2016-05-31

CONTENTIOUS ACTIVISM & INTER-KOREAN RELATIONS. By...

CONTENTIOUS ACTIVISM & INTER-KOREAN RELATIONS. By...
[한국의 정치사회][남북관계][서평] CONTENTIOUS ACTIVISM & INTER-KOREAN RELATIONS.
By Danielle L. Chubb. New York: Columbia
University Press, 2014.
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Introduction 1
Understanding Inter-Korean Relations 1
Political Activism and Inter-Korean Relations 6
1. Political Activism, Discursive Power, and Norm Negotiation 9
Traditional Approach 10
Alternative Accounts of Inter-Korean Relations 12
Inter-Korean Relations and North Korean Human Rights 16
Political Activism and Inter-Korean Relations 18
Conceptual Framework 20
Historical Case Studies 41
2. Political Activism Under Yushin and the Kwangju Uprising,
May 1980 47
First Republic: Rhee Syngman 48
Second Republic: Chang Myŏn 50
Third Republic: Park Chung Hee 53
Yushin: The Fourth Republic 57
viii contents
Anticommunism and Nationalism Under Park Chung Hee 62
Political Activism Under Yushin 66
The End of Yushin 76
3. From Kwangju to Democracy, 1980–1987 79
Dominant Discourses of the Fift h Republic 81
Political Activism in the Fift h Republic 90
Democratic Transition 114
4. South Korea in Transition, 1987–1997 119
Roh Tae Woo, 1987–1992 122
Kim Young Sam, 1992–1997 125
Post-1987 Political Activism 132
The North Korean Famine 148
5. A New Era of Inter-Korean Relations, 1998–2007 153
Kim Dae Jung, 1998–2002 156
Roh Moo Hyun, 2003–2007 160
Political Activism Under the Sunshine Policy 165
Transnational Advocacy and South Korean Discourses 188
Conclusion:
Inter-Korean Relations from a South Korean Perspective 197
A New Age of Conservative Politics: Inter-Korean Relations Under Lee Myung Bak, 2008–2012 200
Future Prospects 205
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This book discusses how sets of beliefs, which the author specifies as “arguments” or ‘‘discourses” (19) around the political priority of “unification, human rights, and democracy” have, according to the author, provided a focus for three “distinct activist ovements” in South Korea. These distinct sets of beliefs, the author argues, “continue to influence debate around inter-Korean relations” (19) as the political activists of yesterday have become the politicians, diplomats, and officials of today. The aim of the book is to understand better inter-Korean relations through “examining the nature of South Korean domestic political debate” (5).
Chapter 1 reviews various theoretical perspectives to conclude that “an agency-driven conceptualization of discursive power” provides a helpful explanatory device that is best employed via “a wider, historical view of politics” (30). To this end, chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5, provide a historical summary of the relations between South Korean governments and political activists from the years of the Park Chung Hee military dictatorship (1961 to 1979) through to and including the period of democratization from the late 1980s, and the “decade of progressive rule” (195) of the late 1990s and early 2000s that concluded with the election in 2007 of the conservative president, Lee Myung Bak. 

The fairly short concluding chapter summarizes the contribution of the book as demonstrating that political activism is not spontaneous but has ‘deep-seated social, cultural, and political roots’ and that “the relationship between dominant (state) and dissident (political activist) discourses is multifaceted” (98).

Critical analysis, in the scholarly sense, of human rights movements is very sparse, given the fear of analysts of being portrayed as sympathetic
to human rights abuses and the understandable reluctance of scholars to have their work isinterpreted by one side or another in politically charged debates. In South Korea, those fears are compounded by the continued existence of the National Security Law that is used to penalize those judged to be sympathetic to North Korea with sanctions that include mprisonment.
This book, therefore, addresses a number of potentially productive debates.
Chapter 5 provides interesting new empirical material in the short section on the “new right” and the “new left” of the human rights movement in South Korea, in terms of the division between them as to how much to involve United States regime change advocates in domestic human rights campaigns (168–195). The author also touches on the story of how some South Korean activists saw North Korea as a society to be emulated, how most were disillusioned but some remained faithful to what for most observers is at best an outdated society ruled over by a repressive government and at worst a vision of hell in which crimes of humanity are committed against the entire population on an everyday basis; this is another untold story that would bear further investigation.
Overall, however, the book is handicapped by insufficient specification of the research question such that the narrative is forced into an over-high
level of generality. The consequent lack of a defined central thesis results in the absence of cohesive analytical structure that makes it hard to identify the key points that the author wants to make. In the absence of a clear analytical framework, the historical chapters end up with a lot of descriptive material that the book struggles to integrate into narrative cohesion. That is not to say that the book does not abound with ideas and possibilities but the trick here would have been to develop these ideas so as to provide the foundations for a disciplined framing of the historical material.
The book clearly started as a doctoral thesis and there is nothing intrinsically wrong in that. It does, however, suffer from the absence of a really good editing job that could have eradicated what read as quite descriptive summaries between chapters, repetition, odd locutions, and references to theoretical work that are not integrated or developed as part of the analytical frame for the book. More substantively, there is a “levels-of-analysis” issue that need to be resolved. The author is centrally concerned with the issue of “norm negotiation” and this is a potentially important way of thinking about who or what achieves hegemonic dominance in any society; the issue in this book is that there is an elision between the level of individual, nonstate actor, society, government and state. In the context of a book that is intending to explain inter-Korean (state and society?) relations by evaluating the activities of individuals and non-state actors, we need, at minimum, to have these different levels analytically specified so that the questions of who is negotiating, how, why and what are the outcomes, in terms of the relationships between these different analytical levels, can be asked in the first place.
Nevertheless, at the heart of this book is a commendable approach to scholarship. It is committed to the idea of explaining important things—in this case what political activists do and how we understand what they do—and it also tries hard to avoid naïve empirical exposition as a substitute for careful analytical investigation.
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Review by Hazel Smith
University of Central Lancashire, Preston, United Kingdom
Pacific Affairs: Volume 88, No. 3 – September 2015 716
INGENTACONNECT.COM

ㅎㅅㅎ의 종교학 잡담 :: 히데무라 겐지(秀村研二)와 니와 이즈미(丹羽 泉)의 한국종교 연구

ㅎㅅㅎ의 종교학 잡담 :: 히데무라 겐지(秀村研二)와 니와 이즈미(丹羽 泉)의 한국종교 연구

Contentious Activism and Inter-Korean Relations (Contemporary Asia in the World): Danielle L. Chubb: 9780231161367: Amazon.com: Books

Contentious Activism and Inter-Korean Relations 
Danielle L. Chubb
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In South Korea, the contentious debate over relations with the North transcends traditional considerations of physical and economic security, and political activists play a critical role in shaping the discussion of these issues as they pursue the separate yet connected agendas of democracy, human rights, and unification.
Providing international observers with a better understanding of policymakers' management of inter-Korean relations, Danielle L. Chubb traces the development of various policy disputes and perspectives from the 1970s through South Korea's democratic transition. Focusing on four case studies―the 1980 Kwangju uprising, the June 1987 uprising, the move toward democracy in the 1990s, and the decade of "progressive" government that began with the election of Kim Dae Jung in 1997―she tracks activists' complex views on reunification along with the rise and fall of more radical voices encouraging the adoption of a North Korean–style form of socialism. While these specific arguments have dissipated over the years, their vestiges can still be found in recent discussions over how to engage with North Korea and bring security and peace to the peninsula.
Extending beyond the South Korean example, this examination shows how the historical trajectory of norms and beliefs can have a significant effect on a state's threat perception and security policy. It also reveals how political activists, in their role as discursive agents, play an important part in the creation of the norms and beliefs directing public debate over a state's approach to the ethical and practical demands of its foreign policy.

