LONGLISTED FOR THE NATIONAL BOOK AWARD • A searing reassessment of U.S. military policy in the Middle East over the past four decades from retired army colonel and New York Times bestselling author Andrew J. Bacevich, with a new afterword by the author
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From the end of World War II until 1980, virtually no American soldiers were killed in action while serving in the Greater Middle East. Since 1990, virtually no American soldiers have been killed in action anywhere else. What caused this shift? Andrew J. Bacevich, one of the country’s most respected voices on foreign affairs, offers an incisive critical history of this ongoing military enterprise—now more than thirty years old and with no end in sight.
--- During the 1980s, Bacevich argues, a great transition occurred. As the Cold War wound down, the United States initiated a new conflict—a War for the Greater Middle East—that continues to the present day. The long twilight struggle with the Soviet Union had involved only occasional and sporadic fighting. But as this new war unfolded, hostilities became persistent. From the Balkans and East Africa to the Persian Gulf and Central Asia, U.S. forces embarked upon a seemingly endless series of campaigns across the Islamic world. Few achieved anything remotely like conclusive success. Instead, actions undertaken with expectations of promoting peace and stability produced just the opposite. As a consequence, phrases like “permanent war” and “open-ended war” have become part of everyday discourse.
Connecting the dots in a way no other historian has done before, Bacevich weaves a compelling narrative out of episodes as varied as the Beirut bombing of 1983, the Mogadishu firefight of 1993, the invasion of Iraq in 2003, and the rise of ISIS in the present decade. Understanding what America’s costly military exertions have wrought requires seeing these seemingly discrete events as parts of a single war. It also requires identifying the errors of judgment made by political leaders in both parties and by senior military officers who share responsibility for what has become a monumental march to folly. This Bacevich unflinchingly does.
A twenty-year army veteran who served in Vietnam, Andrew J. Bacevich brings the full weight of his expertise to this vitally important subject. America’s War for the Greater Middle East is a bracing after-action report from the front lines of history. It will fundamentally change the way we view America’s engagement in the world’s most volatile region.
Praise for America’s War for the Greater Middle East
“Bacevich is thought-provoking, profane and fearless. . . . [His] call for Americans to rethink their nation’s militarized approach to the Middle East is incisive, urgent and essential.”—The New York Times Book Review
“Bacevich’s magnum opus . . . a deft and rhythmic polemic aimed at America’s failures in the Middle East from the end of Jimmy Carter’s presidency to the present.”—Robert D. Kaplan, The Wall Street Journal
“A critical review of American policy and military involvement . . . Those familiar with Bacevich’s work will recognize the clarity of expression, the devastating directness and the coruscating wit that characterize the writing of one of the most articulate and incisive living critics of American foreign policy.”—The Washington Post
“[A] monumental new work.”—The Huffington Post
“An unparalleled historical tour de force certain to affect the formation of future U.S. foreign policy.”—Lieutenant General Paul K. Van Riper, U.S. Marine Corps (Ret.)
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Editorial Reviews
Review
“[Andrew J.] Bacevich is thought-provoking, profane and fearless. . . . [His] call for Americans to rethink their nation’s militarized approach to the Middle East is incisive, urgent and essential.”—The New York Times Book Review
“Bacevich’s magnum opus . . . a deft and rhythmic polemic aimed at America’s failures in the Middle East from the end of Jimmy Carter’s presidency to the present.”—Robert D. Kaplan, The Wall Street Journal
“A critical review of American policy and military involvement . . . Those familiar with Bacevich’s work will recognize the clarity of expression, the devastating directness and the coruscating wit that characterize the writing of one of the most articulate and incisive living critics of American foreign policy.”—The Washington Post
“[A] monumental new work . . . One of the grim and eerie wonders of his book is the way in which just about every wrongheaded thing Washington did in that region in the fourteen-plus years since 9/11 had its surprising precursor in the two decades of American war there before the World Trade Center towers came down.”—The Huffington Post
“The book reveals a number of critical truths, exposing deep flaws that have persisted for decades in American strategic thinking—flaws that have led successive American presidents to ask the American military to accomplish the impossible, often while barely providing it with the resources to accomplish even the most modest of goals. . . . Read Bacevich—not for the solutions he proposes but to be sobered by the challenge.”—National Review
“In one arresting book after another, Andrew J. Bacevich has relentlessly laid bare the failings of American foreign policy since the Cold War. This one is his sad crowning achievement: the story of our long and growing military entanglement in the region of the most tragic, bitter, and intractable of conflicts.”—Richard K. Betts, director, Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies, Columbia University
“Andrew Bacevich offers the reader an unparalleled historical tour de force in a book that is certain to affect the formation of future U.S. foreign policy and any consequent decisions to employ military force. He presents sobering evidence that for nearly four decades the nation’s leaders have demonstrated ineptitude at nearly every turn as they shaped and attempted to implement Middle East policy. Every citizen aspiring to high office needs not only to read but to study and learn from this important book. This is one of the most serious and essential books I have read in more than half a century of public service.”—Lieutenant General Paul K. Van Riper, U.S. Marine Corps (Ret.)
