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올 한 해 외교관 후보생 우리반 친구들과 해럴드 니콜슨경의 외교론을 함께 읽었다. 다들 바쁜 교육 일정속에서 자주 만나 깊이 있는 의미분석까지 이르지는 못했지만, 각자 읽으며 나름 유익했으리라 믿는다. 고전이 고전이 된 데에는 다 까닭이 있고, 외교론 역시 그러했다.
나름대로 정리해 본 외교론의 고갱이는 다음과 같다. 니콜슨은 언제 읽어도 깊은 인사이트를 준다. 고전의 힘이랄까. 우리반 친구들이 늘 갈무리해 놓으면 좋겠다.
첫째, 어떤 경우에도 거짓은 안된다.
니콜슨은 17세기 영국 외교관 헨리 워튼 경의 말 "대사는 조국을 위해 주재국에 파견된 거짓말쟁이다" (an ambassador is a man sent to lie abroad for the good of his country)를 반면교사의 사례로 인용한다. 자칫 국익을 핑계로 허언을 하거나, 아니면 모호한 발언을 할 때가 있다. 사실 국가간 관계에서 누가 대놓고 거짓말을 하겠는가. 그러나 면피용으로라도 안된다. 단기적 위기 회피용 거짓은 국가를 재앙으로 이끈다. 니콜슨은 워튼경과 대조하며 18세기 프랑스 외교관인 프랑수아 드 칼리에르를 인용한다. "거짓말은 반드시 독을 한방울 떨어뜨려 놓는다. 기만으로 얻어진 눈부신 외교적 승리는 반드시 토대를 송두리째 흔들며 무너진다." 당시 영국 국왕 제임스 1세는 워튼 경을 다시는 대사로 기용하지 않았다. 개인적으로는 과거 싸드 배치 관련, 2016년 북경을 방문한 우리 총리가 사드 배치 계획을 묻는 시진핑 주석에게 결정된 것이 없다고 한 발언이 가장 뼈아팠던 사례였다. 우리는 청와대가 사실을 숨길리는 없다고 생각했다가 열흘 후 발표를 보며 입을 다물지 못했다. 물론 전략적 모호성을 거짓말이라 규정하기 어렵고 중국의 사드배치 반대 논리나 반응에 결코 동의할 수 없었지만, 아쉬움이 컸다.
둘째, 공감이 핵심이며 '주고' '얻어야' 한다.
외교관, 협상가는 자신의 의견과 입장을 잠시 내려놓고, 상대방의 입장에 설 수 있어야 한다. 즉 주재국 또는 협상 상대가 왜 이렇게 생각하고, 주장하고, 반응하는지를 단순히 미루어 짐작하는 선을 넘어서서, 아예 그 입장이 되어보아야 한다. 그리고 객관화와 중립화 역시 넘어서 그 성향과 견해에 일단 공감해보아야 한다. 그 연후에 다시 우리 입장으로 돌아와, 상대의 입장에 대처해야 한다. 니콜슨은 단순한 사유실험을 요구하는 것이 아니라, 적극적 공감의 과정을 거칠 것을 요구한다. 한스 모겐소는 이를 외교간이 가져야 할 '공감의 의무' (duty of emphathy)라 칭하며, 외교관들이 상대에 관해 끊임없이 연구하고 호기심을 가질 것과, 겸손하게 이 공감의 능력을 배양할 것을 주문했다. 십수년전 일본출장 때 IAEA에서 이란핵협상 대표를 맡았던 수토 타카야 대사와 면담했을 때 사뭇 놀랐었다. 완전히 이란 입장에서 사안을 들여다보고 논리를 제시했다가 다시 국제사회와 일본의 입장으로 돌아오는 시선의 이동을 능수능란하게 보였기 때문이었다. 함께 했던 선배는 이야기했다. 외교관이 상대에 대해 공감하며 협상에 임하다보니 결국은 본국에서 비난받는 경우가 다반사고, 그게 외교관의 운명이기도 하다며 웃었다.
셋째, 세가지 키워드가 중요하다. 첫째 준비, 둘째 준비, 셋째 준비
외교는 개인기나 재치, 순간적 기지에 의해 구성되지 않는다. 한 두 차례 개인의 즉흥적 역량으로 위기를 넘길 수는 있다. 그러나 길게 보아 외교는 체계적인 준비와 숙고의 산물이어야 한다. 이를 위해 가장 중요한 것은 철저한 정보 수집과 분석, 그리고 판단능력이 선행되어야 한다. 주재국의 역사, 정치, 인물, 정서, 대중의 인식 등을 면밀히 관찰해야 한다. 두번째는 본부와의 명확한 의사소통과 적시 반응이다. 본부는 명확한 지침과 훈령을 주어야 하고, 외교관들은 이에 대해 칼날 같이 움직여야 한다. 셋째는 부처, 전문 기관들과의 조율이다. 국가 전체의 이익을 반영하는 고민들을 입체적으로 다루어내야 한다. 이게 세가지 준비다. 니콜슨경의 메시지는 간명하다. "즉흥적이거나 레토릭으로 하는 외교는 결코 오래 갈 수 없다" 준비와 진정성이 핵심이다.
넷째, 주관적 신념과 이념 그리고 기계적 이익 추수를 배제해야 한다.
니콜슨은 외교관 중 최악의 유형은 선교사, 광신도, 법조인들 범주라고 본다. 종교나 이념 아니면 법조문이나 규약에 기속되기 때문이다. 순진한 이상주의는 위험하다. 물론 신념은 필요하지만 유연성을 배제하는 태도를 피하라는 이야기다. 이와 반대로 냉소적 현실주의의 실리 집착도 마찬가지로 위험하다. 니콜슨은 최상의 외교관 유형은 이성적이고 인간적인 회의론자들이라고 말한다. 신념이 아니라 이성에 의해 상식과 통념을 바탕으로 실용적 외교를 구현할 수 있다고 본다. 절제된 현실주의랄까? 국내 정치에 의해 정파적 이념 또는 가치에 외교가 복속되는 추세가 현저한 지금 시사하는 바도 있다. 선출된 정부의 방침과 노선을 충실히 이행하되, 법과 제도를 벗어나거나 사당하된 이익에 복무하지 않도록 늘 스스로를 돌아보아야 한다.
