The Avoidable War
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| Author | Kevin Rudd |
|---|---|
| Language | English |
| Subject | Geopolitics |
| Genre | non-fiction |
| Published | 22 March 2022 |
| Publisher | PublicAffairs |
| Publication place | United States |
| Media type | Paperback |
| Pages | 432 |
| ISBN | 978-1541701298 |
The Avoidable War: The Dangers of a Catastrophic Conflict between the US and Xi Jinping's China is a non-fiction book by Kevin Rudd, the former prime minister of Australia.
Overview and content
[edit]In the book's 17 chapters,[1] the author talks about the relationship between the United States and China as well as ways to handle competition between these two great powers to avoid a conflict that could have catastrophic consequences.[2]
Reception
[edit]In a book review at The Financial Times, James Crabtree writes, "Rudd’s book provides a rich and realistic portrayal of China’s motivations, as well as a stark warning to a world standing on the edge of a conflict potentially far more devastating than Russia’s recent invasion of Ukraine. His argument contains an intriguing balance of pessimism and optimism. On the one hand, competition between the superpowers is inevitable. Rudd sketches out 10 plausible scenarios over Taiwan, half of which end in military confrontation."[3]
Writing for The Sasakawa Peace Foundation, Thomas Wilkens of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute writes, "Rudd illustrates why he believes the dangers have increased through his systematic analysis of the Xi Jinping regime’s worldview and how this will grate against American strategic interests. In the course of the book, he provides reasoned argument and trenchant analysis of this worldview, affording valuable observations throughout, based on his familiarity with China and vast diplomatic experience (of which he frequently reminds the reader)."[1]
Australian Naval Institute's Tim Coyle writes in his book review, "Kevin Rudd aims this book at an American readership; however, it is equally appliable to regional and extra-regional countries as any war between the US and China would be catastrophic for the world."[4]
References
[edit]- ^ a b Wilkins, Thomas. "Averting a Sino-American Conflict: A Review of Kevin Rudd's The Avoidable War". The Sasakawa Peace Foundation. Retrieved 21 February 2023.
- ^ "Kevin Rudd's The Avoidable War: The Dangers of a Catastrophic Conflict between the U.S. and Xi Jinping's China". The National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR). Retrieved 21 February 2023.
- ^ Crabtree, James (2 May 2022). "The Avoidable War — averting a conflict between the US and China". Financial Times. Retrieved 21 February 2023.
- ^ ANI. "The Avoidable War; The Dangers of a Catastrophic US-China Conflict | The Australian Naval Institute". Retrieved 21 February 2023.
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The Avoidable War: The Dangers of a Catastrophic Conflict between the US and Xi Jinping's China Hardcover – March 22, 2022
by Kevin Rudd (Author)
4.6 4.6 out of 5 stars (623) 4.3 on Goodreads 1,431 ratings
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A war between China and the US would be catastrophic, deadly, and destructive. Unfortunately, it is no longer unthinkable.
The relationship between the US and China, the world’s two superpowers, is peculiarly volatile. It rests on a seismic fault—of cultural misunderstanding, historical grievance, and ideological incompatibility. No other nations are so quick to offend and be offended. Their militaries play a dangerous game of chicken, corporations steal intellectual property, intelligence satellites peer, and AI technicians plot. The capacity for either country to cross a fatal line grows daily.
Kevin Rudd, a former Australian prime minister who has studied, lived in, and worked with China for more than forty years, is one of the very few people who can offer real insight into the mindsets of the leadership whose judgment will determine if a war will be fought. The Avoidable War demystifies the actions of both sides, explaining and translating them for the benefit of the other. Geopolitical disaster is still avoidable, but only if these two giants can find a way to coexist without betraying their core interests through what Rudd calls “managed strategic competition.” Should they fail, down that path lies the possibility of a war that could rewrite the future of both countries, and the world.
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Editorial Reviews
Review
“[P]enetrating and sensible… [a] worthy and ambitious intellectual re-creation."―Kevin Peraino, New York Times
“Rudd’s book provides a rich and realistic portrayal of China’s motivations, as well as a stark warning to a world standing on the edge of a conflict potentially far more devastating than Russia’s recent invasion of Ukraine.”―Financial Times
“Rudd directly confronts the growing possibility of war and offers well-thought-out proposals to prevent that catastrophic outcome and the ‘global carnage’ it would cause.”―New York Review of Books
“[O]ne of the best primers on US-China relations.”―The Telegraph
“Rudd has become one of the most influential Western commentators on relations between China and the West. He correctly takes the prospect of a war between the US and China very seriously and comes up with a plan to avert disaster.”―Gideon Rachman, Financial Times, best summer books of 2022
“[A] probing analysis of the risks of war between China and the United States.”―Irish Times
“Rudd, the former prime minister of Australia, debuts with an incisive analysis of the rising tensions between the U.S. and China. Surveying the cultural, historical, and ideological roots of the conflict, Rudd makes a convincing case that the two sides now regard ‘some form of armed conflict or confrontation’ as inevitable…. Shot through with reasoned analysis and evenhanded appraisals of both countries’ strengths and weaknesses, this is a valuable guide to de-escalating a global flashpoint.”―Publishers Weekly
“An exploration of one of the world’s most significant and fraught international relationships… An accessible primer on the evolving China–U.S. rivalry.”―Kirkus
“A lifelong student of China, Kevin Rudd has become one of today’s most thoughtful analysts of China’s development. The Avoidable War focuses on the signal challenge posed by China’s evolution to America and to world order. Can the US and China avoid sleepwalking into a conflict? Rudd offers constructive steps for the two powers to stabilize their relations.”―Henry A. Kissinger
“Wise counsel from a seasoned statesman who recognizes the real risk of catastrophic war and illuminates a promising path the US and China could take to avoid it.”―Graham Allison, Douglas Dillon Professor of Government at the Harvard Kennedy School, and author of Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap?
“An extraordinary tour de force that analyzes the most important geopolitical relationship of the twenty-first-century. Organized, like Dante’s Inferno, into concentric circles that describe in brilliant detail the challenges ahead and a timely prescription to avoid a catastrophe. Let us truly hope that we can indeed avoid a war that looms upon us like a dark tower, threatening all the progress we have made.”―Admiral James Stavridis, 16th supreme Allied Commander of NATO, former dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University
“Based on a lifetime of observation and experience of China and America, Kevin Rudd has produced a rare book of wisdom and a detailed roadmap for how the two countries can manage their strategic competition and avoid a disastrous war.”―Joseph S. Nye, Harvard University Distinguished Service Professor, Emeritus
“This is an important book and Mr Rudd, now president of the US-based Asia Society, makes his case powerfully.”―The National (UAE)
“Kevin Rudd has written the year’s best China book…With thoroughness and precision, Rudd has assembled a wide array of information and historical background… it is one of the best single-volume surveys of the China issue available to the public.” ―Claremont Review of Books
“The Avoidable War is a deeply impressive work, and it is to be hoped that it will have a formative influence on the ‘China debate’ in the United States and other countries. Indeed, it may be that, decades hence, Rudd is remembered as a sort of successor to George Kennan—a powerful thinker who, early in the course of a titanic struggle, laid out a broad strategic outline marked by foresight, prudence, and careful assessment of the strategic culture and goals of a totalitarian superpower.”―Comparative Strategy
About the Author
Kevin Rudd is president and CEO of Asia Society and has been president of the Asia Society Policy Institute since January 2015. He served as Australia's 26th Prime Minister from 2007 to 2010, then as Foreign Minister from 2010 to 2012, before returning as Prime Minister in 2013. Rudd graduated from the Australian National University with honors in Chinese studies, and is fluent in Mandarin. He also studied at the National Taiwan Normal University in Taipei.
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Publisher : PublicAffairs (March 22, 2022)
Language : English
Hardcover : 432 pages
Customer Reviews: 4.6 4.6 out of 5 stars (623)
==From the United States
A. Menon
5.0 out of 5 stars Illuminating perspective on the underlying tensions between the US and China
Reviewed in the United States on May 20, 2022
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The Avoidable War is a very timely book on the high tensions that exist between the US and China at the moment. It was published in March, soon after the Russia invasion of Ukraine and as such is very well timed in terms of its relevance. Of course the book must have been a project that has been worked on for quite some time now so it also indicates the author's predictive understanding of the growing conflicts that are now manifesting themselves in devastating actions at the level of nation state. The Avoidable War is an overview of the author's beliefs about the narratives that drive both the US and China's position on both the global and domestic arenas. It spends much time discussing the priority hierarchy that potentially drives the CCP actions an in particular it attempts to frame the mindset of Xi Xinping.
The author spends time on the perspective of both China and the US but spends much more time on China. As a former prime minister of Australia as well as a long time student of China, Kevin Rudd is truly an expert on the subject he is covering and has met extensively with global leaders throughout his career. The author begins by giving the historical relationship between the US and China and the thawing between the two with Nixon opening up to China.
He gives a background to the hopes of the US in its early embrace and the contradicting core values that have remained at the center of the CCP with small blips perhaps in the 80s. The author then goes on to discuss how trust is now at a historical low with the failure of globalization to be equitable in its economic outcomes for many classes and with the Trump phenomenon coming to full force in the recent years. Both sides can agree on little common ground and as such each views the others actions through the most pessimistic lens and this is makes compromise increasingly difficult with both actors digging their heels in on their own world views.
The author moves on to discussing Xi Xinping, a leader who has disappointed much of the world with a pull to the right for China and its nationalism. The author has met and had overlap with Xi Xinping on the order of 3 decades when the author was a young diplomat in China. He gives his perspective on the man and his character and worldview.
At the core the author describes Xi as a man who is committed to taking China to its "rightful place" on the world stage. There is much historical baggage to this perspective in which wrongs from hundreds of years ago are relevant for todays dismissal of the intent of liberalism.
Furthermore the author highlights Xi's lack of comfort in economics but strong calculations with regards to politics.