“Bacevich asks and answers a provocative, inconvenient question: In a multigenerational war in the Middle East, ‘Why has the world’s mightiest military achieved so little?’ ”—Graham Allison, director, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, and Douglas Dillon Professor of Government at Harvard’s John F. Kennedy School of Government
“Andrew Bacevich lays out in excruciating detail the disasters orchestrated over decades by the architects of the American empire in the Middle East. Blunder after blunder, fed by hubris along with cultural, historical, linguistic, and religious illiteracy, has shattered cohesion within the Middle East. The wars we have waged have given birth to a frightening nihilistic violence embodied in radical jihadism. They have engendered an inchoate rage among the dispossessed and left in their wake a series of failed and disintegrating states. These wars have, as Bacevich writes, laid bare the folly of attempting to use military force as a form of political, economic, and social control. Bacevich is one of our finest chroniclers of the decline of empire, and America’s War for the Greater Middle East is an essential addition to his remarkable body of work.”—Chris Hedges, former Middle East bureau chief for The New York Times and author of Wages of Rebellion: The Moral Imperative of Revolt
“Andrew Bacevich’s thoughtful, persuasive critique of America’s crusade for the Greater Middle East should be compulsory reading for anyone charged with making policy for the region. We cannot afford to repeat the past misjudgments on the area. As Bacevich wisely argues, the stakes are nothing less than the future well-being of the United States.”—Robert Dallek, author of Camelot’s Court: Inside the Kennedy White House
From the Hardcover edition.
Read more
About the Author
Andrew J. Bacevich is a retired professor of history and international relations at Boston University. A graduate of the U.S. Military Academy, he served for twenty-three years as a commissioned officer in the United States Army. He received his PhD in American diplomatic history from Princeton. Before joining the faculty of Boston University in 1998, he taught at West Point and at Johns Hopkins University. His three most recent books—Breach of Trust, Washington Rules, and The Limits of Power—all hit the New York Times bestseller list. A winner of the Lannan Notable Book Award, he lectures frequently at universities around the country. He lives with his wife, Nancy, in Walpole, Massachusetts.
From the Hardcover edition.See all Editorial Reviews
Product details
Paperback: 480 pages
Publisher: Random House Trade Paperbacks; Reprint edition (February 7, 2017)
Language: English
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5.0 out of 5 stars
Excellent Summary of How We Got Into This Mess -
ByLoyd EskildsonHALL OF FAMEon April 5, 2016
Author Bacevich opens by contending that our military involvement in the greater Middle East began with the failure to rescue the American hostages in our Tehran embassy. Mechanical breakdowns, very limited visibility due to stirred up dust, and a chopper accidently hitting a stationary C-130 resulted in the mission being canceled and the deaths of 8 Americans. While President Carter quickly took responsibility, Bacevich points out that the myriad errors in design and execution were attributable to the military professionals involved.
Bacevich also points out that Carter's predecessors going back to WWII had done him no favors with their forging ill-advised relationships and foolhardy commitments. Nonetheless, Carter had launched America's War for the Greater Middle East, compounding those inherited errors. That war continues today, with no end in sight.
America's War for the Greater Middle East was a war to preserve the American way of life, rooted in an abundance of cheap energy. In 1969, imports already accounted for 20% of American consumption, and the next year U.S. domestic oil production peaked. By 1973, in retaliation for U.S. support for Israel in the October War, Arabs suspended oil exports to the U.S. and the West. Eventually, oil imports resumed, but the availability and price of gasoline had now become a matter of national concern. The hierarchy of national security priorities was beginning to shift from nuclear weapons and the Soviet Union.
President Nixon launched a plan to insure that Americans would not have to rely on any source of energy beyond our own (Project Independence), but the idea that retrenchment was needed did not sit well with some. There was a strong sense of entitlement, notwithstanding Britain's prior experiences. However, the just-concluded war in Vietnam effectively dampened any enthusiasm for further military adventurism.
From the end of WWII to 1980, virtually no American soldiers were KIA in the Greater Middle East. Since 1990, virtually no American soldiers have been killed in action anywhere except in the Greater Middle East.
When Carter became president, he first had to confront what he called an 'inordinate fear of communism' that had found the U.S. in bed with corrupt, repressive regimes. However, he hadn't figured on the Iranian Revolution. Previously the CIA helped engineer a coup that returned the Shah to his throne while overthrowing a democratically elected Iranian government. Nixon sold top-line American weapons to Iran, now flush with cash thanks to booming oil exports - envisioning Iran as ensuring stability in the gulf, along with Saudi Arabia.
The Shah, however, was losing his grip on power - having previously alienated segments of society ranging from secularized liberals to religious conservatives. All saw the Shah as an American lackey, the U.S. as parasitic. Both the Shah and Washington dithered. On 1/16/79, he fled into exile.
The Iranian Revolution that overthrew the Shah triggered a second 'oil shock' as Iranian production fell off sharply, and OPEC announced a succession of price increases. Carter's ratings sank. Prior to addressing the nation, he concluded that America's oil addiction was the underlying problem and had led to losing our moral bearings. 'Too many of us now worshipped self-indulgence and consumption.' Carter saw one path - constant conflict between narrow interests ending in chaos and immobility, and another with us united in control of our destiny via conservation. It became a conflict between self-interest and self-sacrifice. Eventually, the speech became known as Carter's "crisis of confidence" (malaise) speech. With that refusal, the Persian Gulf and its environs acquired massively heightened significance.
Carter had just previously signed off on a memo committed the U.S. to assist Afghan insurgents warring against the Soviet-supported regime in Kabul. The amount was small - only $500,000, and material provided primarily medical supplies and communications equipment. Brezinski saw this as needed to dissuade the Soviets from meddling in the Persian Gulf. On 11/1/79, Brezinski met with Iran's prime minister, in an effort to forge a new positive relationship. However, on 11/4, Iranian students opposed to Carter's allowing the Shah to enter the U.S. for medical treatment, overran the U.S. embassy in Tehran. The Carter administration had no intention of another coup, feared by the students, and the Ayatollah had not ordered the seizure or even prior knowledge of it. Unfortunately, he soon endorsed what the students had one and transformed a difficult problem into a much bigger one. Carter then switched to a goal of maintaining a military preponderance in the region.