다섯째, 좋은 외교관의 덕목을 갖추기 위해 항상 노력해야 한다.
결국 외교는 사람이 한다. 니콜슨이 강조하는 외교관의 자질은 진실 (Truth), 정확(Accuracy), 침착(Calm), 인내(Patience), 온화(Good temper), 겸손(Modesty), 충성(Loyalty) 이다. 얼핏 들으면 하나마나 한, 또는 누구나 다 할 수 있는 이야기 같다. 그러나 하나하나 외교관 교육 현장에서 곱씹으며 제자들에게 강조하다보면 울림이 크다. 이 잣대로 교육생들을 보려 하고, 그렇게 판단한다. 말 한마디에 얼마나 진실성이 담겨있고, 표현이 정확한가. 돌발 상황에 얼마나 견고하고 또 잘 버티는가. 누군가와의 갈등이 있거나 제3자의 도발에 어떤 태도와 표정으로 대하고 그것이 가식이 아니라는 것을 전달할 수 있는가. 그리고 정말 국민 한사람 한사람을 섬기려는 충성심 즉 애국심이 있는가. 이 잣대로 내 스스로와 제자들을 견주어보는 훈련을 하면, 보다 구체적인 행동 강령이 잡힌다.
니콜슨은 이 기본 자질 (quality)들에 부가하여, 더 탁월한 외교관이 되기 위해서는 지적 능력과 전문지식, 분별능력, 신중함, 사교성과 환대의 태도, 사람을 끌어들이는 매력, 근면성, 담대함, 그리고 재치 등을 들고 있으나.... 아이고 이건 평생 훈련해야 할 덕목들이자 일종의 부가 가치들이다. 기본 가치인 위의 자질들을 먼저 다듬고 다져놓아야 한다. 고시에 합격하면 인생의 가장 중요한 업적을 이룬 성취감에 빠질 수 있다. 그러나 그 때부터가 시작이다. 공직 허리에 젊은 이 친구들을 배치, 관리자로 키워낼 때는 그만큼의 부담과 압력을 감당해야 한다. 매일 스스로를 채찍질하며 위의 덕목에 얼만큼 부합되는지 가늠해야 한다.
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공관실습을 마치고 이번주 귀국하면 곧 수료하고, 최종 임용절차를 거쳐 연말에 정식 외교관이 된다. 우리반 친구들은 초지일관 성실했고, 진지했으며 예의를 갖추었다. 기대가 크다.
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김진연
오랜 기간 해외 영업을 해오면서 개인적으로 지켜온 원칙이 있는데 어쩌면 말씀하신 외교관 자질 원칙과 비슷한 것 같습니다. 그런데 이런 걸 무시하고 꼼수를 부리거나, CEO의 개인 판단에 맞춰, 무리하게 윗 사람에 맞추어 일을 벌여서 사고가 여러 번 난 것을 목격하고 경험했습니다. 그렇게 해서 일어난 어떤 일은 그룹 회장이 15년 넘게 인도 방문도 못하게 하게 했습니다..거기에 전자, 화학 생산 법인들도 있는데.
결국 제가 인도 건은 해결 못하고 백도어는 찾는 것으로 끝냈지만 , 다른 비슷한 건들을 중동에서는 해결했습니다. 가능했던 것은 그 원칙들을 지켰기에.
어쨌든 말씀하신 것은 외교 뿐만 아니라 영업에도 적용될 수 있는 것이라는 제 개인 의견
Shang E. Ha
오. 이 책이 아직도 읽히는군요. 학부 1학년 2학기 외교론 교재였는데 (윤영관 교수님 강의).
JS Choe
오십년전 대딩시절 외교관 꿈을 꾸며 접했던 이름 한스 모르겐소! Politics among Nations 교재... 인교수님께서 소개해 주신 해럴드 니콜슨 "외교론" 강하게 각인됩니다. 결국 인생사 기본 도덕과 상호신뢰 원칙이 국가간에도 그대로 적용된다는 가르침 아닌가 받아들인 1인 입니다.
정화태
이재명님,트렁프님께 들려드렸으면 좋겠습니다.
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Diplomacy
Harold Nicolson
4.25
9,373 ratings587 reviews
In these pages, Sir Harold Nicolson outlines a history and definition of diplomacy, the art of implementing foreign policy by negotiation. The historical development of diplomacy is traced from primitive origins (when, hypothetically, the concept of diplomatic immunity arose from the realization that it was impractical to kill and eat an emissary before he had delivered his message), to modern times, when diplomatic procedure has become highly sophisticated and is controlled by strict conventions. Sir Harold also describes the ideal diplomatist, the varying types of European diplomacy, and recent changes in diplomatic procedure. The remodeled British diplomatic service has been analyzed in the revised chapter dealing with "The Foreign Service." The chapter on "Diplomatic Language" includes a glossary of words and phrases currently employed in diplomatic usage. An epilogue, added to this third edition, discusses the changes that have occurred in the field in post-war times, and refutes some of the the basic contentions of "The Ugly American" view of diplomacy.
Sir Harold Nicolson, author and critic, was formerly with the British diplomatic service, and is considered an authority on diplomatic problems and procedure. Some of his other books are: The English Sense of Humour; King George V, His Life and Reign; and The Age of Reason.
GenresHistoryPoliticsNonfictionInternational RelationsPolitical ScienceWorld HistoryPhilosophy
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151 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1994
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Harold Nicolson189 books29 followers
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Sir Harold George Nicolson KCVO CMG was an English diplomat, author, diarist and politician. He was the husband of writer Vita Sackville-West, their unusual relationship being described in their son's book, Portrait of a Marriage.
