Chee-Kwan Kim
·
[Forgotten Ally – 잊혀진 동맹]
1.
1937년부터 1945년까지 중국 전역에서 일본과의 전쟁이 이어졌다. 그리고 8년이라는 긴 시간 동안의 전쟁으로 인해 중국인 1,500만에서 2,000만이 목숨을 잃었고, 8,000만에서 1억 남짓의 난민이 발생했다.
피해규모와 세계사에 미친 영향이 엄청났음에도 불구하고 오늘날 중일전쟁은 이차대전의 일부로 기억되지 않는다. 서구에서는 그들이 직접적으로 관여하지 않아서, 일본은 침략국이었기 때문에, 그리고 중국의 경우 전쟁을 수행한 주체가 현 집권세력이 아닌 국민당이었기 때문에 중일전쟁은 망각의 대상이 되었을 것이다.
2.
일본의 예상대로였다면 마르코폴로 다리 사건은 만주사변과 같은 전개로 진행되어 늦어도 1938년 중으로는 중국 영토의 상당 부분은 자국의 식민지가 되었어야 했고, 이를 발판으로 동남아 세력 확장 또한 순조롭게 진행되어 소위 일본제국의 “대동아공영권” 건설의 꿈은 마침내 실현되었을 지도 모른다.
그러나 예상과 달리 국민당 정부는 격렬하게 저항했고, 소련이 러시아에서 나치를 무력화한 것과 같이 중국은 아시아에서 일본의 발목을 잡아 이차대전을 연합군의 승리로 이끄는데 결정적인 역할을 한다.
하지만 전쟁 중 만연한 기근, 국민당의 부패, 그리고 연합군의 지원 미비와 미국의 중국 정세에 대한 오판으로 국민당은 국공내전에서 패하여 중국 본토를 공산당에게 내주고, 북경에서 쓸어 담은 보물을 들고 허겁지겁 대만으로 도주할 수 밖에 없었다.
3.
중일전쟁 중 장개석 정부는 중국인민의 대일본 저항의지를 해외에 전하기 위해 여러 상징을 동원했다. 그 중 병사 한 명의 이름이 “我抗命 (아항명)“, 즉 “나는 운명을 싸운다”였다.
한편 식민지 조선의 운명은 철저히 제3자에게 종속되어 강대국들의 선택과 국제 상황에 따라 반사적 이익을 얻는 수혜자가 되기도, 혹은 의도치 않은 부수적 피해자가 되기도 할 뿐이었다.
가령 예를 들어, 만약 중일전쟁이 일어나지 않았다면 아시아에서는 기존의 질서가 유지되었을 가능성이 있고, 이 때 조선은 일본의 식민지로 남았을 것이다. 또는 국공내전에서 공산당이 승리하지 않았다면 해방 후 대한민국은 냉전의 수혜자로서의 지위를 얻지 못했을 것이며, 미국이라는 제국의 등에 올라타 이루어낸 오늘날의 번영은 불가능했을 것이다.
한편으로는 1945년 8월에 미국이 일본에 핵을 투하하지 않고 태평양 전쟁이 애초 예상과 같이 46년까지 이어졌다면 미군은 일본 본토 침공에 여념이 없었을 것이며, 만주를 통해 들어왔을 소련군을 통해 조선반도 전체가 공산화가 되었을 가능성이 농후하다.
4.
광복은 조선인들이 일제에 항거한 결과 찾아온 것처럼 게으른 역사물들은 가르치지만, 식민지 조선에게 해방은 밤에 도둑이 찾아오듯 불현듯 찾아왔고, 운명은 조선인의 의지와 무관하게 움직였다.
오히려 이 땅에서 운명과 싸워서 이긴 역사는 해방 이후 국가 건설 과정에서 찾을 수 있다고 나는 생각한다. 역사의 방정식에 개입하겠다는 의지는, 그 싸움의 도정은, 식민지 해방에 역할을 못했다는 자괴감을 충분히 상쇄시키도 남을 만큼, 이 땅에 사는 그 누구도 판타지로써의 역사에 목을 매지 않아도 될 만큼, 가치있는 싸움이었다.
마침 오늘 지난 정권에서 ”파묘“의 대상으로까지 언급되었던 백선엽 장군의 동상 개막식이 있었다고 한다. 한국 사회가 백장군과 같은 “아항명“들의 이름을 소중하게 간직할 수 있는 사회가 되기를 다시 한번 기원해본다.
- Rana Mitter의 “Forgotten Ally: China’s World War II”를 읽고.
All reactions:103Park Yuha, Eun Ha Chang and 101 others
14 c
Chee-Kwan Kim
https://chosun.app.link/Z6nrxkztbBb
CHOSUN.APP.LINK
보훈부, 백선엽 장군 ‘친일 행위자’ 문구 현충원 홈피서 삭제 추진보훈부, 백선엽 장군 ‘친일 행위자’ 문구 현충원 홈피서 삭제 추진
Chee-Kwan Kim
https://chosun.app.link/xw5K0PTtbBb
CHOSUN.APP.LINK
‘6·25 영웅’ 백선엽 장군, 73년 만에 다부동에 우뚝 서다‘6·25 영웅’ 백선엽 장군, 73년 만에 다부동에 우뚝 서다
차선아
좋아할 순 없지만 부인할 수도 없는 게 역사겠죠.
2
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1 d
Park Eunsik ·
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같은생각입니다
2
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1 d
장현우
영어가 되시니,,일어도 되시고 흑흑
2
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1 d
Chee-Kwan Kim
장현우 Hyo-jin Kim 훌륭한 책이니 마르코폴로에서 번역본을 내시지 않을까 싶습니다만…^^
3
장현우
김치관 마르코 땜에 파산 직전이유 ㅠㅠ
Hyo-jin Kim
김치관 미터의 다른 책을 준비하고 있어요.
진민
통찰력이 깊으신 분이라고 생각합니다만 이렇게 차분히 읽다보니 진중함까지...^^
공감해요!
Lee Doosoo
멋진 글입니다. 감사합니다.
HyangHoon Kim
캬 중일전쟁이 그랬군요. 결과적으로 중국이 승리했으나 국민당이 깊숙히 관여하고 주도한.
Chee-Kwan Kim
김향훈 국민당이 전방에서 싸우는 동안 궤멸 직전까지 갔던 중국공산당은 정규군을 용인받았을 뿐 아니라 후방 산시성에 숨어 힘을 키웠으니...중일전쟁은 모택동에게는 blessing in disguise였던 셈이지요.
HyangHoon Kim
한국은 얼떨결에 최전방 기지가 되어 선진국으로 도약
Kibum Sung
전쟁지도상황만 보면 국민당이나 국부군이 무능하지는 않은 것 같습니다(부패는 별론) 다만 일본군을 완전히 섬멸할 능력은 없었을 뿐;;
연안의 공산당이 일본군을 제대로 상대한 것은 전쟁말기에 한두차례 정도였던 것으로!
