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Identity: The Demand for Dignity and the Politics of Resentment Hardcover – September 11, 2018
by Francis Fukuyama (Author)
4.3 out of 5 stars 51 customer reviews
The New York Times bestselling author of The Origins of Political Order offers a provocative examination of modern identity politics: its origins, its effects, and what it means for domestic and international affairs of state
In 2014, Francis Fukuyama wrote that American institutions were in decay, as the state was progressively captured by powerful interest groups. Two years later, his predictions were borne out by the rise to power of a series of political outsiders whose economic nationalism and authoritarian tendencies threatened to destabilize the entire international order. These populist nationalists seek direct charismatic connection to “the people,” who are usually defined in narrow identity terms that offer an irresistible call to an in-group and exclude large parts of the population as a whole.
Demand for recognition of one’s identity is a master concept that unifies much of what is going on in world politics today. The universal recognition on which liberal democracy is based has been increasingly challenged by narrower forms of recognition based on nation, religion, sect, race, ethnicity, or gender, which have resulted in anti-immigrant populism, the upsurge of politicized Islam, the fractious “identity liberalism” of college campuses, and the emergence of white nationalism. Populist nationalism, said to be rooted in economic motivation, actually springs from the demand for recognition and therefore cannot simply be satisfied by economic means. The demand for identity cannot be transcended; we must begin to shape identity in a way that supports rather than undermines democracy.
Identity is an urgent and necessary book―a sharp warning that unless we forge a universal understanding of human dignity, we will doom ourselves to continuing conflict.
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Product details Hardcover: 240 pages Publisher: Farrar, Straus and Giroux; 1st Edition edition (September 11, 2018) Language: English ISBN-10: 0374129290 ISBN-13: 978-0374129293 51 customer reviews 4.3 out of 5 stars 4.3 out of 5 stars howing 1-8 of 51 reviews
September 20, 2018
Format: Kindle EditionVerified Purchase
I have read almost all of Dr. Fukuyama's books and recommended several of them to friends and associates. I looked forward for months the publication of "Identity." Ultimately I found it unsatisfactory.
On a positive note Dr. Fukuyama's ability to set context once again is a strong foundation. He starts with the Greeks and works his way to the present. His description of the evolution of thought is an education by itself. (Not to mention that anyone who has read "Snow Crash " gets a special place in my heart.) Rather than, as most reviewers do, give you a synopsis (I will leave that to others) I will focus on my misgivings. 1. A central theme is the human need to be valued. This need to be valued is intrinsic. But there is a difference between being valued and narcissism. Dr. Fukuyama does not help me understand where valuing you when you are deluded about your self worth plays into a creedal society. 2. Dr. Fukuyama speaks about diversity in traditional liberal (as in leftist) terms - race, creed, gender, etc. What was missing for me was the value of "diversity." Will I somehow be a better person and citizen if I have to read 100 illiterate and meaningless authors to tick the diversity box before I can read a second Fukuyama? I wholeheartedly disagree that meaningless prattle becomes inherently meaningful because of the race, religion, gender, national origin or sexual preference of the author. I would have expected Dr. Fukuyama to rail against such identities but he does not. 3. Dr. Fukuyama speaks to inequality of economic success and appears to favor redistribution. This flies in the face of, and stomps heavily on, the concept of property rights - a fundamental attribute of the U.S. Constitution. It does not matter to me if it is a King, a dictator, or a "liberal democracy" when they appropriate my private property for some egalitarian "public good" I am going to resent those who benefit from the fruits of my labor. The governmentization of private charity has turned a positive social good into a negative evil. This area is not addressed as part of the fracture of society into interest groups. 4. Dr. Fukuyama does not discuss merit other than in the context of the earliest warrior class except to note that the general population seems to have substituted vacuous celebrity for the prior principles of honor, service and sacrifice. If everyone is self-actualizing their self aggrandizement why is this surprising? We have a old fashioned word for this: selfish. 4. Finally a note about President Trump. Given Dr. Fukuyama's public dislike for the President I expected him to go off the deep end as has Stephen Pinker ("Enlightenment Now".) He does not. But where I hoped for more insight was in "the road not taken." Most of us (projecting the Universe (Multiverse) from a sample of one) are not engaged on a daily basis with the arc of history. My favorite analogy for political action is a pendulum. As an issue swings to an extreme more and more people are driven from their lethargy and become active participants. But the pendulum has to swing. Both Dr. Fukuyama and Michael Porter ("Competitive Advantage") point to the negative impact of the continuation of policies and institutions that have long outlived their usefulness. President Trump is a disruptor of the status quo. Both Dr. Fukuyama and I agree that the status quo seems to be in the direction of a retreat of liberal democracy. Maybe a little disruption is a good thing. Which is not to suggest that I approve of the President's antics. On a personal note: I am retired and live alone on a sailboat. I have spent the last 9 years traveling all over the world. I have immense personal time and usually spend 3 to 4 hours a day reading and taking online courses during which time I am required to pet my very demanding cat XO. I find that the descriptions of the "right" are totally foreign to my personal experience of people in the United States. I don't identify with the "right" as described nor do I identify with the "left." I honestly don't know who these people are. In a multidimensional space we need more than a linear description. *(new) According to Gallup in 2017 42% of Americans identified as "Independent", 29% as Democrats, 27% as Republicans. So what are "Independents?" Left, Right, Up, Down, Charmed, Strange? (Inside joke for quantum theory proponents.) Their viewpoint appears to be ignored by Dr. Fukuyama. Yet they are the plurality of Americans. *********************************** Update September 30, 2018 (with minor updates to the above for clarity) Having read "Identity" for a second time and other's reviews I have finally realized what has been really bothering me. The "story" falls flat. The final chapter is a bromide of "what should be." There is no "getting to Denmark." It is clear to me (but apparently not Dr. Fukuyama) that the 4th Estate is both a significant cause of identity politics and a possible positive force for creating a more creedal society. Their daily broadside of identity politics validates those who would see the society fractured into smaller and smaller interest groups. This may get "clicks" but is detrimental to society as a whole. How does one convince them to change their behavior? Dr. Fukuyama speaks to a number of potential policy changes that in his opinion could move us in the right direction. But policy change requires elucidation of the rationale and persuasion of the need for change. The "Federalist Papers" weren't written because the Founders had a lot of spare time. (Equal time - nor were the Anti-Federalist Papers.) My three star rating should not imply that reading this book is an unworthy use of time. (I have, for example, read it twice so far.) I had just hoped for more. January 8, 2019. I just discovered that my android view has no button to link to comments. I happened to view this review on my desktop and have responded to some questions. My apologies.
September 11, 2018
Format: Kindle Edition
In Identity: The Demand for Dignity and the Politics of Resentment, Stanford political scientist Francis Fukuyama presents an impressively well-reasoned and lucid explanation of the phenomenon of identity politics, which is being increasingly recognized as a powerful force within the United States and world-wide.
Although he acknowledges in the Preface that the 2016 U S presidential election was the inspiration for the book, Identity goes far beyond an analysis of the last election or similar phenomena like the Brexit vote. The scope of the book is summed up well in the aptly-chosen subtitle: The Demand for Dignity and the Politics of Resentment.
Fukuyama is a scholar and deep thinker, and he traces the origins of identity politics back to its roots both historical and psychological. As he explains it, identity politics begins with thymos, a basic human desire for dignity and recognition of an individual’s worth, which creates resentment if an individual feels disrespected.
The modern concept of identity has changed over the past few centuries, though, under the influence of thinkers like Martin Luther, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and others. As society has become modern and complex, people have felt their identities more repressed and value their inner selves more. And as modern society has developed, people increasingly began to believe that dignity is something that all people deserve, and not just a narrow class. When large numbers of people sense they are not being accorded that dignity, various forms of unrest develop. Some are positive and productive, and some are not, and Fukuyama presents a number of excellent examples, such as the Arab Spring that was touched off when a Tunisian policewoman slapped a street vendor. If people cannot feel respected for themselves alone, they can look for respect by virtue of membership in a group, be it ethnic, religious, or class, and it is this push for respect by virtue of group identity that is being noted in many ways today, whether it is the tribal antipathies in Africa, anti-immigrant feelings in many countries, or requests for ethnic-focused dorms on college campuses. Although we tend to note negative results of people’s quest for dignity and respect, Fukuyama says “that the demand for dignity should somehow disappear is neither possible nor desirable”. Ultimately, if I may oversimplify a much more sophisticated conclusion, Fukuyama calls for a broadening of the sense of identity based on a commitment to liberal democratic principles as a solution to many ills.
Identity is definitely the best non-fiction book I have read in a very long time. It is disturbing, enlightening, and convincing; to me it also appeared very objective if approached with an open mind, although I suspect it will offend hardliners in both the liberal and conservative camps. His thesis is sophisticated, but the book is very readable, and his ultimate conclusion is positive: “Identity can be used to divide, but it can and has also been used to integrate. That in the end will be the remedy for the populist politics of the present.” My thanks to Netgalley and the publishers for an advance review copy of this book.
September 15, 2018
Format: Kindle EditionVerified Purchase
As an acknowledged “middle aged white guy” who has been been trying to better understand “the race” issue through self reflection, reading material written by other who don’t look like me or have wildly different understanding of the American experience, I found this book to be insightful and likely to ruffle the feathers of the far left and far right. I think the author has a historically solid foundation for his work and provides excellent insight about how dignity and identify are impacting our politics and likely to impact the future if not managed well. Well worth my time and money.
September 17, 2018
Format: Kindle EditionVerified Purchase
Facts, sound arguments, detailed evidence, solution focused, fair and balanced. Brilliant! Can't tell if the author is "left" or "right". What is clear is that he is interested in the good of the whole, understands left and right limits, and is a true American in the truest sense of the word.
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Sep 13, 2018Mehrsa rated it it was ok
5 stars for the first half, 3 stars for the solution and a big 0 for a few chapters toward the end. The book begins with a brisk walk thru Western civilization as it went from village life to industrial life and from Catholicism thru Reformation and then Nietzsche. So far so good. The thesis is that people started measuring themselves by their inner lives as opposed to their kin and village ties as society was fragmented. Then he moves through the American founding and another super speedy synthesis of the tension between being a nation that embraces diversity or one that is rigidly white and Christian. I really liked Fukuyama's Political Order and Political Decay--it was 2 volumes of dense history that I thought was really illuminating. I think he probably shortcuts too much of that in here, but he's written it all before. (Louis Menand has a devastating New Yorker critique of this part so maybe read that) Then, in his solutions, it's fine. I don't agree with all of it (he's a HARD assimilationist--no bilingual education, public service requirements, military duties for immigrants, etc), but generally he thinks America should embrace its identity as a nation of immigrants, but also take immigration reform seriously. He says nothing at all about gender or race reform within the country, which is curious given the point of the book is about identity politics and how we might fix it.
