2019-01-31

시장에 대한 새로운 접근과 해석을 위하여 – 다른백년



시장에 대한 새로운 접근과 해석을 위하여 – 다른백년



다른백년과 함께, 더 나은 미래를 향해

기획칼럼
이래경의 [제3섹타 경제론]
시장에 대한 새로운 접근과 해석을 위하여

자본의 탐욕에 대한 이념적 종속이냐? 인간의 자유 실현을 위한 실천적 도구이냐?이래경 2019.01.24 1 COMMENT


한겨레 신문에 ‘을의 경제학’이라는 제목으로 칼럼을 연재하고 있는 장흥배 님이 1월 10일 ‘시장은 어떻게 지배하는가’라는 주제로 쓴 글의 일부를 아래로 다시 소개한다..

“최저임금제의 의의는 임금 최저선의 결정(이라는 영역)에서 시장에 대한 사회의 우위를 확인한 것이다. (중략) 문재인 정부하에서 최저임금제의 역사적 의미는 시장의 힘을 극복하려는 것이었지, 이에 굴복하라는 것이 아니었다. 촛불항쟁, 여야 대선주자들의 공약 경쟁, 이를 통해 들어선 정부의 정책 수립을 통해 탄생한 최저임금 1만원이 가리키는 정책 방향은 공룡 재벌에 의해 망가진 공정거래 질서의 복원, 만약의 고용 위기를 상쇄할 과감한 복지와 소득재분배, 부동산 지대경제의 청산 등이었다. 요컨대 시장과 경제를 16.4%의 최저임금 인상이 수용될 수 있는 환경으로 개혁한다는 것이 인상을 결정한 사회적 합의의 요구였던 것이다. 달리 보면 이 모든 과제에서 허탕을 치고 역진하는 정부가 최저임금 인상 효과를 무력화하는 온갖 꼼수로 나가는 것은 예정된 수순일 수밖에 없다.

좌절로 가는 최저임금 1만원 실험에서 남아야 할 교훈이 있다. 지배계급은 언제나 자신들의 계급적 이해에 따른 선택을 객관적인 시장의 힘에 의한 제약으로 위장한다는 것이다. (반작용적) 역효과 명제는 이를 통해 대중의 사고를 효과적으로 지배한다. 실상 신비한 시장의 힘으로 포장된 상자를 뜯어보면 재벌, 상가와 아파트 자산가, 상위 10% 고소득자들의 경제적 이권을 유지·확대하려는 (탐욕의) 이해가 대개의 내용물이다”



명쾌한 선언이다! 시장은 당연히 시민사회의 필요와 합의에 따라 작동하고 역할을 해야 한다 그런데 촛불의 이름을 앞세워 집권한 문재인 정부에서조차 한국 사회의 모습은 시장논리와 경제성과라는 미명으로 극소수의 기득권층 탐욕이 합리적인 것처럼 포장되고 이들에 의해 전일적으로 지배당하는 공간으로 변모하였다.

본인과 가족들의 패악행위 등으로 스스로 경영능력이 없음을 만천하에 노출한 조양호 대한항공 그룹회장의 경영권을 박탈하기 위하여 마땅히 이루어져야 할 연기금 등 공공투자 지분의 주주권 행사(stewardship)를 유보하면서 오히려 수구언론과 보수진영에서 이를 마치 사유재산권과 경영권의 침해하는 것으로 오도하는 것에 암묵적으로 동조하고, 명백하고 노골적으로 탈법과 불법을 저지른 이재용을 삼성이라는 한국 대표기업의 주주이자 경영자라는 단 하나의 이유로 구속을 면책하고 석방하였다. 결국 대한항공과 삼성이라는 거대한 기업집단들이 국민적 자산이 아니라 일개 가문의 전횡적 사유물이라는 것을 공인한 셈이다.

시민들에게서 수임한 개혁을 추진하는 대신 애매하게 삼성과 연대하며 황당하게 시장의 논리를 전면적으로 내세웠던 지난 세월의 참여정부에 이어, 역시나 이익 방어에 노련한 기득권의 간교와 교언영색으로 포장된 예의 시장논리에 포획되고 투항하면서, 인간다운 삶을 보장하는 최저임금제 실현과 노동시간 단축이라는 역사적 명제에서 말머리를 돌려 뒷걸음친 문재인 정부는 이제 더 이상 촛불과 시민을 정권의 명분과 장식용으로 운운해서는 아니 된다.사진: pixabay

시장은 기본적으로 무죄이다. 문제는 시장이라는 이름으로 포장하여 작동하는 기득권과 자본의 탐욕과 이를 정당화하는 논리와 이데올로기와 매카니즘, 그리고 이에 조응하여 형성되는 정치 경제 사회 문화 전반에 걸친 구조가 문제이다. 이에 한걸음 더 들어가 시장이라는 일반적이고 포괄적인 용어를 시장, 시장가격, 시장기구(역할), 시장경제 등으로 다시 세분하여 들여다 보고자 한다.

경제학 사전에 의하면 시장은 일군의 공급자와 수요간에 성립하는 재화 내지는 용역의 교환 또는 매매의 관계 전체를 지칭하는 용어이다. 역사적 흐름으로 볼 때 상품경제가 발달하지 않은 시대에는 교환 내지는 매매 행위가 특정 장소에서 이루어졌으나, 상품경제가 일반화된 이후에는 구체적 매매 행위에 더하여 개념적 추상으로서 시장이 존재하면서 이를 바탕으로 형성된 관계와 범위의 내용이 특정 장소를 대신하게 되었다고 적고 있다.

아담 스미스 이래 경제학의 핵심은 가치에 대한 논쟁과 시장에서 가격이 형성되는 과정에 관한 것일 것이다. 개념으로서 가치와 시장 가격 간에 존재하는 괴리에 대한 관점과 해석이 지난 수백 년간 서구를 중심으로 이루어진 경제 산업의 내용을 역동적으로 규정해 왔다고 해도 과언이 아닐 것이다. 경제학을 전공하지 않은 필자는 다만 기업인으로서 30여 년간 실물 경제를 체험한 바탕으로 경제와 시장에 대해 기존의 논쟁과는 다른 의견을 만용스럽게 개진해 보고자 한다.

육체라는 유기체적 형태를 지닌 인간에게는 의식주의 해결이라는 절대적 필요가 존재하며 어떠한 상황과 조건에서도 이를 충족하는 재화와 서비스가 제공되어야 비로소 해당 사회가 지속될 수 있다. 이를 해결하려는 국가단위의 시스템을 현대적 의미에서 복지의 사회안전망 이라고 할 수 있을 것이다. 다행히 수 차례의 산업적 혁명과정을 통하여 인류의 노동 생산성이 획기적으로 높아지고 기본적으로 의식주의 수요를 해결하면서, 이제 추가적으로 진행되는 생산(경제)활동은 역사의 흐름이라는 시간적 요소와 더불어 사회와 정치적 관계구조 속에서 상대적이며 개별적으로 형성되는 수요와 연동하여 다양하게 전개된다.