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Review

In this meticulously researched book, Danielle L. Chubb reveals that South Korean policies toward the North are about far more than strategic considerations. Reaching beyond prevailing state-centric foreign policy accounts, she convincingly argues that inter-Korean relations have been significantly shaped by the legacy that several decades of contentious political activism have left on South Korean society and politics.
(Roland Bleiker, University of Queensland)

A comprehensive and penetrating analysis of the dynamic interplay of democracy, unification, and inter-Korean relations. The book is original and innovative in theory and methodology, rigorous in empirical investigation, and rich in policy implications. A must read for students of Korean politics and East Asia studies.
(Chung-in Moon, Yonsei University)

Review

Contentious Activism and Inter-Korean Relations offers a refreshingly different account in that it is the first book to place political activists at the center of analysis.
(Andrew Yeo, Catholic University of America)

About the Author

Danielle L. Chubb is lecturer in international relations at Deakin University in Melbourne, Australia. She earned her Ph.D. at the Australian National University and has been a research fellow with Pacific Forum CSIS. Her main research interests are the political dynamics of the Korean peninsula, the role of nontraditional actors in security arenas, and Australian foreign policy in the Asia-Pacific.
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한국을 찾은 美 특수부대들... ‘김정은 참수’ 훈련?

한국을 찾은 美 특수부대들... ‘김정은 참수’ 훈련?
"미국이 북한 인권문제를 어처구니없이 부풀리고 있다. 우리는 대단히 평등하고, 자유로운 삶을 살고 있다. 조국을 지키는 것이 우리 형제의 꿈”이라고 목청을 돋우기도 했다. “미국을 봐라. 백인 경찰이 백주대낮에 흑인을 쏴죽이는 나라다. 흑인들의 생명을 파리 목숨보다도 우습게 아는 나라”라고 비난하기도 했다. 동생 제임스는 앞서 미국 CBS방송 시사프로 ’60 Minutes’의 ‘An American in Korea’라는 프로에서 북한의 외교관이 되고 싶다는 뜻을 밝힌 바 있다.
 

2016-05-29

[새책]그는 어떻게 제국의 변호인이 됐나? ‘제국의 변호인 박유하에게 묻다’ - 민중의소리

[새책]그는 어떻게 제국의 변호인이 됐나? ‘제국의 변호인 박유하에게 묻다’ - 민중의소리

권종술 기자 epoque@vop.co.kr
최종업데이트 2016-05-26 11:31:50
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“또 하나의 기억 또 하나의 억압, 21세기 금서!”

문구만 보면 굉장한 진실을 전하기 위해 정치권력에 맞선 의사(義士)의 풍모가 느껴진다. 하지만 이 문구는 박유하 교수가 쓴 ‘제국의 위안부’ 제2판 표지에 등장하는 문구다. 박 교수는 재판을 통해 34곳에 대해 삭제 결정이 내려지자 해당 부분을 삭제한 2판을 발간했다. 또 인터넷 등을 통해 PDF판을 무료 배포하기까지 했다.
“21세기 금서”라는 검은 띠지가 달린 ‘제국의 위안부’를 서점에서 만나는 건 복잡다단한 감정을 불러일으킨다. 사회적으로 박 교수를 향해 비판의 목소리가 커졌지만, 이를 둘러싼 지식인 세계의 풍경들은 우려할 만한 상황이다. 검찰의 형사기소에 대한 항의와 맞물리면서 한국의 자유주의 지식인의 상당수가 ‘학문의 자유, 표현의 자유’라는 이름으로 ‘제국의 위안부’에 힘을 실었다. “낡은 민족주의의 틀에서 벗어나야 한다”는 그럴싸한 양념이 더해지면서 ‘제국의 위안부’를 실질적 또는 내용적으로 지지하는 일까지 벌어졌다.
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‘제국의 위안부’ 2판 표지. “또 하나의 기억 또 하나의 억압, 21세기 금서!”라는 구절이 선명하다ⓒ기타
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‘제국의 위안부’가 ‘21세기 금서’라고?
이런 풍경들은 ‘제국의 위안부’와 관련한 논란이 법적인 삭제 조치로만 끝날 수 없는 성격의 것임을 잘 보여주고 있다. 이런 현실 속에서 최근 출간된 ‘제국의 변호인 박유하에게 묻다’는 이번 논란에 대한 제대로 된 대응의 시작을 알리는 소중한 첫 결실이다. 이 책의 필자들은 이런 현실에 대해 비판적인 관점에서 다양한 문제제기를 한다. 비판 대상은 1차적으로는 ‘제국의 위안부’와 저자 박유하이고, 2차적으로는 박유하를 옹호하는 한국의 자유주의 지식인이다. 마지막으로 일본의 리버럴 지식인을 비판하고 있다. 법학, 역사, 문학 전공자들과 언론인, 운동가 들이 다각적인 분석을 통해 일본군 ‘위안부’ 문제의 본질에 접근하며 그들은 전쟁범죄를 부정하려는 ‘일본의 역사수정주의’ 흐름을 마주했다.
‘제국의 변호인 박유하에게 묻다’의 출판을 기념해 지난 23일 국회의원회관 201호에선 서평회가 열렸다. 이날 서평회엔 이 책의 필진들과 일본군 ‘위안부’ 문제에 관심을 가진 시민들이 함께했다.
서평회에서 나온 이야기 가운데 흥미로운 부분은 ‘제국의 위안부’를 둘러싼 국내 지식인들의 태도와 일본의 역사 수정주의 그리고 그 배후에 있는 미국의 존재였다. 사실 필진인 김수지 역사평설가는 “노무현 정부 때 친일반민족행위사료집을 낸 적이 있다. 거기 보면 ‘친일의 유형과 논리’가 나온다. 어떻게 식민지 지식인이 친일의 길을 갔는 지 알 수 있다. 그 길은 자연스럽고 합리적이고 지적으로 보인 길”이라고 말했다.
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‘제국의 변호인 박유하에게 묻다’ 서평회ⓒ최진섭
김수지 역사평설가는 이 책에서 일제시대 당시 정교원이라는 언론인이 쓴 ‘내선일체의 윤리적 의의’라는 글에서 주장한 ‘동근동조(同根同祖)’라는 논리를 인용한다. 그가 이런 논리를 만든 건 “일본이 조선을 지배하는 것은 이 민족의 침략이 아니고 따지고 보면 조상이 같으니 억울해할 일도 아니고, 자연스럽게 받아들여야 한다”고 선동한다. 그리고 박유하의 논리도, 박유하를 옹호하는 지식인들의 논리도 이런 의도와 한계에서 벗어날 수 없다고 지적하고 있다. 김수지 역사평설가는 “이상하게 우리나라 지식인들은 자신들이 합리적인 지식인임을 강조한다. 마치 중간에 있는 게 합리적인 것처럼 말한다. 기울어진 시소에서 어디로 가야 중간이 되냐”고 꼬집기도 했다.

