by Medea Benjamin
Protesters attend the rally to denounce deploying the Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) near the U.S. embassy on July 13, 2016 in Seoul, South Korea. South Korea's defense ministry announced on July 13, 2016 that it will deploy the U.S. military's THAAD anti-missile defense unit in Seongju county amid the escalating tension with the neighboring China and North Korea. (Photo by Chung Sung-Jun/Getty Images)
Touching down in Washington DC Friday night after a peace delegation to South Korea organized by the Task Force to Stop THAAD in Korea (STIK), I saw the devastating news. No, it was not that Reince Priebus had been booted from the dysfunctional White House. It was that North Korea had conducted another intercontinental ballistic missile test, and that the United States and South Korea had responded by further ratcheting up this volatile conflict.
The response was not just the usual tit-for-tat, which did happen. Just hours after the North Korean test, the US and South Korean militaries launched their own ballistic missiles as a show of force. Even more incendiary, however, is that South Korean President Moon Jae-in also responded by reversing his decision to halt deployment of the US weapon system known as THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense). President Moon gave his military the green light to add four more launchers to complete the system.
South Korea’s new, liberal president came into office on May 10 on the wave of a remarkable “people power” uprising that had led to the impeachment and jailing of the corrupt President Park Geun-hye. Part of the legacy that Moon inherited was an agreement with the US to provide land and support for THAAD, a missile defense system designed to target and intercept short and medium-range missiles fired by North Korea.
THAAD is controversial on many fronts: military experts say it doesn’t work; environmentalists say it emits dangerous radiation; national assembly members say it was never submitted for a vote; China says the radar is aimed at them and has responded with economic sanctions; and the local residents of Seongju, where the system is placed, are furious that their tranquil lives have been pierced by a billion dollar Lockheed-Martin weapon system they were never consulted about.
Our delegation—composed of former Green Party presidential candidate Jill Stein, Reece Chenault of US Labor Against the War, Will Griffin of Veterans for Peace and myself—had the opportunity to visit Seongju, a farming town 135 miles southeast of the capital, and the neighboring town of Gimcheon. The feisty residents, including women farmers in their eighties, have been protesting every single day for the past year. We attended a rally with thousands, which concluded with a symbolic smashing of a cardboard version of THAAD, and a candlelight vigil that takes place in both towns every night, rain or shine. The villagers have blockaded the roads to prevent entry of the launchers, fought with police, publicly shaved their heads in opposition, and set up a 24/7 protest camp. They are joined by the local Won Buddhists, who consider the THAAD site their sacred ground.
It was the resilience of Seongju and neighboring Gimcheon residents that pushed the Moon administration to pause the deployment process until a thorough environmental impact assessment had been completed, which would have taken about a year. This gave the villagers hope that they would have time to convince President Moon to rethink and reverse the THAAD agreement altogether. The president’s recent decision will only spark more local outrage.
The North Korean nuclear program is certainly alarming, as are the myriad human rights violations of that repressive regime. But the question is how best to de-escalate the conflict so that it doesn’t explode into an all-out nuclear war. Adding another weapon system into the mix is not the answer.
The North Korean regime feels encircled. It knows that the most powerful nation in the world, the United States, wants to overthrow it. There’s Trump’sbelligerent rhetoric: “If China is not going to solve North Korea, we will." There’s the ever-tightening screws of sanctions. Just a few hours before the latest North Korean missile test, Congress approved yet another round of sanctions to squeeze the North.
There are 83 US military bases on South Korean soil and US warships often patrolling the coast. US-South Korean military exercises have been getting larger and more provocative, including dropping mock nuclear bombs on North Korea. The US military also announced that it would permanently station an armed drone called Gray Eagle on the Korean Peninsula and it has been practicing long-range strikes with strategic bombers, sending them to the region for exercises and deploying them in Guam and on the peninsula.
The United States has also long held a “pre-emptive first strike” policy towards North Korea. This frightening threat of an unprovoked US nuclear attack gives North Korea good reason to want its own nuclear arsenal.
North Korea’s leadership also looks at the fate of Iraq’s Saddam Hussein and Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi, leaders who gave up their nuclear programs, and conclude that nuclear weapons are their key to survival.
So the North Korean leadership is not acting irrationally; on the contrary. On July 29, the day after the test, North Korean President Kim Jong-un assertedthat the threat of sanctions or military action “only strengthens our resolve and further justifies our possession of nuclear weapons.”
