The Process: 1,100 Days that Changed the Middle East Kindle Edition
by Uri Savir (Author) Format: Kindle Edition
"Meet your Enemy Number One," a nervous Norwegian diplomat said to Uri Savir, the young director-general of Israel's Foreign Ministry, as he introduced him to Abu Ala, one of Yasser Arafat's top aides. They were in Oslo, and this was the first official encounter between Israel and the PLO. The atmosphere was tense. Savir read from prepared notes: "The aim of Israel's elected government," he began, "is to bring about a historic reconciliation with the Palestinian people. We have no interest in only a cosmetic change of the status quo. It is not our wish to control your lives. . . ." For more than half a century, both sides had denied the other's right to exist; both had sustained a terrible toll. Yet in the three years that followed that first encounter, after thousands of hours of subtle and complex secret negotiations, they hammered out the blueprint for a peaceful conclusion to a conflict that had seemed irre-
concilable. This book is the Israeli chief negotiator's extraordinary account of those negotiations, their implementation and aftermath, and of the un-
likely partnership that emerged between Yitz-
hak Rabin, Yasser Arafat, and Shimon Peres.
As the process initiated at Oslo began to re-
shape allegiances throughout the Middle East, Israeli and Palestinian extremists set out to violently destroy what they described as "the threat of peace." This is the inside story of the race between those committed to reconciliation and those who vowed to destroy the peace. It is also a poignant story of the developing relationship between Savir and Abu Ala, both from Jeru-
salem, both committed to their people, to their land, and to peace.
Will the peace process initiated at Oslo prevail against the assault of extremists and enemies of peace on both sides? The answer to this question, and the future of the peace process, is crucial not just to Israel and the Palestinians, but to the Middle East and the world.
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Length: 352 pages Word Wise: Enabled Enhanced Typesetting: Enabled
Page Flip: Enabled Language: English
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From the Inside Flap
our Enemy Number One," a nervous Norwegian diplomat said to Uri Savir, the young director-general of Israel's Foreign Ministry, as he introduced him to Abu Ala, one of Yasser Arafat's top aides. They were in Oslo, and this was the first official encounter between Israel and the PLO. The atmosphere was tense. Savir read from prepared notes: "The aim of Israel's elected government," he began, "is to bring about a historic reconciliation with the Palestinian people. We have no interest in only a cosmetic change of the status quo. It is not our wish to control your lives. . . ."
For more than half a century, both sides had denied the other's right to exist; both had sustained a terrible toll. Yet in the three years that followed that first encounter, after thousands of hours of subtle and complex secret negotiations, they hammered out the blueprint for a peaceful conclusion to a conflict that had seemed irre-
--This text refers to an alternate kindle_edition edition.
About the Author
Uri Savir was Israel's chief negotiator with the PLO from 1993 to 1996. He was the first Israeli official to negotiate secretly with a senior representative of the PLO. From their first meeting up until the signing of the Interim Agreement in September 1995, he and his Palestinian counterpart, Abu Ala, spent approximately thirty-five hundred hours in negotiations. In 1994-95, Savir headed Israel's delegation for talks with Syria and permanent status negotiations with the Palestinians. Savir has been an associate of Shimon Peres since 1984. He was Israel's consul general in New York between 1988 and 1992 and director-general of Israel's Foreign Ministry from 1993 to 1996. Today, he heads the newly founded Peres Center for Peace in Tel Aviv. --This text refers to an alternate kindle_edition edition.
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The Process: 1,100 Days that Changed the Middle East Kindle Edition
by Uri Savir (Author) Format: Kindle Edition
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Editorial Reviews
From Kirkus Reviews
A leading Israeli diplomat's insider view of the intricate negotiations between his country and the Palestinians from May 1993, four months before the conclusion of the Oslo agreement, through May 1996 and the election of Benjamin Netanyahu as prime minister. Savir, former Israeli consul-general in New York, became director general of his country's Foreign Ministry under the late Yitzhak Rabin. When it became apparent that the secret Oslo talks begun in early 1993 had a real potential for a diplomatic breakthrough, he was named head of the Jewish state's negotiations with the PLO, and then the Palestinian Authority, during the three-year period he chronicles. Norwegian mediators half-jokingly, half-seriously introduced his Palestinian counterpart, Abu Ala, to Savir as ``your enemy number one.'' The two often conveyed sharply conflicting views and instructions from their superiors, yet not only learned how to work together but developed a deep respect, even fondness, for each other. Savir is most revealing in relating how fraught with basic national yearnings and symbolism even the most seemingly technical issues became. The Israelis were desperate for security and an end to terror, the Palestinians equally insistent on not being condescended to or humiliated by the Israelis, and upon a recognition of the trappings of a national identity. Savir also writes with an admirable capacity to criticize Israeli leaders in a thoughtful and restrained way. For example, concerning Israel's closure of the Gaza and West Bank borders and its concomitant focus on Arafat's inadequate efforts to combat Palestinian terrorists, he acknowledges that ``we tended to be so focused on the Palestinian leadership that we often failed to see Palestinian society as a community of needs and aspirations that its leaders must serve and reflect.'' Passages like this will make Savir open to charges of not being a hard-headed enough diplomat and historian; others will rightfully praise him for possessing the skilled negotiator's necessary qualities of empathy, vision, and an ability to compromise. -- Copyright ©1998, Kirkus Associates, LP. All rights reserved. --This text refers to an out of print or unavailable edition of this title.