The author moves on to the hierarchy of concerns that drive the party's calculations, first and foremost is the sustained ruling ability for the CCP.
This maintenance of power is of more importance than any other consideration and as such is a subject for which any use of force can be justified if the Party's authority becomes at risk.
Another critical concern is how to unify the vast population of China to achieve the common goals of the country, from this drives a use of Nationalism to create cohesion on a group of the scale of China. This has substantial risks as a strategy as nationalist fervour can be challenging to contain when it blows up. The author of course highlights the need for China to deliver economic growth to maintain its mandate to govern the population. One can see that economics can be subordinated to other priorities in times like now given their Covid lockdowns but there is still a core focus on improving living standards as a critical pillar for the party to focus on.
The author also discusses longer term objectives like modernizing the military and developing its technological expertise. Topics like the construction of bases in the South China Sea are discussed as well as the development of a blue water fleet. The author also highlights how projects like the Belt and Road initiative are important for China to create a web of dependable economic relationships with its neighbors as well as some of the frictions that come from the lack of institutional oversight of projects.
The author weaves this into its overall leverage building with neighbors through infrastructure aid and other moves to create dependencies. There is a much lower soft power component to China's initiatives but it still creates benefits for many recipients especially while the US has stepped back from its overseas engagement.
The author then focuses on the desire to change the global order. This can be seen on a day to day basis with the overall dismissal of the idea that the liberal order is the legitimate one and so the longer term re-design of global institutions which were an outgrowth of the WWII aftermath is a continued project from China.
The author then moves on the US which is a fraction of the book and discusses the US's disappointment in the path that China has taken. He discusses how the US feels like it was cheated by the steps China took in its integration into the worlds economy and how it did not follow through on core promises with regards to its own economy. With a revised view on China and the expected path of its political economy the perspectives on the benefits of engagement are now considered to be substantially outweighed by the detrimental consequences and as such a decoupling has started. The US has yet to adjust what it can offer allies so that they can regain some of the standing that it had prior to Trump and military aid remains the more de facto form of aid than greater trade and economic benefits. Nonetheless this will start to change and one can see from the revival of Nato that some aspects of these trends are starting to reverse due to global events.
The author ends with the dangers that come from this growing conflict of fairness on the world stage but notes the deep connections between the two countries from a financial standpoint. He highlights some mechanisms that might be used to prevent unintentional misunderstood signals and the need for policies that mimic how the US and the Soviet Union tried to prevent disaster through protocols. Overall the author tries to highlight where the grievances stem from and how both sides need to better understand each other such that conflict becomes less likely but ultimately there are deep ideological divides that are now obvious and impossible to reconcile. That being said at least part of this conflict stems from leadership personalities that catalyze escalation when friction shows itself namely with Trump and Xi and as such some revision from leadership should be a key ingredient to any normalization. It appears unlikely that anything like that can be expected right now as politically nationalism and the views on the clash of civilizations is on the rise. Overall The Avoidable War is a well timed and insightful book that can help the reader understand China's calculus better.
13 people found this helpful
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Jack Peace
4.0 out of 5 stars A most illuminating and insightful book.
Reviewed in the United States on June 10, 2022
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I listened to the audio version and then purchased a hard copy to read for a second time. Mr Rudd has come up with the type of analysis and insights rarely seen from a politician these days. The fact he speaks Chinese and had been on the inside, has in no doubt aided him in his endeavor by making a clear sense of a most complex domestic and geopolitical situation and then proposing realistic solutions. He uses ample data to support many of his thesis but only where it is needed and necessary. The writing is equally crisp, direct and in some places passionate and powerful. This is truly a must read for anyone who is interested or bothered by what is going on between China and the US, especially for those who are likely briefed daily on those matters but choose to stick to his or her own beliefs because of oversized arrogance or sheer ignorance on both sides.
Now I come to a few areas where I somewhat disagree or perhaps hope to add to the author’s perspectives without giving things away. First of all, while Mr Rudd’s 10 circles of relative strategic importance of Xi Jinping’s priorities are the most comprehensive I have seen for completeness, I am afraid he is giving the communist leader too much credit for his overall mindset and intelligence. Xi is certainly an astute student of revolutionary politics and has proven ruthless in its prosecution. However, he is quite behind his contemporaries when it comes to economics and geopolitical prowess in today’s international environment. As a result, many of the strongman and imperial style ambitions he expresses may never be carried out. Even if he attempts, disastrous outcomes await his regime and the Chinese people at large. China under Xi Jinping is therefore likely to be aggressive in name only but not in substance, some of which Mr Rudd has also alluded to. Secondly, much of Xi Jinping’s actions at present are no more than political power posturing for Chinese domestic consumption. Just like Mao Zedong some 70 years before, China will not start a war with the US over Taiwan for fear of losing to the US and therefore see its one party legitimacy in jeopardy. To that end, a preemptive attack on the US in the Pacific to exploit a strategic first mover advantage is even less plausible. Having said that, I do think chances for an accidental military confrontation due to miscalculation are nonetheless real between China and the US but of limited consequence. Thirdly, there are also hawkish factions in the US which are spoiling for a major war just to defeat China in an epic battle between “the good and evil.” The last thing China wants is to be coerced into such an eventuality where the loser is bound to be itself regardless of its economic size and military preparedness. At the end of day, close to half of China’s population still barely survives with $1000 per year, a dismal distance from even the least prosperous of developed countries.
So what if Taiwan decides to breach the red line and declares independence in the near term? This would definitely incur Xi’s wrath and bring China and the US immediately to the brink of war, leaving him with no choice. I however hope that smarter minds and cooler heads can prevail under such a scenario. The most common sense response is to simply refuse to acknowledge Taiwan’s legitimacy and cut off diplomatic and economic relations with any country which chooses to recognize Taiwan as a sovereign country. Unless there is a global boycott of China should it choose military intervention, I doubt any of the countries including the major Western Powers will take sides with the renegade province, especially if China chooses a non-military approach.
If Xi Jinping indeed has the interest of the Chinese people at heart, then China’s sheer scale in territorial size and population coupled with sustained economic growth will see its economy return to global dominance, eclipsing any other country by a large margin in 20-25 years. Xi Jinping may not see Taiwan return to the motherland in his lifetime, but if there is a legacy to speak of for himself, it would be the laying of the foundation for 1000 years of Chinese Rejuvenation. By then, who will ever care about Taiwan?
7 people found this helpful
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BMAN
5.0 out of 5 stars Excellent Book to Learn about the Real China
Reviewed in the United States on August 1, 2022
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I decided to pick up this book to learn about China, now one of the most important countries. This book focuses on TRUST - “Can We Trust China?” This reading reminded me of a very relevant story I heard from a Vietnamese friend some time ago. He said his Chinese father never needed a paper contract in conducting his business for decades in Vietnam. His trusted customers can pick up products and needed only pay his father after they have sold the products. This was done verbally without any paper contract. A new customer would be given a chance to start small and prove his/her trustworthy in time. If anyone cheats, the words of mouth would spread quickly in the trusting community; and it would be very difficult for this bad person to rejoin this Chinese business community again. My friend said he never heard any one cheated and his father never had a lawyer. The “trust” stories in the book are different but it tells the same “trust” I learned from this friend. It is very interesting to see someone elaborating this topic in a book in great depth. It is written in away enjoyable to read. Despite I have heard a similar story before, I still learn a lot more from this book. This is absolutely a great book anyone can learn in order to be successful with China or Chinese.
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Sandy
5.0 out of 5 stars The big & long term picture of US vs China.
Reviewed in the United States on February 19, 2025
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Very enlightening and informative perspective on China and Xi Jinping. Valuable view in that Rudd is not from the US. He compares likely scenarios of the US and China relationship going forward. Some of the scenarios are very bad for the US and would be changing of the whole world order that we have been a benefactor of since WWII.
It is little dry at times, but still worth wading through the detail that supports his conclusions. This book is a valuable piece for educating yourself about path ahead for the US and China.
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Joe Northrop
5.0 out of 5 stars Kevin Rudd has done us a great service
Reviewed in the United States on March 30, 2022
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If you only read one book about the contentious relationship between the US and China, it should be this one. There are many other books around that purport to examine the bilateral relationship and predict the future, but this is the only one written by someone who is a life-long student of China, who speaks Mandarin, and who knows most the important players, having been an Australian foreign service officer in Beijing, an Australian state government official, and having served as prime minister twice.
Rudd begins with a tale evocative of "The Band Played Waltzing Matilda", marching in an ANZUS Day (their Memorial Day) parade with his father, a veteran of WW II, still suffering from its effects. Then he recounts the staggering losses in several wars of the 20th Century...and also Neville Chamberlain's "Peace with Honor" speech as a cautionary tale on the folly of war and the danger of willful acquiescence to tyranny which produces neither peace nor honor.
Only by understanding each other can the US and China avoid a fate worse than anything those bloody conflicts produced. And, unfortunately, we do not understand each other.
Rudd lays out his task...to explain why we say one thing and the Chinese hear another by examining the bilateral relationship going back to our first contact and the many historical issues that we in the US rarely consider, but are part of China's thought process even today. He examines the seemingly polar opposite views from Washington and Beijing on most important issues, but concludes that there is hope, despite the radically different world views, that we can avoid "Thucydide's Trap".
But, to have any hope of doing so, we must do a much better job of understanding each other. Few US policymakers or politicians know much about China beyond politically useful slogans, even fewer actually speak the language. Fewer still know anything substantial about China's leaders or what motivates their actions. Rudd tells us by organizing much of the book around Xi Jinping's "Ten Concentric Circles of Interest", and devotes a chapter to discussion of each.
As a student of China myself for 40 years, I've never seen such a logical and informed expositon of Xi's (which is China's) priorities and motivations. In the final chapters Rudd examines the US response, the politics of the Twentieth Party Congress and its crucial importance, the dangers in the coming decade and how strategic competition can be managed to avoid a war.