4.2
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4.25
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Daniel Clausen
Author 10 books540 followers
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September 13, 2016
Whatever one may think about Kissinger, he is an indispensable theorist of realpolitik, balance of power politics, and the national interest. I originally picked the book up because I wanted something that covered a large span of history and was written clearly and simply. The book did not let me down. What is accomplished in 850 odd pages? There are two major themes that run throughout the book: that countries have survived and prospered largely when they have been practitioners of realpolitik; but also, that leaders have performed best when balancing the necessities of survival in the international system with their own domestic needs (the converse of this is when leaders understand domestic needs in a way that allows them to work effectively in international politics). In a sense, then, the book creates some of the fabric for Lebow's A Cultural Theory of International Relations.
For some, his portrayal of international relations may be too simplistic. But there is something to be said for simplicity when it weaves over 200 years of diplomacy into a coherent narrative. In addition, the problems he explores in the post-cold war world (he wrote the chapter amazingly in 1994) in retrospect seem prescient. In part he says that the US will need to figure out whether it should be a beacon or a crusader (presumably of liberty and democracy). The country is now suffering the hangover of being a crusader and is now struggling to regain its stature as a beacon. The challenge he specifies-- for the US to find a national interest-- is now the one that the US is facing--if not overtly. He is even able to go beyond his realpolitik framework and identify the way the world may be progressing (in at least some ways) toward a post-soveriegnty, postnational, and in some areas supranational regions and issue areas. In this respect, Buzan and Weaver's Regions and Powers is a great complement to the book.
In terms of the issues Kissinger identifies in the last chapter, these problems have been explored fairly well in the pages of Foreign Affairs and International Security (see also the Cambridge Series in International Relations).
international-relations-classics
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Nicholas Whyte
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November 2, 2019
http://nwhyte.livejournal.com/1312207.html
This is a somewhat frustrating book. The opening chapters, based apparently on the author's PhD thesis about diplomacy in the nineteenth century, are pretty dull, even soporific. But once Kissinger gets to the twentieth century, it all gets rather exciting - particularly as regards the foreign policy of Germany in the period between the two world wars and between 1945 and 1961; I don't think I have read a better analysis. But then, rather surprisingly, as Kissinger himself becomes an actor the book becomes less interesting; his fascination with the characters of Nixon and Reagan robs him of any ability to judge their efforts objectively, and even his account of ending the Vietnam War is repetitious and oddly unenlightening.
The book fails to establish its main intellectual theses which are that a) America is unique in bringing its own moral values to international diplomacy and b) that this is only successful when these are consciously married to a realist perception of what is possible. The first proposition is easily falsified by the large number of other countries which have attempted to export their own ideologies to the rest of the world. America has been more successful, admittedly (though the jury must surely still be out on the Chinese), but that's not the same as being unique.
The second proposition is trickier. Kissinger's bête noire is John Foster Dulles, Eisenhower's Secretary of State, who he blames for Suez, Hungary and the initial and irreversible commitment to Vietnam. But on Kissinger's evidence, the problem with Dulles was not faulty ideology but poor personal management skills; Dulles made speeches without reference to his own officials' painstakingly compiled research, containing commitments on which he was utterly unable to deliver (or, worse, from which it was impossible for him to disengage). It was, on Kissinger's account, fortunate for Dulles that for most of his term of office the Soviet Union was led by Khrushchev, whose own personal management skills were even worse.
Kissinger's praise for Ronald Reagan, despite his total lack of intellectual depth (which Kissinger describes in a couple of devastating phrases), is further evidence for my view that knowing a lot about international relations in theory is not a good qualification for actually being involved in practice. I'm dubious anyway about the genuine value of Reagan's legacy - again, on Kissinger's own evidence, Gorbachev and Shevardnadze first discussed how to change the Soviet Union years before Reagan came to power, thanks to the CSCE process started by Nixon and ended by Ford; SDI had little to do with it. But if you think Reagan was in any way successful, that in itself is a serious strike against the idea that studying IR is any use at all (other than for potentially generating literature to be read by other IR scholars, rather than practitioners). Kissinger damns Carter by barely mentioning him.
I also found fault with Kissinger's analysis of American discourse. He singles out the Vietnam war as having been a uniquely divisive and horrible event in the American psyche. But the more I read about American history, the more it seems to me that the nasty, viscerally horrible debate that was happening 40 years ago about Vietnam, the brutal debate happening now about health care, the question of slavery which sparked armed conflict in the 1860s, the division between John Adams and Alexander Hamilton in the 1790s, that this style is all fairly characteristic of the standard mode of American discourse. It's not for the faint-hearted, and it's not for me, but it's a recurrent phenomenon through history. I'm sure that for Kissinger and for many of his colleagues, Vietnam was a uniquely searing experience. But in the context of American history, it seems less so (at least to me).
Cyprus conspiracy theorists will be (and already have been) disappointed that the island is not mentioned even once in the book.
