Child Of Conflict
by Bruce Cumings, Editor
Publication date 1983
Topics Foreign relations, Korea, history, Korean war, 1950-1953, United states, foreign relations, korea, Cold War, Bruce Cumings, Korean Question, post-wwii history
Collection opensource
Language English
====
"This book contains nine essays and two commentaries. All except two essays are on United States policy dealing with the Korean question between 1943 and 1953.
Eight articles which dealt with the birth of a "child of conflict" are:
- "Introduction: The Course of Korean-American Relations, 1943- 1953" by .Bruce Cumings;
- "Diplomacy Delayed: The Atomic Bomb and the Division of Korea, 1945" by Mark Paul;
- "U.S. Decisions on Korean Policy, 1943-1950: Some Hypotheses" by Stephen Pelz;
- "Korea: Test Case of Containment in Asia" by James Matray;
- "The March to the Yalu: The Perspective from Washington" by William Stueck;
- "The Origins of the American Security Commitment to Korea" by John Kotch;
- "The Struggle over the Korean Armistice: Prisoners of Reparation?" by Barton Berstein; and
- "Internal Warfare in Korea, 1948-1950: The Local Setting of the Korean War" by John Merrill.
- The last chapter entitled "Records in the National Archives Relating to Korea, 1945-1950" is by Jack Baunders.
Though not complete, it includes an index. There is no bibliography.
Although this is not the first book which dealt with Korean-American relations of the period, to those who are interested in studies in comparative international development this book will not only be valuable, but also stimulating and provocative. Essays in the book delved into the process of policy adoption, shifts in policy under a constantly changing international environment, and motives behind each policy. Factors which shaped Korean-American relations during the period are carefully explored. The overall theme seems to be "inconsistencies in U.S. policy," and most essays seem to point toward "failures of American policy" in dealing with the Soviet Union in general, and the Korean question in particular.
Several essays have been published in the English language which dealt with United States policy toward Korea and Korean-American relations. In addition, several collections of English language essays have appeared recently either in connection with the commemoration of the 110th anniversary of the General Sherman case of 1866 or the centennial of U.S.-Korean relations (1882-1982). A book which dealt with United States policy and the Korean-American relationship of the 1940-1950 period was published a decade and a half ago, and a few books dealing with the Korean War and United States policy toward Korea have also been published. Professor Cumings himself has authored an excellent book entitled The Origins of the Korean Book Reviews 79 War: Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes, 1945-1947 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981). However, this collection of critical essays is the first volume "based entirely on'; recently declassified archival materials relating to United States foreign policy which affected the fate of Korea, and thereby increased the knowledge about the history of Korea of the period. Although these essays did not overturn the already established facts or notions related to United States policy toward Korea, every essay in this collection reflects revisionist views, be it on United States policy, or origins of the Korean War, and has added new dimensions to studies on United States foreign policy and diplomacy.
The authors have amply demonstrated their competency and serious scholarship as well as their knowledge about the making of United States policy, its implementation, and the Korean situation, some factual errors notwithstanding. These factual errors are minor in nature. For example, unlike what Cumings said, there are no "Pacific ports of North Korea" (37); the North-South talk took place in Pyongyang and not in Haeju as Merrill pointed out (139); and Paek Son-yop was not prime minister of South Korea as Kotch stated (249). Cumings' statement that "tens of thousands of Korean soldiers who fought with the Chinese Communists" entered North Korea in 1949 and 1950 (54) is misleading. In effect, some 25,000 of the disarmed Korean Communists entered North Korea in these years. The statement made by Pelz regarding the number of casualties in the rebellion on Cheju Island is inconsistent. Was it 15 percent (139) or 10 percent (141) of the island's population who lost their lives?
In his lengthy essay Cumings analyzed the shift in United States foreign policy from Roosevelt's internationalism to Truman's containment/rollback policy. At the same time his essay attempted with candor to uncover Acheson's hidden motive of excluding South Korea from the United States defense perimeter. His thesis is that Acheson "wished to shape a defense policy [and] create a situation in which the offense would blunder" (48), Cumings suggested that Acheson may have deliberately misled the North Koreans to start a war (44-49). According to Cumings, the Korean War, "a civil and revolutionary war" (53), was started by the North Koreans and not by Stalin (48, 54-55). Therefore, Cumings believes the rollback policy of the Truman administration was based on wrong assumption (53-55), and it failed to achieve its objectives. Cumings steadfastly argued that the goal of United States policy toward Korea should have been, and should still be, to bring about a democratic Korean government (17).
In his article Paul seems to have failed to establish a credible and indisputable fact that there is a direct relationship between the atomic bomb and the division of Korea, although he hinted that perhaps because of American atomic bombs Stalin was compelled to accept unilateral decisions made by the United States regarding Korea, Japan and Manchuria (88, 90). 80 Studies in Comparative International Development / Summer 1984
According to Pelz, the Korean War came because the United States never made a conclusive decision to hold Korea, and it failed to make a credible military threat against the Soviet Union (94, 119, 134). Roosevelt's mishandling of the Korean issue and Truman's mismanagement of foreign and military affairs are carefully examined (98-100). Pelz believes that the Korean tragedy could have been avoided, if Korea was made a neutral nation, or the United States "allowed the Russians to assume the occupation duties for the four trustees in Korea" (105). What would have been the result of Soviet occupation of entire Korea? Pelz ignored this important question. Be that as it may, discounting hitherto maintained views regarding the character of the Truman administration's foreign policy, Pelz presented his own hypothesis related to Korea policy of the Truman administration that the self-satisfying decision-making led the Truman administration to get into trouble, and that erroneous perceptions and domestic political considerations led Truman to adopt a "poor" Korea policy (131-132).
Merrile's thesis on the local origin of the Korean War endorsed the views of Cumings and Pelz that the Korean War was "a civil and revolutionary war" (159-162). Matray's careful study revealed that Korea was a test case of containment policy of the Truman administration, however ineffectively it was applied, and that Korea eventually became far more important to the Truman administration than was previously believed (192).
While Stueck presented indisputable evidence that the crossing of the 38th parallel by United Nations troops was authorized by the American government, and it was a mistake to do so (216, 236, 237), Kotch revealed an astonishing fact, which had hitherto been unknown to many, that the United States government did not hesitate to contemplate and formulate a plan to overthrow the South Korean government of Rhee when the Korean president refused to cooperate with the Americans (244-249, 257).
The last essay by Berstein pointed out how difficult it was to negotiate a truce with the Communists. Saunders offered valuable information concerning new source materials on North Korea in the National Archives (325-326).
The essays are written in clear, scholarly language and are easy to follow. The authors made significant contribution toward the understanding of the ways in which United States policy toward Korea was formulated, revised, and executed or failed to be carried out. With their revisionist views, the authors increased the need to investigate the subject further, as they provoked serious academic discourses on the subject matter. Undoubtedly, this book has enriched the field of literature on the postwar United States foreign policy which gave a birth to a "child of conflict."
— review by Andrew C. Nahm, Western Michigan University
====
e access to 500,000+ books in court this week. Join us!
BOOKS
VIDEO
AUDIO
SOFTWARE
IMAGES
My uploads
My loans
My favorites
My lists
My collections
My web archives
Account settings
Get help
Log out
Search metadata
Search text contents
Search TV news captions
Search radio transcripts
Search archived web sites
Advanced Search
ABOUT BLOG PROJECTS HELP DONATE CONTACT JOBS VOLUNTEER PEOPLE
Full text of "Child Of Conflict"
See other formats
Child of Conflict
The Korean-American
Relationship, 1943-1953
Edited by Bruce Cumings
“ re ey meee QOL ee eee,
Y
j
I
Child of Conflict
The Korean-American
Relationship, 1943-1953
Edited by Bruce Cumings
This collection of essays is the first volume
based entirely on recently declassified archival
materials relating to U.S. policy toward Korea
in the early post-war period. Departing from
accepted interpretations of events, the eleven
historians and political scientists here present
highly stimulating views on a wide range of is-
sues surrounding the Korean War.
Mark Paul's article is perhaps the most authori-
tative study of how the division of Korea oc-
curred in August 1945. A treatment of the guer-
rilla movement in South Korea during the late
forties is given by John Merrill. His essay,
which is critiqued by Jon Halliday, develops a
new argument on the internal origins of the Ko-
rean War. James I. Matray analyzes U.S. policy
in Korea as a test case of containment and sug-
gests that Korea became far more important to
the Truman administration’s overall approach
to Asia than was previously believed. William
Stueck reconstructs the process that led to the
crucial decision to march north of the thirty-
eighth parallel and John Kotch discusses the
1953 negotiations at Panmunjom and those re-
sulting in the U.S.-Korea Mutual Defense
Treaty.
Barton Bernstein focuses on the lengthy negoti-
ations to end the war, and particularly on the
tactics and goals of the Truman administration.
In the concluding essav, Jack Saunders, an ar-
chivist with the National Records Center, pro-
vides a thorough bibliographical guide to the
extensive archives on the U.S. occupation of
Korea. Bruce Cumings contributes a long intro-
duction. commented on by Llovd Gardner,
which surveys Korean-American relations be-
tween 1943-1953. He outlines the kev tenets of
U.S. foreign policy during that era and argues
that preventine Russian daminatior ir tne Pa-
cific was the fundamental monve behin US
actions.
Bruce Cumings is associate professor of interna-
tional studies and political science at the Uni-
versity of Washington. He recently won the
Harry S. Truman Book Award for The Origz:s of
the Korean War: Liberation and the Emergence of
Separate Regimes, 1945-47.
Publications on Asia of the School of Interna-
tional Studies 37
University of Washington Press
Seattle and London
Sponsored by the Korea Program
of the School of International Studies
Dedicated to
James B. Palais
Copyright ©1983 by the University of Washington Press
Printed in the United States of America
All rights reserved, No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted
in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical including photocopy, record-
ing, or any information storage or retrieval system without permission in writing
from the publisher.
This book has been published with the assistance of a grant from
the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation
Display art: traditional Korean folk designs
End papers: a typical pattern for a Korean book cover
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Main entry under title:
Child of conflict.
(Publications on Asia of the School of International
Studies, University of Washington ; no. 37)
Includes index.
1. United States—Foreign relations—K orea— Addresses,
essays, lectures. 2. Korea— Foreign relations—United
States—Addresses, essays, lectures. I. Cumings, Bruce,
1945- . IL. Series: Publications on Asia
of the School of International Studies, University of
Washington; v. 37.
E18S.8.K6C45 1983 $27,519073 82-48871
ISBN 0-295-95995-9
A Fe hss
JUNG S. KIM LIBRAKY
b yo
CHILD OF CONFLICT
The Korean-American Relationship,
1943-1953
Edited by
Bruce Cumings
UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON PRESS
SEATTLE AND LONDON
Contents
Preface
Introduction: The Course of Korean-American
Relations, 1943-1953
Bruce Cumings
Commentary, Lloyd Gardner
Diplomacy Delayed: The Atomic Bomb and
the Division of Korea, 1945
Mark Paul
U.S. Decisions on Korean Policy, 1943-1950: Some Hypotheses
Stephen Pelz
Internal Warfare in Korea, 1948-1950:
The Local Setting of the Korean War
John Merrill
Commentary, Jon Halliday
Korea: Test Case of Containment in Asia
James I. Matray
The March to the Yalu: The Perspective from Washington
William Stueck
The Origins of the American Security Commitment to Korea
John Kotch
Vii
Or
~]
133
163
169
239
Vili
CONTENTS
The Struggle over the Korean Armistice:
Prisoners of Repatriation?
Barton J. Bernstein 261
Records in the National Archives Relating to Korea, 1945-1950
Jack Saunders 309
Contributors oer
Index 329
Preface
IT IS A REMARKABLE PARADOX THAT A RELATIONSHIP AS LONG AND AS INTENSE
as that between the United States and Korea should be so unstudied.
For almost four decades the Korean peninsula has been a matter of
concern to American security, thousands of Americans have been in
day-to-day interaction with the political, military, and economic
realities of Korea, and millions of Americans have set foot in what
was, until 1945, a country perceived in the West as a ‘‘Hermit Kingdom,”’
a backwater, or a minor appendage to the grander problems of Japan,
China, or Russia. Yet in spite of such intense contact, familiarity has
bred in the American mind not understanding and empathy, for the
most part; the phenomenon of the Sinophile or Japanophile who
bridges two cultures and creates understanding is almost unknown. In
the scholarly world Korea retains its former status, a little ganglion
attached to considerations of Japan or China, and there has been
very little systematic work in the postwar era focusing on Korea or
the peculiar problems of the close, and often conflicting Korean-
American relationship.
For Koreans, however, two American landings at the port of
Inch’6n transformed their country utterly, orienting it away from the
ix
x PREFACE
age-old concerns of its relationship with Japan, China, or Russia. The
first landing, on September 8, 1945, inaugurated an American occu-
pation that did not finally end until June 1949 and that had, if any-
thing, a deeper and more lasting effect than the American occupation
had on Japan. The second landing, in September 1950, defeated the
most serious Korean attempt at ousting the American presence, and
raised the possibility of a peninsula entirely unified and aligned with
the United States. Now China was also threatened, however, and so the
expansion of American influence to the Yalu River was thrown back; the
pre-1950 status quo was restored, and it has remained to this day:
4 divided Korea, with both Koreas in their own way viewing the Ameri-
can problem as their cardinal concern. Events in the United States,
whether a new foreign policy doctrine, a Democrat replacing a Repub-
lican in the White House, or (for South Korea) a new fad or fashion
in the mass media or in scholarly circles, immediately refract their
effects on Korea and Koreans. Yet for Americans events in Korea
remain distant, problematic, ill-understood, or simply of no concern
or moment. A South Korean president is shot by his intelligence
chief, and the event is forgotten within weeks; the North Koreans
change their policy on unification and American newspapers report
it in a three-line blurb.
Such unconcern with the Korean-American relationship has been
replicated in scholarly circles as well. Although a small cadre of spe-
cialists on Korea quietly toils away at producing an article here and a
volume there, the effect has not been great. No American has yet
produced a scholarly and thoroughly informed history of Korea. The
best English-language survey of Korea’s colonial decades appeared in
1944; the standard work on the American occupation, a book limited
largely to one province, was published in 1951 and has been out of
print for years.! Many have written on the South Korean political
process since 1945, but this literature tends to view Korea through
the lenses of the dominant and sometimes irrelevant concerns of
American political science; when a revolt or a regime change occurs,
it usually does so as mysteriously to our scholars as to our State Depart-
ment. Studies of North Korea go on mostly within the comfortable but
confining limits of an anachronistic Cold War framework. When one
1. See Andrew Grajdanzev, Modern Korea (New York: Institute for Pacific
Relations, 1944), and E. Grante Meade, American Military Government in Korea
(New York: King’s Crown Press, 1951). An exception to my judgment on the
field would certainly be Gregory Henderson’s Korea: The Politics of the Vortex
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968), which broke much new ground on
the period 1945-53, while covering the last century of Korea’s history.
|
PREFACE xi
compares the literature of today to what we had a decade ago on Korea,
of course, there is much to be thankful for. But when we compare it to
that on China, Japan, or Vietnam, we quickly become aware of our
plight.
This volume represents a small effort toward remedying some of
these difficulties; it also in some ways reflects the difficulties of doing
so. All the authors have the virtue of bringing new and interesting
materials to bear on the Korean-American relationship and its problems,
yet in all but one case the new materials are entirely from the American
side. The wealth of recently declassified archival documentation from
the 1940s and early 1950s makes possible for the first time (in my view)
the writing of the history of the early postwar period in Korea. The
authors have all immersed themselves deeply in such materials, dis-
tilling from them a new understanding of the origin of our involvement
in that part of the world. As they liberated secret materials and new
facts, they also emancipated their minds from the crusty verities of the
1950s that still dominate studies of the Korean-American relationship.
But the presentations remain partial, because so much remains to be
done on the Korean side of things and, of course, on the Russian and
Chinese sides (although here the authors can hardly be blamed for not
viewing materials that have been sealed and will be sealed for genera-
tions).
The alpha and the omega of the period here studied, unfortunately,
involved either the use or the threat of atomic bombs. Mark Paul finds
in the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki a key to under-
standing American diplomacy toward Korea in 1945, or rather, the
lack of serious diplomacy. John Kotch shows us that President Eisen-
hower’s purported threat to unleash atomic warfare on North Korea
was much less important in getting a settlement at P’anmunjom than
was Syngman Rhee in seeking to prevent it. My essay seeks to stretch
the period a bit to find three critical shifts in American policy toward
Korea from 1943 to 1953. The first shift, and the grandest, occurred a
year and a half after Pearl Harbor, when President Franklin Delano
Roosevelt included Korea in his plans for postwar trusteeships over
former colonies. Having blessed Japanese control of Korea in 1905
(another Roosevelt did this) and never challenging it thereafter, the
United States now dropped its policy of unconcern with and noninterfer-
ence in Korea for an internationalist policy seeking to enmesh Korea, and
the Soviets, in an American-managed postwar condominium. This pol-
icy then gave way to de facto containment in 1945 and formal contain-
ment in 1949 and 1950. The third shift occurred when the United States
embarked on a rollback mission in the fall of 1950.
oe | “4b gee
xii PREFACE
At each stage of American policy major elements of the Korean
population in the North and South resisted it: this is perhaps the most
neglected element of postwar historiography on Korea, and this is
why John Merrill’s article is so important. To begin with, it is the first sys-
tematic treatment of the little-known but important guerrilla conflict in
South Korea; based primarily on American archival materials from the
period, it demonstrates that the movement was much bigger and more
long-lasting than had been thought. Second, the material illustrates the
earlier point that no full treatment of the late 1940s is possible simply
from the American side of things; Koreans were active, and in this case
violent, in opposing American policy and continually thwarted the best
laid plans of policymakers in the comfortable confines of Washington
or Foggy Bottom. Third, Merrill’s paper must raise the question of
when the Korean War really began. With one hundred thousand dead
before the shots were fired in June 1950, his argument that the war
had civil rather than international origins seems persuasive; with the ap-
parent defeat of the southern partisans in early 1950, the civil conflict
became skewed toward conventional military encounter. Last, Merrill
also seeks a model that explains such insurgencies, a matter that Jon
Halliday takes up in his useful commentary on the Merrill paper.
The violence and disorder of the American occupation was best
known to the U.S. military, not surprisingly, and they first imple-
mented in action the policy known as containment. Yet, as James
Matray and I argue, it was the State Department that was most anxious
formally to apply the containment doctrine to Korea, whereas the mili-
tary departments tended to be more reticent, more aware of the limits
to American power in Asia. Matray makes a major contribution show-
ing how Korea was very nearly included with Greece and Turkey
in the planning of the Truman Doctrine in the spring of 1947. Few have
made this case before, and indeed it runs counter to the conventional
historiography on the Cold War, but Matray marshals entirely persuasive
evidence to defend his position. Furthermore, close readers of Matray’s
essay, my own, and the interesting commentary by Lloyd Gardner,
will be able to understand that in the minds of certain key State De-
partment planners, Dean Acheson especially, containment had been
applied to Korea in 1947; it just had not been funded properly by Con-
egress, or backed properly by the military.
Dr. Matray probably would not agree with everything in my essay,
however, and my interpretation of rollback in the fall of 1950 conflicts
here and there with the essays by Stephen Pelz and William Stueck. But
that is all well and good; it gives the reader something to think about.
Dr, Pelz uses the new documentation to place the Korean decision within
PREFACE xii
the context of bureaucratic politics and decision-making theory, and
provides a window on domestic politics that is most welcome. Dr. Stueck
brings out a wealth of new material in his article, and he also demon-
strates that secret documents often are as confirmatory of what we
thought happened as revelatory of hidden facts.
When American rollback met Chinese rollback, with a vengeance,
the Korean War was pushed back to the vicinity of the thirty-eighth
parallel—where the problems began in the first place, and where they
have yet to be resolved. In this sense the Korean War accomplished
nothing, only a restoration of the pre-war status quo at great human
cost, especially to Koreans. Yet John Kotch’s essay demonstrates
that the war did much for the Republic of Korea, through tempestuous
negotiations no doubt, even to the point of a possible coup against
Syngman Rhee, but with a final result that enmeshed South Korea in a
security system that has held the peace for thirty years. Barton Bernstein
analyzes just how long, tough, and usually fruitless the negotiation was
that finally ended the war. These last two years—summer 1951 to sum-
mer 1953—saw a more limited war than the first year, since super-
power conflict was now unlikely. Yet during this period unprecedented
bloodletting and the virtual pulverization of northern Korea from the
air took place—all for a bit of land here, a bit of negotiating advantage
there. The last two years of the war have not been as well studied as the
earlier part, and Bernstein’s account must now be the definitive one.
John Saunder’s bibliographical essay caps the volume; it is the only
survey available on the voluminous holdings in the National Archives on
postwar Korea and American policy. Those who have used these papers
will know what a great service he has done, and how much remains to
be digested on the Korean-American relationship in the early postwar era.
As this preface is being written, nearly three decades after the end
of the war, I am reminded of how much about the postwar Korean-
American relationship remains the same. American policy remains com-
mitted to a safe, middling option: containment. This is the lesson that
the Chinese and the North Koreans taught. The option of American
withdrawal was briefly aired again in the the late 1970s, and just as
quickly dropped. Mercifully, rollback is unlikely to be tried again. Still
containing communism in the North, the United States daily confronts
but will never consult with the northern leadership. Perhaps it is time to
revive the policy never really tried: Rooseveltian internationalism, with
its emphasis on diplomacy, accommodation, and multilaterality.