(It's also hilarious that all these identity politics naysayers lump #metoo and BLM into identity politics because those have nothing at all to do with identity, but are about very specific and identifiable wrongs, but whatever.) HERE is where he is just flat out wrong--and it was actually super interesting to read this part because I have long been bugged by the standard narrative of identity politics, but Fukuyama helped me figure out exactly what the problem is at the core of the standard narrative--THE HISTORY IS JUST WRONG! The narrative of identity politics (as proposed by Lilla, Haidt, Chua and repeated over and over by pundits) is that the left took up identity politics at some point in the late 60s or maybe early 70s and they lost their coalitions of working people. And now it's everywhere and it's metastasized all over the place and look what you did--the right just picked up this beast you created and now we have Nazis. Fukuyama tells the story of the Civil Rights movement as such: MLK just wanted blacks to be treated equally to whites--he wasn't demanding any sort of big change. Then, the black nationalists and the campus radicals ruined everything by demanding recognition of their dignity AS black people. They drew attention to their specific racial grievances. The "black campus radicals" objected to Stanford's core lit classes because they were mad it was all white men and they wanted to add blacks and women. He quotes a speech by a spokesperson on this--and the important inflection point for Fukuyama is that the whole argument hinges on FEELINGS. Students of color will FEEL psychologically wounded by reading these things and their dignity will not be represented. Haidt in his new book (The Coddling of the American Mind) and Lilla's older book go hard on this thread too--that people were being irrational and focused on feelings and from then on everything went to hell because people couldn't be rational anymore. And by people, they mean mostly black people and women. (Ok, let me take a breath because this part made me want to throw the book at the wall really hard, which was a problem because I was listening to it as I was running so what I actually did was just channel my anger into running faster (so yay for that).) Here is the problem with this narrative: 1. MLK was not simply asking for blacks to be treated the same as whites. You can either read the rest of the I Have a Dream Speech or literally any speech MLK gave before or after that one sentence that Reagan and everyone after Reagan liked to quote--you know the one. MLK was asking for justice and for redress. He literally used the word redress. He wanted America to make it right after having oppressed, subjugated and enslaved the black population. While Fukuyama is marching through history, he never touches on this by the way. (Quick TRIVIA: How was slavery justified? You guessed it--by RACIAL IDENTITY!). (Note 2: How was Jim Crow and the Klan organized? Guessed it again, RACIAL IDENTITY). 2. The black nationalists and the "campus radicals" may have said some uncomfortable things, but their movements were also not based on FEELINGS of dignity as Fukuyama claims. It is perfectly reasonable and rational to demand that other voices be included in the cannon. Also perfectly reasonable to demand recognition for race-based claims after centuries of exclusion based precisely on RACE. 3. Also, and this is critical. Demanding dignity was not new. Black people and women have been demanding DIGNITY and RESPECT based on their IDENTITY as blacks for FOREVER. It's just that before, they were either killed or silenced when they did it. The 60s was just the first time whites had to pay attention and apparently, some of them did not like it one bit. Frederick Douglass, Sojourner Truth, W.E.B. Dubois on and on and on have been demanding dignity and justice. Dubois writes The Soul of Black Folk--he was the James Baldwin and the Ta Nahisi Coates of that era. He talked a lot about white people and black people and he spoke of black people as a people whose claims of justice needed to be recognized. (Sorry for all the caps--I am trying to highlight the words Fukuyama cares a lot about). 4. It's also absurd to say that the left and minorities invented identity politics. White identity politics has been conveniently deployed for generations--especially in building coalitions of Southerners who had nothing else in common besides their whiteness. They weren't even from the same places or classes--they were white and that was it. Literally, crack a book about politics in the South between say 1800 to today. (Start with Slavery by another Name or Strange Career of Jim Crow if you prefer to read a book by white men ;)) Which brings me to my last point, 5. NIXON INVENTED IDENTITY POLITICS. Don't believe me? Read my second book (Color of Money) Chapter 6. The Civil Rights coalitions' demands were all based on economics and ending segregation and addressing the wealth gap. Actual economic policy. MLK's last movement was a poor people's movement, which was just class-based and not at all race-based. In fact, most of the black radicals were roaming around the world building coalitions among all sorts of races to build a class-based revolution. They were called communists. So you might not like that, but communism is hardly identity politics. Nixon is the one that puts the kibosh on class-based coalitions (AGAIN--using the white identity southern strategy just like after Reconstruction). Nixon's plank on civil rights is black identity politics-- "black power and black pride and black capitalism" that's his campaign message. I shit you not. He forms an identity based coalition of "real Americans" (white Americans) that is still intact. This is the thread that Palin and Trump pick up on, but it was always there. So lament identity politics all you want, but get the freaking history right.(less) 
This is required reading, because with this book, Fukuyama is clearly on to something. At the core, he discusses how we can overcome political polarization and strenghten our democratic systems. In order to grasp the underlying current that drives today's discussions and gave rise to Trumpism ("With regard to character, it was hard to imagine an individual less suited to be President of the United States." ), Fukuyama tackles identity politics - and you know what? My guess it that most people who read this review will have a strong emotional response to the expression alone - welcome to the heart of the problem.
To say it right at the beginning: Fukuyama agrees that discrimination, inequality and injustice must be fought, that the goals of #metoo, #blacklivesmatter, and comparable social movements deserve support ("No critique of identity politcs should imply that these are not real and urgent problems that need concrete solutions."). His point is that on top of that, we need to fight the particularization of society into a mere conglomerate of interest groups. When the economically disenfranchised who are disregarded (e.g. in the Rust Belt) and those groups who have long been deprived of recognition and acceptance start to fight each other, who will win...ähem...bigly? Democratic political entities need meta-narratives that bring people together, and these meta-narratives must be based on ideals and virtues like the rule of law or the belief in human dignity, concepts that people can share and incorporate in their identities no matter their personal background: "One does not have to deny the potentialities and lived experiences of individuals to recognize that they can also share values and aspirations with much broader circles of citizens." This is of course only the rough outline of Fukuyama's elaborate argument. In a highly interesting chapter dedicated to the rise of identity politics, Fukuyama shows how the concept of dignity is closely connected to the spread of modernity in the 19th century, but was already discussed in Ancient Greece as an inherent urge in all people. This deeply human factor is exploited by the "politics of resentment": "In a wide variety of cases, a political leader has mobilized followers around the perception that the group's dignity has been affronted, disparaged or otherwise disregarded. (...) A humiliated group seeking restitution of its dignity carries far more emotional weight than people simply pursuing their economic advantages." Yes, the rise of fascism, radical Islamism and Trumpism are of course also rooted in identity politics, and this touches on a neuralgic point: People shouldn't get recognition simply for who they are, for showing their inner self, Fukuyama argues, because this is the door through which radicals step to promote the "politics of resentment". Instead, all people should be held up to certain moral standards. And there's one more argument that I'd like to point out here, because I think it's a very important one: "The tendency of identity politics to focus on cultural issues has diverted energy and attention away from serious thinking on the part of progressives about how to reverse the thirty-year trend in most liberal democracies toward greater socioeconomic inequality." That's true, especially in the States and in Britain. Has the left given up in the fight for a more social economy? Has class been replaced by culture? There are many things that Fukuyama writes that I don't agree with, e.g., I think that his derogative postulation of a " new religion of psychotherapy" is missing the potentials of therapy, I don't share his skepticism regarding dual citizenship, his assessment of postcolonial studies seems a little dubious, and I think he misrepresents the debate about the "Leitkultur" (leading culture) in Germany - and there is much more. But that's not the point here - the point is that Fukuyama wrote a book that can propel the current discourse forward, that brings up many ideas for discussion and that maintains that identity politics and solidarity are both important. He aims to bridge the gap in order to defeat the "politics of resentment" and to save liberal democracy - and we should listen to his ideas and debate them with people we agree with, and especially with people we don't agree with. (less)  The modern concept of identity unites three different phenomena. The first is thymos, a universal aspect of human personality that craves recognition. The second is the distinction between the inner and the outer self, and the raising of the moral valuation of the inner self over outer society. This emerged only in early modern Europe. The third is an evolving concept of dignity, in which recognition is due not just to a narrow class of people, but to everyone. The broadening and universalization of dignity turns the private quest for self into a political project. Referencing Socrates, Rousseau, Luther, Kant, Hegel, et al, Francis Fukuyama begins Identity with an overview of historical thought regarding identity, dignity, and the surprisingly late in human evolution notion that we were all created equal. This notion quickly led to the rise of liberal democracies, and with the end of the Cold War in the 1980s, Fukuyama himself declared that we had reached “the end of history” (and with liberal democracies actually in retreat around the world today, Fukuyama stresses in a preface that people have misunderstood what he meant by terms like “history” and “the end of”). Fukuyama explains that with the despotism of Communism made obvious to the West by the 1960s, the progressive left abandoned their drive for economic redistribution and put their energy into the Civil Rights, Women's Liberation, and Gay Rights Movements, thereby igniting today's identity wars: The problem with the contemporary left is the particular forms of identity that it has increasingly chosen to celebrate. Rather than building solidarity around large collectivities such as the working class or the economically exploited, it has focused on ever smaller groups being marginalized in specific ways. This is part of a larger story about the fate of modern liberalism, in which the principle of universal and equal recognition has mutated into the special recognition of particular groups. Because the spoils of Capitalism made possible within liberal democracies has, over the past couple of decades, disproportionately benefited those at the top and left many millions of people in stagnant or declining conditions, this has created many millions of people who feel like their individual dignity has been disrespected. This “politics of resentment”, writes Fukuyama, has been the catalyst for the Arab Spring, the rise of ISIS, the strengthening of Putin's hold on Russia, Brexit, and the populist movements that have seen right-wing governments elected all around the world (with particular attention paid to Trump's manipulation of identity politics to win the presidency of the United States). Fukuyama's answer to this problem is increased nationalism, since that's the level at which we all feel a unifying pride and since only an entity the size of a nation-state can properly protect and care for its own citizens. He makes the case that the EU should have put more effort into creating a unifying “European” identity (and that the EU is a good example of why we'll never have one global government), and that the US and its “creedal” identity (a melting pot of shared values) is the blueprint for all liberal democracies: This creedal understanding of American identity emerged as a result of a long struggle stretching over nearly two centuries and represented a decisive break with earlier versions of identity based on race, ethnicity, or religion. Americans can be proud of this very substantive identity; it is based on belief in the common political principles of constitutionalism, the rule of law, democratic accountability, and the principle that “all men are created equal” (now interpreted to include all women). These political ideas come directly out of the Enlightenment and are the only possible basis for unifying a modern liberal democracy that has become de facto multicultural. To achieve an increased nationalism (to replace divisive identity politics), Fukuyama proposes: the elimination of dual citizenships (in the case of the EU, he suggests a single European citizenship); better assimilation of immigrants to a nation's creedal identity; voters' rights only for full citizens; a universal requirement for national service (not necessarily military); and the right for nations to enforce their borders and set criteria for citizenship. This will, apparently, help all citizens of a nation to remember, “Identity can be used to divide, but it can and has also been used to integrate. That in the end will be the remedy for the populist politics of the present.” After an interesting historical overview for the majority of this book, I'm not ultimately convinced by Fukuyama's easy-sounding remedy for populism; and what might work in the States doesn't sound like it will translate in Canada, which has always prided itself on being the mosaic to America's melting pot; where to not parrot the official line that “diversity is our strength” makes one a pariah. While the United States has benefited from diversity, it cannot build its national identity around diversity as such. Identity has to be related to substantive ideas such as constitutionalism, rule of law, and human equality. Americans respect these ideas; the country is justified in excluding from citizenship those who reject them. Well, we in Canada do build our identity around “diversity as such” – not only were we founded as two distinct societies, but further, we encourage immigrant communities to celebrate their heritage throughout successive generations, and every First Nation is supported in efforts to preserve their unique and diverse identities; “assimilation” is the dirtiest of words in Canada (and I rather think it would be the same for the idea of one pan-European citizenship). So, while most of Fukuyama's writing here was interesting enough (but not, I suspect, anything new for those who follow this sort of thing), his “remedy” to identity politics and populism sort of falls flat. Glad I read it, can't widely recommend. (less) 
Sep 16, 2018Gary Beauregard Bottomley rated it did not like it
Let me cut to the quick, there are three reasons why I felt this book was inadequate: 1) there was little new in it, 2) the author wrongly argues both sides are to blame by appealing to false dichotomies and false framing and 3) his solutions provided would only exasperate the real problem and not make it better.