Adding the Persian Gulf to the list of U.S. strategic priorities added to defending Western Europe and Northeast Asia. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and Reagan's election combined to revive the Cold War. The task, however, was complicated by the fact that states receiving U.S. 'protection' such as Iran, did not want or cooperate with it. The U.S. began with upgrading ports and airfields to which it had been promised access in Egypt, Kenya, Morocco, Oman, and Somalia. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia undertook building bases far beyond its needs or ability to operate. A series of training exercises was programmed to cycle U.S. forces through the region - aimed to acclimate U.S. troops to conditions in the region and promote an increasing tolerance for their presence. The U.S. also began poring billions in military aid into the area - $9.1 billion in 1984, $11 billion the next year. It was assumed that memory of prior upheavals dismantling the Ottoman Empire after WWI, creation of Israel in 1948, overthrowing Iran's government in 1953, the Suez Crisis of 1956, the Arab-Israeli Wars of 1967 and 1973 would fade away. It was also assumed that Kremlin leaders would play their assigned role as bogeymen - that changed with Gorbachev becoming leader (March, 1985) and working to call off the Cold War.
While Weinberger continued to warn of Soviet military threats, Gorbachev accepted U.S. terms in 1987 for a treaty eliminating intermediate-range nuclear missiles from Europe, and announced plans to end occupation of Afghanistan. In February 1989, the final contingent of Soviet forces left Afghanistan. By end of 1989, our army found itself with more tanks and tank crews than it knew what to do with - made redundant by the sudden end of the Cold War.
We then quickly fingered Saddam's Iraq as the new Public Enemy #1, and the peace dividend never materialized. To this point, U.S. containment efforts had been directed against states. Reality was that religion (Sunni vs. Shiite), and resentment over Western meddling, including border changes, which the U.S. had become heir to were to play a far stronger role than ever imagined. Iraq, Israel-Palestine, and Pakistan were prime examples of the latter.
U.S. assistance to the mujahedin during the 1980s totaled between $4 - $5 billion, matched by Saudi Arabia.
The Marine barracks bombing in Lebanon (had been placed there as a poorly thought through means of ending conflict in Lebanon) was not avenged, nor were additional Marine deaths by Syrian artillery fire at the Lebanon airport, or the two U.S. aircraft shot down by Syrian air defenses east of Beirut. Thomas Friedman wrote that the Marines had 'accomplished virtually nothing.' Hezbollah could reasonably claim to have inflicted a decisive defeat on the world's preeminent superpower - a conclusion not lost on other U.S. opponents.
By 1979, Libya's efforts towards liberating Palestine etc. had earned it a place on our list of state sponsors of terrorism. Reagan concluded Gaddafi needed to be taught a lesson. In 1973, Gaddafi had claimed ownership of the Gulf of Sidra. The U.S. had rejected Gaddafi's claim without pressing the issue. Reagan changed that by having the U.S. Navy progressively challenging Gaddafi, dispatching carriers Forrestal and Nimitz across the 'line of death.' Two responding Libyan fighters were shot down. A later attack in response to the West Berlin disco bombing and against Gaddafi personally at Benghazi (18 F-111s from Britain - 2 turned back due to equipment failures, four aborted while on target approach, a 7th missed its assigned target, and an 8th shot down; 15 A-6 Intruders from aircraft carriers destroyed the airfield) - overall achieving little, as Gaddafi was apparently warned in advance. That was the inauguration of an extended and futile experiment in employing military might to defeat terrorism - even though Reagan was pleased.
---
5.0 out of 5 stars
ByLoyd EskildsonHALL OF FAMEon April 5, 2016
Author Bacevich opens by contending that our military involvement in the greater Middle East began with the failure to rescue the American hostages in our Tehran embassy. Mechanical breakdowns, very limited visibility due to stirred up dust, and a chopper accidently hitting a stationary C-130 resulted in the mission being canceled and the deaths of 8 Americans. While President Carter quickly took responsibility, Bacevich points out that the myriad errors in design and execution were attributable to the military professionals involved.
Bacevich also points out that Carter's predecessors going back to WWII had done him no favors with their forging ill-advised relationships and foolhardy commitments. Nonetheless, Carter had launched America's War for the Greater Middle East, compounding those inherited errors. That war continues today, with no end in sight.
America's War for the Greater Middle East was a war to preserve the American way of life, rooted in an abundance of cheap energy. In 1969, imports already accounted for 20% of American consumption, and the next year U.S. domestic oil production peaked. By 1973, in retaliation for U.S. support for Israel in the October War, Arabs suspended oil exports to the U.S. and the West. Eventually, oil imports resumed, but the availability and price of gasoline had now become a matter of national concern. The hierarchy of national security priorities was beginning to shift from nuclear weapons and the Soviet Union.
President Nixon launched a plan to insure that Americans would not have to rely on any source of energy beyond our own (Project Independence), but the idea that retrenchment was needed did not sit well with some. There was a strong sense of entitlement, notwithstanding Britain's prior experiences. However, the just-concluded war in Vietnam effectively dampened any enthusiasm for further military adventurism.