The essays in this volume were originally prepared for two confer-
ences on Korean-American relations held in Seattle in 1978 and 1980,
OOO
xiv PREPACE
Both were aspects of a larger project on Korean-American relations
begun at the University of Washington in 1977 and continuing to 1981,
funded under two grants from the Henry Luce Foundation. The pur-
pose of the first conference was to bring together younger scholars
working on or just having completed doctoral dissertations on the sub-
ject of the project—especially scholars who have utilized the vast array
of documentation on American policy toward Korea in the period from
World War II through the Korean War that was declassified during the
1970s. More senior scholars were invited to the 1978 conference as
discussants. The second conference dealt more directly with the Korean
War, with several papers by senior scholars. The discussion at both con- CHILD OF CONFLICT
ferences was memorable in its intensity and spiritedness; both were
rare occasions when people of diverse views have at each other in the
sole interest of informed intellectual exchange. Although only a por-
tion of that commentary has been reproduced in this volume, all the
authors benefited greatly from the discussion, and we would like to
thank in particular Frank Baldwin, Daniel Chirot, Roger Dingman,
Herbert Ellison, Lloyd Gardner, Jon Halliday, Donald Hellmann, James
Kurth, Okonogi Masao, Otis Pease, Michael Robinson, Dae-sook Suh,
and Robert Swartout. Special thanks are owed to James B. Palais, who
has given unstintingly of his time, expertise, and intelligence through-
out the project, and who, in typical fashion, debated any and all issues
arising during the conferences. Dr. Palais, along with George Beckmann
and Kenneth Pyle of the University of Washington, helped to obtain
funding from the Henry Luce Foundation for the project and we are
all in their debt.
Also deserving of thanks are David Satterwhite, who worked dili-
gently and efficiently on various administrative details connected with
the conferences, and Suhaini Azmad who typed the final manuscript.
I wish to thank the School of International Studies at the University
of Washington for providing its expert services. Two anonymous out-
side readers for the University of Washington Press also provided use-
ful comments and criticisms. I was helped immensely by the profes-
sional editorial services of Margery Lang and Judy Robertson. It goes
without saying that all responsibility for errors and for interpretations
rests with the editor and the authors.
Introduction: The Course of
Korean-American Relations,
1943-1953
BRUCE CUMINGS
AT THE VERY EARLY POINT OF AUTUMN, 1943, LESS THAN TWO YEARS AFTER
Pearl Harbor, State Department planners defined Soviet control of
all Korea as a likely threat to the security of the postwar Pacific.
This basic position persisted down to the decision to intervene in
the Korean War in June 1950. It persisted through various policies
that sought to reconcile American interest in Korean and Pacific
security with the obvious limits to American power, limits that were
often called to the attention of State Department officials by military
planners.
The first formal Korea policy—commitment to a multilateral
This article represents a first effort to record the results of my research on the
period from 1947 to 1950. Much remains to be done, and a fuller account will
appear in the second volume of my Origins of the Korean War. Earlier versions of
this article were presented at the annual meeting of the American Historical As-
sociation, December 1979, and at the Conference on the Korean War, Seattle,
1980. I would like to thank the following people for their comments on the earlier
drafts: Lloyd Gardner, Roy Kim, James Kurth, Walter LaFeber, James Palais,
William Stueck, and the participants in the Conference on the Korean War.
3
ee
4 BRUCE CUMINGS
trusteeship, from late 1948 until early 1947—sought to resolve security
with capability by enrolling the Soviets into a four-power consortium
that the United States would dominate. Trusteeship did not work,
however, because, among other reasons, American occupation forces
that were rushed into Korea in the wake of Japan’s defeat hammered
out a de facto containment policy. Various premature “cold warriors”
worked out their own policies with the State Department far from the
scene; events of local origin thus skewed U.S. policy toward contain-
ment in Korea, something that nearly became established policy in
carly 1947, only to be put off until late 1949. The agency of delay was
the move of the Korean problem to the United Nations, which seemed
to be the best means of guaranteeing Korean security at a time when
American power was stretched to the limits on a global scale. The
period from 1947 to 1949 thus saw de facto containment garbed in
internationalist clothes, as the United States sought a separatist solution
in Korea under United Nations auspices; during this period the con-
tingencies in U.S, policy toward Korea expressed themselves in classic
bureaucratic fashion: a commitment to the status quo, sandwiched
between an option simply to get out, and an option to go in with both
feet,
When containment arrived formally in Korea policy, it did so with
a “rollback” option (positive action) that added an entirely new ele-
ment; pursuit of rollback eventually—in the fateful days of late 1950—
blasted American policy back to an equilibrium point at containment,
from which it has never diverged to this day.
INTERNATIONALISM, CONTAINMENT, ROLLBACK: A SKETCH
In conventional accounts of the cold war, the Roosevelt administra-
tion is identified with a naive internationalism, the Truman administra-
tion with a realistic containment, and the Eisenhower/Dulles admin-
istration with unsettling rollback policies. FDR’s globalism, exemplified
by the United Nations organization and the “four policemen” (the
United States, USSR, Great Britain, China) who would regulate the
peace, gave way to Truman’s narrower conception of containing the
Soviet Union, first in Greece and Turkey (1947) and then in East Asia
(1950). When the Republicans assumed power in 1953, John Foster
Dulles proclaimed a new policy of “liberation,” or rollback, accom-
panied by loud rhetoric about “‘positive action” against communism
to replace the alleged defeatism and negativism of containment; Dulles
met his deserved rebuke in 1956, when the Soviets invaded Hungary
and the United States could do nothing to implement its support of
rollback, thus showing the policy to have been empty.
This account of policies and people is fallacious and misleading.
INTRODUCTION +5
Only the Truman administration pursued actual rollback policies, and
only in Korea. From 1945 to 1950 American policy moved through
the entire gamut, beginning with the inherited Rooseveltian elobalism,
narrowing to containment by early 1946, and moving into a phase of
potential rollback in the summer of 1949. After the Korean War
began, the opportunities of the fighting opened the way to the only
implementation of rollback, and the only occupation of Communist-
held real estate in the postwar era. The Korean peninsula, far from
being a distant backwater, was instead the center of all this action.
Close attention to the Korean case therefore goes beyond Korean-
American relations: it tells a tale, if not the tale, of the cold war.
What do these terms mean? How might we conceptualize the
differences between internationalism, containment, and_ rollback?
What follows is necessarily tentative, an attempt to sketch key elements
of each policy—or vision—and to highlight variation. At the boundaries
the policies were not so different, merging with each other, but at
the core each represented a separate vision of how to deal with the
great problem of the postwar era, the vigor and strength of com-
munism. Each had an identifiable economic, political, strategic, and
ideological content, and each can be identified with different elements
of state and society in the United States.
All three visions can be distinguished less as coherent ideologies
than as different conceptions of states and markets in a capitalist
world economy. Internationalists wanted a strong state at home, to
regulate the business cycle and provide a safety net for the worst social
effects of capitalism, but they wanted weak and even demilitarized
states abroad to stave off protectionism and provide a third-path
alternative between communism and reaction. The containment com-
promise, however, led to the posting of strong, if partially demilitarized
industrial neomercantile states in Japan and Germany, since grand
area security and economic revival seemed to demand such measures.
Thus the archetypal containment liberal (Hubert Humphrey or Henry
Jackson) favored Truman’s foreign policy and Roosevelt’s domestic
policy. Rollbackers wanted the American state to be weak vis-a-vis
domestic economic interests but strong against foreign economic
interests. The three visions were nowhere articulated fully by their
proponents, although Roosevelt came the closest to this; instead
the coherence of each must be sought in theory and practice, that is,
in policy and the reality of American actions.
Internationalism
FDR’s internationalist vision sought to reconcile three great prob-
lems of the postwar era: the revival of the world economy, especially
6 BRUCE CUMINGS
its West European component; the rise to great power status of the
Soviet Union; and the unraveling of colonial empires everywhere. For
each problem, there was a policy combining emphasis on openness
with regulation, the absence of obstacles being essential to free trade
and economic revival, the regulation necessary to tame unruly nations
and peoples. The Bretton Woods decisions symbolize tne response
to the first problem, the United Nations and general involvement of
the USSR in world affairs (economic and political) symbolize the
second response, and the third was a general program of trusteeships
for enemy colonies and firm pressure on allied empires to lead their
colonies toward gradual independence and intermeshing with the
world economy. Here was a New Deal for the world: a regulated,
managed free market system. It was, among the three visions, a “‘first-
best” world from the standpoint of American economic and security
interests. Without going into more detail nere,! we may sketch the
essentials of the vision as follows:
Metaphor: the open door
Economic content: a regulated open door, a world economy made safe for free
trade, an absence of obstacles (especially protectionist barriers) to the flow of
commerce, a “grand area”2 encompassing the globe with the United States as a
hegemon looking after the whole—the supreme regulator so disastrously absent in
the 1930s.
Political content: a world under regulated law (the United Nations) with four
regulators (the United States, USSR, England, China) looking after the peace
through collective security; the practical content was exemplified by the Yalta
decisions? envisioning both trade-offs for Soviet and Western security and an
enmeshing of the Soviet Union in multilateral, criss-crossing ties that would ham-
string its insurgent impulses (containment by embrace and envelopment); practical
U.S. dominance assured by having numerous proxy-voting allies and clients in the
UN and elsewhere.
Strategic content: the United States would look after the whole, the Allies the
parts; exclusive control of territory and military bases less important than high-
technology and highly maneuverable Navy, Air Force, and atomic capabilities;
joint policing, with the Soviets recognized as a great power and welcomed into
security arrangements.
1. Here I draw on the following sources: Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the
Korean War: Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes, 1945-1947
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), chap. 4; Franz Schurmann, The
Logic of World Power (New York: Pantheon Books, 1974), pt. 1; Robert Gilpin,
U.S. Power and the Multinational Corporation (New York: Basic Books, 1975).
2. This term is used in various deliberations of the Council on Foreign Rela-
tions during World War II. See Laurence H. Shoup and William Minter, Imperial
Brain Trust: The Council on Foreign Relations and United States Foreign Policy
(New York: Monthly Review Press, 1977), pp. 135-40.
%. See in particular Diane Clemens, Yalta (New York: Oxford University Press,
1970); also Gumings, Origins, chap. 3.
INTRODUCTION 7
ideological content: free rein to intemmationalist, open-door thinking and meta-
phors; free trade as the (regulated) hidden hand that would bring progress every-
where and liberalize both transnational intercourse and domestic political and
social structures; classic Wilsonian idealism.
Role of the state: within the American state, the executive branch predominates
at the expense of vested interests in the State Department and elsewhere; presiden-
tial foreign policy direction; liberalization of target authoritarian states abroad;
everywhere the state regulates market activity.
Social constituency: Eastern bankers, high-technology industries, New Dealers,
liberal Democrats, Navy and Air Force (a potential coalition, aborted by FDR’s
death).
This sketch will please no readers in entirety, and some readers not
at all. But this does get us closer than usual toward understanding an
snternationalist current in American politics and foreign policy that
comes to the fore most clearly in times of crisis: during the Depression,
during the Second World War, and then again in the 1970s, when both
the Carter administration and the Trilateral Commission embraced
many elements of the internationalist vision, as a response both to the
neomercantile policies of Richard Nixon and to the general decline of
American power on a global scale.*
Containme nt
Containment became the de facto policy of the Truman administra-
tion in the first weeks of 1946, if not earlier. This was the time of
George F, Kennan’s famous “Jong telegram,” which provided a ra-
tionale for containing Soviet expansion; secret threats to use the
atomic bomb to get the Soviets out of northern Iran; and acknow-
ledgyments by Truman (albeit after the fact) that at this juncture inter-
nationalist policy toward the Soviets was decisively reversed.” A year
later the Truman Doctrine formalized containment policy. Here was a
second-best world, as both the Soviet Union and the United States
erected political and economic barriers and blockades that made a
mockery of Rooseveltian one-worldism. Instead one got two blocs, the
United States organizing by far the stronger one in those (substantial)
parts of the “orand area’’ still left to it, the Soviets attempting to
create a Socialist political bloc and common market. The United States
got much, but by no means all, of what the internationalist vision had
promised: free trade and liberalization throughout the capitalist realm,
once Japan and West Germany were revivified. But neither could be
4. See Mary Kaldor, The Disintegrating West (New York: Hill ancl Wang, 1978);
also Bruce Cumings, “Chinatown: Foreign Policy and Hlite Realignment,” in The
Hidden Election: Politics and Economics in the 1980 Campaign, ed. ‘Thomas
Ferguson and Joel Rogers (New York: Pantheon Books, L981), pp. 196-251,
5. Cumings, Origins, pp. 225-27.
8 BRUCE CUMINGS
trusted with first-rank military power, and so bulwarks of defense had
to be created, usually with American military force. Containment was
a compromise, an “option B’’ between internationalism and the positive
nationalism of rollback. Therefore many of FDR’s followers, chastened
by Soviet provocation, retreated and joined Republican international-
ists (Senator Vandenburg, Dulles) in a domestic coalition behind
Truman’s policies. The containment sketch looks like this:
Metaphor: bulwarks
Economic content: a second-best world of blocs, but with open systems outside
Socialist boundaries and the potential for reintegrating selected Socialist states’ in
the capitalist world economy; military expenses to maintain containment bulwarks
primed economic pumps; economic aid to states on the containment periphery
would bolster grand area economy and security; Japan and West Germany posted
as neomercantile states in a free trade international system,®
Political content: the United Nations became a U.S. instrument, and collective
security came to mean American policing; Yalta assumptions gave way to Riga
assumptions regarding USSR;’ assumption of Soviet aggression as akin to a me-
chanical wind-up car (Kennan’s metaphor) led to construction of bulwarks along
containment periphery, thus reinforcing state structures in Iran, South Korea,
Taiwan, and elsewhere; counterrevolution in Vietnam, Korea, Guatemala.
Strategic content: United States looks after the whole and the parts; exclusive
control of territory and bases, with ground forces added to naval and air force
components, necessitating huge defense budgets and transfer payments to maintain
a far-flung empire; allies corralled and disciplined by Soviet threat and U.S. military
presence in Germany, Japan, South Korea; various alliance systems dominated
by United States.
Ideological content: anticommunism but muted nationalism; realpolitik practice
with idealist rhetoric; sacrifice of means to ends; progressivism giving way to
freedom and democracy as code words for anticommunism,
Role of the state: executive branch dominant at the inception (Acheson present
at the creation), but giving way to vested interests in the national security state;
coalition of armed services after NSC 68 and big budgets; development of a Schum-
peterian perpetual motion machine leading to permanent empire; abroad, alliance
with authoritarian anti-Communist elements with legitimation provided by periodic
human rights salvos and campaigns—the weaker and liberalized states envisioned
by FDR gave way to bulwarks, the great metaphor of containment.
Social constituency: initially unstable containment compromise gave way to
stable coalition between Democratic and Republican middle (lasting until 1970 or
so), after boundaries of consensus redrawn by failed rollback and McCarthyism;
Rockefeller Republican wing joined with liberal Democrats in foreign policy;
internationalists (bankers, advanced industries) got most of what they wanted;
6. Charles S$. Maier, “‘The Politics of Productivity: Foundations of American
International Economic Policy after World War II,” in Between Power and Plenty,
ed, Peter J. Katzenstein (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978), pp. 44-46.
7. The Yalta/Riga dichotomy used by Daniel Yergin parallels my international-
ist/containment dichotomy. See his Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War
and the National Security State (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1978), pp. 17-68.
INTRODUCTION 9
national industries, midwestern grain interests, and declining industries less satisifed
with containment than internationalists, but conflict muted during long revival of
Japan and West Germany; Dulles trades rollback rhetoric for containment policy.
Containment was thus a compromise policy that established foreign
and domestic alliances that were relatively stable after the early 1950s
crisis, and during the long period of American hegemony lasting until
the Nixon administration. Pleasing no one in entirety, it gave everyone
something of what they wanted and therefore persisted longer than
internationalism or rollback.
Rollback
Rollback was the preferred strategy of those elements wholly dis-
satisfied with internationalism and partially dissatisfied with contain-
ment; it got its strongest voicing in the early 1950s® but its only actual
implementation in 1950. Since it barely existed in both theory and
practice, unlike the other two visions, it is the hardest to sketch satis-
factorily. A world free of communism was its ideal, leading to com-
promises on other fronts. Thus, where regulated free market New
Dealers and internationalists would flirt with and tend toward socialism
(witness Keynes), 1950s rollbackers and 1930s isolationists would do
the same in regard to fascism and authoritarian regimes of the right. An
undercurrent in American politics visible mostly as rhetoric, its heart-
land was the oil belt and sun belt and the right wing of the Republican
party. Its stalwarts were industrialists like Robert Wood and H. L.
Hunt, politicians like William Knowland, and political groups like the
John Birch Society. Richard Nixon gave this current voice in the 1950s,
as did Dulles, but both were opportunists who in fact moved fluidly
through all three visions during their careers. The hero of this current
was Douglas MacArthur, but he lacked organic ties with its consti-
tuency and functioned as a party of one, explaining in part the failure
of rollback. The sketch looks like this:
Metaphor: positive action :
Economic content: classic, not Wilsonian, imperialism—territorial instead of
nonterritorial, envisioning expansion by agglomeration and direct control rather
than indirection; raw materials and markets grasped exclusively if necessary, instead
of a Rooseveltian organization of great spaces for free trade for all; opposition to
8. See for example James Burnham, Containment or Liberation? (New York:
John Day, 1953), p. 31: “‘At most, containment can be a temporary expedient,
a transition. As the transition is completed, containment must move towards one
or the other of the two major poles, towards appeasement or liberation.” For the
domestic constituency of rollback (and McCarthyism), see Immanuel Wallerstein,
“McGarthyism and the Conservatives,’’ M.A. thesis, Columbia University, 1954, |
am indebted to Professor Wallerstein for providing me with a copy of his thesis,
10 BRUCE CUMINGS
competition from a revived Japan and Germany; fundamentally neomercantilist
in its conception of relations between states, but opposed to state regulation of
markets at home,
Political content: opposition to the United Nations and collective security; Yalta
was treason and Riga axioms represented compromise, since Riga view emphasized
Russian expansionism rather than global Communist conspiracy; Soviets were not
functioning mechanically but diabolically; construction of bulwarks was means to
an end (rollback), not the end in itself; counterrevolution extended from Socialist
periphery to Socialist heartland; anticommunism by whatever means necessary
meant support for reaction everywhere (Chiang K’ai-shek, Trujillo, Syngman Rhee,
etal.),
Strategic content: Asia first rather than Europe first; away from old-world and
immoral diplomacy, toward moral and new world imperialism; exclusive control of
territories and bases and full military mobilization as means and not ends; fascina-
tion with high-technology weaponry for obliterating communism, therefore use of
atomic weaponry and Air Force (here enters Curtis LeMay); allies disciplined and if
recalcitrant or weak, abandoned for fortress America.
Ideological content: rampant American nationalism, chauvinism, patriotism, and
high (if specifically American) moral content; eruptive anticommunism; idealist in
rhetoric, but a non-Wilsonian idealism resting on entrepreneurial virtues and a
restless search for markets and raw materials.
Role of the state: strong military and weak regulation of the economy; war capital-
ism if necessary, vast reinforcement of military branches in the meantime; heroic
executive, gutted State Department.
Social constituency: military bureaucracies and defense industries, declining
industries such as textiles, national industries such as independent oil (e.g. Hunt
Oil), and steel and automobiles if and when they are threatened by foreign competi-
tion; grain-belt interests seeking foreign markets, especially Asian markets in the
1940s and 1950s; Republican party right wing, especially southern and sun belt
constituencies that resent Eastern establishment dominance, Rockefeller wing, and
big Eastern banks that control and provision credit; small and medium businesses
and farms hurt by multinational corporations.
Americans are not an ideological people, or more properly, the
Hartzian? consensus is so deep that alternative visions only arise to be
9. Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America (New York: Harcourt Brace &
World, 1955). In Hartz’s terms, internationalism reflects the liberal impulse to
transform the world in the American image; isolationism the liberal impulse to
withdraw from a recalcitrant world; rollback, drawing upon the 1930s isolationist
currents in the transformed circumstances of the 1950s, represents a reaction
against both, caused by the perception of the Communist threat as diabolical,
and yet sharing with the isolationists of the thirties a general lack of real interest
in or connection with the world, This was reflected in a habitual propensity toward
a self-protective withdrawal in the face of internationalist or containment-liberal
dominance of U.S. foreign policy. The lack of realism of rollback policies and the
preference for losing gloriously (MacArthur) rather than winning shrewdly also
reflects the typical lack of interest in the world at large of these quintessential
American nationalists. It remains true, however, that all three visions derive from a
fundamental ideological agreement that no one has ever analyzed better than Louis
Thirts,
INTRODUCTION 11
witnessed in times of crisis. Therefore the three sketches will please no
one. Instead they are approximations that simply seek to explain more
of the variance in American foreign policy than do other conceptions,
especially conventional ones that take neither Rooseveltian one-worldism
nor rollback currents seriously. To some extent these three visions
may even be mythical: but that does not invalidate the hypothesis
that people acted on the assumptions. Myths, visions, and ideologies
mingle together in the real world, as they influence history. Since
1945 policy has fluctuated around a consensual mid-point fashioned
by sharp political conflict among these three currents. Internationalism
on the “‘left’’ and rollback on the ‘right’? have pushed the ‘‘middle”’
(usually meaning containment) in one direction or another; we know
this when we think of the consensual mid-point of policy in 1945 and
compare it to 1952: what a difference! And we know it when we
witness the cacaphony of policies in the 1970s, as the cold war seemed
to begin again just as it seemed to be ending, and with no administra-
tion capable of mustering a foreign policy consensus that could be
compared to that of the postwar years.!9 By the early 1980s, such
policy confusion had come to the point that most of the cardinal
assumptions of the postwar settlement have been called into question:
the alliance with West Europe, the combination vice/virtue of a strong
economy but weak military in Japan; even the old Europe-first versus
Asia-first debate has come to the fore again. So, even though the
three categories are not tidy and much remains to be said, these are
important currents in American foreign policy and the particular
experience of Korea policy, to which we now turn, helps to explain
how the containment compromise was finally won.