Given the proximity of North Korea to the South’s capital Seoul, a city of 25 million people, any outbreak of hostilities would be devastating. It is estimatedthat a North Korean attack with just conventional weapons would kill 64,000 South Koreans in the first three hours.
A war on the Korean Peninsula would likely draw in other nuclear armed states and major powers, including China, Russia and Japan. This region also has the largest militaries and economies in the world, the world’s busiest commercial ports, and half the world’s population.
Trump has few options. His Defense Secretary Jim Mattis has warned that a pre-emptive strike on the North’s nuclear and missile capabilities could reignite the Korean War. Trump had hoped that Chinese President Xi Jinping could successfully rein in Kim Jong-un, but the Chinese are more concerned about the collapse of North Korea’s government and the chaos that would ensue. They are also furious about the deployment of THAAD in South Korea, convinced that its radar can penetrate deep into Chinese territory.
But the Chinese do have another proposal: a freeze for a freeze. This means a freeze on North Korean missile and nuclear tests in exchange for a halt on US-South Korean war games.
The massive war games have been taking place every year in March, with smaller ones scheduled for August. A halt would alleviate tensions and pave the way for negotiations. So would halting the deployment of the destabilizing THAAD system so disliked by South Korean villagers, North Koreans and the Chinese.
Given the specter of nuclear war, the rational alternative policy is one of de-escalation and engagement. President Moon has called for dialogue with the North and a peace treaty to permanently end the Korean War. North Korean diplomats have raised the possibility of a “freeze for a freeze.” Time has proven that coercion doesn’t work. There’s an urgent need to hit the reset button on US-Korean policy, before one of the players hits a much more catastrophic button that could lead us into a nuclear nightmare.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0 License
Medea Benjamin, co-founder of Global Exchange and CODEPINK: Women for Peace, is the author of the new book, Kingdom of the Unjust: Behind the U.S.-Saudi Connection. Her previous books include: Drone Warfare: Killing by Remote Control; Don’t Be Afraid Gringo: A Honduran Woman Speaks from the Heart, and (with Jodie Evans) Stop the Next War Now (Inner Ocean Action Guide). Follow her on Twitter: @medeabenjamin
Source from Common Dreams: https://www.commondreams.org/views/2017/07/29/urgent-warning-time-hit-reset-button-us-korean-policy?utm_campaign=shareaholic&utm_medium=facebook&utm_source=socialnetwork
Top
North Korea: Diplomacy and a sense of history are needed
North Korea: the art of the deal
Paul Rogers 3 August 2017
Pyongyang is close to its nuclear-weapons goal. Diplomacy – and a sense of history – are now needed.
Pyongyang. (stephan)/Flickr. Some rights reserved.
North Korea’s nuclear ambitions are causing widespread concern in the international arena. The strong focus on this one state, however, is also a timely moment to note that a number of relatively small states in broadly similar circumstances of insecurity have also had nuclear ambitions. These states are commonly described by analysts of international security as “fortress” or “garrison” states. How their nuclear stories worked out is worth recalling in today's dangerous atmosphere, particularly with Trump in the White House.
The main contenders in this group are Taiwan, South Korea, South Africa, Israel and North Korea itself. It's true that several other states have had nuclear intentions, and took at least initial steps. Argentina and Brazil, and (perhaps surprisingly) Switzerland and Sweden were among them, but all terminatedtheir programmes at quite an early stage. Of the five fortress states, two have not gone the whole way, one did so and then gave them up, one has a large and powerful nuclear arsenal and one – North Korea – is almost there.
What of the other four?
First, since 1988 successive political leaders in Taiwan have declared that the state will not “go nuclear”, but it certainly took the initial steps to do so after the People's Republic of China conducted its own first nuclear test in 1964. It had already built a research reactor in the later 1950s and conducted initial nuclear-weapons-related work at the Institute of Nuclear Energy Research, established thirty miles (43kms) southwest of Taipei in 1964. There are no signs at present that Taiwan is likely to change its policy, but the state would have the potential to do so within a very few years if that policy were to change.
Second, South Korea also had nuclear-weapons ambitions in the 1970s, but the military government at the time came under heavy pressure from the United States not to develop them. The considerable US military support available to Seoul was also a factor. Even so, a few reports suggested that some work was undertaken in secrecy, and in 2004 the government partially acknowledged this in contacts with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). If South Korea had taken a decision to go further, it is probable that an initial nuclear-weapon test would have been feasible in less than two years.
What is common to all five “fortress states” is that they perceive (or perceived) themselves to be threatened in circumstances where they could not guarantee protection from much more powerful states.