From the end of WWII to 1980, virtually no American soldiers were KIA in the Greater Middle East. Since 1990, virtually no American soldiers have been killed in action anywhere except in the Greater Middle East.
When Carter became president, he first had to confront what he called an 'inordinate fear of communism' that had found the U.S. in bed with corrupt, repressive regimes. However, he hadn't figured on the Iranian Revolution. Previously the CIA helped engineer a coup that returned the Shah to his throne while overthrowing a democratically elected Iranian government. Nixon sold top-line American weapons to Iran, now flush with cash thanks to booming oil exports - envisioning Iran as ensuring stability in the gulf, along with Saudi Arabia.
The Shah, however, was losing his grip on power - having previously alienated segments of society ranging from secularized liberals to religious conservatives. All saw the Shah as an American lackey, the U.S. as parasitic. Both the Shah and Washington dithered. On 1/16/79, he fled into exile.
The Iranian Revolution that overthrew the Shah triggered a second 'oil shock' as Iranian production fell off sharply, and OPEC announced a succession of price increases. Carter's ratings sank. Prior to addressing the nation, he concluded that America's oil addiction was the underlying problem and had led to losing our moral bearings. 'Too many of us now worshipped self-indulgence and consumption.' Carter saw one path - constant conflict between narrow interests ending in chaos and immobility, and another with us united in control of our destiny via conservation. It became a conflict between self-interest and self-sacrifice. Eventually, the speech became known as Carter's "crisis of confidence" (malaise) speech. With that refusal, the Persian Gulf and its environs acquired massively heightened significance.
Carter had just previously signed off on a memo committed the U.S. to assist Afghan insurgents warring against the Soviet-supported regime in Kabul. The amount was small - only $500,000, and material provided primarily medical supplies and communications equipment. Brezinski saw this as needed to dissuade the Soviets from meddling in the Persian Gulf. On 11/1/79, Brezinski met with Iran's prime minister, in an effort to forge a new positive relationship. However, on 11/4, Iranian students opposed to Carter's allowing the Shah to enter the U.S. for medical treatment, overran the U.S. embassy in Tehran. The Carter administration had no intention of another coup, feared by the students, and the Ayatollah had not ordered the seizure or even prior knowledge of it. Unfortunately, he soon endorsed what the students had one and transformed a difficult problem into a much bigger one. Carter then switched to a goal of maintaining a military preponderance in the region.
Adding the Persian Gulf to the list of U.S. strategic priorities added to defending Western Europe and Northeast Asia. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and Reagan's election combined to revive the Cold War. The task, however, was complicated by the fact that states receiving U.S. 'protection' such as Iran, did not want or cooperate with it. The U.S. began with upgrading ports and airfields to which it had been promised access in Egypt, Kenya, Morocco, Oman, and Somalia. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia undertook building bases far beyond its needs or ability to operate. A series of training exercises was programmed to cycle U.S. forces through the region - aimed to acclimate U.S. troops to conditions in the region and promote an increasing tolerance for their presence. The U.S. also began poring billions in military aid into the area - $9.1 billion in 1984, $11 billion the next year. It was assumed that memory of prior upheavals dismantling the Ottoman Empire after WWI, creation of Israel in 1948, overthrowing Iran's government in 1953, the Suez Crisis of 1956, the Arab-Israeli Wars of 1967 and 1973 would fade away. It was also assumed that Kremlin leaders would play their assigned role as bogeymen - that changed with Gorbachev becoming leader (March, 1985) and working to call off the Cold War.
While Weinberger continued to warn of Soviet military threats, Gorbachev accepted U.S. terms in 1987 for a treaty eliminating intermediate-range nuclear missiles from Europe, and announced plans to end occupation of Afghanistan. In February 1989, the final contingent of Soviet forces left Afghanistan. By end of 1989, our army found itself with more tanks and tank crews than it knew what to do with - made redundant by the sudden end of the Cold War.
We then quickly fingered Saddam's Iraq as the new Public Enemy #1, and the peace dividend never materialized. To this point, U.S. containment efforts had been directed against states. Reality was that religion (Sunni vs. Shiite), and resentment over Western meddling, including border changes, which the U.S. had become heir to were to play a far stronger role than ever imagined. Iraq, Israel-Palestine, and Pakistan were prime examples of the latter.
U.S. assistance to the mujahedin during the 1980s totaled between $4 - $5 billion, matched by Saudi Arabia.
The Marine barracks bombing in Lebanon (had been placed there as a poorly thought through means of ending conflict in Lebanon) was not avenged, nor were additional Marine deaths by Syrian artillery fire at the Lebanon airport, or the two U.S. aircraft shot down by Syrian air defenses east of Beirut. Thomas Friedman wrote that the Marines had 'accomplished virtually nothing.' Hezbollah could reasonably claim to have inflicted a decisive defeat on the world's preeminent superpower - a conclusion not lost on other U.S. opponents.
By 1979, Libya's efforts towards liberating Palestine etc. had earned it a place on our list of state sponsors of terrorism. Reagan concluded Gaddafi needed to be taught a lesson. In 1973, Gaddafi had claimed ownership of the Gulf of Sidra. The U.S. had rejected Gaddafi's claim without pressing the issue. Reagan changed that by having the U.S. Navy progressively challenging Gaddafi, dispatching carriers Forrestal and Nimitz across the 'line of death.' Two responding Libyan fighters were shot down. A later attack in response to the West Berlin disco bombing and against Gaddafi personally at Benghazi (18 F-111s from Britain - 2 turned back due to equipment failures, four aborted while on target approach, a 7th missed its assigned target, and an 8th shot down; 15 A-6 Intruders from aircraft carriers destroyed the airfield) - overall achieving little, as Gaddafi was apparently warned in advance. That was the inauguration of an extended and futile experiment in employing military might to defeat terrorism - even though Reagan was pleased.