FROM INTERNATIONALISM TO CONTAINMENT IN KOREA
The internationalist position on colonies developed during the war,
as a means of resolving the postwar status of colonies then under Axis
control: Italian colonies in Africa, Japanese-held French colonies in
Indochina, and Korea. The method was multilateral trusteeship, a
preeminently Rooseveltian idea in being opposed to unilateral control
of the colonies, nonterritorial, and hopeful of channeling and contain-
ing revolutionary nationalism rather than opposing it frontally. In
regions where the Soviet Union was likely to be involved, such inter-
nationalism was not anti-Communist in a direct and frontal sense,
seeking instead to embrace the Soviet Union in a host of multilateral
arrangements that would give it responsibility for the peace, but ham-
string it and render manageable its insurgent impulses. In its trusteeship
10. Cumings, ‘Foreign Policy and Elite Realignment.”’
Ie BRUCE CUMINGS
incarnation, internationalism had a shrewd policy aimed at ending
unilateral colonialism (until 1945 the policy was directed at European
colonialism as well, hoping to open their colonies to American in-
fluence and commerce) and preventing the emergence of revolutionary
nationalism. For Korea, the end of the war would likely bring both
an end to colonialism and an opening to Soviet-supported revolution.
From 1943 to 1945 Roosevelt dominated and defined Korea policy,
. pushing the trusteeship idea on Eden in March 1943 (Eden didn’t like
it), Stalin at Tehran (Stalin was amused), Chruchill at Yalta (prompt-
ing one of Churchill’s blustery statements about the sanctity of the
British Empire), and various State Department officials who often
found out about the trusteeship idea and Korea policy in the aftermath
of a Big Three or Big Four conference"! At Cairo, in December 1943,
the idea led to the first Great Power pledge of Korean independence
since its annexation by Japan in 1910, with the trusteeship notion
showing up in the proviso, independence ‘in due course.”
Such internationalist policy required a deft touch and confident
assurance that the United States would likely dominate any sort of
multilateral security arrangement after the war ended. This was a policy
for the whole. Other people, however, had to look after the parts of
American policy, and lacked Roosevelt’s confidence about the postwar
world or his easy assurance that he could handle the Soviets. On Korea,
these would be various middle-level officials in the State Department’s
Far Eastern office: Hugh Borton, John Carter Vincent, H. Merrell
Benninghoff, and from time to time Alger Hiss. They sought to give
practical meaning to the trusteeship policy, and to define what U.S.
interests in Korea might be when the war ended. In doing so they
very early enunciated certain themes and assumptions that would prove
to be quite consistent, indeed to define the State Department’s position
on Korea for years. Stated succinctly, the position was that a Korea
wholly in Soviet hands would be a threat to the security of the postwar
Pacific, and therefore a threat to American security. Roosevelt may
or may not have agreed; there is no record of his position on Korea
in Pacific security. Other principles were in consonance with Roose-
velt’s view on Korea: it could not govern itself in the years following
Japan’s defeat; a Great Power administration would thus be necessary,
with multilateral means preferable, unless American control was in
jeopardy; trusteeship was the preferred means of multilateral adminis-
tration, but full or partial military occupation of Korea might be
necessary to ensure American influence.
A State Department territorial subcommittee paper done in No-
11. This section is drawn from my Origins of the Cold War, vol. 1, chap. 4.
INTRODUCTION 13
vember 1943 noted that “the security of the North Pacific will be of
concern to the U.S.”; Korea was of concern since “Korea’s political
development may affect this security.” At about the same time, Ben-
ninghoff, Vincent, Borton, and Hiss (among others) prepared and
reviewed a paper containing the following statement:
Korea may appear to offer a tempting opportunity to apply the Soviet conception
of the proper treatment of colonial peoples, to strengthen enormously the eco-
nomic resources of the Soviet Far East, to acquire ice-free ports, and to occupy a
dominating strategic position in relation both to China and to Japan.... A Soviet
occupation of Korea would create an entirely new strategic situation in the Far
East, and its repercussions within China and Japan might be far reaching, 2
There is no indication that Roosevelt knew about this and other
planning, a matter that became immaterial when he died in April 1945,
In the subsequent vacuum of foreign policy leadership an upward
displacement of bureaucratic position occurred, such that relatively
junior officers like Benninghoff came to play important parts in Korean
policy, Benninghoff becoming a key political officer in the early days
of the American occupation in Korea. Those who had looked after the
parts, with little conception of the whole, rose. Thus at Potsdam the
American delegation never discussed trusteeship planning for Korea,
in spite of specific urgings by Stalin and Molotov that the matter was
unprecedented and had to be discussed; in the middle of the conference
the successful atomic test at Alamogordo convinced them that Soviet
participation in the Pacific War was less important than they had
thought. They delayed discussions of Korea policy, as Mark Paul’s
essay in this volume shows, and in the end there was no such discussion,
In the wake of the atomic attacks on Japan, several American
officers attached to the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee
(SWNCC), including Dean Rusk, found a line at the thirty-eighth
parallel that could divide U.S. and Soviet occupation responsibilities
in Korea. This occurred on the night of August 10-11, 1945. Stalin’s
response was to say nothing—the first of several anomalies in Soviet
policy toward Korea, leading up to the fall of 1950, Why anomalous?
Because the Soviets had entered Korea on August 8 and could have
enveloped the peninsula long before the Americans could arrive.
SWNCC planners were desirous of stopping the southward flow of
Soviet power in Korea; thus they wanted a line as far north as practi-
cable, one that included the capital at Seoul. (Given American capabili-
ties, no line was practicable if the Soviets resisted.) Thus the decision
was political. The U.S. military was more reluctant, noting that no
12. U.S. Department of State, Record Group (hereafter cited as RG) 59, Notter
File, ‘Japan: Korea; Problems of International Trusteeship,’’ Nov. 30, 1943,
l4 BRUCE CUMINGS
forces for o¢ cupation were anywhere near Korea. Although the decision
came in harried times, it was a logical follow-on to planning that had
linked the control of Korea to Pacific security as early as November
1943,
The reluctance of the American military to occupy Korea presaged
another consistent pattern: the State Department wished to define
Korea as important to U.S. security, but military planners sensed the
limits of American military power and wondered if this peninsula
were all that important in the context of global U.S. security concerns.
Such worries came up again in 1947 and 1950, as we will see. Later
in August 1945 yet a third pattern in American policy toward Korea
was etched in: with the actual occupation, policy would increasingly
be subject to decisions made on the scene rather than in Washington,
State Department planners were too far off and too preoccupied with
other matters to grab the reins of policy. Those on the scene quickly
came to think that they knew better, and so sought to exclude the
State Department. Thus “high policy,” to speak in such terms, dallied
behind Korean realities—usually by at least six months—and all too
often the tail wagged the dog.
A month after the Korean problem was disregarded at Potsdam, the
United States had sponsored a rush into Korea and had acquired, so
it seemed, some sort of commitment to defend at least a part of Korea
against Soviet encroachments or a Soviet-sponsored regime, This
scramble into Korea, and this seeming commitment, had the support
of virtually all government agencies concerned with the matter, from
the president on down, Gen. John R. Hodge, occupation commander,
not only understood this mandate but learned, also in late August,
that his problems would include not simply the Soviets, but Korean
revolutionaries released by the thousands from Japanese prisons after
August 15. Such political prisoners joined others in setting up labor
unions, political parties, “‘people’s committees,” and a host of peace-
keeping forces that nearly supplanted the Japanese by the time the
Americans arrived, Hodge knew this because of “a flood” of mes-
sages exchanged with Japanese commanders in Seoul who spoke darkly
of Communists running rampant and desired an early American entry
to prevent “‘the transfer of authority from the Japanese hand,”!3
Hodge thus, from the day he arrived, set about eliminating this
domestic, indigenous revolutionary force, something that so greatly
disordered the U.S. occupation, that the indigenous Left and its for-
tunes became the touchstone against which virtually all occupation
policy was judged from 1945 to 1949 (the occupation did not actually
13. Cumings, Origins, 1:126-28.
INTRODUCTION 15
other things, the surreptitious return of Syngman Rhee to Seoul
(through an end run around State Department Opposition), the revival
of the very substantial Korean element of the Japanese national police,
Forces for the south alone (in October 1945), and finally moves toward
the creation of a separate southern administration that would merge
selected exile nationalists (Syngman Rhee and Kim Ku, mainly) with
the colonial bureaucracy. Hodge was a premature cold warrior; like
from December 1945 on; by August 1946 its Korean leaders were
already questioning American “interference” in their activities. This
same entity became the political basis for the ROK regime in 1948;
very little changed during 1946 and 1947, What were the consequences
of this early, precipitate action?
First, the southern regime was almost entirely an American crea-
tion, much more so than with the Nationalists in China or the succes-
14. Ibid., p. 230,
Ib KRUGE CUMINGS
changes on a world-wide scale would force Washington to see its virtues.
In the dialectic of Soviet-American local interaction, with most of
the early initiatives coming in the south, the thirty-eighth parallel
became a line drawn in the dirt behind which were constructed dikes
and edifices in the form of military, police, and civil bureaucracies,
all with the main goal of stopping the southward flow of revolution,
or the northward flow of counterrevolution, So what seemed wrong
and insubordinate in 1945 came to seem early and prescient by 1947.
The difference between policy and implementation, or the high
policy of Washington and the “low policy” of the occupation, may
be likened to the philosophical distinction between theory and practice.
Washington’s theory was one thing, Seoul’s practice was quite another.
But it is much easier to modify or destroy high policy that remains
in the realm of theory, than it is to modify (let alone destroy) a de
facto practice that, in the doing, brings with it actual commitments.
Thus it was that the years 1946 and 1947 saw Washington modify and
eventually destroy its ostensible Korea policy, as hopes at home caught
up with reality abroad.
FROM DE FACTO CONTAINMENT TO A CONTAINMENT POLICY?
From Washington’s standpoint, the main problem with occupation
policy was that it contradicted American policy toward Korea—not a
minor matter. After Potsdam the Korean question was not again
broached with the Soviets or the other Allies until December 1945,
when the foreign ministers met in Moscow. The Korea portion of the
agreed accords called for joint Soviet-American discussions leading
toward the establishment of a unitary Korean provisional government,
to be followed by a four-power trusteeship of up to five years. It was
Washington that had again pushed the trusteeship issue, and indeed
its draft paper at Moscow had suggested only a trusteeship, with noth-
ing about a provisional government. The latter was a Soviet suggestion,
as was the sequencing of the various steps. The United States accepted
the Soviet proposals, in a mutual compromise that seemed to herald
a reestablishment of Allied unity.
Washington’s trusteeship policy had been pubicly announced on
October 20, 1945, by John Vincent, and it had set off a storm in
Korea. All shades of political opinion opposed this seeming neocolonial
device. Hodge and his advisers were forced, by this sentiment and by
the effects of their implemented policies, to support the opposition
to trusteeship. This they did; within days of the announcement of
the Moscow accords Koreans in the south were saying the Soviets
had pushed through trusteeship over the objections of Americans
secking Korean independence, Without going into more detail, this
INTRODUCTION 17
grotesque distortion of what happened at Moscow became gospel
truth for conservative Koreans, deeply confused the mass of Koreans,
and led to the virtual scuttling of the Moscow agreements. In late
January 1946, in the wake of this fiasco, Hodge submitted his resigna-
tion, It was not accepted, however, in part because Harriman had made
a hurried trip to Korea and had decided that Hodge was doing a good
job, which by implication meant that the State Department was not
and therefore the ostensible American policy for Korea was wrong.
These events severely biased the subsequent U.S.-Soviet Joint Com-
mission meetings in the spring of 1946 toward failure, which indeed
occurred in early May. Yet throughout 1946 the State Department
maintained its commitment to a trusteeship for Korea, and did not
relinquish this internationalist device until it found another: turning
the Korean problem over to the fledgling United Nations. So, one had
trusteeship in form (or theory) and containment in substance (or
practice). Furthermore one had the slow welling up and congealing
of a containment policy in Washington as well, as 1946 and 1947
proceeded.
The little-known scuttling of the Moscow accords in Korea was
contemporaneous with the better-known reorientation of American
policy in early 1946, the bench marks being Kennan’s famous “‘long
telegram,’? and the turn away from compromise with the Soviets
(Truman had not liked the Moscow agreements, and decided to “get
tough” with the Russians).!° Thus major watersheds in the course of
events within Korea came to move in tandem with major watersheds
in the development of the cold war. Although Washington’s policy
remained trusteeship, and commitment to the Moscow plan, an un-
named State Department official attached to the U.S. delegation to
the joint commission put U.S. policy rather differently in March 1946,
and in so doing marked the degree to which the occupation’s de facto
policy was becoming more acceptable. The goal of U.S. policy should
be “to bring about an independent, democratic, stable Korean Govern-
ment capable of resisting Russian domination over a protracted period
of time. In the American view, freedom from Russian domination is
more important than complete independence. . . . Unless coerced by
force, it is believed that Korea will, if left to itself, orient itself toward
the United States rather than toward the Russians for the foreseeable
future.”
The memorandum described the American ‘“‘primary objective”
15. Ibid., pp. 225-27; see also John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the
Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972),
pp. 282-315.
1k BRUCE CUMINGS
as preventing Russian domination, the “secondary objective” as Korean
independence, and then went on to say:
Since Korean independence is a secondary objective, it is not believed to be in the
U.S. interest to form a Korean Government which could be granted complete
independence within the next few years. Unless and until the U.N.O. can give
reasonable proof of its ability to prevent aggression, the United States, together
with Russia, if necessary, must extend some form of territorial guarantee to Korea
and exercise certain prerogatives in Korea’s international relations. . . . Any method
of forming a provisional government of Korea must, therefore, be based on the
condition that some form of disguised control shall continue to be exercised by
the United States for some years to come.!6 [Emphasis added.]
Here, clearly, was strong support for the occupation’s policies, and the
germ of a policy that would reconcile substantive containment with
ostensible internationalism, that is, taking America’s Korea problem to
the United Nations.
By September 1946, Korea had become rather important, at least in
the mind of one of Truman’s high advisers. Clark Clifford’s important,
top secret report of that month!’ argued that “the U.S, should support
and assist all democratic countries which are in any way menaced or
endangered by the U.S.S.R.’’; in discussing certain ‘trouble spots”
he turned first to East Asia: “This country should continue to strive
for a unified and economically stable China, a reconstructed and
democratic Japan, and a unified and independent Korea.’’ Such coun-
tries “will require diligent and considered effort on the part of the
U.S. if Soviet penetration and eventual domination is to be prevented.”
The paper also argued for global policies, not ones linked only to the
preservation of a non-Communist Western Europe.
Such thinking led directly to the Truman Doctrine in early 1947,
marking among other things a formal commitment to containment in
Europe, and in Greece and Turkey. For a time it appeared that it would
also be extended to Korea. On March 5, 1947, Secretary of War Robert
Patterson addressed a letter to the Secretary of State, saying that
Greece and Turkey were ‘only part of a much larger problem”; he
thought it “important and urgent” to survey situations elsewhere in
the world “‘which may require analogous financial, technical, and
military aid on our part.” This prompted a study of Korea, then getting
16. “U.S. Document no, 3, Joint Commission Files,” quoted in “History of
the U.S. Armed Forces in Korea,” unpub. ms. (Seoul, Tokyo; 1947, 1948), 2,
chap, 4:154-55.
17. “American Relations with the Soviet Union: A Report to the President by
the Special Counsel to the President,” Sept. 24, 1946, in Containment; Docu-
ments on American Policy and Strategy, 1946-1950, ed. Thomas Etzold and
John Lewis Gaddis (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978), pp. 64-71.
INTRODUCTION 19
about $100 million per annum in all expenses connected with the
occupation. An interdepartmental committee came up with a report,
submitted to the secretaries of state and war,!8 which argued that
containment should be extended to Korea and that the large sum (for
that time) of $600 million be appropriated for ‘“a positive political,
cultural, and economic program.” The committee had interviewed
Hodge, Gen, Archibald V. Arnold (military governor in Korea), Har-
riman, and others, all of whom apparently supported such a pro-
gram. Although arguing that in the event of general war, troops and
bases in Korea would be a liability, still “control of all of Korea by
Soviet or Soviet-dominated forces, while not immediately serious,
would constitute a strategic threat to U.S. interests in the Far East.”
Japan, in particular, would suffer ‘an extremely serious political and
military threat.” Korea needed a “positive program” in addition be-
cause it was “the only place in the world where the U.S. and the
U.S.S.R. stand face to face alone.” The report continued: “It is im-
portant that there be no gaps or weakening in our policy of firmness
in containing the U.S.S.R. because weakness in one area is invariably
interpreted by the Soviets as indicative of an overall softening. A
backing down or running away from the U.S.S.R. in Korea could very
easily result in a stiffening of the Soviet attitude on Germany or some
other area of much greater intrinsic importance to us” (emphasis
added).
A few weeks later the Joint Chiefs of Staff argued that
In the Pacific area of United States defense commitments, from the standpoint of
urgent want, Korea, China, and Japan deserve consideration for current United
States assistance. From the security viewpoint the primary reason for current
assistance to Korea would be that .. . this is the one country within which we
alone have for almost two years carried out ideological warfare in direct contact
with our opponents, so that to lose this battle would be gravely detrimental to
U.S. prestige, and therefore security, throughout the world. To abandon this
struggle would tend to confirm the suspicion that the U.S. is not really determined
to accept the responsibilities and obligations of world leadership, 9 [Emphasis
added.]
The JCS went on to rank East Asian countries hierarchically according
to their “importance to our national security”: (13) Japan, (14) China,
(15) Korea, (16) the Philippines.
If one looks back on such judgments from, say, the standpoint of
18. U.S. Department of State, RG 353 (SWNCC-SANACCG), box 86, “334 Com-
mittee, Interdepartmental, Korea.’’
19. Joint Chiefs of Staff, ‘U.S. Assistance to Other Countries from the Stand-
point of National Security,” Apr. 29, 1947, in Containment, ed. Etzold and Gaddis,
pp. 71-83,
20 BRUCE CUMINGS
1953, ranking Korea fifteenth in the world is perhaps not surprising.
Looking forward from 1940 it would have been inconceivable to a
State Department official (let alone a Korean) to find U.S. policy
so interested in this little peninsula. Clearly a major change had oc-
curred. Although the JCS paper, like the interdepartmental committee
report, raised the possibility of abandoning Korea in time of global
war (a critically important caveat we will return to), such concern for
Korea was unprecedented in traditional American policy. And note
the reasoning of the JCS: the United States had been directly battling
the Communists in Korea. This was of course accurate, as the JCS
knew from Hodge’s voluminous reports, and expresses the creeping
commitment that came with the counterinsurgent policy of the occupa-
tion.
On April 4, Secretary Patterson responded to such thinking by
dropping a bombshell: the United States should “get out of Korea at
an early date’’; all measures should have early withdrawal as their
goal.” He noted that the occupation was a great drain on War Depart-
ment funds, that Congress was not likely to provide $600 million for
Korea, and if it did this would be a drain on other needed funds, He
suggested either that the United States set up and recognize a separate
southern government, or take the problem to the United Nations,
both as methods of getting out. An important consideration for Patter-
son, and others, was the likely call on U.S. resources in China. The
possibility of aiding the Kuomintang was still high. Another considera-
tion, entirely bureaucratic, was that the War Department was footing
the bill for an occupation engaged in a highly political struggle within
Korea, and was getting little but criticism for its efforts from the
State Department—including, during the period, plans to replace
Hodge with a State-directed civil commissioner.
With this argument Patterson set the terms of a debate that would
last down to 1950, in which the State Department argued for what
might be called the political-strategic interest of the United States in
Korea, while military departments at times recognized the political
value, but tended not to say much about it and instead to argue that
the military-strategic value of Korea was nil: it would be bypassed
in a general war, and so the troops should come out. The situation was
one in which the State Department defined the political value of
Korea as high, with the fairly unsubtle suggestion that the occupation
was botching the political aspect by supporting the Korean right-wing;
whereas the military, tired of paying for a thankless struggle, and
20. U.S. Department of War, RG 319, Plans and Operations Division, “Korea
1946-1950,” box 87.
INTRODUCTION 2)
worried about world-wide limits to U.S. power, retreated to a narrow
general-war-based definition of Korea’s value to the United States.
One suspects that as often as not military planners hoped to pass to
ihe State Department the responsibility—and the costs—for deciding
where to make a stand, and when.
Dean Acheson, by then an under secretary of state, had somewhat
different ideas. He told a secret congressional hearing in 1947 that
“we have drawn the line in Korea.’’ His point was that containment
should be applied where it could work, but not where it would simply
drain American blood and treasure. In a cabinet meeting in March
1947, for example, when queried as to why, if containment were the
policy, the United States would want to pull out of China, Acheson
responded, ‘‘Fundamentals of problems the same [in China]. The
incidences are different.’’*! The “incidences” in Korea were such that
containment might work; in any case, as we have seen, the occupation
had been trying to make it work.
These disputes over whether containment should apply to Korea,
or whether the United States ought to cut its losses, were put off with
the acceptance of SWNCC 176/30, “United States Policy in Korea,”
implemented in mid-August 1947.2% This document argued that “The
U.S. cannot at this time withdraw from Korea under circumstances
which would inevitably lead to Communist domination of the
entire country. The resulting political repercussions would seriously
damage U.S. prestige in the Far East and throughout the world... .”
The suggested course of action was to take the Korean problem to
the United Nations General Assembly in the fall of 1947, assuming
(as virtually all Americans in Seoul and Washington had since early
1947) that the second round of U.S.-Soviet Joint Commission talks
would fail. So, while continuing to pursue de facto containment within
Korea, high policy again was defined by internationalists who hoped
that the UN could somehow retrieve and sanctify the American effort,
an effort that the internationalists continued to criticize in numerous
memos. It is noteworthy, however, that such a course was first sug-
wested in Seoul in March 1946, just as the first joint commission con-
vened, by a person with intimate knowledge of the internal Korean
situation (see the SWNCC document cited above).