현장에서 물물교환과 단순한 매매가 이루어지던 시대를 지나 근대에 이르면 위에 언급한 다양한 형태의 시장과 사회적 권력구조 속에서 집단적 공급과 수요의 균형적 만남을 통하여 시장가격이 형성된다. 이때 시장이라는 구체적 또는 추상적 공간에서 현상적으로는 수급상황과 한계효용의 논리에 따라 가격이 형성되지만, 실현된 가격이라는 현상 뒤에는 생산 및 공급의 수단과 유통망 기반의 소유권을 둘러싸고 형성된 사회적 지위와 정치적 권력구조가 실제적인 힘으로 작동하게 된다.

현대의 대부분 경제학자들은, 알프레드 마샬이 제시하였듯이 일군의 공급과 수요에 의한 균형에 의해서 합리적으로 시장가격이 형성되고 호모 에코노미쿠스로 규정된 인간들에 의해 한계효용적이고 판단논리적인 행위에 의해, 기존에 형성된 가격선이 수학의 법칙처럼 이동한다고 곧이 곧대로 믿지는 않을 것이다.

오히려 시장가격과 변동은 사회평균 생산력에 의한 노동가치에 기반하되 혁신적 기제와 더불어 사회구조와 세력간의 힘에 의해 결정된다고 보는 것이 현실적이다. 이에 더하여 체제의 주류집단이 주도하는 미디어 매체의 홍보와 문화적 환경 속에서 개별적 집단적 심리 욕구가 인위적으로 형성되면서 소비자들로 하여금 의도하지 않은 수요를 촉발하게 만든다.

권력구조에 따라서 전개되는 시장 현실과는 별도로, 이론적으로 이상적인 조건하에 수급 균형과 한계적 효용가치 이론이 작동하는 시장경제에서는 매체 또는 공간이라는 장소를 통하여 재화와 서비스의 공급지를 확인할 수 있으며 가격을 매개로 실제적인 수요가 보내는 신호를 확인하면서, 일차적인 수요와 공급에 대한 정보와 균형의 기능에 더하여, 경제적 유효 자원들을 가장 효과적으로 배분하고 결합시키는 역할과 기능을 갖게 된다고 믿는다.

이러한 관점에 서면 20세기 전체주의적인 극우 파시즘과 극좌적인 스탈린 시대의 경제체제를 경험하였던 빈 학파의 미제스와 하이에크의 신자유주의적 이론과 입장이 일면 타당하고 이해할 만한 것이다. 혹독한 시대적 경험을 겪은 빈 학파의 입장에서 보면 시장이 제 기능을 발휘하기 위해서는 핵심 사항으로 반드시 개인적 자유주의와 무제한적 사유재산권이 전제되어야 하며 국가의 역할을 상기 요소들을 보호하고 보장하는 것으로 제한해야 한다. 좀더 나가서는 인간의 자의적 판단을 배제하면서 시장에게 만능의 능력을 부여하여 신과 동등한 위치까지 올려 놓는다. 이제 시장 만능주의는 ‘반드시 시장에 복종해야 하며 다른 대안은 없다(TINA’)는 강력한 이데올로기로 발전해 나간다.

반면에 폴라니와 케인즈 등의 입장에 서면 자본가들의 지나친 탐욕으로 자유시장의 기능이 실패하고 독점의 폐해가 커져가면서 사유적 자본의 자기조정과 이익실현이라는 매카니즘이 망가졌음에도 불구하고, 생산을 무리하게 강행하여 한편에서는 과잉생산물이 누적되는 반면에 식민지를 포함하여 빈곤과 결핍으로 탈진한 시장의 과소소비 상황이 겹치면서, 이러한 공황적 상황을 정치권력의 강제이던 군사적 물리력이던 국가단위 또는 연합적 지역단위에서 폭력적으로 해결하는 과정으로 파시즘이 태동한 것으로 판단하게 된다. 한마디로 파시즘은 탐욕 때문에 실패한 시장 기능을 강제적으로 작동시키면서 발생하는 반동적 현상인 것이다. 따라서 민주적 절차에 따라 시민들의 선택에 의해 위임된 정치적 강제력으로 잘못된 시장질서와 왜곡된 산업구조에 개입하고 수정을 시도하는 것은 정당하고 마땅한 일이다.

상기의 두 가지 상반된 입장이 대치하는 가운데, 지난 백여 년간 경험을 통하여 되돌아 보면 시장기능과 시장경제의 역할은 결국 역사적 상황에 따른 사회적 정치적 관점과 입장의 문제로 다시 귀결된다. 마치 근대 정치철학의 출발점에서 공히 국가의 성립을 사회계약론으로 해석하면서도, 홉즈는 기존 질서의 권력자인 군주의 입장에 서고 로크는 신흥 유산자 계층의 편협한 이익을 옹호하는 논리를 전개하지만 루소는 모든 공민들의 참여와 합의에 의한 일반의지에 기초하여 근대적 민주주의를 주창한 역사적 경험을 되돌아 보게 한다. 판단의 기준은 ‘무엇과 누구를 위한 것 인가’ 이다.

이에 더하여 제3차 산업혁명이 진행되면서 제조업과 서비스업 간의 생산성 격차에 따른 보몰 효과가 나타나고 제2차 대전 이후 미국의 절대적 경제력에 의해 달러에 기초하여 형성된 기존의 통화시스템에 미국경제가 위축되는 과정에서 심각한 비대칭성이 형성되면서 고전적인 경제와 통화의 이론에 괴리와 변종이 생기기 시작하였다. 급기야 무형재를 중심으로 하는 제4차 산업혁명의 출현과정에서는 기존의 시장경제 이론인 재화 및 서비스의 배타성과 경쟁의 논리 및 수확체감의 법칙 등이 더 이상 유효하지 않은 상황에 직면하게 된다.

금융과 산업변천의 경제사를 오랜동안 연구해온 건국대의 최배근 교수는 최근의 저작 ‘위기의 경제학? 공동체의 경제학!’을 통하여 (기존의) 경제학은 없다고 선언하기에 이른다. 그에 의하면 현재의 경제적 위기는 지난 시기 공업화에서 벗어나는 탈공업화 과정에서 새로운 출구를 찾지 못하면서 과다하게 금융산업에 의존하게 되었고 위에 언급한 달러 중심의 통화시스템과 금융산업이 미국의 패권과 결합하고 세계화를 통하여 전지구적 불균형과 극심한 소득불평등이 확대를 거듭하면서 양극화의 위기 상황을 초래하였다는 것이다. 현재 우리가 직면하고 있는 적나라한 현실이다.

인류의 미래에 대한 희망을 포기하지 않는 최교수는 인터넷 망과 ICT 기술의 기반을 전제하는 미래적 사회에서는 탈물질적인 무형재를 중심으로 전개될 것으로 예상하면서 이러한 무형재적 미래의 산업에는 혁신적 창의성과 자율성이 가치창출의 핵심을 이룬다고 주장한다.