Chee-Kwan Kim
https://chosun.app.link/Z6nrxkztbBb
CHOSUN.APP.LINK
보훈부, 백선엽 장군 ‘친일 행위자’ 문구 현충원 홈피서 삭제 추진보훈부, 백선엽 장군 ‘친일 행위자’ 문구 현충원 홈피서 삭제 추진
Chee-Kwan Kim
https://chosun.app.link/xw5K0PTtbBb
CHOSUN.APP.LINK
‘6·25 영웅’ 백선엽 장군, 73년 만에 다부동에 우뚝 서다‘6·25 영웅’ 백선엽 장군, 73년 만에 다부동에 우뚝 서다
5
Like
Reply
1 d
차선아
좋아할 순 없지만 부인할 수도 없는 게 역사겠죠.
2
Like
Reply
1 d
Park Eunsik ·
Follow
같은생각입니다
2
Like
Reply
1 d
장현우
영어가 되시니,,일어도 되시고 흑흑
2
Like
Reply
1 d
Chee-Kwan Kim
장현우 Hyo-jin Kim 훌륭한 책이니 마르코폴로에서 번역본을 내시지 않을까 싶습니다만…^^
3
Like
Reply
1 d
장현우
김치관 마르코 땜에 파산 직전이유 ㅠㅠ
4
Like
Reply
1 d
Hyo-jin Kim
김치관 미터의 다른 책을 준비하고 있어요.
3
Like
Reply
1 d
Edited
진민
통찰력이 깊으신 분이라고 생각합니다만 이렇게 차분히 읽다보니 진중함까지...^^
공감해요!
Like
Reply
22 h
Lee Doosoo
멋진 글입니다. 감사합니다.
Like
Reply
17 h
HyangHoon Kim
캬 중일전쟁이 그랬군요. 결과적으로 중국이 승리했으나 국민당이 깊숙히 관여하고 주도한.
Like
Reply
8 h
Chee-Kwan Kim
김향훈 국민당이 전방에서 싸우는 동안 궤멸 직전까지 갔던 중국공산당은 정규군을 용인받았을 뿐 아니라 후방 산시성에 숨어 힘을 키웠으니...중일전쟁은 모택동에게는 blessing in disguise였던 셈이지요.
4
Like
Reply
8 h
HyangHoon Kim
한국은 얼떨결에 최전방 기지가 되어 선진국으로 도약
Like
Reply
8 h
Kibum Sung
전쟁지도상황만 보면 국민당이나 국부군이 무능하지는 않은 것 같습니다(부패는 별론) 다만 일본군을 완전히 섬멸할 능력은 없었을 뿐;;
연안의 공산당이 일본군을 제대로 상대한 것은 전쟁말기에 한두차례 정도였던 것으로!
====
Forgotten Ally: China’s World War II, 1937-1945 Hardcover – 10 September 2013
by Rana Mitter (Author)
4.4 out of 5 stars 698 ratings
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The epic, untold story of China’s devastating eight-year war of resistance against Japan
For decades, a major piece of World War II history has gone virtually unwritten. The war began in China, two years before Hitler invaded Poland, and China eventually became the fourth great ally, partner to the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain. Yet its drama of invasion, resistance, slaughter, and political intrigue remains little known in the West.
Rana Mitter focuses his gripping narrative on three towering leaders: Chiang Kai-shek, the politically gifted but tragically flawed head of China’s Nationalist government; Mao Zedong, the Communists’ fiery ideological stalwart, seen here at the beginning of his epochal career; and the lesser-known Wang Jingwei, who collaborated with the Japanese to form a puppet state in occupied China. Drawing on Chinese archives that have only been unsealed in the past ten years, he brings to vivid new life such characters as Chiang’s American chief of staff, the unforgettable “Vinegar Joe” Stilwell, and such horrific events as the Rape of Nanking and the bombing of China’s wartime capital, Chongqing. Throughout, Forgotten Ally shows how the Chinese people played an essential role in the wider war effort, at great political and personal sacrifice.
Forgotten Ally rewrites the entire history of World War II. Yet it also offers surprising insights into contemporary China. No twentieth-century event was as crucial in shaping China’s worldview, and no one can understand China, and its relationship with America today, without this definitive work.
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===
From Australia
Jason Walters
4.0 out of 5 stars A very good book
Reviewed in Australia 🇦🇺 on 18 November 2020
Verified Purchase
Well researched and well written. A very good text on important history that is so important but has been largely ignored by all but the most direct participants.
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From other countries
Hugh Murray
2.0 out of 5 stars FORGOTTEN ALLY? NO, BETRAYED ALLY1
Reviewed in the United States 🇺🇸 on 14 September 2017
Verified Purchase
What's wrong with this book? In the Index one can find a listing for Chiang Kia-shek's “paranoia over Soviet Union,”(p. 431) but there is nothing in Mitter's Index concerning the assassination plots against Chiang by the chief US military leader in China during most of WWII. General “Vinegar” Joe Stilwell's plots included having Chiang jump from an airplane with a defective parachute or have him die from food poisoning with a botulism that would not show in an autopsy. These “plans,” even though not implemented, should have been included in the book. Also missing is the comment to Stilwell by the beloved Pres. Franklin Roosevelt concerning the Chinese leader, “If you can't get along with Chiang and can't replace him, get rid of him once and for all.”(Richard Bernstein, FP, 3 Sept. 2015) Mitter has truly mistitled his book: The Forgotten Ally, should have been The Betrayed Ally. And Mitter wrongly concluded that different approaches and policies were “character driven squabbles [which] would lead to one of the postwar tragedies in American politics: the sterile debate on 'Who Lost China'”(Mitter, 354)
What makes Mitter's book so important is that he is so representative of the mainstream history establishment. A professor of History and Politics at Cambridge U. in England, Mitter's volume will become the quick reference work on WWII China for many years. But his Leftwing bias is so clear and evident, yet so ubiquitous in academe that he us unaware of it and how it distorts his history. I hope to expose some of his biases.
There is a strong argument to be made that American “aid” to the Republic of China during WWII was destructive to Chiang and his Nationalist government, - that Roosevelt and Gen. George Marshall were willing to sacrifice China to entice Stalin to join the war against Japanesean. China, like Poland and eastern Europe, would be served to the Soviets by the West. The big difference, the Soviet troops were in Poland and eastern Europe, so the West “gave” the Soviets what they had already conquered. In China, FDR and Marshall were willing to give Stalin what his troops had not won, inviting them in at the war's conclusion.
In the 1930s Marshall had risen quickly in the US Army, being promoted over more senior officers. His work with the depression program, the Civilian Conservation Corps, had gone well, and he rose in the ranks. In part this may have been because his politics were more amenable to the Roosevelts, for in the US, the elected officials are the ultimate authority. Marshall served a stint in China, where he disliked the Nationalist regime, and so did his protege, Joe Stilwell.
In 1927 Chiang had turned against his allies within the Nationalist Party, and sought to destroy his erstwhile Communist colleagues. Simultaneously, Chiang was also fighting against local war-lords, trying to unify the nation. In 1931 the Japanese invaded several northeastern provinces, and established a puppet state to represent the Manchu minority, restoring the last Chinese emperor, Pu Yi, as the head of the new nation of Manchukuo. Chiang was too weak to do much about that or further Japanese inroads into northern China. In 1937 a minor incident on a bridge outside of Beijing with shots fired between Chinese and Japanese soldiers escalated. This time Chiang did not yield, and the 2nd Sino-Japanese War had begun.