일본의 역사수정주의와 한일 군사동맹 그리고 미국

이날 서평회에서 정연진 미국 OK 원코리아 대표는 미국과 관련한 문제에 대해 지적했다. 그는 2000년 미국 연방 법원에 일본군 ‘위안부’ 문제와 관련해 일본 정부와 소송을 벌여던 당시를 설명하면서 “일본의 방해는 충분히 짐작했다. 하지만 가장 큰 큰 걸림돌은 미 국무부였다. 당시 미국은 유태인 홀로코스트와 달리 미 법정에서 다뤄서 안 된다고 재판부 설득하는 등 집요하게 방해했다”고 밝혔다. 정 대표는 이어 정 대표는 “남북이 같이 힘을 합쳐서 국제무대에서 일본에 대항할 수 있는, 남북 공조 가능한 이슈가 바로 일본군 ‘위안부’ 문제다. 하지만 한국 정부가 일본과 졸속 합의에 나서면서 남북 공조의 기회도 차단했다”고 꼬집었다.
우리 지식인들과 미국의 태도를 관통하는 말은 일본의 ‘역사수정주의’다. 그리고 식민지근대화론, 국정교과서로 한국의 역사를 왜곡하는 입장과 일본의 역사수정주의 흐름은 동전의 양면처럼 맞닿아 있다. 대한민국 상해임시정부(1919년)의 법통성을 부정하고 새롭게 건국절(1948년)을 추진하는 세력과 전쟁범죄, 식민지 지배 책임을 회피하고 일본의 군국주의 부활을 꾀하는 세력은 이미 내용적인 ‘화해’를 끝냈는지도 모른다. 어쩌면 그들은 조만간 한일군사동맹을 위해 어깨동무를 나란히 할 ‘동지적 관계’인지도 모른다. 그리고 그런 말도 안 되는 화해를 한일군사동맹을 필요로 하는 미국은 압박하고 있는 것이다.
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‘제국의 변호인 박유하에게 묻다’ 서평회ⓒ정연진

이 책은 이런 맥락에서 ‘제국의 위안부’를 경계해야 해야 한다고 경고하고 있다. ‘화해’의 담론으로 포장하고, 표현의 자유로 띠를 두르고, 사상 검열 당한 피해자 흉내를 내지만 ‘제국의 위안부’는 진실과는 거리가 멀다고 꼬집는다. 그러면서 “박유하는 누구 편인가?”하고 질문을 던진다. 엄연히 전쟁범죄 피해자가 실재하는 문제에서 ‘당신은 누구편인가’라는 질문은 단지 민족주의적이고 국가주의적인 질문은 아니라고 말한다. 이 책의 필진 가운데 한 명인 손종업 교수는 “박유하가 어느 민족이나 국가의 편익을 추구하는가는 중요하지 않다. 다만 그녀의 책이 어떤 보편적인 가치를 추구하는가가 문제일 따름이다. 학문은 ‘해결책’이 아니라 ‘진실’ 또는 ‘사실’을 통해 기존의 패러다임과 맞서야 한다”고 말했다.
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가해자의 입장에서 바라본 위안부 문제, 소녀상, 정대협

‘제국의 위안부’가 담고 있는 건 과연 무엇일까? ‘제국의 위안부’에 대해 2016년 1월 창립한 일본군‘위안부’연구회 초대 회장인 김창록 교수는 “많은 이들에 의해 지적되었듯이, 부분의 전체화, 예외의 일반화, 자의적인 해석과 인용, 극단적인 난삽함, 근거 없는 가정에서 출발한 과도한 주장 등등, 수많은 문제점으로 가득 찬 ‘제국의 위안부’는 이미 학술서로서의 기본을 갖추고 있는지 의심스러운 책”이라고 평가했다.

이 책의 필진인 이재승 교수도 위안부는 성노예가 아님을 입증하는 박 교수의 서술 방식에 대해 언급하면서 “자신이 믿고 싶은 몇 가지 사례들을, 더구나 자기가 믿고 싶은 방식대로 믿고 이를 사태의 전부로 일반화하고 나머지 사례를 모조리 증거가 없다고 하는 것이 수정주의자들의 행위공식”이라고 비판했다. 아울러 이 교수는 박유하의 ‘제국의 위안부’는 시종일관 제국의 입장에서, 즉 가해자의 입장에서 위안부 문제, 소녀상, 정대협을 바라본다는 것이다. 이재승 교수는 “박 교수 는 근본적으로 침략과 전쟁을 억압받는 여성이나 주권을 박탈당한 민족의 관점이 아니라 제국의 시선에서 제국의 변호사로서 다루고 있다”고 꼬집었다.
아울러 이 책은 ‘제국의 위안부’라는 제목 자체가 일본제국의 전쟁 책임을 묻는 일본군 ‘위안부’를 회피하기 위해 의도적으로 고안된 명칭이라 할 수 있다. ‘제국의 위안부’라는 말은 ‘조선인 위안부’를 일본군과 동지적 관계로 만들어 일본군의 범죄를 면죄해주는데 쓰이고, 다른 한편으로는 ‘위안부’(성노예) 문제는 단지 일본만의 책임이 아니며 일본보다 일찍 제국주의 확장을 한 서양에게 더 큰 책임이 있다는 식으로 초점을 흐리게 한다. 이처럼 ‘제국의 위안부’라는 책 제목은 일본의 전쟁범죄, 식민지 지배 책임을 희석화, 추상화하고, 축소하는 데 활용된다고 꼬집는다.

이 책의 제목은 ‘제국의 변호인 박유하에게 묻다’다. 손종업 교수는 “마지막으로 내가 이 글의 제목을 ‘제국의 변호인’이라고 쓴 것에 대해서 그것은 지나치게 폭력적인 게 아닌가 비판하는 분들이 있으리라고 생각한다. 당연히 그래야 하지 않겠는가. 또한 그런 분들이라면 너무도 당연히 ‘제국의 위안부’라는 제목이 얼마나 경솔하고 비학문적이며 어느 누군가에게는 지나치게 폭력적이고 모욕적인 언어인가를 느끼게 되지 않을까 싶다”고 말했다.

지난 23일 열린 서평회에서 이 책을 기획한 최진섭 도서출판 말 대표는 “서점에서 ‘21세기 금서’라는 띠지를 단 ‘제국의 위안부’를 보는 순간 감정이 북받쳤다. 그 옆에 비판 책 같이 놓아야겠다는 생각을 했다. 표현의 자유는 정의를 실현하기 위해, 거대 권력에 맞서 싸우는 의미를 담고 있다. 그런데 이 책은 제국주의에 맞서 몇 십 년을 싸워온 이들을 희롱하는 내용”이라며 이 책을 기획하게 된 계기를 설명했다. 이 책이 ‘제국의 위안부’ 옆에 놓여질 수 있게 된 것이 얼마나 다행인지 모른다. ‘제국의 위안부’와 박유하 교수의 주장이 가진 위험성을 우리는 충분히 아는 듯 하지만 실은 아무것도 모르고 있다고 해도 과언이 아니기 때문이다.
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“한국은 ‘消耗戰’ 과잉 사회다” | 사람과사회

“한국은 ‘消耗戰’ 과잉 사회다” | 사람과사회

“한국은 ‘消耗戰’ 과잉 사회다”

마크 트웨인, “우리를 곤경에 빠뜨리는 것은 우리가 잘 모르는 것이 아니라, 우리가 확실히 알고 있다고 생각했으나 사실은 그렇지 못한 것이다.”

