(PDF) China’s International Leadership: Regional Activism vs. Global Reluctance

(PDF) China’s International Leadership: Regional Activism vs. Global Reluctance


China’s International Leadership: Regional Activism vs. Global Reluctance
Article (PDF Available) · September 2017 with 183 Reads
DOI: 10.1007/s41111-017-0079-6
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Xiaoyu Pu
12.97University of Nevada, Reno
Abstract
Since the late 1990s, China has been actively seeking a leadership role in its region, while taking a more reluctant attitude toward global leadership. Drawing upon recent research on status in international relations, this article seeks to explain the variation in China’s leadership at regional and global levels. A rising power does not always maximize its status on the world stage. China seeks an active role in East Asia due to its strong interests and identity commitment within the region. However, China takes a more reluctant approach toward global leadership, because higher status brings additional responsibilities and risks. Due to various limitations, China cannot become a new hegemonic power. But China can be a co-leader in regional and global affairs, and it can also be a more active leader in the developing world.
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ORIGINAL ARTICLEChina’s International Leadership: Regional Activismvs. Global ReluctanceXiaoyu Pu1Received: 4 September 2017 / Accepted: 7 September 2017ÓFudan University and Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2017Abstract Since the late 1990s, China has been actively seeking a leadership role inits region, while taking a more reluctant attitude toward global leadership. Drawingupon recent research on status in international relations, this article seeks to explainthe variation in China’s leadership at regional and global levels. A rising power doesnot always maximize its status on the world stage. China seeks an active role in EastAsia due to its strong interests and identity commitment within the region. However,China takes a more reluctant approach toward global leadership, because higherstatus brings additional responsibilities and risks. Due to various limitations, Chinacannot become a new hegemonic power. But China can be a co-leader in regionaland global affairs, and it can also be a more active leader in the developing world.Keywords International leadership China Status1 IntroductionThe election of Donald Trump as the US president has generated uncertainty ininternational politics. As America under the Trump presidency has become moreinward looking, China has implemented a much more active global diplomacy,developing new international initiatives and hosting many multilateral meetings.Does a more inward-looking America provide golden opportunities for China toplay a more prominent role on the global stage? According to strategic thinker andCNN commentator Zakaria (2017), the answer is yes because ‘‘Trump could be thebest thing that has happened to China in a long time’’. According to He (2017), a&Xiaoyu Puxpu@unr.edu1Political Science Department, University of Nevada, 1664 N Virginia St, Reno, NV 89557,USA123Chin. Polit. Sci. Rev.DOI 10.1007/s41111-017-0079-6
former vice foreign minister of China, the political development of 2017 hasaccelerated the arrival of the ‘‘post-American era’’, which began after the 2008financial crisis.Is China ready to become a new global leader? The answer is not that clear, as Chinais sending contradictory signals. Largely abandoning Deng Xiaoping’s low-profileapproach in global affairs, Xi Jinping has implemented a much more ambitious foreignpolicy, proposing new international institutions and hosting high-profile summitmeetings. Some Chinese diplomats have started to talk about China’s leadership inglobal governance more explicitly. In January 2017, senior Chinese diplomat ZhangJun commented that China would assume world leadership if needed (Reuters 2017).However, in February 2017, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi cautioned about theinflated expectation of China’s global role, saying, ‘‘China has no intention to leadanyone, nor does it intend to replace anyone’’ (Wang 2017). During his speech at theSummit Meeting for the Belt Road Initiative in May 2017, Xi Jinping expressedChina’s intention to contribute more to global development, but Xi also reassured hisinternational audience that ‘‘In pursuing the Belt and Road Initiative, China has nointention to form a small group detrimental to stability’’ (Xi 2017).What kind of role should China play in regional and global affairs? Why doesChina sometimes seek active leadership while at other times demonstrate reluctancein international leadership? Drawing upon recent