알라딘: 새롭게 밝혀낸 한국전쟁의 기원과 진실 John Merrill, Korea: The Peninsular Origins of the War.

알라딘: 새롭게 밝혀낸 한국전쟁의 기원과 진실
Korea: The Peninsular Origins of the War. 





새롭게 밝혀낸 한국전쟁의 기원과 진실
존 메릴 (지은이), 이종찬, 김충남 (옮긴이) 두산동아 2004-01-31

목차

한국어판 발간에 즈음하여

머리말

1 한국전쟁에 얽힌 의문

2 너무도 잔인했던 1948년 봄

3 남북한 정권의 수립

4 여수 순천 10.19 사건

5 38선 무력 충돌과 여름철 게릴라 공세

6 1949~50년 동계 공비 토벌 작전

7 한국전쟁 직전의 남북한 정세

8 한국전쟁은 공산화 전략의 최후 수단

역자후기

주해

참고 문헌

찾아 보기

==

목차

[ 1 . 한국전쟁에 얽힌 의문 ]

. 소련의 사주로 보는 미국

. 신빙성이 낮은 흐루시초프 회고록

. 북침이라고 우기는 북한

. 이승만의 음모라는 수정주의자들

. 김일성 정권의 파벌 투쟁의 산물

. 강대국 정치의 산물

[ 2 . 너무도 잔인햇던 1948년 봄 ]

. 총파업 투쟁에 나선 남로당

. 제주의 비극은 시작되고

. 평양으로 간 김구와 김규식

. 남한에서 선거는 이루어지고

[ 3 . 남북한 정권의 수립 ]

. 제주도의 유혈 사태는 계속되고

. 조직 재정비에 나선 남로당

. 강동정치학원의 게릴라 양성

. 8월 '지하 선거'와 '해주 회의'

. 대한민국 정부의 수립

[ 4 . 여수 순천 10.19 사건 ]

. 제주 파견에 항거한 반란군

. 힘겨웠던 '여수 순천 10.19 사건' 진압 작전

. '축복으로 바뀐 비극'

. 지리산 빨치산이 된 반란 세력

. 다시 불타는 제주

. 평양의 계획과 어긋난 '여수 순천 10.19 사건'

[ 5 . 38선 무력 충돌과 여름철 게릴라 공세 ]

. 제주도는 평정되고

. 제주를 찾은 이승만 대통령

. 김일성의 소련 방문과 '통일전선' 결성

[ 6 . 1949년 ~ 50년 동계 공비 토벌 작전 ]

. 웅진 반도에서의 군사 충돌

. 총공세에 나선 인민유격대

. 새로운 전략을 모색한 공산 세력

. 게릴라 토벌에 열중한 남한 정부

. 곤경에 처한 이승만 정부

[ 7 . 한국전쟁 직전의 남북한 정세 ]

. 5.30 국회의원 선거

. 통일 선전 공세에 나선 평양

. 김일성의 남침 결정

[ 8 . 한국전쟁은 공산화 전략의 최후 수단 ]

. 남한 내의 공산 게릴라 투쟁

. 남북한 관계

. 북한의 정책 결정 과정

. 국제적 여건

  

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저자 소개
지은이: 존 메릴
저자파일 신간알리미 신청
최근작 : <새롭게 밝혀낸 한국전쟁의 기원과 진실> … 총 1종 (모두보기)
하버드 대학굥서 석사 학위를, 델라웨어 주립대학에서 정치학 박사 학위를 받았다. 미국의 한반도 문제 전문가로서 오랫동안 국무부 동북아지역 정세분석관으로 재직하였따. 존스 홉킨스 대학교 국제대학원, 조지타운 대학교, 조지 워싱턴 대학교, 라파에트 대학교, 델라웨어 대학교, 고려 대학교, 워싱턴 전략 및 국제 관계 센터 등에서 강의 및 연구 활동을 해 왔다. 본 저서 외에도 몇 권의 저서와 수많은 논문을 발표하였다.


