention in order to pro- 

tect the lives and properties of the subjects 

of the allied countries, then the two nations 

agree that they shall allow each other to take 

the necessary steps." We had no objection 

to offer to this amendment, except with regard 

to one or two words. We had further con- 

versations with regard to these, and very 

quickly we came to a complete agreement, and 

deared up all the difficulties of Article I. 

It was arranged that our interests in China 

should be covered by inserting this phrase: 

"On the part of Japan, in addition to her 

interests in China, her interests in Korea," 

etc., and so Article I. was agreed upon as it 

stood in the completed treaty. 

The question of Japan's interests in Korea 

had thus been completely settled. As for 

the points embodied in Articles 11. and III., 

namely, that in case one of the allies engages 

in war with a third nation the other shall 

maintain neutraHty, and if another country 

helps the enemy then the ally shall take up 

arms in defence of the first-mentioned ally, 

these points had been discussed and agreed 

on in my first formal n^otiations with Lord 

Lansdowne, and so there was very little 

negotiation with regard to them. 

With r^;ard to the article prohibiting the 

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i84 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

n^otiation of any special agreements during 

the continiiance o£ the alliance there has been 

no s«ious difference of opinion. The sen- 

tence in Article IV. of the treaty and the sen- 

tence in Article V., namely, '"libe allies agree 

not to enter into any special agreement with 

any other nation, which might prejudice the 

interests mentioned in the forgoing articles 

without mutual consent," and, "If Great 

Britain and Japan should agree that the 

above-mentioned interests are in jeopardy, 

the two Governments shall communicate 

tt^ether fully and frankly," had been covered 

by my conversation with Lord Lansdowne 

at the opening of the fonpal negotiations 

when he had said that Japan and Great 

Britain should always maintain intimate 

friendship with each other, and in r^ard 

to the problems of the Extreme East shall ex- 

change views without reserve and shall take 

joint action in defence of their interests. As a 

result of this early tmderstanding no objection 

to this point was raised. 

On the other hand, in the first British draft 

there was a phrase that in r^ard to China 

and Korea no agreement should be made 

with any other country. We, in our first 

amendments, changed it so as to read that 

no agreement should be made which might 

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Anglo-Japanese Alliance Concluded 185 

be prejudidal to the interests of the other 

party. The British Government offered no 

objectiDn to this amendment. 

I think that the object of our amending 

the draft in this manner was that in the event 

of our entering into scone agreement with 

Miother country, with regard to our interests 

in China or Korea, we should not be compelled 

to inform Great Britain at the time (rf nego- 

tiation. If we had been obliged to do so it 

might have been very inconvenient for us. 

For example, whilst I was actually negotiat- 

ing with Lord Lansdowne over the treaty of 

alliance, our Government, as already narrated, 

had sent Marqtus Ito to St. Petersburg 

and had even appdnted M. Kiuino as our 

Minister to St. Petersbia^ with a view to 

negotiating a Russo-Franco- Japanese Agree- 

ment. That was the reason why we made 

the amendment. 

Regarding the term of the alliance, as set 

forth in Article VI., there had been no provi- 

sion for this in the British draft of November 

6th. I had telegraphed to my Government 

recommending it to make the term for five 

years, to be renewable for a further period 

of five years on the e:q)iration of the first 

term. Tlie Government practically adopted 

my suggestion. Thus this matter was settled 

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i86 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

and inserted in Article V. o£ the first draft 

amendments. 

Another point, that of continuing the alli- 

ance, in the event of its expiration during a 

period of war, was also satisfactraily settled 

at the same time. The British Government 

made no objections to either of our sugges- 

tions on these points, but in their second draft 

of the treaty they slightly changed the method 

of renewing the life of the treaty, by insert- 

ing a sentence that unless one of the allies 

should give a year's notice to terminate the 

treaty it should automatically remain in force 

indefinitely but subject to a year's notice 

from either party. The Japanese Govern- 

ment had no objection to that. 