“우리를 곤경에 빠뜨리는 것은 우리가 잘 모르는 것이 아니라, 우리가 확실히 알고 있다고 생각했으나 사실은 그렇지 못한 것이다.”
 논란은 ‘사회적 현상’이라 생각한다. 그리고 가장 크고 심각한 문제는 우리 사회가 ‘비정상’에 익숙한 까닭에 사회 현상에 대한 사리판단을 제대로 하지 못하는 구조가 악순환을 반복하고 있다는 데에 있다.
<제국의 위안부> 논란은 ‘사회적 현상’이라 생각한다. 그리고 가장 크고 심각한 문제는 우리 사회가 ‘비정상’에 익숙한 까닭에 사회 현상에 대한 사리판단을 제대로 하지 못하는 구조가 악순환을 반복하고 있다는 데에 있다.
박유하 교수가 밝힌 책과 글을 공유하는 것으로 답답한 마음을 조금이나마 위로를 하고 싶다. 아울러 박유하 교수를 지지하는 명단도 살펴봤다. 이들은 편지 받는 명단에 있는 사람이다. 일부는 편지 주소만 있다. 전체 명단인지 여부는 잘 모르겠다. 지지 명단에는 낯선 분과 익숙한 분, 그리고 직접 만난 분도 있다. 개인적으로 이 분들에게 고마운 마음이 크다. 또한 이들은 ‘더 나은 것’을 이룰 수 있는 길과 방향과 힘을 주는 주인공이라는 생각도 빼놓을 수가 없다. 이 글을 읽고 박유하 교수의 소식을 받고자 하는 분이 있다면 이메일, 이름, 연락처 등을 박유하 교수 페이스북에 들어가서 메시지를 보내는 것도 참 좋을 것 같다.
박유하 교수가 밝힌 책과 글을 공유하는 것으로 답답한 마음을 조금이나마 위로를 하고 싶다. 아울러 박유하 교수를 지지하는 명단도 살펴봤다. 이들은 편지 받는 명단에 있는 사람이다. 일부는 편지 주소만 있다. 전체 명단인지 여부는 잘 모르겠다. 지지 명단에는 낯선 분과 익숙한 분, 그리고 직접 만난 분도 있다. 개인적으로 이 분들에게 고마운 마음이 크다. 또한 이들은 ‘더 나은 것’을 이룰 수 있는 길과 방향과 힘을 주는 주인공이라는 생각도 빼놓을 수가 없다. 이 글을 읽고 박유하 교수의 소식을 받고자 하는 분이 있다면 이메일, 이름, 연락처 등을 박유하 교수 페이스북에 들어가서 메시지를 보내는 것도 참 좋을 것 같다.
‘재판통신 20160525’를 읽었다
박유하 세종대 교수가 보내준 ‘제국의 위안부’ 소식을 담은 편지다.
박유하 교수가 편지는 민사 및 형사재판에 대한 이야기, 네 번째 재판 이야기(2016.05.23), 국민참여재판 일정(2016.08.29~09.02) 이야기 등을 담고 있다. 5월 23일 재판을 위해 준비한 반박문 서문, 그리고 홈페이지에서 <제국의 위안부>(제2판 34곳 삭제판)와 <화해를 위해서>를 내려 받을 수 있는 바로가기가 들어 있다.
“우리를 곤경에 빠뜨리는 것은 우리가 잘 모르는 것이 아니라, 우리가 확실히 알고 있다고 생각했으나 사실은 그렇지 못한 것이다.”
소설가 마크 트웨인의 말이다. 박유하 교수는 홈페이지 첫 화면에 올려놓았다. 마크 트웨인의 심정(心情)과 같은 마음이 들었기 때문일 것이다.
<제국의 위안부> 논란은 ‘사회적 현상’이라 생각한다. 그리고 가장 크고 심각한 문제는 우리 사회가 ‘비정상’에 익숙한 까닭에 사회 현상에 대한 사리판단을 제대로 하지 못하는 구조가 악순환을 반복하고 있다는 데에 있다.
박유하 교수가 밝힌 책과 글을 공유하는 것으로 답답한 마음을 조금이나마 위로를 하고 싶다. 아울러 박유하 교수를 지지하는 명단도 살펴봤다. 이들은 편지 받는 명단에 있는 사람이다. 일부는 편지 주소만 있다. 전체 명단인지 여부는 잘 모르겠다.
지지 명단에는 낯선 분과 익숙한 분, 그리고 직접 만난 분도 있다. 개인적으로 이 분들에게 고마운 마음이 크다. 또한 이들은 ‘더 나은 것’을 이룰 수 있는 길과 방향과 힘을 주는 주인공이라는 생각도 빼놓을 수가 없다.
이 글을 읽고 박유하 교수의 소식을 받고자 하는 분이 있다면 이메일, 이름, 연락처 등을 박유하 교수 페이스북에 들어가서 메시지를 보내는 것도 참 좋을 것 같다.
아래와 같은 논의를 위해 생각하고, 풀고, 끝내야 한다.
-제국의 위안부, 왜 논란이 됐나?
-제국의 위안부, 무엇이 문제인가?
-제국의 위안부, 논란을 부추기는 이유는?
끝내기로서의 이해와 판단이 필요하다. 이를 바탕으로 소모전(消耗戰)을 끝내기 위해 더 필요하다. 논쟁으로서의 의의가 없는 것에 우리 사회는 너무 많은 소모전쟁을 치르고 있는 까닭이다.
한국은 분명 ‘消耗戰’ 과잉 사회다.

함께 읽기
<제국의 위안부>(제2판 34곳 삭제판)
https://cldup.com/upJTpO4a_q.pdf
<화해를 위해서>
https://cldup.com/YiCRLBRb5R.pdf
‘제국의 위안부’ 형사 기소에 대한 지식인 성명
https://www.facebook.com/peopleciety/posts/1091766644169242

About 김종영 (449 Articles)
사람과사회 운영자다. 국문학과 저널리즘을 배웠다. '글은 사람과 사회며, 좋은 비판은 세상을 바꾼다'는 말을 좋아한다.

일/미 역사학자들의 위안부문제 관련 성명과 반응에 대해

일/미 역사학자들의 위안부문제 관련 성명과 반응에 대해
May 29, 2015 at 12:56pm
https://www.facebook.com/notes/park-yuha/%EC%9D%BC%EB%AF%B8-%EC%97%AD%EC%82%AC%ED%95%99%EC%9E%90%EB%93%A4%EC%9D%98-%EC%9C%84%EC%95%88%EB%B6%80%EB%AC%B8%EC%A0%9C-%EA%B4%80%EB%A0%A8-%EC%84%B1%EB%AA%85%EA%B3%BC-%EB%B0%98%EC%9D%91%EC%97%90-%EB%8C%80%ED%95%B4/1124405170919729
25일에 나온 일본역사학자들의 성명이 어떤 내용일지 나오기 전부터 기대가 컸다. 시기적으로 미국역사학자들의 성명에 이어진 것이었기 때문에 그 성명에 대한 의견도 반영되어 있으리라고 생각했다. 하지만 발표된 성명에는 그에 대한 아무런 언급도 없었다. 결론부터 말한다면 이런 내용으로는  일본정부와 이 문제에 회의적인 일본국민들을 설득하기 어려울 것이다. 내용이 틀려서가 아니라 해야  할 이야기의 반밖에 없는 성명이기 때문이다. 본질을 말한다 해도 설명이 더 필요할 때도 있다.

일본신문중에 이 성명을 보도한 곳이 아사히신문과 도쿄신문뿐이라는 사실이 그런 정황을 설명해 준다. 침묵한 일본언론들 중 비판받아야 할 언론들도 있지만,그 전부가 위안부문제를 부정해서만은 아니다. 그리고 그런 언론과 국민들에 대한 이해가 없는 한 위안부문제의 해결은 없다.

오히려 NHK가 이 성명을 보도했다는 사실에 한국은 한번쯤 주목할 필요가 있다. NHK는 작년에 회장이 위안부문제에 부정적인 발언을 한 이후로 한국에서는 나쁜정부의 대변인처럼 인식되고 있지만, 일본은 한국만큼 대표자의 권한이 강하지 않다. 수천명의 직원들이 회장과 똑같이 생각할 거라고 생각하면 오산이다. 2000년여성국제전범재판보도를 둘러싸고 일본지원자들은 NHK를 고발한 적도 있는데, 그런 지원자들이 하고 싶은 얘기를 보도해 준 극소수의 언론 중 하나가 <국영방송> NHK였다는 점은 아이러니가 아닐 수 없다.