This book should be required reading for any US politician BEFORE they open their mouth about China. Here are the facts, not some polemic or conspiracy tinged harangue by a jilted lover, like another much read book on China that purports to expose Beijing's nefarious plan for World domination. If we are to avoid the worst, we must be prepared. Thanks to Kevin Rudd, there is at least a chance that we can be.
33 people found this helpful
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Eric Grover
4.0 out of 5 stars Kevin Rudd sees the danger of a surging China but lacks Reagan's and Thatcher's moral clarity
Reviewed in the United States on October 4, 2022
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In The Avoidable War: The Dangers of a Catastrophic Conflict between the US and Xi Jinping’s China former Australian Labor Prime Minister Kevin Rudd offers insight, gloom, and counsel for America.
Since cousin Great Britain passed the baton during WW2, America has been the world’s preeminent military, economic, and cultural power, and the architect and guarantor of the reigning liberal Western world order. Challenger China, however, is on the rise, and, increasingly, locking horns with the US. Rudd worries the burgeoning Sino-American conflict will ignite into a hot war.
After tyrant and mass murderer Mao Zedong died in 1976, pragmatic Deng Xiaoping become the Middle Kingdom’s paramount leader. Deng downplayed Marxist-Leninist doctrine and loosened state control of the economy to boost growth, famously quipping “It doesn’t matter if a cat is black or white so long as it catches mice.” Private-sector entrepreneurs were free to prosper, so long as that benefited the state, vivifying a sclerotic economy. However, despite the hopes of many in the West, the Chinese Communist Party didn’t loosen its grip on political power.
Playing a long game to strengthen China, Deng sought engagement rather than confrontation with the outside world. The US welcomed this apparent opening, and helped, supporting China’s accession to the WTO, providing the biggest market for the looming manufacturing colossus, and supplying needed technology.
America operated on the wishful assumption the Middle Kingdom would inexorably liberalize and integrate into the US-led rules-based liberal world order.
Now, by many measures, a surging China is the world’s number two power and aspires for ascendancy. President for Life Xi is in more of hurry than his predecessors. He’s purged the CCP of rivals, installed his myrmidons to head the military (“the gun”), the propaganda wing (“the pen”), and internal security (“the knife”), brought the oligarchs to heel, and extinguished nascent embers of freedom. Xi is the Middle Kingdom’s most powerful ruler since Mao. Barring a health issue or assassination, he’s likely to reign for years to come.
Rudd characterizes Xi’s worldview as “Marxist-Nationalist.” Xi’s China is increasingly ideological, nationalist, assertive abroad, and intolerant of internal dissent. He’s reinvigorated the CCP’s Marxist-Leninist foundations, turbocharged Chinese nationalism, and sharpened the country’s ambitions.
A recent Pentagon-sponsored RAND study concluded, "China’s rise in power on the world stage may produce a low-intensity conflict or a major war with the U.S.” RAND warns the US could “find itself confronting a peer rival for global leadership possessing far greater power than the Soviet Union ever held.” Like the USSR it threatens its neighbors and seeks world domination. But with 1.4 billion people, the world’s second largest economy, and greater technological prowess than the USSR, China is a more formidable foe.
Under Emperor Xi, the greater China’s military, economic, and technologic power relative to America’s, the greater the risk of war - or America ceding spheres of influence to Beijing.
In Danger Zone: the Coming Conflict with China US academics Hal Brands and Michael Beckley echo Rudd’s and RAND’s fear. But they worry China’s near-term window is as good as it’s going to get, and that, therefore, maximum danger is nigh. China’s demographic trends are horrific. By bringing the heretofore vibrant private sector to heel, Beijing will slow, if not suffocate economic growth. And increasingly alarmed about the Sino threat, Australia, India, and Japan are ramping up defense spending.
While a man of the West – a Davos man! Rudd postures a kind of moral equivalence and political neutrality over the conflict between China and America. Reading The Avoidable War, one could be forgiven for at times thinking Australia didn’t have a stake in the struggle’s outcome.
To avoid war, Rudd urges the US and China to adopt “managed strategic competition.” It has the flavor of Nixon’s and Kissinger’s policy of détente with the Soviet Union. Washington and Beijing would still jostle across multiple fronts, but within agreed boundaries.
Why, however, would anybody expect Beijing to honor an agreement the second it thought the balance of forces were sufficiently to its advantage that it was no longer in its interest? Rudd himself acknowledges Americans have come to distrust China, with ample cause.
Rudd’s Green fundamentalism distracts from his warning and his suggestion that that’s an area for common ground is contrary to China’s and America’s economic interests, which China’s ruling elites understand but many of America’s do not.
Projecting his own climate-change alarmism, Rudd declares “on climate change, China’s national economic and environmental interests mandate global cooperation.” Beijing’s actions, however, testify it rightly appreciates maximizing cheap reliable energy to fuel growth is in China’s interest, which is why it has the world’s largest fleet of coal-fired power plants.
In Clash of Civilizations political scientist Sam Huntington forecast if American elites remained confident, that the 21st century would be America’s and the West’s, but that that was no certain thing. Huntington viewed the principal threats as Sino and Islamic civilizations.
In a similar vein, Rudd contends “The key question today is whether the United States is sufficiently conscious of the dimensions of China’s rise and whether it is still possessed of sufficient political resolve and strategic acumen to deal with this formidable challenge to American regional and global power.” If it isn’t, China will become the dominant power in a darker world.
Rudd warns that “if there is no sustained counterstrategy from the United States over the next several US administrations that effectively rebuilds American power, reenergizes US alliances, and creates a credible global economic alternative to the long-term gravitational pull of the Chinese market, the overall trend lines appear to favor Xi Jinping’s China.”
Although Beijing’s use of its economic might to advance Sino interests is effective, it’s hardly attractive.
As a Sinophile Rudd criticized the CCP’s internal oppression. It’s crushed national minorities like the Uighurs, Tibetans, and Mongolians, extinguished representative government and freedom in Hong Kong, and eliminated or imprisoned countless dissidents. But Rudd’s realism cloaks moral timidity and accommodation. The CCP isn’t going to tolerate political pluralism or transform China into a good-faith pacific partner in the liberal world order.
In Red Roulette: An Insider's Story of Wealth, Power, Corruption, and Vengeance in Today's China, Desmond Shum, husband of arrested billionaire Whitney Duan Weihong observes “The Party has an almost animal instinct toward repression and control. It’s one of the foundational tenets of a Leninist system. Anytime the Party can afford to swing toward repression, it will.” Emperor Xi’s CCP has put an exclamation point on Shum’s lament.
Given a choice between economic growth and control, the CCP will choose control. Thanks to China’s phenomenal economic growth over the last four decades, Xi and the CCP think they can afford to swing back to repression and are doing so in spades.
Beijing is becoming more aggressive abroad. Canberra isn’t going to deter the Chinese colossus.
A world without an engaged muscular America, with China as global hegemon, would be decidedly less liberal, less free, and less prosperous. The best Australia could hope for would be to be a tributary state.
During the Cold War, Reagan broke with decades of accommodation of the Soviet Union – “the Evil Empire.” His strategy was “We win, they lose.” Reagan had moral clarity and backbone – qualities not much in evidence among Western leaders today - and framed the conflict in moral terms. He rallied the world, gave hope to the oppressed behind the Iron Curtain, and was willing to engage in an arms race the USSR couldn’t win.
Rudd suggests hopefully “America has begun to stir.”
Pieces of parchment spelling out the terms of strategic managed competition will not deter or constrain Emperor Xi’s China.
Military power and prowess matter. While for decades the US looked for opportunities to reduce and deferred modernizing its nuclear arsenal, China is rapidly expanding its nuclear quiver. Today it has the world’s largest navy. At the end of WW2, the US Navy had 6768 ships. Today it has 296. America should modernize and increase its navy, air force, and nuclear arsenal. And, most critically, it must dominate the 21st century’s commanding heights, space.
A confident America, militarily, economically and technologically preeminent, with muscular foreign and defense policies and committed allies, will deter imperialist China. Overwhelming American and allied strength, moral clarity, and resolution can check Emperor Xi’s China and keep it from menacing Taiwan, Japan, the Philippines, Vietnam, India, and Australia.
Allies are more likely to be committed if America is strong and resolute.
Additionally, if the world and Chinese are very lucky, sustain pressure and moral condemnation will precipitate the CCP’s fall, and liberalization within the Middle Kingdom.
The Avoidable War is timely and eminently readable. Rudd is clear-eyed about the challenge China poses. He lacks, however, Reagan’s and Thatcher’s moral clarity and stones.
29 people found this helpful
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Dan
5.0 out of 5 stars One of the best books on US-China, from THE expert on this topic
Reviewed in the United States on October 18, 2022
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Highly recommend this book to anyone who would like to understand more on US-China relationships, where and why it has gotten here and where it ought to and might go next.
Kevin is THE thought leader, observer and player in global political scene, with direct interactions and keen observations combined with thoughtful analysis, based on first hand experience with many of the key players and leaders today.
Kudos to having constructed a thoughtful framework on Managed Strategic Competition, one has to provide a peaceful pathway for co-existence without breaking into an all-out war.
Rare to read a book that has distilled his years of lectures and talks on this topic, and points towards clear scenarios and outcomes for intelligent people to look beyond current impulsive behaviors and actions driven by insecurity, to rationally chart a course of action based on potential optimal future outcomes.
Hope this book reaches those who are able to influence decisions, directly or indirectly, that makes the key relationships work for a sustainable future and benefit of all.
One person found this helpful
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JOHN FLEMING
5.0 out of 5 stars everybody should read this book and then pass it on !