research on status and risingpowers, the article seeks to address these questions. The first section will discuss theanalytical framework of status and rising powers. The second section explainsChina’s active leadership role in East Asia. The third section investigates thereasons why China is reluctant to play a global leadership role. The fourth sectionevaluates the prospects and limitations of China’s international leadership. Theconclusion summarizes the findings and implications.2 Status and Rising PowersIn international relations, status can be defined as the following: ‘‘collective beliefsabout a given state’s ranking on valued attributes (wealth, coercive capabilities,culture, demographic position, sociopolitical organization, and diplomatic clout)’’(Paul et al. 2014, 7). Status competition among emerging powers and establishedpowers is often viewed as a zero-sum game. A rising power’s demand for higherstatus is a potential threat to the status of the established powers. One formerPentagon official even claims that China has a ‘‘secret strategy’’ to replace the USAas the leading world power (Pillsbury 2015). From the perspective of statuscompetition, the conflict between China and the USA seems to be inevitable. AsChina is pushing forward its foreign policy agenda, the USA has been pushing backagainst China. For some strategists, this rivalry between the USA and China is seenas inevitable. Admiral Harry Harris, Jr., the commander of US Pacific Command(PACOM), recently said, ‘‘I believe China seeks hegemony in East Asia’’ (Gady2016). In his new book, Destined for War, Graham Allison (2017) argues that Chinaand the USA are heading toward a war neither wants. The reason is Thucydides’sChin. Polit. Sci. Rev.123
Trap, which is a deadly pattern of structural stress that results when a rising powerchallenges a ruling one.However, in the contemporary world, the role of status is more nuanced. Statuscan be a driving factor as well as a mitigating factor in international rivalry. First ofall, status drives international rivalry, because status is often viewed as a scarceresource. In particular, if international status is viewed as a positional good, it is ascarce resource that cannot be shared by all nations (Schweller 1999; Hirsch 1976,27). In international politics, the struggle for status has been recognized as one ofthe major sources of conflict (Lebow 2008). In some contexts, status competitionamong great powers is even viewed as a zero-sum game.Second, status often drives international rivalry because nation-states (especiallyemerging powers) often want to have higher status. Traditionally, the status concernof emerging powers is the gap between their desired high status and others’recognition of their status. There are psychological and political motivations toclose the gap. Status discrepancy is the core issue of the power transition problem inworld politics. According to power transition theory, the onset of war between adominant and a rising power grows more likely as the gap in relative strengthbetween them narrows and as the latter’s grievances with the existing order movebeyond any hope of peaceful resolution (DiCicco and Levy 1999). In internationalrelations, emerging powers are especially sensitive about their status. Lebow (2008)categorizes such countries as ‘‘parvenu powers’’ and describes them as psycholog-ically insecure, with a strong motivation to show off their power and status. Forcountries like China and India, historical trauma and national humiliation at thehands of Western colonial powers have constructed a post-colonial ideology thatpushes them to strive for more power and status (Miller 2013). Historically, anemerging power that sought higher status would act assertively, and this struggle forhigher status might lead to conflict during a power transition. Given that emergingpowers want to have higher status, the struggle for the change in position can lead tozero-sum competitions and conflicts (Larson and Shevchenko 2009; Deng 2008).The existing arguments of status scarcity are not necessarily wrong, and they arestill valid in some contexts. However, I contend that these two arguments are notalways valid. Status competition can be mitigated in a number of ways.First, status is fundamentally social and cultural, which means that it is notalways scarce. Scholars conventionally conflate status with class or power, butstatus is ‘‘more fluid, more easily changed than class or power’’ (Best 2011, 12). Asstatus is primarily rooted in social interaction and social context, the standards ofstatus are subject to change. In domestic society, there are various social sphereswith different status symbols and status criteria. As people in domestic societiesachieve status in various ways, the criteria of status change over time and acrosssocieties. Instead of seeing status always as a scarce resource, we have seen anemerging phenomenon of status abundance (Best 2011). Prizes proliferate in everycorner of our society, from ‘‘Academy Award winner!’’ to ‘‘Best NeighborhoodPizza!’’ In international politics, while some institutions such as the United NationsSecurity Council (UNSC) are highly privileged status clubs, we see the proliferationof international clubs from the G20, Davos, and BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, Chinaand South Africa), to the Asia-Pacific Economic Forum. Because there are differentChin. Polit. Sci. Rev.123