아무튼 한국언론들은 언제나처럼 이 성명이 일본을 대표하는 것처럼 대서특필했다. 또 참여인원이 얼마나 많은지를 강조하려 했다. 동아일보등이 2200명이라 하더니 조선일보는 6900명이라 했고 한겨레는 13800명이라고 보도했다. 한국일보는 16개학회들 중에 회원이 2200명인 <대표적역사연구단체인 역사학연구회가 포함되어 있다>고 했는데 다른 신문은 대표5개학회중 4곳이 포함되었다고 썼다.
이 학회들 중에 <일본을 대표하는 학회>가 들어 있다는 건 사실일 것이다. 왜냐하면 이 성명은 진보성향학자들이 주축이 된 성명이라 할 수 있고, <일본전후>에서 아카데미즘을 이끌어 온 건 진보쪽이었기 때문이다.
그렇다 하더라도 16개단체중에 대학이나 지방이름을 단 학회가 다수 보인다는 건 만명이 넘는다고 한겨레가 강조하고 싶어한 이들 중 중복가입된 이들이 있을 수 있다는 걸 말한다. 더구나 대학원학생회원들도 적지 않을 것이다. 이런 식의 심리와 역학이 <20>설을 만든다. 자신도 회원인데 학회가 자신에게는 의견을 묻지 않았고, 앞으로도 참여할 생각이 없다고 페북에 쓴 일본인학자도 있었다.

이보다 먼저 나온 미국역사학자들은 좌우 상관없이 <일본국민>들이 대체적으로 납득가능할 것으로 보이는 성명을 써 냈었다. 그리고 비판이라기보다는, 설득/권고 논조였다. 한국은 그저 비판으로만 보고 싶어 했지만, 이들의 입장이 <제2의 고향>-즉일본은 사랑하는 사람들이라는 것을 스스로 강조한 이들인 이상 당연한 일이다. 그들의 성명은 충분히 논의되고 고심한 흔적이 뚜렷했고, 결과적으로 섬세했고 합리적이었다.
그에 비해 정작 일본내 학자들의 성명은 지극히 간단했다. 그리고 결과적으로 반쪽짜리 성명이 되었다. 이 문제에 부정적인 이들을 겨냥하면서도 혼잣말같은. 다이얼로그가 아니라 모놀로그적인. 많은 이들이 애썼을 텐데 애석한 일이다.

이들의 주장 성명 발표 직후에 일본 인터넷에서 이들에 대한 비판과 야유가 들끓었던 건 그런 문맥에서다. 그들의 야유중에는 이 문제를그저 부정하고 싶은 이들도 물론 많지만, 그들의 야유를 소수화하거나 잠재울만한 설득력이 없는 성명으로는 위안부문제 해결은 어렵다.

나는 이 학자들의 가열찬 자기비판에 경의를 품고 있고, 성명의 문제의식에 기본적으로는 찬성하고 지지한다.  그럼에도 불구하고 남는, 치명적인 문제점을 지적해둔다.
일본 정부가 혹 움직인다면 일본학자들의 성명-조언때문이 아니라 미국역사학자들의 조언 때문일 것이다.

1.이들이 겨냥하는 <일부정치인이나 언론>이 만약 아베정부라면, 아베정부는 고노담화를 계승한다고 했으니 고노담화에 대한 언급은 불필요하지 않았을까.
이런 내용은 아베정부에 대한 부정확한 비판을 늘려 아베정부를 오히려 경직시킬 것이다. 산케이나 요미우리같은 언론에 대한 비판은 필요하다. 그들이 아베정부를 지지하는 층이라는 것도 분명하다. 하지만 그럴 수록, 그런 언론과 정부의 차이를 발견하고 정부가 무언가 할 수 있도록 하는 지원담론이 필요하다.

2.<본인의 의사에 반한> <연행(?)>도 <강제>라고 말하면서 전에는 <군인에 의한 직접 연행>을 <강제연행>이라고 생각했던 과거인식에 대한 설명이 전혀 없다. 개념전환을 한다면 한번쯤은 공식적인 설명이 필요하다. 그렇게 하지 않기 때문에, 논점을 설명없이 바꾼다는 야유를 받는다.  인신매매나 성매매에 대한 언급은 아베정부를 향한 것이었겠지만, 결과적으로 미국의 역사학자들과 다른 견해를 내놓은 것처럼 보여, 미국학자들을 비판한  것처럼 되어 버렸다.

3.<본인의 의사에 반한 연행>의 주체를 명시하지 않았다. 설사 군인이었다 해도 그런 케이스가 오히려 소수이고 그렇게 간 경우도 군이 돌려보내거나 다른 곳에 취직시킨 경우도 있다는 사실, 즉 <본인의 의사에 반해>데려간 것은 꼭 국가나 군의 공식정책이나 방침이 아니었다는 것, 즉 어느쪽이 예외적인 일이었는지도 말해야 공정하다. 업자가 인신매매했을 경우 군이 어디까지 관여할 수 있었는지도,  비판이든 옹호든 명확하게 그 구조를 언급해야 오해를 피할 수 있다. 그렇게 하지 않았기 때문에 인신매매의 주체가 일본인 것처럼 오해하게 되고  정확치 않은 비판과 일본정부가 경직되는 일이 이어진다. 하청업자보다 일감을 준 이를 비판하는 것은 맞지만, 그렇게 할 경우에 생기는 문제에 대한 배려가 부족했다.

4.위안부에 <성노예>적인 측면이 있다는 것은 부정할 수 없다. 성매매적인 측면이 있다 해도 불공정한 차별구조가 있었다는 건 나 역시 지적한 이야기다. 하지만 <성노예적>인 구조를 지적하는 일과 <성노예>라고 말하는 일은 다르다. 듣는 이들이 떠올리는 내용이 달라지기 때문에, 결국 일반인들의 이해는 여전히 좁혀지지 않는다.   성노예였다고 한다면 그들의 직접<주인>이 업자였고 강제노동을 시킨 것도 이윤을 얻은 것도 업자였다는 사실도 말해야 하지 않았을까.

5.나 역시 차별등 <그러한 정치적 사회적 배경을 사상(버리는)>는 이들을 비판했지만 ,이 성명 역시 또다른 측면을 <사상捨象>하고 있으니 결국 이들이 비판하는,위안부문제를 부정하는 이들과 구조적으로는 같은 자세를 취한 셈이 되었다.

 사족--
대학교원의 <학문의 자유> 침해를 항의하는 이들이, 나의 <사직을 요구하는 협박>에 멈추지 않고 고발이라는 <부당한 공격>에 나선
한국인 고발자들에 대해서는 침묵하는 것도, 그렇게  버려진 구조와 다르지 않을 것이다.  여기 참여했을 이들의 일부는, 나의 논지를 마치 자신들의 것과 다른 것처럼 비판중이고, 그런행위/비판은 나에 대한 고발을 정당화시키고 있다. 그런 사실에 대해 일본학자들이 어떻게 생각하는지도 궁금하다.

http://minjok.info/archives/2509


“Asahi Shimbun” Coverage of the Comfort Women Issue Through the Years | Nippon.com

“Asahi Shimbun” Coverage of the Comfort Women Issue Through the Years | Nippon.com

“Asahi Shimbun” Coverage of the Comfort Women Issue Through the Years
On August 5, 2014, the Asahi Shimbun ran an article assessing its past coverage of the comfort women issue, admitting many factual errors including the 32-year-old testimony of Yoshida Seiji. What came to light through this article, however, was not so much the truth about comfort women as the mutually skewed debate in both Japan and South Korea, which share a peculiar postwar history.

Facts Unchanged by Asahi’s Assessment

One thing needs to be made clear at the outset: wartime “comfort women” did in fact exist across Asia during World War II, with the involvement of Japan and the Japanese military. It is also undeniably true that there were numerous instances of local women in war zones being forced into sexual service under threat of military violence. In this respect, their plight is no different from the violence perpetrated by occupation forces in other wars.
The emphasis here, though, is on “war zones.” The comfort women system itself was simply an incarnation of Japan’s officially approved system of managed prostitution taken to areas occupied by the Japanese military. (Japan abolished its managed prostitution system in 1958.) The majority of comfort women consisted of Japanese women in mainland Japan, as well as women in Korea and Taiwan, which were annexed to Japan at the time. Managed prostitution was no less than officially sanctioned human trafficking, and there is no question that it grossly violated the human rights of those subject to it. But this human rights violation was altogether different from coercion in war zones, which is a war crime.
South Korea has been highly vocal against Japan on the issue of comfort women in recent years, the gist of the criticism being that it was a war crime. But Japan has not waged war on the Korean Peninsula since its 1894–95 war with Qing-dynasty China. It has not, moreover, fought a single modern war with countries of the Korea Peninsula.