따라서 기존 경제와 산업의 영역에서 지배적 형태였던 소모적이고 경쟁적이고 배제적인 방식에서 탈피하고 데이터와 네트워크를 기반으로 한 협력과 공유라는 새로운 방식과 논리가 도입되어야 한다는 것이다. 혁신 역시 협력과 공동작업을 통해서만 실현가능하고 가치창출방식과 사업모델에도 다다익선의 가치체증의 법칙이 작동하면서 이타자리(利他自利)형 경제 모델과 법칙이 작동하게 된다는 것이다.

이에 따라 교육 역시 타인과 경쟁적인 지식축적의 암기형에서 협력을 기반으로 더불어 함께 과제를 인식하고 문제의 해결을 찾아가는 방식으로 바뀌어야 하며, 금융도 기축통화 중심과 중앙은행의 통제적 개입 방식에서 벗어나 블록체인과 플랫홈 공유를 통한 민주적이며 다원적인 시스템 도입이 불가피하다는 입장을 기술하고 있다.



필자는 최배근 교수가 ‘공동체 경제학’이라는 이름으로 던지는 새로운 문제의식의 도전과 혁신적인 패러다임의 전망에 전적으로 지지하고 동의하면서, 다른 한편에서는 다음과 같은 몇 가지 사항을 보완하여 지적하고자 한다. .

우선 인간이 유기적 육체를 지닌 존재라는 조건으로 인하여, 자연재에 노동을 가하여 의식주의 수요를 해결하는 절대적 기초재와 인터넷 기반과 ICT 기술에 기반으로 새로이 형성되는 무형재를 구별하여 접근하는 것이 필요하다는 생각이다. 기초재 중에서도 의복은 대충 해결된 상태이지만 식량은 여전히 국가단위에서는 안보적 차원의 주제이고 개별적인 시민에게도 일상적으로 중요한 주제이다. 주거의 문제는 특히 투기가 극성을 부리는 한국사회에서는 사회 안전망으로서 복지의 핵심적 내용을 차지하면서 공공의 개입과 역할이 반드시 요구되는 영역이다. 양보할 수 없는 의식주의 전반적 영역에서는 고전 경제학에서 이야기하는 배타적 경합성이 여전히 작동하고 있다는 점을 간과해서는 안될 것이다.

무형재 일반 역시 성격에 따라 섬세한 재분류가 필요할 것이다. 인간의 삶에 있어서 필요한 재화와 서비스의 생산 및 제공의 효율을 드높이고 자유의 가능성을 제고하는 역할이 있는가 하면, 제한된 인생의 시간을 사이버 공간에서 허비하고 무의미하게 하는 낭비성 또는 중독성의 문제를 야기하는 측면이 있다는 것도 염두에 두어야 한다. 경제는 시장에서 표현되는 단순히 수치로만 평가해서는 안되며 인간적 삶의 가치를 고양하는데 주어진 역할을 하여야만 한다.

따라서 최교수도 언급하였듯이 경제학 또는 시장의 개념을 단순히 과거형으로 고전적 해석과 영역에만 머무를 것이 아니라 이에 더하여 새로이 전개되는 조건과 상황에 응동하고 변화를 추구하고 내용을 확장하여야 한다. 마치 물리학에서 뉴톤의 법칙에서 아인슈타인의 상대성 이론으로 그리고 또 다시 양자론으로 변신을 시도하듯이, 폴라니가 언급하는 복합사회(정치, 산업, 사회, 문화, 기술 등이 상호작용하는)속에서 조건과 상황에 따라 과거의 이론을 포괄하면서도 끊임없이 새로운 실험정신으로 접근해야 할 것으로 본다. 역시 중요한 것은 무엇을 위한 시장논리이고 누구를 향한 경제이론인가 라는 근본적 질문에 응답해야 하는 것이다.

인류 미래를 결정하는 것이 과학과 기술이라면 이도 역시 사회적 합의와 정치적 강제를 통하여 개입하고 전향적인 방향으로 유도하여야 한다. 과학과 기술에 중립성은 없다. 지난 칼럼에서도 언급하였듯이 인터넷 환경이라는 공유재와 이를 기반으로 하는 공유경제를 명확히 구분해야 하며 구글과 폐북 그리고 우버 등에서 경험하였듯이 설령 이들이 인류에게 보편적인 편이와 효율성을 제공한다 하더라도 기술 특성상 어마어마한 운용의 과정과 성과를 개인과 특정 기업이 독점하는 것에는 매우 심각한 문제가 제기된다. 따라서 공유기반의 소유와 운용의 과정에 공공적 개입이 반드시 필요하며, 실현된 운용의 성과를 시민사회 또는 인류가 함께 향유할 때만이 명실공히 공유경제라는 용어를 비로소 부여할 수 있다. 지혜와 합의가 필요한 영역이다.

미래에 전개되는 산업사회에서는 로봇과 AI에 의해 대부분의 반복적인 육체노동뿐만 아니라 단순한 정신적인 판단과 관리업무도 대체될 것으로 전망되고 있다. 물론 진행 과정에서 새로운 직업과 일자리가 생기겠지만 숫자나 내용에 있어서 소멸되는 기존의 직업군을 모두 보충하고 대체할 수는 없을 것이다. 이 점이 기존에 있었던 산업혁명들과 차별화되는 지점이다. 속도를 조절하여 실업의 충격을 완화할 수는 있겠지만 단기적인 해결책일 뿐이다. 기존의 산업과 체계에서 새로운 일자리가 자연스레 만들어질 것으로 기대하는 것은 연목구어(緣木求魚)적 행위이다.

근본적으로 기존적인 계약방식의 전일적인 직업으로 받아들이는 일자리의 개념을 바꾸어 가야 한다. 많은 학자들은 자본제 이전에 있었던 자기실현적 자영 형태의 농업과 수공업이라는 오래된 과거에서 새로움을 찾고자 한다. 미래 사회에서는 시장과 기업의 요구사항 대부분이 사회적 역사적 노동의 축적된 형태인 과학기술로써 해결될 것이다. 기존의 방식과 다른 ‘새로운 일자리’라는 개념의 도입은 기존 복지체계의 재구성, 기본소득의 도입 그리고 조세체계의 대변화를 요구하는 매우 광범하고 중요한 주제이기에 추후에 다시 언급해 보기로 한다.

결론은 인간들이 서로 관계를 맺고 살아가는 복합적 공간으로서 시민사회가 만능적 시장의 일방적 지배를 받아서는 안된다는 것이다. 동물들은 자연의 법칙에 지배를 받고 진화하면서 살아 남았지만, 인간은 언어와 대화라는 방식으로 인위적인 합의와 협력을 통하여 역사를 이루어 왔고, 대자적인 질문과 성찰을 통해 누적된 지식을 기반으로 발전을 이루고 자유의 범위를 확대하여 왔다.