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Σωτήρης Αδαμαρέτσος
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June 29, 2020
Closing (for the umpteenth time) this magnificent book, I called a classmate and friend of thirty years who currently serves in a high diplomatic position outside Greece (...) The discussion was also about the present book by the National Security Advisor and former Secretary of State of the United States, Henry Kissinger; however, it was embellished with the friend's image of the old wolf H.K., weak and old at 97 years old, but with a clarity of thought, speech and perception that still fascinates. The ability of this man to understand the key to every problem, and to still have clear thoughts about a subject and to be able to formulate them equally clearly, is one of the main characteristics of this controversial personality. You have probably heard of Kissinger. For years, the revelation about his alleged phrase against the Greeks, a famous hoax spread by the magazine Nemesis, was circulating. Of course, this is a Unique Diplomat, with participation in some of the most important events of the last century (even in some of controversial ethics such as in Argentina or Chile). However, in this work is the entire culmination of the thoughts and ideas of a man whose last concern was...his posthumous fame. Kissinger develops with unique argumentation, clarity of ideas, critical analysis, Knowledge and Understanding of Causes, with a Thucydides-like Writing, the history of Diplomacy from the time of Richelieu to the fall of the USSR. The half of the book up to the beginning of the Great Patriotic War is MASTERPIECE - a pan-European history. Guided by Cardinal Richelieu's theory of the right of the state over all (raison d'état) and in its interests, France managed to keep Germany divided thanks to the Thirty Years' War for two centuries. This led to the Treaty of Westphalia (1640), the first formal establishment of states in Europe. The raison d'état lasted almost 170 years and after Napoleon's defeat at the Congress of Vienna, Metternich and Castleridge chose to lead Europe through the theory of the Balance of Power and the conditions, more as a weakness of the peripheral peoples than as a strength of the Great Powers. Although the strong personality of Bismarck succeeded in turning the balance in favor of a unified Germany in 1870, it lasted only 45 years until the excessive increase in power of all led to a war. At this point, K brings America into play as the main factor, since then, in shaping the ideas of Diplomacy, where Power is determined by the Sovereign. With President Wilson, America enters World War I with a new ideology; Wilsonian humanism, the belief of Americans in their messianic mission as champions of universal values and as crusaders in the struggle for the dominance of democracy and freedom. A belief that gave birth to the movement of self-determination of peoples and led to the creation of new European states. Although America ultimately refused the role of champion, and retreated into the interior. K essentially disagrees with this thought here, arguing - successfully, I admit - against it. After all, when it was necessary to exercise this humanitarian ideology of states in the face of the threat, Hitler proved that "in front of a pistol, every diplomatic file is useless..." During the war, Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin returned to the 19th century logic of the balance of power. Although Churchill understood the stakes in Yalta and Potsdam, Britain's loss of power did not allow it to change its destiny after the war. At least the English understood the end of colonialism earlier compared to the narrow-minded French. However, America, after Kennan's famous telegram from Moscow in 1947, is led to the logic of Containing Communism with the Wilsonian ideology of the nation called to save freedom. Opposite them stands the ideology of the evolution of the history of Marxism, ultimately proving that what was called the Cold War was a clash of pure ideologies, born before the APA. However, those who handled the events after Yalta were all children of this era loyal to doctrines and ideas of another era. But times change faster than generations... The Mutual Certainty of Destruction that nuclear war gave birth to essentially changed the theory of war and politics radically!!! And at this point the rest of the book becomes a document as K. gradually enters the picture, as a security advisor under Eisenhower and Kennedy until his rise to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs under Nixon. Against the idea of Containment, a form of coercion through the obsession with Good, which made America a slave to the idea of guarding and intervening in every conflict across the planet, gradually leading it to the mistakes that led it to Vietnam, and the division of American society. - - - the piece
ιστορία
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Luís
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December 9, 2025
That's one of the bibles of international relations, written by a realpolitik follower. Unfortunately, Kissinger still needs to correct a big mistake: working in an administration that constantly mixes political and economic affairs. Under these circumstances, diplomacy ceases to be a public service tool and becomes a lobby.
As a defender of any freedom, I'm afraid I have to disagree with many of his statements in this work.
2023-readings america-canada e-3
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Constantinos Capetanakis
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December 29, 2021
To give this book 5* is a gross understatement. To call it monumental is a cliché. Epic? Masterful? The same. Yet, all these characterizations are totally true.
I was not expecting this. I knew that it is considered one of the essential readings, but to think that I had it on my shelf for more than 20 years and only picked it up now is shameful. Or maybe not, maybe now, after so many other books, I was better prepared.
There is great polemic surrounding Kissinger. We Greeks are especially prone to hating him because of his stance during our hounta/dictatorship and Cyprus’ invasion by Turkey (and his total lack of explanation, description of events and his part in it). It is true that he stirs intense reactions. Nevertheless, that’s besides the point. There is no doubt, even among his hate fan-club, that he has a brilliant mind and a thorough knowledge of international affairs. Whether one likes him or not, agrees with him or not, is irrelevant.
One has to keep in mind that the biggest part of the book is historical, dating back from the 17th century, together with an anatomic description of specific events leading to and culminating in the two WWs and of the Cold War, not its entirety. Kissinger is famous for stressing a specific point and masterfully avoiding other, more unpleasant ones.
His favorite personalities, Richelieu and Bismarck take center-stage. The Vienna accord (1815) is his favorite system and the cynicism oozing from the above permeates the whole book. But it’s a cynicism which is fitting and justifiable. And it goes hand in hand with substantial empathy. Kissinger’s EQ is comparable to his IQ and even though there is doubt about his sincerity when he expresses empathy there are still plenty of “cracks” scattered in the book which directly show that since he is talking about state affairs, not charity institutions, his assessment doesn’t shy away from admitting that the US (his much beloved, adored rather, adopted country) lives with the frequent contradiction between its moral (crusade-like) values and its actions.
The book was written in 1994 and therefore has no 9/11, Putin, 2nd Iraq war, Internet, Euro, Arabian spring, Trump and ….Covid. This doesn’t make it dated; on the contrary, Kissinger foresees a lot and for those that he doesn’t he couldn’t. As to its historical pickings, these are plenty and all extremely insightful. The two WWs, the Suez crisis, the Cold War theories and evolution, the Korean war, Hungary, Berlin, Vietnam (of course). However, it is also the first part which is historically amazing: Richelieu, then Bismarck, Napoleon III, the balance of powers (Kissinger’s mantra throughout), the invention, realization and assessment of Realpolitik. There is a Stalin analysis like no other I have come across. A Hitler one as well, sober yet chirurgical. Adenauer earns his respect, as does De Gaule, Churchill, FDR. The list is big, the “targets” of his study are all complicated people, people who have shaped our society and quite possibly our future.
I am itching to write much more, there are endless quotes one could reproduce, passages which show the man’s acute perception of personalities, crises, chain events, indirect apologies (or lacks). Kissinger is artful in interpreting events in a way that both suits his theories and avoid pitfalls. But as no one is really reading this review and as I dislike overtly long ones myself, suffice it to say that despite its 900+ pages and the dense meaning and substance of virtually every sentence this is a magnificent ride and an indispensable reading companion of the Cold War era and its analysis. It will -and should- be read multiple times. Perhaps I will be editing this review going forward - just so to read it myself, to remind me of the wisdom that this book offers.