For item 1), every author should assume that a reader of their book is interested in the topic and wants to learn more about the topic and is obligated to provide the reader something they don’t already know. In the first third of the book, the author breaks no new ground for those familiar with Charles Taylor’s ‘Sources of the Self’, Plato’s ‘Republic’, and for those who have listened to multiple Great Course Lectures on ‘identity’ and Martin Luther, and who are intimately familiar with Rousseau, and have read some of Freud, read lots of Kant, Nietzsche and Hegel, or have vaguely already understood what identity means. All of those items or people were presented within the first third of this book. I’ll even say it’s okay to bring the all too familiar up if the author can provide a narrative or look at it from a different angle and make the reader see differently, but this author did not. Do not underestimate your reading audience. Most of us want to really understand the world we live in and are doing what we can to the best of our abilities to learn about our world. Charles Taylor made Schopenhauer his main character in his book. Fukuyama doesn’t mention Schopenhauer and he makes Rousseau his main character. That’s fine I guess, but there are connections that needed to be filled in that Fukuyama didn’t do for his reader and Rousseau’s dignity concept can be derived from Spinoza’s ‘conatus’ which led to Schopenhauer’s ‘will to live’ and Nietzsche’s ‘will to power’. In the end, it’s possible to describe Nietzsche’s ‘will to power’ as self worth or one’s own self esteem (this author makes dignity and respect, self worth and self esteem of the individual, pivotal). The author is out of his field and expertise (I think he is a political scientist) and sometimes I felt he covered his topic superficially and to be brutally honest he should stick to topics he understands. The author uses dignity as his focal point for rationalizing ones hate. I’ll say that in order to feel superior to the other all one needs to do is hate them, but in order to be superior all one needs to do is not hate the other. Using the word ‘dignity’ does not change the fact that one is justifying their feelings over their reason. The author appeals to ‘lived experiences’ and dignity as he strives to defend his ‘both siderism’, and the squishy middle which really does not exist when it comes to a reality that includes Nazis, alt-right and those who want a return to 1950s America which privileges the privileged over all others. For item 2), when a Nazi runs a car into peaceful protesters the proper response is not ‘both sides are to blame’. That’s psychotic and an appeal to identity based on dignity doesn’t make it any less psychotic. (I want to be careful here, the author is not advocating that response, but he does rationalize it in some ways, and he does not call it for the psychotic unacceptable behavior that it surely is). Tolerance is not necessary when it comes to the ultimate purveyors of identity, Nazis. Diversity and tolerance are good, but is not necessary when it comes to purveyors of hate or Nazis. There were a lot of false equivalences and poor framing the author made in the middle part of the book. The author seemed to justify mocking a disable person (as candidate Trump did) as a standing up to ‘political correctness’ and that doesn’t make the act itself any less hateful and wrong. Shrouding ones hate with the label of anti ‘political correctness’ doesn’t lessen the cruelty of the act. I always translate ‘political correctness’ into terms of ‘politeness’. Things which are impolite are politically incorrect. All of our values and the golden rule can be derived from the politeness we show others. Mocking somebody for a disability is never polite and one should not whine against those who criticize those who are that kind of cruel by invoking a tirade against political correctness as the author seems to try to do through a juxtaposition of his points as he comments on Trump’s actual behavior and defends his support for such behavior by fictionalizing an alienation of the individual because of their self perceived denial of dignity being thrust upon them by an imaginary elite other. The author mocked changing the name of ‘manhole’ covers for the sake of political correctness. He really seemed to be channeling the spirit of the ravings against political correctness as espoused in the Unabomber’s Manifesto (I really recommend people read that trash, not because of its stupid arguments, but because that kind of thinking still prevails among the alt-right and Trump followers and those who think ‘both sides are to blame’ when Nazis run their cars into peaceful demonstrators). I think one of the most eye opening segments I’ve seen on TV was when an award show a couple of years ago pointed out how the word ‘actress’ is really sexist and that the ‘actors’ male and female would individually stand up and say ‘I am an actor’, sometimes ‘political correct’ (polite) behavior can make us aware of the ‘ism’ that lies within us such as sexism. That made a difference for me and it changed how I speak (and think) because of that. Morons still want to live in the 1950s and ‘make America great again’ as those supposedly ‘good old days’ by retaining the privileges of the privileged over everyone else who is not a member of the in-tribe. For item 3), the author’s solutions are the exact opposite from the ones I would recommend. He wants to meld everyone’s identity (and values) into an amorphous blob that would best be characterized by that currently possessed by the privileged. He wants to bring back unearned pride in one’s own culture and the belief that just because it is one’s own tradition that makes it superior and more just than those of the others not part of the in-tribe thus making it easier to exclude those who are different. I think that one should never outsource ones beliefs and must appeal instead to rational justification, evidence, analysis and empirical reasoning. Why is it that those with the power and the privileges never think they are motivated by identity? I’m being rhetorical and already know the answer, but this book doesn’t seem to question that premise. (And why does he call out Muslims but not Mormons, Evangelicals, Catholics or other revealed religions, all of which can have bigotry based beliefs on nothing more than whim or faith. For example, to say ‘gays are going to hell and should not be allowed to get married because they insult my dignity’ is wrongheaded no matter what faith label you are hiding behind or your appeal to religious liberty based on nothing more than your feelings for which you rationalized by putting the label ‘dignity’ onto it). Our myths and traditions can bind us as readily as they separate us. Those who want to learn nothing new, and think both sides are to blame and want the status quo to remain will enjoy this book. For the rest who really want to understand the sources of the self, read or listen to the books, the authors and the Great Courses alluded to in the second paragraph above. (less) 
Dec 06, 2018Oleksandr Zholud rated it really liked it
This new book by Francis Fukuyama about the hot issue in the US and EU politics today – identity. He doesn’t take neither left nor right side in the debate, but shows that the debate itself maybe out of focus.