Third, the white South African government in the the apartheid era considered a nuclear-weapons programme to be essential for its security against countries to its north. By the late 1980s it had got as far as having a small arsenal with six operational nuclear weapons, and one in development. In a decision that caused some surprise, the government announced in 1989 that it wasdismantling its arsenal and acceding to the non-proliferation treaty (NPT). This was represented as an ethical choice, though others attributed to the concerns of a white political elite facing the prospect of majority rule. Whatever the motives at the time, it is certainly the case that post-apartheid South Africa has been very prominent in calls for global nuclear disarmament.
Fourth, Israel is alone among the five in having persisted to developing a very powerful nuclear arsenal, though along the way it has had an extraordinarily close relationship with a superpower. The programme started in the 1950s It had plenty of external help, initially from the French, and by the end of the 1960s had produced some devices. Now it has an arsenal of at least 100 weapons, capable of being launched by strike-aircraft, Jericho ballistic-missiles or submarine-launched cruise-missiles.
What is common to all five “fortress states” is that they perceive (or perceived) themselves to be threatened in circumstances where they could not guarantee protection from much more powerful states. Taiwan and South Korea do now see their security as being stronger because of US power, though in 2016 senior officials in South Korea’s conservative government broached the idea of reopening a programme, and one poll indicated majority public support. Israel, meanwhile, regards its nuclear force as absolutely essential, in spite of its relationship with Washington.
Pyongyang, it's good to talk
Where does this leave North Korea and why is there such current concern? The country has conducted several nuclear tests and probably has a handful of low-yield bombs. But that is not the same thing as being able to deliver them to, for example, the continental United States. This is where the recent testing of its most powerful missile, the Hwasong-14, is significant. Although not tested over a full intercontinental range (5,500-plus km), the trajectory used and the altitude reached means that North Korea is on the way to developing a weapon that can target American territory.
That will take more time, with further tests and intensive work on re-entry vehicles and warheads. But the pace of development has exceeded the expectations of independent analysts. The key political point is that North Korea will most likely have that capability before the end of Trump’s first term in 2020, if he survives that long.
It is highly unlikely that North Korea will be deterred from this path. It has long feared US intervention, a fear hugely boosted by George W Bush’s state-of-the-union address in January 2002 when Pyongyang was labelled one of three “axis of evil” states. Another of these, Iraq, had its regime terminated the following year. Bush was unequivocal: “States like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes present a grave and growing danger.”
North Korea will most likely have the capability to target American territory before the end of Trump’s first term in 2020, if he survives that long.
Trump now talks in similar terms, if more briefly and via tweets. The state department under Rex Tillerson is much more cautious, while others in Congress point to the huge dangers of any kind of military action. Among most diplomats in Europe there is a consensus that diplomacy has to be allowed to work, and that this must involve a determined effort to see the world as viewed from Pyongyang. This case is also argued powerfully by Gabrielle Rifkind (see "Let’s try and understand North Korea’s actions..." The Guardian, 31 July 2017). This should be the way forward.
It's also essential that other states use whatever influence they might have and recommend great caution. This might have included the UK, not least since it is only a few months since the RAF was for the first time in decades exercising with South Korean and US airforce units (see "North Korea: the US-UK's latest target", 4 May 2017).
That, however, seems unlikely given the chaotic internal politics of Brexit. The position is made worse by having in Boris Johnson a foreign secretary who seems more concerned to threaten to sail Britain’s brand new aircraft-carrierinto the South China Sea. This act is almost certain to damage relations with China, the one country that has serious influence with Pyongyang.
But what of the United States, and the prospect that it will take military action? Here, three factors could well become relevant:
– Trump himself, especially if he becomes immersed in yet more domestic controversies and then seeks an overseas diversion as a way out
– Washington's defence and security apparatus is now largely in militaryhands. That the chair of the US joint chiefs of staff is a serving general is usual; what is most unusual is to have three retired generals as head of the department of defence, as national-security advisor, and as chief of staff at the White House
– The ever-present risk of untoward escalation at a time of crisis, represented by the acronym AIM (accidents, incidents and mavericks). These are the variables that can potentially turn tensions into out-and-out violence.
This is a time for diplomacy that ensures tension with the "fortress state" is turned from military threat to a peaceful outcome.