---
5.0 out of 5 stars
An important and disturbing book
ByRichard Kon June 22, 2016
This book is a well-documented, but very disturbing, book about the United States' involvement in what Bacevich calls the "greater middle east", i.e. from Northern Africa to Pakistan. Bacevich spares no administration in his criticism of our objectives and means of implementing them. This effort, which started out as attempt to prevent the USSR from inhibiting the flow of oil from this region from its position in Afghanistan, has become, according to Bacevish, a muddled and ultimately unsuccessful series of mis-adventures. How many times, he asks, do we need to prove that removing the head of the beast does not solve anything?
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5.0 out of 5 stars
ByRichard Kon June 22, 2016
This book is a well-documented, but very disturbing, book about the United States' involvement in what Bacevich calls the "greater middle east", i.e. from Northern Africa to Pakistan. Bacevich spares no administration in his criticism of our objectives and means of implementing them. This effort, which started out as attempt to prevent the USSR from inhibiting the flow of oil from this region from its position in Afghanistan, has become, according to Bacevish, a muddled and ultimately unsuccessful series of mis-adventures. How many times, he asks, do we need to prove that removing the head of the beast does not solve anything?
---
5.0 out of 5 stars
A Cogent Comprehensive Account of the Wars in the Middle East
ByThe Peripatetic Readeron April 16, 2016
There have been other histories of the imperialistic wars in the Middle East. Some are clouded by political ideologies or agendas; some are comprehensive others superficial. The best of these are written by news journalists, others by political hacks, yet others by self-serving politicians or talking heads.
This book is easily one of the best histories of the Middle East wars. It interprets these wars not only in its military context but as a political history of the forces and policies which shaped the conflicts. It reminds us all of those political events long forgotten. The account is given in a journalistic manner, without political commentary or spin, but placing those events in a political context, showing how those events were shaped by American political forces.
This history stands out because it is an account of military conflict written by a career military man. Author Andrew Bacevich graduated from West Point, served in Vietnam and retired a colonel in the US Army. Bacevich understands military conflict, understands this particular military conflict (or series of conflicts), and understands the forces which created and sustains those conflicts.
Bacevich cogently relates these military conflicts with the domestic political stresses and developments which influenced American intervention. American have long considered it their birth-right to have unlimited access to oil, not just simple oil, but cheap oil. This long-held and deeply ingrained belief guided American intervention in the Middle East. With this in mind, America has intervened in the Middle East not out of any phony-baloney justification such as “establishing democracy” (Iraq), or “protecting women’s rights” (Kuwait), “finding Osama Bin Laden” (Afghanistan), or, more recently, “promoting stability in the region” (Lybia), but to guarantee a steady and uninterrupted flow of oil.
Whatever legitimacy this purpose may have had currency in the 70s, the underlying premise of this history is that this military purpose has been lost. War, Bacevich argues, quoting Clausterwicz, makes sense only when a country is accomplishing its political purposes.
In the case of the war for the greater Middle East, Bacevich shows that after thirty five years of military conflict there is no positive political purpose served by continued fighting. With surgical precision he demonstrates how the US’s fixation with oil has created schizophrenic, disjointed foreign policy. For example, within the same six-month period President Carter gave his famous “Malaise” speech, where he indicated that America did not have an energy crisis but a crisis in the loss of traditional American values, he promulgated the Carter Doctrine, according to which any attempt to gain control of the Persian Gulf would be considered an assault on the United States’ vital interests, justifying, if needed, military action, and authorized the first military appropriations to the native insurgents to fight Soviet troops in Afghanistan. Those native insurgents morphed into Al Quaeda, and Al Quaeda morphed in the ranks of ISIS. As Bacevich quotes a contemporary columnist who commented what we are all realizing now — that the US created a monster.
Bacevich’s book should be considered required reading in schools and universities. It is highly recommended.
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5.0 out of 5 stars
ByThe Peripatetic Readeron April 16, 2016
There have been other histories of the imperialistic wars in the Middle East. Some are clouded by political ideologies or agendas; some are comprehensive others superficial. The best of these are written by news journalists, others by political hacks, yet others by self-serving politicians or talking heads.
This book is easily one of the best histories of the Middle East wars. It interprets these wars not only in its military context but as a political history of the forces and policies which shaped the conflicts. It reminds us all of those political events long forgotten. The account is given in a journalistic manner, without political commentary or spin, but placing those events in a political context, showing how those events were shaped by American political forces.
This history stands out because it is an account of military conflict written by a career military man. Author Andrew Bacevich graduated from West Point, served in Vietnam and retired a colonel in the US Army. Bacevich understands military conflict, understands this particular military conflict (or series of conflicts), and understands the forces which created and sustains those conflicts.
Bacevich cogently relates these military conflicts with the domestic political stresses and developments which influenced American intervention. American have long considered it their birth-right to have unlimited access to oil, not just simple oil, but cheap oil. This long-held and deeply ingrained belief guided American intervention in the Middle East. With this in mind, America has intervened in the Middle East not out of any phony-baloney justification such as “establishing democracy” (Iraq), or “protecting women’s rights” (Kuwait), “finding Osama Bin Laden” (Afghanistan), or, more recently, “promoting stability in the region” (Lybia), but to guarantee a steady and uninterrupted flow of oil.