A Hoax Created by Yoshida Seiji

Yoshida Seiji. (© Yomiuri Shimbun/Aflo)
Be that as it may, the comfort women issue is still treated as a war crime in South Korea, as it also was in Japan up until a certain point. One factor underpinning this is a lie: the testimony of a man by the name of Yoshida Seiji (1913–2000). Yoshida claimed to have worked during World War II as a labor mobilization manager at the Shimonoseki branch of the Yamaguchi Prefecture Rōmu Hōkokukai, an organization that oversaw day laborers. He published two books in the 1980s, in which he wrote that he had “hunted out” roughly 200 young women on Jeju Island during wartime. Years later, when the issue blew up, reporters, historians, and even Korean researchers conducted surveys on the island to confirm the facts, but none of them was able to find evidence or testimony supporting his account.
If this were the whole story, Yoshida’s tale would have faded into oblivion without gaining much public attention. But as fate would have it, the Asahi Shimbun—Japan’s most influential newspaper since before the war—wrote up the testimony in an article in 1982. “Comfort women hunting” in the Korean Peninsula thus made Korean headlines and became a central issue in the country’s criticism of Japan.
Things were further complicated by the way that the Asahi mixed up joshi teishintai (women’s volunteer corps), in which Japanese citizens were gathered to volunteer their labor during the war, with comfort women. Women’s volunteer corps existed throughout Japan and its territories, primarily in schools. This led to widespread discourse based on the assumption that “comfort stations” were highly common.

Summary of the Asahi Assessment of Its Comfort Women Coverage

1. Existence of coercive recruitment
Regarding the September 2, 1982, article in the Osaka morning edition about “comfort women hunting” on Jeju Island, which was based on the testimony of Yoshida Seiji, and the description in an editorial on January 12, 1992, that women were “solicited or forcibly taken away as volunteer corps”:
In Korea and Taiwan, which were under Japanese colonial rule, prostitution rings were able to deceptively recruit large numbers of women with promises of good work, and no records have been found of the Japanese military systematically abducting women for sexual purposes. In regions occupied by the Japanese army, including Indonesia, records indicating that the military carted off local women have been confirmed. In both cases, the women were forced into service against their will.
2. Yoshida Seiji’s testimony about “comfort women hunting” on Jeju Island
Regarding having run 16 articles based on Yoshida’s testimony since becoming the first major media outlet to take up the testimony:
Asahi conducted additional research on Jeju Island but was unable to obtain information corroborating Yoshida’s testimony. Judging the testimony to have been false, it retracted the articles.
3. 1992 article and political intent
Regarding the criticism that the January 11, 1992, story on a document indicating military involvement in comfort stations was timed to coincide with Prime Minister Miyazawa’s visit to Korea:
There was no such intention, and Asahi ran the article five days after learning the details. Meanwhile, the government had been notified of the document’s existence prior to the article being printed.
4. Confusion of volunteer corps with comfort women
Regarding the 1991–92 articles stating that comfort women from the Korean Peninsula were forcibly recruited under the pretext of joining the joshi teishintai (women’s volunteer corps):
Joshi teishintai refers to the joshi kinrō teishintai (women’s volunteer labor corps), which mobilized women to work in munitions factories and other locations during the war, and is completely distinct from comfort women. Some of the reference materials used by the reporters also confused the two, resulting in misuse of the term.
5. Background of the August 11, 1991, article on the first testimony by a former comfort woman
Regarding allegations that the article, which preceded Korean media coverage, was somehow biased, because its writer was related to a senior member of a Korean organization supporting lawsuits by former comfort women:
What prompted the story was information provided by the chief of the Seoul bureau of the time, and there was no intentional distortion of facts.

The Tide-Turning Coverage of January 1992

Coverage along these lines reached a climax around the time of Prime Minister Miyazawa Kiichi’s visit to South Korea in January 1992. The previous year, a former comfort woman had come forward for the first time and sued the Japanese government. As with the Yoshida testimony, Asahi wrote up the story ahead of Korean media. In the midst of the commotion, just days before Miyazawa left for Korea, Asahi reported on a document suggesting that the Japanese military and public agencies had facilitated the transportation of comfort women to “comfort stations.” The prime minister was obliged to repeatedly apologize during his visit, and the next year Chief Cabinet Secretary Kōno Yōhei released a statement regarding the comfort women issue. (Although the statement acknowledged the existence of comfort women, public-sector involvement in operating comfort facilities, and coercion in war zones, it made no mention of coercion in Korea.) Other media organs began following in Asahi’s footsteps.
With the government being forced into action, the articles to date quickly came under scrutiny, the outcome being that Yoshida’s testimony had no basis in fact and that the volunteer corps and comfort women had been mixed up. From August 1992 onward, Japanese media refrained from coverage based on the testimony. But they neither retracted nor corrected past articles.

Japan and Korea in Deadlock

The situation further escalated, even as the media fell silent on the subject. In 1996 Radhika Coomaraswamy submitted an addendum to her report to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, taking up Yoshida’s testimony as evidence. Seven Korean former comfort women came under domestic attack for accepting reparations from the Asian Women’s Fund, an organization set up by Japanese government initiative to compensate former comfort women across Asia, and were later cut off from government support. Even today, the overwhelming attitude in South Korea is that they cannot accept reparations or apologies unless Korean comfort women are treated as victims of coercion in war zones and not along the lines of the Kōno Statement.
The Korean stance was publicized in the United States in a campaign led by Korean Americans, culminating ina 2007 resolution by the House of Representatives condemning Japan. In March 2007 Prime Minister Abe Shinzō, then in his first term, had remarked that “there was coercion of these women in the broad sense, but not in the narrow sense”—in other words, that comfort women existed in Korea as a product of human trafficking, but that there had been no coercion on the direct part of the Japanese military. This only earned him the reputation of a historical revisionist from both the government and people of the United States.
The Japanese government, for its part, could not possibly provide a response above and beyond that of the Kōno Statement, which would entail acknowledging Yoshida’s “lie” as fact. And so Japanese-Korean relations fell into an impasse with no foreseeable way out.

Syngman Rhee’s Myth of Wartime Victory over Japan

Koreans did not actually start out with a sense of victimhood regarding the issue of wartime comfort women. If highly criminal acts had in fact been committed, Korea would have raised the issue immediately after the war, as the Netherlands did in the postwar trials of Class B and C war criminals. In reality, it was not until the 1980s that “coerced comfort women” came to be talked about, and only after testimony and media reports came out in Japan.
Once the image of wartime women forced into sexual slavery was set forth, however, it spread immediately. South Korea had good reason to embrace the image.
The state of South Korea was born as a consequence of the former Japanese territory of Korea being divided at the end of World War II. Both North and South Korea came into being because the Empire of Japan fell, not because they won independence with their own hands. But with both countries being exclusivist in nature, the Korean War broke out, and a long and fierce clash of national identities has continued since then.
Early on, the North had the upper hand in this conflict. North Korea has its origins in a resistance movement based in the Yanbian district of Jilin, Manchuria, after Japan’s annexation of Korea. Led by anti-Japanese partisan groups with the backing of the Communist Party of China, this movement claimed to be the true leaders of independence. The predecessor of South Korea, meanwhile, was the provisional Korean government, which aligned itself with the Kuomintang government of China. Syngman Rhee, South Korea’s first president, was also president of the provisional government. This government in exile formed an armed force known as the Korean Liberation Army during the Sino-Japanese War of 1937–45, but this force never fully functioned and did not actually engage in battle against Japan. Nor did the government ever win the formal recognition of the international community. Moreover, the Kuomintang government, its sponsor, lost the civil war with the Communists, which supported North Korea, and retreated from the mainland to Taiwan in 1949.
Nonetheless, in the Korean War over unification of the peninsula, the South Korean administration of Syngman Rhee held firmly to the line of its “history of resistance against Japan.” Accordingly, it asked to be invited to the San Francisco Peace Conference of September 1951 between Japan and the Allied powers and other members of the international community, as well as to be included as a signatory of the treaty. In short, it demanded that the international community acknowledge South Korea as a victor over Japan in World War II. The Allies refused, but South Korea continued to conduct itself as a victor, both at home and abroad.