He starts with Plato's The Republic and introduces concept of thymos - third part of the soul (first two are desires and reason, roughly equivalent to id and ego concepts of Freud) acts completely independently of the first two. It is the seat of judgments of worth: like a drug addict wants to be a productive employee or a loving mother. Human beings crave positive judgments about their worth or dignity. Those judgments can come from within, but they are most often made by other people in the society around them who recognize their worth. If they receive that positive judgment, they feel pride, and if they do not receive it, they feel either anger (when they think they are being undervalued) or shame (when they realize that they have not lived up to other people’s standards). This leads to two more concepts: isothymia (all people have equal worth) and megalothymia (some people are better). Note that the latter case doesn’t mean only racist douchebags, but everyone, who thinks that e.g. it would be ok to kill Hitler or Stalin (assuming some people are worse). To some extent thymos is similar to virtues as described by Deirdre N. McCloskey in The Bourgeois Virtues: Ethics for an Age of Commerce. Then the author discusses Martin Luther, Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Nietzsche, who added to the modern concept of identity. In the classical liberalism of the nineteenth century, the state was held responsible for protecting basic rights such as freedom of speech and association, for upholding a rule of law, and for providing essential public services such as police, roads, and education. The government “recognized” its citizens by granting them individual rights, but the state was not seen as responsible for making each individual feel better about himself or herself. In the second half of twentieth century the focus shifted: “the triumph of the therapeutic” (see Philip Rieff), when the decline of a shared moral horizon defined by religion had left a huge void that was being filled by psychologists preaching a new religion of psychotherapy. Traditional culture, according to Rieff, “is another name for a design of motive directing the self outward, toward those communal purposes in which alone the self can be realized and satisfied.” As such it played a therapeutic role, giving purpose to individuals, connecting them to others, and teaching them their place in the universe. But that outer culture had been denounced as an iron cage imprisoning the inner self; people were told to liberate their inner selves, to be “authentic” and “committed,” but without being told to what they should be committed. Under the therapeutic model, however, an individual’s happiness depends on his or her self-esteem, and self-esteem is a by-product of public recognition. Governments are readily able to give away public recognition in the way that they talk about and treat their citizens, so modern liberal societies naturally and perhaps inevitably began to take on the responsibility for raising the self-esteem of each and every one of their citizens. The disillusionment is classic left (communists) after the 1960s shifted the left from the industrial working class and Marxist revolution to the rights of minorities and immigrants, the status of women, environmentalism, and the like. This actually is one of the reasons that white blue collars voted for Trump or Brexit – they still have problems, but the left care mainly about other issues. It was easier to talk about respect and dignity than to come up with potentially costly plans that would concretely reduce inequality. The left continued to be defined by its passion for equality, but that agenda shifted from its earlier emphasis on the conditions of the working class to the often psychological demands of an ever-widening circle of marginalized groups. Many activists came to see the old working class and their trade unions as a privileged stratum with little sympathy for the plight of groups such as immigrants or racial minorities worse off than they were. Recognition struggles targeted newer groups and their rights as groups, rather than the economic inequality of individuals. In the process, the old working class was left behind. According to Fukuyama, the right currently hi-jacked the left’s identity politics, vocally protecting not the usual targets (black, women, LGBTQ+) but native-born workers and dominant long-established cultural identities. The latter can also feel threatened and it doesn’t matter whether there is a real fact under this threat – the identity is subjective by definition! What he suggests? He fully agrees that there is inequality and a greater equality of opportunity is desirable. He likes the idea of Bassam Tibi’s Leitkultur, “leading culture,” as the basis for a national identity, which was defined in liberal Enlightenment terms as belief in equality and democratic values. (less) 
DivIdentity
As the author states in his preface, his book was mainly written because Donald Trump was elected president of the U.S. in November 2016, and maybe a little bit because a majority of those taking part in the Brexit referendum were in favour of the UK’s leaving the EU. Fukuyama, under the impression of those two big surprises, apparently wanted to explain how these two events were possible – two events which he regards as standing in need of an explanation. In his study Identity. Contemporary Identity Politics and the Struggle for Recognition, Fukuyama undertakes to come up with an explanation of political developments that at first sight do not seem to have anything to do with each other, but which are, in fact, two sides of one coin and which are all alarming. Why is it right-wing parties and movements that seem to profit most from the new social inequality due to the failed promise of globalization, when traditionally all those who see themselves as losers on the global market should look to left-wing parties as champions for their interests? Why are liberal values and concepts under assault from both proponents of multiculturalism and dyed-in-the-wool conservatives? Why are western societies breaking apart into a quilt of parallel societies defining themselves by religious or ethnic features rather than by adherence to the same abstract principles of democracy? Or by participation in the same global market? These are some of the questions at the basis of Fukuyama’s study, and it is obvious that the two events named at the beginning are stunning examples of the developments these questions summarize. Fukuyama, by way of answer, points out that human beings’ needs cannot be explained merely with a view to the economy, i.e. a person’s material well-being is not the only prerequisite for their overall satisfaction. What they also need is social recognition and respect from others but also from themselves, and this is where identity comes into play, namely as people’s concept of what they are and what worth they therefore have in the world. Fukuyama even offers two cool words in this context: isothymia, i.e. “the demand to be respected on an equal basis with other people” (p.xiii), andmegalothymia, i.e. “the desire to be recognized as superior” (ibd.) He then starts quite an impressive tour de force through western philosophy and politics in order to pinpoint when and how those two demands arose and shaped political thought. We go, among others, from Plato to Luther and then alight on the fur-hat-wearer Rousseau, who is not only responsible for the theoretical justification of fascism in his contrat social (what would la terreur de la vertu have been without this book?), but who also came up with the notion of there being an inner flower garden of identity within every person that has the right to be watered and admired by society because – although it should not be judged – it is good as such. In other words, Rousseau is also responsible, in a way, for the emergence of the Snowflake as a social and psychological norm. One should think that fascism and rugged individualism which is not based on what I achieved and contributed to society (good old J.T. Adams) but on what I think makes me oh so special and interesting, are two concepts that rule each other out, and yet Rousseau still manages to hold them at the same time. But you may well expect this elasticity of principles from a despicable man who writes a book on education but dumps his own five children into orphanages in order to save himself time and money. However, let’s return to Fukuyama: As someone who has read Roger Scruton, for instance, the statement that humans are not merely homines oikonomici but that they also (and maybe even basically) define themselves with reference to their culture, their history, and whatever ties them to the region they live in, was not too new to me so that I was already familiar with the starting point of Fukuyama’s argument. However, his distinction between the two major currents the quest for respect can follow was something that added to the thoughts of Scruton and others. In the author’s own words, ”understandings of dignity forked in two directions during the nineteenth century, toward a liberal individualism that came to be embedded in the political rights of modern liberal democracies, and toward collective identities that could be defined by either nation or religion.” (p.91) In his presentation of these two diverging developments, Fukuyama never tires of showing the potential dangers of the collective identities because their proponents may “often play by democratic rules, but harbour potentially illiberal tendencies due to their longings for unity and community.” (p.69) His scepticism with regard to “[w]hite nationalism […] in Europe” even leads him to equate it with fascism as such (cf. p. 121). Here at the latest, I could not help wondering at Fukuyama’s readiness to simplify history in order to arrive at a point that may curry favour with some of his readers. It is true that an extremely vitriolic variety of nationalism culminated in fascist regimes in various European countries but it is certainly a grossly rash conclusion to say that European nationalism “was called fascism” (ibd.)* What about countries like France and Great Britain, which evinced a high degree of nationalism in the 19th and 20th centuries but where fascism never stood a realistic chance? Apart from that, if you go back in history and look at the origins of nationalism, let’s say in Germany, you will find that it was at first the twin-brother of liberalism. This is quite logical – and stands in contradiction to Fukuyama’s fine, but simply academic, discrimination between individualism/liberalism and nationalism/religion – in that the early liberals who demanded basic civic rights from their governments had to base their claims on something that all those people who would benefit from these civic rights had in common: This was their belonging to one nation. If you no longer saw the state as the personal property of a dynasty but postulated the citizens’ right to have their say, you would have to find some common ground to replace (or complete) people’s attachment to their feudal sovereign, and this was the concept of nation. What is more, in his final chapters – for me, by the way, the best of the whole book – Fukuyama himself comes to the conclusion that abstract legalistic loyalties like acknowledging the rule of law and diversity as a value as such, will, despite their importance, not be sufficient to ensure the survival of democratic societies as we know them: ”A liberal democracy is an implicit contract between citizens and their government, and among the citizens themselves, under which they give up certain rights in order that the government protects other rights that are more basic and important. National identity is built around the legitimacy of this contract; if citizens do not believe they are part of the same polity, the system will not function. […] Citizens often have to accept outcomes they do not like or prefer, in the interest of a common good; a culture of tolerance and mutual sympathy must override partisan passions.” (p.130f.) The concept of nationhood at the bottom of a liberal democracy may even make such a kind of government practicable: ”Democracy means that the people are sovereign, but if there is no way of delimiting who the people are, they cannot exercise democratic choice.” (p.139) While reading the last three chapters of his book, where Fukuyama shows fair judgment of the problems threatening modern democracies and, by propagating a creedal national identity, also offers a sensible solution to a lot of these problems, I kept asking myself whether his clear-cut distinction between liberalism/individualism and nationalism/common ground is not at variance with the cleverest parts of his book. Fukuyama also succeeds in explaining the renascent attraction right-wing political groups exert on large numbers of people in Europe and North America, and at the same time he points out one of the most fundamental mistakes the old left has made, namely its complete change of focus from addressing social inequality to concentrating on righting the wrongs of smaller interest groups that define themselves in terms of culture, gender or sexual orientation. Of course, Fukuyama does not deny that there was actually some reason for addressing some of the issues these groups had and trying to set them right, but he is also awake to the consequences this had: Large parts of the traditional working classes felt themselves and their values disrespected and became prone to looking for a political home on the other side of the party spectrum. Apart from this, too great a focus on whatever special rights certain interest groups might want to claim for themselves, poses another, more principal problem, namely that of discarding democratic and liberal principles. In Fukuyama’s own words: ”Multiculturalism was a description of societies that were de facto diverse. […] While classical liberalism sought to protect the autonomy of equal individuals, the new ideology of multiculturalism promoted equal respect for cultures, even if those cultures abridged the autonomy of the individuals who participated in them.” (p.111) One might also say, “who – via birth – are made to participate in them”, and then the dangers (e.g. its long-term tendency to undermine legal equality and the liberal constitution as such) and injustices a naïve multiculturalism carries with it might become even clearer. Even Fukuyama himself sometimes fails to see its dangers, as for instance when he says that religious identity may ”take the innocuous form of wearing a hijab to work” (p.72). One should well think about what such a garment stands for, and that in some countries it is imposed by a patriarch culture on its women who have no choice but to wear it, and also that in certain Muslim communities in Europe every woman wearing a hijab adds to the social pressure exerted on those who do not and neither want to, before one labels such a decision merely “innocuous” instead of admitting the complexity of the implications it has. There are also other particulars in which I tend to disagree with Fukuyama, wholly or by degrees, for instance in his statement that the deleterious effects of the ideology of political correctness on free speech are greatly exaggerated (cf. p.121), or his general acclaim for a European super-state (although he does address the lack of democratic structures in the EU bureaucracy), and there was one passage I really found annoying, namely this one: ”And as a result of the bitter Israeli-Palestinian conflict, many Muslims displayed a kind of anti-Semitism that Europe had been vigilant in suppressing since the end of World War II.” (p.148) I would still say, and I’m sure that Fukuyama would agree with me, that it is the anti-Semite himself that is to blame for his anti-Semitism, and not some excuse he may come up with. So, after all these lengthy considerations, what do I have to say about this book? On the one hand, it offers deep insight into the identity crises – I am deliberately using the plural here – we are going through, and into why the Left is losing so much ground to the Right (not a truly conservative right, but often a plainly populistic one), and it offers a sensible remedy to these our ailments. The only problem being that people might not be overly ready to apply this remedy to their way of thinking: People on the far right will not like to part with their exclusive concept of nationhood because it disguises their xenophobia, and people on the left will not give up their concept of multiculturalism because in furthering it, they get high on the impression of their own moral superiority, cheaply for themselves, but dearly at the expense of their own liberal society. I cannot see all the parts of Fukuyama’s theoretical introduction really lead to the conclusions he draws, as I’ve already said, and neither do I agree fully with all his observations and assessments. All in all, for me the book was a mixed bag, a rather full but still a mixed one. * The way Fukuyama presents his argument makes it impossible to tell whether he himself considers “white nationalism” fascist or whether he presents the perspective of its opponents, the text being slightly ambiguous here. (less) 
Oct 28, 2018Nancy rated it liked it
3.5
After hearing about the book on NPR my husband suggested I read Identity: The Demand for Dignity and the Politics of Resentment by Frances Fukuyama. One thing I appreciated about this book is how the author presents his arguments, explains them, and before he moves on restates his case to that point. It really makes it easier for the general reader because this is a theoretical book. The author begins with a brief history of the development of identity, from the ancient Greeks through the Ref ...more 
Sep 16, 2018Dan Graser rated it really liked it
Fukuyama's latest book is a relatively brief, extended-essay form work, that focuses on the history of identity at the personal level and how it is reflected in larger social and political movements. This is obviously a very timely subject on which to be writing as it seems everyone has an opinion on this concept and a series of articles and videos of their favorite speakers either railing against the very idea or explaining how all of their opposition just don't understand why someone would feel the need to bolster their identity as their repressors are the very larger identity who remain and have remained dominant for centuries. In fact right now I imagine you have a favorite line of Jordan Peterson denouncing the cultural marxism of the academic left which has produced a generation fixated on divisions by race, gender expression, or sexual orientation; or perhaps you're recalling a stormy sermon from Michael Eric Dyson defending the concept of individual dignity and respect as reflected in larger group identity politics from those who over-simplify and obscure because at the socio-political level they want to remain at the top of the heap.