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Margarita Garova
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May 27, 2022
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Akaitsoti
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November 26, 2015
Αυτο το βιβλίο πρέπει να το μελετήσεις, όχι απλά να το διαβασεις.
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Aaron Million
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January 8, 2018
This opus by Henry Kissinger is not for the faint of heart. While shorter than his White House memoirs, the book still clocks in at 835 pages. Unfortunately, many of these pages are consumed with Kissinger dissecting foreign policy moves and counter-moves, some from centuries ago. If the reader does not have a firm grasp of 20th century American foreign policy history and/or European military history from the past few centuries, he may find himself quickly sinking in the diplomatic quicksand. Kissinger seems to presume that the reader has at least a working knowledge of such events as the Crimean War.
At times, especially while reviewing European diplomatic maneuvers from the 1800s, even Kissinger admits that it can get confusing. That is saying something, as this man is one of the foremost experts on foreign policy and diplomacy. Notably, this book is only focused on certain areas: Europe, the United States, Vietnam, and the Soviet Union. All areas or countries that Kissinger is familiar with. There is almost no mention of Latin America, Central America, Australia, or Africa. Repeating a pattern from his White House books, Kissinger ignores Japan except where it concerns the country's involvement in WWII and a few pages at the end about its relationship with China. This seems to be a glaring weakness of the book, given Japan's importance in the world economy following WWII. Kissinger clearly has no interest in Japan, or the other areas mentioned, thus he makes it seems as only Europe and the U.S. matter where foreign policy is concerned.
In addition, his focus on the U.S. is mainly from WWI on up. Aside from an early chapter that seemed somewhat out of place comparing and contrasting Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson, you would not think that America had any diplomacy before WWI. There is almost no mention of one of this country's most respected diplomats: John Quincy Adams. No mention of the negotiations with Spain over Florida in the 1810s/1820s or with Great Britain over the Oregon territory in the 1840s. No review of the annexation of Texas or the War with Mexico. There is only a brief mention of the Cuban Missile Crisis. How can the moment where the U.S. and the Soviet Union came closest to a nuclear war not be discussed in a book about diplomacy? Especially one that spends so much time discussing U.S.-Soviet relations? Deft diplomacy by John F. Kennedy (after many serious foreign policy stumbles) and Nikita Khrushchev backing down are the two things that kept that crisis from becoming a nuclear war. Apparently, Kissinger thinks that if he wasn't involved in it or didn't study it, then it is not worth writing about. This is unfortunate as diplomacy is more than just European, or Kissinger-involved American foreign policy, in nature.
Fortunately, once Kissinger gets to WWII, his writing style become far more engaging, and the narrative is easier to follow. For example, when writing about the Potsdam Conference involving Harry Truman, Winston Churchill, and Joseph Stalin on page 434: “The Potsdam Conference rapidly turned into a dialogue of the deaf.” Kissinger obviously feels most at home discussing Cold War diplomacy because he lived it. In his chapters about FDR, Churchill, and Stalin he succeeds in showing each man's view and how it colored the geopolitical lens through which he looked at things. While Kissinger is certainly not unbiased when it comes to the Soviets, he is able to fairly present the concerns that Stalin and those after him had about democracies trying to contain the Soviet sphere of influence. Kissinger argues that, while mistakes were certainly made by American politicians, in all likelihood nothing that they would have done or said would have appeased Stalin other than total capitulation to the Soviet Union unilaterally expanding its presence across Central Europe and the Middle East.
When Kissinger turns to Vietnam, he provides an excellent analysis of how the U.S. slowly got itself entangled in Vietnam. Kissinger takes pains to point out the reasoning that Truman, Dwight Eisenhower, and even Kennedy, used and how, in retrospect, their decisions appear misguided, their judgments faulty, and U.S. strategy clearly off-the-mark. But at the time that some of these decisions were made, they appeared to just be extensions of the global containment policy that began immediately following WWII. Kissinger does not give Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, or Lyndon Johnson a pass on their Southeast Asian decisions. But he does provide some needed context to help explain- especially in the cases of Truman and Eisenhower – the reasoning they used in making their decisions. With Kennedy and Johnson he, appropriately, less forgiving as by then the U.S. was becoming more arrogant than wise in its thinking about trying to contain communism. As for his own role in the Nixon Administration, he does not give much of a personal account as he did in his memoirs. Instead we get a summation of the negotiations.
Following Vietnam, Kissinger lapses into a few chapters concerning Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan's relationships with Soviet leadership. As Kissinger tended to do in his White House memoirs, unfortunately he gets bogged down in interminable discussions about the nuclear arms race. While this clearly was a top concern of policymakers on both sides, Kissinger simply goes into too much detail for the average reader. Discussing strike force capabilities and so forth causes one to struggle at times to get through the narrative. Also of note in this part of the book: zero mention of Jimmy Carter and the Camp David Accords. How can this be left out? That, to me, is a prime example of the good that an American president can do on the diplomatic front. To not discuss such a major accomplishment, but yet spare no ink in discussing SALT, leaves me wondering what exactly was Kissinger's purpose in writing this book.
Kissinger concludes with a chapter on the state of American relations with the world in 1993/1994, when he wrote this book. While he is generally spot-on with his analysis, I do question is assertion on page 834: “Through most of its history, America knew no foreign threat to its survival.” Somehow I think James Madison, watching the White House get torched by the British in the War of 1812, would disagree. This is a worthwhile read mainly for those interested in global politics, especially European and 20th century. But for a general reader or casual student of history, ultimately this may not be worth the effort.
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Mark
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August 1, 2013
I simply do not have the knowledge to be able to manage the author's continuous stream of biases and errors, and if I did have that much knowledge what would be the point of reading the book?