I have previously narrated that the British 

Foreign Minister, as the result of agitation 

by scone members of the Cabinet, wished to 

ext^id the scope of the alliance so as to in- 

clude the protection of British interests in 

India in case of necessity. 

The argimients advanced by Lord Lans- 

downe for this were, briefly, that Japan under 

the treaty obtained protection for her enor- 

mous interests in Korea, but Great Britain 

only obtained protection for her interests in 

the Yangtse Valley. K these were compared 

Japan's interests were far greater, for they 

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Anglo-Japanese Alliance Concluded 187 

were vital to ha-. In order, therefore, to 

obtain more equilibrium in the advantages 

which the treaty gave, Japan should agree 

to include Great Britain's interests in India 

and their protection among the mutual objects 

of the alliance. 

I believe that Mr. Chamberlain felt strcmgly 

on this point. 

Anyhow, when oiu: Government considered 

the matter it was not willing to include India 

in the scope of the treaty, and it was for this 

reason that in the first British draft it amended 

the words "Far East" into "Extreme East," 

and then there could be no doubt on the point. 

The argument which it sent to me for my 

instruction was as follows: 

"The original object of the alliance is to 

protect the mutual interests of Great Britain 

and Japan in the Extreme East, that is, in 

China and Korea. Judging &om the declara- 

tions of other Powers on the subject in 

reference to China, they also feel that they 

have interests in that country. So, by de- 

claring otu: intention of maintaining the ex- 

isting status in China, the alliance between 

Japan and Great Britain is a document of 

importance to all Powers, for not only does 

it protect the interests of Great Britain and 

Japan in China but also the interests of every 

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i88 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

other country having interests in China. 

The alliance is, therefore, impartial to all 

nations. But if we now extend its scope to 

cover India then it would be going beyond 

the original intention of the two signatories, 

and it could no longer be r^arded by other 

nations in the same impartial manner. For 

this reason we cannot agree to the British 

proposal." 

When I received this ai^ument I thought 

that it looked very plausible, but on examina- 

tion I came to the conclusion that it was very 

feeble. I thought this because whilst the 

argument with regard to international inter- 

ests in China was correct, the introduction 

of the protection of Japanese interests in 

Korea was just as much outside the field 

of impartiality as the British proposal was 

supposed to be. I felt that if I were to attempt 

to argue the point with Liord Lansdowne on 

the hnes laid down by my Govenraient it 

would be just like "poking a bush to produce 

When I discussed the point with the Mar- 

quis, therefore, I argued differently. I said: 

"If we extend the ^>here of influ^ice of the 

alliance we may be obliged to meddle with 

various complicated interests, and thus we 

may be obliged to step outside the objects 

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Anglo-Japanese Alliance Concluded 189 

c^ginally intended when the alliance was 

proposed. Our Government would much 

prefer to limit the application of the alliance 

to our interests in China and Korea." 

later in the n^otiations Lord Lansdowne 

again referred to the Indian proposition. He 

said: "I am afraid there will be criticism that 

the benefits d«ived by Japan and Great 

Britain are not proportionate." 

To this I could only repeat what I had said 

before, namely, that British interests along 

the Yangtse were in no way behind those of 

Japan in Korea, and that should disturbances 

arise in those districts, then the benefit which 

Britain woiild derive from the alliance would 

indeed be very great. I told Lord Lansdowne 

that in the event of the development of neces- 

sity, the Japanese Government would certainly 

act in regard to India in the manner in which 

the British Government would desire, and 

the matter was left like that. 

A very important matter which had to be 

settled was the question of whether Germany 

should be invited to enter the alliance. TTiis 

question had been in suspense ance the begin- 

ning of the negotiations, and to tell the truth 

it had been rather worrying both the British 

and the Japanese Governments. Marquis 

Ito had been strongly of the opinion that we 

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190 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

should not keep the n^otiations secret tintil 

after the conclusion of the treaty, for he said 

that if we thus excluded Germany and merely 

gave her the chance to join in the alliance 

after the conclusion of the n^fotiations, we 

should get only very hard feelings from that 

country. 