Given the passion and the vitriol with which this is normally discussed and frequently not actually discussed in said discussions, Fukuyama's discussion here is very enjoyable even if his proposed solutions to the divide this concept has produced in our society might seem somewhat general. Beginning with the origins of identity in the Greek word, "thymos," which was the third part of the soul, according to Socrates, that seemed to operate free from reason and desire (the other two parts). Also, this concept was actually thought only to belong to the warrior class in society who were actively defending everything else society held dear. While not an exact parallel to today's notion of identity, it can certainly be seen as a causal concept. Also the larger societal notions of, "isothymia," versus, "megalothymia," terms borrowed from economists, frame the debate between the human drive to be seen as just as good versus the human drive to be seen in comparison to everyone else. Fukuyama then proceeds to give a brief outline of his own concept of identity: "Identity grows, in the first place, out of a distinction between one's true inner self and an outer world of social rules and norms that does not adequately recognize that inner self's worth or dignity." This is later expanded to include: "The modern concept of identity unites three different phenomena. The first is thymos, a universal aspect of human personality that craves recognition. The second is the distinction between the inner and the outer self, and the raising of the moral valuation of the inner self over outer society. The third is an evolving concept of dignity, in which recognition is due not just to a narrow class of people, but to everyone." The suggestions for remedy of the divide caused by these issues start to center around a broader idea of societal identity free of jingoistic nationalism. Where this discussion has spawned a ceaselessly stupid and deliberately obfuscating discussion about fighting against political correctness when frequently that is what's being talked about at all, we thus get bloated morons who are respected for saying what they think especially if it goes against "politically correct speech," even if it has nothing to do with reality and the amount of thought they have actually put into those remarks is nonexistent. Equally adept at giving criticism to the excesses of the left and right on this idea, Fukuyama writes: "Identity politics for some progressives has become a cheap substitute for serious thinking about how to reverse the 30 year trend in most liberal democracies toward greater socioeconomic inequality...That an argument is offensive to someone's self-worth is often seen as sufficient to delegitimize it, a trend encouraged by the kind of short-form discourse propagated by social media." Even though he deftly deals with the conflicts in the EU, US, global discussions of immigration, and the conflict of nationalist politicians with under-represented populations, I can already hear the chorus of people saying that Fukuyama hasn't actually dealt with the issue itself or understood the true position of identity politics (as if anyone has claim to the sole understanding of the idea), however I find his conclusion rational and a reasonable goal to work towards, even if at the moment it seems completely unattainable: "Identity can be used to divide, but it can and has also been used to integrate. That in the end will be the remedy for the populist politics of the present. (less) 
Sep 02, 2018A Reader rated it really liked it
Every individual has an impulse to be respected and recognized, says Francis Fukuyama. Recognition is a deeply rooted human desire; it has been the cause of tyranny, conflicts, and wars, but at the same time, it also acts as a psychological foundation of many virtues, such as courage, justice and the spirit of citizenship.
This struggle for recognition, or what today we call identity politics, has become hugely important in the contemporary political discourse. Identity grows, writes Fukuyama, “out of a distinction between one’s true inner self, and the outer world of social rules and norms that does not adequately recognize that inner self’s worth.” Say I am a woman, or an African-American, or a lesbian, or some other category, a person that I have been disrespected and marginalized by my society in the past and what I am now asking is respect, the recognition that I am as good a person as everybody else. In his book Identity: The Demand for Dignity and the Politics of Resentment, Francis Fukuyama goes back to Hegel’s non-materialistic view of history based on the struggle for recognition, a desire so strong that Hegel argued that it is the driving force of history. Fukuyama offers a historical overview, from what Plato called ‘thymos’, the longing for respect and recognition, to Martin Luther’s Reformation, and the social changes that brought to Europe, to the modern concept of identity and identity politics. The modern concept of identity unites three different phenomena, he writes. The first is ‘thymos’; the second is the distinction between a person’s outer and inner self that emerged in early modern Europe and suggests that the individual (the authentic self) should be prioritized over social structures; and the third is an evolving concept of dignity, in which recognition is due not just to a narrow class of people, but to everyone. This authentic inner self is the basis of the human dignity and it is recognized by political documents such as the United States Declaration of Independence and more recently by the Charter European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights which declares that the peoples of Europe are resolved to share a peaceful future based on common values in a European Union, “founded on the indivisible, universal values of human dignity, freedom, equality and solidarity; based on the principles of democracy and the rule of law. What is happening today, argues Francis Fukuyama, is that many people do not feel that their inner self is respected and valued by their societies. Identity politics is, in short, a struggle for the recognition of dignity. Francis Fukuyama examines many groups and movements that feel disregarded, from Arab Spring to the white working-class men in the United States and Europe and from the Black Lives Matter to the women who launched the #MeToo movement. The characteristic of all these movements is the desire for recognition and respect, he argues. “Each movement represented people who had up to then been invisible and suppressed; each resented that invisibility and wanted public recognition of their inner worth. So was born what we today label as modern identity politics.” I don’t feel comfortable with identity politics. I never bought into it. To me, we are individuals with multiple identities. I am a woman, feminist, environmentalist, European, a bookworm, a kind of nomad. I understand that identity politics is a natural response to injustice. As such there is nothing wrong with it. Societies need to protect the marginalized and the excluded. It becomes problematic only when identity is interpreted in certain tribal way. The tendency of identity politics to focus on cultural issues and to ever narrower group identities threatens the possibility of communication, inclusiveness and collective action and diverts energy and attention away from broader socioeconomic issues, such as inequality or political corruption. The remedy, writes Fukuyama, is not to abandon the idea of identity. We all have multiple identities defined by our race, gender, education, affinities, etc. The aim is to create identities that are broader and more integrative that take into account the diversity of the existing liberal societies. He favours identities based on creed, that is shared values and beliefs, rather than identities based on race or heritage. He suggests that the “successful assimilation of foreigners,” could restrain populism and he proposes civic education in schools in order to form informed and open-minded citizens. Could this steer individuals, groups, and nations away from a politics of resentment? Francis Fukuyama hopes that it does. (less) 
Sep 12, 2018Tammam Aloudat rated it it was ok
I keep telling myself not to read books by privileged rich men about the problems of our world, then I do exactly that. I regret it!
There are interesting concepts here, some are somewhat useful in the debate on identity and some just drown in Fukuyama's desire to justify himself. Let me elaborate. There is a point where he goes on about how people misread his controversial and much criticised The End of History and the Last Man, he is telling us how he was not wrong in saying that liberal democr ...more 
Jun 13, 2018David Wineberg rated it liked it
Identifying is innate
Francis Fukuyama’ Identity starts off very badly, with a bizarre defense of his famous claim that the crumbling of the USSR and the dismantling of the Berlin Wall constituted “the end of history”. Like a Donald Trump (who gets more criticism than everyone else in the book combined), he doubles down on the statement by claiming what it says is nothing like what he meant. He claims to have used a completely different meaning for the word “end” as in “target” or “objective”. S ...more 
Aug 24, 2018Murtaza rated it it was ok
Francis Fukuyama gets a bad rap from many people for being known as the guy who appeared to declare the “End of History” as the brief moment when liberal democracy prevailed over communism at the end of the Cold War. In large part I feel that his bad reputation on this subject is undeserved. His famous book, titled “The End of History and the Last Man,” never actually said that an end of history had arrived that would mean an end to events, only that, according to a Hegelian teleological view of history, liberal democracy was the most satisfactory to people’s needs and the search for a better system was over. His argument about Nietzsche’s Last Man also explained how liberal democracies may even end up destroying themselves due to their own evident soullessness. It’s a contentious argument that I’m not even sure I buy, but he made a much stronger and more interesting case than the caricature of him suggests.
The End of History was an excellent book. This book, disappointingly, is mostly just a warmed over version of parts of that famous work. It specifically deals with the importance Greek concept of “thymos,” the strive for recognition by others. This aspect of the human soul contribute to people’s innate need for the recognition of their dignity and unique identity by others. Rousseau helped develop the idea that people have a unique interior life constrained by an oppressive outer society, which identitarians have been warring against ever since. Unfortunately Fukuyama just retreads much of his old writings for the most part and doesn’t add much more. His solution for the problems caused by identity politics are instituting programs for integration and shared public service. Good ideas but hardly original. Someone unfamiliar with his work might get more out of this than I did but I found it to be an underwhelming read. Nonetheless I still appreciate him as a serious if at times contentious thinker. (less) 
Feb 05, 2019SueKich rated it it was amazing · review of another edition
“…the preoccupation with identity has clashed with the need for deliberative discourse”
This is a balanced and well-argued account of contemporary identity politics that starts with an explanation of its ancient roots: “Thymos is the part of the soul that craves recognition of dignity; isothymia is the demand to be respected on an equal basis with other people; while megalothymia is the desire to be recognised as superior. Modern liberal democracies promise and largely deliver a minimal degree of equal respect, embodied in individual rights, the rule of law, and the franchise. What this does not guarantee is that people in a democracy will be equally respected in practice, particularly members of groups with a history of marginalization. Entire countries can feel disrespected, which has powered aggressive nationalism, as can religious believers who feel their faith is denigrated. Isothymia will therefore continue to drive demands for equal recognition, which are unlikely to ever be completely fulfilled.” Francis Fukuyama then goes on to examine the demands of identity that so dominate world politics today and – unlike many other books on this and other related subjects – he actually does address “What is to be done?” He offers pragmatic rather than fanciful solutions and his prose is clear, concise and eminently readable. The author only mentions the influence of the internet in the debate on identity politics in the last few pages of his book; I would have liked to hear more on his analysis of the web’s impact. Are social networks like Facebook and Twitter – or even Amazon and GoodReads! – our new nations to which we feel we belong? As we head towards the next decade, it strikes me that the rise in identity politics gives a whole new meaning to the term “The Roaring Twenties”.(less) 
An okay, if superficial and generic, read. It is also pessimistic, but not pessimistic enough.