criteria to rank countries, states that seek to have a distinct positive national identitymight choose different strategies to achieve status, including the strategies ofcompetition, emulation, or creativity (Larson and Shevchenko 2009).Second, even in a competitive context, status politics is not necessarily a zero-sum game. It is useful to make a distinction between status as a positional good andstatus as a club good. When status is viewed as a club good, it will not always bescarce. If status is regarded as a positional good in some absolute sense, statuscompetition is a zero-sum game (Hirsch 1976, 27). According to this view, thepursuit of status is inherently competitive because status is relative and scarce. Thiswould imply that great power competition could be positional, in that as one stategains status, another loses it. This zero-sum view of status competition is qualifiedby the notion of a ‘‘club good’’ (Sandler 1992). A club is ‘‘a voluntary collective thatderives mutual benefits from sharing one or more of the following: production costs,the members’ characteristics, or an impure public good characterized by excludablebenefits’’ (Sandler 1992, 63). Club goods are often partially rival in their benefits,owing to congestion or crowding. Crowding means that one user’s utilization of theclub good decreases the benefits still available to the remaining users. In social lifeas well as in international politics, members of elite groups typically restrictmembership to an organization to preserve its status and privileges. If anyone canbecome a member of the club, then membership is not worth much (Rivera 2010). Ininternational politics, there are different kinds of power clubs, such as the club ofthe Western industrialized economies (G8), nuclear powers club, permanent five atthe UNSC, and emerging power club (the BRICS countries).Finally, emerging powers do not always want to have higher status. For instance,while most studies assume a rising India will always struggle for more recognitionas a great power, India sometimes seems to complain about the over-recognition ofits rise in the international system. China is striving for great power status whiletrying hard to maintain the image of developing country status (Pu and Schweller2014).Based on the above discussions, I have developed the following propositions toexplain the variations of a rising power’s international leadership endeavor.Proposition 1 The stronger a rising power feels it belongs to a certaincommunity, the more is it willing to pay the cost to play a leadership role in thiscommunity.Proposition 2 When joining a high-status club will be too costly, a rising power islikely to be reluctant to take a leadership role in the community.3 China in East Asia: Seeking an Active Leadership RoleChina has traditionally been a dominant power in East Asia, and it wants to regainthat regional leadership. Based on China’s identity and historical legacy in EastAsia, China has demonstrated both the desire and potential capabilities to play aleadership role in regional economic order, but China’s attitudes concerningregional security order are much more ambiguous.Chin. Polit. Sci. Rev.123
China’s desire to play a leadership role in Asia is rooted in China’s historicalstatus in the region. East Asian countries worry about the possibility that Chinamight have the expansionist goal of rebuilding a new version of a tributary system inEast Asia. China seems to be sending complex signals about its status and role inAsia. Since the global financial crisis, Chinese elites have hotly debated China’sstatus and role on the world stage. The ongoing debate reveals a high level ofuncertainty about China’s position in the world. While the notion of the ‘‘revival ofthe Chinese nation’’ implies the clear goal of ‘‘making China great again’’, China’sultimate place on the global stage is unclear. Many Chinese want China to becomericher and stronger, but disagree on whether China should eventually seeksuperpower status (Pu 2017). East Asia is strategically important to China