The Imperial leaders of Japanesean were furious that China refused to follow the rising sun in its determination to expel Western colonialists and oppressors from Asia. Japanesean attacked Shanghai in the largest battle since the 1916 Battle of the Marne of WWI. China still would not surrender. Japanesean decided to be ruthless in its next major campaign, known today as “the Rape of Nanking (Nanjing).” Chiang was basically alone in his fight. He had had help from German military advisers, but in time they were recalled as Germany, Italy, and Japanesean joined in an anti-Comintern Pact. Stalin provided some minor help, and in the 1939 undeclared war – USSR and Mongolia vs. Japanesean and Manchukuo, the Soviets quickly smashed the Japanese defenses, and peace was restored.
Chiang was basically alone in trying to stop the Japanese with regular armies. The communists were limited to the north or their center in Yenan. They could only use guerrilla tactics against the Japanese. Chiang's army might delay the Nipponese invaders, but the Nationalists were not as well equipped, or trained, and they usually succumbed. Finally, some Nationalists, fed up with the loss of life and lands, decided for an alternative approach. Wang Jingwei, had once been the number 2 man to Sun Yat-sen, leader of the Chinese Revolution that had overthrown the Qing Dynasty in 1911. In 1940 Wang and several other prominent Chinese, left Chunking, the new evacuated Nationalist capital, for Hanoi, Indo-China (then under the Vichy French, collaborating with the Axis). From there they flew to Japanese occupied cities and soon established a collaborationist regime in Nanjing. For them, the fight against Japanesean was over. The fight against the West and the communists would continue. With the defection of these Nationalist leaders, Chiang was even more alone.
That changed in December 1941 when the Japanese attacked Hawaii. America entered the war. Chiang had an ally. Or did he? FDR's favorite Gen. Marshall appointed Joseph Stilwell to be the US military attache to China, and Stilwell was suddenly 2nd in command of the Chinese army. Although Stilwell had not been know for his generalship, he took some of Chiang's best-trained troops on a risky venture in Burma, and then abandoned them! Stilwell turned up in India and appeared before the newsreels. Chiang's troops were not trained for the jungle warfare where Stilwell had led them. There were serious losses by the Allies there, Chinese, Indian, and British troops. Soon Stilwell complained that Chiang was not fighting the Japanese, but instead keeping his troops for a later conflict against the communists. But some of the troops about whom Stilwell complained were in areas where they were also holding important junctions threatened by the Japanese. Mitter fails to ask a very basic question about Stilwell, - was he an enemy of the Nationalist Government?
Mitter writes: “During the summer of 1943 Stilwell fantasized about taking command of all Chinese troops, including the Communists, with Chiang and the Nationalist military leadership left as ciphers only.”(302) Note, he does not mention the Red leaders as ciphers. Was Stilwell and enemy of the Nationalists?
An answer to that question might be gleaned by reviewing a hand-written letter Stilwell sent to a friend on 6 April 1946. By then, WWII was over, Stilwell was in the US, and the Soviets had taken Manchuria at the end of the war as agreed to at Yalta by FDR and Stalin. The Soviets expropriated much portable, industrial material back to the USSR and later would give many confiscated Japanese weapons and some American lend-lease supplies to the Chinese Communists entering Manchuria. Both the USSR and the USA recognized the Nationalists as the official Republic of China, and America tried to get Nationalist (KMT) troops to Manchuria before the Reds got there. The Soviets blocked some American ships from the ports, but eventually the KMT troops disembarked and won some, and then some more of the cities of Manchuria. Suddenly there was open civil war between the Reds and KMT. The Reds were not nearly as well trained at this point, and the KMT was winning victory after victory when Stilwell wrote the letter. He wrote: “Isn't Manchuria a spectacle? ...It makes me itch to throw down my shovel and get over there and shoulder a rifle with Chu Teh.” (Barbara Tuchman, Stilwell and the American Experience in China, 1911-45, p. 527) Chu Teh was then the military leader of Communist forces. He would later command the Chinese “volunteers” who crossed the Yalu River to drive the Americans from North Korea. Tuchman adds that the Stilwell letter was published in the newsletter of a pro-communist journalist in January 1947. (Tuchman, 527, ftnote) Sen. Joseph McCarthy, in his book critical of Marshall, reported that the same letter was also published on 26 Jan. 1947, in photostat, in the New York Daily Worker (organ of the Communist Party, USA). (McCarthy, America's Retreat from Victory, p. 62)
Stilwell did not take his rifle to Manchuria in spring 1946, and he died a few months later. However, Gen. Marshall came to the rescue of Stilwell's communist friend. “Both Nationalist armies combined to take Szup'ing and push north...in June 1946...Only another cease-fire order on 6 June – agreed to as a result of great pressure from Marshall and later described by Chiang as his 'most grievous mistake' – saved Lin Piao's [communist] headquarters and permitted the central Manchurian front to stabilize...for the remainder of 1946.”(Edward L. Dryer, China at War, 1901-1949, pp. 324-25) At the same time that Americans were demanding Communists be excluded from the governments of Italy and France, Gen. Marshall was demanding that Chiang form a coalition government that included the Reds. Marshall threatened to cut off all American aid if this were not done. Neither Chiang nor Mao really wanted a workable coalition. Marshall then did cut off all aid to the KMT, the official government of China. Marshall, who was then Pres. Truman's Special Envoy to China would boast, “As Chief of Staff I armed 39 anti-communist divisions, now with the stroke of a pen, I disarm them.” (McCarthy, 90) With Marshall's friends in the US State Dept., Chiang was unable to get the proper license to purchase ammunition or weapons in the US. The State Dept. got Britain to fall in line, so Chiang could get no ammunition or replacements or new weapons. Marshall did more to harm the KMT. When Gen. Wedemeyer was suggested as the new Ambassador to China, Marshall received word from Zhou En Lai, the representative of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in many negotiations. Zhou objected to Wedemeyer, and Marshall then withdrew support for the general. Instead, John L. Stuart was appointed Ambassador to the Republic of China. Stuart had been a missionary, a university professor, a man who had called for the removal of Chiang, and a teacher of Zhou En Lai. So the new Ambassador to Chiang was a man more sympathetic to the radical rebels than to the official government of China. Marshall had a lot in common with Stilwell.
Though the KMT had been winning the civil war in China when Marshall first imposed the embargo, as the year went by, the Reds, with help from the Soviets, began to push the the KMT back from what Dreyer considered its high point with the capture of Yenan in March 1947. (Dreyer, 319) Meanwhile, China became an issue in American politics. While a big “Get America Out” rally in California featured labor leader Harry Bridges, Black singer and celebrity Paul Robeson, and Hollywood actors like Edward G. Robinson, the newly elected Republican Congress had other ideas. It passed legislation to provide considerable funds to the KMT. Left-wingers and Soviet agents in the Treasury Dept., Commerce, and State, obstructed and delayed delivery of the aid until it was too late. When US Ambassador to China Patrick Hurley had resigned in November 1945, he warned that “a considerable section of our State Dept. is endeavoring to support Communism generally as well as specifically in China.” (Tuchman, p. 523-24). Gen. Wedemeyer, who succeeded Stilwell, reported that the KMT could win the civil war with American help, but as this contradicted Marshall's view, the Wedemeyer Report was suppressed for several years. Gen. Claire Chennault, who led the Flying Tigers in China, had worked well with Chiang, and was critical of the communists and of Stilwell. The left wing had been extremely critical of the US during the Spanish civil war for not aiding the Republic against the rebels of the Falange, because the Republic was the legitimate government, - the left now reversed itself, demanding no aid to the legitimate government of China, Chiang and the KMT. Mitter dismisses these debates as personality squabbles, which led to the horrors of McCarthyism. Mitter accuses Hurley and the right wing of distortion (370), and concludes that the civil war “went badly for the Nationalists in large part because of Chiang's ... judgments.”(369) Observe Mitter's non-judgmental phrase, “...when the Korean War broke out in 1950.”(371) I would argue the question as to whether China became Communist or Nationalist was a major one, and there is good reason to suspect deception and treason in the American community led to the betrayal of Chiang and the victory of Mao.