21. The first quotation is from U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Re-
lutions, Hearings: A Bill to Provide for Assistance to Greece and Turkey, 80th Cong.,
Ist sess, (Washington, D.C,: Government Printing Office, 1973), p. 22. The second
iy from Matthew J. Connelly’s summaries of Truman cabinet meetings, Mar. 7, 1947,
cabinet meeting, in Connelly Papers, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Mo,
22, U.S, Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States (here-
alter, FRUS), 1947 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1972), 6:738-41,
BRUCE GUMINGS
~
nm
The move to the UN was a grand success in lining up multilateral
backing for American policy in Korea, although the Americans (in
Washington and Seoul) had constantly to cajole and threaten the
delegates on the UN Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK)
to get them (1) to agree to serve, over Soviet objections; (2) to hold
an election in the south only, when their mandate was to hold it
throughout Korea; (3) to validate that the May 10, 1948, National
Assembly elections were conducted in a “free and fair”? atmosphere
(given that all delegates knew the election would bring Syngman Rhee
and the rightist Korean Democratic party to power); (4) finally to
recognize the Republic of Korea as “the only such government” in
Korea organized under UN sponsorship—something that the Rhee
regime immediately used as tantamount to official UN recognition.
But the policy was also a failure, in that it not only accomplished but
gave blessing to the final division of Korea and the separate southern
regime that had been created, in its essentials, in the fall of 1945. In
other words, the UN sanctioned a division and a regime that interna-
tionalists (John Vincent being the best single example) had fought
against since early 1945, The reasons this could happen are two, and
simple: (1) the United States utterly dominated the UN during this
period; (2) both containment thinkers and internationalists were
united by an irreduceable minimum goal: Korea or a part of it should
be kept out of the Soviet orbit, for otherwise the security of the
Pacific would be threatened. This was where core U.S. policy stood
from 1943 on; the move to the UN also froze U.S. policy until 1949.
For two years from the fall of 1947, the United States was concerned
with riding herd on various UN decisions, and on UNTCOK;; it sched-
uled the withdrawal of its troops, but continually put this off—from
August 1948 to December 1948 to June 1949. During this period, also,
the question of containing communism in Korea or getting out also
remained unresolved, although as long as American troops remained
on the ground there were secret plans to defend those troops and
South Korea in the event of an attack; and the de facto containment
policy continued apace in the form of American-supported suppression
of insurgents on Cheju Island (from April 1948 on) and in the Cholla
and KySngsang provinces (from October 1948 on).
The essential argument over Korea within American circles from
1947 to 1949 continued to revolve around the military consideration
23, General Hodge told Gen, Albert Wedemeyer in August 1947 that during
the fall 1947 uprisings in South Korea he and MacArthur feared an invasion and
“had a plan’? to defend Korea if this should happen. See Memo of conversation,
Hodge and Wedemeyer, Aug. 27, 1947, Twenty-fourth Corps Historical File.
INTRODUCTION 28
that Korea was not a good place to fight in time of general war, versus
ihe political consideration that the loss of Korea would threaten
Pacific security and call into question American prestige and credibility.
lt is my tentative view that during this period the military argument
never had the upper hand, with one exception: in the fall of 1947
certain internal discussions seemed to suggest a consensus that the
United States should ‘‘cut bait,’’ should sit out in Korea, regardless
of the consequences. This was the only time in the postwar period
when one could, on the basis of the available documentation, argue
for a fundamental change either in established or de facto U.S. policy
toward Korea. That change was not implemented, but the deliberations
ure instructive,
Bureaucratically, the reason for consensus was that George Kennan,
by then head of the Policy Planning Staff (PPS), agreed with the
military that Korea was not a good place to make a stand in the cold
war—although for reasons very different from those of the military.
In June 1947 Kennan had remarked in a top secret memo that PPS saw
only two areas outside of Europe requiring “large-scale economic
assistance of the sort envisioned here for Europe’’; these were Japan
and Korea. But by September Kennan found “a real likelihood that
Korea will eventually become a Soviet satellite,” and recommended
putting it at ‘the bottom of the list,” meaning after Japan and China.**
Why?
First, Kennan thought the military’s strategic judgment that Korea
was the wrong place to fight in time of general war was important,
and had to be taken seriously. Second, and more important, in Septem-
ber 1947 PPS laid out the basic policy for the reverse course in Japan;
the highest call on American resources should now be a revived and
politically friendly Japan. Once this was accomplished, and assuming
interim aid to keep Korea out of Soviet hands, Kennan hoped that
Japan would again serve as a balancer to the Soviet Union in Northeast
Asia. This idea was based on his reading of the diplomatic history of
(he previous half-century in the region, and on the ideas of his elder
cousin, also named George Kennan, whom he revered. The best state-
ment of Kennan’s view came in a paper in 1949: ‘“‘The day will come,
and possibly sooner than we think, when realism will call upon us
not to oppose the re-entry of Japanese influence and activity into
Korea and Manchuria. This is, in fact, the only realistic prospect for
countering and moderating Soviet influence in that area... .”
24. Kennan memo to Lovett, June 30, 1947, RG 59, Policy Planning Staff
(PPS) File, box 33. Also, draft paper, ‘U.S, Policy Toward a Peace Settlement with
Japan,” Sept. 22, 1947, box 32, top secret. See also FRUS, 1947, 6:784.
24 BRUCE CUMINGS
He then cited Theodore Roosevelt’s views in 1905 (ones that later
sanctioned Japan’s annexation of Korea, and that were formed with
the help of advice from the elder Kennan).”° Kennan’s remaining
notion was that Americans were not very adept at propping up Asian
regimes. Americans were as ill-equipped for this as Asians were for
enlightened government. Kennan’s judgment on Asia reversed the
Sinocentric schema of high civilization radiating outward from the
Middle Kingdom, getting ever weaker as it approached the barbarian
periphery. For Kennan, Asia was the far periphery of an advanced
civilization emanating from Western Europe; the eastward projection
had a decidedly downhill trajectory: the first drop was in Eastern
Europe, the second in Russia (most of whose vices were Oriental),
and the third (and here one began to scrape bottom) was China and
its little brother Korea. In the late 1940s the nationalist side in China
and Korea was incontinent and how could one have containment with
incontinence? Americans should not attempt to do for them what they
could not do for themselves. Japan was the exception because it had
an industrial base, one of only five in the world. We had four and they
had one and things should be kept that way, was Kennan’s parsimoni-
ous idea behind his containment doctrine, Kennan also had been in
contact with the “Japan lobby” during this period; the lobby was made
up of assorted diplomats, bankers, journalists, and military leaders, and
urged an end to the purges and reforms of the early occupation, They
wanted a reinvigorated Japan that would be integrated with an
American-dominated world economy; some among them wanted a
rearmed Japan that would, 4 la Kennan, balance Soviet power in
Northeast Asia. Thus Kennan concluded that cutting bait in Korea was
not a bad idea, but for reasons that had not occurred to the U.S.
military. On September 24 he recommended that “our policy should
be to cut our losses and get out of there as gracefully but promptly
as possible.”*® A rare consensus between the State Department and
the military seemed to have latched onto option A: the elegant retreat.
The great success in the United Nations in late 1947, however,
tipped bureaucratic ballast back toward a comfortable option B (the
status quo) on Korea, while this new charge for the fledgling UN and
the deterioration of the cold war increasingly biased U.S. policy toward
a formal decision for containment in Korea. Option B was enshrined
in a National Security Council document (NSC 8), approved by Truman
25. Kennan memo to Rusk, Oct. 6, 1949, RG 59, PPS File, box 13, top secret.
26. FRUS, 1947, 6:814; see also Howard Schonberger, “The Japan Lobby
in American Diplomacy, 1947-1952,” Pacific Historical Review 46, no, 3 (August
1977): 327-59; also John G. Roberts, “The ‘Japan Crowd’ and the Zaibatsu Res-
toration,” Japan Interpreter 12 (Summer 1979):384-415.
INTRODUCTION 25
in April 1948, and which governed Korea policy through the entire
7 This was the year that saw the final, formal establishment
ol separate Koreas, a post facto rationalization of decisions taken two
years earlier, As 1949 dawned, however, new problems arose with
this divided Korea and its leaders.
)'
year,”
THE BAITING GAME
With U.S. policy poised between withdrawal (option A) and the
ironclad guarantee of commitment (option C), two obstreperous
\sian dictators sought to bait a far-off and seemingly reluctant guaran-
tor. Chiang K’ai-shek and Syngman Rhee urged full U.S. backing for
the southern side in their respective civil wars. Chiang could not get
American policy to bite, and he ended up on Taiwan (still dangling
bait). Syngman Rhee dangled bait all during 1949. A third dictator,
Kim Il-sung, also sought support for his side of the civil war, in a
bargaining relationship with the Russians and the Chinese—a matter
we will get to shortly.
1948 was a year that changed the East Asian context of American
policy profoundly. Most important, the Nationalists lost the civil war
in China. The victory of Mao’s forces had a tremendous impact on all
actors in the East Asian milieu. For Americans, including George
Kkennan, it suggested a stiffened policy in areas contiguous to China.
lor Syngman Rhee and his allies, it struck terror in their hearts. For
Kim Il-sung and his allies, it was the headiest thing that had happened
since the capitulation of the Japanese Empire. Next in importance, the
reverse course for Japan set in, giving the United States a strong com-
mitment there and raising fears among Japan’s old enemies. The spring
crises in Czechoslovakia and Berlin suggested to Americans a Soviet
policy willing to probe with force at the periphery of its empire.
Within South Korea the old battles between the State Department
und the occupation also ended; General Hodge was replaced in late
August 1948, and a new ambassador, John Muccio, became the head of
the American mission in Seoul. Unlike Vincent or Borton, Muccio
was a cold warrior who got along well with the military," and rarely
if ever questioned the harsh repression that was daily fare under the
Rhee regime. All of these changed circumstances combined to suggest
once again the virtues of containment in Korea.
On December 17, 1948, the chief of the Division of Northeast
Asian Affairs in the State Department, Max Bishop, penned a top
27. FRUS, 1948, 6:1164-69.
28. Oral history interview, John Muccio, Truman Library. Muccio thought
his proven capacity to get along with the military was an important reason for
his selection,
26 BRUCE CUMINGS
secret memorandum that fit Korea into previous considerations.*? He
wanted a careful review of NSC 8 in view of the changed situation. On
Japan, he remarked, “Should communist domination of the entire
Korean peninsula become an accomplished fact, the islands of Japan
would be surrounded on three sides by an unbroken arc of communist
territories . . . we would be confronted with increasing difficulties in
attempting to hold Japan within the United States sphere. . . .”
Should Korea be lost, the United States “would have lost its last
friend on the continent” with China’s fall; “failure to face up to these
problems in Korea could eventually destroy U.S. security in the Pa-
cific.’’ Bishop suggested a “‘positive effort” aimed, in Truman Doctrine
terms, “to develop in non-Soviet northeast Asia a group of independent
people . .. who, on an economically viable basis, are capable of success-
fully resisting communist expansion.” Bishop was close to the Japan
lobby and this statement reflected its views on Korea. Like Kennan,
Bishop also noted that there was in Northeast Asia “one of the four
or five significant power centers in the world.” Then he asked the
containment question: ‘Whether communist expansion in northeast
Asia had already reached the point at which the security interests of
the U.S. require positive efforts to prevent further expansion.” But he
also introduced a new question: ‘Whether the communist power sys-
tem, already brutally frank and outspoken in its hostility to the U.S.,
must be caused to draw back from its present extensive holdings”
(my emphasis). Elsewhere, in the National Security Council (NSC),
the Economic Cooperation Agency (ECA), and the CIA, Japan’s
economic revival raised a similar question: how Japan could be viable
without its previous Asian territories, how it could function except
as a drain on American resources without its old “natural” economy.
Japan needed an economic hinterland, and from 1948 to 1950 Ameri-
can planners sought it in Manchuria, Korea, Taiwan, and Southeast
Asia.2° Such thinking also suggested the virtues of rollback, at least
in some of these regions. Thus, a rollback option had been suggested,
and now the choices were four: cut bait, containment, ironclad guaran-
tee, and rollback.
Bishop had urged that the NSC convene and discuss a review of
NSC 8. When Army replied that it still required “a firm troop with-
drawal date’? because Korea was still a place of “little strategic inter-
est,” the dispute was referred to the NSC.*! At this point, however, an
29. FRUS, 1948, 6:1337-41.
30. This idea is developed, with supporting documentation, in Bruce Cumings,
“The Origin and Development of the Northeast Asian Political Economy, 1900-
1982,” International Organization, forthcoming.
31. FRUS, 1948, 6:1342, 1343 n.
INTRODUCTION 27
uld problem arose in new and dangerous form. The firmest advocate of
jollback was Syngman Rhee. As carly as June 1946 he had publicly
argued for a “northern expedition” to kick the “Communist bandits”
out ol the north; he used the same Chinese characters that Chiang did
lor the northern expedition in the 1920s (pukbdl or betfa). At about
(lhe same time he found a small coterie of unofficial American backers
(4 support his plans for a separate southern government and a march
”’ Americans familiar with South Korea since 1945 knew that
iol only Rhee, but his nationalist rival Kim Ku, and such other right-
Wiig Koreans with experience in the Chinese Nationalist military as
Yi P6m-s6k and Yi Ch’6ng-ch’Sn, had grandiose plans not only to
uilack north but to keep on going into Manchuria, to open a new front
i alliance with Chiang in the Chinese civil war. Hodge’s intelligence
“peration also developed information that Kim Il-sung and his Koreans
with Chinese experience on the Communist side, meaning mainly
‘lu Chéng and Ch’oe YSng-gdn, also had plans to attack south, using
xperienced Koreans (by the tens of thousands), doing or having done
huttle in Manchuria (assuming Mao would release them to Korea).*?
north,
12. Cumings, Origins, pp. 249, 532.
‘4, On September 18, 1947, Yi Ch’dng-ch’on urged upon Hodge, in a top secret
iwemorandum, the following course:
A Var East military alliance, under American leadership, should be con-
cluded. In case of emergency the [South] Korean army will take the lead
in standing at the front, and do their best, in combination with the Chinese
| Nationalist] Army, to destroy the army of a communist country.
If America should allow the Japanese to be armed again and let them
lake part in the joint campaign, the Japanese army shall take charge of the
operation in the localities of Maritime Provinces and Liaotung Peninsula,
while the Korean army will take on the operations against the enemy front
of Yalu River and Tumunchiang River. . . . If circumstances require, the
loree shall be advanced ahead. . .. According to the command of the Highest
Commander of the American Army we will defeat, in close cooperation
with the Far East allied armies [Nationalist China and Japan] the enemy
in front of the Tumunchiang River and the Yalu River .. . and continue
marching northward, .. .
Short of an all-out war in the Far East, Yi thought that within Korea, “be-
fore the [North Korean] communist army makes a raid over the [38th parallel]
line, the [South] Korean Army will advance north of the 38th parallel, and march
foward the Korea-Manchuria border defeating the communist armies every-
Where,”
Chis memo is one of several similar ones that might be quoted; it demon-
‘irales what the occupation had on its hands in South Korea. See RG 332,
'wenty-fourth Corps Historical File, G-2 Weekly Summary no. 105, Sept. 7-14,
1917, enclosing the above memo, Yi Ch’Sng-ch’On was the leader of the powerful,
paramilitary Taedong Youth Corps.
As tor the North Koreans, a trusted informant who claimed to have been at
28 BRUCK CUMINGS
Rhee muted his public threats in the summer and fall of 1948,
since he and the ROK needed UN backing. But after the December 12,
1948, resolution giving de facto UN recognition to the ROK, Rhee’s
threats became palpable and dangerous. On February 8, 1949 Rhee
met with Muccio and Army Secretary Royall, and according to the
top secret memorandum of conversation, “[Rhee] said he would
like to increase the Army, provide equipment and arms for it, and
then in a short time move north into North Korea. He said that United
Nations recognition of South Korea made it legal to cover all Korea
and that he saw nothing could be gained by waiting,””*4 Muccio respon-
ded by saying that ‘No such action should be taken certainly until
there was an opportunity to work matters out peacefully with North
Korea,’’ and Royall said ‘‘Of course, no invasion could in any event
take place while the United States had combat troops in Korea, and
that his [Rhee’s] suggestion was tantamount to a request that we
should have all American combat troops removed.’’ These were, it
might be said, rather tepid handslaps to a call in a private, secret meet-
ing by an American client for embarking on aggressive war. In the
aftermath, however, Muccio and Royall drew opposite conclusions.
Muccio wanted the troops to stay so that the ROK military could
be controlled, while Royall and the military wished to withdraw so
that they might choose whether or not to involve American troops in
a Korean war, and the terms of such a war. Rhee continued such
provocative rhetoric, publicly and privately, and thus one of the prime
rationales for the final withdrawal of American troops in summer 1949
was to distance American power from this volatile charge, to give
the Americans a choice in any possible hostilities.° As things stood
a meeting between Mu Chong and Ch’oe YOng-gon in Manchuria, May 10, 1947,
told U.S. intelligence that Ch’oe said the following: ‘‘Korea will soon be ours.
At present there is not a single unit in the United Democratic Forces now driving
the Kuomintang from Manchuria that does not have my troops in it. At the end
of the Manchurian campaign these troops will be seasoned, trained veterans, When
the Americans and the Russians withdraw, we will be able to liberate Korea im-
mediately ,”’ See RG 332, ‘Intelligence Summary—North Korea,” no. 38, June 15,
1947.
34. FRUS, 1948, 6:957.
35. This was a common view among Americans in South Korea. The ECA di-
rector, Arthur Bunce, made the point in early 1950 when he remarked, “‘President
Rhee might be more compliant with our wishes if he were made to feel a little
more uncertain about continuing U.S. support.” FRUS, 1950, 7:31. George Ken-
nan remarked during the Princeton seminars in 1953 that the question that
troubled American planners before June 1950 was not so much a North Korean
attack, but ‘‘whether we could restrain Rhee and the South Koreans from taking
INTRODUCTION "99
in early 1949, the United States—or at least its operative military
commander in the region, MacArthur—did have a mission “to repel
attack by external hostile forces’ as long as troops were on the
yround,%® This was, as we have seen, MacArthur’s plan since at least
late 1946,
Under urgent demands to resolve these problems, the NSC met and
decided upon NSC 8/2,%” basically an amendment to NSC 8 that did
ot change options A, B, and C, did not add the fourth option of
rollback, and scheduled the final withdrawal for June 30, 1949. Bishop’s
emphases on the threat to Japan and the severe blows to U.S. and
UN security were Korea to fall, however, were included. Also, more
emphasis was placed on the impossibility (given Rhee’s threats) of
yoing the option C route: the ironclad guarantee. Troop withdrawal
und the apparent indeterminacy of the American commitment to
defend the ROK, would provide useful levers in bringing Rhee and
lis allies to heel. As the troop withdrawal beckoned, Rhee verged
on panic and encouraged his military into aggressive actions that he
lioped would force the United States to commit to his regime.*® In
ihe engagements that followed his forces were badly mauled by the
North Koreans, however, and many Americans became more deter-
mined to place distance between the United States and the ROK. The
last contingents of U.S. troops left by early July, the occupation
(und U.S. operational control of the ROK military) ended, and Rhee
seemed to have lost his baiting game.
CONTAINMENT WINS SANCTION IN A ROLLBACK PACKAGE
American policy, clearly, would not commit to Rhee’s provocative
rollback strategy. But during this same period—summer 1949—U.S.
policy began to congeal around containing an overt North Korean
utter North Korea,” Dean Acheson Papers, Princeton Seminars, July 9, 1953
\ranscript, box 81, Truman Library. Acheson also said that if the United States
had given an ironclad guarantee to South Korea, “you would in effect have given
South Korea such an underwriting that their whole conduct would have been
(iuite different and it would have been quite provocative and very belligerent”
(ibid., Oct. 10-11, 1953 transcript, box 84).
56, Cable, Department of War to MacArthur, Dec. 21, 1948, RG 218, JCS,
485.21 Korea (Mar. 19, 1945), box 25, formerly top secret.
37. FRUS, 1949, 7, pt. 2:969-78.
38. The KMAG Commander, Gen. W. L. Roberts, said that the South Koreans
started the first major 38th parallel battle, at Kaestng on May 5, 1949. He also
thought that the South started the greater part of the fighting in the summer of
1049. See FRUS, 1949, 7, pt. 2:1009; also Roberts letter to Maj. Gen. Charles
Kolté, Sept. 13, 1949, in RG 319, P & O Files, box 548,
30 BRUCE CUMINGS
attack, and by December 1949 this policy had arrived with new op-
tions, one of which was rollback. This assertion directly reverses the
conventional historiography, but new documentation requires such
a reversal, in my view. On June 27, 1949, the Department of the
Army drew up a top secret schedule of options in the event of “a
possible full scale invasion from North Korea subsequent to withdrawal
of U.S. troops from South Korea.’2 The possible courses of action
included (a) emergency evacuation of American nationals in Korea;
(b) presentation of the problem to the United Nations Security Coun-
cil for emergency consideration; and (c) “to initiate police action
with U.N. sanction by the introduction of a military task force into
Korea composed of U.S. units and units of other member nations of
the U.N. with the objective of restoring law and order and restoration
of the 38th parallel boundary inviolability” (emphasis added). The
paper recommended adopting options (a) and (b) as policy, but option
(c) was deemed “unsound militarily” and should be considered
only if ‘‘all other methods have failed.” The JCS subsequently stated
its agreement with these judgments. Thus the military stuck to its
long-standing judgment that Korea was the wrong place to make a
stand—but now with the single caveat, unless all else fails.
