평양은 정말로 충성분자들이 사는 도시인가 | 서울에서 쓰는 평양이야기

평양은 정말로 충성분자들이 사는 도시인가 | 서울에서 쓰는 평양이야기

by 주성하기자   2012-06-28 9:00 am

우리가 아는 평양은 출신 성분이 좋은 충성계층이 모여 사는 도시이다. 평양에는 배급과 전기 공급, 살림집 건설 등 지방 사람들이 상상도 못할 특혜가 집중돼 왔다.

북한은 ‘평양공화국’과 그들을 먹여 살리는 ‘지방공화국’으로 나뉜다는 말이 그래서 나왔다. 굶주린 지방에서 정권에 대한 불만이 높아져도 평양시민들은 정권에 충성을 다할 것이고 지방에서 봉기가 일어나도 평양은 동참하지 않을 것이라는 게 외부에서 바라보는 상식이다.

과연 그럴까. 과거엔 그랬을지 모른다. 하지만 지금의 평양은 우리의 상상 이상으로 변하고 있다.

평양의 생활수준은 지방에 비해 매우 높다. 배급제 붕괴 후 대외무역과 뇌물 상납으로 부를 쌓은 사람들이 평양에 모여 있다. 이는 사회주의 제도에선 불가능한 일이다. 북한이 더 부패해지길 바라고 배급제 시절로 돌아가길 가장 바라지 않는 사람들이 바로 평양시민들이다.

평양에서 남부럽지 않게 살려면 컴퓨터, 휴대전화, DVD플레이어가 필수적이다. 이런 기기들은 정보 유통을 가속화하고 외부 문명을 빠르게 보급시킨다. 북한에서 한국 영화와 드라마가 가장 많이 보급되고 한국 문화를 가장 많이 모방하고 있는 곳이 바로 평양이다.

해외에 나가는 외화벌이 노동자의 80% 이상도 출신 성분이 좋은 평양시민 중에서 뽑힌다. 지난해 중국을 방문한 북한 주민 15만 명의 대다수는 평양시민들이다. 외부세계를 직접 눈으로 본 사람은 자기가 얼마나 전근대적 시스템에서 살고 있는지 누구보다 잘 깨닫게 된다.

당국의 통제가 가장 먹히지 않고 가장 자유분방한 도시도 다름 아닌 평양이다. 생활총화나 강연회 같은 과거 주민 세뇌를 위한 회의들도 평양에선 이미 돈만 내면 쉽게 빠질 수 있는 형식상 의례가 된 지 오래다.

주민 수탈이 가장 어려운 곳도 평양이다. 과거 김정일이 지시했다는 각종 ‘수탈 금지 방침’을 방패처럼 내밀며 저항하는 데다 권력층이 많아 강제로 빼앗기도 어렵다.

하지만 지방의 변화는 평양에 비하면 매우 굼뜨다. 평양에 살다 몇 년 전 지방으로 이주했던 한 탈북자는 “배급이 끊긴 지 오랜 지방에서 오히려 과거 사회주의적 시스템이 더 잘 유지되는 데 깜짝 놀랐다”라고 말했다.

회의가 꼬박꼬박 열리고 각종 노력동원과 무리한 수탈도 큰 반항 없이 집행되고 있었단다. 아마 평양에서 그랬다면 당장 거센 반발이 일어났을 것이라고 그는 말했다.

지방 주민들에겐 외부세계가 어떻게 사는지 깨달을 수단과 능력도, 자신을 억누르는 간부들에게 맞서 반항할 힘도 없다. 그저 3대 세습은 당연한 일이고 대를 이어 충성해야 하며 정권에 불만을 터뜨리면 당연히 감옥에 가야 한다고 믿는 사람들이 부지기수다.

북한에선 진짜 공산주의자는 농촌에 있다는 말이 있을 정도다. 하긴 당장 내일 굶어죽을 수 있는 사람들에겐 먹을 것 이외의 생각은 사치다.

위의 탈북자는 “내가 본 평양시민들은 전쟁이 일어나면 가장 먼저 살길을 찾아 도망갈 사람들이지만 오히려 지방 사람들이 나라를 지킨다며 목숨 걸고 싸울 것 같았다”라고 고백했다.

평양의 충성심은 역설적으로 평양에 베풀어진 과도한 특혜가 좀먹어 버리고 있다.

최근에도 북한은 해외에 대규모 인력파견을 시작했다. 이 역시 최대 수혜자는 평양시민들이 될 것이다. 충성심이 사라진 평양의 다음 모습을 관찰하는 것은 매우 흥미로운 일일 것이다.

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아래는 거의 같은 내용으로 25일 미국 ‘동서센터’ 주관 세미나에서 발표한 내용입니다.

25개국 수백 명 기자들을 대상으로 하나보니 발표는 영어로 했습니다.

Good morning. My name is Seong-ha Joo. I escaped from North Korea 10 years ago, and I am currently a reporter for the Dong-a daily. I received my English education in North Korea, so I would like to ask for your understanding for my imprecise pronunciations. Also before I begin, I would like to thank the gracious staff at the East-West center for organizing this meaningful occasion.

I have spent a long time in North Korea and currently run an information network there, so I think I have a relatively good understanding of the realities of North Korea on the ground.

But given eight minutes to speak, I cannot include too many stories. Instead, I will mention just one point, that there is a need for the outside world to take a new look at the city of Pyongyang. In other words, I would to address the following question, “Is Pyongyang really the city of dedicated loyalists as its outside reputation goes?”