Reviewed in the United States on August 24, 2024
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a great evaluation of the aspirations and ambitions modern China
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ChrisFg
4.0 out of 5 stars Managed Strategic Competition complements Regional assessments of Multipoliarity
Reviewed in the United States on January 6, 2023
Verified Purchase
In The Avoidable War Rudd sets out his Managed Strategic Competition proposal for avoiding a US China war. He situates his proposal in Xi Jinping's worldview, assessed using his framework consisting of 10 concentric circles.
Leaving aside the possibility of a US-China war by mistake, Rudd founds his proposal for managed strategic competition on three core propositions:
• USA-China develop a clear understanding of the other's irreducible red lines.
• Channel their strategic rivalries into a [globally] competitive race to enhance each's military, economic, and technological capabilities.
• Continue strategic cooperation in defined areas of global and national interest.
Rudd provides a useful summary of the domestic and global factors influencing XiJP's and China's national, regional, and global reactions to events. Although not deeply argued, the factors are gathered and coherently organized.
Ten alternative futures for China-US rivalry are sketched, from the unthinkable a nuclear war to ongoing robust economic competition. Rudd’s managed strategic competition proposal is presented as a mechanism to foster ongoing robust economic competition without descending into war.
In an assessment of his proposal’s consequences Rudd endeavors to be even handed and for the most part is. But few words are spent considering the, possibly insurmountable, US attitude changes toward China necessary before his proposal gains US Congressional bipartisan support.
Rudd has unique China-US experiences and is the recently announced next Australian Ambassador to the USA when Australia's national interest is a "stable and safe Indo-Pacific."
4 people found this helpful
Wojo
4.0 out of 5 stars Well written snapshot of US and China relations in 2022
Reviewed in the United States on January 15, 2023
Verified Purchase
Kevin Rudd uses his experience to give us a great snapshot of the state of US and China relations in 2022. He is an educated and intelligent writer who was formerly Prime Minister of Australia, resided in both China and the US, speaks both languages and is President and CEO of the Asia Society. The book gives an in-depth assessment of the conflict between the two countries and what may be done to prevent an otherwise inevitable world war. Like any snapshot of a moving target, things have already changed...the reason I took back a star.
One person found this helpful
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Community Reviews
Mike
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June 23, 2022
Given the escalating tensions in the US-Australia-China relations, The Avoidable War by Kevin Rudd is a timely analytical tome. Whilst the author’s politics may be off-putting for some, there can be no doubt about his qualifications and experience in Chinese and American geopolitics. He begins his study of ‘The Avoidable War’ with a brief history of the US-China relationship. Then, using the paradigm of ten circles, he analyses Xi Jinping’s worldview and the various factors influencing the changes in China and its impact on world affairs. Finally, he explores various alternatives for future relations and promotes a “managed strategic competition”. A most readable, thoughtful and detailed discussion that identifies the dangers inherent in a China-US conflict for Australia. So, if you want to go beyond the simplistic polarity of dove-hawkish notions then this book is a valuable contribution to informing your thinking. Overall, a comprehensive book that all readers can enjoy with a five star read rating.
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John Davie
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May 19, 2022
This book is really a great example of western chauvinism.
Rudd learns the language and works for a western-capitalist think tank and bestows upon himself the rank of China genius. In reality this book is nothing more than one long smear against the People's Republic of China.
Rudd seems to take at face value the self proclaimed status of the United States as protector of democracy and human rights worldwide. At the beginning of the book Rudd professes his 'love' for China. Though this is immediately met by a qualifier, he urgently makes a genuflection at the altar of anti-communist hatred with a dubious factoid pulled straight from the bible of commie-bashing itself the Black Book of communism;
'At the same time I have been deeply critical of Mao's depredations of the country during the Great Leap Forward of 1958, which left some thirty million dead through starvation...'.
Interestingly his love for the United States, and Australia, come unqualified, despite a large array of war crimes, genocide and ethnic cleansing between them. When it comes to atrocities, Rudd's outrage is quite selective.
When it comes down to it Rudd's gripe with the PRC is that it ended the century of humiliation. The west has never forgiven China for dragging itself out of an imposed poverty and re-establishing the territorial and political integrity that was almost completely ruined by western intervention. This is also his problem with Xi Jinping. The BRI, military modernisation and re-assertion of claims in the South China sea are not a repeat of western Imperialism but are an anti-colonial phenomenon and can only be understood as a reaction to the history of western intervention. Xi's programme of national rejuvenation and shaking off the final shackles of the century of humiliation go hand in hand.
Really what Rudd would like to see is a return to the good old days of the open door policy when a starving and drug addicted rump-China was run by a western backed kleptocracy. Unfortunately for him the days of imperialism are over. And Rudd's colonial dream is set to turn to dust.
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Lukasz
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April 23, 2022
4.5/5
An excellent book for those who would like to better understand the current world and the precarious balance of power between China and America. The author gives great insights into Xi Jinping's vision of China's development and goals and possible scenarios of shifts in geopolitics in the 2020s. Whatever happens, we'll be living dangerously in the decade to come.
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Ben
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April 5, 2022
This was an outstanding read on China, foreign policy, and international relations - leading towards potential conflicts (war).
It detailed some impressive predictions between China-US, and Russia.
It also did an amazing job at looking towards what could happen between these superpowers in the future.
There was also a lot of description surrounding the predicted incoming war with Taiwan.
One of the best books on tactics and strategy of world powers - specifically around China - I have ever read.
4.9/5
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Frederic
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October 11, 2022
Author and former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd studied China in university, is fluent in Mandarin and writes like the diplomat he was. He scrupulously avoids taking sides and probably means well with this book. Who wouldn't share Rudd's view that war between China and the USA ought to be avoided?
Rudd usefully lays out the various historical reasons why China and the USA don't trust each other. He describes the rise of Xi Jinping as leader of the Chinese Communist Party and outlines China's history, politics and economic system. He proposes a safety net of managed competition between the two remaining superpowers that will delay conflict while America gets its act together.
That's sensible, as far as it goes, but Rudd ignores or downplays many massive signs that China's path to global domination will be neither smooth nor inevitable.
Rudd notes that the pillars of the Chinese Communist system are nationalism, Marxism with a Chinese twist and economic growth, which keeps the Chinese population from resenting their lack of freedom. Marxism has elsewhere failed repeatedly and spectacularly. Nationalism is hard to control, once ignited. Economic growth is sought by all governments, but it's much easier to achieve in a free economy. China has harvested a lot of low hanging economic fruit but will be challenged to reach Western levels of prosperity without huge political upheaval. Rudd mostly ignores this.
He suggests that if economic growth falters enough to cause unrest, Xi's regime is likely to become more belligerent internationally, which stirs up Chinese nationalism and may deflect criticism of his authoritarian government. That makes sense, unfortunately. Remember the Argentinian junta invading the Falklands in 1982?
Like many dictators (see Napoleon, Hitler, Castro and Putin), President Xi is not an economic genius. In fact, he's now cracking down on China's private sector and undermining investor confidence in the private part of the Chinese economy, which creates 90% of China's jobs. Rudd points out that China's economy is already much less efficient than that of Western democracies. Punishing private sector success will just make things worse for China, economically, but Xi's main obsession is remaining in power and he's still a Marxist, so he can't help himself. He thinks he has to stamp out both dissent and inequality.
Clearly, the Chinese Communist Party wants to stay in power at all costs by remaining authoritarian, using courts as a weapon of the state, randomly changing financial rules and stealing intellectual property. That is not compatible with sustaining domestic prosperity, much less attracting needed foreign capital from capitalist countries.
While China and Russia may dangle their despotic debt to snare more banana republics into their global network of goon regimes, they won't defeat democracy and capitalism, long term, because people want freedom and capital will always flee arbitrary, authoritarian markets in favour of more free, transparent ones.
While he describes himself as deeply realistic, Rudd seems completely to miss this basic truth about economics. It's not his only blind spot.
As a longtime climate activist, Rudd supports the Paris Accord and urges the West to recruit China to join the global anti CO2 crusade, glossing over the fact that, despite the Paris Accord, China is still building coal fired power plants as fast as it can.
Unlike ostentatiously virtuous Western leaders like Canada's vacuous Justin Trudeau, President Xi is not stupid enough to destroy his domestic energy industry for the sake of domestic and international, innumerate, progressive applause. Yes, Xi may try harder in future to clean up visible, particulate air pollution in Beijing, because it's sickening his people, but he won't put a massive, anti CO2 environmental brake on China's economic growth, because his and his party's survival depend on that growth.
Like Ray Dalio's book, "Principles for Dealing with the Changing World Order" which also predicts China toppling the USA, Rudd's narrative presents important evidence but then ignores its implications when they don't fit his message. Discussing China and the West, Rudd remains a true diplomat. He is neutral to a fault. I was also reminded of a very weak book I read on Stalin that managed to laud the diminutive dictator's work ethic but downplayed his tendency to slaughter millions of people.
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Changho Sohn
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August 7, 2022
This is a good entry primer for Chinese affairs. But this is not a great book to seek much insights into how to avoid a war. It is one thing to lay out an entire spectrum of Chinese affairs that are readily available in the public domain. The book packs them well. But merely putting out all the ingredients out on a table will not transform them into a gourmet. Yes, much clearer understanding of China is possible by reading the book. But what of the other half? The book outwardly puts the two powers squarely in half, both its title and its book design. Yes, the concentric circle idea of putting different facets of Chinese affairs is a clever idea. But it misses out almost entirely, any reflective plane or analysis vis-a-vis the US. "Destined for War" by Allison is criticized as being rather too simplistic. But it does present a clear logic by putting the two powers into an equal perspective, thus the Thucydides Trap formulation. This book does not.
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James Fok
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April 21, 2022
Balanced analysis of key strategic priorities of the current Chinese administration and of the drivers of conflict in the Sino-US relationship, along with constructive suggestions on how to peacefully manage strategic competition between the two countries.
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Nikhil
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July 26, 2022
Since 2017, when Donald Trump became the President of USA and shook up the world order as it has existed, various fault lines have emerged. The sharpest of them has been the one that exposed the uneasy partnership between China and USA that has existed since Kissinger made his trip to the Middle Earth in the 70s.