Mitter describes how Chiang in 1937 was the recognized leader of China – recognized even by Stalin's USSR. Mitter notes how the early years of war in China received world-wide publicity. The Spanish Civil War was still on-going, and suddenly there was another war against cruel imperialism. If Guernica became a symbol for the world of the horrors or war, soon that picture was to be joined by newsreels of bombing when the Japanese invaded Shanghai, and even more so , Dec.-Jan. 1937-38 when Japanese troops were given free reign to loot, rape, and kill in Nanking, the city that had been the capital of Chiang's China. Although Mao in his out-of- the-way Yenan hoped to use guerrilla tactics, Chiang, with difficulty, maintained a regular Chinese Army to fight the Japanese invaders, even if they were usually loosing ground and battles.
In December 1941 the Japanese did not simply attack Pearl Harbor; they attacked the (American) Philippines, British Hong Kong, the Dutch Indonesia, Siam, the Malay States, the “Gibraltar of the East” Singapore, and Burma. By February 1942, all of SE Asia was controlled by the Japanese or their allies. How could Chiang receive any American supplies? Either on a Burma road (which was soon closed because of the Japanese), or by air over “the hump,” the Himalayas.
The Americans also supplied Chiang with two military figures – one of whom proved disastrous; the other helpful. “Vinegar” Joe Stilwell was theoretically 2nd in command of the Nationalist Army, directly under Chiang. Stilwell quickly developed a contempt for Chiang whom he called “the peanut” in his diaries. The other American advisor, who unlike Stilwell, stressed the role of air power in the war was Gen. Claire Chennault, whose Flying Tigers would become legendary in the Asian war. Because the Japanese' occupation of coastal China now extended to all of SE Asia, Chiang's Nationalists were isolated; getting supplies to them was a major problem. Of course, after Pearl Harbor, Germany had declared war on the US, and Gen. Marshall and the American leadership decided Europe would be the primary target, so most supplies and lend lease materials would be headed for Britain or the USSR rather than China. Stilwell was in charge of US lend-lease to China, which he used to force Chiang to do as the American general wanted. In many ways Stilwell (and perhaps Marshall and FDR) viewed Nationalist China more as a satellite than as an ally. Mitter concluded that FDR's appointment of Stilwell in China would lead “to the four-year duel between Chiang and that American general...”(242) In the clashes, although “Stilwell had no previous direct experience in generalship,...he had a powerful friend in George C. Marshall.”(250) On 6 February 1942 Marshall sent a message to China – “American forces in China and Burma will operate under Stilwell's direction...but Ger. Stilwell himself will always be under the command of the Generalissimo [Chiang].” (250) Stilwell thought that meant he was in command.
In the spring 1942 Stilwell engaged in a battle for Burma. As things went badly, he ordered the Chinese troops under his command to withdraw to India. Chiang was appalled that a foreign commander of Chinese troops would send them to another country rather than back to China. Chiang counter-manded Stilwell's orders. Then Stilwell and his small entourage arrived at Imphal, India, where he was interviewed by American journalists. Chiang was aghast that Stilwell, the commander, would abandon his troops. Many of those “best” Chinese troops became lost in the thick Burmese jungles, and lost to later fighting in China. Even Stilwell had described this as a “risky” adventure (255); Mitter writes of this episode as “the Burma debacle.”(260) Not only did China lose access to supplies when the Japanese captured and retained the Burma Road, but Stilwell's “highly risky gamble was much more likely to fail than to succeed. It led to the death or injury of some 25,000 Chinese troops along with over 10,000 British and Indian troops (with only 4,500 Japanese casualties). Retreat might” have saved many for the defense of China.”(260)
Again and again the Nationalists are depicted as incompetent and corrupt, and Mitter, either quoting Western observers or adding his own judgment, reinforces these negatives. For some Westerners, Chiang Kai-shek became “Cash my check.” Others found Chiang personally honest, but one who allowed corruption in his Army. Zhisui Li trained as a physician in the West, but with his wife was enthusiastic to return to the new China with his wife in 1949. On the way back, they stopped in Hong Kong where a friend introduced them to a man, reputed to be a high CCP official. The friend told Li to give a gift to the official for “a smooth return...you might land a good-paying job in a medical college in Beijing...give him a Rolex watch...” The idealistic couple refused to give a bribe. After some problems upon entry to the Peoples Republic of China, Li eventually became the personal physician to Mao. “In 1956, when I told Mao the story [about the request for a bribe], Mao laughed uproariously. 'You bookworm,' he chided me. 'Why are you so stingy? You don't understand human relations. Pure water can't support fish.'”(Zhisui Li, The Private Life of Chairman Mao, p. 41) It appears that the corruption denounced by leaders of the CCP in recent years began at the birth of the PRC with Mao's attitude.
As in other theaters of fighting in WWII, the changes in the popular image of Chiang would follow the pattern of another leader who fought against both Axis aggression and communism. On 25 March 1941, Prince Paul, Regent of Yugoslavia, agreed to adhere to the Tri-Partite Treaty, effectively bringing his nation into an Axis alliance. Because many officers were Serbs and opposed to the Germans, they staged a coup on 27 March. Hitler, preparing for his Operation Barbarosa against the USSR, did not want an anti-German Yugoslavia behind his lines. On 6 April 1941 Germany invaded Yugoslavia and was soon joined by several Axis allies. By mid-April, Yugoslavia had surrendered. Later that same month, Draza Mihailovic, an officer, gathered others together to begin a resistance to German occupation. Only after the Germans attacked the Soviet Union 22 June 1941 would any communist think of forming an underground against the fascist occupation and collaborating governments in the now dismembered Yugoslavia. The leader of the communist partisans was Josip Broz Tito, and he and Mihailovic forces at first agreed to cooperate. However, when sabotage provoked massive retribution by the Germans, Mihailovic's Chetniks were opposed to large-scale sabotage, except under special circumstances. Tito was for it. By year's end, there were skirmishes between the Chetnics and the communists.