 Outsiders view Pyongyang as the place where the elites of North Korea live to sustain the regime. This is certainly true. Differences between Pyongyang and the rest of the country are stark, to the point where there is a well-known saying in North Korea that says the population of the People’s Republic of Korea is 24 million, but the country further divides into a 3-million-people “Republic of Pyongyang,” and “Republic of Countryside” where the rest of the population lives.

Pyongyang residents have received privileges to the extent unimaginable by residents in the countryside. It is said that Kim Jong-il once remarked during the “March of Tribulations” of the 1990s, when more than a million people died of starvation, “even if everyone else starves to death, I can continue the revolution as long as I have the citizens of Pyongyang.”

The ruling class of North Korea has always strived to ensure rations to citizens of Pyongyang, and has prioritized providing electricity and real estate in Pyongyang. Pyongyang has not simply been a capital, but has really been the “capital of the revolution” as the gigantic sign stands to read in front of the Pyongyang station.

Therefore, it has become our common assumption that unlike any other provinces that could certainly feel disgruntled toward the regime, Pyongyang at least must remain very loyal to the regime. Many of us would predict that even if some kind of social upheaval were to occur in the countryside, Pyongyang citizens would not dare to be a part of it.

Now, is this assumption really true? Perhaps in the past it was. But in my opinion, recent facts and evidence tell us that we must reevaluate.

There is evidence that the disproportionate privileges afforded to Pyongyang have actually been corroding its loyalty.

The average living standards of Pyongyang citizens are very high compared to those of elsewhere in North Korea. That is because the privileged elites live there. Now, it is natural for expectations to adjust as human beings accumulate wealth and power. The people of Pyongyang appreciate prosperity. They no longer wish to be bound to regulations and controls, and desire even higher comparative living standards.

Fortunately for Pyongyang residents, changes in Pyongyang have been helping them in their desires. Pyongyang has many people who have accumulated stupendous wealth through foreign trade and bribery since the ration system collapsed.

Accumulating that much wealth used to be not possible before when the communist system was actually somewhat functional. Nowadays, those who desire most deeply that North Korea does not return to its old system of rations—those who want the current corrupt state of things so to speak to persist the most—are Pyongyang citizens themselves.

Along with the rise of living standards were introduced to Pyongyang various gadgets of modern civilization such as computers, mobile phones, and DVD players.

These gadgets tend to speed the flow of communication and propagate information from the outside world. It is in Pyongyang where the largest viewership of South Korean movies and TV shows can be found, and it is in Pyongyang where South Korean culture is most closely imitated.

Indeed, it is in Pyongyang where people who know the outside world most well are gathered.

Because Pyongyang is where most of the higher “songbun” people—the higher “caste,” the most unsuspected classes—live, 80% or more of the workers sent abroad to gather foreign currency are recruited from Pyongyang.

Last year alone one hundred and fifty thousand North Koreans entered China, and the vast majority of them were Pyongyang citizens. Those who have seen foreign countries with their own eyes know better than anyone how decrepit and behind North Korea is compared to the rest of the world.

They also realize more clearly than anyone what kind of bizarre and obsolete systems three-generation hereditary succession and punishment by family association are. In a sense, the privileges of Pyongyang citizens are acting like poison for their faith in and loyalty to the regime.

The place where government controls are most ineffective is also Pyongyang. While people in the provinces are powerless to stand up against officials who abuse power to extort wealth, Pyongyang citizens confidently quote various past stipulations of Kim Jong-il as their excuse to defy exploitative orders. In fact, it is much more difficult in general too to make Pyongyang people listen because there are many powerful people in Pyongyang.

“Educational” and “self-criticism” sessions that have been used in the past to brainwash North Koreans are no longer meaningful in Pyongyang.

That is because it is becoming increasingly easier for people to bribe their way out of these sessions in Pyongyang. In Pyongyang, officials running these sessions themselves wish that more people would bribe their way out of these sessions.

Meanwhile, even as Pyongyang is becoming daily a more difficult city to govern, the countryside is still seeing the brainwashing sessions being regularly attended and people being faithfully mobilized for various exploitative activities.

A recent defector from Pyongyang who also experienced the countryside, said that he was “surprised to see that past communist practices are being much better followed in the countryside.”

That is because there is no alternative recourse for people in the countryside than to submit to the pressures of corrupt officials. Provincial officials can get away with treating people brutally and arbitrarily sending them to jail, but these kinds of practices are not imaginable in Pyongyang.

Many people in Pyongyang are ranked much higher than the lower order bureaucrats who carry out the party’s edicts for collection. Even if residents do not have the rank or power themselves, because of their high “songbun” or caste they can easily find relatives who will speak for them. If they cannot find relatives powerful enough they can also pay their way out of obligations.

Another reason that people in the countryside are more docile is that, besides those in the border areas, most North Koreans in the countryside are still not very aware of what the rest of the world looks like.

People are poor in the countryside and cannot easily obtain access to modern communication devices that can afford them a glimpse of the outside world. Instead, they take it as a matter of course that their supreme leaders are hereditary and talking back to authority means going to jail. As the saying goes in North Korea, the real communists reside in the countryside.

There is a real need for us to view Pyongyang in a different light. Is Pyongyang really a city of loyalists faithful to the North Korean regime, or is it a city where actually the first calls for freedom in North Korea can ring with the highest likelihood? I look forward to discovering that answer with you.

My time is up, and so I would like to end my presentation here. Thank you for listening.