Whatever legitimacy this purpose may have had currency in the 70s, the underlying premise of this history is that this military purpose has been lost. War, Bacevich argues, quoting Clausterwicz, makes sense only when a country is accomplishing its political purposes.
In the case of the war for the greater Middle East, Bacevich shows that after thirty five years of military conflict there is no positive political purpose served by continued fighting. With surgical precision he demonstrates how the US’s fixation with oil has created schizophrenic, disjointed foreign policy. For example, within the same six-month period President Carter gave his famous “Malaise” speech, where he indicated that America did not have an energy crisis but a crisis in the loss of traditional American values, he promulgated the Carter Doctrine, according to which any attempt to gain control of the Persian Gulf would be considered an assault on the United States’ vital interests, justifying, if needed, military action, and authorized the first military appropriations to the native insurgents to fight Soviet troops in Afghanistan. Those native insurgents morphed into Al Quaeda, and Al Quaeda morphed in the ranks of ISIS. As Bacevich quotes a contemporary columnist who commented what we are all realizing now — that the US created a monster.
Bacevich’s book should be considered required reading in schools and universities. It is highly recommended.
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5.0 out of 5 stars
Flawless and objective analysis of America's intervention in he Middle East
ByJohn R. Washingtonon July 4, 2016
Bacevich's superb writing style and objective analysis of the indisputable and total failure of the U.S. policy in the Middle East is a must read for any American who is not deep in slumber. The American political establishment is so completely and incredibly stupid, with a near perfect track record of achieving the opposite result of the expressed intentions, and the near complete group think population supporting the idiocy is stranger than any imaginable fiction. It won't matter if Hillary Clinton or Donald Trump wins the Presidential elevtion, as the Ivy league lackys who join the team will surely continue to wallow in their profound stupidity.
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5.0 out of 5 stars
ByJohn R. Washingtonon July 4, 2016
Bacevich's superb writing style and objective analysis of the indisputable and total failure of the U.S. policy in the Middle East is a must read for any American who is not deep in slumber. The American political establishment is so completely and incredibly stupid, with a near perfect track record of achieving the opposite result of the expressed intentions, and the near complete group think population supporting the idiocy is stranger than any imaginable fiction. It won't matter if Hillary Clinton or Donald Trump wins the Presidential elevtion, as the Ivy league lackys who join the team will surely continue to wallow in their profound stupidity.
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5.0 out of 5 stars
Great education
ByWillardon May 27, 2017
I loved this book because it gave me a great education on why the US has been involved in the Middle East these many years. I also enjoyed the author's vision of how we could better use US military resources for the security of the nation. What I didn't like was a times Bacevich seem to have a personal dislike of some of the military leaders he wrote about in this book. However, that said I would recommend this book to all military leaders and US political leaders to ask WHY are we still involved in the Middle East militarily. Additionally, what is a better alternative or should we stay, but at least question why we have been fighting in a region this long without a clear vision of how it should end.
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ByWillardon May 27, 2017
I loved this book because it gave me a great education on why the US has been involved in the Middle East these many years. I also enjoyed the author's vision of how we could better use US military resources for the security of the nation. What I didn't like was a times Bacevich seem to have a personal dislike of some of the military leaders he wrote about in this book. However, that said I would recommend this book to all military leaders and US political leaders to ask WHY are we still involved in the Middle East militarily. Additionally, what is a better alternative or should we stay, but at least question why we have been fighting in a region this long without a clear vision of how it should end.
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5.0 out of 5 stars
Brilliant, fascinating, and educational, but ultimately depressing.
ByRichard C. Reynoldson July 12, 2016
Mr. Bacevich has written a book that is brilliant, fascinating, and educational, but ultimately depressing. The first three are attributable to his excellent writing talents; I’ll get to the fourth item shortly.
1] Bacevich begins with President Jimmy Carter’s decision on July 3, 1979, to provide a small amount of money to Afghan insurgents fighting Soviet troops. In his January 1980 State of the Union address, he acknowledged what subsequently became known at the Carter Doctrine. Because of tensions in Iran and Afghanistan, any attempt to gain control of the Persian Gulf Region would be considered an assault on U.S. vital interests. Decoding this: we need the oil.
In subsequent chapters, Basevich details
2] the buildups of various campaigns to depose such heads of state as Moamar Gaddafi and Saddam Hussein. Getting rid of Gaddafi was relatively easy but even after Saddam Hussein was finally removed from power, peace was not restored in Iraq. Three different offensive operations have been involved in that beleaguered country and the U. S. is now engaged in the fourth Iraqi war. Using the umbrella term of The Greater Middle East, Basevich also chronicles our misadventures in Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo.
Our wars in these countries employed a considerable amount of U. S. military resources, more than enough to defeat the enemy. But the problem that emerged after such victories was what to do then.
3] Top-level strategists had not adequately planned for the vast numbers of civilian casualties and destruction of the country’s infrastructure. In cases like Iraq, the civilian populace wanted no part of the American liberators; the quicker they left the country the better. Another major error in our Middle East strategy was the failure to consider the political and religious composition of the country we sought to stabilize and rebuild. Today we have an organization called ISIS that is growing steadily in numbers and hell-bent to destroy the western powers. They are even using captured US-made Humvees as their conveyance of choice for suicide missions so we have to provide the Iraqi forces with antitank weapons.