Yugoslavia, unlike some European nations, was a multi-ethnic state with simmering feuds and hatreds. With defeat, Serbia was reduced in size; an independent Croatia created; and parts of the Yugoslavia were occupied by Hungarians, Italians, and others. There were Slovenians and Muslims, and Jewish and German minority groups. Mihailovic and the Chetniks did at time collaborate with the puppet government in Serbia; sometimes, Tito's Partisans also collaborated. However, more important for the future of both Tito and Mihailovic were some of the personnel of Britain's MI6 and the newly formed American Office of Strategic Services (the American intelligence agency). At the decoding area in Benchly Park in the UK, we now know several important figures were Communists and Soviet agents. Also, in the rush to create an American agency, Bill Donovan was chiefly concerned about recruiting people opposed to fascism, rather than worrying if they might have far-left backgrounds. With the help of Communist and Soviet agents inside Britain's MI6, and similar agents inside Donovan's OSS, soon MI6 and the OSS were reporting that Tito's partisans were doing all the fighting in Yugoslavia against the Germans and fascist collaborationist regimes, while Mihailovic either did nothing or was himself collaborating. When Mihailovic's guerrillas did fight, the MI6 crowd attributed such resistance to the Reds. The stage was being set for the betrayal of Mihailovic; by early 1943 Churchill, believing the distorted MI6 reports, gave up on Mihailovic, and at war's end,when Tito and the communists came to power, Mihailovic was executed. Many said that was a political decision of the court. In 2017 a Serbian court quashed the treason conviction of Mihailovic. Others maintain that was a political decision.
So initially, Mihailovic is portrayed as a national, patriotic hero fighting against the German oppressors. But when the communists backed Tito, a change in reporting about Mihailovic occurred.
A similar pattern can be observed in the treatment of Chiang and Mao. At first, Chiang is hailed as the Chinese leader standing up against brutal, Japanese aggression. But then he is portrayed as corrupt, inefficient, unwilling to fight the Japanese, always in retreat. By contrast, Mao was building a new egalitarian society where everyone pulled together for the same goals; and his forces led guerrilla campaigns against the Japanese and collaborators. Dreyer argued years later that all hoped to avoid battle with the Japanese, but all had to fight them if and when the Japanese attacked. But only the Nationalists maintained an army of 4 million to oppose the Japanese. Mitter even acknowledges that Chiang's armies held down about 500,000 Japanese troops who might have been assigned elsewhere.(379) such as a major invasion of India. Others place the number of Japanese stuck in the China quagmire at 700,000 to a million; it was a war that Japanesean simply could not seem to win because of the resistance by Chiang.
Mitter includes discussion of the repression in China under Wang's Axis-Nationalist regime in Nanjing; Chiang's anti-Japanese regime in Chunking; and Mao's communist territory in Yenan. In war time, of course, the first two imposed repression. Here's how Mitter describes what was occurring in Yenan: “The communist terror was different. The purpose...was not to line anyone's pocket. Rather, it envisioned – and achieved – one clear aim: it would bring together radicalized ideology, wartime isolation, and fear to create a new system of political power. The war against Japanesean was giving birth to Mao's China.”(295) The History Channel in 2017 showed a special on Mao which provided an example. After arriving in Yenan after the Long March, Mao had posters announce requests for criticism. Next day, some critics posted their views on the wall. Mao found the author of the main critique, had him arrested. Mao then watched as the man's knees were bent in various, unnatural ways, meant to cause as much pain as possible. Mao did not touch; just watched. Additional pain was inflicted upon the critic. Eventually, the fun was over and Mao had the victim killed. Thus, Mao was forging unity among the radicals.
In WWII America was clearly more interested in defeating Hitler and fascism in Europe, deeming them a greater threat than Imperial Japanesean. The US and Britain had much in common, and when FDR and Churchill met in the Atlantic, sailors of both nations sang Christian hymns, shown in newsreels, reinforcing the common bonds. There were no similar bonds with Stalin's USSR. But like Churchill, FDR would make a deal with the devil to defeat Hitler. Lend lease and military supplies were sent to Britain and the Soviets while American servicemen in the Pacific might be 3rd on the priority list. We did not want Britain or the Soviets to collapse.
But we did not want the Republic of China to collapse either! America sent Stilwell to be the number 2 military figure in the Republic of China! We were turning Chiang's China into a satellite. Could you imagine Roosevelt sending an American general to be the number 2 military figure in Stalin's USSR? Although we were giving much more to Stalin, Americans could not even stop when American aid was being re-labeled in the USSR so it appeared to the recipients as Soviet home aid. Stalin was given a free hand. FDR's Administration even asked Hollywood to produce films sympathetic to Stalin, so “Mission to Moscow” and other films glorifying Stalin's Soviet empire were produced.
Even if the remarks by FDR to Stilwell, to get Chiang to do what we want or eliminate him- even if this conversation were another Stilwell fantasy, it would not alter the way the US treated the leader of the Chinese Republic. China was snubbed as a satellite, and as the war wore on, and the influence of the left-wingers in the American bureaucracy waxed, their smearing of Chiang prepared the way for the disarming of the KMT and the victory of the communists in 1949.
After four years of fighting the Japanese alone, with America as a new ally, Chiang was left to deal with an inept general who recklessly wasted Chinese troops on ventures that weakened China and permitted Japanesean to launch a major assault into China in 1944. There is also good reason to believe leftists and communists were inside American intelligence organizations working inside China, providing information to the “peasant rebels.” So “hero” Chiang of 1938 was transformed into the corrupt, inept, un-willing-to-fight the Japanese, fascist-tainted Chiang of the mid-1940s. That is why Chiang deserved to abandon Chinese claims to Outer Mongolia (which was by then the Soviet satellite of Mongolia), and deserved to have the Soviets plundering Manchuria at the end of WWII. And of course, that is why Chiang did not deserve any weapons for his KMT during the civil war against the peasant reformers of Yenan led by Mao.
Like others, I think Chiang with American help could have defeated the Communists in the civil war following WWII. Deception and treason crippled Chiang's chances to win. The results – China under Chairman Mao for decades with millions of Chinese starved, tortured, or executed. And the other legacy of that era – the Kim Il Sung dynasty in North Korea. What a legacy of the Left?
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Clem
5.0 out of 5 stars Great History Lesson
Reviewed in the United States 🇺🇸 on 22 September 2019
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One of the reasons I loved this book so much is that I felt that I learned an awful lot. Although I’ve always considered myself fairly astute when it comes to the history of the second world war, reading this book reminds me that my knowledge of the subject has always been somewhat skewed to one side. I could tell you a lot about the European events, but not much about the Asiatic affairs; especially the conflict between Japan and China. I’m sure there are many in the same boat as I am. This is probably why the author, Rana Mitter, accurately uses the word “forgotten” in his title for this book.
This book is a very linear, easy to understand account of the events that led up to Japan’s invasion of neighbor China in 1937 which, one could argue, was when and where World War II actually started. We read of all of the major military and political events of the war in China up until the war's conclusion in 1945. We read this narrative from the eyes of the Chinese and, as good as the book is, it can be awfully sickening and depressing. Well….it is war.
There are a lot of Chinese names and places within these pages, and it can be quite easy to get lost while trying to assimilate all of the Sino monikers. Whether or not the author made a conscious effort or not, he somehow manages to keep his readers connected and never overwhelmed. Example: I’ve always heard Chiang Kai-Shek’s prominent wife referred to as Madame Chiang, yet the author always refers to her by her Asian name – Song Meiling. Now, this could be incredibly confusing, yet whenever she’s back in the narrative after a long absence, the author reminds us who she is by simply interjecting “…Chang Kai-Shek’s wife…” after we’re reintroduced to her. I found these instances a huge relief and it prevented me from getting lost and overwhelmed. I’d be lying if I told you I could pass a quiz that covers all of the names and places mentioned in this book, but when compared to other books of a similar nature, this one excels in this area. The author also includes a “cast of characters” at the beginning of the book, but since I read on the Kindle, it wasn’t necessarily easy for me to flip back and forth. Still, give the author kudos for realizing that most of his readers can benefit from such an inclusion.