About the author
Paul Rogers is professor in the department of peace studies at Bradford University, northern England. He is openDemocracy's international security adviser, and has been writing a weekly column on global security since 28 September 2001; he also writes a monthly briefing for the Oxford Research Group. His latest book is Irregular War: ISIS and the New Threat from the Margins (IB Tauris, 2016), which follows Why We’re Losing the War on Terror (Polity, 2007), and Losing Control: Global Security in the 21st Century (Pluto Press, 3rd edition, 2010). He is on Twitter at: @ProfPRogers
Source from Open Democracy: https://www.opendemocracy.net/paul-rogers/north-korea-the-art-of-the-deal
------------------
4.There are excellent options for dealing with North Korea’s nuclear weapons program
EXCELLENT KOREA OPTIONS FOR THE LONG TERM
James Goodby
August 1, 2017
I. INTRODUCTION
In this essay, James Goodby argues that there are excellent options for dealing with North Korea’s nuclear weapons program “but these can become visible only if one approaches the problem posed by North Korea with the long view in mind.” These include the steps needed to end the Korean war; a limited nuclear weapons-free zone that would include not only non-nuclear states in Northeast Asia, but also partial coverage of intermediate range nuclear systems in China and Russia; and the creation by the United States, China, and Russia of a global joint enterprise of nations committed to working together that would work together to create the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons
James Goodby is US Ambassador (Ret.), Distinguished Service Professor Emeritus, Carnegie Mellon University
Banner image: Game of Go
II. NAPSNET POLICY FORUM BY JAMES GOODBY
EXCELLENT KOREA OPTIONS FOR THE LONG TERM
August 1, 2017
Most analysts today assert that the United States has only bad options when it comes to North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. This is not quite true. There are excellent options, but these can become visible only if one approaches the problem posed by North Korea with the long view in mind. This is why it is so important to have a US-ROK review of where we jointly want relations with the DPRK to go in the longer term. Other nations that participated in the Six-Party Talks should also be consulted, of course, but the ROK is the nation with the most at stake.
The often posited first step – the freezing of North Korea's missile and nuclear weapons program at their present levels – would be important but it is an interim step. Unless that step is followed quickly by much broader agreements, North Korea is likely to abandon the freeze and resume testing missiles and nuclear warheads. Aside from receiving economic benefits, the North would seek to strike agreements in two areas, North-South Korean relations, and resolving the issues left over from the 1950-53 Korean War. Agreements in these areas could also benefit the United States and its friends in Northeast Asia if properly framed.
It is for the two parts of divided Korea to manage North-South relations. In my view, human rights should be on this agenda, as it was in 1991, when Kim Il-sung, the founder of North Korea, negotiated the so-called “Basic Agreement.” It contained a provision for the freer movement of people, information, and ideas similar to those in “Basket III” of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act. The agenda would almost certainly provide for renewing economic relations and should include negotiating reciprocal transparency measures and consultative mechanisms to reduce the risks of a war that neither side wants but that both sides have prepared for. As its close ally, the United States will have its say in the ROK’s stance in inter-Korean rapprochement, but ultimately, these matters are for the two Koreas to sort out.
The second area of probable interest to the DPRK – resolving issues left over from the 1950-1953 Korean War – inherently involves the United States as a principal party. Dealing with issues arising from the Korean War means negotiating an agreement or a series of agreements to replace the armistice agreement of 1953. This negotiation must involve China and the United States, as well as North and South Korea, the countries that implemented the armistice agreement.
Items on this agenda would include borders on land and at sea, establishing diplomatic relations, some measures to regulate military activities on and around the Korean Peninsula, and pledges to refrain from the use or threat of force to resolve differences. A high-level meeting hosted by China might be a way to kick off these talks and a system for periodic monitoring of the talks at the summit level should be installed. Close consultation with Japan would be essential.
A "peace treaty" this is not, because it would have an interim character until the nuclear issues are resolved to the satisfaction of all the nations involved in these talks, as well as other stake-holders, primarily Japan and Russia. It is almost certain that North Korea's nuclear/missile programs can be rolled back only in the context of a broader negotiation.