옮긴이: 이종찬
저자파일 신간알리미 신청
육군사관학교를 졸업하고 서울대 행정대학원에서 석사 학위를 받았다. 최근의 저서로는 세계화와 한국의 발전 방향을 다룬 <세계로 가는 길목을 잡아라>가 있다.


옮긴이: 김충남
저자파일 신간알리미 신청
최근작 : <한국의 10대 리스크>,<미국의 21세기 전쟁>,<당신이 알아야 할 한국 현대사> … 총 9종 (모두보기)
육군사관학교(21기)와 서울대 대학원을 졸업했으며 미국 미네소타대학교에서 정치학 박사를 받은 후 육군사관학교와 외교안보연구원 교수를 지냈다. 청와대에서 사정비서관, 정무비서관, 공보비서관으로 전두환, 노태우, 김영삼 등 세 분의 대통령을 9년여에 걸쳐 보좌했다. 하와이 동서문화센터(East-West Center)에서 10여 년간 연구위원으로 재직하면서 대통령 리더십 연구에 전념한 바 있고, 뒤이어 세종연구소 객원연구위원을 지냈으며, 현재 한국군사문제연구원 객원연구위원으로 있다.
저서로는 『성공한 대통령 실패한 대통령』, 『대통령과 국가경영』, The Korean Presidents: Leadership for Nation Building, 『대통령과 국가경영 2』, 『일등국민 일류국가』, 『민주시대 한국 안보의 재조명』, 『당신이 알아야 할 한국현대사』 등이 있다.

===

Korea: The Peninsular Origins of the War. By JoHN MERRILL. Newark:
University of Delaware Press, 1989. iv, 237 pp.
Who was responsible for initiating the Korean Conflict in June 1950? Did Stalin or Truman start the war? Or was it Kim Il Sung or Syngman Rhee who initiated the war? Was this an international war or a civil conflict? 

Putting these questions in reverse, who could have stopped the Korean War: Syngman Rhee, Truman, Kim Il Sung, or Stalin? These and other related questions are refreshingly significant, especially as we recall this tragic conflict more than forty years later.

In this relatively short but in-depth study, originally his dissertation, John Merrill, has succeeded in summarizing contending theories of the conflict. By utilizing  American archival materials, Korean sources, extensive interviews, and radio monitoring reports, he has examined the highly confusing and contentious internal setting of Korea in the aftermath of the country's liberation in 1945.

 Stressing the importance of what he calls "the Third World Nationalism," he has carefully reviewed in detail extremely chaotic conditions in Korea, particularly in the south, in a search for possible internal answers to the origins of the Korean War (pp. 20-21). In this sense, Merrill's study is complementary to Bruce Cumings' Origins of the Korean War (1981). Both studies emphasize that the war was not only international but also for civil and revolutionary in character.

Particularly useful is Merrill's first chapter summarizing competing theories about the outbreak of the war. A prominent explanation, of course, focuses on the powers struggle between Kim Il Sung and Pak Hong-yong as a contributing factor to the exaggerated North Korean confidence that their victory was certain. The Kim-Pak power struggle probably concerned who could better convince Stalin that a war for the unification could be won, and a critical element in the equation was the strength of the Communist guerrilla forces in the south. 

Subsequently, it has been revealed that both Kim and Pak, for their own differing reasons, grossly exaggerated the strength of these southern guerrilla forces. Steadily increasing border clashes along the 38th parallel interrupted communication with the southern Communists, while Seoul's successful anti-guerrilla campaign greatly reduced the influence of the Communist guerrillas under Pak's leadership. Unable to function effectively because of the pursuit by southern police, Pak fled to Pyongyang in 1947 thereby clearly indicating the weakened state of Communist guerrilla forces in the south.