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Maria
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October 21, 2017
==
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해럴드 니콜슨의 고전 <외교론>(Diplomacy)에 대한 요약과 평론입니다. 요청하신 대로 나를 향하지 않은 글이므로 <해라> 체를 사용하여 작성하였습니다.
<외교론(Diplomacy)> 요약 및 평론
1. 요약: 외교의 본질과 직업적 윤리
해럴드 니콜슨의 <외교론>은 외교를 단순한 국가 간의 대화가 아닌, 고도의 지적·도덕적 규율을 요구하는 전문 직무로 정의한다. 니콜슨은 외교의 역사적 기원부터 시작하여 현대 외교가 직면한 변화와 외교관이 갖추어야 할 필수 덕목을 체계적으로 정리했다.
외교의 정의와 변천 니콜슨은 외교를 <독립국 간의 공식적인 관계를 수행하는 데 적용되는 지성과 기지(tact)>라고 정의한다. 그는 외교가 정책(Policy)과 혼동되어서는 안 된다고 강조한다. 정책은 정치인이 결정하는 목적지라면, 외교는 그 목적지에 도달하기 위해 외교관이 사용하는 수단이자 과정이다. 저자는 고대 그리스와 로마, 그리고 15세기 이탈리아의 체계를 거쳐 확립된 <구외교(Old Diplomacy)>가 1차 세계대전 이후 대중의 감시를 받는 <신외교(New Diplomacy)>로 전환되는 과정을 추적한다.
외교관의 이상적인 자질 이 책의 핵심은 외교관의 자질에 관한 서술에 있다. 니콜슨은 훌륭한 외교관이 갖추어야 할 일곱 가지 덕목으로 **진실성(Truthfulness), 정확성(Precision), 침착함(Calm), 인내(Patience), 겸손(Modesty), 충성심(Loyalty), 그리고 기지(Tact)**를 꼽는다. 특히 그는 외교에서 가장 위험한 요소를 <도덕적 이상주의>나 <종교적 열정>이 아니라, 오히려 <부정직함>과 <부주의함>으로 보았다. 외교관의 신용은 한 번 무너지면 회복할 수 없기에, 당장의 이익을 위한 기만보다는 장기적인 신뢰 형성이 외교의 본령임을 역설한다.
민주주의와 외교의 충돌 니콜슨은 신외교의 특징인 <공개 외교>에 대해 비판적인 시각을 유지한다. 협상의 결과는 공개되어야 마땅하지만, 협상의 과정까지 대중과 언론의 감시 하에 놓이게 되면 외교관들은 타협보다는 대중의 인기에 영합하는 발언을 하게 된다는 것이다. 그는 민주적 통제와 전문적인 기밀 유지 사이의 균형이 현대 외교의 성패를 결정짓는다고 주장한다.
2. 평론: 고전의 보편성과 시대적 한계
해럴드 니콜슨의 <외교론>은 출간된 지 수십 년이 지났음에도 불구하고 여전히 외교학의 성서로 불린다. 이는 그가 외교를 단순한 기술이 아닌 하나의 <기질(Temperament)>과 <윤리>의 영역으로 끌어올렸기 때문이다.
신뢰의 가치에 대한 재발견
이 책의 가장 큰 미덕은 외교를 <상대를 속이는 기술>로 보는 대중적 편견을 정면으로 반박한다는 점이다. 니콜슨은 외교의 승리가 상대의 패배를 의미하는 것이 아니라, 양측이 수용 가능한 합의점에 도달하는 것임을 명확히 한다. 현대의 복잡한 국제 정세 속에서도 국가 간의 실무 협의가 유지되는 배경에는 니콜슨이 강조한 <정확성>과 <진실성>이라는 직업적 윤리가 깔려 있다.
구외교에 대한 향수와 엘리트주의
평론적 관점에서 볼 때, 이 저작은 니콜슨이 가졌던 시대적·계급적 한계를 드러내기도 한다. 그는 직업 외교관들의 폐쇄적이고 전문적인 세계를 옹호하며, 일반 대중의 여론이 외교에 개입하는 것을 본질적으로 불신한다. 이는 19세기 유럽의 <세력 균형> 정치를 이상화하는 경향으로 나타난다. 오늘날처럼 비국가 행위자(NGO, 다국적 기업 등)와 시민의 목소리가 커진 다극화된 세상에서, 소수 엘리트 중심의 외교론은 다소 시대착오적으로 보일 수 있다.
현대적 의의: 기술 너머의 인간적 통찰
그럼에도 불구하고 니콜슨의 통찰은 유효하다. AI와 디지털 통신이 외교의 속도를 바꾸어 놓았지만, 결국 국가 간의 마지막 합의는 인간 대 인간의 신뢰를 바탕으로 이루어진다는 점을 상기시키기 때문이다. 그는 외교관에게 <시인과 같은 상상력>과 <사학자와 같은 비판적 시각>을 동시에 요구한다. 이는 오늘날 정보의 홍수 속에서 본질을 꿰뚫어 보아야 하는 모든 전략가에게 시사하는 바가 크다.
결론
<외교론>은 외교 기술서라기보다 <국가적 품격에 관한 에세이>에 가깝다. 니콜슨은 외교의 목적이 평화이며, 그 평화는 오직 정직한 소통과 상호 존중을 통해서만 지속 가능하다는 보편적 진리를 전달한다. 비록 시대적 배경은 달라졌으나, 국가의 이익을 대변하면서도 국제사회의 일원으로서 지켜야 할 최소한의 도덕을 논한다는 점에서 이 책은 여전히 필독서로서의 가치를 지닌다.
해럴드 니콜슨의 핵심 주장 중 현대에 적용할 만한 구체적인 사례나, 특정 덕목에 대한 심층적인 분석이 더 필요하신가요? 혹은 이 내용을 바탕으로 요약본의 길이를 조정해 드릴까요?