Unreasonable Comparisons with Germany

The echoes of Rhee’s myth live on to this day. South Korean critics of Japan, whether politicians, organizations, or the media, almost invariably compare Japan with Germany. Regarding the territorial dispute over Takeshima, in particular, they have repeatedly brought up the German-Polish Border Treaty, suggesting that Japan follow Germany’s example. In the treaty, signed at the time of its reunification in 1990, Germany settled its border dispute with Poland and relinquished the rights of German refugees to make territorial claims.
In truth, drawing a parallel between South Korea and Poland is a stretch. Poland had undisputedly been at war with Germany and was, moreover, a direct victim of Nazi war crimes. But South Korea, as noted above, was never at war with Japan during World War II. Whether residents liked it or not, the Korean Peninsula was part of Japan at the time. South Korea thus had a good motive or psychological basis for wanting to present itself as a country that had warred with Japan, and the issue of “coerced comfort women” gave it a way to be seen in the same light as wartime Poland or the territories later occupied by the Soviet Union.

The Japanese Media’s War Involvement

The psychological inclination to portray South Korea as World War II victims was also seen among certain elements in Japan, specifically among the media. Here again, a comparison with Germany is a good illustration.
In both Japan and Germany, according to the terms of surrender to the Allied powers, those held responsible for the war were prosecuted in military trials, and the wartime regimes dismantled. The Nazis and Nazism were done away with in Germany as the culprits of war, while the military and militarism were eliminated in Japan. The disbanding of the military and the purging of those involved was more thorough in Japan than in Germany. But this was true only with regard to the military. While a discussion of the circumstances surrounding the process is beyond the scope of this article, the bottom line was that, aside from the zaibatsu (financial and industrial conglomerates) being taken apart, virtually all of Japan’s nonmilitary leadership was left intact, including politicians, the bureaucracy, and universities.
The most prominent of these examples were media organizations. In Germany, war collaborators were systematically dissolved or expelled in the postwar process of negating Nazi propaganda, and newspapers were not exempted from this fate. Japan and Germany greatly differ in that respect.
From the 1931 Manchurian Incident onward, the Asahi ShimbunMainichi Shimbun, and Yomiuri Shimbun, Japan’s three major newspapers since the prewar era, fed the enthusiasm for the invasion of mainland China as virtual mouthpieces of the military. Circulation of the three dailies skyrocketed, and as of 1945 Asahi and Mainichiwere each selling 3.5 million copies daily, while the newer Yomiuri had a circulation of 1.5 million. All three had established their status as national newspapers by this time. Although the US Occupation banned Ogata Taketora, chief editor of Asahi, and Shōriki Matsutarō, president of Yomiuri, from public office under suspicion of war crimes, the purge did not extend far beyond them, and was lifted before long. Aside from the breakup of the Dōmei News Agency into Jiji Press, Kyodo News, and Dentsu, Japan’s media organizations were unaffected, even down to their nameplate designs.

Shift of Authority from Politics to the Media

The sway of Japanese media organs over public opinion, which they built up during the war as instruments of propaganda under the National Mobilization Law, only grew stronger in the postwar decades. This stems in part from the government and public agencies preferentially passing on information to the media under the press club system. In effect, the wartime system of general mobilization has continued.
With no more military control, topped with greater influence, Japan’s national newspapers and other media giants have come to hold enormous clout. The figure below gives a good picture of just how much of a presence they have in Japan. Yomiuri and Asahi are the top two newspapers by circulation anywhere in the world. Considering that China and India have populations 10 times larger than Japan and that Japanese is used almost exclusively within the country, Japan’s share of the global market is remarkable. The Soviet Pravda and Chinese People’s Daily were said to have had circulations of 15 million and 10 million, respectively, in the final days of the Cold War. Compared with these numbers, the domestic presence of Japan’s mammoth newspapers is extraordinary.
When Japan lost the war, the government also lost its authority regarding historical issues and other matters of values, and journalism and academia took over the leadership in forming public opinion. Issues involving history and war responsibility became topics in which the media held the overwhelming advantage over the government and political authority. The media needed to be champions of justice, all the more because of their own part in the war. Thus, historical issues with Japan’s nearest neighbor became a favorite topic for Japanese newspapers.

Asahi’s Far-Overdue Retraction

Asahi did the right thing in reviewing its past coverage of the comfort women issue and admitting its errors. But the gesture came much too late. Fully 32 years had passed since the first article on Yoshida’s testimony came out and 22 years since the government was obliged to act and the testimony lost its credibility. In the interim, the image of “comfort women forced into service” became ingrained in Korean public opinion, and the global community came to perceive it as a centerpiece in the question of Japan’s wartime responsibility.
To international eyes, the points of contention between Japan and South Korea are trivial details in the overall issue of Japan’s comfort women. What matters is Japan’s attitude toward the wartime comfort women issue as a whole, as well as toward the even larger issue of its responsibility for the war. But the moment Japan tries to correct its own error, however “trivial” the error may be, the outside world interprets this as an attempt to revise history. That South Korea has the intention of taking political advantage of the issue is beside the point. In this respect, Japan is still the defendant.
Within Japan, moreover, there exists pressure to deny not only the country’s responsibility regarding comfort women but all of its other wartime responsibilities on the ex post facto grounds of small inaccuracies. This pressure has further constrained Japan’s actions.
Meanwhile, South Korea has continued to promote the fiction created by Syngman Rhee in its recent course of cozying up to China. China, too, is beginning to answer to this call. Although Japan has yet to truly realize the severity of the situation, China’s commendation of the Korean Liberation Army and remarks about Chinese-Korean cooperation in the struggle against Japan have important foreign policy implications for South Korea. China had long regarded North Korea as the legitimate government of the Korean Peninsula. As the prospect of North Korea’s collapse and North-South unification becomes more real, it is likely that South Korea will step up its campaign for both domestic and international recognition of Rhee’s version of history as the basis for unification.
Retracting past coverage will not wipe the slate clean. The fictitious accounts of history perpetuated by both Japan and South Korea have had consequences far more grave and sinful than the “lie” told by Yoshida that started it all.
(Originally written in Japanese by Mamiya Jun, Editorial Department.)