Kevin Rudd’s book, The Avoidable War, attempts to explain how the history to this uneasiness and why it has only increased over time. More so since Xi Jinping’s ascent to power in 2012 and his desire to leave an imprint as great (if not greater than) as Mao Zedong’s in Chinese history.
The book is intended for non Chinese audiences, probably a practical move as it may anyways not see light of day within PRC. As such, a significant portion of the book is dedicated to explaining Xi Jinping’s views on China, its rightful role in the pantheon of nations, the path towards achieving the same and the key impediments in that path. It explains how China has little or no compunctions about lying through its teeth or going back on commitments made by it in various global forum, so long as they contribute to its forward-march to greatness.
Xi sees the USA and its now rag-tag bunch of alliance partners as the primary stumbling block in China’s path. Hence, he has cleverly used China’s growing economic clout and the increasing inward looking stance of the American population (and by extension the US govt) to build an alternate narrative where China, at worst, could be one of the two global super powers, and potentially even the leader of a not-such-a-free world as the US continues to vacillate in its role as a global policeman.
While Kevin doesn’t seem to be dewy-eyed about China and it’s means to power, he seems to have a rather romantic view of China’s destined path. Just as China has builds its global ambitions through its economic prowess, it is the same economy which may prove to be its undoing. Internal economic and social contradictions, combined with an increasingly hostile global market (for Chinese goods and philosophy) have resulted in a scenario where China is sitting on a powder-keg and the match is held by a leadership which has total belief in its own infallibility.
Will the USA and China will figure out a framework with which to manage their increasingly contradictory and conflicting relationship or will they drag all of us into another war, with countless and senseless loss of lives, or maybe we continue to lurch forward in this environment of uncertainly. The answers will only come with time.
Till then, we can only speculate and watch the games from the sidelines. And of course attempt to understand the conundrums facing these two countries though the eyes of Kevin Rudd.
PS: By sheer omission, the book also highlights the extreme irrelevance that India has in the larger geo-political dialogue to any neutral observer.
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Steven
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August 14, 2022
"it was the rise of Athens and the fear that this instilled in Sparta that made war inevitable"
Thuycydides's trap is whenever a rising power threatens to displace a ruling power, a violent clash is inevitable. Historically, this has been the rule, not the exception.
Kevin Rudd was a previous prime minister in 2007 for Australia (no consensus on whether he was good or bad). And basically the only Western leader ever to be fluent in Chinese. He's a bit of a scholar and recently talks a lot about US-Chinese relations. This book is his gatherings from his analysis and his own Chinese connections as a neutral voice.
3 factors have changed the game in the US-China relationship.
- The economic, military and technological lead of the US is closing
- Xi Jinping's rise to power in 2014 and his new direction for China
- Trump's responses to a more assertive China during his presidency in 2017
This book goes in particular to the Xi Jinping factor, his motives, desires and all. Kev asserts that to avoid a war you must know the other's motives. War isn't good, the worse cases will be bloody and catastrophic. It's also good because I reckon most westerners never engage with the Chinese point of view.
I like the book because this isn't an assertion on which political-economic system is more moral, but the practical challenges of both (Xi Jinping's in particular) in steering his country to achieve his goals. He describes his approach in this book as "deeply realist".
The book is dense as hell, a dozen latin phrases, new vocabularly, heaps of international organisations, basic economics, geography knowledge are kinda needed to have an enriched reading. But also requires a bit more brain power than what I normally use when reading fiction. When my eyes start to glaze you can miss the golden nuggets so I spent a lot of time rereading passages. That's my main reason for the 3 star, this book is a bit hard, but still good. I learnt a fuck ton and this has changed my view of the incoming decade.
I wouldn't read this book if you are susceptible of being a doomer, it doesn't look that good right now for the western world order, but he ends with the guardrails required to avoid the war, suggestions for both the US and China.
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David Allen
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April 5, 2022
A methodical examination of China's expanding imperial trajectory and how it stacks up against the US. Some of Xi Jinping's 10 circles felt a bit rambly.
Kevin has a gift for being unconsciously hilarious. For example, in the chapter 'America's emerging strategic response to Xi Jinping's China' where he provides an earnest strategic analysis of Trump's tweet diplomacy. Lol.
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=====
The Avoidable War:
The Dangers of a Catastrophic Conflict between the U.S. and Xi Jinping’s China
22 March 2022
Washington, D.C.
The Hon. Kevin Rudd AC
President & CEO, Asia Society
President, Asia Society Policy Institute
26th Prime Minister of Australia
Thank you Senator Romney for doing me the honor of attending the launch of this book here in Washington, D.C.
In fact, it is good to see so many people here from both sides of the aisle of American politics, and from around the international community as we come together to think through the great question of our age: the future of the U.S.-China relationship and whether in the years to come, this ends in crisis, conflict or war.
As well as David Lipton, Counsellor to the Secretary of the Treasury Janet Yellen; former Deputy
Secretary of State John Negroponte; former Trade Representatives Carla Hills and Susan
Schwab; the Ambassadors of the Philippines, Thailand, as well as from my own country Australia, as well as other members of the diplomatic corps; and my publisher Public Affairs, represented by Colleen Lawrie and Johanna Dickson; and my literary agent and friend Michael Carlisle.
Dear friends, one and all,
Today, here in Washington, and in capitals around the world, we are rightly focussed on the unfolding horror in Ukraine.
Our common resolve must be simple: to defend freedom. To defend people’s right to choose the governments who lead them. And to defend the rights of nation states to live in peace and security within their nation’s boundaries.
Or as Article I of the United Nations Charter reminds us, to be free from the scourge of war.
All democracies should rally to the cause of providing the democratically elected government of Ukraine all the material resources it needs to defend its democracy and its country.
Just as all of us have a common global responsibility to shoulder our share of the burden with assisting the millions of Ukrainian refugees now pouring out of their blood-soaked land.
It may therefore seem odd to be here in Washington today launching a book entitled The Avoidable War. Not between Russia and Ukraine (even though that war was entirely avoidable, had Vladimir Putin chosen diplomacy rather than the sword).
The avoidable war we speak of today for so many of us remains unthinkable, and that is any future war between China and the United States.
Many of our friends in Europe also thought, until a month ago, that another major war on the European continent was unthinkable. But now it has come to pass.
We should therefore reflect soberly on the decade that lies ahead as we slide into a new and uncomfortable binary world that is divided between China and the United States.
Lessons of history
It’s always problematic to reach back into the past to justify a course of action for the future.
History never repeats itself. But as Mark Twain has reminded us, it often rhymes.
As I reflect on the 20th century, since the “war to end all wars” (and that was World War I), there are three sets of principles which remain anchored in my mind.
The first is how did we all became “sleepwalkers” during the extraordinary events of 1914 as we all tumbled headlong into a war which nobody wanted, few expected, and which monarchs, prime ministers and diplomats failed to prevent. Some thought it was possible. But none saw it as probable. Until the “Guns of August” ripped loose.
If you have read my compatriot Christopher Clark’s book The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914, you too will be haunted by how quickly the unthinkable becomes very thinkable indeed.
A second principle to emerge from the horrors of the 20th century is the problem of appeasement.
If dictators conclude that democracies lack resolve, then the sorry history of the 1930s is that they are emboldened. And so Hitler began the salami slicing of Europe. Until it became all too late to prevent general conflagration.
If there is a third principle, perhaps it is this: despite our near-death experience during the Cold War and the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, the world survived—ultimately through a combination of deterrence, détente and diplomacy.
In the case of the United States, the fact that Kennan’s doctrine of containment finally prevailed fully forty years after it was conceived was due to the fact that successive administrations—both Republican and Democratic—sustained it until the Berlin Wall came down, the Soviet Union collapsed and Eastern Europe was free.
There are of course many other lessons from history. Not all geopolitical. Geoeconomic lessons are rich as well. Economic enmeshment between the nations of the world may make armed conflict less probable, but certainly doesn’t remove the risk altogether, particularly as we reflect once again on what happened back in 1914 in what was then a highly globalized Europe and a highly globalized world.
Then there is our common planetary challenge of climate change. This too, as a matter of logic, should draw us together to save our shared biosphere. On this Paris gave us cause for hope. Glasgow a little less so. But as we see a return to hydrocarbons in response to the energy challenges of the moment, think of what Thomas Paine would have called “common sense”— common sense appears to be yielding to imperatives of economics and geopolitics.
The rise of China
So how do we draw these threads together in dealing with the challenge we all face in China’s continued rise?
The metrics are stark.
China as the world’s most populous country; the world’s second largest economy; the world’s largest military; as well as a nuclear weapons state.
China is also now actively engaged in a series of unresolved territorial disputes: along the SinoIndian border; in the East China Sea against Japan; in the South China Sea against multiple claimant states (including U.S. treaty ally the Philippines); and, of course, the biggest of them all, Taiwan.
Add to these geopolitical factors, and the ideological and ideational divides that now separate these two worlds, as China seeks to replace an international rules-based order, led by the United States, with one of its own making and choosing—one which puts China at its center and seeks to change that order’s norms and rules in a manner more compatible with Chinese national values and interests.
Taken together, these represent a heady mix of geostrategic challenges for the three decades that lie ahead—as we move towards Xi Jinping’s 2049 target of the national rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, by which point he plans for China to be the most powerful nation on Earth.
What then is to be done?
So what then is to be done if this is indeed to be the “avoidable war,” as the title of the book suggests it should be?
And how do we apply the lessons of history—sleepwalking, appeasement, deterrence, diplomacy and a common concern for the global commons—to a strategic framework which might just have some chance of reducing the possibilities for crisis, conflict and war between these two great powers of the 21st century?
At present, both Republicans and Democrats characterize the U.S.-China relationship as one of strategic competition.