==
<한국어> Harold Nicolson, <Diplomacy> (약 1,000단어 요약+평론)
Harold Nicolson의 <Diplomacy>는 “외교란 무엇인가”를 역사적 전개와 실무의 원칙, 그리고 외교관이 갖춰야 할 덕목이라는 세 축으로 정리한 고전입니다. 초판은 1939년 런던에서 출간되었고, 2차 세계대전이 막 시작된 시점의 문제의식(전쟁을 막지 못한 ‘새 외교’의 실패, 선전·대중정치의 압력, 협상 기술의 중요성)을 강하게 품고 있습니다. AbeBooks
1) 책의 핵심 구성과 논지(요약)
Nicolson은 외교를 단순히 “국가 간 교섭”이 아니라, <공식 대표가 평화적 수단으로 관계를 관리하는 기술>로 규정합니다. 이때 외교는 ‘정책(policy)’ 그 자체가 아니라, 정책을 구현하기 위한 <교섭·전달·조정의 실행 영역>입니다. 이런 구분은 “외교정책은 정치가가 결정하되, 협상은 전문 외교가가 맡아야 한다”는 주장으로 이어집니다. Brill+1
책의 전반부는 외교의 역사와 제도 변화(상주공사, 비밀교섭, 대사관 체계)를 개괄하고, 중반부는 ‘구(舊)외교’에서 ‘신(新)외교’로의 전환을 다룹니다. 특히 1차 대전 이후 “공개외교, 국민통제, 국제기구”라는 이상이 등장했지만, 실제로는 대중정치·언론·선전이 협상의 유연성을 갉아먹고 오히려 갈등을 증폭시키기도 했다는 점을 비판적으로 짚습니다. 책의 목차 수준에서 보아도 그는 <조직화된 외교의 기원>, <외교이론의 발전>, <구외교에서 신외교로의 이행>, <민주적 외교> 같은 장을 통해 이 변화를 단계적으로 보여줍니다. UCLA Library Search
후반부의 백미는 “좋은 외교관”의 조건입니다. Nicolson은 협상을 망치는 유형으로 “선교사(미션), 광신가, 변호사”를 들고, 이상적 외교관은 “이성적이고 인간적인 회의론자”에 가깝다고 말합니다. Responsible Statecraft 여기서 ‘회의론’은 냉소가 아니라, <상대의 입장과 이해를 끝까지 상상하는 절제된 현실감각>을 뜻합니다. 그는 공감(empathy), 인내, 절제, 신중함, 품위 같은 덕목을 반복해서 강조합니다.
또 하나의 중요한 축은 <진실성>입니다. 흔히 “외교는 거짓말”이라는 통념이 있지만, Nicolson은 거짓이 단기적 승리를 가져와도 결국 신뢰를 훼손해 장기적으로 불리해진다고 봅니다. 외교관의 진실성이란 “대놓고 거짓을 말하지 않는 것”을 넘어, <거짓 인상을 유도하거나 중요한 진실을 교묘히 누락하는 것까지 경계하는 태도>로 정의됩니다. Responsible Statecraft 그는 국가가 운영하는 선전(오늘날의 ‘공공외교’ 담론과도 겹치는 영역)이 상대국과의 신뢰를 붕괴시킨다는 점도 강하게 경고합니다. Responsible Statecraft
정리하면, 이 책은 (1) 외교 제도와 관행의 역사, (2) ‘민주화된 외교’가 낳는 딜레마, (3) 협상의 기술과 외교관의 인격적 자질을 결합해, 외교를 <전문기술이자 윤리적 실천>으로 동시에 붙잡으려는 시도입니다.
2) 강점(평론)
첫째, “외교를 가능케 하는 조건”을 냉정하게 정리합니다. 국가이익의 충돌을 전제하면서도, 그 충돌을 <폭력으로 가지 않게 붙잡아두는 장치>가 외교라는 관점을 일관되게 유지합니다. 그래서 이 책은 이상주의/현실주의 어느 한쪽 선전에 가깝지 않고, “현실 속에서 가능한 평화”라는 실무적 감각을 줍니다.
둘째, <전문성>의 문제를 정확히 찌릅니다. 정책 결정과 협상 수행을 구분하지 못하면, 협상은 국내 정치의 과시무대가 되고, 상대는 “정말 합의할 의지가 있는가”를 의심하게 됩니다. 이 문제는 오늘날에도 그대로입니다. 지도자의 SNS 발언, 국내용 강경 수사, 의회·언론의 즉흥적 압박이 협상을 질식시키는 장면을 우리는 반복해서 봅니다. Nicolson이 ‘선전’의 해악을 말한 대목은, 디지털 시대에 더 날카롭게 들립니다. Responsible Statecraft+1
셋째, 외교관의 ‘기술’뿐 아니라 ‘품성’을 강조한 점이 오래 남습니다. 협상은 정보·논리 게임이기도 하지만, 결국 사람과 사람 사이의 신뢰·체면·시간감각이 좌우합니다. Nicolson은 이를 “상식과 자비(charity)가 국제관계에 적용된 것”이라고까지 말합니다. Responsible Statecraft 이 표현은 오늘날의 냉혹한 국제정치 서술에서 오히려 희소한 균형감을 줍니다.
3) 한계(평론)
첫째, 시대적·지리적 편향이 있습니다. 1939년의 유럽 중심 외교사를 기반으로 하기에, 탈식민·비국가행위자·국제여론의 다층성(시민사회, 디아스포라, 초국적 기업/NGO 등)은 충분히 다루지 못합니다. 또한 ‘외교관의 품위’ 논의에는 엘리트주의의 그림자가 남아 있습니다.
둘째, “진실성”을 핵심 덕목으로 제시하면서도, 국가가 실제로는 비밀작전·정보전·회색지대 행위를 병행하는 현실과의 긴장(어디까지가 불가피한 은폐이고 어디서부터가 파괴적 기만인가)을 체계적으로 풀어내진 않습니다. 다만 이 한계는 책의 결함이라기보다, 이후 학계가 더 세분화해 탐구해야 할 질문을 남긴 것으로 볼 수도 있습니다.