Speaking of Chiang Kai-Shek, there’s a lot of politics in this book as well. Although probably not completely necessary, it’s definitely warranted and does add needed color to the overall picture. Not only do we have Chiang’s Nationalist party, but we also read of the internal conflicts with Communist leader Mao Zedong. There’s even a third influence (again, new to me), Wang Jingwei, who starts off siding with Chiang, but later splits to attempt to collaborate with the invading Japanese. It’s not that Wang is a traitor necessarily, but he feels it’s probably best for all for China to become subjects of the more powerful Japan. Think of the French Vichy government during World War II as a comparison. All of these rival factions want the same thing for China, and we see many uneasy alliances at different times during the conflict with Japan. In fact, we even see the other Western leaders flirt with Zedong’s communist ilk at times. If it can aid in a better, quicker outcome for the war, it’s definitely worth considering.
Sadly, we also learn that the “superpower” allies (The U.S., England, and Russia) almost see the Chinese as inferior in terms of intelligence and the ability to lead. Looking back at history, this seems horribly racist, but had the Chinese been a race of white people instead of yellow people, you get the impression that Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin would have probably involved Chiang-Kai-Shek in a lot more discussions involving strategy and the future of the allies. Winston Churchill, in particular, comes across as a racist dinosaur who still yearns for the time of English Imperialism.
Yet through all of this, China survives. Things get somewhat easier when Japan devotes its energy to the United States midway through their war with China, yet things never seem to go as well as any of the Chinese leaders would like. They also feel almost as isolated from their allies as they do from their enemies during many of their brutal struggles.
The book, as its title suggests, ends when World War II ends, but everyone knows there’s so much more story to tell with China, and where the next few years would take them. The author gives us a quick postscript of what “happened next”, but I wanted much more. Of course, that’s always a sign of a good book; when the story is over, but you wish the author would keep going. That would warrant an entirely new book, though, and my personal quest is to find one that continues this magnificent (yet horrific) story.
Note: If you have Amazon Prime, there’s a video documentary you can watch that is narrated by the author of this book about these events. It serves as a good companion piece. The video places more emphasis on the battles and the survivors then it does the politics, but it’s a great tool to reinforce what you read about here.
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Julie Merilatt
4.0 out of 5 stars Comprehensive Chinese History
Reviewed in the United States 🇺🇸 on 15 February 2023
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It has been my goal to read more about WWII outside of the European theater, and this is probably the most comprehensive book about China’s role in the war. They endured years of onslaught from the Japanese long before western countries were involved. China was invaded and large swaths occupied and brutalized by Japan’s superior army starting in 1937. China didn’t fight offensively, but tried to defend when and where they could. Unfortunately, inadequate leadership was ineffective in so many aspects of governance and military management.
Before the war truly became international, there were more details about internal Chinese conflict than about fighting the Japanese. It was Nationalists versus Communists versus Collaborationists. On top of enemy air raids and assault, there was flooding and famine as a result of poor decision-making by Nationalist Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and skirmishes with Mao Zedong’s communist forces.
If you thought China was a hot mess prior to international involvement, it got even worse when the Allies tried to interfere. Yes, the Chinese government was corrupt and indecisive, and therefore the Allies viewed them as inferior and incapable. Even as the war wound down, China was treated as a second-rate ally and was not included in most of the summits that would shape the post-war world. This attitude toward China would have lasting effects on its relationship with the USA and would influence the trajectory of the country for decades to come. This book definitely gave me an in-depth look at China’s role in the war and the global consequences.
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Shiraj s.
5.0 out of 5 stars Very nice book
Reviewed in India 🇮🇳 on 4 April 2023
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A detailed account & detailed story
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Auditor
2.0 out of 5 stars NOT “FORGOTTEN”- SLANDERED AND ABANDONED
Reviewed in the United States 🇺🇸 on 1 June 2017
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NOT “FORGOTTEN”- SLANDERED AND ABANDONED
Nineteen chapters of entertaining but relatively obscure background events of WW2 China lead up to a fictitious Epilogue. While Mitter headlines “Forgotten Ally”, he wants the shameful dissolution of that alliance “forgotten”. Claiming it a “sterile” issue, he evades and contradicts three years of U.S. State Department records, key papers of Mao Zedong and other defining documents in order to cover-up reality and complicity. He uses comments of fellow authors to support wildly inflated statistics on Communist strength and completely ignores the denial of promised U.S. aid to the faithful, devastated ally that fought the bulk of the Japanese Army throughout WW2. In the real world, State Department records contain Ambassador Stuart’s, 3/17/48 report from China; “America still delays the long promised aid on which survival of democratic institutions depends.” Two weeks later he reported “The Chinese people do not want to become communists, yet they see the tide of communism running irresistibly forward.” Mitter finds these assessments by America’s Official Representative in China easily ignored. He claims Red military superiority at end of WW2 made Red victory inevitable. Consider; In 1946, General Lucas, Commander of U.S. Military Advisory Group- China, reported that his MAG staff could build a first rate Chinese Army and defeat the Communists in two years if the U.S. provided arms and supplies equivalent to those required by ten American Divisions. Consider; Admiral Cooke head of U.S. Military in China testified to Congress “Several times in 1946 … when they had the Communists licked, a truce took place.” Consider; After two years of civil war, General Wedemeyer, former China commander, conducted a Special Presidential fact finding tour. On returning to the States, he urged immediate shipment of WW2 surplus arms to China and Korea. When Wedemeyer refused to revise his findings, his report was suppressed.
Mitter cites a fellow author as his source for claiming a 1941 Red Base Area population of 44 million, but Mao reported at his 1942 Conference of Senior Cadres that his Base Area population was 1.5 million. Mitter lists no source for his claim that, in early 1945, Mao commanded “900,000 regular troops supplemented by a similar number of militia”. Consider; Chiang blockaded Mao’s Base Area with 200,000 Government troops, (The Reds claimed 400,000), until Japan surrendered. Mitter doesn’t explain how 200,000 (or 400,000) could maintain a three year blockade while facing nearly two million Red troops. The quality of Mao’s troops is indicated by his many directives urging more crop production from his troops. Mao’s “Army” was in reality a militia of part time farmers. Its limitations are described in detail by Stalin’s liaison in Mao’s HQ. (See China’s Special Area- Petr Vladimirov).
Mundane details in the body of this book reveal a subtle bias. The author seems to raise Chiang Kai-shek, from his past status as victim of slanderous attacks, towards the level of respect he enjoyed with world leaders of his era. But, each mention of Chiang’s government is tagged with the adjective “corrupt”. This book’s Index lists 22 pages that describe (but do not document) corruption in Chiang’s government. (This, while history’s deadliest terrorist merits 3 listings under “Terrorism”.) Is the level of China corruption worthy of seven times more print than the horror inflicted Mao Zedong? Consider; China fought the bulk of the Japanese Army throughout WW2 on less than 2% of U.S. aid to WW2 allies. By keeping the Japanese Army out of India and Australia, China saved countless of thousands of American and British lives at virtually no cost to America or Great Britain. Why the incessant interest in China’s morality? Why the underplaying of Mao Zedong’s monstrous crimes against humanity? Crimes that began before and continued through the era covered in this book.