I do agree with the author that the real danger lurks on the extreme end of the alt-right, but I disagree with the casual treatment and an easy pass he gives to the excesses of the ctrl-left, and the role they play in the current mess. For better or for worse, they have been summoning into the existence that particular stinky bogeyman we all fear and would rather not see again. To quote Titania McGrath, the well-known social justice activist: "Activists such as myself are spearheading a new culture war, sniffing out prejudice like valiant bloodhounds of righteousness, courageously snapping at the heels of injustice. To give a tangible example of our achievements, consider how the definition of the word ‘Nazi’ has been successfully broadened to include anyone who voted for Brexit, has ever considered supporting the Conservative Party or who refuses to take the Guardian seriously. Although this is a great victory for the progressive cause, it does mean that there are now more Nazis living in modern Britain than even existed in 1930s Germany."(less) 
Fascinating and deep stuff: an analysis of everything behind the curtain. Fukuyama show how everything hinges together -- dependencies, relationships, prerequisites, hierarchies, dynamics -- to produce the world we live in. He doesn't cherry-pick the data. Nobody is immune. It's all there: the good, bad and the ugly. At any moment, this is the outcome we get. The one we have to live with. The one we need to adapt to. The cards you get to play. Like it or not . . . what it is.
And from where I sit, it looks pretty grim, no matter what your political persuasion, your group, your town. This boat's full of holes and it's sinking fast. Lotsa luck, y'all. Cheers! JIM inMT (less) 
Required reading, and very readable
In Identity: The Demand for Dignity and the Politics of Resentment, Stanford political scientist Francis Fukuyama presents an impressively well-reasoned and lucid explanation of the phenomenon of identity politics, which is being increasingly recognized as a powerful force within the United States and world-wide. Although he acknowledges in the Preface that the 2016 U S presidential election was the inspiration for the book, Identity goes far beyond an analysis of the last election or similar phenomena like the Brexit vote. The scope of the book is summed up well in the aptly-chosen subtitle: The Demand for Dignity and the Politics of Resentment. Fukuyama is a scholar and deep thinker, and he traces the origins of identity politics back to its roots both historical and psychological. As he explains it, identity politics begins with thymos, a basic human desire for dignity and recognition of an individual’s worth, which creates resentment if an individual feels disrespected. The modern concept of identity has changed over the past few centuries, though, under the influence of thinkers like Martin Luther, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and others. As society has become modern and complex, people have felt their identities more repressed and value their inner selves more. And as modern society has developed, people increasingly began to believe that dignity is something that all people deserve, and not just a narrow class. When large numbers of people sense they are not being accorded that dignity, various forms of unrest develop. Some are positive and productive, and some are not, and Fukuyama presents a number of excellent examples, such as the Arab Spring that was touched off when a Tunisian policewoman slapped a street vendor. If people cannot feel respected for themselves alone, they can look for respect by virtue of membership in a group, be it ethnic, religious, or class, and it is this push for respect by virtue of group identity that is being noted in many ways today, whether it is the tribal antipathies in Africa, anti-immigrant feelings in many countries, or requests for ethnic-focused dorms on college campuses. Although we tend to note negative results of people’s quest for dignity and respect, Fukuyama says “that the demand for dignity should somehow disappear is neither possible nor desirable”. Ultimately, if I may oversimplify a much more sophisticated conclusion, Fukuyama calls for a broadening of the sense of identity based on a commitment to liberal democratic principles as a solution to many ills. Identity is definitely the best non-fiction book I have read in a very long time. It is disturbing, enlightening, and convincing; to me it also appeared very objective if approached with an open mind, although I suspect it will offend hardliners in both the liberal and conservative camps. His thesis is sophisticated, but the book is very readable, and his ultimate conclusion is positive: “Identity can be used to divide, but it can and has also been used to integrate. That in the end will be the remedy for the populist politics of the present.” My thanks to Netgalley and the publishers for an advance review copy of this book. (less)  This is among the necessary books to understand the basis of some of the recent dramatic move toward populism, nationalism and even religious fundamentalism in many parts of the world. This book argues that concerns around ones’ identity are the root of many of the radical political manifestations of the day, the leading examples being the election of Trump and Brexit. While this book explains identity politics, it looks deeper into the issue of identity over time, satisfyingly. While books such as ‘Hillbilly Elegy’ look into a specific segment of the population to explain Trumpism and the recent wave of populism, this book follows a longer arc of history and does hit its mark most of the time. The further the roots of the arguments the stronger they seem and more universal their applications are beyond the above-mentioned incidents. Borrowing loosely from the New York Times review of this book, this book is a book about those books. While some of the underlying causes espoused in this book are not wholly new, the narrative is richer and more convincing. Here are the salient elements that I got from the book: - Identity is deep-rooted and a critical foundation of humankind. It can form a strong basis for good and progress and when such identities are hollowed out or weakened due to societal change (and supported economic factors), it can be supplemented by new identities or other protests and these can lead to undesirable outcomes. - Economic marginalization is an important cause for the new wave of populism but is not a sufficient lens to understand issues that open up. Hollowed identities are important to watch as well. - Recent events such as Brexit, the victory of Trump and Arab spring have erosion of identities as a basis. - Traditional champions of the poor ignored larger simmering identity issues that were boiling under the surface among the working class whites while focused on numerous and narrower, valid but incomplete identities. - The voids left by traditional identities got filled by national and religious identities, that were readily available and in many cases, cheaply peddled by politicians or other leaders. - Cures exist, but authors do not think that there is anyone who will adopt them. So, things will get worse before they get better. The authors cover many aspects and over a long period of time. As in anything else, this evolution progresses, but unevenly. Here are a few: - How Socrates, while grappling with the tension between logic and desire, there was the view that identity might have to be treated by itself. - How Martin Luther’s worry about the need to redeem with ones’ inner self to reach God, but the pointlessness of addressing the exterior - Rousseau’s attempt to treat the dual nature of man – to deal with society, but appreciating the inner self. - The logical and mechanical view of Kant and Hagel’s view on the working class. The progress of human society from an agrarian one where one’s place was so settled to one that involved new and urban ones where one had to find himself or herself and how that brought questions about self-identity to the fore. As questions to identities led to gaps, they resulted in people filling those gaps with either with nationalism and religion. - His explanation of the new feminist and the black lives matter movements as seeking to get dignity for identity, as opposed to mere equality makes sense somewhat, but not always. As the Mehrsa notes her wonderful reviewhttps://www.goodreads.com/review/show..., there is an element of righting wrongs that were never before possible is a large cause. - The shift from identity to self-esteem to the megalomania. He squarely lays the blame on the emergence of megalomania and the manifestation in Trump as one that was brought in large part by a culture of therapy that coddled self-esteem and excused malignant deviations from it, just to keep it sated. - And many more. He speaks of the differences in Europe and America. He points to Europe’s effort to forge a union without an identity for the person as a mistake. He points to out of the main of underlying incongruities in the immigration of European countries. As an immigrant American, I am sympathetic to many of the travails that immigrants go through in my adopted country, but have failed to appreciate so far how hard immigration is to the other countries. And how the response to the recent refugee crisis does not paint the whole picture of how the issuance of national identity and assimilation in these countries are complicated as well, maybe even more so. In regard to American, he argues quite convincingly that the reduction of a common American identity and replacement with a celebration of diversity as identity as a mistake as well. His explanation of how America forged a national identity, how sets it up apart and how that identity seems to be fraying and is inadequate makes sense, sadly. Selfishly, I wish he had spent more time on how the American national identity came about and the lessons from it. The author does have a few pages for technology, but not nearly enough. He speaks on how the initial euphoria of the internet gave ways to the reality of clustered audiences and self-selection into such groups, but I wish it had been treated more. Specifically, I would have been interested in hearing out how this can play out in the immediate future. Even in the past, the effect of technology on identities would have been useful to understand. His policy prescriptions were meager and he himself considers them doomed. In any case, I am not one to consider that someone who diagnoses a problem wonderfully needs to bear the burden to come up with a matching solution. Besides, while the study of history is crucial to make the future better, it will not be enough. I do wish that the author had spent more time discussing possibilities for the near future. On the other hand, as I understood the issues that he laid out, I can also see that there is no easy remedy in the near future that one can see. Maybe he shares that dire prognosis as well and hence the reluctance to speak on the same. This brings me to my lament. I think the author’s square and specific blame on the left and the right for ignoring the issues and exploiting them to one’s benefit are correct. He has explained the underlying causes that have caused the unexpected revolts against the world order that manifested in an unexpected and sometimes repugnant way (like the vulgarity and overt racism). But, I do not see that the ruling elite or the politicians or the media, or anyone who had a say in the old world order speak to the issues raised in the book, other than very lightly. Rather sadly, the previous world order seems to have broken into two camps – either join the new populists in dancing over the corpses of the established world order indecently or get scandalized by the obscenity of the dance rather than understand why the killing occurred in the first place. (less) 
A nice fusion of philosophy, psychology, and political science. And you learn some new words like traduce and thymos. I had found his much publicized book on the end of history rather obtuse but this is much sharper although it does have some moments of dryness. It has a timeliness as well as an urgency too.
Identity as an individual has given way to shared identity by groups of like individuals. Nationalism and religion exploit these unions and social media has given them a disproportionate loud speaker. Identity is shaping every debate. You could compromise on an issue but you can’t compromise on identity. Fukuyama takes us through American and European political systems. There’s a lot of meat here in this short book that could be a college course. He offers solutions but I’m not as optimistic for the future. (less) 
Nov 02, 2018Lord_Humungus rated it really liked it
Recommends it for: interested in nationalism or islamism
Recommended to Lord_Humungus by: I follow Fukuyama since his "Political Order" series
Shelves: nationalism, politics, e-copy, history, psychology
Review in English (not my mother tongue) and Spanish (below).