Basevich has
4] little regard for the senior army officers leading the wars in these Middle East countries. He faults General Tommy Franks for not helping his superiors think and plan realistically about war. In a photograph of General Petreus, he refers to him as King David and points out his unprofessional cultivation of journalists in order to bolster his own reputation. Does the name Paula Broadwell ring a bell?
Basevich doesn’t make any recommendations on how America should get out of this Vietnam-like quagmire and that’s probably a wise thing on his part. He does postulate two things we can do:
5] wait things out and work to promote nonviolent solutions from within Iraq and Afghanistan, or use overwhelming military force. He believes that the original concerns about the Gulf Region, us needing the oil, are no longer valid. Instead, we should be focused on defending Canada and Venezuela as our best sources of oil.
So what do we have to show for ourselves after years of fighting in these countries at the cost of many American lives and billions of dollars spent. This is where the depressing part emerges: very little, if anything. It should be a primary concern of the next president who will be elected in four short months, be it Clinton or Trump.
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5.0 out of 5 stars
ByRichard C. Reynoldson July 12, 2016
Mr. Bacevich has written a book that is brilliant, fascinating, and educational, but ultimately depressing. The first three are attributable to his excellent writing talents; I’ll get to the fourth item shortly.
1] Bacevich begins with President Jimmy Carter’s decision on July 3, 1979, to provide a small amount of money to Afghan insurgents fighting Soviet troops. In his January 1980 State of the Union address, he acknowledged what subsequently became known at the Carter Doctrine. Because of tensions in Iran and Afghanistan, any attempt to gain control of the Persian Gulf Region would be considered an assault on U.S. vital interests. Decoding this: we need the oil.
In subsequent chapters, Basevich details
2] the buildups of various campaigns to depose such heads of state as Moamar Gaddafi and Saddam Hussein. Getting rid of Gaddafi was relatively easy but even after Saddam Hussein was finally removed from power, peace was not restored in Iraq. Three different offensive operations have been involved in that beleaguered country and the U. S. is now engaged in the fourth Iraqi war. Using the umbrella term of The Greater Middle East, Basevich also chronicles our misadventures in Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo.
Our wars in these countries employed a considerable amount of U. S. military resources, more than enough to defeat the enemy. But the problem that emerged after such victories was what to do then.
3] Top-level strategists had not adequately planned for the vast numbers of civilian casualties and destruction of the country’s infrastructure. In cases like Iraq, the civilian populace wanted no part of the American liberators; the quicker they left the country the better. Another major error in our Middle East strategy was the failure to consider the political and religious composition of the country we sought to stabilize and rebuild. Today we have an organization called ISIS that is growing steadily in numbers and hell-bent to destroy the western powers. They are even using captured US-made Humvees as their conveyance of choice for suicide missions so we have to provide the Iraqi forces with antitank weapons.
Basevich has
4] little regard for the senior army officers leading the wars in these Middle East countries. He faults General Tommy Franks for not helping his superiors think and plan realistically about war. In a photograph of General Petreus, he refers to him as King David and points out his unprofessional cultivation of journalists in order to bolster his own reputation. Does the name Paula Broadwell ring a bell?
Basevich doesn’t make any recommendations on how America should get out of this Vietnam-like quagmire and that’s probably a wise thing on his part. He does postulate two things we can do:
5] wait things out and work to promote nonviolent solutions from within Iraq and Afghanistan, or use overwhelming military force. He believes that the original concerns about the Gulf Region, us needing the oil, are no longer valid. Instead, we should be focused on defending Canada and Venezuela as our best sources of oil.
So what do we have to show for ourselves after years of fighting in these countries at the cost of many American lives and billions of dollars spent. This is where the depressing part emerges: very little, if anything. It should be a primary concern of the next president who will be elected in four short months, be it Clinton or Trump.
--
5.0 out of 5 stars
The US is shockingly unwilling to learn from experience.
Bybrendanon November 30, 2016
Format: Kindle Edition|Verified Purchase
Extraordinarily well written, informed, panoramic, and massively disturbing.
I can't be the only one left wondering how the US is ever going to get anything right if, when the evidence flows this overwhelmingly, persistently, and *catastrophically* against an idea, that idea marches on. Why is Max Boot still around? Why is Krauthammer still revered? Why hasn't Pat Buchanan been de-marginalized after, you know, being right about everything? How on earth did the democrats, with a relatively pacifistic base, nominate Hillary "we came, we saw, he died" Clinton?
Why is there any reason to believe the US has the capacity to get any important tough decisions right?
And what's wrong with us? Is this just what decadence looks like in an enormous and multicultural country, where the forces of diligent patriotism have atrophied relative to those of corruption, foreign attachments, careerism, and symbolic emotional motives?
Great book. Horrible story. And no reason for optimism.
--
5.0 out of 5 stars
Bybrendanon November 30, 2016
Format: Kindle Edition|Verified Purchase
Extraordinarily well written, informed, panoramic, and massively disturbing.
I can't be the only one left wondering how the US is ever going to get anything right if, when the evidence flows this overwhelmingly, persistently, and *catastrophically* against an idea, that idea marches on. Why is Max Boot still around? Why is Krauthammer still revered? Why hasn't Pat Buchanan been de-marginalized after, you know, being right about everything? How on earth did the democrats, with a relatively pacifistic base, nominate Hillary "we came, we saw, he died" Clinton?
Why is there any reason to believe the US has the capacity to get any important tough decisions right?
And what's wrong with us? Is this just what decadence looks like in an enormous and multicultural country, where the forces of diligent patriotism have atrophied relative to those of corruption, foreign attachments, careerism, and symbolic emotional motives?