The mundane emerges again when Mitter’s map of “Areas of Communist control …” is examined. Applying the scale listed on this map to this map, the distance from Peking to Taiyuan measures approx.750 miles. Rand McNally has it approximately 250 miles. This map presents Communist Areas 300% larger than reality.
Mitter also has problems with major events and key characters and seems to lack insight regarding the U.S. wartime military situation. He presents General Marshall prioritizing war theaters and deciding what forces to commit. Roosevelt and Churchill decided war theater priorities. Marshall was U.S. Army Chief of Staff . He had no direct authority over other branches of the U.S military. In regard to U.S. efforts in Asia that produced a mountainous supply road, Mitter’s concept “… the road might have played a more significant role.” is wrong. The road was a precipitous mountain route, after more than a year of two lane construction it was bottlenecked to one lane. A road, that was predicted to fail, did fail. It provided a tenuous 1000 mile trip that required trucks to carry fuel for the 2000 mile round trip, (China had no fuel). One summer rain sent boulders weighing as much as six tons crashing down on the road and washed out 300 river crossings. The British in Burma christened it the “White Elephant Road”. Mitter misses again on China’s Manchuria concessions to USSR saying they were “unresolved” when Stalin left for Potsdam. Yalta records attest that, with Chiang absent, Churchill and Roosevelt awarded Stalin “preeminent rights” in Manchuria in a signed agreement at Yalta. The only China concession at Potsdam was a grant of port control of Dairen, Manchuria by Truman to Stalin based on Stalin’s pledge to maintain it as an “Open Port”. By year’s end, USSR closed Dairen to American ships and it remained closed until China succumbed.
On the conversion of China into the world’s deadliest regime, long evaded documents attest that China wasn’t “lost”. China didn’t “fall” into communism. China, with one fifth of world population, was targeted by Lenin, shortly after his takeover of Russia. Stalin’s first subversion was foiled by Chiang Kai-shek. His second succeeded with help from Washington insiders.
We now know that the one endlessly maligned as “Corrupt Despot” later founded a thriving democratic nation and the one hailed as “The Great Teacher” was really history’s deadliest dictator. How could they be so wrong? History’s deadliest betrayal needed history’s most pervasive cover-up. The list of cover up participants is long and depressing. That cover-up fiction is only now refuted by recently revealed documents that have been carefully avoided for decades.
FOR MORE OF THAT EVADED INFORMATION:
U.S. Dept. of State- Foreign Relations of the United States- The Far East and China-1946,1947&1948
U.S Senate- Committee on the Judiciary- Testimony of Adm. Cooke re; General Marshall Disarming China 10/51
U.S House Committee on Foreign Affairs- General Marshall Testimony on China, 2/20/48
U.S. CIA Docs. ORE 32-48, ORE 32-49
* Key excerpts from the above now appear in book form.
Also recommended:
Mao: The Unknown Story- Chang & Holliday
Galahad- Charles N Hunter
Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung- Vols. 1-5, Mao Tse-tung
China’s Special Area- Petr Vladimirov
Wedemeyer Reports- Albert C Wedemeyer
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H. Schneider
5.0 out of 5 stars Forgotten? Abused? Neglected?
Reviewed in the United States 🇺🇸 on 29 November 2013
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We need to keep challenging our perceptions of the world. That's the essence of science, even of history. Sometimes, history is rewritten when new material comes to light, when archives are opened. (At other times, it is rewritten when political power shifts.)
This book first retells the period up to the start of 'real' war between Japan and China. Japan's occupation of Manchuria doesn't even count as war, because China did not resist. The Chinese state and military were too weak to resist modern international forces. That was an heritage from Qing times, which the KMT hadn't been able to repair.
This war before WW2, between 37 and 41, is retold in part 2. The West stayed neutral like in Spain. Ironically, the only real help for CKS, the anti-communist, came from the Soviet Union, who didn't want a victorious and aggressive Japan on its eastern border. When war in Europe started in 39, and Russia had her temporary non aggression pact with Germany, help from Russia was lost to China. CKS hoped to pull in the US on his side, but progress was small and slow.
During this period, two major outrages happened: the Nanking massacre, when Japanese troops killed 300 000 civilians, and then the breaching of the Yellow River dikes by the nationalists, which held up the Japanese advance by a few months, and killed half a million people. A stalemate ensued, in which nationalists, communists and Japanese (with collaborators) each controlled chunks of the country.
1941 brought a big geopolitical shift. The Germans attacked Russia, and the Japanese, despite being unable to fully subdue China, set their goals higher. American support to China started only after Pearl Harbor, when Japan became a shared enemy. However, American and British war strategies did not place high priority on China. 'Europe first' was the doctrine. The relationship was doomed from the beginning, considering the disagreements on necessities. CKS was not treated as an equal ally, and he didn't have Stalin's bargaining power to overcome the contempt.
America sent a general to lead the Chinese army, under the Generalissimo. That was a poor substitute for real help, and it was bound to fail in view of personal issues. CKS and Stilwell never accepted each other. Mitter places much of the blame with Stilwell, who is described as headstrong and rash, while inexperienced. Furthermore, army man Stilwell disagreed with Air Force man Chennault on strategy. Similarly, different American intelligence units operated in China without coordination. American help didn't seem to be of much use to China.
Anyway, the war went badly for years, as did the situation in the nationalist regions, where famines, inflation, and chaos ruled. This softened up the people for the later take over by communists. Terror ruled in all 3 zones, that was not either party's privilege.
By 44, when a major Japanese push into central China caused devastating defeats for nationalist armies, American confidence in CKS' leadership and war effort had eroded to such a low level, that the seemingly more active and efficient CCP seemed a viable alternative towards the war effort.
A vast field for alternative history and 'what if' speculation opens itself up... Would CKS have stood a chance to survive as leader and unite the country if he had had more American support? Etc
I recommend the book strongly, but I warn against expectations of major disclosures. New perspectives move in gradually, not in leaps and bounds.
The author doesn't 'take sides' for CKS, but his view of CKS and his deficiencies is a bit friendlier than has been standard lately. Vinegar Joe gets downgraded. (I need to re-read Tuchman's sympathetic biography.) Regarding strategy, Mitter tends to agree more often with CKS than Stilwell. An important subject, which was played up in the American public, is the question of CKS' attitude towards fighting against Japan. His critics accused him of being unwilling to wage war against the invader. Mitter paints his attitude more in the light of limited resources and strategic disagreements.
The book raised my awareness of the weak position of China among its 'allies'. Stalin remained 'neutral' towards Japan until near the end, so he was useless to CKS. The Brits were never supportive, because their hardly hidden agenda included holding their colonies. The Americans had other priorities too.
The book's title is therefore inaccurate. It should not be 'forgotten ally', but 'ignored and neglected ally'. It should certainly not be misunderstood as support for the 'who lost China' school of thought. China was never America's to lose. Mitter makes that point explicitly.