forvarious reasons. China has been a predominant power in East Asia for thousands ofyears, and the Chinese view that regional leading status as natural instead ofsomething that challenges the status quo (Yan 2001).Under Xi Jinping’s leadership, China has pursued a more active regionaldiplomacy. From October 24 to October 25, 2013, Beijing hosted a majorconference on China’s regional diplomacy that laid out some long-term goals forChina. According to Xi, China must strive to make its neighbors more cooperativein economics and security (Xinhua 2013). Xi identified a four-part philosophy toguide diplomacy toward regional neighbors, centering on efforts to convey orrealize amity, sincerity, mutual benefit, and inclusiveness. These are all positivefeatures that generally resonate with earlier approaches to nearby states (Xinhua2014). In recent years, China’s leaders and some of its intellectuals have rekindledan interest in the philosophy and history of a more traditional Chinese order.Contemporary Chinese philosopher Zhao (2006) argues that traditional Chineseideas provide a better philosophical framework for solving global problems,asserting that the Chinese theory of Tianxia is simply ‘‘the best philosophy for worldgovernance’’. Here, it is worth pointing out that rising powers often portray theirvisions of order in similar terms of universal solutions to global problems. TheTianxia worldview claims to build a post-hegemonic order but, when articulated, itoften gives the impression that China seeks to impose its views on the world.China has tried to use its economic power to expand its influence in Asia. It hasalso tried to reassure its neighbors that it will be a peaceful regional power and thatits rise provides more opportunities to regional countries (Liu 2016). President Xiofficially launched the initiative of Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) ona state visit to Indonesia in October 2013. Facing diverse challenges and growingproblems in its own economic model, China has had to find a new engine ofeconomic growth. Xi has called this next phase of growth the ‘‘new normal’’ (Hu2015). This term envisions a fundamental change in China’s economic develop-ment. China will pursue a rebalancing effort to diversify its economy, embrace amore sustainable level of growth, and distribute benefits more evenly. The ‘‘newnormal’’ is in its early stages, but if China manages to sustain it, the Chinese peoplecan count on continued growth and improvement in their quality of life as Chinabecomes further integrated into the global economy.Many developing Asian countries are faced with the task of upgrading theirinadequate and inefficient road, air transport, port, and railroad infrastructure.Chin. Polit. Sci. Rev.123
Deficient infrastructure presents critical barriers to achieving local economic growthand regional integration. The majority of South and Southeast Asian countries comeout very poorly in international comparisons of quality of transportation and othercritical infrastructure. For such countries, infrastructure underdevelopment is amajor obstacle to economic advancement. Outdated port infrastructure has madeintra- and inter-regional maritime transportation extremely costly in many Asiancountries and impeded their formation of maritime cooperation with China.Moreover, they lack the financial resources to upgrade their existing facilities. TheWorld Bank and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) combined do not haveadequate capacity to meet this enormous investment demand, while the longconstruction cycles of infrastructure development projects have deterred privateinvestors. In this context, the aim of the AIIB is to fill this investment gap regardinginfrastructure development in Asian countries. Beijing is, however, also hoping thatAIIB will further expand China’s diplomatic influence in Asia and beyond. AIIB ispart of China’s geo-economic strategy, which focuses on ‘‘the use of economicinstruments to promote and defend national interests, and to produce beneficialgeopolitical results’’ (Blackwill and Harris 2016, 20).China has taken an ambivalent attitude toward East Asia’s security order. As adominant power in East Asia for thousands of years, China has always worried thatan outside power will establish a military bases around China’s periphery capable ofencroaching on China (Kissinger 2012, 50–51). This obviously poses problems forexisting US alliances in the region. At the Conference on Interaction andConfidence Building Measures in Asia, in Shanghai, President Xi unveiled a new‘‘Asian security concept’’, calling for Asian security to be left to Asians (Xi 2016).Xi’s speech generated some speculation that China would seek to exclude Americafrom Asia. China’s