One proposal for resolving the nuclear weapons issue that has been studied for many years deserves a fresh look. This is the idea of creating a nuclear weapon- free zone in a geographically defined area in Northeast Asia. My take on this is as follows: South and North Korea would join with Japan in pledging to renounce their possession of nuclear weapons in accordance with the Nonproliferation Treaty. China, Russia, and the United States would retain their status as nuclear weapon states under the terms of the Nonproliferation Treaty but would pledge to support in concrete ways the decision of North and South Korea and Japan to renounce nuclear weapons. First, Russia and China might agree to redeploy specific short- and medium-range nuclear delivery systems out of range of Japan and the Korean Peninsula. China's DF- 21 and Russia's SS-21, now being replaced with the SS-26, would be candidates for such redeployment. Second, the United States and South Korea would have less need for the THAAD system to be deployed in South Korea if North Korea accepted the status of a non-nuclear weapon state under the terms of the Nonproliferation Treaty and could deactivate that system in parallel with the redeployments of Chinese and Russian short-and medium-range nuclear delivery systems. Third, China, Russia, and the United States would join with other Permanent Members of the United Nations Security Council in proposing a global joint enterprise of nations committed to working together to create the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons. In addition to supporting the creation of a de facto nuclear weapon-free zone in Northeast Asia, this move would put the nuclear weapon states of the Nonproliferation Treaty, and their allies, in a better position to respond to those nations that will probably bring a treaty to ban nuclear weapons into force in late 2018.
Note that sea-based nuclear systems are not included in my description of a nuclear weapon-free zone in Northeast Asia. This is because I regard these as strategic systems that should be covered in a negotiation that would specifically address such systems, either in a renewal of US-Russia START talks or in a forum created as part of the joint enterprise referred to above.
What now should be done to stabilize a nuclear/missile freeze while broader negotiations are proceeding? Confidence-building measures would be in order and, in addition to those that might be developed in other Korea-centered talks, these could include measures like mutual security guarantees extended on a reciprocal basis by nations involved in any of these negotiations, suspending the US-South Korean annual military exercises, and steps by North Korea to prevent fast launch procedures in its missile forces.
One confidence-building measure that should be considered for insertion into the process of negotiations at almost any time would be to restore the Joint Recovery Teams that worked from 1996 to 2005 to recover the remains of American soldiers still missing in action. This would be a win-win agreement for the United States and North Korea and, morally, it would be one of the most satisfying. In a small way, it might also help to underwrite assurances of peaceful intent by all parties. It would reassure Pyongyang that an American preemptive attack was not likely while American soldiers were visiting grave sites and old battlefields in the North and would give Washington some hope that Kim Jong-un might share the opinion once voiced by Winston Churchill that jaw jaw is better than war war.
III. NAUTILUS INVITES YOUR RESPONSE
The Nautilus Asia Peace and Security Network invites your responses to this report. Please send responses to: nautilus@nautilus.org. Responses will be considered for redistribution to the network only if they include the author’s name, affiliation, and explicit consent.
Source from Nautilus: http://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-policy-forum/excellent-korea-options-for-the-long-term/
Top
EXCELLENT KOREA OPTIONS FOR THE LONG TERM
James Goodby
August 1, 2017
I. INTRODUCTION
In this essay, James Goodby argues that there are excellent options for dealing with North Korea’s nuclear weapons program “but these can become visible only if one approaches the problem posed by North Korea with the long view in mind.” These include the steps needed to end the Korean war; a limited nuclear weapons-free zone that would include not only non-nuclear states in Northeast Asia, but also partial coverage of intermediate range nuclear systems in China and Russia; and the creation by the United States, China, and Russia of a global joint enterprise of nations committed to working together that would work together to create the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons
James Goodby is US Ambassador (Ret.), Distinguished Service Professor Emeritus, Carnegie Mellon University
Banner image: Game of Go
II. NAPSNET POLICY FORUM BY JAMES GOODBY
EXCELLENT KOREA OPTIONS FOR THE LONG TERM
August 1, 2017
Most analysts today assert that the United States has only bad options when it comes to North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. This is not quite true. There are excellent options, but these can become visible only if one approaches the problem posed by North Korea with the long view in mind. This is why it is so important to have a US-ROK review of where we jointly want relations with the DPRK to go in the longer term. Other nations that participated in the Six-Party Talks should also be consulted, of course, but the ROK is the nation with the most at stake.
The often posited first step – the freezing of North Korea's missile and nuclear weapons program at their present levels – would be important but it is an interim step. Unless that step is followed quickly by much broader agreements, North Korea is likely to abandon the freeze and resume testing missiles and nuclear warheads. Aside from receiving economic benefits, the North would seek to strike agreements in two areas, North-South Korean relations, and resolving the issues left over from the 1950-53 Korean War. Agreements in these areas could also benefit the United States and its friends in Northeast Asia if properly framed.