This book deals with a very interesting topic for me but unfortunately does not bring too many new things. Most of the text consists of generalizations that will be familiar to anyone minimally acquainted with History, especially recent History. We all know a couple of things about Islam, the war in Syria, and the Arab Spring. The new things that have struck me most are the following: 1. The concept of "thymos", the place of the soul where judgments about value are based. It is the part of the mind that judges others and oneself as worthy of admiration and respect. The emotions associated with thymos are pride, shame, and anger. Fukuyama affirms that thymos is the basis of identity movements, nationalism and political Islamism. It’s not so clear to me. I think it's something even simpler. That the human being has an innate tendency to tribalism, to delimit the own group from the others, the "we" of the “them" and to solidarize with the own group and to be aggressive to the others. 2. The parallels between nationalism and radical Islamism. Both arise when people who have grown up in a rural environment are dislocated and anomized by their contact with the more complex industrial civilization. They are left without the traditional identity in which they had grown up, but without integrating fully with the society of which they become part. It is very controversial if the young radical Islamists commit attacks because of some (religious) ideas or because of this dislocation of their identity. Fukuyama thinks that both hypotheses are true. 3. I was surprised that his criticism of the "globalist cosmopolitans" (among which I count myself) is as naive and irritating as usual. The globalists argue that the concepts of national identity and state sovereignty are outdated and should be replaced by transnational identities and institutions, for economic and functional reasons as well as for moral reasons (the commitment to political equality should not begin or end at national borders). Fukuyama accepts this to a certain extent, but says that it is not a reason to change the international order based on national states, or to not have the right kind of national identity within those states. The idea that states are obsolete and should be overcome by international bodies is flawed, according to him, because no one has shown how these international bodies could be accountable to citizens. In addition, the functioning of democratic institutions depends on sharing norms, perspectives, and culture, which may exist at the level of a national state, but do not exist internationally. This is to give a naive image of the globalist cosmopolitans. Our position is not that national states must be abolished tomorrow and suddenly. But we are clear that this is the final goal. Fukuyama is not clear. However, he is a reasonable man, and in the short term, I think we would agree. "Effective international cooperation can and has been being built through cooperation among existing states. For decades, nations have been renouncing aspects of their sovereignty to protect their national interests. The types of cooperative agreements needed to resolve many issues can continue to be addressed in this way. " I agree. But only for a certain time, only up to a certain point. The truth is that national states continue to have the capacity to reverse these agreements (ex: Brexit). The interests of others may not be sufficiently taken into account (ex: US renouncing agreements on climate change), etc. That simply should not happen. Only a democratic World Government can take into account the rights of all humans at the same time. And it is not true that means of accountability have not been invented. They are already there, working inside every democratic state. You only have to copy them. That solution is far away, of course. We globalists are not naive. But if it is far away, it is because of nationalisms. If they did not exist, it would not be so difficult. 4. Fukuyama is as perplexed as other intellectuals by the question of sovereignty. The sovereignty resides in the people, and from there flows the legitimacy of the government, but who the hell is "the people"? "[Pierre] Manent identifies a major gap in modern democratic theory. Thinkers such as Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Immanuel Kant, the authors of the Federalist Papers, and John Stuart Mill all assumed that the world was predivided in nations that formed the foundation of democratic choice. They did not provide a theory of why the border between the United States and Mexico should run along the Rio Grande, whether Alsace should belong to France or Germany, whether Quebec should be part of Canada or or a “distinct society,” on what grounds Catalonia could legitimately separate itself from Spain, or what the proper level of immigration should be. Such theorizing has been left to others.[The nationalists]” But Fukuyama also does not theorize beyond that, either. 5. His solutions for identity problems: -Combat the specific abuses against dignity (police violence, sexism), which are real and urgent problems that need concrete solutions -Promote national identities built with the foundational ideas of liberal democracy, and assimilate newcomers to those identities, actively - Ideally, the EU should create a unique citizenship based on adherence to basic democratic and liberal principles; transfer powers of the Commission to Parliament, and have a unique educational system. All this is very difficult at present. -Erect important requirements for the naturalization of immigrants -Avoid dual citizenship -Relate the identity not with diversity, but with important ideas such as constitutionalism, the rule of law, and human equality. Exclude from citizenship those who do not share them. -Center the debate on how to best assimilate immigrants. -Mandatory and universal national service, which could be military or civic -Assign more resources to border control The work has a table of contents, an apparatus of notes, and a bibliography. The electronic version does not have an index itself, just a list of the terms of the index of the physical book, leaving for the reader the electronic textual search. In short, an honest and brief book on an interesting topic, but with few new ideas. ESPAÑOL: Este libro trata un tema interesantísimo para mí pero desgraciadamente no aporta demasiadas cosas nuevas. La mayor parte del texto trata son generalizaciones que serán familiares para cualquiera mínimamente familiarizado con la historia, especialmente la reciente. Todos sabemos cuatro cosas sobre el islamismo, la guerra en Siria, y la Primavera Árabe. Las cosas nuevas que más me han llamado la atención son las siguientes: 1. El concepto de “thymos”, el lugar del alma donde se asientan los juicios de valor. Es la parte de la mente que juzga a los demás y a uno mismo como dignos de admiración y respeto. Las emociones asociadas con el thymos son el orgullo, la vergüenza, y la ira. Fukuyama afirma que el thymos es la base de los movimientos identitarios, del nacionalismo y del islamismo político. Yo no lo tengo tan claro. Creo que es algo todavía más simple. Que el ser humano tiene una tendencia innata al tribalismo, a delimitar el grupo propio del ajeno, el “nosotros” del “ellos” y a hacer piña con el propio grupo y coger manía al ajeno. 2. Los paralelismos que hace entre el nacionalismo y el islamismo radical. Ambos surgen cuando las personas que han crecido en un entorno rural quedan dislocadas y anómicas por su contacto con la civilización industrial más compleja. Se quedan sin la identidad tradicional en la que habían crecido, pero sin integrarse del todo con la sociedad de la que pasan a formar parte. Es muy discutido si los jóvenes islamistas radicales cometen atentados por culpa de unas ideas (religiosas) o por culpa de esta dislocación de su identidad. Fukuyama piensa que ambas hipótesis son ciertas. 3. Me sorprendió que su crítica de los “cosmopolitas globalistas” (entre los que me cuento) es tan ingenua e irritante como viene siendo lo habitual. Los globalistas argumentamos que los mismos conceptos de identidad nacional y soberanía estatal están caducados y deben ser reemplazados por identidades e instituciones transnacionales, tanto por razones económicas y funcionales como por razones morales (el compromiso por la igualdad política no debe empezar o terminar en las fronteras nacionales). Fukuyama acepta esto hasta cierto punto, pero dice que no es razón para cambiar el orden internacional basado en estados nacionales, ni para no tener el tipo adecuado de identidad nacional dentro de esos estados. La idea de que los estados están obsoletos y deberían quedar superados por cuerpos internacionales es defectuosa, según él, porque nadie ha mostrado cómo esos cuerpos internacionales deberían rendir cuentas a los ciudadanos. Además, el funcionamiento de las instituciones democráticas depende de compartir normas, perspectivas, y cultura, las cuales pueden existir a nivel de un estado nacional, pero no existen internacionalmente. Esto es dar una imagen ingenua de los cosmopolitas globalistas. Nuestra posición no es que los estados nacionales deban ser superados mañana y de repente. Pero tenemos claro que ese es el objetivo final. Fukuyama no lo tiene claro. Sin embargo, es un hombre razonable, y a corto plazo, creo que estaríamos de acuerdo. “La cooperación internacional efectiva puede y ha estado construyéndose a través de la cooperación entre los estados existentes. Durante décadas las naciones han estado renunciando a aspectos de su soberanía para proteger sus intereses nacionales. Los tipos de acuerdos cooperativos necesarios para resolver muchos asuntos pueden continuar siendo abordados de esta manera”. Yo estoy de acuerdo. Pero sólo durante cierto tiempo, sólo hasta cierto punto. La verdad es que los estados nacionales siguen teniendo la capacidad de revertir estos acuerdos (ej: el Brexit). Los intereses de los demás pueden no ser tenidos lo suficientemente en cuenta (EE.UU renunciando a acuerdos sobre cambio climático), etc. Eso no debería suceder. Sólo un gobierno mundial democrático puede tener en cuenta los derechos de todos los humanos a la vez. Y no es verdad que no se han inventado maneras para que respondiera ante los ciudadanos. Ya están inventadas, y funcionan con cualquier gobierno democrático. Esa solución queda lejos, por supuesto. Los globalistas no somos ingenuos. Pero si queda lejos es por culpa de los nacionalismos. Si no existieran, no sería tan difícil. 4. Fukuyama está tan perplejo como otros intelectuales por la cuestión de la soberanía. La soberanía reside en el pueblo, y de ahí fluye la legitimidad del gobierno, pero ¿quién demonios es “el pueblo”? “[Pierre] Manent identifies a major gap in modern democratic theory. Thinkers such as Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Immanuel Kant, the authors of the Federalist Papers, and John Stuart Mill all assumed that the world was predivided into nations that formed the foundation of democratic choice. They did not provide a theory of why the border between the United States and Mexico should run along the Rio Grande, whether Alsace should belong to France or Germany, whether Quebec should be part of Canada or a “distinct society,” on what grounds Catalonia could legitimately separate itself from Spain, or what the proper level of immigration should be. Such theorizing has been left to others.[The nationalists]” Pero Fukuyama tampoco teoriza más allá de eso. 5. Sus soluciones para los problemas identitarios -Contrarrestar los abusos específicos contra la dignidad (violencia policial, machismo), que son problemas reales y urgentes que necesitan soluciones concretas -promover identidades nacionales construidas con las ideas fundacionales de la democracia liberal, y asimilar a los recién llegados a esas identidades, de manera activa -idealmente, la UE debería crear una ciudadanía única basada en la adherencia a los principios democráticos y liberales básicos; traspasar poderes de la Comisión al Parlamento, y tener un sistema educativo único. Todo esto es muy difícil actualmente. -Erigir requisitos importantes para la naturalización de los inmigrantes -Evitar la doble ciudadanía -Relacionar la identidad no con la diversidad, sino con ideas importantes como el constitucionalismo, el imperio de la ley, y la igualdad humana. Excluir de la ciudadanía a los que no las compartan. -Centrar el debate en cómo asimilar mejor a los inmigrantes. -Obligar universalmente a un servicio nacional, que podría ser militar o cívico -Asignar más recursos al control de fronteras La obra tiene una tabla de contenidos, un aparato de notas y una bibliografía. La versión electrónica no tiene un índice propiamente dicho, sólo una lista de los términos del índice del libro físico, dejando al lector la búsqueda textual electrónica. En resumen, un libro honrado y breve sobre un tema interesantísimo, pero con pocas ideas nuevas. (less) 
Absolutely fantastic book. Anyone wondering what the heck is going on in the western world - why it seems that polarization is at never-before-seen levels; why policymakers can't get anything done; why we have a President Trump; why Europe has had such trouble integrating its immigrant populations - should read this to better understand some of the root causes.