Timeline of “Comfort Women” Coverage and Historical Issues

1977Comfort women issueYoshida Seiji publishes Chosenjin ianfu to Nihonjin: Moto Shimonoseki rōhō dōin buchō no shuki (Korean Comfort Women and the Japanese: A Former Shimonoseki Labor Mobilization Manager’s Memoir).
1982MediaSeptember 2: In the Osaka morning edition, the Asahi Shimbun prints an article on Yoshida’s testimony about hunting for comfort women on Jeju Island. Asahi would go on to publish 16 articles regarding Yoshida’s testimony.
Historical issues
June 26: Major newspapers and television networks report that a reference in a high school history textbook to Japan’s “aggression” into northern China had been rephrased as an “advancement” during the Ministry of Education’s authorization process.
July–August: The textbook problem becomes a diplomatic issue. The Education Ministry announces that no such change had been made, and media outlets admit after further review that the report had been false (caused by an error by a Nippon Television reporter). An “Asian neighbors clause” is added to the textbook authorization standards.
1983Comfort women issueYoshida publishes Watashi no sensō sekinin (My Wartime Responsibilities).
1989Comfort women issueA Korean translation of Watashi no sensō sekinin is published.
1990Comfort women issue
October: 37 women’s organizations in South Korea issue a statement making six demands to the Japanese government, including an acknowledgment that comfort women were recruited coercively, a formal apology, and compensation.
November: The Korean Council for the Women Drafted for Military Sexual Slavery by Japan (Chongdaehyop) is established.
Historical issues
October: Germany is reunified.
November: The German-Polish Border Treaty is signed. Until this time, East Germany had neither formally recognized the eastern border with Poland defined in the Yalta Agreement (Oder-Neisse line) nor relinquished the rights of German refugees from the former eastern territories to make territorial claims, but the treaty resolves both issues.
1991Media
August 11: Asahi, ahead of Korean media, runs an article based on a taped testimony by the first former comfort woman to go public on an anonymous basis.
August 14: The Hokkaidō Shimbun prints an exclusive interview of the woman with her real name included.
August 15: Major Korean newspapers report on the story.
Comfort women issue
August: A former comfort woman comes forward for the first time in South Korea. Japanese and Korean media cover the story, both of which confuse the volunteer corps with comfort women. The Japanese government begins investigations.
October 1991–February 1992: The Korean network MBC airs a television series in which a comfort woman is the protagonist.
December: Former comfort women who went public file a lawsuit against the Japanese government, led by Japanese human rights lawyers; the Japanese Supreme Court rejects the claim in 2004.
1992Media
January 11: Asahi carries an article titled “Ianjo: Gun kan’yo shimesu shiryō” (Document Indicating Military Involvement in Comfort Stations) in its morning edition.
January 12: Asahi’s editorial, “Rekishi kara me o somukemai” (We Will Not Look Away from History), again confuses the volunteer corps with comfort women. Following these articles, domestic and foreign media report on Yoshida’s testimony, specifying the numbers of individuals who were coercively recruited. But after scholars identify the testimony as being fictitious, domestic media refrain from coverage premised on the testimony from August onward.
July–August: Based on records of the postwar trials of Class B and C war criminals, Asahi reports on the forced recruitment of numerous Dutch women as comfort women in the former Dutch East Indies (now Indonesia) during the war.
Comfort women issue
January: Following the articles by Asahi, Korean media report on the issue in unison, confusing the volunteer corps with comfort women.
January 16: Prime Minister Miyazawa Kiichi visits South Korea and apologizes at the bilateral summit.
March–April: Historian Hata Ikuhiko conducts research on Jeju Island and discloses his conclusion that Yoshida’s testimony had been fabricated.
April: The government releases its findings, acknowledging cases of public-sector involvement at comfort facilities across Asia.
Historical issuesAugust: China and South Korea formally establish diplomatic relations.
1993Comfort women issueAugust: The “Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary Yōhei Kōno”is issued.
1994Comfort women issueAugust: Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi makes a statement toward resolution of the issue.
Historical issues
January: The government of the Netherlands releases documents regarding Dutch comfort women in the former Dutch East Indies.
China begins patriotic education.
1995Comfort women issue
January: Yoshida Seiji admits in the Shūkan Shinchō magazine that his books are fictional.
July: The Asian Women’s Fund, a private entity, is set up by government initiative.
August: The Murayama Statement is issued on the fiftieth anniversary of the end of World War II.
1996Comfort women issueJanuary: The UN “Coomaraswamy Report” addendum citing Yoshida’s testimony is submitted.
1997Comfort women issueJanuary: The Asian Women’s Fund makes compensation to seven Korean women. The individuals are denounced as traitors in South Korea.
1998MediaMarch: Yoshida Seiji refuses to be interviewed by AsahiAsahi writes that it “could not verify the authenticity” of his testimony.
Comfort women issueMarch: In response to a request from Chongdaehyop, South Korea’s Kim Dae-jung administration withdraws support for the seven women who accepted compensation from the Asian Women’s Fund.
2000Historical issuesJuly: The United States and Germany agree on the establishment of “Remembrance, Responsibility, and the Future,” a foundation for handling lawsuits against German companies.
2001Comfort women issueJanuary: NHK airs “Towareru senji sei-bōryoku” (Questioning Wartime Sexual Violence,” the second episode of the series Sensō o dō sabaku ka(How to Judge the War). The program becomes controversial in 2005.
Historical issues
A junior high school history textbook by the Japan Society for History Textbook Reform passes government screening.
August: Prime Minister Koizumi Jun’ichirō makes his first visit to Yasukuni Shrine.
2004Historical issuesJune: In South Korea, the Roh Moo-hyun administration enacts the Special Law on Sex Trade. (Japan’s Anti-Prostitution Act went into force in 1957.)
2005Media
January: Asahi takes up the NHK TV program aired in January 2001 under the headline, “NHK ‘ianfu’ bangumi kaihen: Nakagawa Shō, Abe shi ‘naiyō katayori’ zenjitsu, kanbu yobi shiteki” (Alterations to NHK Program on Comfort Women: Nakagawa Shōichi and Abe Shinzō Summon Executives on Day Before Broadcast, Say “Content Is Biased”). Shortly thereafter Matsuo Takeshi, a former executive director-general of broadcasting cited in the article as one of the NHK executives, comes forward and flatly denies its content.
July: Asahi carries an investigative article on the story, but no facts are revealed that negate Matsuo’s claim.
Historical issues
March–April: Anti-Japanese demonstrations spread in China.
August: The Roh Moo-hyun administration enacts a law impeaching and ostracizing descendants of Korean collaborators to the Japanese colonial government.
2006Historical issuesAugust: Prime Minister Koizumi Jun’ichirō makes his last visit to Yasukuni Shrine.
2007Comfort women issue
March: The Asian Women’s Fund is dissolved. Prime Minister Abe states that “there was coercion of these women in the broad sense, but not in the narrow sense” and is met by backlash in the West.
July: The US House of Representatives passes a resolution urging the Japanese government to apologize on the issue. Yoshida’s testimony is employed as a source.
2010Historical issuesSeptember: A collision occurs between a Chinese fishing vessel and the Japan Coast Guard near the Senkaku Islands. Anti-Japanese movements escalate in China.
2011Comfort women issue
August: The Constitutional Court of Korea rules the government’s “omission” regarding the comfort women issue as unconstitutional.
November: Chongdaehyop erects a comfort woman statue in front of the Japanese embassy in Seoul.
2012Historical issues
May: The South Korean Supreme Court rules in favor of individual compensation to Koreans who were forced to perform labor for Japanese firms during the war.
August: Korean President Lee Myung-bak visits Takeshima. He also demands that the emperor of Japan apologize to Korea’s independence activists.
September: The Japanese government decides to nationalize the Senkaku Islands, sparking anti-Japanese protests in China.
2013Comfort women issueJuly: A comfort woman statue is erected in Glendale, California, with funding from Korean Americans.
Historical issues
March: Park Geun-Hye takes office as president of South Korea.
June: President Park visits China as a state guest.
2014MediaAugust 6: Asahi carries a feature assessing past coverage of the issue of so-called military comfort women and admits that its reports on forced recruitment by the military had been erroneous.
Comfort women issue
June: The Japanese government investigates the process by which the Kōno Statement was drafted and decides against revising it.
August: Asahi’s assessment articles prompt heightened demands to revise the Kōno Statement, including from within the Liberal Democratic Party. Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga Yoshihide reconfirms the government’s policy that no revision is needed.
Historical issues
January: A memorial hall for An Jung-geun, the Korean nationalist who assassinated former prime minister of Japan and resident-general of Korea Itō Hirobumi, is opened in Harbin, Heilongjiang, China.
May: A stone monument in honor of the Korean Liberation Army is unveiled in Xian, Shaanxi, China.
July: Chinese President Xi Jinping visits South Korea and remarks to the effect that China and South Korea had joined in a common front in the struggle against Japan.