efforts to keep its periphery free of any potentially hostile greatpower presence and pressure represent a long-lasting trend that shows anunderstandable wariness toward outside powers (Sutter 2008, 72).The USA has been a leading power in the Asia-Pacific region since World War IIand does not want to be pushed out of Asia by an exclusionary bloc. As China’spower and status grow in Asia, the USA increasingly sends signals to its allies andfriends intended to maintain its credible commitments in the region. ‘‘Because theUnited States regards Asia as the most important region in the world for its long-term interests, there is special sensitivity to the potential long-term significance ofany Chinese actions in Asia that suggest that the PRC is either assuming a morehegemonic posture toward the region or specifically seeking to constrain theAmerican presence and activities there’’ (Kissinger 2012, 50–51). At the same time,even if China is complaining about the American military presence, it has beenambivalent about US alliances (Wu 2005). Beijing might increasingly express itsfrustrations of the strengthening of US alliance in Asia, but it cannot provide analternative security structure that could realistically replace the current system (Liff2017). Furthermore, the USA has often used its alliance system to constrain therisky behaviors of its allies in Asia (Cha 2009).Above all, China has demonstrated both the desire and capabilities to play aleadership role in the regional economic order, but China’s vision of regionalsecurity is more constrained. Today’s China is different from the ancient ChineseChin. Polit. Sci. Rev.123
empire. The distribution of power and geopolitics in East Asia is far morecomplicated. The USA, as a non-East Asian power, has been the dominant power inEast Asia since World War II. East Asia has always been a very crucial platform ofChinese diplomacy and foreign policy, and in terms of China’s comprehensivediplomacy East Asia is regarded as the ‘‘priority’’ for China’s diplomacy. China’sassertive behaviors in maritime disputes generate tensions and uncertainty in thearea. However, Chinese foreign policy in Xi Jinping’s era also has demonstratedmore continuity than change. Reassurance continues to be a big part of Chineseforeign policy. While China’s assertiveness poses challenges for regional order, it isimportant to note what China is not doing, or at least has not yet done: China has notused military force to retake islands occupied by other claimants in the South ChinaSea, and China does not seek to challenge US global primacy (Bader 2016). Despitethe recent ‘‘assertive turn’’ in Chinese foreign policy (Chen et al. 2013), it ispremature to conclude that China has completely abandoned its low-profileapproach in world affairs (Qin 2014).4 China’s Global Leadership: a Reluctant ApproachIn recent years, China has carefully crafted its image as a strong nation throughvarious high-profile projects such as the Beijing Olympic Games, Shanghai Expo,and One Belt One Road Initiative. With an ambitious slogan of ‘‘the ChineseDream’’, President Xi aims to rejuvenate the Chinese nation. According to Liu(2010), a professor at China’s National Defense University, China and the USA willpursue an Olympic-style competition for global leadership.However, Beijing sometimes tries to avoid taking a high-profile role. In 2014, theInternational Comparison Program of the World Bank estimated that China’seconomy was likely to surpass that of the US in size sometime in 2014.1Instead ofcelebrating its coronation as the world’s number 1 economy, China’s NationalBureau of Statistics emphasized it did not endorse the results as official statistics.The Chinese media, far from trumpeting the news of China’s elevation to theworld’s largest economy, played it down or ignored it altogether (Pei 2014). Inmultilateral forums such as the United Nations General Assembly, Chinese leaderscontinue to emphasize China’s status as a developing country. While theinternational audience increasingly views China as an emerging superpower thatshould take a leadership role, many Chinese elites and the public still emphasize thatChina is a developing country and that China should not be eager to take aleadership role in global affairs (Fish 2017).China is not a ‘‘status maximizer’’ on the global stage. While China might enjoya high status in international affairs, China’s leaders and bureaucracies—illprepared for the country’s sudden high profile in global affairs—remain resistant tochange when it comes to Beijing’s global status and responsibilities, emphasizingthat China remains a developing country. China declines to actively participate inthose international clubs that might symbolize high status in the international1This is based on purchasing power parity (PPP).Chin. Polit. Sci. Rev.123