시장은 신이 만든 만능의 법칙이 아니라, 인간들이 일구어낸 매우 소중한 인공적 성과물의 하나이며, 따라서 시장은 시민사회를 풍요롭게 하는 효율적 수단과 관계적 방식으로 작동해야만 한다. 시장이라는 이름과 논리로써 오히려 인간의 삶을 왜곡시키고 구속하려고 한다면, 정치적 영역에서 혁명을 일으켜서 폭군을 몰아내었듯이, 시장이라는 포장의 뒤에 숨어 있는 탐욕을 제거하고 기득권 체계를 전복시켜서라도 시장으로 하여금 시민사회에 풍요로운 삶의 조건을 제공하고 봉사하는 충복으로 역할을 다하도록 유도해야 한다. 시장은 인간사회에 봉사하는 유능하고 유용한 도구이어야 한다. 이것이 경세제민經世濟民이요, 제민지산制民之産의 요체이다. 2019-01-21.

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다른백년 이사장, 국민주권연구원 상임이사. 철든 이후 시대와 사건 속에서 정신줄을 놓치지 않으려 노력함. ‘너와 내가 우주이고 역사’라는 생각을 갖고 있음. 서로 만나야 연대가 있고, 진보의 방향으로 다른백년이 시작된다는 믿음으로 활동 중이며, 제3섹타 경제론의 기고를 통하여 인간의 자유와 해방의 논리를 추구하고 있다.

How Kim Jong Il Starved North Korea - The Atlantic

How Kim Jong Il Starved North Korea - The Atlantic



How Kim Jong Il Starved North Korea
JORDAN WEISSMANNDEC 20, 2011


What kind of disastrous economic policy results in the death by starvation of up to 3 million people in a nation with the population of Texas?


Reuters

When North Korean dictator Kim Jong Il died of a coronary this weekend after 17 years in power, the homuncular tyrant left his country much as he found it -- poor and desperately hungry.



For the last two decades, North Korea has grappled with food crisis upon food crisis, the result of a dysfunctional government and its erratic leader. In 1994, the year Kim inherited North Korea's reins from his late father, the country was in the midst of a severe agricultural decline. The newly minted despot transformed it into a famine that would claim as many as three million lives. Food shortages have plagued the country ever since.


It begs the question: How did one man starve a nation of roughly 23 million people? The answer: By clinging to a broken economic system designed to do little but ensure his own survival.

Agriculture has always been a dicey proposition in North Korea, where the cold, mountainous terrain is short on high-quality farmland. A normal economy could cope by importing food. But during the 1980s, the North Korean government embarked on a policy of radical self-sufficiency known as juche. Farmers were expected to overcome mother nature and grow enough crops to feed the entire population. To do it, they relied on heaps of chemical fertilizer. But that crutch was yanked away in 1991, when the Soviet Union collapsed.






The demise of the USSR threw North Korea's entire economy into chaos, and agriculture was among its most important casualties. Without imports of cheap fuel (self-sufficiency had its limits), the country's industrial base fractured, and production of fertilizer dwindled. Farm yields plummeted, and the government started a campaign urging citizens to consume less. Its cheery slogan: "Let's eat only two meals a day."

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It was against this background that the Kim Jong Il took power. The country was at a crossroads, says Marcus Noland, a leading expert on North Korea at the Peterson Institute for International Economics. With the USSR gone, the prospects for a small, isolated, neo-Stalinist regime looked rather grim. The government could have opened up its economy, much like Vietnam did with great success. Instead, North Korea chose to stay frozen in time.




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"The mystery is why the North Koreans did not understand the historical magnitude of the change around them," Noland says.

One Cold War relic in desperate need of reform was the country's food distribution system. Crops such as rice and corn were raised on collectivist farms, then doled out by the state. The process served a political purpose by funneling cheap food to the country's outsized military, as well as citizens in the capital of Pyongyang, which together made up the base of Kim's power. But it was also ready to collapse.


AFTER THE COLD WAR, THE FARMER WAR


In 1995, when the globe first learned about the North Korean famine, massive floods decimated as much as 15% of North Korea's farmable land. Local officials began hoarding food they were charged with distributing. And a fuel shortage made it impossible to move crops around the country. The government appealed to the United Nations World Food Program for humanitarian aid, blaming the floods for the disaster. Yet even as he sought help from abroad, Kim deepened the crisis at home by stumbling into a war with his country's farmers.



Without enough food to go around, the North Korean regime had turned to triage. Pyongyang and the military had to eat, so the government cut rations for farmers instead, slashing the portion of their harvest they could keep to feed their own families. Predictably, there were severe consequences. Faced with the unappealing prospect of going hungry, farmers began hiding their grain. In 1996, the World Food Program found that half the country's corn crop had gone missing. Reports spread of farmers' roofs collapsing under the weight of stashed food. Soldiers were sent to guard the fields at harvest time, but as a United States Institute for Peace reportnoted, they were easily bribed. After all, the soldiers were hungry, too.

From there, the situation only degenerated. Despite the international community's wariness toward the Kim regime, food aid did begin to flow. But much of it was stolen by well-connected elites, who re-sold the aid at marked-up prices. Farmers started doing the same thing with their own crops. As a result, food prices soared, and the poorest continued to starve.






Farmers stole their own crops. Elites stole the aid. Impoverished Koreans starved. Because the country's statistics are so unreliable, nobody knows the exact number of casualties caused by the famine. But common estimates peg the number of deaths between one million to three million.


THE GHOSTS OF 1994


The great famine finally began to subside in 1998. There were better harvests. The world continued delivering food aid. And North Koreans adjusted to the new private food markets. But history had a habit of repeating itself under Kim. The government set in motion a second, albeit milder, food crisis when it outlawed the private sale of grain in 2005, forcing the country to rely once again on the public food system. The situation worsened once foreign governments cut off aid following the military's first nuclear test.

Then just in October, Reuters published areporton the growing fears about yet another food shortage.

"The country's dysfunctional food-distribution system, rising global commodities prices and sanctions imposed over Pyongyang's nuclear and missile programs had contributed to what appears to be a hunger crisis in the North, even before devastating summer floods and typhoons compounded the emergency," the wire reported.



There are skeptics who believe that Pyongyang is exaggerating its food problems. The country is known to hold grain for its military, even as rural peasants starve, and according to Reuters, South Korean officials believe it may be stockpiling supplies in preparation of a new nuclear test.

And yet, the echoes of 1994 are haunting. Like his father before him, Kim Jong Il has left the country in the hands of a politically inexperienced son, who has yet to consolidate his own power. Once again, the transition has happened at a moment when the government may not be able to feed its own people. Hopefully, the parallels end there.

>

We want to hear what you think about this article.Submit a letterto the editor or write to letters@theatlantic.com.




JORDAN WEISSMANNis a former senior associate editor at The Atlantic.

고난의 행군 - 위키백과, 우리 모두의 백과사전



고난의 행군 - 위키백과, 우리 모두의 백과사전



고난의 행군
위키백과, 우리 모두의 백과사전.