4) 오늘 읽는 의미
이 책의 현재성은 “외교는 쇼가 아니라 <관계관리의 기술>”이라는 단순한 메시지에서 나옵니다. 상대를 악마화하는 선전, 국내용 감정정치, 즉흥적 공개발언이 관계의 기반을 깨뜨릴 때 외교는 작동할 수 없습니다. Nicolson이 강조한 전문 협상, 신뢰, 절제, 공감은 디지털 시대에 더 희귀해졌고, 그래서 더 필요해졌습니다. Responsible Statecraft+1
<English> Harold Nicolson, <Diplomacy> (about 1,000 words: summary + review)
Harold Nicolson’s <Diplomacy> is a classic attempt to explain what diplomacy is, how it evolved, and what makes it succeed or fail in practice. First published in 1939, it carries the urgency of an era in which “new diplomacy” after World War I had promised peace through openness and public accountability—yet Europe was sliding into catastrophe. AbeBooks Nicolson’s distinctive contribution is to treat diplomacy not merely as statecraft, but as a disciplined craft grounded in historical experience and sustained by professional standards and personal qualities.
1) The book’s core argument (summary)
At the definitional level, Nicolson frames diplomacy as the conduct of relations between states (and other recognized entities) by official agents through peaceful means. researchportalplus.anu.edu.au He insists on a crucial distinction between <foreign policy> and <diplomacy>: policy concerns the goals and priorities set by governments and subject to democratic control; diplomacy is the executive practice of negotiation and representation that implements policy. Brill+1 When those spheres are blurred—when negotiators become partisan performers or when domestic politics dictates every tactical move—negotiation loses flexibility and credibility.
Structurally, the book moves from history to method to ethos. Nicolson sketches the origins and institutionalization of diplomacy, the development of diplomatic theory, and the transition from “old diplomacy” to “new.” UCLA Library Search The “old” is associated with secrecy, aristocratic professional corps, and bilateral maneuvering; the “new” emerges after 1918 with slogans of open covenants, parliamentary oversight, and public diplomacy. Nicolson does not romanticize the old system, but he doubts that publicity automatically produces better outcomes. Public opinion, mass media, and propaganda can harden positions, reduce room for compromise, and tempt leaders to posture for domestic audiences rather than bargain seriously.
The most quoted—and arguably most influential—part of the book is Nicolson’s discussion of the <qualities of the good diplomat>. He famously argues that the worst diplomatists are “missionaries, fanatics and lawyers,” while the best are “reasonable and humane sceptics.” Responsible Statecraft “Scepticism” here is not cynicism; it is a disciplined refusal to confuse moral certainty with negotiable reality, combined with the ability to see the world through the other side’s eyes. He emphasizes patience, accuracy, discretion, self-control, and what later theorists would call empathy.
Equally central is Nicolson’s insistence on <truthfulness>. Against the cliché that diplomacy is refined lying, he argues that deception poisons relationships and undermines the foundations of durable agreements. Truthfulness, for Nicolson, is more than avoiding explicit falsehoods: it includes avoiding misleading impressions and the strategic suppression of relevant truths. Responsible Statecraft This is why he is sharply critical of propaganda and the corrosive effects of state-backed information campaigns on long-term trust. Responsible Statecraft
In short, Nicolson presents diplomacy as both an art and a discipline: it is a practice of managing conflict through negotiation, but it depends on institutional professionalism and moral habits—especially restraint, reliability, and an ethic of honest dealing.
2) Strengths (review)
The book’s greatest strength is its <clarity about diplomacy as a craft>. Nicolson is not writing abstract international relations theory; he is explaining how negotiation works when interests collide and when pride, fear, and domestic pressures push states toward rigidity. His insistence on distinguishing policy from negotiation is a practical insight with enduring relevance: even today, peace processes and crisis bargaining often fail when talks become theater for domestic audiences rather than serious problem-solving.
Second, Nicolson’s focus on <character and trust> is unusually valuable. Modern discussions of diplomacy often swing between technical manuals (process, tactics, leverage) and structural theories (power balances, institutions). Nicolson reminds us that diplomatic outcomes also depend on credibility, tone, and the slow accumulation of confidence. His “humane sceptic” model captures a paradox: successful negotiators are neither naïve idealists nor amoral cynics; they combine realism with a limited but genuine moral sensibility—something like “common sense and charity applied to international relations.” Responsible Statecraft
Third, his critique of propaganda reads as more—not less—relevant in the digital age. If trust is a strategic asset, then continuous public hostility, half-truths, and performative outrage are not cost-free; they make later bargaining harder. Later commentators have noted how Nicolson’s 1939 account remains strikingly applicable even decades later. icds.ee
3) Limitations (review)
The book also shows its time. Its historical frame is largely Eurocentric and state-centric, written before decolonization, before the UN system matured, and before transnational actors (NGOs, multinational corporations, global social movements) became central to diplomatic life. Nicolson’s professional ideal sometimes carries an elitist undertone: the diplomat as a cultivated gentleman whose discretion and temperament protect the state from mass passions.
Moreover, the ethics of “truthfulness” can feel under-theorized when confronted with modern realities: covert action, intelligence manipulation, strategic ambiguity, and grey-zone competition. Nicolson offers a strong moral compass, but he does not fully map the boundary between legitimate confidentiality and destructive deception—a boundary that contemporary diplomacy constantly tests.
4) Why it still matters
Reading <Diplomacy> now is a reminder that negotiation is not a moral weakness but a core instrument of peace. Nicolson’s warning is blunt: when diplomacy becomes ideology, litigation, or missionary zeal, it stops being diplomacy. Responsible Statecraft His positive message is equally direct: durable agreements grow out of disciplined professionalism, empathy, and a habit of honest dealing. In an era of instant messaging, viral outrage, and domestic polarization, Nicolson’s virtues—restraint, reliability, and humane scepticism—are harder to sustain, which is precisely why they remain worth studying. Responsible Statecraft+1
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