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historyguy
5.0 out of 5 stars Finally, the long lost and long sought after missing chapter of WWII
Reviewed in the United States 🇺🇸 on 9 December 2013
Verified Purchase
Great leadership/strategic level view of the war between China and Japan with an honest look at the triumphs and failures of China's real leader during the conflict, Chiang Kai-Shek, and the lesser personage (during the war anyway) of Mao Zedong. Mitter also relays the story of the puppet leader of China under Japanese occupation, Wang Jingwei. China has been ignored for a very long time in the World War II narrative even though they consistently held down over a million Japanese troops before and after the West finally entered World War II in Asia. Chiang is shown as a brutal dictator, but someone who was able to hold the divided nation of China together through massive Japanese attacks, civil war with the communists, betrayal by close friends, and allies with a penchant for throwing their weight around and treating China like a second class power. China's sacrifice in World War II is estimated by Ritter to be at least 14 - 20 million lives lost. This is second only to the losses of the Soviet Union. I think this alone entitles China's story in the war to be told by someone who understands the chaotic past, politics, and pragmatism of China's leaders at this unbelievable time in China's history. Ritter also connects the threads and shows why Mao gained the upper hand in the civil war, and how WWII had made things easier for the Communists, and harder for the Nationalists.
Don't expect exhaustive descriptions of battles, but do expect to see how China's leaders made decisions based on the outcome of battles, and other disasters during the war.
Highlights:
*Ritter is unsparing of the Imperial Japanese government. He rightfully places most of the blame for events in China on them, and does not fall for the Japan is the "victim" theory (due to the atomic bombs) that I have seen in other books about the war in Asia.
Japan wanted to splinter China into disparate states forever so they could exploit China's resources and labor for their own power. Other colonial regimes did the same prior to Japan (on a much smaller scale), but Japan's invasion of China was an epic war crime which almost ended the existence of the Chinese state and people forever.
*The description of Mao's war is revealing and flies in the face of official Chinese Communist propaganda. Mao and his men fought hard guerrilla campaigns against the Japanese, and they deserve credit for that. However, Chiang and the Nationalists fought all of the big battles where the outcome mattered, and the life and death of China were at stake. Ritter makes it very clear that China is starting to come to grips with the contribution of the Nationalists in the war effort rather than believing that Mao beat the Japanese single handed.
*The Nationalists are no saints. You will cringe at some of their decisions in the face of the Japanese onslaught. They would cause a lot of unnecessary suffering for their own people.
*Ritter rightfully condemns British and American treatment of the Chinese before and during the war. The special privileges they enjoyed in China were humiliations for the Chinese, and British colonies on the Chinese mainland were a slap in the face to a proud people. However, when Ritter compares Britain, and especially the US with Japanese colonialism in China it rings a little hollow. The British and the US should be mentioned, and are appropriately criticized in this book, but Japanese aims, aggression, and war crimes far outstrip anything ever done in China by a western power. The Japanese invasion is second only to Hitler's brutal attack on the Soviet Union in the violent history of the twentieth century. Ritter also makes it clear that American and Allied assistance to China is one of the factors which allowed China to survive as long as it did against Japan (8 years).
Buy this book and open your mind to a titanic lost chapter in the most researched and written about war in all history.
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doc peterson
5.0 out of 5 stars Forgotten history
Reviewed in the United States 🇺🇸 on 19 March 2014
Verified Purchase
Rana Mitter does a remarkable job in exploring the pivotal role China played in the Second World War and in explaining why this has largely been forgotten (or overshadowed by other events) in the West. China's place in the conflict is forgotten and ignored at our peril, the Chinese historical narrative is crucial to understanding regional politics between China and Japan now, and China's perspective of the West looking forward.
Why China's contributions have disappeared from Western histories of the war is fairly straightforward - as Mitter writes, "Put simply, (because of) the early Cold War ... The history of China's war with Japan became wrapped in toxic politics for which both the West and Chinese themselves ... were responsible." This, of course, hints at the complex and tumultous relationship between China (both the Nationalists under Chiang Kai Shek and the Communists under Mao) and the Allies (the US, Great Britain and the USSR).
Mitter begins with a brief overview of post Qing-dynasty China and the in-fighting and competition between rival groups for control of the country, matters greatly compounded by the Japanese occupation of Manuchuria. The collapse of China two years before Nazi Germany invaded Poland is convincingly argued as the real starting point of the war, the fact that China stood alone against Japan highlighted against the image of a brave Britain standing alone against German fascists in 1940.
The theme that Mitter revisits again and again is the paradoxical view the West took of China: on one hand as a backwards state (a view dating back to the Opium War of the mid-19th century), whose internal corruption and military ineptitude did not warrant serious attention, and on the other hand, the recognition that China was necessecary to keep in the war as it occupied hunderdes of thousands of Japanese soliders who may otherwise have been used to expand into Siberia, India, Australia or shore up the war in the Pacific. For years, MItter writes, "China had to fight practically alone without any assurance that help from the outside world was forthcoming."
Added to this, the Japanese occupation also effectively interrupted efforts by the Nationalists to unify China, the Communists literally on the ropes and hanging on by the skin of their teeth when the country was invaded. Mitter points out that the Japanese in effect, provided breathing room and opportunity for the Communists to catch their breath, reoutfit and reorganize.
While the scope of the book focuses on World War II, this is not a military history per se; rather, it is more of a history of the war in China, and its social and geopolitical effects. I much prefer this approach to the topic than a more narrow (and more military-oriented) focus. It is a part of world history that has sadly not received much attention. For that reason, as well as for Mitter's depth, detail and outstanding analysis I give it an enthusiastic five stars. Highly recommended.
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S. Kenneth Pai
4.0 out of 5 stars Why China has been a Forgotten Ally?
Reviewed in the United States 🇺🇸 on 12 April 2014
Verified Purchase
Mitter can be considered biased in favor of China in his presentation of facts and his tone in general.. But unless he believes in what he is saying, and unless he felt injustice has been done to China--as most Chinese do--that their contributions in human life and and suffering were not being appreciated but ignored, he would not have been so fired up to write a book so powerful such as this one.
It's true that Mitter did not break any new grounds in research or scholarship. But c'mon! Count the number of pages occupied by footnotes. Every significant historical fact he cites has been publicly known for decades. But general American public didn't care; policy makers and opinion leaders have had their minds made up already. The chain of events was not kind to China.
After the war ended, images from China were none but negative: internal turmoil, civil war, corruption, Chinese army enters the Korean:conflict:, talks of dropping the A bomb across the Yalu River on to Chinese territory.... The glow of hard-won peace after V-J day was followed almost immediately by a Cold War. To expect a sympathetic glance at a sad bygones ally would have been too much indeed.
Fast-forward to 2014. A Nixon-era honeymoon proved to be too short and soured by the tragic Tiananmen event (the students styro-foam "Statue of Liberty" gave Americans the wrong idea about what the Chinese really wanted--Equality and not Freedom in the American sense). Yes, China has stopped talking about exporting Communism. Yes, China has adopted capitalism all but in name. it doesn't matter! Americans believe in nothing short of American style Democracy. The ritual of the Vote--even if you have to bribe your way, steal them...the result almost didn't matter but the format counts. Well, China just wont buy it, especially when it is going to be a US import. This has become the roots of departure as China veers off to a different horizon.
Worse, China after over a century of foreign domination has decided to end the humiliations no more. It is powerless with the US Navy guarding Taiwan from China. Now the US is inducing Japan--who surrendered to the Allies including China in 1945, to be the lead in an island chain around China's coast to make sure its navy and Air Force cannot venture without running against American intervention under the shield of its bilateral defense treaties with China's neighbors.
In short , the former Ally and former foe have switched roles by no fault of China.
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