둘러보기로 가기검색하러 가기


조선민주주의인민공화국의 기근(朝鮮民主主義人民共和國饑饉) 또는 고난의 행군(苦難行軍)은 조선민주주의인민공화국에서 1990년대 중반 최악의 식량난으로 약 33만 명의 조선민주주의인민공화국 국민들이 아사하자[1][2] 김일성의 항일 활동 시기 어려웠던 상황을 상기시켜 위기를 극복하려고 채택한 구호이다. 1938년 말 ~ 1939년 초 김일성이 이끄는 유격대만주에서 혹한과 굶주림을 겪으며 일본군의 토벌작전을 피해 100여 일간 행군한 데서 유래했다. 고난의 행군 시기 아사자가 300만 명이라는 주장도 제기되었지만, 2010년 11월 22일 대한민국 통계청이 유엔의 인구센서스를 바탕으로 발표한 북한 인구 추계에 따르면, '고난의 행군(1996~2000년)' 시기 실제에 근접한 아사수는 33만여 명이다.[2]


목차
1배경
2실제에 근접한 사망자 수
3각주
4같이 보기
5외부 링크
배경[편집]

1989년에 동구권 공산당 일당 독재가 붕괴하였고 1991년에는 소련이 붕괴하였다. 동구권의 붕괴로 고립된 조선민주주의인민공화국의 경제는 파탄에 이르렀고 설상가상으로 1993년 흉작,[3] 1990년대 중반에는 수해로 인한 최악의 대흉작으로 배급제가 붕괴되며 아사자가 속출하기 시작했다. 1996년 1월 1일 노동당 기관지인 〈노동신문〉 등은 신년 공동사설에서 '모자라는 식량을 함께 나눠먹으며 일본군에 맞서 투쟁한 항일빨치산의 눈물겨운 고난과 불굴의 정신력'을 상기하자며 "'고난의 행군' 정신으로 어려움을 헤쳐나가자"고 호소했다. 이후 조선민주주의인민공화국 내에서 '익측(翼側)도 후방도 없이 걸어온 간고한 행군길'에 관한 항일빨치산 1세대들의 증언이 대대적으로 보도되기 시작했다. 여기에 더해 서정시 〈끝나지 않는 행군길〉, 가요 〈고난의 행군 정신으로〉·〈아버지 어머니의 청춘시절〉 등과 영화들이 잇달아 발표되면서 대대적인 홍보에 나섰다.



1989년에서 1997년까지 북한 쌀, 옥수수 생산량198919901991199219931994199519961997
쌀( 정미 100만 톤)3.243.363.073.343.562.181.400.981.10
옥수수(100만 톤)4.343.904.203.723.943.551.370.831.01


[4]

이로 인해 조선민주주의인민공화국 지도부는 1998년에 경제 건설을 위한 '사회주의 강행군'을 제시했고 2000년 1월 1일 〈노동신문〉은 신년 공동사설을 통해 "우리 인민의 투쟁으로 여러 해째 계속된 어려운 행군이 마침내 '구보(驅步) 행군' 단계에 접어들었다"고 공식 선언했다.
실제에 근접한 사망자 수[편집]

2000년대 초중반까지 뚜렷한 근거는 없지만, 일부 대한민국 언론으로부터 고난의 행군 동안 사망자가 3백만 명이라는 주장이 제기되기도 했다. 이런 주장은 일본 공산당 기관지 '아카하타'의 평양 특파원을 지낸 하기와라 료(萩原遼)의 저서 "김정일의 숨겨진 전쟁(金正日 隠された戦争)"에서 처음 나온 것이다.[5]

2010년 11월 22일 대한민국 통계청이 발표한 북한 인구 추계에 따르면, '고난의 행군(1996~2000년)' 시기에는 33만여 명이 사망했다. 북한이 1990년대 중반 이후 10여 년(1994~2005년)간 식량난으로 61만 명의 인구 손실을 본 것으로 추산됐다.[2]

기초자료는 유엔의 지원 아래 인구센서스를 실시한 1993년과 2008년의 통계. 통계청은 93년 통계를 나이와 사망률, 탈북인구, 연령별 출산율을 고려한 뒤 2008년 통계와 비교·분석했다. 통계청 관계자는 “인구센서스를 바탕으로 추계한 만큼 이번에 발표한 숫자가 실제와 가장 근접할 것”이라고 말했다.[2]


각주[편집]

  1. 북한주민 기대수명 남한보다 11세 낮아
  2. 이동:가 북한 ‘고난의 행군’ 5년 동안 주민 33만 명 굶어 죽어 중앙일보 2010.11.23 종합 6면
  3. 『現代北朝鮮経済研究へのアプローチ』王勝今, 藤田暁男, 龍世祥著 104p 「1993년 곡물생산실적은 춘경기의 저온기상과 8월 집중호우로 인한 홍수 피해로 전년보다 12% 감소한 481만 3000톤(정곡기준)으로 멈추었다.」
  4. 『UNDP[1998]』
  5. 북한의 대 기근은 김정일의 인위적 조작 자유아시아 방송 2004-12-05
  6. 萩原 遼, 『金正日 隠された戦争―金日成の死と大量餓死の謎を解』 文藝春秋 2004年11月
  7. 『김정일의 숨겨진 전쟁 : 김일성의 죽음과 대량 아사의 수수께끼를 푼다』 하기와라 료 지음 | 양창식 옮김 | 자유미디어 | 2011년 12월 10일 출간


같이 보기[편집]
대약진 운동
3년 대기근(zh:三年困难时期)
홀로도모르
외부 링크[편집]
고난의 행군 - 북한 지식사전, 통일부, 2013.11.11

North Korean famine - Wikipedia



North Korean famine - Wikipedia



North Korean famine
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

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Arduous March
(고난의 행군)
Country North Korea
Location Nation-wide
Period 1994–1998
Total deaths 240,000 to 3.5 million
Observations Economic mismanagement,[1]natural disasters,[2] collapse of the Soviet bloc
Relief Food and humanitarian aid (1994–2002)[3]
Consequences Militarization of economy; spread of limited market activity; food aid from South Korea, China, United States, Pakistan, Japan and the European Union[4]

The Arduous March
Chosŏn'gŭl
고난의 행군
Hancha
苦難의行軍
Revised Romanization gonanui haenggun
McCune–Reischauer konanŭi haenggun


Part of a series on the
History of North Korea


Soviet Civil Administration 1945–48
Provisional People's Committee for North Korea 1946–48
Kim Il-sung's rule 1948–94
Korean War 1950–53
Korean DMZ Conflict 1966–69
Juche 1972
Death and state funeral of Kim Il-sung 1994
Kim Jong-il's rule 1994–2011
North Korean famine 1994–98
Songun 1998
Sunshine Policy 1998–2010
Six-party talks 2003
ROKS Cheonan sinking 2010
Death and state funeral of Kim Jong-il 2011
Kim Jong-un's rule 2011–present
State Affairs Commission 2016
North Korean crisis 2017
DPRK-US summit 2018