The reference to ‘police action” is very important. The military’s
thinking about Korea had assumed conditions of general war to this
point, but here the idea of limited war intrudes. At about the same
time, George Kennan at PPS was thinking along similar lines. After
PPS seemed to have washed its hands of Korea policy, with little
mention in its voluminous papers from late 1947 to 1949, Korea
reappeared in a memo of March 28, 1949, referred to in the same
breath with Greece and Turkey in a discussion of military assistance
programs. In July, Kennan offered his “personal view” on Formosa
(Taiwan) and U.S. Asian policy.° He argued that if the military
continued to think that global U.S. requirements forbid a major at-
tempt to defend Formosa, then the United States should reconcile
itself to its ultimate takeover. He went on to say, however, that in
the wake of the Chinese Communist victory on the mainland, “Our
situation in the Far East will not permit further inaction in areas
where our military and economic capabilities would be adequate to
meet the possible commitments flowing from intervention.” If “others”
(meaning for the most part the military) agreed with him, “then my
39, FRUS, 1949, 7, pt. 2:1046-57.
40. RG 59, PPS Papers, box 33, Mar. 28, 1949, paper on military assistance;
also, box 2, July 6, 1949.
INTRODUCTION 31
personal view is that we should take the plunge’? and intervene to
protect Formosa, The logic would seem to fit South Korea as well
As part of a PPS project to take stock of the American easton in
the wake of the Maoist victory, on August 24 John Davies, Jr. wrote
to Kennan that “Finally, the question must arise someplace an our
relations with the U.S.S.R.—and it will probably be in Asia—whether
we can afford to follow indefinitely a policy of avoiding risks of con
llict with them at whatever cost to us.’*! He added the ieineresting
observation that ‘It would appear that we could not embark on such :
course [intervention], even on a limited scale, until the Communists
have so acted as to justify our retribution along the lines of this paper”
(emphasis added). In meeting 148 of the PPS, Oct. 11, 1949 aN
remarked that the JCS were always making caren ne of
enemy capabilities and basing policy on them, when in fact “limited
rit her than total warfare should be our objective.”*?
Che above papers were not immediately framed in policy state-
ments, but just as with the coincidence of views between the militar
and PPS in the fall of 1947, two years later both the JCS and the PPS
were considering a limited or police action in Asia to stop what the
all took to be Soviet expansion. From within South Korea came similar
\urgings. Muccio was a constant advocate of ever greater military aid
to the ROK, and on October 19 remarked that “American based
strategic and otherwise, in Korea is large and increasing daily.” A
month later, as part of a top secret request for more material laces
slated that a “serious emergency” might “arise at any Gis aly.
month after that Acheson wired Muccio that the State De in t
wanted to encourage the ROK ‘‘to appeal to the [U.N aise
Assembly . . . if there should be a major military stank ae ik
(hirty-eighth parallel.”** All this went on contemporaneously with
Muccio’s considerable worries about Rhee’s blustery threats ne th
distinct likelihood that the ROK Army might seek to march bead
’
the CIA was predictin i
g a North Korean attack
etewcimare ar ack in the wake of U.S.
11, Ibid., box 13.
12. Ibid., box 32.
15, See memos in FRUS, 1949, 7, pt. 2:1088, 1100, 1108.
Id, Nov. 1, 1949, RG 59, decimal file 895.00.
| * U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, ‘Consequences of US Troop With-
bgp rom Korea in Spring, 1949,” Feb. 28, 1949, ORE 3-49, top secret Bs
1e CLA deemed it “highly probable” that an invasion would follow the aie icwal
Ilarry S. Truman/President’s Secretary’s Fi
an / ent’s Secretary’s Files (HST/PSF), box 256, Truman Li-
BRUCE CUMINGS
From the fall of 1949 to the spring of 1950 was, as Acheson
aptly put it, “the NSC 68 period.” It was, in other words, the time
when the State Department and NSC pursued a major—perhaps the
major—reorientation of postwar global policy, resulting in the famous
NSC 68 document. Simultaneously the same agencies developed NSC
48, “The Position of the U.S. with Respect to Asia,” approved by
Truman in its second revised form as 1949 drew to a close. This
document was, in effect, an NSC 68 for Asia policy. Although this
documentation has been available since the mid-1970s, most analysts
have missed the interesting dialectic between containment and rollback
policies that runs through both documents.
In its final form NSC 48/2 included for the first time an expressed
commitment to extend containment to Asia: “For the foreseeable
future . . . our policy must be to contain . . . the power and influence
of the USSR in Asia.” But there was another phrase as well, in the
second ellipsis: “to contain and where feasible to reduce the power and
influence of the USSR in Asia” (emphasis mine). Although Korea was
not mentioned in this context, the logic of the new policy meant that
the policy of containment pursued in Korea since August 1945 had
won final sanction. But what about the suggestion of reducing Soviet
power and influence? Was this an insignificant addendum? The delibera-
tions leading up to the adoption of NSC 48/2 show that it was not.
In conjuring the realm of the feasible, policy makers had rollback in
their minds.
First let us look at the application of containment. In the summer
of 1949 PPS was not alone in its desire to resist further Soviet (i.c.,
Communist) expansion wm Asia. Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson
stimulated the NSC 48 deliberations by recommending on June 10,
1949, that the American objective should be “to contain communism”
in Asia’ Earlier on, in a paper included in Truman’s own NSC file,
the CIA had argued that smaller Pacific Rim countries like Formosa,
Korea, and Indonesia were ‘“*becoming critical” as a result of the Chi-
nese Communist victory; in this region, “the available opportunities
as well as the pressing necessity for stabilizing US influence are being
concentrated.’*® Attention focused on Formosa during the NSC 68
period, down to the outbreak of the Korean War, with various agencies
46. Included in Containment, ed. Etzold and Gaddis, pp. 252-76. NSC 48/1
was the approved document, NSC 48/2 the approved and slightly modified conclu-
sions to the document.
47, FRUS, 1949, 7, pt. 2:1108.
48. U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, 12-48, “‘Review of the World Situation,”
Dec. 16, 1948, in HST/PSF, National Security Council Meetings, box 205, Truman
Library.
INTRODUCTION 33
recommending that it should or should not be defended; it is critical
to understand that for high policy makers like Acheson the Taiwan
and Korea questions were (1) part of the same problem of resisting
further Communist encroachment, but (2) two different problems
because Taiwan was interconnected with the American desire to split
China off from the USSR, whereas North Korea was seen as a complete
Soviet satellite. Thus, the containment logic that emerged in 1949
fit Korea much better than it did Taiwan. In one of Acheson’s few
references to Korea in these months, he remarked that ‘the all-or-
nothing boys refuse to do what is possible in Korea, because we will
not attempt what is impossible in China.”*? Here he referred to his
efforts to get economic and military aid bills for the ROK through
Congress, but the separation of the Korean and Chinese problems in
regard to the limits on American power was clear.
In a very important early draft of NSC 48, a “sanitized” copy of
which was declassified in 1981,°° the sense of pressure coming all
along the Soviet-influenced perimeter runs through the document;
the United States “‘must be able to apply pressure on any front at a
time of its own choosing if it is not to lose the advantages of the initia-
live.’ Containment logic was thus applied world wide; the Soviet
mechanical car would be stopped by judicious application of pressure
along a global perimeter in which the earlier perceived differences
between Europe and Asia had disappeared, The commitment to con-
lainment in the revised version (NSC 48/1) grew out of this world-
ranging logic of perimeter defense. Far more striking, however, is that
containment had become an “option B,’”’ sandwiched between option
C, which was the status quo to 1949 in Asia, and a new option A:
rollback. The first draft of NSC 48 was not about containment, it
was about rollback,
To begin with, the phrase in the final NSC 48 document, “‘contain
and where feasible reduce’ Soviet power, was rendered as follows in
the first draft: ‘Our immediate objective must be to reduce the power
and influence of the USSR in Asia.” In responding to Communist
activity the United States, as mentioned earlier, would apply pressure
along the Communist periphery “on any front at a time of its own
choosing if it is not to lose the advantages of the initiative.’’ (In all
the rollback talk of the early 1950s, there was constant reference to
seizing the initiative through an active policy—Dulles’s “positive ac-
tion”—in contrast to the alleged passivity of containment.) The draft
49. Acheson to David Bruce, July 26, 1949, in Acheson Papers, memoranda
of conversation, box 64, Truman Library.
50. Memo to Rusk, Burns, Fahey, Oct. 26, 1949, sanitized copy declassified
Feb. 13, 1981, in HST/PSF, National Security Council Meetings, box 207.
NN eee eS
M4 BRUCE CUMINGS
referred as follows to the possibility of getting Asians to fight Asians
in the interests of seizing the initiative: ‘Asia contains indigenous
forces which if effectively developed in aggressive pursuit of the cold
war should be able by means short of war to commence the roll-back
[sic] of Soviet control and influence in the area, without constituting
a serious drain on United States economy.”
In the final draft, however, this paragraph was amended to say
“to the degree that Asian indigenous forces develop opposition to the
expansion of USSR influence, they would assist the U.S, in containing
Soviet control and influence in the area... .”” (my emphasis). Thus
in both this instance and the key phrase about containing and reducing
Soviet power, containment had to be added to a first draft thinking
only of rollback.
Furthermore, in discussing the containment defense perimeter in
Asia, the first draft stated that control of perimeter defense “may be
adequately established by the United States only if the area of com-
munist control is reduced,’’ a thought that was dropped in the final
draft. Another dropped phrase asserted that “Before its defeat, Japan
was a strong anti-communist force in Asia,” which has interesting,
but unexplored, implications. All in all, the authors wanted a “dynamic
program” in American Asian policy, allowing it to act “in a positive
manner”; the new, dynamic policy would be “a springboard for positive
action in Asia.”’ These rollback phrases were left out of the final draft.
The conclusions to the first draft recommended that the United
States reconsider its entire Asian policy, and make “certain funda-
mental decisions respecting future policy.” They recommended the
annexation of Taiwan (‘‘the United States should obtain title to For-
mosa’’) and its use ‘in the event of war”; Japan should also be available
to the United States should war occur. Chinese Communist expansion
should be blocked through “every practicable measure” including
overt and covert action, short of “the commitment of US military
forces.”’ A “high-ranking individual,” either military or civilian, should
be appointed ‘‘to direct all United States efforts against communism
in the vicinity of China.” Two other concluding recommendations
have deletions in this ‘‘sanitized’’ draft, making it impossible to know
to what they refer, although they may refer to CIA and military G-2
covert forays into China and North Korea, of which there were many
in this period. A peace settlement with Japan was recommended:
“brief, non-punitive, and confined to general principles.” With Japan,
the United States should promote “a strong trading area among the
non-communist countries of Asia.” And finally, “The United States
should mobilize all instrumentalities of the government which may
be effectively utilized . . . in order that a coordinated political, eco-
INTRODUCTION “s
35
homie and psychological offensive [here follows a 23-space deletion]
imay be brought to bear against the communist conspiracy in Asia.”
Ilere indeed was Asia’s NSC 68, a strategy for creating an Asian “orand
area” for free trade and anticommunism.
NSC 68, adopted in effect if not formally in April 1950,5! con-
tained similar references both to containment all along a global com-
munist periphery, and to rollback. Soviet mischief might mean global
war, or it might mean “limited objectives”; in any case the United
States must “apply force” to counteract such activity. But containment
was not conceived passively: “As for the policy of ‘containment,’ it
is one which seeks by all means short of war to (1) block further
expansion of Soviet power, (2) expose the falsities of Soviet preten-
sions, (3) induce a retraction of the Kremlin’s control and influence
and (4) in general, so foster the seeds of destruction within the Soviet
system that the Kremlin is brought at least to the point of modifying
its behavior. . . .’? (emphasis added). Later on the document referred to
“the checking and rolling back” of the Kremlin’s drive, “to check and
to roll back” its attempt at world domination, the taking of “dynamic
steps to reduce the power and influence of the Kremlin,” and so on.°?
In short, the dialectic between containment (passive bulwarks) and
rollback (dynamic action) was nearly identical to that in NSC 48. For
the drafters of NSC 48 in the fall of 1949 the changed Asian context in-
cluded not just the Maoist victory, but also the reverse course in Japan.
Communism in China meant a need for new bulwarks (the containment
metaphor): thus, in the NSC 48 draft, “we must decide whether to
acquire Formosa” or not; “we must decide whether to attempt to
make India the bulwark against the extension of communist control”
in South Asia; in Southeast Asia, the United States should find a
resolution to “the colonial-nationalist conflict,” in ways that “satisfy
the fundamental demands of the nationalist movements, lay the basis
for political stability and resistance to communism, and avoid weaken-
ing the colonial powers who are our Western allies.” (Thus the final
draft recommended aid to the French in Indochina.) A new mechanical
car had emerged, directed by Moscow through Peking, necessitating
bulwarks all along the China perimeter. But what did the reverse course
for Japan suggest?
Put simply, the drafters thought the revived Japanese economy
would require an Asian hinterland in order to function. This was an
idea that ran like a thread through much of the reverse course planning.
51. NSC 68 was declassified by Henry Kissinger in 1975. It is included in
Containment, ed. Etzold and Gaddis, pp. 383-442,
52. Ibid., pp. 393, 401, 429, 434-35.
36 BRUCE CUMINGS
We have already seen that Kennan immediately grasped the strategic
logic of reviving Japan: it should be reintroduced in Northeast Asia
as a counter to the Soviet Union in classic balance-of-power fashion.
But the NSC 48 drafters, and other agencies such as the ECA and the
CIA,°> saw an economic logic as well. In this they were joined by
elements of the private sector in the Japan lobby, representing banking
and high-technology industries that did not fear Japanese competition.
Their basic conception was to fit the Japanese economy into a hier-
archical model of transnational capitalism, based on the economic
reasoning of comparative advantage and the product cycle, in which
Japan would be a distinctly second-rank economy in relation to the
United States (and kept on an oil, food, and defense dependency to
give the United States leverage), but would be the leading Asian econ-
omy, drawing raw materials and finding markets in an Asian hinterland.
As I have argued elsewhere, this conception bears close comparison
to Immanuel Wallerstein’s world-system model, founded on multiple
tripartite hierarchies of core, semiperiphery, and periphery. The
results of the war had put Japan distinctly back in the semiperiphery
vis-a-vis the United States, but it had also deprived Japan of its colonial
periphery in Taiwan, Korea, Manchuria, and North China. Most Ameri-
can planners thought in 1949 that the Japanese economy would be
unviable without a hinterland. Given the splitting of Korea, the Com-
munist victory in China, and the likelihood that Taiwan would fall,
they naturally looked to Southeast Asia as a likely periphery.
Thus NSC 48/1 argued that Japan can be self-supporting only if
‘it ig able to secure a greater proportion of its needed food and raw
material (principally cotton) imports from the Asiatic area, in which
its natural markets lie.’”? The first draft, in a statement left out of
NSC 48/1, said “certain advantages in production costs of various
commodities in the United States, Japan and Southeast Asia suggest
the mutually beneficial character of trade of a triangular character
between these three areas.’? The countries of Southeast Asia had
“a marked comparative advantage in the economies of production”
of “strategic materials . . . such as tin, rubber, and hard fibers.” This
thinking was retained in the final draft, although references to a triangle
involving Japan were dropped because they smacked too much of the
prewar situation. But trade with China was not foreclosed for Japan
53. U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, ORE 43-48, May 24, 1948, in HST/PSF,
memoranda 45-49, box 255, Truman Library; Economic Cooperation Administra-
tion (ECA), unsigned memo of Nov. 3, 1948, Acheson Papers, box 27, Truman
Library.
54, See Gumings, ‘*The Origin and Development of the Northeast Asian Political
Keonomy.”
INTRODUCTION 37
because this, too, was thought to be good for Japan’s economy, and
what was good for Japan’s economy was also good for the United
States, if not for our European allies who resisted Japanese re-entry
into Southeast Asia.
Southeast Asia was the main candidate for Japan’s hinterland in
the period from 1948 to 1950, but there were some suggestions that
the old hinterland might be more appropriate, if Korea, Manchuria,
and Taiwan could be kept out of or wrested back from Communist
hands. Thus an ECA memorandum in Acheson’s papers, dated Novem-
ber 3, 1948, argued that ‘(North China and Manchuria constitute the
one area of vital importance to the U.S.” in Asia; “the Japanese proved
it to be the key to control of China,” and without the resources of
the area, ‘‘there would literally be no hope of achieving a viable econ-
omy in Japan.” The author noted “the strategic and economic relation-
ship of North China and Manchuria with Korea and Japan.” Thus, “our
first concern must be the liberation of Manchuria and North Korea
from communist domination.”’ A covering letter said that this memo
“has met with such approbation in a number of quarters that [Ache-
son] might be interested in reading it.”°> There is no record of Ache-
son’s reaction.
Stretching from the Pacific ports of North Korea through Man-
churia into North China was the only well-developed industrial struc-
ture in Asia outside of Japan, with heavy industries such as steel, iron,
petrochemicals, automobiles, and hydroelectric generation, newly
installed by Japan in the 1930s and early 1940s, The parsimonious
industrial-structure logic of Kennan’s containment policy (we had
four, they had one) would seem to make this Northeast Asian complex
more important for Japan than Southeast Asia: here was Japan’s
true “natural”? economy, the result of its imperial policies over four
decades. I have found only scattered evidence that the “liberation”
of this region had anything to do with NSC 48, or with the march
north after the Korean War began. The most one can say is that the
rollback logic mingled security and economic considerations inex-
tricably, and that both the security and the economic advantages of
rollback were more obvious in Northeast than in Southeast Asia.
‘The more important points about rollback in 1949 are two: first,
such contingency planning cleared the way for the adoption of contain-
ment in Asia, by making containment seem to be a compromise rather
than a wholly new policy. Rollback ran interference for containment,
turning it into a comfortable option B. Rollback phraseology then
provided a rationale for marching into North Korea, as we will see,
85, EGA, unsigned memo; see n, 55,
58 BRUGE GUMINGS
Second, this was liberal rollback. That is, a handful of high policy
makers, all from the moderate Democratic and Republican “middle,”
penned the rollback logic. This had nothing to do with the rollback
sketch at the beginning of this paper, at least in regard to the social
constituency for such policies. Japan-firsters, not China-firsters, de-
veloped the rollback planning; they were the people who had argued
against containing communism in incontinent China. The Japan-
firsters, moreover, were Europe-firsters as well, having an integrated
understanding of Japan’s place in the world economy and the virtues
for American interests of a revived Japan that would simultaneously
weaken the British in Southeast Asia and continue England’s American-
cushioned fall from empire. The policy would enhance American
hegemony in Asia and Europe simultaneously.
Rollback talk also had great value in domestic politics. It would steal
an issue from the Republican Right, while bringing Republican moder-
ates such as Dulles into a much more stable coalition behind American
cold war policy. Indeed, it was during the “NSC 68” period that Dulles
joined the Truman administration, and it is then—not in 1953—that he
began talking about “positive action,” the rollback metaphor.
SOME WAITING GAMES
Had Stalin or Kim Il-sung read NSC 48/1, either would have pre-
dicted the entry of American forces into a Korean war under conditions
of direct, unprovoked, conventional invasion. With the subsequent
development of NSC 68 in early 1950, the likely effect of an attack
in Korea on world-wide security would have been just as obvious.
Presumably neither Stalin nor Kim read these top secret documents.*©
But Acheson, Muccio, and other officials had read them. Having read
them myself, I can only say at this point (especially in the absence of
State Department files after December 1949, still unreleased to the
National Archives), that much remains to be explained about the be-
havior of those responsible for Korean and Asian policy in the months
leading up to June 25, 1950. In particular, why was there not a public
or diplomatic initiative to make American policy clear, and to head
off the impending conflict?
56. William Manchester claims that Kim Philby and Guy Burgess, as first and
second secretaries at the British Embassy in Washington in 1950, sat on the top
secret Inter-Allied Board; Philby is said to have acted as liaison officer between
the CIA and UK Secret Intelligence Service. Manchester thinks that they passed
American battle plans in Korea to the Russians in the fall of 1950. Presumably
the Russians could also have viewed top secret planning prior to the Korean War,
a point that Manchester does not mention. See American Caesar: Douglas Mac-
Arthur, 1880-1964 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1978). pp. 596-98.
INTRODUCTION 53Y
noo ~—
tou killed in action
(quertilla & border)
number of guerrilla clashes
number of 38th parallel
clashes
io
ales
Ochaber November December January February March April May June
1049 1950
Fig. 1. Guerrilla and thirty-eighth parallel fighting, October 1949-June 1950
Source: KMAG G-2 (Intelligence) Weekly and Periodic Reports
Three more facts need to be established. First, as mentioned earlier,
throughout most of 1948 and 1949 a guerrilla struggle existed in the
south, and after May 1949 it was punctuated by numerous engagements
along the thirty-eighth parallel. By April 1950, however, as figure 1
demonstrates, this guerrilla effort was virtually extinguished and border
incidents also tailed off to nothing after March 1950. Second, major
transfers to North Korea of Korean soldiers who had been fighting in
the Manchurian campaigns with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)
occurred in 1949 and early 1950; Kim Il-sung seems, in other words,
io have won his baiting game with Mao. A minimum of thirty-thousand
yoldiers were involved in these transfers, and the troops became the
main shock forces in the early stages of the Korean War. According to
U.S. military intelligence, Korean units made up perhaps 20 percent of
PIA forces in Manchuria, and within the North Korean military Korean
officers who had been at Yenan or had served in the Chinese civil war
made up fully 80 percent of all officers. The Chinese were happy to
40 BRUCE CUMINGS
utilize Korean soldiers, but they disliked “the rigidly nationalist views”
of the Koreans, One of the top northern leaders, Mu Chodng, a Korean
who had made the Long March and was said to be close to Chu Teh,
reportedly demanded that the Chinese Communists should reward
North Korea with the Chinese province of Chientao in recognition
of Korean sacrifices in the civil war.’ Within North Korea the regime
recruited soliders using entirely nationalist appeals, with no reference
to China or the Soviet Union, and not much to socialism.°8
Although the origin of the Korean People’s Army cannot be dis-
cussed further here for reasons of space, the point to remember is that
battle-hardened Koreans directed this army, using highly nationalistic
appeals; Chinese influence was greater than Soviet influence from
1946 on (the year the army began forming), and yet this was a Korean
rather than a puppet army. In 1950 the Soviets shipped tanks and
other materiel to North Korea, primarily to compete with the Chinese
for influence, just as they do today. The DPRK gets it high-technology
military items from the USSR, the depth of its experience is with
China, but its heart is thoroughly Korean, I believe, although I cannot
at this point prove, that the conventional battles of the Korean War
began because the North wished to unify the peninsula and provide
thereby the basis for an authentically revolutionary-nationalist re-
gime that could resist domination by outside forces, including the
Soviets and the Chinese.°? Furthermore it is my view that the osten-
57. RG 332, Intelligence Summary—North Korea, no. 36, May 18, 1947; also
no. 37, May 31, 1947.