From the Inside Flap
our Enemy Number One," a nervous Norwegian diplomat said to Uri Savir, the young director-general of Israel's Foreign Ministry, as he introduced him to Abu Ala, one of Yasser Arafat's top aides. They were in Oslo, and this was the first official encounter between Israel and the PLO. The atmosphere was tense. Savir read from prepared notes: "The aim of Israel's elected government," he began, "is to bring about a historic reconciliation with the Palestinian people. We have no interest in only a cosmetic change of the status quo. It is not our wish to control your lives. . . ."
For more than half a century, both sides had denied the other's right to exist; both had sustained a terrible toll. Yet in the three years that followed that first encounter, after thousands of hours of subtle and complex secret negotiations, they hammered out the blueprint for a peaceful conclusion to a conflict that had seemed irre-
--This text refers to an out of print or unavailable edition of this title.
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Product details
File Size : 1224 KB
Word Wise : Enabled
Print Length : 352 pages
Publisher : Vintage (October 6, 2010)
Publication Date : October 6, 2010
"Meet your Enemy Number One," a nervous Norwegian diplomat said to Uri Savir, the young director-general of Israel's Foreign Ministry, as he introduced him to Abu Ala, one of Yasser Arafat's top aides. They were in Oslo, and this was the first official encounter between Israel and the PLO. The atmosphere was tense. Savir read from prepared notes: "The aim of Israel's elected government," he began, "is to bring about a historic reconciliation with the Palestinian people. We have no interest in only a cosmetic change of the status quo. It is not our wish to control your lives. . . ."
For more than half a century, both sides had denied the other's right to exist; both had sustained a terrible toll. Yet in the three years that followed that first encounter, after thousands of hours of subtle and complex secret negotiations, they hammered out the blueprint for a peaceful conclusion to a conflict that had seemed irre-
concilable. This book is the Israeli chief negotiator's extraordinary account of those negotiations, their implementation and aftermath, and of the un-
likely partnership that emerged between Yitz-
hak Rabin, Yasser Arafat, and Shimon Peres.
As the process initiated at Oslo began to re-
shape allegiances throughout the Middle East, Israeli and Palestinian extremists set out to violently destroy what they described as "the threat of peace." This is the inside story of the race between those committed to reconciliation and those who vowed to destroy the peace. It is also a poignant story of the developing relationship between Savir and Abu Ala, both from Jeru-
salem, both committed to their people, to their land, and to peace.
Will the peace process initiated at Oslo prevail against the assault of extremists and enemies of peace on both sides? The answer to this question, and the future of the peace process, is crucial not just to Israel and the Palestinians, but to the Middle East and the world.
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Top reviews from the United States
Matthew Smith
5.0 out of 5 stars Important for the insider's perspective
Reviewed in the United States on October 29, 2011
These types of books are very important because they give the reader a different perspective of the history. While it is true that many times the authors are too close to the actual history they are writing about to give a complete account, what they do is add to the histories giving readers a broader perspective and thus a more complete understanding of the events and the people who shaped them. This account gives the reader the personal point of view of one of the most important and involved negotiators in the Olso process from the Israeli side.
For me this human element was very essential to my reorienting my understanding of the Oslo process, especially as regards the Israeli side. My previous view was very cynical as regards both the PLO (Arafat in particular) and the Israelis. Arafat was distant, weak and losing relevance inside the territories to the internal leadership and the intafada. The Oslo negotiations were his way back into relevance, whereas the Israelis saw a weakened Arafat as an opportunity to hash out an agreement that would secure their main interests at the front end while relegating the Palestinians' interests to negotiations to be determined on the back end. I originally saw Oslo as a cynical power play by the Israelis to extract the most advantage from the Palestinians while giving up very little.