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The North Korean famine (Korean: 조선기근), which together with the accompanying general economic crisis are known as the Arduous March or The March of Suffering[5] (고난의 행군) in North Korea, occurred in North Korea from 1994 to 1998.[6]

The famine stemmed from a variety of factors. Economic mismanagement and the loss of Soviet support caused food production and imports to decline rapidly. A series of floods and droughts exacerbated the crisis. The North Korean governmentand its centrally planned system proved too inflexible to effectively curtail the disaster.[5][6] Estimates of the death toll vary widely. Out of a total population of approximately 22 million, somewhere between 240,000 and 3,500,000 North Koreans died from starvation or hunger-related illnesses, with the deaths peaking in 1997.[7][8] A 2011 U.S. Census Bureau report put the likely number of excess deaths during 1993 to 2000 at from 500,000 to 600,000.[9]

Contents
1Arduous March
2Background


3Causes
3.1Floods and drought
3.2Failure of the public distribution system
3.3Long-term causes


4Healthcare
5Widespread malnutrition
5.1Military
5.2Women
5.3Children


6Estimated number of deaths
7Black markets
8International response
9Post-famine developments
10See also
11References
12Further reading
13External links


Arduous March[edit]

The term "Arduous March", or "The March of Suffering" became a metaphor for the famine following a state propaganda campaign in 1993. The Rodong Sinmun urged the North Korean citizenry to invoke the memory of an apocryphal fable from Kim Il-sung's time as a commander of a small group of anti-Japanese guerrilla fighters. The story, referred to as the Arduous March, is described as "fighting against thousands of enemies in 20 degrees below zero, braving through a heavy snowfall and starvation, the red flag fluttering in front of the rank."[10]

As part of this state campaign, uses of words such as 'famine' and 'hunger' were banned because they implied government failure. Citizens who said deaths were due to the famine could be in serious trouble with the authorities.[11]


Background[edit]

The great famine is known in North Korea by the officially mandated phrase konanŭi haenggun (The Arduous March). It was a central event in the country's history, and it forced the regime and its people to change in fundamental and unanticipated ways.[5]

Only about 20% of North Korea's mountainous terrain is arable land. Much of the land is only frost-free for six months, allowing only one crop per year. The country has never been self-sufficient in food, and many experts considered it unrealistic to try to be.[12]

In the late 1980s the Soviet Union was embarking on political and economic reform. It began demanding payment from North Korea for past and current aid – amounts North Korea could not repay. On 26 December 1991, the Soviet Union fell, ending all aid and trade concessions, such as cheap oil.[7] Without Soviet aid, the flow of imports to the North Korean agricultural sector ended, and the government proved too inflexible to respond.[13]In 1991, energy imports fell by 75%.[14] The economy went into a downward spiral, with imports and exports falling in tandem. Flooded coal mines required electricity to operate pumps, and the shortage of coal worsened the shortage of electricity. Agriculture relied on electrically powered irrigation systems and artificial fertilizers and pesticides, and it was hard hit by the economic collapse.[15][16]

Most North Koreans had experienced nutritional deprivation long before the mid-1990s. The country had once been fed with a centrally planned economic system that overproduced food, had long ago reached the limits of its productive capacity, and could not respond effectively to exogenous shocks.[5]

North Korea's state trading companies emerged as an alternative means of conducting foreign economic relations. Over the past two decades, these state trading companies have become important conduits of funding for the regime, with a percentage of all revenues going "directly into Kim Jong-il's personal accounts ... [which have been] used to secure and maintain the loyalty of the senior leadership." [17]

The country soon instigated austerity measures, dubbed the "eat two meals a day" campaign.[18] These measures proved inadequate in stemming the economic decline. According to Professor Hazel Smith of Cranfield University,[19]


... the methods of the past that had produced short-to medium-term gains might have continued producing further small economic benefits if the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc had remained and continued to supply oil, technology, and expertise.
— Hazel Smith, Hungry for Peace: International Security, Humanitarian Assistance, and Social Change in North Korea

Without the help from these countries, North Korea was unable to respond adequately to the coming famine. For a time, China filled the gap left by the Soviet Union's collapse and propped up North Korea's food supply with significant aid.[20] By 1993, China was supplying North Korea with 77 percent of its fuel imports and 68 percent of its food imports. Thus, North Korea replaced its dependence on the Soviet Union with dependence on China – with predictably dire consequences. In 1993, China faced its own grain shortfalls and need for hard currency, and it sharply cut aid to North Korea.

In 1997, So Kwan-hui, the North Korean Minister of Agriculture, was accused of spying for the United States government and sabotaging North Korean agriculture on purpose, thus leading to the famine.[21] As a result, he was publicly executed by firing squad by the North Korean government.[22]


Causes[edit]


1] Floods and drought[edit]


The economic decline and failed policies provided the context for the famine, but the floods of the mid-1990s were the immediate cause. The floods in July and August 1995 were described as being "of biblical proportions" by independent observers.[23] They were estimated to affect as much as 30 percent of the country.[24]

As devastating floods ravaged the country in 1995, arable land, harvests, grain reserves, and social and economic infrastructure were destroyed. The United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs reported that "between 30 July and 18 August 1995, torrential rains caused devastating floods in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). In one area, in Pyongsan county in North Hwanghae province, 877 mm of rain were recorded to have fallen in just seven hours, an intensity of precipitation unheard of in this area... water flow in the engorged Amnoc River, which runs along the Korea/China border, was estimated at 4.8 billion tons over a 72 hour period. Flooding of this magnitude had not been recorded in at least 70 years."[25]

The major issues created by the floods were not only the destruction of crop lands and harvests, but also the loss of emergency grain reserves, because many of them were stored underground. According to the United Nations, the floods of 1994 and 1995 destroyed around 1.5 million tons of grain reserves,[26] and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention stated that 1.2 million tons (or 12%) of grain production was lost in the 1995 flood.[27] There were further major floods in 1996 and a drought in 1997.[28]

North Korea lost an estimated 85% of its power generation capacity due to flood damage to infrastructures such as hydropower plants, coal mines, and supply and transport facilities.[29] UN officials reported that the power shortage from 1995 to 1997 was not due to a shortage of oil, because only two out of a total of two dozen power stations were dependent on heavy fuel oil for power generation... and these were supplied by KEDO (the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization). About 70% of power generated in the DPRK came from hydropower sources, and the serious winter-spring droughts of 1996 and 1997 (and a breakdown on one of the Yalu River's large hydro turbines) created major shortages throughout the country at that time, severely cutting back railway transportation (which was almost entirely dependent on electric power), which in turn resulted in coal supply shortages to the coal-fueled power stations which supplied the remaining 20% of power in the country.[30]

A 2008 study, however, found no variation in children's nutrition between counties that had experienced flooding and those that had not.[31][??]