58. Some recruit interviews in 1948 give the flavor of the appeals:
: Why did you volunteer for the People’s Army ?”’
: I want to participate in the struggle.
: What is the struggle?
: The struggle against the traitors and pro-Japanese.
: Don’t you like working in the fields?
: Since I am young I would rather fight than work in the fields.
: Since all the people like the People’s Republic [inmin konghwaguk,
not minjujuti inmin konghwaguk, interestingly], why do Syngman Rhee and
Kim Koo oppose it?
A.: Because they want to fill up their dirty stomachs.
Q.: Who must build the People’s Republic?
A.: We must build it with our own hands.”
Another recruit was asked, ‘Who is the greatest patriot?” and answered,
“General Kim Il-sung’’; ‘‘Who are our enemies?” ‘Landlords, capitalists, pro-
Japanese and reactionary elements’’; “What if the American bastards shoot you?”
“T will suffer anything, even death, to defeat them.”
See numerous recruit interviews in the original Korean, SA 2005, Item 5/44,
in RG 242, “Captured Enemy Documents,” National Records Center, Suitland, Md.
59. | think the evidence is overwhelming that the North Koreans launched
OPO POP
INTRODUCTION 41
sible “Korean War” subsequent to June 25 was in fact a denouement,
not a beginning; it was a civil and revolutionary struggle fought over
issues that were joined immediately after liberation in 1945, moving
through a political phase in 1945-46 in which revolutionaries sought
to establish people’s committees in North and South, into a phase of
mass rebellion in the fall of 1946, then into a period of unconventional
warfare from early 1948 to the beginning of 1950, and finally to a
phase of conventional warfare that began in the summer of 1949 on
4 small scale, then moved into a quiet period of waiting as both North
and South sought backing from their guarantors for a conventional
assault, and then into hot war as the People’s Army, in MacArthur’s
phrase, “struck like a cobra” and nearly enveloped the peninsula
within weeks. I also think that this last phase was initiated by Kim
[l-sung and his allies over at best Stalin’s acquiescence and at worst
over his objections. Subsequent Soviet behavior in the fall of 1950
supports such an interpretation, as we will see, Had the United States
not become involved, the June war would have been a denouement
to the previous period. All of this, of course, is subject enough for
another article. The question here is why, in the face of numerous
reports about a coming invasion, little was done to stop it.
American intelligence—that is, the Korean Military Advisory Group
(KMAG) G-2 and the separate G-2 operation that Colonel Willoughby
van for MacArthur (the general excluded the CIA from Korea) —
monitored the movement of Korean troops from China to North
Korea, and the steady southward displacement of troops, tanks, and
materiel within North Korea; as the southward movement continued,
warnings of imminent attack became standard fare for intelligence
olficers.°! The U.S. military was much more cognizant of North
Korea’s China connection than was the State Department—it tended
io discount G-2 reports of Chinese involvement. More important, the
iilitary saw a monolithic communism in Asia, whereas the State
Department made distinctions between China and the USSR and
OO e. ee ee ee eee
(he major fighting on June 25, perhaps utilizing a minor provocation by the South.
ik) 242 contains one piece of evidence supporting this that historians might not
ordinarily find: in several notebooks compiled by mechanics and technicians
ws they serviced North Korean airplanes in the Third Squadron in the period from
April to June 1950, we find that entries for April show various inspections and
yervicing, whereas those of June 19, 20, and 22 show the exclusive entry, ‘‘airplane
preparation” (pihaenge chunbui). See SA 2005, Item 4/75, in ibid.
60, 1 confirmed this in a discussion with Gen. Joseph Stilwell, who was CIA
Avia chief in June 1950 (March 1978, Seattle, Washington).
61, RG $19, no, 873, Intelligence Library “P” File, 1946-51, KMAG G-2
Weekly Summaries and Periodic Reports, 1948-50,
42 BRUCE CUMINGS
sought to split one from the other in 1949-50. The State Department—
and especially Acheson—saw the Formosa and Korea questions dif-
ferently: Formosa should not be defended because to do so would
alienate Mao and Chou En-lai; North Korea was a Soviet satellite and
an attack from that corner was a different matter.
The CIA, or its operatives, at times claimed to have predicted the
invasion, but its general estimate of the situation, issued a week before
the war, predicted more of the same: more guerrilla war and political
struggle designed to unseat Syngman Rhee and cause the collapse of
his regime.©* KMAG intelligence officers collected the empirical evi-
dence which, in hindsight, pointed to an invasion. But people on the
scene had lived with invasion scares ever since April 1946, when Hodge
predicted an invasion timed to coincide with Soviet activities in north-
em Iran. By 1950 there had been thousands of such warnings. The
full run of KMAG G-2 reports in 1949 and 1950 show the facts of
southward deployment, but no evidence of “intelligence” derived
from these facts sufficient to predict an invasion. MacArthur’s own
weekly G-2 reports sent up through regular channels in the weeks
before June 25 also contain evidence pointing toward an invasion,
but none of the characteristic red pencil marks that usually indicated
the drawing in of commander’s attentions.
On May 10, the ROK defense minister publicly called the attention
of foreign correspondents to the “arrival of two divisions of Chinese
[sic] Communist troops in Northern Korea,” and two days later
Rhee commented at a press conference on the defense minister’s
statements:
I have heard North Korean troops [are] concentrating near the 38th parallel... .
We can do nothing. We will solve this matter through the UN and the United
States. . . . North Korea is concentrating near the thirty-eighth parallel. I do not
think these North Korean troops are concentrating near the thirty-eighth parallel
to invade Japan or China. . . . In South Korea the U.S. has one foot in South
Korea and one foot outside so that in case of an unfavorable situation it could
pull out of our country. ... General Roberts and Ambassador Muccio have worked
to obtain more arms for Korea, but people in the United States are dreaming.
For six weeks after mid-May the ROK government was silent on
the North Korean build-up. The KMAG G-2 reports from the period
are very poor and sketchy. A full understanding of this strange period—
the only one since August 1948 not marked either by southern threats
to march north, or alarms about “bandit” aggression—must await
more documentation. There seems to be little question that by June
62, FRUS, 1950, 7:109-21.
6%, Ibid., pp. 83, 85,
INTRODUCTION 48
1950 Rhee had been convinced by his American advisers—official ones
like Muccio and unofficial ones like Robert Oliver®—that no help
would come from the United States if he initiated a war, or if he
clearly provoked an attack. In June 1950 silence for this inveterate
yambler may have been his last refuge.
In any event, the first Korean War was, as Muccio later put it,
“fortunately clearcut.’ Clear-cut, that is, to everyone except a
small handful with close knowledge of the Korean scene since 1945.
A psychological, but critical, distance intruded between the likely
war of summer 1949 and the actual war of June 1950. It came like a
thunderclap, and thus historians have been concerned with ‘who
started the Korean War.”’ It is a question no one has thought to ask
about the Vietnam War.
When war came in the form of frontal invasion, with only the
barest attempts to claim provocation, American involvement was a
foregone conclusion. All high officials at Blair House were unanimous
for intervention, minus a few military demurrals about committing
yround troops. A formerly top secret JCS study of the decision to
intervene put the argument simply, and correctly:®© the rapidity of
the decision is itself evidence that the Truman administration was
“alveady pledged’? to defend South Korea, State Department intelli-
yence officials also got together in record time (mid-afternoon, June 25
Washington time) in a thorough discussion of the situation that was
heavily loaded toward intervention.©”
The NSC 48 decision, and the June 25 decision, were decisions for
containment, Containment was a classic option B between those who
favored rolling back communism and those who favored the interna-
(ionalist measures we have discussed; containment was a convenient
lall-back point that did not necessarily compromise the ultimate goals
of rollback or internationalist accommodation, For all practical pur-
poses, this compromise was forced in Korea in 1945. By late 1949,
Washington’s policy makers gave final approval, in effect, to the actions
llodge and others had taken since 1945 to forge an anti-Communist
bulwark in the South. Strangely, however, the containment compro-
inise did not last long. North Korea’s lunge forward opened up the
sealm of the feasible: the first postwar opportunity to reduce Com-
iiunist-held territory, But before getting to that story, there remains a
O41, See Robert Oliver, Syngman Rhee and American Involvement in Korea
(Seoul: Panmum Books, 1978), chap. 11,
65, Oral history interview, John Muccio, Truman Library.
66, Joint Chiefs of Staff, “The Korean Conflict,” see, 6, vol, 4, chap. 5, p. 3
tow in Modern Military Braneh, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
67, FRUS, 1950, 7:148-55,
,
44 BRUCE CUMINGS
certain lacuna that will have occurred to the reader by now. What about
Acheson’s press club speech?
DEAN ACHESON AND THE KOREAN WAR: A HYPOTHESIS
On January 12, 1950, Acheson spoke on Asian policy at the Press
Club in Washington, D.C, Although few at the time commented on it,
after June 25 observers noted that he had seemingly excluded South
Korea from the American defense perimeter in Asia. His Republican
opponents, and many historians since, argue that he “gave the green
light” to the Communists to attack, In his memoirs Acheson says
surprisingly little about this controversy, except to dismiss his critics
and to remark on the “stupidity” of the Russians in sponsoring the
Korean attack.68 In the Princeton seminars, a retrospective set of
discussions on Truman policies, Acheson said ‘tin those days I was
fresh and eager and inexperienced,” one should have known that in
speaking off the cuff from notes, and in not consulting others, “you’ve
left yourself open to a very serious misunderstanding.”
When a researcher reads through the private papers of a prominent
individual, sitting astride the daily stream of policy papers, memos,
notes, letters, and diaries, he forms judgments. Some people he likes
more, others less; some he respects more, others less; eventually he
arrives at certain conclusions about the person, Acheson’s papers
bring forth the unshakeable judgment that this was not a naive nor
an inexperienced person, Indeed, few American secretaries of state
have ever matched Acheson’s grasp of world affairs, his vision, his
ability to articulate policy, his capacity to think questions through
and to discern logic in the flow of events. For Acheson the world in
1950 was like a set of city blocks, here was Europe, there was Asia;
the Asian block had Japan next to Korea, China next to Indochina,
and Acheson had shrewdly conceived policies for each. Only people
who have never sought intellectually to order global events (and there-
fore think it impossible), or specialists who plumb the parts at the
expense of the whole, could fail in Acheson’s papers to find a man
who was the antithesis of the naive groper. In some circles of foreign
policy analysis it has become de rigeur to deny that policy makers
have any plans at all, or to sec in the imputation of a plan some sort
of conspiracy theory. “Acheson never thought about Korea, he had
no time to do so,’’ said one commentator on an earlier version of
this article. This is fallacious. Acheson thought about the global city
68. Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation (New York: Signet Books, 1970),
pp. 465-67, 970-71.
69, Princeton Seminars, Feb, 13, 1954, box 81, Truman Library.
INTRODUCTION 45
and each block in it on a daily basis; furthermore he had plans, visions
and he kept secrets.” All hegemonic statesmen do; for diate meee,
someone so lowly as an academic department chairman does as ele
if on a decidedly lesser scale.
So, in what follows I make the hypothesis that Acheson knew what
he was doing in his press club speech, that he fit Korea into the logic
of over-all Asian policy, and that therefore the speech and its aftermath
demand extensive probing and thought. To do otherwise would be to
deny the man’s character, to ignore his acumen, and indeed to make
ol history a nihilistic endeavor in which we all flounder about aimlessly
But, given the lack of documentation from January 1950 on sets
can be no more than an interpretation, a set of hypotheses that eke
(o render intelligible what has long been unintelligible.
When the Korean War broke out, Acheson dominated American
policy on the question. The declassified Blair House meeting minutes
make this palpable; furthermore it was Acheson who made the decision
10 take the Korean question to the UN Security Council on the evenin
of J une 24 (Washington time), before he had notified Truman of fis
lighting; it was Acheson who told Truman there was no need to have
him back in Washington until twenty-four hours later; it was Acheson
whe labored alone on the afternoon of June 26 with fundamental
decisions committing American power to the Korean War, approved
(hat evening at Blair House.”! Acheson later remarked that in regard
to NSC decisions in general, the JCS and other military agencies would
mike their case (always a bad one, he thought), ‘then a discussion, and
then—in my experience, always—the President deciding in favor of sian
| thought was the sound view, which was the one | presented to him.”
\\ennan stated that the Korea decisions were ‘‘not something a
pon [Acheson] by the military leaders, but rather something arrived
al by himself, in solitary deliberation.’’””* The decision to intervene was
therefore, Acheson’s decision, supported by the president and tlie
civilian leaders,
Acheson’s press club speech was also something arrived at “‘in
yolitary deliberation.’”’ This was to be a public, and therefore sanitized
or understated, explanation of the new policy for Asia (NSC 48/1)
70, For instance, Acheson’s secretary, Lucius Battle, asked if Acheson’s tele-
a call with Secretary Pace of July 13, 1950, should be recorded via dictation;
% \e = binges “We have agreed to make no record of it. Repeat nothing,”
vo ee book, entry for July 14, 1950, in Acheson Papers,
a eo eton Seminars, Oct. 10-11, 1955 sessions, boxes 83 and 8&4, Truman
72. Ibid,
46 BRUCE CUMINGS
Acheson received from the State Department several drafts of the
speech, but rejected them all_including one from George Kennan
that asserted his ideas about reinvolving Japan in the Korean and
Northeast Asian situation.’ Instead Acheson labored alone on the
speech for several days, spoke from notes, and then did not keep the
notes. The speech was taken down verbatim and distributed by the
State Department.
Acheson spent more hours on this speech than he did on the
decision to intervene in Korea. His appointment book’* shows that
he had a meeting about the speech on January 5, worked all day alone
on it January 8, met again about it on January 9 in the morning,
worked on it again on the afternoons and evenings of the tenth and
eleventh, and then on the twelfth, ‘all morning at home working on
the speech.” He did not discuss the defense perimeter concept with
anyone until using it in the speech. His fundamental point, which he
later thought the speech made ‘‘quite clear,’’ was that nations within
the perimeter would automatically be defended (e.g., Japan): “this
is the line which we can hold and will hold.” For certain nations
outside the perimeter (¢.g., South Korea) the initial reliance in case
of attack would be on the people attacked to defend themselves, while
invoking UN collective security sanctions.”
This was a wholly acceptable rendering of Acheson’s own position.
He had to look after the whole, and knew that American power was
stretched around the globe and could not plug holes and fissures in
the containment periphery everywhere. The UN and allied support
would be necessary, which he had earlier recommended for both
Formosa and South Korea in the event of an attack.’© Also, both
Formosa and South Korea had recalcitrant and obstreperous leaders
whose favored policy was rollback, and therefore an ironclad commit-
ment to defend them would lead to uncontrollable behavior, perhaps
provocation. As early as February 1949 Acheson had spelled out this
logic with perfect clarity in regard to Formosa and the same logic
fit Korea. The United States, he said, should not encourage the ir-
redentist issues that animated Chiang K’ai-shek, ‘“‘just at the time we
shall be seeking to exploit [re: China] the genuinely anti-Soviet irre-
dentist issue in Manchuria and Sinkiang’’; furthermore, “It is a cardinal
point in our thinking that if our present policy is to have any hope of
success in Formosa, we must carefully conceal our wish to separate
73, See the draft, dated Jan. 9, 1950, in George F. Kennan Papers, box 24,
Princeton University Library.
74. Acheson Papers, box 45, Truman Library.
75, Princeton Seminars, July 23, 1953 session, box 81, Truman Library.
on KRRUS 1949. 7. pt, 241088,
INTRODUCTION
47
the island from mainland control.” And then, ‘‘If we are to interve
militarily on the island, we shall, in all probability, do so in conc im
with like-minded powers, preferably using UN pedir and ai
the proclaimed intention of satisfying the legitimate demands of th
indigenous Formosans for self-determination either under a UN trust :
ship or through independence.’’”” The speech therefore was an pn
able public rendering of Acheson’s carefully constructed position a
Asia, but it had a realm of ambiguity necessary to conceal Acheson’
desire to keep both Formosa and the China mainland, and North a d
Sou th Korea, divided, Secrecy was necessary to pueventt outcries f :
military and congressional leaders who would say the defense b i
could not sustain commitments to such places, and to mai i ia
ambiguity to discipline China and Rhee. pi pe ne
Acheson was not, on the available record, an advocate of “positive
action,” at least in regard to Korea and Taiwan. This would hedehen
can policy to petty dictators for whom Acheson had contempt, and i
likely provocations that would reinvolve the United States in a
Asian civil wars. It is likely that he made the revisions in NSC 48/1
that introduced containment rather than rollback as the main point
Acheson’s entire emphasis, during the NSC 68 period and in his ogi
was-on constructing a defense, not an offense, and this is wh fe
introduced the notion of a defense perimeter in Asia and wh a
visioned different defenses for Formosa and South Korea The He
remaining point here, referred to earlier, is that the ibdentielete defend
South Korea had to be stronger in his mind than the imtention t
defend Formosa, because North Korea was assumed to be a ‘
Soviet proxy whereas China might be split off from Moscow oe fe
In constructing his own defense against critics weer June 25
Acheson chose a football analogy to explain himself, It may be materi
that the American global war plan at the time was titled “Offtackle.”
In any case, in some handwritten notes in his papers is the follouain: :
What we have had to do is to construct a defense with inade sae
jeans, trying to guess where each play would come through dhe line
Ihe charge regarding Korea is that we should have known that he
attack was coming; that we should have announced that we w id
meet it and that we should have armed ourselves and the selenite
meet it. As to the first, the task of an opposition is to oppose sa
perhaps it is doing its best with a situation which it itself created
(emphasis added).’8 Acheson is the linebacker and he Gao ty
7 a
7, NSC 57/5 memoranda, Mar, 3, 1949, in HST/PSI, National Security
Council Meetings, box 205, Truman Library, ;
TT & : lien
78. Ache son me mo to “Jim! (probably James Webb), August ?, 1950, Acheson
Vapers, box 65, Truman Library,
Pe BRUCE CUMINGS
may come around end or throw a pass or come offtackle. A properly
constructed defense encourages the offense to choose one instead of
another option. Acheson was, as he says, present at the creation; he
saw himself as shaping a world from the standpoint of American
hegemonic interests with limited resources. In Asia he wished to shape
a defense, to create a situation, in which the offense would blunder.
Perhaps this is why he refers in his memoirs to the “stupidity” of
the Russian attack in Korea, when other characterizations might come
to mind—perfidy, aggressiveness, probing a soft underbelly.
But what if the offense had its headquarters in P’yOngyang and
not Moscow? Stupid is not an adjective that I have ever considered
applying to Joseph Stalin. Kim Il-sung was not stupid, either, but
he and his allies were—and remain today—extraordinarily incapable of
attributing subtlety to American policy; for them the United States
was just another imperialist among the many that have bedeviled Korea.
Furthermore Kim was and is fixated on Korea and the desire to reunify
his divided country. If we make the assumption that Acheson was
not simply constructing a defense, but a particular defense that would
encourage action in one place and not another, Kim may have played
into his hands, Stalin, on the other hand, gave apparent lukewarm
support to the endeavor and then pulled back, both in June 1950,
when he pulled advisers back, and in the subsequent course of the
fighting, when according to Khrushchev he failed to provide North
Korea with the wherewithal for victory.’ Stalin had a policy similar
to Acheson’s in regard to Socialist allies along the containment peri-
phery. Support them, if Russian interests are not hurt, abandon them
(e.g., the Greek guerrillas) if they are, but in any case leave a realm
of ambiguity that does not commit Soviet might. Above all, make
a mess here, make a mess there (Korea, Indochina) in the hope that
the Americans would be drained in a hemorrhage of blood and treasure.
The documentation does not permit any firm judgments on these
matters. It does suggest an interpretation of Acheson’s behavior, how-
ever, that refutes naiveté, indecision, or inexperience, and that sees
him doing more than creating a passive and ill-considered defense in
Asia. He seems to have wanted to proffer a menu of choices to the
Communists, and to encourage a choice that would be preferable from
the American standpoint. His idea was that the best offense against
the Soviets was a well-constructed defense. This was shrewd contain-
79. See Khrushchev Remembers, 2 vols., ed, and trans. Strobe Talbott (Boston:
Little, Brown, 1970), pp. 367-73; also John Merrill’s discussion of this passage
based on the original Russian transcript, in Journal of Korean Studies 3 (1981):
181-91.
INTRODUCTION
49
ment, but it was still containment, resting on the idea that if positive
action were the order of the day in 1950, it was better if the Com-
munists acted first. During the Princeton seminars he and his colleagues
agreed that ‘‘Korea came along and saved us” (another participant said
* I hank God for Korea”),®° a frank acknowledgment that the Korean
crisis provided the rationale for NSC 68, and indeed for the funda-
mental reorientation of American global policy. But to put it more
accurately, we might say Kim came along and saved them. Richard
Nixon in a new book suggests not football but poker as the analo
for Acheson’s Korea policy in early 1950: ‘“The North Koreans thou
our intentions were face up on the board. ... It [June 25] a
miscalculation by them, based upon a misrepresentation by us.”®!