In reading this book though, it is obvious how much the participants were really looking for an historic deal to take place that would improve the lives of both Israelis and Palestinians, and when the author takes the reader inside the room during these discussions one becomes privy to just how enormously complicated this process was. This is the aspect of the book that opened my eyes the most. It is that, not only were there complicated discussions about land, resources, protection forces and very difficult cooperation arrangments, but that these negotiations were set against the backdrop of one hundred years of animus, conflict, war, occupation, propaganda and two conflicting and mutually exclusive national narratives. This the reader gets to see first hand how the mistrust and historical grievances affect every aspect of the negotiations.
This book also, in an oblique way, goes along way in explaining why Oslo failed. Both sides failed to prepare their people for the long road that lay ahead. The Israelis particularly failed to brace their public for the ebb and flow that this process was bound to produce, instead Oslo was touted as the process that would change the Israelis' lives in a single bound. Instead of bracing the public for the inevitable backlash from extremists, on both sides, they raised Oslo to heights it couldn't attain so soon, and when the inevitable violence did occur Labor was not prepared to deal with fall out from right. They set expectations too high, and then instead of having an adult conversation with their people they laid the blame on Arafat thus undercutting their partner as well as their own platform by undermining that partner. It was a tragic failing.
Another aspect I find so strange among Israeli analysts and negotiators, such as this author, is how they can be so good at analyzing Arafat and his style of governing on the tactical level, but then turn around and be so bad at applying this same skill to the strategic level. I have found this to be the case in every account I have ever read from Israelis on the inside. This author discusses in perfect detail, on the tactical level, how Arafat conducted these negotiations in that he was a leader through patronage and not an iron fisted dictator. Finding one of his men becoming too important or influential he would replace him with someone else to reassert his authority and assure no one would become a rival. This style made the negotiations extremely difficult as Arafat would reshuffle the teams as his needs dictated. The author was very good at analyzing how this method of governance hurt the negotiations and made continuity almost impossible, but as always when the author pulls back form the tactical and discusses the strategic aspects of Arafat's rule he forgets everything he just discussed and describes Arafat as if he is an all powerful leader that controls with an iron fist. He describes Arafats failure to put a stop to extremists like Hamas and IJ as if Arafat did not have to concern himself with popular opinion. I have never understood this dichotomy between the strategic and tactical analysis.
The last point I find telling about these negotiations is Rabin's utter refusal to go up against the settler movement at all. The fact that he wouldn't even discuss the removal of the settlements in Hebron and even made their security a priority over the Palestinians need to administer one of its largest cities shows a lack of seriousness on the part of the Israeli government. These are points that force me to remain cynical about the Israeli governments true intentions for the end game to the Oslo process. If they refused to entertain the removal of even the most unrealistic of Israeli settlements, how are we to believe that they were serious about an end that would be even remotely acceptable to the Palestinians?
While I remain cynical about the top leadership of both sides, what this book, and others like it, have done is to show me that there are many people honestly striving for a just and equitable solution to these complex problems. It showed me the reality of how difficult it is to take pragmatic steps when these issues are so terribly enmeshed in religious, ideological and historical concerns as well. While I remain cynical, it still gives me hope to see honest people striving and working so diligently for solutions to these problems. I recommend this book.
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Barry Smith
4.0 out of 5 stars Good Israeli perspective!
Reviewed in the United States on June 10, 2002
Uri Savir, who played a key role in the secret Oslo negotiations that occurred during the early 1990's, wrote this book describing his experience in the peace talks. Savir does a remarkable job of detailing the behind-the-scene dealings that occured while the public was kept (in the early parts of the negotiations) in the dark. However, my one main complaint, and this is probably unavoidable on his part, is that it is blatantly from an Israeli perspective. While he always speaks of his Arab counterparts in friendly terms, Savir shows his ignorance of their point of view in several places. I say this cultural naivete is unavoidable because throughout the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict, there has been, sometimes on purpose, a recurring theme of refusing to see the conflict through the Arab perspective. It is naturally impossible for one culture of people to sympathize with another group of people. So I commend Savir for his behind-the-scenes analysis, but be careful of his subtle Israeli point of view/bias.
3 people found this helpful
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Ian K O'Malley
5.0 out of 5 stars An Insider's Look
Reviewed in the United States on December 10, 2000
Uri Savir provides an unmatched view of the ever troublesome attempted peace process between the Israeli's and Palestinians. Savir, an Israeli Foreign Minister, provides a very balanced portrayal of the events that led up to the historic Oslo Peace agreements and the period through Rabin's assignation. The book reads as a personal journal but is well documented of the events surrounding this three year period. If you are interested in the Arab-Israeli conflict or the intricacies and absurdities of international diplomacy this book is a must.
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