Great book. Horrible story. And no reason for optimism.
--
5.0 out of 5 stars
The definitive analysis of our Iliad in the middle east
ByPMon April 12, 2016
This is the most incisive military analysis of America in the Middle East from Carter to Obama. An expose of the self seeking and self promoting actions of our generals and politicians and the fatuous neoconservative militarism which presently guides the foreign policy of our country. Brilliant! There is no better exposition of the delusion associated with the self proclamation of critically strategic areas of the world which before the end of the Cold War held absolutely no importance whatsoever to our well being. The folly of reliance on military power to cure political and cultural defiencies, defined as an absence of neoliberal Christian democracy, and the failure to attain that objective is documented in this engrossing study of self deception and evangelization.
When you finish reading this book you will understand the reasons why we cannot effectively engage middle eastern problems but also why we can't bring ourselves to disengage.
When american soldiers are sent overseas and become casualties their blood becomes a symbol to shed more blood. We have seen this in every war fought since 1945. The men we elect to the presidency with the exception of Eisenhower have had no clue how to conduct foreign policy when the lives of our men and women are at risk. We seem to be caught up in some macho vendetta with the entire world. The continuation of this vendetta has proven to be very profitable for a few wealthy people far from the firing line. It has proven to be amenable to vote getting. It has proven to be amenable to the self promotion of those officers above field level command into whose hands our servicemen have been encared.
It is clear that this country is in more danger today than 35 years ago when we decided to engage directly in the middle eastern quagmire. Yes, it was a quagmire before we got involved and transformed an oil protection mission into preventive war interventionism with the purpose of imposing neoliberal democracy upon Stone Age societies. Our strategy is a muddle, a chimera.
All Americans have to ask ourselves some very hard questions about just what we are doing in the Middle East and how do we expect it to end.
This mission cannot go on forever and Americans cannot expect to remain insulated from the blowback from the wars we are conducting.
---
5.0 out of 5 stars
ByPMon April 12, 2016
This is the most incisive military analysis of America in the Middle East from Carter to Obama. An expose of the self seeking and self promoting actions of our generals and politicians and the fatuous neoconservative militarism which presently guides the foreign policy of our country. Brilliant! There is no better exposition of the delusion associated with the self proclamation of critically strategic areas of the world which before the end of the Cold War held absolutely no importance whatsoever to our well being. The folly of reliance on military power to cure political and cultural defiencies, defined as an absence of neoliberal Christian democracy, and the failure to attain that objective is documented in this engrossing study of self deception and evangelization.
When you finish reading this book you will understand the reasons why we cannot effectively engage middle eastern problems but also why we can't bring ourselves to disengage.
When american soldiers are sent overseas and become casualties their blood becomes a symbol to shed more blood. We have seen this in every war fought since 1945. The men we elect to the presidency with the exception of Eisenhower have had no clue how to conduct foreign policy when the lives of our men and women are at risk. We seem to be caught up in some macho vendetta with the entire world. The continuation of this vendetta has proven to be very profitable for a few wealthy people far from the firing line. It has proven to be amenable to vote getting. It has proven to be amenable to the self promotion of those officers above field level command into whose hands our servicemen have been encared.
It is clear that this country is in more danger today than 35 years ago when we decided to engage directly in the middle eastern quagmire. Yes, it was a quagmire before we got involved and transformed an oil protection mission into preventive war interventionism with the purpose of imposing neoliberal democracy upon Stone Age societies. Our strategy is a muddle, a chimera.
All Americans have to ask ourselves some very hard questions about just what we are doing in the Middle East and how do we expect it to end.
This mission cannot go on forever and Americans cannot expect to remain insulated from the blowback from the wars we are conducting.
---
5.0 out of 5 stars
A shocking litany of American failure
ByHal C. Wingoon June 4, 2016
Anyone looking for a thorough and reasonable account of America's multi-decade failures of Middle East military and political misadventures will find it all spelled out in this brilliantly researched and cogently written book. To my knowledge no one has even attempted to document the string of failures which lay proper blame at the feet of every president from Lyndon Johnson forward in respect to never even trying to unerstand why nothing worked for America in imposing its will and self interest across the Middle East. It's like every president and military commander could do no better than sing a song from "Bye Bye Birdy": "What can't they be like we were, perfect in every way" Sadly, there is scant evidence that not enough has been learned by anyone to avoid more mistakes in the future. And with an American presidential future that includes the possibility of Donald Trump, our future in the Middle East looks even more haunting, scary and dangerous. At least we have the small comfort that Andrew Bacevich spoke truth to power, regardless of who listened. Read it and weep.
ByHal C. Wingoon June 4, 2016
Anyone looking for a thorough and reasonable account of America's multi-decade failures of Middle East military and political misadventures will find it all spelled out in this brilliantly researched and cogently written book. To my knowledge no one has even attempted to document the string of failures which lay proper blame at the feet of every president from Lyndon Johnson forward in respect to never even trying to unerstand why nothing worked for America in imposing its will and self interest across the Middle East. It's like every president and military commander could do no better than sing a song from "Bye Bye Birdy": "What can't they be like we were, perfect in every way" Sadly, there is scant evidence that not enough has been learned by anyone to avoid more mistakes in the future. And with an American presidential future that includes the possibility of Donald Trump, our future in the Middle East looks even more haunting, scary and dangerous. At least we have the small comfort that Andrew Bacevich spoke truth to power, regardless of who listened. Read it and weep.
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