On November 20th, the day after I had 

returned from my visit to Paris to constilt 

with Marquis Ito, I asked Lord lansdowne 

for his opinion on the matter. He said then: 

"Germany certainly recognizes that the in- 

terests of Great Britain and Japan in C3iina 

are very large and that her own interests do 

not bear comparison with those of the two 

nations; even if we do not inform her imtil 

the n^otiations are concluded it does not 

necessarily follow that she will be vexed. 

Besides, if we inform Germany about the 

alliance too soon she may use it as an instru- 

ment to advance her own interests. I think 

that it woidd be better to wait before we 

inform her of it." 

Later, however, the Marquis raised the 

question himself to me and asked: "What 

shall we do about letting Germany come into 

the alliance?" 

I replied that I believed oiu" Government 

had the intention of proposing to Germany 

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Anglo-Japanese Alliance Concluded 191 

after consulting the British Government on 

the matter, but only when the treaty_had 

been concluded. 

I telegraphed to Count Komura on the 

point and he replied: 

"The Imperial Japanese Govenmient de- 

sires that Germany should eventually enter 

the treaty. But, until either the treaty has 

been finally signed or until all the articles 

have been finally agreed on, we think that it 

is bett^ to keep the whole matter secret. It 

would, therefore, be advisable to postpone 

notifying Germany imtil latCT. We consider, 

however, that as Great Britain, in comparison 

with Japan, has far more important relations 

with the Powers and particularly with Ger- 

many, the matter of notifying Germany 

should be left to the discretion of the British 

Government." 

I agreed with this view, and I was also 

afraid that if Germany should be notified 

she might utilize her participation in the 

treaty to obtaio seme special interest for 

herself under it. I, therefore, communicated 

my views and those of my Government to 

Lord Lansdowne. He at once ^reed to my 

Government's attitude, and was indeed very 

satisfied with it. Soon after that the negotia- 

tions were brou^t to an end and I received 

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192 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

instructions from Tokio to sign the treaty 

and seal it. 

Then our Government seemed to recognize 

that there might be some necessity for invit- 

ing Germany to participate in the trea^ 

and telegraphed to me: 

"We have left the question of inviting 

Germany to the discretion of the British 

Government. However, we would like to 

have Germany come into the treaty, but if 

an invitation is to be extended to her it should 

be done by the British and Japanese Govern- 

ments simultaneously. Inquire from the 

British Government when notice is to be 

given to the British Ambassador at Berlin 

to notify the German Government." 

I conmiunicated this message to Lord 

Lansdowne. 

It happened just at that time that the 

German Imperial Chancellor, Count von 

Biilow, had made a speedi in the Reichstag, 

attacking Mr. Joseph Chamberlain, the Brit- 

ish Colonial Minister, and he had also used 

some derogatory language with r^:ard to the 

British army. As a result, the British people, 

who had been getting very irritated with 

the German Press on account of its attitude 

in the South African War, now became seri- 

ously hostile to Germany. Lord Lansdowne 

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Anglo-Japanese Alliance Concluded 193 

thought that the moment was hardly propi- 

tious for approaching Gennany, so it was 

decided to wait a little. Later, however, he 

thought it might be better to informally notify 

Coimt von Metternich, the German Ambas- 

sador in London, not giving him the text of 

the tteaty but only an outline of the same. 

He consulted me about this, and exphiaed 

that this step would prevent Gennany from 

raisii^ objections later on. He also thought 

that by this it would be possible to gauge 

the views of the German Government on the 

matter. 

I telegraphed to Tokio asking my Govern- 

ment's opinion, and as a result it was decided 

to notify the German representatives at Lon- 

don and Tokio in the same manner on the 

same day, February 3d. 

Well, on the night of February 2d Lord 

Lansdowne hurriedly sent me a messenger 

with a message that he had decided for certain 

reasons to postpone notifying the German 

Ambassador, and asking me to tel^raph to 

Tokio to postpone the notification there. 