hierarchy, such as the G-2 or G-8. The identity of a developing country has alwaysbeen an important theme in China’s diplomacy (Dittmer 2010); yet, China’snational identity has evolved and it is increasingly a country with a conflictedidentity (Pu 2017). Since China has developed the second largest economy in theworld and become a major player in the global economy, can it still be considered adeveloping country? The picture is indeed complicated. Since the start of theopening and reform era, China’s economy has developed rapidly, but China hasbeen hesitant to give up its preferred identity as a developing country. The identityof a developing country has been a useful solidarity tool to consolidate support frommany actual developing countries. This partially explains why China is unwilling tojoin higher-status groups such as the G8, which is primarily composed of Westernindustrialized countries.China’s reluctant approach is shaped by the legacy of Deng Xiaoping’s teachingof tao guang yang hui (which generally means ‘‘ low-profile’’ approach) (Chen andWang 2011). Deng proposed such a low-profile approach to international affairs at aparticular time when China was sanctioned by the West after 1989 politicalrepercussions. Deng’s strategic thinking about China’s international posture has hada lasting impact on China’s diplomacy (Irvine 2010). Two decades after the end ofthe Cold War, China has emerged from a marginalized position to that of anemerging superpower on the world stage (Deng 2008). However, officials still thinkChina should keep a low profile.China’s reluctance to take on global leadership is driven by its policy of strategicreassurance. China has repeatedly reassured the established powers that its futureposture will be peaceful and non-threatening. Chinese leaders are so eager toreassure the world about China’s non-threatening intentions that they have evenchanged the slogan of ‘‘peaceful rise’’ (heping jueqi) to ‘‘peaceful development’’(heping fazhan) (Glaser and Medeiros 2007). While the change from ‘‘peacefulrise’’ to ‘‘peaceful development’’ is simply a change in terminology, the changefurther emphasizes the reassurance message of the Chinese leaders about China’sintentions and strategy. In other words, while the fundamental message of the twoconcepts is essentially the same, ‘‘peaceful rise’’ has a more competitive tonebecause the notion of ‘‘rise’’ indicates an improvement in China’s status andpossible decline of other countries’ status. Thus, Chinese leaders preferred to use theterm ‘‘peaceful development’’ instead of ‘‘peaceful rise’’ (Glaser and Medeiros2007).China’s reluctance to take on global leadership is also related to its calculation ofthe trade-off between the enhanced status and increased responsibilities. A greatpower has unique privileges and responsibilities in governing world affairs.Although a rising power might be eager to have more privileges and influences byjoining a higher-status club, the cost of taking on greater responsibilities might notbe what a rising power wants. In history, rising powers tended to avoid paying thecosts of system management, but these types of behaviors are relativelyunderstudied. For instance, during the era of its rapid economic rise, Japan hadchosen to ‘‘maintain a low posture in international political affairs, to cooperate withother nations rather than take the initiative, to defend its own interests rather thanChin. Polit. Sci. Rev.123
assume responsibility for preserving peace and order around the world’’ (Vogel1979).Above all, China takes a more reluctant approach toward global leadershipbecause higher status brings additional responsibilities and risks. In 2009, then-Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao spoke at the Copenhagen summit, and he madeChina’s position as a developing country exceptionally clear. Wen emphasized theprinciple of ‘‘common but differentiated responsibilities’’ on environmental issuesand claimed that thus China should be treated as a developing country (Xinhua2009). At a recent meeting of ministerial- and provincial-level officials in 2017, XiJinping emphasized that ‘‘China is still in the primary stage of socialism’’, and‘‘China’s international status as the largest developing country has not changed’’(Yan 2017). Despite its rising profile on the global stage, China will not abandon itsdeveloping country status anytime soon.5 Limitations and ProspectsChina’s international leadership has become more influential in lockstep withChina’s growth in material power. When China was relatively weak in the 1980sand 1990s, its foreign policy strategy stressed integration within the Western-ledinternational