After arriving in Pyongyang, Pak was appointed foreign minister under Kim Il Sung, even though his credentials in the ranks of the Korean Communist movement of were superior to Kim's. Pak's flight from the south diminished his standing in Pyongyang and Moscow, but the full significance of the guerrilla weakness in the south apparently was not accurately understood in either capital. Pak appears to
have continued overestimating the potential of the southern guerrilla forces to Kim, Khrushchev in his Glasnost Tapes (1990) informs us that Kim claimed to his
Soviet mentors to have established large networks of guerrilla forces in the south, and said these were ready for military action. Kim's certainty of success in militarily unifying Korea appears in considerable measure to have rested on his expectations about the southern guerrillas, but after June 25th there was no massive uprising by these forces. Pak eventually had to pay a price for his role in the general Soviet-North Korean miscalculations about the southern guerrillas. He was tried in Pyongyang in 1956-57 for treason as a U.S. spy, and among the charges was the accusation that he deliberately misled Kim by overstating the strength of the southern guerrilla forces.


===

Korea: The Peninsular Origins of the War, by John Merrill. Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1989. 237 pp. Map, bibliography, index. $32.50 

Harry Truman had a simple explanation of the origins of the Korean War. Soviet leader Joseph Stalin, the president claimed, ordered North Korea to invade South Korea as part of his plan for global conquest. Alternative theories usually have been more complex, with an increasing number of writers in recent years viewing the conflict as a civil war. John Merrill, in Korea: The Peninsular Origins of the War, reexamines the role of "both local and international factors" (p. 189) in the origins of the Korean War, focusing primarily on "the escalating hostility between the rival Korean governments in the years before the war" (p. 20). While revisionists have discussed the local dimensions of the conflict, they "impute an excessive degree of autonomy to the North Korean leadership" (p. 181). "Almost nothing has been written," the author contends, "on how North Korean unification policy was influenced by the guerrilla struggle in the South and the clashes along the thirty-eighth parallel" (p. 54). Successfully providing "a better understanding " (p. 16) of the Korean War, Merrill concludes that North Korea's attack on June 15, 1950, "was the last link in this chain of political violence" (p. 20). Korea: The Peninsular Origins of the War begins with a useful appraisal of five leading interpretations of the outbreak of the Korean conflict. "None of these theories," Merrill demonstrates, "provides a comprehensive explanation for the origins of the war" (p. 53). Of special value is his detailed assessment of the validity of Nikita Khrushchev's memoirs, which he labels "an intriguing blend of fact and fancy" (p. 29). Attention then shifts to describing the emerging pattern of "ongoing civil strife" (p. 21) in South Korea following American military occupation in 1945. "The roots of the war can be traced to the division of the country," the author asserts, "but the more serious violence began after the two superpowers started to disengage from Korea early in 1948" (p. 181). To prove his point Merrill presents the best factual and interpretational coverage yet available of such key events as the South Korean elections of 1948, the North-South Unification Conference, the Cheju-do Uprising, and the Yösu-Sunch'ön Rebellion . 

When American troops withdrew in June 1949, six months after the Soviets, "the lines of the future conflict were essentially drawn" (p. 97). Ironically the unplanned violence in South Korea not only "came as an unpleasant surprise to the North," (p. 70) but it strengthened Syngman Rhee's regime. While police arrested or killed Communist agitators, "hawkish southern commanders" (p. 136), with Rhee's encouragement, launched a series of military thrusts north of the thirty-eighth parallel in the spring of 1949. At first, "Pyongyang adopted a defensive stance . . . , concentrating on building a 'revolutionary base' in the North while supporting the insurgency ... in the South" (p. 136). But this strategy failed, as its calls for reunification had little impact on South Korea and Rhee's army crushed the Odae-san, Chiri-san, and T'aebaek-san guerrillas . International factors then increased the likelihood of war. Moscow's strengthening of North Korea's "armed forces . . . created a serious military imbalance on the peninsula" (p. 188), while U.S. criticism of Rhee's government undermined the credibility of its commitment to defend South Korea. By June 1950, "North Korean hopes of achieving unification by forming a united front with southern opponents of Rhee, by infiltrating [Republic of Korea...