CONTAINMENT VS. ROLLBACK: WHAT DID THE SOVIETS KNOW?
Acheson’s policy was containment, but in the NSC 68 period he
made policy with some State and NSC officials who favored positive
not passive, defense. Their idea, countering Acheson, was that the
best defense is a good offense. In the spring of 1950 John Foster
Dulles joined the administration, speaking about “positive action,”
but was channeled by Acheson into the peace treaty negotiations wae
Japan. On June 19, 1950, Dulles materialized on the thirty-eighth
parallel, eyeing Kim Il-sung through binoculars. In a eit oi
National Assembly in Seoul, he promised ‘‘positive action” to the
Koreans. From June 23 to June 25 (Tokyo time) he had extensive
consultations with MacArthur,’* The available record suggests that
Dulles did not think much of MacArthur, indeed that he recommended
lis dismissal upon returning to Washington. There is no evidence that
= ‘ag hgh sng had a meeting of minds about Korea, although
ulles was the fi j i
ee sored to recommend the use of American forces in
But if we can imagine ourselves, knowing what we now know, but
sitting in Moscow in June 1950, what would we have thou ht i
ldulles’s behavior? We have seen that a dialectic between Ina
wid rollback ran through the deliberations on Asian policy in Washing-
0, An unidentified person said, according to the transcript, “Korea came
long and (saved?) us—do the job for us,’? whereupon Acheson says, “I think
you can say that.’? Princet Seminz : :
inary, nceton Seminars, July 9, 1953 session, box 81, Truman
41, Richard Nixon, The Real War (New York: Warner Books, 1980), p. 254
Hv " © i . j
. Dulles had dinner with MacArthur on June 24 and 25, Tokyo time
45, Aches ree s thi ' ‘U,
. eson records that Dulles recommended using U.S. troops if necessary
on the : : i i “ '
morning of June 25, Washington time, See his ‘Notes on meetings,” Ac
sou Papers, box 81, . siiliaid
50 BRUCE CUMINGS
ton. The stunning depth and complexity of the Korean crisis is re-
vealed, however, in suspicions that Stalin also knew about this policy
dialectic. Kim Philby and Guy Burgess, Soviet spies in the British
intelligence service, sat astride the flow of top secret documentation
in Washington. Philby has admitted that he tipped Moscow to a joint
effort by British and American intelligence to pursue rollback in
Albania, that is, to topple the Communist regime there. American
writers have now begun to suggest that Stalin may have read U.S.
intelligence documents in the fall of 1950, something that MacArthur
thought true at the time.®4
Now imagine yourself responsible for the security of allies along the
containment periphery, the problem that vexed U.S. policy throughout
the period of 1948 to 1950. Only assume that these are Socialist
allies and you are in Moscow. Would it not be your duty to inform
your allies of the possibility that they might be subject to attack,
in a situation where they were already subject to guerrilla forays
by the opposition? Then add to this the lone, idiosyncratic, but extra-
ordinarily influential figure of MacArthur, seeing himself as a man
of destiny, presiding over the revival of Japan (an aggressor five years
earlier), and speaking openly of saving all Asia from communism.
What would be the best defense in this situation? It would be a good
offense, that is, a pre-emptive attack such as that on the morning of
June 25.
Here we do nothing more than conjure and play with the logic of
the situation in June 1950. This is not history, it is pleasant specula-
tion. These are questions that history cannot answer, at least not now
and most likely, never. For those involved on all sides take secrets
to the grave. In the Princeton seminars there was an interesting col-
loquy between Herbert Feis and Dean Acheson. Acheson remarked that
“I can’t recall why we sent [Dulles] over [to Korea and Japan].”
Feis asked, ‘Are you sure his presence didn’t provoke the attack,
Dean? There has been comment about that—I don’t think it did.
You have no views on the subject?”? Acheson: ‘‘No, I have no views on
the subject.”” And then Kennan breaks in: ‘There is a comical aspect to
this, because the visits of these people over there, and their peering
over outposts with binoculars at the Soviet [sic] people, I think must
have led the Soviets to think that we were on to their plan and caused
them considerable perturbation.” Acheson: ‘‘Yes—Foster up in a
bunker with a Homburg on—it was a very amusing picture.” Here the
colloquy ended.®%
84, Kim Philby, My Secret War (New York: Grove Press, 1968), pp. 194-98.
See also Manchester, American Caesar, pp. 596-98.
8h, Princeton Seminars, Feb, 13, 1954 session, boxes 81 and $4, Truman Library.
INTRODUCTION Si
Yes, comical, amusing. But the best evidence on the North Korean
ultack is that it was organized in the week before the war by a few high
officials, with even members of the cabinet remaining in the dark until
June 25.8 Foster in a bunker with a Homburg may not be immaterial
to how “Korea came along and saved us.”
KOREAN WAR II: ROLLBACK
The deliberations on containment and rollback in the NSC 68
period reflected new assumptions about the uses of American power,
hut they would be no more than abstract assumptions if no rollback
hud occurred. It did occur, and the march into North Korea was jus-
\ified by reference to the previous phraseology and reasoning,
All this has been obscured by a historical verdict in which the
debacle of the North Korean campaigns has been blamed on Mac-
\rthur; the desire to fault MacArthur is palpable throughout the
"'yinceton seminars and indeed in most liberal histories of the war
ever since, MacArthur did want rollback, it is true, but so did some of
liis liberal colleagues at the State Department and NSC, In fact the
rollback policy drew together a far more broadly based coalition
behind Korea policy than had ever existed before. It healed splits
hetween internationalists, containment advocates, baitcutters, and
tollbackers, leaving only some isolated internationalists in its wake.
Ilid the successes of the march north not been so fleeting, the coalition
would have included Japan- and Europe-firsters seeking an Asian
liinterland with China- and Asia-firsters hoping to recapture China
lor Chiang; they were all in support of rollback after the September 15
lnch’Sn landing. This rollback coalition would later have been strained
over the question of whether to go beyond the Yalu, with the Asia-
liigiers in support and the Europe-firsters opposed, fearing that this
would bring World War Ill. Or, a unified Korea under American aus-
jices might have temporarily stabilized domestic conflict over foreign
policy, until rollback met a failure elsewhere. With the Chinese inter-
vention, however, the United States did not get a unified Korea but
thought it was about to get World War III, judging from the panic and
jam in the Truman cabinet’? Eventually the fighting stabilized
ound the thirty-eighth parallel again, the crisis passed, and with it
went rollback as a viable American policy. From that time until the
19608 and the Bay of Pigs, containment was the preferred policy
4G, See Robert Scalapino and Chong-sik Lee, Communism in Korea, 1 (Berke-
lvy and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1972): $94.
47. See cabinet meeting minutes, Nov, 28 and Dec, 12, 1950, Connelly Papers,
fruman Library. Those present spoke of the possibility of “total war,’ declaring
(hotlonal emergency and “total mobilization” in the United States,
———
52 BRUCE CUMINGS
of the Truman and Eisenhower administrations, rollback nothing more
than rhetoric.
Until the Inch’n landing, there was no unanimity among high
policy makers. John Foster Dulles was among the first to call for roll-
back, on July 14. The PPS argued a week later, however, that the Krem-
lin would intervene to protect North Korea, which in turn led to an
“emphatic dissent” by John Allison, director of the Office of Northeast
Asian Affairs. At the end of July, the Department of Defense submitted
a paper arguing for rollback and showing a touching regard for Korean
aspirations for unification—something rarely seen in American policy
before or since, and explicable solely by the opportunities of the fight-
ing in Korea, This paper, however, also argued that the fighting pro-
vided “the first opportunity to displace part of the Soviet orbit,” and
thus linked rollback thinking with the realm of feasibility pointed to in
NSC 48/1. Then in Allison’s top secret paper of August 12, the NSC
48/1 phraseology was patent: “Since a basic policy of the United States
is to check and reduce the preponderant power of the USSR in Asia
and elsewhere, then UN operations in Korea can set the stage for the
non-communist penetration into an area under Soviet control” (empha-
sis added).®8 This phrase reappeared several more times in top secret
planning prior to the move north. Still, however, there was no unani-
mity; Kennan and the CIA, among others, continued to oppose a march
north. Up to the Inch’6n landing, U.S. policy had determined only to
wait until the moment arrived, when the realm of the feasible might
present itself, or might not; the decision would be taken accordingly.®?
MacArthur’s brilliant success carried everything before it in Korea,
and everything behind it in Washington. It stimulated a consensus on
rollback so broad that it stretched all the way from MacArthur to inter-
nationalist John Vincent, the main antagonist in the State Department
of the Korean Policy of the occupation and the military. On October 7
Vincent weighed in from exile in Bern, saying “Personally, I believe we
should cross the 38th parallel when set to do so irrespective of whether
Chou En-lai is bluffing or not.’’ Another archetypal liberal who suffered
the wrath of the McCarthyites, O. Edmund Clubb, remarked that he
hoped the Chinese would get a good bloodying if they dared to inter-
vene,
88. See: (1) Dulles to Nitze, July 14, 1950, in FRUS, 1950, 7:386-87; (2)
PPS draft memo, July 22, in ibid., pp. 449-54; (3) Allison to Nitze, July 24, 1950,
ibid., pp. 458-61; (4) Defense Department draft memo, July 31, 1950, ibid., pp.
502-10; and (5) Allison draft memo, Aug. 12, ibid., pp. 567-73.
89. See NSC 81/1, and various papers leading up to that decision, in ibid.
90. Vincent to Secretary of State, Oct. 7, 1950, ibid., p. 902; also Clubb to
INTRODUCTION
53
American policy, so unanimously supported, met a debacle of gar-
yantuan proportions with the commitment to rollback. The Chinese
‘taught a lesson” that has yet to be unlearned: option B, containment
was and is the preferred option. This is where U.S. poliog 16ward Koren
has remained to this day. There is no withdrawal, and there is no iron-
clad guarantee, in spite of much pleading by successive Korean presi-
dents. Mercifully, there is no rollback option. %
Three remaining points should be made in conclusion.
The first observation has to do with General MacArthur. The range
ol his mind and his raw assertion of will in the weeks following the a
vasion strike me as breathtaking. He claims to have conceived the idea
for an amphibious attack behind North Korean lines, and a rolling u
ie penton in the smoke and ashes on the outskirts of Seoul on Fe
29." In any case by July 17, three weeks after the war began, and
while the People’s Army was still rolling, he told Army Snes
representatives in Tokyo” that he planned an amphibious assault at
Inch’Sn, Haeju, or Ch’innamp’o (the last two are above the thirty-
eighth parallel); his plan was ‘‘to destroy North Korea (and) to block
off the hope of relief from Manchuria or China.” If the Chinese came
in, “I would cut them off in North Korea. ...The only passages lead-
ing from Manchuria and Vladivostok have many tunnels and bridges. I
gee here a unique use for the atomic bomb—to strike a blocking blew
bas He also noted in passing that ‘‘the problem was to compose an
unite Korea.” Here was rollback with a vengeance, and a very early sug-
yestion for the tactical use of nuclear weapons. During July and he :
MacArthur pursued his plans with the fierce will and ec ec af
i visionary, an onslaught before which other responsible Americans
melted away, especially in light of the rollback talk in Washington
As a second observation one might ask how rollback could be suc-
‘ essful in Korea, Such invasions were part of U.S. contingency plannin
i) Vietnam, but the plans were never implemented. One answer is cee
although Korea was also a civil and revolutionary war, the areas of
te volutionary strength had an entirely different nhashomueway than in
\ ietnam, The Left in the South was strong precisely in those provinces
most distant from North Korea. The southernmost Kyéngsang and
(holla provinces and Cheju Island were the repositories of the ie est
people’s committees in 1945 and 1946, the fiercest rebellions in its
Musk, Nov, 4, 1950, pp. 1038-41.
"1, Manchester, American Caesar, p, 659
02, Memo to General Bolté, J
ene , July 17, 1950, top secret, declassified ¢ i
Modern Military Branch, National Archives, ie
ne
54 BRUCE CUMINGS
1946, and the guerrilla conflict of 1948-50.93 Korea had a political
geography that resembled Vietnam’s actual geography: that is, com-
munism in the North, a thin belt of strength running down the middle
of the mountainous east coast, opening out to rooted strength in south-
western and southeastern provinces. In between was not a central high-
lands as in Vietnam, never integrated under the control of the central
state. Instead there was Seoul, two or three conservative provinces,
and a well-developed transportation and communications net that de-
fined the core region of Korea, Off to the west was not a jungle with
indeterminate national boundaries (Cambodia, Laos), but the Yellow
Sea. These differences, it seems to me, help explain both the defeat of
the southern insurgents and the failure of North Korea’s conventional
assault. The People’s Army never reached inside the Pusan perimeter, to
Taegu and Pusan, major leftist strongholds; they arrived late in the
Chdlla provinces and never on Cheju Island. Thus the North Korean
calculus—a Bay of Pigs calculus—that their attack would touch off a
popular explosion, proved false. Although their strategy was correct if
the United States did not intervene, the application of American mili-
tary force dashed their plans and, because of Korea’s political physiog-
nomy, opened the way to losing the North as well.
Third, what of the Soviets during this period? We have seen that
Stalin originally acquiesced in the thirty-eighth-parallel decision in Au-
gust 1945. A second seeming anomaly occurred in December 1948,
when he withdrew Russian troops from the North, something quite
contrary to Soviet satellite policy in these years, and therefore contrary
to the usual assumption that North Korea was a docile Soviet tool.
Third, Stalin watched as tens of thousands of Korean soldiers who
fought with the Chinese Communists entered North Korea in 1949 and
1950. To a consummate realist who had once inquired how many
divisions the Pope had, this would only indicate a likely skewing of
North Korea toward China, Fourth—and still unexplained—was the
Soviet absence from the UN Security Council in June and July 1950.
Last, and most important, why did the Soviets apparently do little or
nothing when MacArthur moved into North Korea? The various drafts
of NSC 81 in September 1950 argued that the United States should
not go north if the Soviets even threatened intervention, let alone if
they actually intervened. NSC thinking was the mirror image of its
assumption that Stalin had ordered the attack. During the fall of 1950,
93. Cumings, Origins, pp. 267-381.
94, FRUS, 1950, vol. 7, includes several drafts of NSC 81, along with the final
document. The drafts explicitly referred to “a roll-back,”’ if the realm of feasibility
opened,
INTRODUCTION 55
according to the available documentation, the Soviet Union was vir-
tually mute (save some propaganda blasts that cost them nothing) while
China and India made most of the representations to the Americans
about the march north. Nor did the Soviets order the Chinese into
Korea, according to the best scholarship and documentation on the
subject. So what was the Soviet “commitment” to North Korea? One
can hazard a guess that it was not comparable to the U.S. commitment
to South Korea, and of a distinctly different order from Soviet com-
mitments to key states on its East European periphery; also that Stalin
was willing to allow an adventurous Kim II-sung to stew in the juice of
his own provocations; last, that Soviet behavior in the fall of 1950 must
inevitably reflect back on its role in June 1950. Stalin did not order the
only attempt since 1945 to pierce through by force of arms the con-
(ainment periphery. Therefore one hazards a final guess: that Kim II-
sung and his Korean allies moved in June 1950 not at Stalin’s order, but
to unify their country, revolutionize the South, and thereby wraride
the basis for a self-contained national communism that could resist
great power pressure from any source, including China and the Soviet
Union. After the war this peculiar blend of Korean nationalism and
Marxism-Leninism developed in the North alone, and therefore on a
much slimmer base.
As for American policy, and the three sketches at the beginning of
ihis article, we may note the following. First, the post-Inch’6n successes
of the fighting in Korea healed splits among these three currents, mak-
ing for a broad coalition behind rollback. Had it wathon chad the
Chinese not intervened—the coalition would have held until another
rollback debacle occurred. Second, given that it did not work in Korea
i revisionist history had to emerge: MacArthur, the lone wolf, would he
blamed for the failures, while Dulles would again merge comfortably
with the broad middle, while using rollback rhetoric to sate the out-
tiyed appetites of the Republican right wing. But, third and most
important, the failure of Korean rollback meant that decisive limits had
heen placed on “positive action” for at least a decade, making contain-
ment the vastly preferable policy for the liberal elites then in control of
U.S, foreign policy. Containment in fact, albeit with rollback rhetoric
lhecame the policy of the quiet years of the Eisenhower administration,
Liberal rollback had failed, but it was blamed on Asia-first Solienchess
like MacArthur, And so MacArthur slowly faded from the scene, but
Holt without some uproarious pulling and hauling in domestic Asean
politics, as the rollback constituency fought back against the reversal of
verdicts on who was to blame for the debacle in the frigid North Korean
hinterland, |
Commentary
LLOYD GARDNER
HISTORIANS HAVE TREATED THE KOREAN WAR AS A MISTAKE, EITHER BY THE
United States or Russia—or both. Thus Akira Iriye in The Cold War in Asia
suggests Korea was a blunder committed by the two superpowers “search-
ing for a new equilibrium” following the Chinese Communist victory over
the Kuomintang in 1949. Stephen Ambrose finds the United States was
waiting for an incident, which, perhaps unwittingly, the North Koreans
supplied, to launch a whole series of European and Asian initiatives
aimed at reversing what was perceived as an unfavorable (to use the
mildest term) trend in world affairs. George F. Kennan, in looking back
after several years.concluded instead that the North Korean invasion may
have been a response to initiatives already under way. The American
decision to proceed with the conclusion of a Japanese peace treaty,
involving, as it did, the indefinite retention of American military bases in
the Japanese islands, probably had an important bearing, he wrote, on
“the Soviet decision to unleash a civil war in Korea.”!
I think it quite remarkable that almost no one accepts the official
explanation given by President Truman that the attack of June 25,
1950, revealed that the Russians were prepared to go beyond subver-
sion and propaganda to further their aim of world domination, or, only
a shade less dramatic, that Korea was a testing place, where the United
States must put up or shut up. My own feeling is that we ought to go
back to official explanations, and the discussions behind them, if we are
to advance the discussion of the origins of the Korean War lest it be-
come bogged down just at a crucial point or breakthrough.
Professor Cumings has broken down the prewar period into three
periods: first, 1943 to 1947, when American policy centered on the
hope of a big-power trusteeship for Korea. Second, 1947 to 1949, when,
despairing of that solution, policy makers turned to the United Nations
1, Akira Iriye, The Cold War in Asia (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall,
1974), p. 178; Stephen Ambrose, ‘‘The Failure of a Policy Rooted in Fear,” The
Progressive 34 (November 1970): 14-20; George I’, Kennan, Memozrs, 1925-1950
(Boston; Little, Brown, 1967), p, 395.
Kd
ne
58 LLOYD GARDNER
to provide justification for what was really a unilateral experiment in
nation building in South Korea. And, third, the “short fuse” period of
1949 to 1950, when, in the aftermath of the “loss” of China, American
policy makers made ready to repel any further assaults upon their
Asian policy and positions. In each of these periods, however, the
choices before the decision makers were never entirely clear cut. Indeed,
throughout the entire era, serious consideration was given to the “bug
out” option, given the difficulties of persuading the Koreans to have
patience with American efforts, the limitations of American military
power, or the distaste and/or distrust Syngman Rhee engendered in
Washington.
When the trusteeship idea first emerged, as Cumings points out, it
did so in the context of a much expanded concept of American secu-
rity. In Roosevelt’s mind it also contained elements not simply of a
desire to contain revolutionary nationalism, but of a more generalized
Wilsonian concept of collective security. It is significant that Roosevelt
took the initiative in 1942 to offer the Soviet Union an “equal” part-
nership in the postwar world organization before he had himself de-
cided exactly what form that organization would take, Robert Dallek
and Martin Sherwin, as well as Michael Schaller, have all discussed
FDR’s China policy as a complex mixture of traditional hopes for
America’s oldest friend combined with a more pragmatic realization
that with Japan’s defeat the way would be open to Russian expansion
in Asia. Clearly, FDR was seeking to involve the Soviets in what
Richard Nixon would call much later the structure of peace. To do so,
he would employ whatever tools were at hand. For Korea that meant
an attempt at international trusteeship.
This was what Cumings has described as “high policy” to distin-
guish what Washington hoped from the realities of what existed in
Korea, the determinants of ‘‘low policy.” From 1943, as he points out,
the State Department was concerned with the relationship of “Korea’s
political development” to the future security of northern Asia. On
August 18, 1943, Max Bishop of the Far Eastern Division circulated a
memorandum, ‘‘The USSR in the Far East,” to his colleagues that
outlined both sets of considerations.
It was quite likely, he began, that the Russians would use “free”
movements sponsored by the Soviet government in Asia in the same
fashion as the ‘free’? German, Polish and Yugoslav movements in
Europe. “It is believed,” he asserted, “that Korean guerrillas operating
in Manchuria have close Soviet connections.” Russian motivations
operated on two levels, On the ideological level the Soviets were suspl-
cious of all revolutionary movements that they did not control, and
COMMENTARY 59
were determined ‘“‘to gain control of social and economic movements
which might be termed revolutionary in the orthodox sense of that
term.” Added to this motivation, however, was the perennial Russian
longing for warm-water ports.
Very likely Moscow would seek as a basic objective, ‘access to the
Pacific through a port in north China or in Korea on the Yellow Sea.”
Very likely also, Russia would not feel it necessary to “annex” such a
port in either China or Korea “provided that territory were under a
vovernment of which the Russian Government approved and upon
which it felt it could rely—in other words, a government more or less
similar to that in Outer Mongolia.” What complicated matters for
American policy makers was that postwar conditions in China and the
Far East threatened, because of the chaos the Japanese would leave be-
hind and the tendency ‘‘on the part of authorities in the area concerned
. . . to place the blame for their own failures at the doorstep of Moscow
us the instigator of social unrest,” to embroil the United States ina
Soviet-American confrontation.’