By contrast, in China the Communist Party’s official literature describes the period through which we are currently living as “the rise of the East and the decline of the West.”
In Beijing, these are euphemisms for the rise of China and the decline of the United States.
Although I suspect the collective West’s unified response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine (including the imposition of punishing financial sanctions against Moscow and the geopolitical hardening that has occurred in Berlin) may have given China some temporary, pragmatic pause in its ideological euphoria.
Beneath the surface, China also recognizes that it is in a deep strategic competition with the United States for regional and global preponderance—militarily, economically and technologically.
As for Xi Jinping, he plans to be in office until about the mid-2030s (assuming his likely reappointment at the 20th Party Congress this November), by which point he would be in his mid-80s.
It is my judgement that Xi Jinping is likely to seek to use military means to recover Taiwan if that cannot be done via political means.
And that Xi wishes to see this happen within his lifetime.
We should not accept the panicked assumptions of some that this will happen anytime soon.
In my judgement, it would only happen when China believes that the balance of military power was overwhelmingly to its advantage in East Asia, and when financially and economically it would be powerful enough to withstand international financial sanctions.
Neither of these conditions exist at present.
That means it is more likely to be later this decade or early in the next, but still on Xi Jinping’s political watch. Because he, like Vladimir Putin, sees himself as “a man of history” seeking to recover lost national territory.
That means that we have entered what I call the decade of living dangerously.
The question, therefore, is how best to preserve the peace and defend freedom during what will be difficult and destabilizing times.
To do so, what I argue in the pages of this book is that it might just be possible to develop a joint strategic framework between Washington and Beijing of what I call “managed strategic competition.”
I have a simple approach to these questions: strategic competition can either be unmanaged (that is, that there are no rules of the road); or it can be managed (in the sense that there are some basic guardrails put in place, with the agreement of both sides, to prevent the relationship from spinning out of control by accident, rather than by design).
This becomes even more critical when the stock of political and diplomatic capital available in the bilateral relationship has been depleted to near zero.
And that is the point that we have about reached now.
When there is negligible trust, goodwill or even open lines of communication available, the risk of radical strategic miscalculation is very large.
There is no particular rocket science to my concept of managed strategic competition. I’ve been working on it since I wrote a research paper at the Harvard Kennedy School with my friend and colleague Graham Allison back in 2014. It was then less pressing than it is now. And I have written various articles and delivered various speeches on the concept in the years since then.
There are four components to managed strategic competition.
First, the United States and China must both develop a clear understanding of the other’s irreducible strategic redlines in order to help prevent conflict through miscalculation. Each side must be persuaded to conclude that enhancing strategic predictability advantages both countries, strategic deception is futile, and strategic surprise is just plain dangerous. This will require granular diplomatic understandings on Taiwan.
Second, the two sides would then channel the burden of strategic rivalry into a competitive race to enhance their military, economic and technological capabilities. Properly constrained, such competition aims to deter armed conflict rather than tempt either side to risk all by prosecuting what would become a dangerous and bloody war with deeply unpredictable results. Such strategic competition would also enable both sides to maximize their political, economic, and ideological appeal to the rest of the world. Its strategic rationale would be that the most competitive power would ultimately prevail by becoming (or remaining) the world’s foremost power—with Armageddon avoided. And may the best system win.
Third, this framework would create the political space necessary for the two countries to continue to engage in strategic cooperation in a number of defined areas where both their global and national interests would be enhanced by such collaboration—and indeed undermined by the absence of an agreed, collaborative approach. Climate looms large on the list. The next pandemic comes second. Then there is still the tricky business of maintaining global financial stability given the challenges that lie ahead.
Fourth, for this compartmentalization of the relationship to have a prospect for success, it would need to be policed by a dedicated senior official on either side of the relationship. On the
U.S. side that would be the Secretary of State or the National Security Advisor or the Secretary of Defence. On the Chinese side, it would be the Director of the Foreign Affairs Office of the Central Committee or the Vice Chairs of the Central Military Commission. Or all of the above. But no more quick decisions will be critical to avoiding disaster.
Of course, it is important to be realistic.
No joint strategic framework can in itself prevent war. But properly constructed and based on clarity, transparency, and most importantly credible deterrence, it may significantly reduce the risk of it.
Such a framework would also keep alive the possibility of political change, the evolution of each side’s worldview, or the emergence of new ways of thinking about old problems (both conceptual and even technological) and better managing great power relations in the complex world of the 21st century.
Most importantly, it may cause both China and the United States to conclude that after more than 150 years of one form of political engagement or another, they are not destined for war.
Conclusion
I am sure the approach I recommend in this book will be roundly criticized both in Washington and Beijing as not being sufficiently sensitive to the realities of each side’s core national interests.
My challenge to the critics, however, is to come up with something better.
For those who argue for deterrence, the reality is that deterrence forms a core component of the four part structure I have recommended. For those concerned about the appearance of appeasement, managed strategic competition does nothing of the sort, because there is an internal clarity (as opposed to public political bravado) to the strategic redlines that have been set.
And for those concerned, as I am, about sleepwalking into war, the whole point of two sets of senior officials acting as policemen of the strategic stability of the overall relationship, is that it seeks to avoid, by conscious design, the political and diplomatic inertia—followed by rapid and crazed mobilizations—that we saw in July 1914.
And for those who legitimately believe that, for the sake of the global environmental commons, these two countries—the largest polluters in the world—need to work together to save the planet, managed strategic competition offers a possible vehicle for collaboration on the things that matter to us all.
To succeed, managed strategic competition would need to be embraced in Beijing as well. The Chinese may well argued that the framework I have outlined does not sufficiently accommodate their interests, particularly on Taiwan. But our Chinese friends should reflect on the fact that crisis, miscalculation, conflict and war (and as our Russian friends have discovered, all the uncertainties that those involve) doesn’t suit China’s interests either.
For the United States, for such an approach to work, it would require a level of bipartisan buyin to a coherent long-term national China strategy that would transcend the daily blood sport of domestic American politics.
But America has, in its history, time and again proven that it is capable of uniting when the future of the Republic most desperately needs it.
And that time, I believe, has well and truly come.
I have lived and worked in America for five of the last seven years.
And at the beginning of my career, I lived, worked and studied for some three years in Hong Kong, Taipei, Shanghai and Beijing.
I know both these countries and the civilizational traditions which they represent very well.
And, for different reasons, I admire them both.
The time has come for statesmanship to deliver us from the peril that potentially lies ahead for us all. I hope this book, and the ideas contained within it, might make a small contribution to this great task.
===
Rudd seems to take at face value the self proclaimed status of the United States as protector of democracy and human rights worldwide. At the beginning of the book Rudd professes his 'love' for China. Though this is immediately met by a qualifier, he urgently makes a genuflection at the altar of anti-communist hatred with a dubious factoid pulled straight from the bible of commie-bashing itself the Black Book of communism;
'At the same time I have been deeply critical of Mao's depredations of the country during the Great Leap Forward of 1958, which left some thirty million dead through starvation...'.
Interestingly his love for the United States, and Australia, come unqualified, despite a large array of war crimes, genocide and ethnic cleansing between them. When it comes to atrocities, Rudd's outrage is quite selective.
When it comes down to it Rudd's gripe with the PRC is that it ended the century of humiliation. The west has never forgiven China for dragging itself out of an imposed poverty and re-establishing the territorial and political integrity that was almost completely ruined by western intervention. This is also his problem with Xi Jinping. The BRI, military modernisation and re-assertion of claims in the South China sea are not a repeat of western Imperialism but are an anti-colonial phenomenon and can only be understood as a reaction to the history of western intervention. Xi's programme of national rejuvenation and shaking off the final shackles of the century of humiliation go hand in hand.
Really what Rudd would like to see is a return to the good old days of the open door policy when a starving and drug addicted rump-China was run by a western backed kleptocracy. Unfortunately for him the days of imperialism are over. And Rudd's colonial dream is set to turn to dust.
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Lukasz
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April 23, 2022
4.5/5
An excellent book for those who would like to better understand the current world and the precarious balance of power between China and America. The author gives great insights into Xi Jinping's vision of China's development and goals and possible scenarios of shifts in geopolitics in the 2020s. Whatever happens, we'll be living dangerously in the decade to come.
2022 audiobook non-fiction
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Ben
2,718 reviews217 followers
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April 5, 2022
This was an outstanding read on China, foreign policy, and international relations - leading towards potential conflicts (war).
It detailed some impressive predictions between China-US, and Russia.
It also did an amazing job at looking towards what could happen between these superpowers in the future.
There was also a lot of description surrounding the predicted incoming war with Taiwan.
One of the best books on tactics and strategy of world powers - specifically around China - I have ever read.
4.9/5
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Frederic
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October 11, 2022
Author and former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd studied China in university, is fluent in Mandarin and writes like the diplomat he was. He scrupulously avoids taking sides and probably means well with this book. Who wouldn't share Rudd's view that war between China and the USA ought to be avoided?
Rudd usefully lays out the various historical reasons why China and the USA don't trust each other. He describes the rise of Xi Jinping as leader of the Chinese Communist Party and outlines China's history, politics and economic system. He proposes a safety net of managed competition between the two remaining superpowers that will delay conflict while America gets its act together.
That's sensible, as far as it goes, but Rudd ignores or downplays many massive signs that China's path to global domination will be neither smooth nor inevitable.
Rudd notes that the pillars of the Chinese Communist system are nationalism, Marxism with a Chinese twist and economic growth, which keeps the Chinese population from resenting their lack of freedom. Marxism has elsewhere failed repeatedly and spectacularly. Nationalism is hard to control, once ignited. Economic growth is sought by all governments, but it's much easier to achieve in a free economy. China has harvested a lot of low hanging economic fruit but will be challenged to reach Western levels of prosperity without huge political upheaval. Rudd mostly ignores this.