I calctilated the difference in time between 

London and Tokio and the time necessary for 

draftii^, coding, transmission, and de-coding, 

and foimd that indeed I had no time to lose 

if the message was to get to Tokio in time. 

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194 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

So I sent the telegram as an urgent official 

dispatdi, but all was in vain. The Foreign 

Minister, Count Komura, before he had re- 

ceived my telegram had already informally 

notified the German Minister of the treaty. 

So the British Government had in its turn to 

notify infonnally the German Ambassador. 

Afterwards I heard that the postponement of 

the notification was desired on account of 

some wish expressed by King Edward. 

Anyhow nothing happened, for otu notifi- 

cation to Germany was only a notification, 

and was not an invitation to join the treaty. 

It does not appear either that Germany really 

wanted to be a party to it. It may have 

been due to the strained relations between 

Great Britain and Germany at that time. Or 

it may be that the German Charg6 d'Aflfaires 

who had been at one time so enthusiastic 

about the matter had felt only a temporary 

enthusiasm and the matter had been forgotten 

altogether. Or agaio it may have been that 

owing to the relationship between Russia and 

Germany the latter had decided that there 

was no advantage in joining in the alliance. 

In 1899, after the Anglo-German Conven- 

tion about China had been concluded, and 

even whilst the ink was wet, Germany declared 

tiiat Manchtiria was to be regarded as outade 

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Anglo-Japanese Alliance Concluded 195 

the sphere of that Convention. That showed 

plainly the real feelings which Germany had 

at heart. On account of the strained rela- 

tions between Great Britain and Germany we 

certainly took no special steps to induce her 

to join in the alliance, but, on the other hand, 

if Germany had been really sincere in h^ 

earlier overttires and had proposed to come 

into the alliance, a triple alliance might easily 

have been concluded. It is not reasonable 

to suppose that Germany was purposely 

excluded by Great Britain and Japan. 

As I have said, the first article, that refer- 

ring to Japan's interests in Korea, took up 

most of the time of the negotiations. 

That article was agreed upon on January 

28, 1902, and on the same day the remainder 

of the articles were also approved. On Janu- 

ary 29th I received a telegram from my Gov- 

ernment givii^ me authority to sign and seal 

the instnmient. 

On January 30th, at 5 P.M., at the British 

Foreign Office, the Marquis of Lansdowne 

and I signed the treaty. 

There was a little difference with regard 

to the formalities observed. The British 

Government was of opinion that all those 

officials participating in the signature should 

be empowered to sign by power of attorney 

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196 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

from their respective Governments. Our 

Government, however, was of the opinion 

that as there were no ratifications to be ex- 

changed it was not necessary to obtain power 

of attorney, and the British Government 

accepted this view. 

After the signature of the treaty, the Tokio 

Foreign Office published the text of the treaty 

on February 12, 1902. Tliis date had to be 

selected on accoimt of the public holidays, 

otherwise it would have been published earlier. 

The British Government published the treaty 

on February nth. As a rule a treaty of 

alliance is kept secret. TTie British Govern- 

ment had not intended to publish the text 

of the treaty ofiGcially, but to let it leak 

out in an indirect method. Our Government 

maintained that since the treaty was not 

aimed at any one nation as an enemy, and 

that as its objects coincided with the policy 

declared by all the Powers in regard to Qiina, 

namely, the maintenance of the principle of 

equal opportunity and the territorial integrity 

of China, no harm could be done by the pub- 

lication of the entire document. On the 

other hand, if it were kept secret, it might 

tend to create wild rumours as to the sphere 

of influence of the treaty, and this might be 

injurious to the mutual interests of the allies. 

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Anglo-Japanese Alliance Concluded 197 

We, therefore, thought that it was better to 

publish the document, and the British Govern- 

ment agreed to our opinion. 

Of cotirse, once the treaty was signed and 

sealed it would have been much more difficult 

to keep it secret. Especially if Germany 

was to be notified it would be difficult. On 

the other hand, its pubHcation could have a 

very salutary eflfect on the Manchiuian situa- 

tion, which was then a very prominent 

question in the Extreme East. 