order. While the Chinese government still emphasizes that ‘‘China willnever seek hegemony’’, there are increasing voices both in China and abroad toexplore the possibilities of the Chinese hegemony (Schweller and Pu 2011). If Chinaseeks to become one of several respected great powers, its goal might be compatiblewith regional stability and peaceful change of international order. However, if Chinaseeks to restore a hegemonic ‘‘Chinese world order’’, it will remain an illusion.The USA has maintained a strong military and diplomatic presence in the worldsince the end of World War II. Despite the hype about US decline, the USA remainsfar more powerful than China economically and militarily. Recently, the USA hasstrengthened its military, diplomatic, and economic presence in Asia through theimplementation of Obama’s rebalancing to Asia. Even strategists advocating thatthe USA should readjust its grand strategy argue that the USA should share powerwith China instead of entirely withdrawing from Asia. For instance, Charles Glaserargues that the USA should reduce or terminate its relationship with Taiwan, but theUSA should continue maintaining its alliances with Japan and South Korea, whereAmerican core interests are concerned (Glaser 2015).While China’s rise is real, China also has significant limitations on its ability toproject power. Geopolitically, China is surrounded by several major powers andstrong middle powers who are not likely to accept unvarnished Chinese dominance.India is a rapidly emerging power with nuclear weapons, Japan has both economicand technological potential to be a strong military force, and a resurgent Russia cancheck Chinese power in Central Asia.China is also facing a variety of domestic challenges that will limit its powerpotential, including its aging population, slowing economic growth, and widespreadpollution. Unlike previous rising powers challenging leading states, China’stechnological and military capabilities are much lower relative to those of theChin. Polit. Sci. Rev.123
USA. Further, converting economic power into military might is far morechallenging than it was in the past. Thus, even though the rise of China is real,China is still far away from becoming a peer competitor of the USA in theforeseeable future (Brooks and Wohlforth 2015).If China seeks to dominate East Asia, China’s hegemonic agenda would generatea ‘‘self-defeating’’ mechanism. The more China pursues a hegemonic agenda inAsia, the more likely will it face backlash. Here, it is useful to make a distinctionbetween power and influence: power refers to resources, while influence refers tothe ability to convert those resources into outcomes (Goh 2014). If China wants toincrease its influence in Asia, China should not only increase its resources, but alsoseek cooperation and recognition from other countries. As China pursues a moreassertive policy, other countries might push back against it. Despite voicesadvocating a more accommodating approach to China, Washington has continued torespect its treaties and other obligations to allies in the region such as Japan, SouthKorea, the Philippines, and Australia. Meanwhile, the USA has also been nurturingemerging strategic partnerships with nations such as Vietnam and India. China’sassertive posture in regional policies has thus generated complex reactions acrossthe region.Finally, the ideational and historical foundation to support the reemergence of a‘‘benign Chinese hegemony’’ is questionable. Some argue that studies of historicalsystems in Asia point to the role of a peaceful ‘‘Confucian China’’ sustaining astable Chinese-led order (Feng 2007). From this perspective, Confucianismrepresents a particular perception of Chinese security strategy under which Chinais reluctant to use force against its enemies. However, it is important to notice thatthere is a distinction between the poplar Chinese narrative and historical facts. Inhistory, some leaders of rising powers have actually believed this rhetoric, whileothers have cynically made such proclamations for self-serving purposes. From acomparative perspective, it makes strategic sense for a rising power to promote therhetoric of its benign international leadership: it also provides an ideologicalfoundation from which to critique the existing hegemony, and it might reassureweaker powers or neighboring countries, thereby reducing the risk of balancing. Butsome international relations scholars are skeptical about the allegedly peacefulnature of the Chinese empire in ancient dynasties. According to Wang (2010), whenChina was strong, the constraints of any pacifist culture were limited, and China’srulers typically pursued an offensive strategy. Despite the dominance of anantimilitarist Confucian