He suggests that if economic growth falters enough to cause unrest, Xi's regime is likely to become more belligerent internationally, which stirs up Chinese nationalism and may deflect criticism of his authoritarian government. That makes sense, unfortunately. Remember the Argentinian junta invading the Falklands in 1982?
Like many dictators (see Napoleon, Hitler, Castro and Putin), President Xi is not an economic genius. In fact, he's now cracking down on China's private sector and undermining investor confidence in the private part of the Chinese economy, which creates 90% of China's jobs. Rudd points out that China's economy is already much less efficient than that of Western democracies. Punishing private sector success will just make things worse for China, economically, but Xi's main obsession is remaining in power and he's still a Marxist, so he can't help himself. He thinks he has to stamp out both dissent and inequality.
Clearly, the Chinese Communist Party wants to stay in power at all costs by remaining authoritarian, using courts as a weapon of the state, randomly changing financial rules and stealing intellectual property. That is not compatible with sustaining domestic prosperity, much less attracting needed foreign capital from capitalist countries.
While China and Russia may dangle their despotic debt to snare more banana republics into their global network of goon regimes, they won't defeat democracy and capitalism, long term, because people want freedom and capital will always flee arbitrary, authoritarian markets in favour of more free, transparent ones.
While he describes himself as deeply realistic, Rudd seems completely to miss this basic truth about economics. It's not his only blind spot.
As a longtime climate activist, Rudd supports the Paris Accord and urges the West to recruit China to join the global anti CO2 crusade, glossing over the fact that, despite the Paris Accord, China is still building coal fired power plants as fast as it can.
Unlike ostentatiously virtuous Western leaders like Canada's vacuous Justin Trudeau, President Xi is not stupid enough to destroy his domestic energy industry for the sake of domestic and international, innumerate, progressive applause. Yes, Xi may try harder in future to clean up visible, particulate air pollution in Beijing, because it's sickening his people, but he won't put a massive, anti CO2 environmental brake on China's economic growth, because his and his party's survival depend on that growth.
Like Ray Dalio's book, "Principles for Dealing with the Changing World Order" which also predicts China toppling the USA, Rudd's narrative presents important evidence but then ignores its implications when they don't fit his message. Discussing China and the West, Rudd remains a true diplomat. He is neutral to a fault. I was also reminded of a very weak book I read on Stalin that managed to laud the diminutive dictator's work ethic but downplayed his tendency to slaughter millions of people.
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Changho Sohn
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August 7, 2022
This is a good entry primer for Chinese affairs. But this is not a great book to seek much insights into how to avoid a war. It is one thing to lay out an entire spectrum of Chinese affairs that are readily available in the public domain. The book packs them well. But merely putting out all the ingredients out on a table will not transform them into a gourmet. Yes, much clearer understanding of China is possible by reading the book. But what of the other half? The book outwardly puts the two powers squarely in half, both its title and its book design. Yes, the concentric circle idea of putting different facets of Chinese affairs is a clever idea. But it misses out almost entirely, any reflective plane or analysis vis-a-vis the US. "Destined for War" by Allison is criticized as being rather too simplistic. But it does present a clear logic by putting the two powers into an equal perspective, thus the Thucydides Trap formulation. This book does not.
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James Fok
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April 21, 2022
Balanced analysis of key strategic priorities of the current Chinese administration and of the drivers of conflict in the Sino-US relationship, along with constructive suggestions on how to peacefully manage strategic competition between the two countries.
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Nikhil
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July 26, 2022
Since 2017, when Donald Trump became the President of USA and shook up the world order as it has existed, various fault lines have emerged. The sharpest of them has been the one that exposed the uneasy partnership between China and USA that has existed since Kissinger made his trip to the Middle Earth in the 70s.
Kevin Rudd’s book, The Avoidable War, attempts to explain how the history to this uneasiness and why it has only increased over time. More so since Xi Jinping’s ascent to power in 2012 and his desire to leave an imprint as great (if not greater than) as Mao Zedong’s in Chinese history.
The book is intended for non Chinese audiences, probably a practical move as it may anyways not see light of day within PRC. As such, a significant portion of the book is dedicated to explaining Xi Jinping’s views on China, its rightful role in the pantheon of nations, the path towards achieving the same and the key impediments in that path. It explains how China has little or no compunctions about lying through its teeth or going back on commitments made by it in various global forum, so long as they contribute to its forward-march to greatness.
Xi sees the USA and its now rag-tag bunch of alliance partners as the primary stumbling block in China’s path. Hence, he has cleverly used China’s growing economic clout and the increasing inward looking stance of the American population (and by extension the US govt) to build an alternate narrative where China, at worst, could be one of the two global super powers, and potentially even the leader of a not-such-a-free world as the US continues to vacillate in its role as a global policeman.
While Kevin doesn’t seem to be dewy-eyed about China and it’s means to power, he seems to have a rather romantic view of China’s destined path. Just as China has builds its global ambitions through its economic prowess, it is the same economy which may prove to be its undoing. Internal economic and social contradictions, combined with an increasingly hostile global market (for Chinese goods and philosophy) have resulted in a scenario where China is sitting on a powder-keg and the match is held by a leadership which has total belief in its own infallibility.
Will the USA and China will figure out a framework with which to manage their increasingly contradictory and conflicting relationship or will they drag all of us into another war, with countless and senseless loss of lives, or maybe we continue to lurch forward in this environment of uncertainly. The answers will only come with time.
Till then, we can only speculate and watch the games from the sidelines. And of course attempt to understand the conundrums facing these two countries though the eyes of Kevin Rudd.
PS: By sheer omission, the book also highlights the extreme irrelevance that India has in the larger geo-political dialogue to any neutral observer.
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Steven
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August 14, 2022
"it was the rise of Athens and the fear that this instilled in Sparta that made war inevitable"
Thuycydides's trap is whenever a rising power threatens to displace a ruling power, a violent clash is inevitable. Historically, this has been the rule, not the exception.
Kevin Rudd was a previous prime minister in 2007 for Australia (no consensus on whether he was good or bad). And basically the only Western leader ever to be fluent in Chinese. He's a bit of a scholar and recently talks a lot about US-Chinese relations. This book is his gatherings from his analysis and his own Chinese connections as a neutral voice.
3 factors have changed the game in the US-China relationship.
- The economic, military and technological lead of the US is closing
- Xi Jinping's rise to power in 2014 and his new direction for China
- Trump's responses to a more assertive China during his presidency in 2017
This book goes in particular to the Xi Jinping factor, his motives, desires and all. Kev asserts that to avoid a war you must know the other's motives. War isn't good, the worse cases will be bloody and catastrophic. It's also good because I reckon most westerners never engage with the Chinese point of view.
I like the book because this isn't an assertion on which political-economic system is more moral, but the practical challenges of both (Xi Jinping's in particular) in steering his country to achieve his goals. He describes his approach in this book as "deeply realist".
The book is dense as hell, a dozen latin phrases, new vocabularly, heaps of international organisations, basic economics, geography knowledge are kinda needed to have an enriched reading. But also requires a bit more brain power than what I normally use when reading fiction. When my eyes start to glaze you can miss the golden nuggets so I spent a lot of time rereading passages. That's my main reason for the 3 star, this book is a bit hard, but still good. I learnt a fuck ton and this has changed my view of the incoming decade.
I wouldn't read this book if you are susceptible of being a doomer, it doesn't look that good right now for the western world order, but he ends with the guardrails required to avoid the war, suggestions for both the US and China.
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David Allen
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April 5, 2022
A methodical examination of China's expanding imperial trajectory and how it stacks up against the US. Some of Xi Jinping's 10 circles felt a bit rambly.
Kevin has a gift for being unconsciously hilarious. For example, in the chapter 'America's emerging strategic response to Xi Jinping's China' where he provides an earnest strategic analysis of Trump's tweet diplomacy. Lol.
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The Avoidable War:
The Dangers of a Catastrophic Conflict between the U.S. and Xi Jinping’s China
22 March 2022
Washington, D.C.
The Hon. Kevin Rudd AC
President & CEO, Asia Society
President, Asia Society Policy Institute
26th Prime Minister of Australia
Thank you Senator Romney for doing me the honor of attending the launch of this book here in Washington, D.C.
In fact, it is good to see so many people here from both sides of the aisle of American politics, and from around the international community as we come together to think through the great question of our age: the future of the U.S.-China relationship and whether in the years to come, this ends in crisis, conflict or war.
As well as David Lipton, Counsellor to the Secretary of the Treasury Janet Yellen; former Deputy
Secretary of State John Negroponte; former Trade Representatives Carla Hills and Susan
Schwab; the Ambassadors of the Philippines, Thailand, as well as from my own country Australia, as well as other members of the diplomatic corps; and my publisher Public Affairs, represented by Colleen Lawrie and Johanna Dickson; and my literary agent and friend Michael Carlisle.
Dear friends, one and all,
Today, here in Washington, and in capitals around the world, we are rightly focussed on the unfolding horror in Ukraine.
Our common resolve must be simple: to defend freedom. To defend people’s right to choose the governments who lead them. And to defend the rights of nation states to live in peace and security within their nation’s boundaries.
Or as Article I of the United Nations Charter reminds us, to be free from the scourge of war.
All democracies should rally to the cause of providing the democratically elected government of Ukraine all the material resources it needs to defend its democracy and its country.
Just as all of us have a common global responsibility to shoulder our share of the burden with assisting the millions of Ukrainian refugees now pouring out of their blood-soaked land.
It may therefore seem odd to be here in Washington today launching a book entitled The Avoidable War. Not between Russia and Ukraine (even though that war was entirely avoidable, had Vladimir Putin chosen diplomacy rather than the sword).
The avoidable war we speak of today for so many of us remains unthinkable, and that is any future war between China and the United States.
Many of our friends in Europe also thought, until a month ago, that another major war on the European continent was unthinkable. But now it has come to pass.
We should therefore reflect soberly on the decade that lies ahead as we slide into a new and uncomfortable binary world that is divided between China and the United States.