Our Government, when it had been decided 

to publish, proposed to do so on February 

1 2th. That day in Er^land was a Wednesday, 

which was then private business day in the 

British House of Commons, and Government 

business could not be handled in consequence. 

The British Government proposed, therefore, 

to publish the treaty on Fetffuary nth, and 

we would have done the same, but it was 

Kigensetsu, an important Japanese holiday, 

which made it impossible. It was, therefore, 

published on different days in England and 

Japan as described. 

Our Government, of course, sent to the 

Governments of the various Powers copies 

of the treaty, through oiu- Ministers abroad. 

The different Governments were all satis- 

fied with the treaty, and replied to our notes 

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198 Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi 

that they considCTed the peace of the Extreme 

East would be more securely safeguarded 

by the conclusion of the treaty. 

Only the Russian Foreign Minister was 

astonished to see such words in the treaty as 

"war" and "engaged in war." He thought 

that very extraordinary. He had never 

dreamed that there ever could be such a thing 

as a war in the Extreme East, and so he was 

much astonished to find that such an eventu- 

ality was provided for. 

By the way, there was a connexion between 

the contents of the treaty and its announce- 

ment. If the treaty were to be kept secret 

there was not so much need to make trouble 

about the wording of Article I. But if it 

were to be made public, then such expressions 

had to be chosen as would not invite the 

criticism of outsiders. That is why the nego- 

tiations over this clause took such a long time. 

I have now written the history of the nego- 

tiations for the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. It 

; fWas a great pleasure for me to sign this treaty, 

! I and it was a great success for Japan. But I 

do not think that our Government behaved 

[ well over it, especially in regard to sending 

Marquis Ito to St. Petersbm^ whilst I was 

negotiating with Lord Lansdowne. He ought 

not to have been sent whilst the negotiations 

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Anglo-Japanese Alliance Concluded 199 

with Great Britaio were in progress. Besides 

the embarrassment which it caused me in my 

negotiations, as the conversations with Lord 

Lansdowne and Mr. Bertie showed, such a 

lack of faith and breach of honour put Japan 

in a very bad predicament. She has indeed 

won the support of Great Britain, but she 

lost the respect of Russia and of other Euro- 

pean countries.* 

■ With regard to the publicatioii of the treaty, Count HsyBshi 

makes do reference to perhaps its most extraordinary iocideat. 

Three days before the treaty was officially published, the Yorodtu 

Ckoko, a v«ry sensatioDal Toldo ercning paper, came out with the 

full text of the treaty. It created a considerable atir in Toldo, 

but it was denied by the authorttiea, whilst amongst others who 

were interviewed by the journalists. Baron v. Rosen, the Rus^oa 

Minister, vebemently denied the possibility of such a treaty bdng 

entered into. The full story of how the treaty leaked out has 

never been published, but I have heard that the German Lega- 

tion gave hint of it to a certain Aldmoto, who was connected with 

the Fornita, and be obtuned the full test from a ckrk in the 

Foreign Office.— Ed. 

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CHAPTER V 

Later Notes on the Alliance 

[The following additional notes on the Anglo- 

Japanese Treaty were written by Count Hayashi 

in 1907 or 1908. — Ed.] 

As has been stated elsewhere, the visit of 

Marquis Ito to Russia was apparently an 

ordinary pleasure trip. Neverthdess, the vari- 

ous Governments must have at once conjec- 

tured the true object of the journey, and no 

doubt his arrival was impatiently awaited in 

The proposal of the Marquis to proceed to 

Russia (after my interview with hi rn in Paris 

on November i4tli) but to do nothing to 

prejudice the negotiations for the Anglo- 

Japanese Treaty was a difficult one to carry 

out. I saw that it was necessary to sound 

the depth of the Marquis's resolution on the 

point, and, therefore, I wrote to him on 

November 21st to Berlin, where he was then 

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Later Notes on the Alliance 201 

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