It is for the two parts of divided Korea to manage North-South relations. In my view, human rights should be on this agenda, as it was in 1991, when Kim Il-sung, the founder of North Korea, negotiated the so-called “Basic Agreement.” It contained a provision for the freer movement of people, information, and ideas similar to those in “Basket III” of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act. The agenda would almost certainly provide for renewing economic relations and should include negotiating reciprocal transparency measures and consultative mechanisms to reduce the risks of a war that neither side wants but that both sides have prepared for. As its close ally, the United States will have its say in the ROK’s stance in inter-Korean rapprochement, but ultimately, these matters are for the two Koreas to sort out.
The second area of probable interest to the DPRK – resolving issues left over from the 1950-1953 Korean War – inherently involves the United States as a principal party. Dealing with issues arising from the Korean War means negotiating an agreement or a series of agreements to replace the armistice agreement of 1953. This negotiation must involve China and the United States, as well as North and South Korea, the countries that implemented the armistice agreement.
Items on this agenda would include borders on land and at sea, establishing diplomatic relations, some measures to regulate military activities on and around the Korean Peninsula, and pledges to refrain from the use or threat of force to resolve differences. A high-level meeting hosted by China might be a way to kick off these talks and a system for periodic monitoring of the talks at the summit level should be installed. Close consultation with Japan would be essential.
A "peace treaty" this is not, because it would have an interim character until the nuclear issues are resolved to the satisfaction of all the nations involved in these talks, as well as other stake-holders, primarily Japan and Russia. It is almost certain that North Korea's nuclear/missile programs can be rolled back only in the context of a broader negotiation.
One proposal for resolving the nuclear weapons issue that has been studied for many years deserves a fresh look. This is the idea of creating a nuclear weapon- free zone in a geographically defined area in Northeast Asia. My take on this is as follows: South and North Korea would join with Japan in pledging to renounce their possession of nuclear weapons in accordance with the Nonproliferation Treaty. China, Russia, and the United States would retain their status as nuclear weapon states under the terms of the Nonproliferation Treaty but would pledge to support in concrete ways the decision of North and South Korea and Japan to renounce nuclear weapons. First, Russia and China might agree to redeploy specific short- and medium-range nuclear delivery systems out of range of Japan and the Korean Peninsula. China's DF- 21 and Russia's SS-21, now being replaced with the SS-26, would be candidates for such redeployment. Second, the United States and South Korea would have less need for the THAAD system to be deployed in South Korea if North Korea accepted the status of a non-nuclear weapon state under the terms of the Nonproliferation Treaty and could deactivate that system in parallel with the redeployments of Chinese and Russian short-and medium-range nuclear delivery systems. Third, China, Russia, and the United States would join with other Permanent Members of the United Nations Security Council in proposing a global joint enterprise of nations committed to working together to create the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons. In addition to supporting the creation of a de facto nuclear weapon-free zone in Northeast Asia, this move would put the nuclear weapon states of the Nonproliferation Treaty, and their allies, in a better position to respond to those nations that will probably bring a treaty to ban nuclear weapons into force in late 2018.
Note that sea-based nuclear systems are not included in my description of a nuclear weapon-free zone in Northeast Asia. This is because I regard these as strategic systems that should be covered in a negotiation that would specifically address such systems, either in a renewal of US-Russia START talks or in a forum created as part of the joint enterprise referred to above.
What now should be done to stabilize a nuclear/missile freeze while broader negotiations are proceeding? Confidence-building measures would be in order and, in addition to those that might be developed in other Korea-centered talks, these could include measures like mutual security guarantees extended on a reciprocal basis by nations involved in any of these negotiations, suspending the US-South Korean annual military exercises, and steps by North Korea to prevent fast launch procedures in its missile forces.
One confidence-building measure that should be considered for insertion into the process of negotiations at almost any time would be to restore the Joint Recovery Teams that worked from 1996 to 2005 to recover the remains of American soldiers still missing in action. This would be a win-win agreement for the United States and North Korea and, morally, it would be one of the most satisfying. In a small way, it might also help to underwrite assurances of peaceful intent by all parties. It would reassure Pyongyang that an American preemptive attack was not likely while American soldiers were visiting grave sites and old battlefields in the North and would give Washington some hope that Kim Jong-un might share the opinion once voiced by Winston Churchill that jaw jaw is better than war war.
III. NAUTILUS INVITES YOUR RESPONSE
The Nautilus Asia Peace and Security Network invites your responses to this report. Please send responses to: nautilus@nautilus.org. Responses will be considered for redistribution to the network only if they include the author’s name, affiliation, and explicit consent.
Source from Nautilus: http://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-policy-forum/excellent-korea-options-for-the-long-term/
Top
No comments:
Post a Comment