Lessons of history
It’s always problematic to reach back into the past to justify a course of action for the future.
History never repeats itself. But as Mark Twain has reminded us, it often rhymes.
As I reflect on the 20th century, since the “war to end all wars” (and that was World War I), there are three sets of principles which remain anchored in my mind.
The first is how did we all became “sleepwalkers” during the extraordinary events of 1914 as we all tumbled headlong into a war which nobody wanted, few expected, and which monarchs, prime ministers and diplomats failed to prevent. Some thought it was possible. But none saw it as probable. Until the “Guns of August” ripped loose.
If you have read my compatriot Christopher Clark’s book The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914, you too will be haunted by how quickly the unthinkable becomes very thinkable indeed.
A second principle to emerge from the horrors of the 20th century is the problem of appeasement.
If dictators conclude that democracies lack resolve, then the sorry history of the 1930s is that they are emboldened. And so Hitler began the salami slicing of Europe. Until it became all too late to prevent general conflagration.
If there is a third principle, perhaps it is this: despite our near-death experience during the Cold War and the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, the world survived—ultimately through a combination of deterrence, détente and diplomacy.
In the case of the United States, the fact that Kennan’s doctrine of containment finally prevailed fully forty years after it was conceived was due to the fact that successive administrations—both Republican and Democratic—sustained it until the Berlin Wall came down, the Soviet Union collapsed and Eastern Europe was free.
There are of course many other lessons from history. Not all geopolitical. Geoeconomic lessons are rich as well. Economic enmeshment between the nations of the world may make armed conflict less probable, but certainly doesn’t remove the risk altogether, particularly as we reflect once again on what happened back in 1914 in what was then a highly globalized Europe and a highly globalized world.
Then there is our common planetary challenge of climate change. This too, as a matter of logic, should draw us together to save our shared biosphere. On this Paris gave us cause for hope. Glasgow a little less so. But as we see a return to hydrocarbons in response to the energy challenges of the moment, think of what Thomas Paine would have called “common sense”— common sense appears to be yielding to imperatives of economics and geopolitics.
The rise of China
So how do we draw these threads together in dealing with the challenge we all face in China’s continued rise?
The metrics are stark.
China as the world’s most populous country; the world’s second largest economy; the world’s largest military; as well as a nuclear weapons state.
China is also now actively engaged in a series of unresolved territorial disputes: along the SinoIndian border; in the East China Sea against Japan; in the South China Sea against multiple claimant states (including U.S. treaty ally the Philippines); and, of course, the biggest of them all, Taiwan.
Add to these geopolitical factors, and the ideological and ideational divides that now separate these two worlds, as China seeks to replace an international rules-based order, led by the United States, with one of its own making and choosing—one which puts China at its center and seeks to change that order’s norms and rules in a manner more compatible with Chinese national values and interests.
Taken together, these represent a heady mix of geostrategic challenges for the three decades that lie ahead—as we move towards Xi Jinping’s 2049 target of the national rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, by which point he plans for China to be the most powerful nation on Earth.
What then is to be done?
So what then is to be done if this is indeed to be the “avoidable war,” as the title of the book suggests it should be?
And how do we apply the lessons of history—sleepwalking, appeasement, deterrence, diplomacy and a common concern for the global commons—to a strategic framework which might just have some chance of reducing the possibilities for crisis, conflict and war between these two great powers of the 21st century?
At present, both Republicans and Democrats characterize the U.S.-China relationship as one of strategic competition.
By contrast, in China the Communist Party’s official literature describes the period through which we are currently living as “the rise of the East and the decline of the West.”
In Beijing, these are euphemisms for the rise of China and the decline of the United States.
Although I suspect the collective West’s unified response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine (including the imposition of punishing financial sanctions against Moscow and the geopolitical hardening that has occurred in Berlin) may have given China some temporary, pragmatic pause in its ideological euphoria.
Beneath the surface, China also recognizes that it is in a deep strategic competition with the United States for regional and global preponderance—militarily, economically and technologically.
As for Xi Jinping, he plans to be in office until about the mid-2030s (assuming his likely reappointment at the 20th Party Congress this November), by which point he would be in his mid-80s.
It is my judgement that Xi Jinping is likely to seek to use military means to recover Taiwan if that cannot be done via political means.
And that Xi wishes to see this happen within his lifetime.
We should not accept the panicked assumptions of some that this will happen anytime soon.
In my judgement, it would only happen when China believes that the balance of military power was overwhelmingly to its advantage in East Asia, and when financially and economically it would be powerful enough to withstand international financial sanctions.
Neither of these conditions exist at present.
That means it is more likely to be later this decade or early in the next, but still on Xi Jinping’s political watch. Because he, like Vladimir Putin, sees himself as “a man of history” seeking to recover lost national territory.
That means that we have entered what I call the decade of living dangerously.
The question, therefore, is how best to preserve the peace and defend freedom during what will be difficult and destabilizing times.
To do so, what I argue in the pages of this book is that it might just be possible to develop a joint strategic framework between Washington and Beijing of what I call “managed strategic competition.”
I have a simple approach to these questions: strategic competition can either be unmanaged (that is, that there are no rules of the road); or it can be managed (in the sense that there are some basic guardrails put in place, with the agreement of both sides, to prevent the relationship from spinning out of control by accident, rather than by design).
This becomes even more critical when the stock of political and diplomatic capital available in the bilateral relationship has been depleted to near zero.
And that is the point that we have about reached now.
When there is negligible trust, goodwill or even open lines of communication available, the risk of radical strategic miscalculation is very large.
There is no particular rocket science to my concept of managed strategic competition. I’ve been working on it since I wrote a research paper at the Harvard Kennedy School with my friend and colleague Graham Allison back in 2014. It was then less pressing than it is now. And I have written various articles and delivered various speeches on the concept in the years since then.
There are four components to managed strategic competition.
First, the United States and China must both develop a clear understanding of the other’s irreducible strategic redlines in order to help prevent conflict through miscalculation. Each side must be persuaded to conclude that enhancing strategic predictability advantages both countries, strategic deception is futile, and strategic surprise is just plain dangerous. This will require granular diplomatic understandings on Taiwan.
Second, the two sides would then channel the burden of strategic rivalry into a competitive race to enhance their military, economic and technological capabilities. Properly constrained, such competition aims to deter armed conflict rather than tempt either side to risk all by prosecuting what would become a dangerous and bloody war with deeply unpredictable results. Such strategic competition would also enable both sides to maximize their political, economic, and ideological appeal to the rest of the world. Its strategic rationale would be that the most competitive power would ultimately prevail by becoming (or remaining) the world’s foremost power—with Armageddon avoided. And may the best system win.
Third, this framework would create the political space necessary for the two countries to continue to engage in strategic cooperation in a number of defined areas where both their global and national interests would be enhanced by such collaboration—and indeed undermined by the absence of an agreed, collaborative approach. Climate looms large on the list. The next pandemic comes second. Then there is still the tricky business of maintaining global financial stability given the challenges that lie ahead.
Fourth, for this compartmentalization of the relationship to have a prospect for success, it would need to be policed by a dedicated senior official on either side of the relationship. On the
U.S. side that would be the Secretary of State or the National Security Advisor or the Secretary of Defence. On the Chinese side, it would be the Director of the Foreign Affairs Office of the Central Committee or the Vice Chairs of the Central Military Commission. Or all of the above. But no more quick decisions will be critical to avoiding disaster.
Of course, it is important to be realistic.
No joint strategic framework can in itself prevent war. But properly constructed and based on clarity, transparency, and most importantly credible deterrence, it may significantly reduce the risk of it.
Such a framework would also keep alive the possibility of political change, the evolution of each side’s worldview, or the emergence of new ways of thinking about old problems (both conceptual and even technological) and better managing great power relations in the complex world of the 21st century.
Most importantly, it may cause both China and the United States to conclude that after more than 150 years of one form of political engagement or another, they are not destined for war.
Conclusion
I am sure the approach I recommend in this book will be roundly criticized both in Washington and Beijing as not being sufficiently sensitive to the realities of each side’s core national interests.
My challenge to the critics, however, is to come up with something better.
For those who argue for deterrence, the reality is that deterrence forms a core component of the four part structure I have recommended. For those concerned about the appearance of appeasement, managed strategic competition does nothing of the sort, because there is an internal clarity (as opposed to public political bravado) to the strategic redlines that have been set.
And for those concerned, as I am, about sleepwalking into war, the whole point of two sets of senior officials acting as policemen of the strategic stability of the overall relationship, is that it seeks to avoid, by conscious design, the political and diplomatic inertia—followed by rapid and crazed mobilizations—that we saw in July 1914.
And for those who legitimately believe that, for the sake of the global environmental commons, these two countries—the largest polluters in the world—need to work together to save the planet, managed strategic competition offers a possible vehicle for collaboration on the things that matter to us all.
To succeed, managed strategic competition would need to be embraced in Beijing as well. The Chinese may well argued that the framework I have outlined does not sufficiently accommodate their interests, particularly on Taiwan. But our Chinese friends should reflect on the fact that crisis, miscalculation, conflict and war (and as our Russian friends have discovered, all the uncertainties that those involve) doesn’t suit China’s interests either.
For the United States, for such an approach to work, it would require a level of bipartisan buyin to a coherent long-term national China strategy that would transcend the daily blood sport of domestic American politics.
But America has, in its history, time and again proven that it is capable of uniting when the future of the Republic most desperately needs it.
And that time, I believe, has well and truly come.
I have lived and worked in America for five of the last seven years.
And at the beginning of my career, I lived, worked and studied for some three years in Hong Kong, Taipei, Shanghai and Beijing.
I know both these countries and the civilizational traditions which they represent very well.
And, for different reasons, I admire them both.
The time has come for statesmanship to deliver us from the peril that potentially lies ahead for us all. I hope this book, and the ideas contained within it, might make a small contribution to this great task.
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