A Nuclear South Korea Is a Dangerous Miscalculation
At their upcoming summit, Biden needs to let Yoon know there would be consequences for breaking Seoul’s nonproliferation promises.
U.S. President Joe Biden has a tough task before him this week as he prepares to meet with South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol. The countries face the shared threats of an increasingly capable nuclear North Korea as well as a likely significant nuclear buildup by China. The need for close cooperation on these and other international challenges, including Russia’s war in Ukraine and developing clean energy for climate change, could not be more urgent. That’s why it is especially concerning that some in South Korea are publicly entertaining the idea of the country developing its own nuclear weapons.
Even Yoon joined in when he said in January that if North Korea’s nuclear threat grows, South Korea would consider building its own arsenal. He later walked back these comments, but they attracted international attention, as it is incredibly rare for a country—let alone a democracy allied with the United States—to publicly muse about developing nuclear weapons.
It isn’t only Yoon who has flirted with the nuclear option. Oh Se-hoon, the mayor of Seoul and a potential future presidential contender, also called for the development of these weapons to address South Korea’s security needs. Though politicians have the biggest platforms on this issue, some of the strongest voices advocating for nuclear weapons emanate from prominent South Korean think tanks. Public opinion polls show high popular support for an indigenous nuclear arsenal, though that could change as the downside risks penetrate the public debate. A few polls and remarks from private citizens should not be given excessive credibility, but loose talk from leaders has consequences, and it’s time for South Korea to tighten up if it wants to continue playing a major leadership role in the global system. Biden needs to take advantage of the upcoming summit to make this clear.
The threats to Yoon’s country are real, but a South Korean nuclear weapons program is not the answer. The pursuit of these weapons by Seoul—a stalwart of the global nonproliferation regime and a country protected by the U.S. defense treaty and nuclear umbrella—would needlessly rupture some of the country’s most important geopolitical relationships. It would isolate South Korea, challenge its role as a major technology exporter in the global economy, and jeopardize both the U.S.-South Korean alliance and South Korea’s role as a major geopolitical player—not to mention increase nuclear risks in the region.
South Korea’s nuclear debate—and its extended deterrence relationship with the United States—has only become more complicated in light of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Some South Korean observers have made the questionable claim that Russian President Vladimir Putin’s nuclear threats have deterred direct U.S. military involvement in Ukraine and wondered whether North Korea might successfully employ the same tactics against the United States should it engage in conflict against the South. Moreover, it was only a few years ago that then-U.S. President Donald Trump attempted to coerce larger South Korean defense contributions by threatening to withdraw troops from the peninsula. The damage Trump did to confidence in U.S. security assurances in various geographies should not be underestimated. As a result, and despite considerable efforts by the Biden administration to repair the damage, South Korea is scrutinizing whether it can count on future U.S. presidents to uphold the alliance and the security guarantee it provides.
But South Korea will not solve its national security challenges by developing a nuclear deterrent. Doing so would instead invite new challenges and trigger consequences that would stymie Seoul’s rise as a global leader and imperil both economic prosperity and national security in the process. The South Korean government and its people must fully understand these dangers before they consider such a risky course.
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The global nonproliferation regime is designed with consequences in mind—many of which are steep. The United States has played an instrumental role in creating and sustaining this system. Since the mid-1960s, the United States has worked rigorously within this system to prevent nuclear proliferation to adversaries and allies alike. This policy should be no different for South Korea.
Washington has several tools at its disposal should South Korea breach its Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) obligations, enrich or reprocess any material provided by the United States under its civil nuclear cooperation arrangement, or receive enrichment or reprocessing technology from other sources. Should South Korea cross any of these red lines, the United States could, for example, terminate its nuclear energy cooperation with South Korea and end certain types of military sales and economic assistance, including U.S. credits or loans to South Korea. If South Korea went all the way and tested a nuclear device, the United States would be required under the 1977 Glenn Amendment to cease defense sales and the export of certain key technologies to a nuclear South Korea. Unlike the previous example, there are no waivers for Glenn Amendment sanctions, meaning that even if a future U.S. administration were reluctant to penalize Seoul, it would still be required to enact them.
Some of the harshest consequences would fall on Seoul’s energy sector. South Korea’s nuclear energy program—which provides nearly 30 percent of the country’s electricity—relies on the import of uranium fuel and would thus be impacted severely by the international response. That’s because countries that provide nuclear fuel as part of the Nuclear Suppliers Group would be required under international guidelines to cut South Korea off from these supplies if it abandons its safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency, and many might choose to halt assistance even if South Korea did not cross that threshold. Beyond domestic energy supply, Seoul’s ambitious plan to be a leading nuclear reactor exporter, one of Yoon’s key policy goals, would be unlikely to succeed. Nuclear power has become more widely accepted as an important tool for combating climate change, and it is poised to expand in many parts of the world. South Korean nuclear reactor technology, with U.S. supply chain support, has already been deployed successfully in the United Arab Emirates, and failure to capitalize on this demonstrated success will likely open the way to more Russian and Chinese influence in the Middle East and beyond.
China, South Korea’s neighbor and largest trading partner, would be strongly opposed to a nuclear South Korea and would likely ratchet up military and economic pressure to prevent such a development. These sanctions would almost certainly go beyond those levied by Beijing following Seoul’s deployment of a U.S. missile defense system in 2017—an action that cost South Korea billions of dollars.
Most visibly, South Korea’s prestige and influence also would suffer tremendously if it decided to build nuclear weapons. It’s hard to see how a South Korea mired in controversy over a nuclear weapons program would be permitted to host major international meetings or attend a NATO summit, as Yoon did last year.
Instead of embarking on this pathway, which serves neither South Korea’s nor the United States’ interests, the countries should use the upcoming White House summit to further invest in their now 70-year-old alliance to address emerging challenges in ways that advance, rather than undermine, nuclear stability and nonproliferation. That means strengthening extended deterrence, including by tighter coordination of U.S. and South Korean military capabilities, and improved planning and communications mechanisms for peacetime and crises. It also means continuing to work toward an eventual nuclear weapons-free peninsula through renewed diplomacy with North Korea. For the United States, it means finding ways to manage strategic competition and avoid nuclear risks with China, however daunting those tasks may seem.
For his part, Yoon should use the summit to publicly reaffirm South Korea’s commitment to the NPT. Biden should applaud that commitment given the country’s worrisome security environment and, in return, reiterate the importance the United States attaches to its mutual defense obligations.
The security challenges facing Seoul and Washington are real—but so are the opportunities for advancing their deeply rooted alliance based on shared values and interests. South Korea’s pursuit of nuclear weapons would be a dangerous miscalculation. It’s a scenario neither country should countenance.
Ernest J. Moniz is co-chair and CEO of the Nuclear Threat Initiative. He served as the 13th U.S. energy secretary, from 2013 to January 2017. Twitter: @ErnestMoniz
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