2] Failure of the public distribution system[edit]

North Korea's vulnerability to the floods and famine was exacerbated by the failure of the public distribution system.[5] The regime refused to pursue policies that would have allowed food imports and distribution without discrimination to all regions of the country.[5]Food was distributed to people according to their political standing and their degree of loyalty to the state.[32] The system was created by Cabinet Decrees 96 and 102 in November 1957.

The structure is as follows (the World Food Program considers 600 grams of cereal per day to be less than a "survival ration"):
CategoryAmount allocated

  • Privileged industrial worker 900 grams/day
  • Ordinary worker 700 grams/day
  • Retired citizen 300 grams/day
  • 2~4-year-old 200 grams/day


However, the extended period of food shortages put a strain on the system, and it spread the amount of available food allocations thinly across the groups, affecting 62% of the population who were entirely reliant on public distribution. The system was feeding only 6% of the population by 1997.
YearChanges
1987 Reduced 10%
1992 Reduced another 10%
1994 470 grams/day down 420 grams/day
1997 128 grams/day


The annual amount of food a farmer could keep fell from 167 kilograms to 107 kilograms.


3] Long-term causes[edit][주체농법??] 

The famine was also a result of the culmination of a long series of poor government decisions that accrued slowly over decades.[5] The attempt to follow a closed-economic model caused the regime to abandon the possibility of engaging in international markets and importing food and instead restrict demand. Attempts to increase exports and earn foreign exchange through the Najin Sonbong free trade zone in 1991 were unsuccessful. The North Korean government also missed the opportunity for the short-term option to borrow from abroad to finance food imports after having defaulted on foreign loans in the 1970s.[6]

--------------

Healthcare[edit]
Main article: Health in North Korea

Inadequate medical supplies, water and environmental contamination, frequent power failures, and outdated training led to a health care crisis that added to the overall devastation. According to a 1997 UNICEF delegation, hospitals were clean but wards were devoid of even the most rudimentary supplies and equipment; sphygmomanometers, thermometers, scales, kidney dishes, spatulas, IV giving sets, etc. The mission saw numerous patients being treated with home made beer bottle IV sets, clearly unsterile. There was an absence of ORS (oral rehydration solution) and even the most basic drugs such as analgesics and antibiotics.[33]


Widespread malnutrition[edit]
See also: Health in North Korea § Malnutrition

With the widespread destruction of harvests and food reserves, the majority of the population became desperate for food, including areas well established in food production. In 1996, it was reported that people in "the so-called better-off parts of the country, were so hungry that they ate the maize cobs before the crop was fully developed."[34] This reduced expected production of an already ravaged harvest by 50%.[35]

People everywhere were affected by the crisis, regardless of gender, affiliation or social class. Child malnutrition, as indicated by severe underweight, was found at 3% in 1987, 14% in 1997 and 7% in 2002.[36]
Rice and maize production of North Korea from 1989 to 1997[37]Year198919901991199219931994199519961997
Rice milled (million tons) 3.24 3.36 3.07 3.34 3.56 2.18 1.40 0.98 1.10
Corn harvested (million tons) 4.34 3.90 4.20 3.72 3.94 3.55 1.37 0.83 1.01

Military[edit]

Songun is North Korea's "Military First" policy, which prioritizes the Korean People's Armyin affairs of state and allocates national resources to the "army first". Even though the armed forces were given priority for the distribution of food, this did not mean that they all received generous rations.[38]

The army was supposed to find ways to grow food to feed itself and to develop industries that would permit it to purchase food and supplies from abroad. The rations received by military personnel were very basic, and "ordinary soldiers of the million-strong army often remained hungry, as did their families, who did not receive preferential treatment simply because a son or daughter was serving in the armed forces."[39]


Women[edit]

Women suffered significantly due to the gendered structure of North Korean society, which deemed women responsible for obtaining food, water and fuel for their families, which often included extended families.[40] Simultaneously, women had the highest participation rate in the workforce of any country in the world, calculated at 89%.[41] Therefore, women had to remain in the workforce and obtain supplies for their families.

Pregnant and nursing women faced severe difficulties in staying healthy; maternal mortality rates increased to approximately 41 per 1000, while simple complications such as anemia, hemorrhage and premature birth became common due to vitamin deficiency.[42][43] It was estimated that the number of births declined by about 0.3 children per woman during that period.[8][44]


Children[edit]

Children, especially those under two years old, were most affected by both the famine and the poverty of the period. The World Health Organization reported death rates for children at 93 out of every 1000, while those of infants were cited at 23 out of every 1000.[45]Undernourished mothers found it difficult to breast-feed. No suitable alternative to the practice was available. Infant formula was not produced locally, and only a small amount of it was imported.[34]

The famine resulted in a population of homeless, migrant children known as Kotjebi.[46]


Estimated number of deaths[edit]

The exact number of deaths during the acute phase of the crisis, from 1994 to 1998, will probably never be fully determined, since the government has refused to release any of this information to the outside world. Independent analysis estimates that between 800,000 and 1,500,000 people died due to starvation, disease, or sickness caused by lack of food.[47][48]

Haggard and Noland reviewed all estimates of the "excess" deaths caused by the famine. Estimates range from 220,000 to 4,000,000 between 1995 and 1998, as claimed by the North Korean government.[49]

In 1998, US Congressional staffers who visited the country reported that: "Therefore, we gave a range of estimates, from 300,000 to 800,000 dying per year, peaking in 1997. That would put the total number of deaths from the North Korean food shortage at between 900,000 and 2.4 million between 1995 and 1998."[50] Higher estimates range from 2 to 3 million.[7] North Korean officials have put the figures as low as 250,000 in confidential discussions. Both the extreme high and low ends of the estimates are considered inaccurate.[51]

A survey by North Korea's Public Security Ministry suggests that 2,500,000 to 3,000,000 people died from 1995 to March 1998, although the numbers may have been inflated in order to secure additional food aid.[52] The most sophisticated estimates used to measure excess deaths based on different data from multiple sources give a total number ranging from 600,000 to 1,000,000, or 3 to 5 percent of the pre-crisis population[53]

The consequences of the famine are still playing out – most notably, in the breakdown of the public distribution system and the government's food rationing system and other economic institutions, as well as increasing self-reliance by North Koreans in providing for themselves and their families.[54]

Robinson's team found 245,000 "excess" deaths (an elevated mortality rate as a result of premature death), 12 percent of the population in one affected region. Taking those results as the upper limit and extrapolating across the entire North Korean population across the country's provinces produces an upper limit of 2,000,000 famine-related deaths.[54]

According to the recent research by the U.S. Census Bureau in 2011, the likely range of excess deaths between 1993 and 2000 was between 500,000 and 600,000, and a total of 600,000 to 1,000,000 excess deaths from the year 1993 to the year 2008.[8][page needed][9]


Black markets[edit]