culture, warfare was not uncommon throughout Chinesehistory. The historical records indicate that we should not overestimate the impactof Confucian culture on the strategic decisions of Chinese leaders. The narrative of abenign Chinese hegemony might be more appropriately viewed as an ancient myth.Despite these limitations and constraints, China could still play an internationalleadership role, at least in two respects. First, China could be a co-leader in amultilateral platform, and the format of China’s leadership could be more inclusiveand flexible, including a type of facilitative leadership (Chen et al. 2017). Chinashould wisely seek status as club good instead of as a positional good. Club goodsmight be competitive in some context, but it is not a zero-sum game. If China seeksto become one of several great powers, the established powers (including the USA)Chin. Polit. Sci. Rev.123
might accommodate China’s increasing demands within the existing internationalorder. If China seeks international status as a positional good and replaces the USAas a new global leader, conflict between China and the USA would be inevitable.Thus, seeking co-leadership might send a reassuring message of China’s long-termintentions. Furthermore, given China’s limited power, it would be more realistic forChina to act as one of the collective leaders in global governance. For instance,regarding global climate change, China should collaborate with other partners suchas Europe, India, and Brazil instead of playing a leadership role alone (Sengupta2017).Second, China could play a more active leading role in the developing world. Asthe largest developing country, China’s industrialization and economic emergencesets a successful example for many developing countries. While it is debatable if theChina Model is applicable outside of China, some practical knowledge of China’smodernization could still be transferable to other developing countries. As Chinabecomes richer, it could afford to provide more aid to other developing countries.Given China’s authoritarian political system, its soft-power campaign has not beenvery effective in most of the West, but it has achieved some relative success in thedeveloping world. For instance, China has increased its impact and soft power in theLatin American region not just because of its expanding economic presence: ‘‘Chinaalso offered the power of its example as a country that had emerged relativelyquickly from internal conflict and widespread poverty to reach middle-income statuswith gleaming new skyscrapers, gains in science and technology, impressivetransportation infrastructure, and relative domestic peace’’ (Piccone 2016).6 ConclusionChina has been actively seeking a leadership role in regional affairs, but it is moreambivalent about taking a leadership role in global governance. While status mightstill be competitive in international politics, status politics is much more fluid anddynamic than a purely zero-sum game. A rising power does not maximize its statusall the time.While China’s potential as an international leading power is real, we should alsonotice the limitations of Chinese power. Unlike historical East Asia, today’s EastAsia has a different geopolitical landscape. Maintaining a strong military anddiplomatic presence in the region, the USA is unlikely to withdraw from East Asiafor the foreseeable future. Furthermore, China has important limitations toprojecting its power. China is surrounded by several major powers and strongmiddle powers. Furthermore, unlike previous rising powers challenging leadingstates, China’s technological and military capabilities are much lower relative tothose of the USA.If China’s ultimate goal is to become a more influential co-leader in regional andglobal governance, its aim might be compatible with that of other countries. Chinahas demonstrated both the desire and potential capabilities to play a more active rolein regional economic integration. China’s goals concerning regional security remainmuch more ambivalent. However, if China seeks to restore a Sino-centered worldChin. Polit. Sci. Rev.123
order, the scenario will remain an impossible dream. Given various limitations, amore realistic goal for China is to become a more active international leader inmultilateral platforms, as well as in the developing world.ReferencesAllison, Graham. 2017. Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap?. Boston:Houghton Mifflin Harcourt.Bader, Jeffrey A. 2016. A Framework for US Policy Toward China. Brookings Institution. http://www.brookings.edu/*/media/research/files/papers/2016/03/us-policy-toward-china-framework-bader/us-china-policy-framework-bader.pdf.Best, Joel. 2011. Everyone’s A Winner Life in Our Congratulatory Culture. B