The simplicity of Fukuyama's assertion, that many of today's ills derive from a desire for dignity of self and of increasingly small groups, is the book's strength. Fukuyama covers an impressive range of psychology, philosophy, and history in making his case. And he deftly maneuvers between criticisms of the left and right in assigning "blame" for where we've gotten today. The book is timely, coming a month before the U.S. mid-term elections. I can only hope that Americans choose to elect to represent them people who take the U.S.'s national identities - of constitutionalism, commitment to the rule of law, of equal rights for all - more seriously than smaller identities, be they white nationalists, or splintered interest groups fighting the battle for most aggrieved / disenfranchised. I love some of his recommendations, among them a requirement for national service, a comprehensive deal on immigration, and reconsideration of dual nationalities. Fukuyama has done humanity a service in writing this book. I hope it gets into the hands of as many people as possible, and that Americans, and citizens everywhere, take heed of his call for a defense of liberal democracy and increased civic engagement of all citizens. Our future depends upon it.(less) 
A short, smart and thoughtful look at how our notion of “identity” has changed over the centuries, from its origins in classical culture, through the upheavals of the Reformation and, centuries later, the Industrial Revolution, the post-war shifts that led to the civil rights and women's rights movements, and on to the identity politics of our time. Fukuyama casts a wide net, drawing from such diverse sources and influences as Plato, Martin Luther, Rousseau, Adam Smith, Herbert Marcuse, religion, nationalism, social psychology, and many more sources. The historical perspective allows him to demonstrate that the word has not always meant what it does today and that numerous factors contributed to its many transformations. As he acknowledges early on, many of the chapters here began as essays, a fact made rather obvious by the repetitions the reader encounters. It's a small price to pay, I think. I can’t begin to convey the depth and probity of his argument — not while I’m limited to hunting and pecking with the wrong hand — but I will say that I see this book as nothing less than necessary. There is much to learn here and much to think about. Readers will doubtless not agree with everything Fukuyama says -- indeed, some will likely be irritated by parts of his analyses -- but if they are serious about trying to understand why our political culture is as angry and polarized as it is, they will give thought to why they disagree and what precisely they are disagreeing with. I certainly found myself thinking about things in different ways after reading the book. (less)
Combining Hegel's idea of the struggle for recognition and the identities which communities coalesce around and the problems this poses for a liberal state. Fukuyama poses the authoritarian threat of white nationalism in the wider theme of identity and the centrifugal and centripetal forces that work on a society. This a short outline of the problem of identity and its at once centripetal and then centrifugal elements which push and pull on a society. It doesn't go deep and give this topic the full treatment it deserves but it is a starter. Not bad but it could have been better for a topic that is deep and dominating out headlines. (less)
Jan 06, 2019Daniel Cunningham rated it really liked it · review of another edition
Shelves: kindle, nonfiction, econ-polisci-law, soci-edu-psych
3.5 stars: there is nothing really new here, and there is nothing horribly, terribly wrong here, either. I wish that there was a little more explicit attention paid to e.g. the history of "identity politics" as used to justify slavery, Jim Crow, etc. Then again, maybe Fukuyama felt that, especially in a short work, the obvious didn't need to be stated (if you don't understand that the power of white racism was nigh 100% expressed through identity politics, up to and including making it legal to own, torture, kill, etc. people, then you are hopelessly lost; to state it as boilerplate just to prove you know it is nothing but virtue signaling...) Nonetheless, there were a couple of moments where I was left with of a bit of a sense that a false equivalency was being made.
The biggest drawback for me was that the book, for being so short, zoomed out to the broad international, then to the US, then to the EU/EU region, back to the US, etc. A tighter focus would have helped make his point more strongly. Some reviews seem angry that Fukuyama falls into the trap of claiming that activists/minorities/women/etc. invented identity politics or some such. I do not get that read at all. Modern IP (60's - 10's) is a creature of the left. The never-quite-gone-away and neo-nativist IP of white identitarians is a reaction to that left IP. That doesn't deny the fact that there is continuity with white racisms of the past, or that racism is an animator of those politics today. What is new, what the book is about, is the growing (and some would say already outsized) role IP plays on the left, how that has displaced (imperfectly) more universal groupings, and where all that, in tandem with the already existing white racism and white identity politics that is being consolidated by the right, will lead us. I think reviews like e.g. Mehrsa'ssomewhat miss this point. It critiques like that (couched as a critique of historical accuracy) that makes me reflect on the confusions --or the continuums-- that I sum up as Identity Politics != politics with an identity != having social identities != tribalism != personal identities. A critique of the book that I would give, and a critique of the critiques I've read, is that they don't seem to acknowledge how grievance/desire for respect can move separately from political, or even social, activity. Though, I suppose, it depends on what you mean by the word. A desire for acceptance isn't necessarily the same as a desire for dignity/respect... There is definitely a lot here to think about, even if ultimately I think the book leaves a lot to be desired. (less) 
Identity Politics underlies the painful polarization Western Society is experiencing in the current decade. It is therefore critical that we come to some understanding of the idea and it’s history, current status and future. This is the theme of Fukuyama’s latest book.
He traces the notion from its roots in the shift from Hunter-Gatherer and Agrarian thru Industrial to Post-Industrial Societies and the incumbent upheavals caused by each. He traces the impact of philosophies of Rousseau, Kant, Hegel and Nietzsche, Paine, and the Reformation in developing the concepts of the Rights of Man. This history brings us to the Modern Era and the ongoing struggle between Liberalism and Nationalism we struggle with today, particularly with the introduction of the Ethno-Nationalism preached by the Ultra-Right and maybe even the push for Anarchy driven by some on the Left. The recurring theme running through Identity is that of the Thumos: the Inner Self we all possess that demands to be recognized and which demands Dignity and Respect. Those of us who lived through the Sixties will recognize the emphasis of this Inner Self in the EST, Esalen, and other Self-Actualization Movements. Fukuyama traces much of our current progress and problems to this Era which gave rise to the Civil Rights, Feminist, Environmental, LGBTQ and other associated efforts to recognize this Thumos and its associated Identity and achieve the respect and dignity each group felt it deserved. These Movements continue to evolve and splinter into sub-Movements like Black Lives Matter, Transgender Rights, etc. While he recognizes the achievements of each he also sees the danger of further and further fragmentation of our Identity into narrower groups that can be hijacked by aggrieved White Nationalists, Nazis, autocrats and demagogues. All this analysis brings the reader to a final chapter where we hope for some suggestion as to how to channel the recognized power of the Thumos into a beneficial use of Identity. Here is where the disappointment comes in. Fukuyama’s only idea is for Governments to enact policies that encourage the fusion of these splintered identities into a National Identity which transcends them. While his suggestions are praiseworthy I doubt that they can overcome the pain that rises from such a powerful inner drive not being satisfied. (less) 
Mar 12, 2019Brendan Curran rated it liked it
Fukuyama's book interprets the recent political upheaval we've seen around the globe from a top-down, macro-level point of view. "Thumos", which roughly translates as the need for respect and validity, has been absent in many of the population centers where we are seeing increasing polarization, nationalism, and extremist fervor.
I think his illustration of the problem is compelling and mostly convincing. It is, like all such arguments, incomplete, but precision is not its intent, nor where it can impart value. It's an engaging mental exercise that helps us conceive of trends. It can help inform bottom-up decision making, but I think it would be a grave mistake to take an argument like this and allow it to *drive* decision making. That's a very poor strategy for solving pernicious and deeply entrenched problems. It would have been much better if Fukuyama had illustrated his theory for us and left it at that. Instead, he concludes his narrative by proposing a bunch of half-baked solutions. They're castles in the air that completely discard the very complex set of incentives that guide nation building, statesmanship, and constituencies. The argument goes something like: identity only serves to fracture a sense of unity with one's state and fellow citizens. If we could all just untether ourselves from our localized identities and their consequential politics, and instead rally around ideas of equality, dignity, etc, wouldn't we all be better off? C'mon, man. The other obvious counterpoint is that, in many contexts, such an outlook fails to appreciate or solve for the antagonism states often have with minority populations. It may be easy to suggest in a book that BLM activists should discard their "identity politics" in order to help build a state that "respects their dignity", but this infantile suggestion doesn't approximate anything actionable or credible. Anyway, that conclusion left a sour taste in my mouth, and made it hard to appreciate what was up until then a well reasoned analysis. (less) 
Dec 06, 2018Holly Law rated it really liked it · review of another edition
Shelves: politics, eu, identity, britain, brexit, philosophy, america, non-fiction, class
What a fascinating book. Not only was the content interesting, but the structure was brilliant - the author kept chapters short and consistently recapped and built his argument which made a fairly theoretical work really quite accessible.
While I disagreed with many of the prescriptions in the concluding chapter, I am thankful for being given the opportunity to re-conceptualise my taken-for-granted assumptions and ideas about identity politics being a ‘good thing’. Being ideologically left leaning, I need to give some more thought to the idea that my comrades are part of the problem I situated at the opposite end of the political spectrum. Are we as guilty as dividing as the right? Solidarity as a concrete aspiration is what I’m going to be thinking about tonight. (less) 
Oct 11, 2018John Tyson rated it really liked it
Fukuyama discusses certain merits and a list of drawbacks associated with identity politics, ultimately condemning them for the role they have played in the breakdown of civil public discourse and fracturing national identities.
I enjoyed more the second half of the book as he shifted away from framing his argument and toward real life examples about the EU, USA and other recent and modern case studies. His thoughts are eloquently articulated, and it’s a quick read. He casually makes some fairly radical suggestions at the end. I liked his arguments.(less) |
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