At the same time, the years of famine were also marked by a dramatic revival of illegal, private market activities. Smuggling across the border boomed, and up to 250,000 North Koreans moved to China.[citation needed] Amartya Sen had mentioned bad governance as one of the structural and economic problems which contributed to the famine, but it seems that the famine also led to the widespread government corruption which nearly collapsed old controls and regulations from Pyongyang.[55]

When fuel became scarce while demand for logistics rose, so-called servi-cha(Chosŏn'gŭl: 써비차; MR: ssŏbich'a, "service cars") operations formed, wherein an entrepreneur provides transportation to businesses, institutions and individuals without access to other means of transportation, while the car is formally owned by a legitimate enterprise or unit that also provides transportation permits.[56] The people of North Korea were becoming less reliant on their government and they came to trust the Kim family less.[55]

With the desperation derived from famine and informal trade and commercialization, North Koreans developed their black market, and moreover, they were surviving by adapting.[57]Andrei Lankov has described the process as the "natural death of North Korean Stalinism".[58]

The average official salary in 2011 was equivalent to $US2 per month while the actual monthly income seems to be around $US15 because most North Koreans earn money from illegal small businesses: trade, subsistence farming, and handicrafts. The illegal economy is dominated by women because men have to attend their places of official work even though most of the factories are non-functioning.[59]


International response[edit]

Initial assistance to North Korea started as early as 1990, with small-scale support from religious groups in South Korea and assistance from UNICEF.[3] In August 1995, North Korea made an official request for humanitarian aid and the international community responded accordingly:[4]
Food aid by year (thousands of tons)Donor19951996199719981999200020012002200320042005200620072008200920102011TotalS. Korea 150 3 60 48 12 352 198 458 542 407 493 80 431 59 23 3,314
China 100 150 151 201 280 420 330 212 132 451 207 264 116 3,015
U.S.A. 22 193 231 589 351 319 222 47 105 28 171 121 1 2,400
Others 394 380 501 361 198 248 571 168 143 201 125 20 26 145 61 71 47 3,661
Total 544 505 904 791 1,000 1,231 1,508 1,178 944 845 1,097 307 721 375 298 95 47 12,390


Beginning in 1996, the U.S. also started shipping food aid to North Korea through the United Nations World Food Programme (WFP) to combat the famine. Shipments peaked in 1999 at nearly 600,000 tons making the U.S. the largest foreign aid donor to the country at the time. Under the Bush Administration, aid was drastically reduced year after year from 320,000 tons in 2001 to 28,000 tons in 2005.[60] The Bush Administration was criticized for using "food as a weapon" during talks over the North's nuclear weapons program, but insisted the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) criteria were the same for all countries and the situation in North Korea had "improved significantly since its collapse in the mid-1990s."

South Korea (before the Lee Myung-bak government) and China remained the largest donors of food aid to North Korea. The U.S. objects to this manner of donating food due to the North Korean state's refusal to allow donor representatives to supervise the distribution of their aid inside North Korea.[61] Such supervision would ensure that aid does not get seized and sold by well-connected elites or diverted to feed North Korea's large military. In 2005, South Korea and China together provided almost 1 million tons of food aid, each contributing half.[62]

Humanitarian aid from North Korea's neighbors has been cut off at times in order to provoke North Korea into resuming boycotted talks. For example, South Korea decided to "postpone consideration" of 500,000 tons of rice for the North in 2006, but the idea of providing food as a clear incentive (as opposed to resuming "general humanitarian aid") has been avoided.[63] There have also been aid disruptions due to widespread theft of railway cars used by mainland China to deliver food relief.[64]


Post-famine developments[edit]

North Korea has not yet resumed its self-sufficiency in food production and it relies on external food aid from South Korea, China, the United States, Japan, the European Unionand others. In 2002, North Korea requested that food supplies no longer be delivered.[65]

In the mid-2000s, the World Food Programme (WFP) reported that famine conditions were in imminent danger of returning to North Korea, and the government was reported to have mobilized millions of city-dwellers in order to help rice farmers.[66][67] In 2012, the WFP reported that food would be sent to North Korea as soon as possible. The food would first be processed by a local processor and it would then be delivered directly to North Korean citizens.

Agricultural production increased from about 2.7 million metric tons in 1997 to 4.2 million metric tons in 2004.[61] In 2008, food shortages continued to be a problem in North Korea, although less so than in the mid to late 1990s. Flooding in 2007 and reductions in food aid exacerbated the problem.[68]

In 2011, during a visit to North Korea, former US President Jimmy Carter reported that one third of children in North Korea were malnourished and stunted in their growth because of a lack of food. He also said that the North Korean government had reduced daily food intake from 5,900 to 2,900 kJ (1,400 to 700 kcal) in 2011.[69] Some scholars believed that North Korea was purposefully exaggerating the food shortage, aiming to receive additional food supplies for its planned mass-celebrations of Kim Il-sung's 100th birthday in 2012 by means of foreign aid.[70]

Escaped North Koreans reported in September 2010 that starvation had returned to the nation.[71] North Korean pre-school children are reported to be an average of 3 to 4 cm (1.2 to 1.6 inches) shorter than South Koreans, which some researchers[who?] believe can only be explained by conditions of famine and malnutrition.[72] Roughly 45% of North Korean children under the age of five are stunted from malnutrition and the population of kotjebi persists.[73] Most people only eat meat on public holidays, namely Kim Il-sung's and Kim Jong-il's birthdays.[74]

One report by the Tokyo Shimbun in April 2012 claimed that since the death of Kim Jong-il in December 2011, around 20,000 people had starved to death in South Hwanghae Province.[75] Another report by the Japanese Asia Press agency in January 2013 claimed that in North and South Hwanghae provinces more than 10,000 people had died of famine. Other international news agencies have begun circulating stories of cannibalism.[76]

On the other hand, the WFP has reported malnutrition and food shortages, but not famine.[77] In 2016, UN Committee on the Rights of the Child reported a steady decline in the infant mortality rate since 2008.[78] An academic analysis in 2016 found that the situation had greatly improved since the 1990s and that North Korea's levels of health and nutrition were on par with other developing countries.[79] In 2017, the analyst Andrei Lankov argued that previous predictions of a return to famine were unfounded, and that the days of starvation were long since passed.[80]

A survey in 2017 found that the famine had skewed North Korea's demography, impacting particularly on boy babies. Women aged 20-24 made up 4% of the population, while men in the same age group made up only 2.5%.[81] Chronic or recurrent malnutrition dropped from 28 percent in 2012 to 19 percent in 2017.[82]


See also[edit]

North Korea portal
Death portal
Kotjebi
Potato production in North Korea

Analogous famines:
Great Chinese Famine
Holodomor

General:
Economy of North Korea
History of North Korea
World Food Programme



References[edit]

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Further reading[edit]

Natsios, Andrew S. (2001). The Great North Korean Famine. Washington: Institute of Peace Press. ISBN 978-1-929223-34-3.
Vollertsen, Norbert (2004). Inside North Korea: Diary of a Mad Place. San Francisco: Encounter Books. ISBN 978-1-893554-87-0.