Russia’s ability to disrupt any settlement it disapproved prompted,
| believe, the desire to pursue the trusteeship plan as well as the conclu-
sion that it would be the height of folly to become involved in support
of the Kuomintang once it became clear that civil war could not be
avoided in China. Yet it was already recognized that to implement the
Korean trusteeship or not to participate in the Chinese civil war would
he next to impossible. Hence Roosevelt’s and Truman’s reluctance to
respond to Stalin’s overtures for a discussion of the proposed Korean
solution; hence also the Marshall mission to China.
For a time it seemed important that no discussions at all be held
with Russia about the future of Korea. As John Carter Vincent wrote
Secretary Stettinius on February 8, 1945, the Far Eastern Division was
concerned about the possibility of Sino-Russian discussions of Korea’s
future. Both Great Britain and the United States had a definite interest
in Korea, and any talks would have to be multilateral.? This was remi-
niscent of Secretary Stimson’s fear of Sino-Japanese negotiations in
1941. In both instances the primary goal was to make sure that China
did not unite with another power in any arrangement that would
exclude American interests.
“It appears that if Manchuria and perhaps North China are not to
puss to Chinese control, but rather to pass to Soviet control or separate
2, “The USSR in the Far East,’’ Aug. 18, 1943, Charles Bohlen Papers, National
\rchives, Washington, D.C,
4, Vineent to Stettinius, Feb, 8, 1945, Records of the China Office, Depart-
ment of State, National Archives,
60 LLOYD GARDNER
states under its domination in a progression of circumstances,” the
secretaries of war and navy warned on November 26, 1945, ‘‘then Rus-
sia will have achieved in the Far East approximately the objectives
Japan initially set out to accomplish.’ Was it not at least as serious,
the service leaders asked, to risk that possibility as it was to aid Chiang
K’ai-shek to assert control over such areas? The Marshall mission was
the response to such criticism, but, as China passed under Communist
domination, that effort came to symbolize America’s apparent paralysis
in the face of Russian expansion.
Put another way, the dilemma appeared that the United States
needed Russia to implement its own plans, but involving the Soviets
meant an unacceptable increase of Russian influence—both territorially
and politically. The dilemma produced a series of anomalies such as the
Marshall mission that were foredoomed to failure, and which disturbed
domestic politics in the United States in ways that helped to produce
the Korean War. What this comes down to is, I believe, that Cumings
has provided us with an insight into this 1943-47 “trusteeship” period
that better accounts for American policy in the Far East than Professor
Iriye’s elaboration on the “Yalta System” as an understanding of post-
war Russian-American relations in Asia. The cold war did indeed come
early to Asia.
Was there any way the trusteeship plan could have worked? My
own feeling is it would not have worked under any conditions; but
there does exist evidence that Russian behavior in Korea was shaped by
American occupation policy in Japan even earlier than George Kennan
suggests. Cumings has not explored this avenue in his paper, but per-
haps he will be willing to comment at some point on the impact that
exclusion of the Soviets from any real say in Japan may have had on
their policy toward Korea.
The State Department’s growing feeling that the United States had
a political ‘strategic’ interest in Korea, which coincides with the deci-
sion to move the question to the United Nations (Cumings’s second
period, 1947-49), finds the political officers in the State Department
and the military leaders in the Pentagon in new positions. Whereas in
1945 it was war and navy that wanted a strong stand to prevent Soviet
hegemony in northern Asia, two years later it is the State Department
demanding that the gates be barred to Russian expansion into Korea
and elsewhere, except China, where Marshall’s failure had left a thick
layer of gloom over all discussions of that sorry tangle.
Appearing before an executive session of the Senate Foreign Rela-
4. Secretaries of war and navy to the secretary of state, Nov, 26, 1945, ibid.
COMMENTARY 61
lations Committee to defend the president’s request for funds to initi-
ate the Truman Doctrine, Undersecretary of State Dean Acheson
voiced the strongest commitment to date to securing Korea for the free
world. It was true, he began, that there were parts of the world where
the United States could not do anything effective, areas within the peri-
meter of Russian physical force. “There are other places where we can
be effective. One of them is Korea, and I think that is another place
where the line has been clearly drawn between the Russians and our-
selves.’ That was, as the saying goes, a real mouthful. Apparently the
senators were as struck with this definition of the new doctrine as I was
in 1973 when these hearings were finally released to the public, because
there follows the tantalizing (and frustrating) parenthetical comment,
‘Discussion was off the record.’
What Acheson said ‘“‘off the record”? could not diminish, I think,
the shock he had produced by mentioning Korea as a logical and prom-
inent area for application of the Truman Doctrine. His testimony pro-
duced quite dramatic reactions. Senator Elbert Thomas of Utah re-
jected the notion of refighting the Crimean War to keep Russia out of
the Middle East, but hinted he would be supportive of an effort to pre-
serve “the remarkable peace we brought about in the Far East.” Sena-
ior Walter George of Georgia had a very different reaction. “I do not
see how we are going to escape going into Manchuria, North China, and
Korea and doing things in that area of the world. ... You go down to
the end of the road.’®
Cumings has mentioned in passing the $600 million the State De-
partment wanted for its demonstration project in Korea, Certainly this
was enough to convince any remaining doubters that the administra-
‘ion was indeed serious about whatever it was Acheson had told the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee on or off the record. The British
were amazed at the audacity of American policy shifts toward Korea.
l'or months, of course, the Labour Government had been concerned
about the painful slowness of the Truman administration to come to
urips with the deepening European crisis. Now the air was fairly crack-
ling with the latest about American determination to resist Russian ex-
jansion, We had heard about the proposed appropriation for Korea,
ininuted by M.E. Dening on March 26, 1947, but only that afternoon
hie had had a conversation with Everett Drumwright of the embassy
that elaborated on the American position. “This gauntlet has not
5. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings: A Bill to
lrovide for Assistance to Greece and Turkey, 80th Cong., Ist sess. (Washington,
).C,, Government Printing Office, 1973), p, 22.
6. Ibid., pp, 140-44, 198,
62 LLOYD GARDNER
yet been flung into the arena,’ noted Dening, but Drumwright had as-
sured him that the administration “has a firm intention to go ahead.”
Dening wondered if the Americans realized that money alone was
not enough. Apparently the feeling that the United States had to meet
the Russians head on in Korea now that the trusteeship plan was past
praying for overshadowed all else: “. . . it is a bold move, but its suc-
cess is by no means assured.” Perhaps, he mused, the administration
thought that with the commitment announced in this fashion, the Rus-
sians would see the handwriting on the wall and retreat from Korea.
What would happen if the Russians did not oblige? Are they prepared
to carry the struggle to its ultimate conclusion? “I cannot help wonder-
ing whether they have thought this all out. But the grant-in-aid to
Korea does suggest that the challenge is of world-wide application.’
The answer to Dening’s questions—and to the concerns of Senators
Thomas and George—as suggested by Cumings, would seem to be equi-
vocal, Yes, policy makers knew they had flung the gauntlet down, but
they were by no means sure of what else they had to fling into the
arena. Military objections, Cumings points out, were never the deter-
mining factor. By late 1947 and thereafter, Japan’s security and reha-
bilitation had become major considerations; but I wonder if it is cor-
rect to suggest, as Cumings does (again in passing) to dramatize this
shift that in 1940 it would have been inconceivable to believe the State
Department would have been very interested “in this little peninsula”
without qualifying the statement in a somewhat different way than he
does in his paper.
By this I mean to suggest that by 1947 Korea had become ideolog-
ically much more than a little peninsula off on the periphery of the
policy maker’s vision. While Japan’s survival as a non-Communist indus-
trial workshop of Asia was certainly a major consideration, this stra-
tegic question carried with it certain perceptions of the world. I find it
interesting, for example, that in 1938 and after, when Dean Acheson
returned to government (having convinced himself apparently that the
Axis menace to civilization was somewhat greater than FDR’s decision
to abandon the gold standard) his major preoccupation with Asian
policy was not the desire to ‘‘save” China—but rather to prevent Japan
from denying the ‘“‘white man’’ access to the region. Korea, as he said,
was one place where the line had been clearly drawn.
Summing up my response to Cumings’s second period, 1947-49, I
find it an advance on Stephen Ambrose’s argument that war in Korea
7. Minutes, Mar. 26, 1947, FO 371, Public Record Office, London [UN 2001/
1754/78].
8. Ibid.
COMMENTARY 63
unleashed previously frustrated urges to a more active engagement in
Europe and Asia. Accompanied as it was by the administration’s
determination to strengthen its commitment to South Korea, the
decision to take the matter to the United Nations (like the Truman
Doctrine itself) was evidence of the increasing stake the United States
had in nation building as a means of blocking Soviet expansionism.
Unfortunately, as American policy makers saw it, Syngman Rhee
was determined to follow the same disastrous path taken by Chiang
K’ai-shek. How was this new obstacle to American policy to be over-
come? As the result of several meetings between Acheson and his Far
Eastern experts and outside consultants in the aftermath of the Com-
munist victory in China, the following general thesis was set forth:
“We should seek to insure that the general revolutionary movement
in this area, through which the indigenous peoples are endeavoring
to attain national independence and improved conditions of life, is
not captured by Moscow. In areas in which the movement has already
been captured by Moscow, we should seek to free ine?”
Did that thesis mandate a rollback policy in Korea? Here we are
confronted by the intriguing and conflicting evidence Cumings presents.
In the memorandum I have just cited, there were certain areas identi-
fied as places where America’s role had been a “key factor.” These
included—without a priority assigned for purposes of their discussion—
Japan, Korea, Okinawa, and the Philippines. These places should be
considered ‘demonstration projects’”—where conditions must be such
us to attest to the beneficence of American influence. Recognition of
Communist China was not, the memorandum stated, to be considered
us a method for dealing with Asian problems. But about Korea, the
decision was less confident and certain. A commitment to Korean
(erritorial integrity was out of the question; but, on the other hand,
the Korean government must not be allowed to fail.
Whether Korea ‘failed’? or not was, unfortunately, not within
Washington’s control. But the consequences were likely to be serious
indeed. How could the United States hope to have influence in Japan
or Southeast Asia if, following the debacle in China, another country
such as Korea managed to distort American influence into a blundering
domestic policy that could neither offer citizens democratic rights,
, what was worse, safety from their enemies? Suppose Rhee initiated
a rollback policy on his own? What a fine example that would be of
the evil policy of ‘Western imperialism’! If he won, criticism in Asia
or
9, “Decisions Reached by Consensus at the Meetings with the Secretary and
the Consultants on the Far East,’? Nov, 2, 1949, Records of the China Office,
National Archives.
64 LLOYD GARDNER
(and in Europe) would weaken America’s ideological front. If he
lost, well, that was even worse to contemplate. Certainly John Foster
Dulles thought that was the most likely danger. And he attempted
to extract a promise from Truman before accepting the assignment
to write the Japanese peace treaty that the administration would show
its determination in Asia by defending whatever spot the Communists
chose to attack next, regardless of military considerations, to demon-
strate to those peoples that communism was not the wave of the
future.!°
Throughout this last period, the “short fuse” from 1949 to June
25, 1950, Americans were not certain they could fight a limited war in
Asia. Aside from the presumed difficulties of supporting Rhee in an
offensive operation, there was the “tripwire” problem. In Europe,
NATO was based upon the assumption that America’s atomic monop-
oly, and the alliance, would hold in check overt Russian aggression
against the West. A similar assumption prevailed in Asia, with a crucial
difference. There was no Far Eastern counterpart to NATO. So while
the existence of NATO seemed to guarantee an American response,
despite the Russian development of an atomic bomb, would Washing-
ton risk atomic war for Korea? Interestingly enough, however, the
opposite side of the picture provided policy makers in Washington with
a more serious concern. If the United States did not respond in Korea
by accepting a limited war, would the atomic deterrent in Europe
lose credibility?
Cumings implies, but does not conclude, that American policy in
these months developed along lines somewhere between James K.
Polk’s maneuverings before the Mexican War and Franklin Roosevelt’s
concern that the Japanese fire the first shot. Acheson was certainly
thinking about a Far Eastern pact, to resolve at least one of the difficul-
ties listed above, but the problem was that proponents of such a plan
in Congress were also determined to protect Chiang on Formosa. That
was only one of several complications standing in the way of a Far
Eastern pact. The genuinely revolutionary movements the United
States wanted to encourage, as per the November 1949 memorandum,
were appalled by Chiang, while the administration’s critics were de-
termined to stand by the beleaguered old man whose realm had been
so cruelly reduced to the island of Formosa.
On March 21, 1950, Secretary of State Dean Acheson met with
Representative Christian Herter. Herter was troubled by the false
sense of security that seemed so pervasive throughout the land. To
10. Memoranda of Apr, 28 and May 18, 1950, John Foster Dulles Papers,
Princeton University Library, Princeton, N.J.
COMMENTARY 65
check the deterioration in the world situation would require, said the
congressman, one last offer to negotiate Soviet-American differences.
Should the Russians refuse, then ‘“‘we should label them the barbarians
they are,’ force them out of the United Nations, and break off diplo-
matic relations. Acheson did not feel things had quite reached that
point, but he admitted that the past six to nine months had seen a
trend developing that, if allowed to continue, would lead to a consider-
able deterioration in the American position,
The Russians were bent on world domination, but the United
States could not afford to take the initiative in policies that would
drive its allies into opposition, leaving us “thoroughly confused politi-
cally and economically.’’ Well, said Herter, what could be done to
arouse the American people short of breaking relations with the Soviet
government? “I replied that I do not believe it will be necessary to
create such a situation, the chances are too good that the Russians will
do so themselves.”’ Listing several ways this might come about, Acheson
came to the Asian situation. ‘Finally, I referred to the possibility of
an overall attack on Formosa from the mainland of China where we
understand air strips are being built, Soviet planes are being furnished,
and Soviet crews are training Chinese crews.” !!
The attack came in Korea, of course, but it served the purpose.
‘The point to be remembered, I believe, about both Formosa and Korea
is that the administration was ready to consider coming to terms with
Communist China, if Mao somehow managed to avoid pitfalls. If he
should Jaunch an over-all attack, as Acheson said, then the American
people would quickly forget about their differences over Asian policy,
and the administration could make good use of the “mistake” to
further its other policy goals. No doubt such an attack would solidify
the western alliance as well, and impress Asian neutrals.
Cumings has demonstrated, it seems to me, the reasons why North
Korea moved as it did in June 1950. I would have liked to know more
about the situation in that half of the country in 1945 to 1950. Did
American intelligence assume that the dynamics of North Korea were
nothing more, as an American briefing officer put it after the attack,
than the relationship of Walt Disney and Donald Duck? What, in other
words, kept Kim I-sung in power?
rom Ambassador Alan Kirk in Moscow came an instant analysis
that jibes well with Dean Acheson’s explanation to Representative
Herter. The Russians, he said, probably were not ready to risk an
all-out war with the West. “Kremlin’s Korean adventure thus offers
11, Conversation between the secretary and Representative Herter,” Mar. 24,
1950, Dean Acheson Papers, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Mo,
66 LLOYD GARDNER
us opportunity to show that we mean what we say by talking of firm-
ness, and at same time, to unmask present important Soviet weaknesses
before eyes world and particularly Asia where popular concept Soviet
power grossly exaggerated as result recent Soviet political and propa-
ganda successes that area.’?!?
Let me come back, in conclusion, to the comment I made at the
outset. American policy makers gave as an official explanation for the
response to the North Korean attack the argument that here was a
testing ground, a place apparently chosen by the enemy to probe
America’s will and determination. Acheson believed that, even as he
believed that he could seize upon the attack to launch a counteroffen-
sive in Europe. In 1919 Secretary of State Robert Lansing wrote a
long memorandum to Woodrow Wilson in which he made the argu-
ment that it was possible to separate the Bolshevik from Bolshevism.
The former constituted a small minority that had seized power in
Russia and turned it into a military dictatorship. Bolshevism, on the
other hand, grew out of the war and past abuses, and furnished many
‘misguided recruits” to the Bolsheviki. Bolshevism, by its nature,
could not be conquered by force. But it was possible to defeat the
Bolsheviki, and a terrible mistake to ignore any opportunity to do so.
Acheson’s updated reasoning went something like this: Whatever
the political situation in North Korea or in South Korea, in the eyes
of the world, the attack was a turning point. It had to be met if Ameri-
can predominance, or national security if one prefers, was to be pre-
served. As in 1919, the task was to defeat the Bolsheviki and resolve the
problems that produced Bolshevism.
12. Kirk to Acheson, June 25, 1950, Foreign Relations of the United States,
1950 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1976), 7:139.
13. Lansing to Wilson, Dec. 3, 1919, Woodrow Wilson Papers, Princeton Uni-
versity Library.
Diplomacy Delayed:
The Atomic Bomb and
the Division of Korea, 1945
MARK PAUL
AFTER THE YALTA CONFERENCE EARLY IN 1945, HOPES FOR AN ENDURING
peace following the defeat of the Axis powers seemed bright. “We
really believed in our hearts that this was the dawn of the new day we
had been praying for and talking about for so many years,’’ Harry
llopkins later remembered. ‘‘We were absolutely certain that we had
won the first great victory of the peace.”! Such hopes were soon
eclipsed by dark shadows of doubt. By the time of Franklin Roosevelt’s
death in April 1945, American leaders began to fear that the Soviet
Union would use its power in Eastern Europe and Northeast Asia to
exclude American influence and reshape those regions in ways inimical
(o American political and economic ideals. In this atmosphere of
anxiety, with the war in Europe near an end and Soviet entry into the
Pacific conflict only months away, President Harry S. Truman and his
advisers reconsidered the meaning of the Yalta agreements and the
luture of the cooperative relationship with the Soviet Union.
|, Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History (New
York: Harper & Bros., 1948), p. 870.
68 MARK PAUL
Although Korea itself was not often a matter of direct concern to
these leaders, it was caught up in this reexamination. Northeast Asia
was one of the two areas of the globe where the forces of the United
States and the Soviet Union would meet. It was also a region where
the interests of the two nations potentially clashed. The Yalta agree-
ments had defined the extent of Soviet expansion in the region, but
in light of Soviet behavior behind Red Army lines in Eastern Europe,
American policy makers worried whether the Russians would interpret
the often ambiguous agreement as license to dominate. Because of
its vagueness, the Korean trusteeship plan Roosevelt and Stalin had
verbally approved at Yalta presented a similar problem: How would
a four-power trusteeship operate? What measures were needed to
assure that no other nation would dominate Korea to the exclusion
of American ideals and interests? Also unanswered was the question of
military occupation of the peninsula. Soviet military occupation
of Korea, Washington realized, would surely affect the political future
of the nation. The casual agreement made by Roosevelt and Stalin
had addressed none of these issues, leaving them to future negotia-
tions.”
At the time of the Japanese surrender in August 1945, these issues
remained unresolved. Despite the anxieties in Washington over the
prospects for Soviet-American cooperation, the American determina-
tion to stand up more forcefully to Soviet demands, and the possibility
that the Russians would seek to control Korea, American leaders made
no efforts to clarify the terms of the Korean trusteeship. From Roose-
velt’s policy of seeking immediate, explicit Soviet commitments to
cooperate with the American design in the Far East, the Truman
administration, less confident that Russian ambitions in Asia were
limited, gradually turned to a policy of delaying any settlement of
issues until the United States was in a stronger position to resist Soviet
claims and to pursue its own interests. As a result, Korea emerged
from World War II divided into two occupation zones, with an un-
certain future in a world whose new day of peace had been all too
short,
I
The hopes spawned by the Yalta Conference died almost as soon
as it became necessary to put the agreements into practice. Once again,
the United States and the Soviet Union quarreled over the composition
2. Awareness of these issues was reflected in materials prepared in the State
Department. See U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States
(hereafter FRUS), 1944 (Washington, D.C.; Government Printing Office, 1946), 5:
1224-42, See also FRUS, Yalta, pp. 359-61; FRUS, Potsdam, 1:510-15,
DIPLOMACY DELAYED 69
of the Polish government, dimming the prospects for postwar coopera-
tion. “I have . . . been watching with anxiety and concern the develop-
ment of Soviet attitudes since the Crimea Conference,” President
Roosevelt informed British Prime Minister Churchill at the end of
March 1945. “I am acutely aware of the dangers inherent in the present
course of events not only for the immediate issues involved and our
decisions at Crimea but for the San Francisco Conference and future
world cooperation.” Despite these dangers, Roosevelt had apparently
decided in the last days of his life to stand firmly on his interpretation
of the Yalta agreement on Poland. When he died, the new president,
Harry S. Truman, relying on the counsel of advisers who had long
wanted a firmer policy toward the Soviet Union, moved rapidly toward
a diplomatic confrontation on the issue.*
This renewed controversy fanned suspicions that spread across all
areas of U.S.-Soviet relations, including the Far East. President Roose-
velt had been aware of possible Soviet designs in Asia, yet he believed
that the Yalta agreements would confine the Russians to limited gains
and secure their support for Chiang K’ai-shek’s government in China.
At Yalta, Roosevelt had taken a risk, but there had been no acceptable
alternative: China was weak and divided, and he thought he would
need Russian help to defeat the Japanese and persuade the rival parties
in China to unify. But in April, with Roosevelt gone and tensions about
Poland high, to some leaders this risk seemed too great. Shortly after
KKoosevelt died, Ambassador Averell Harriman returned to Washington
(0 warn the new president of the Soviet ‘‘barbarian invasion of Europe”
and urge him to abandon “the illusion that for the immediate future
ihe Soviet government was going to act in accordance with the prin-
ciples which the rest of the world held to in international affairs.’
Hlurriman’s warning applied to Asia as well as Europe. Although only
days earlier he had heard Stalin promise Soviet support for American
policy in China, Harriman doubted that the Russians would live up to
ihe Yalta agreements. He was convinced that if American efforts did
Ol produce a united Chinese government “friendly” to the Soviets,
Stalin would support the Chinese Communists in setting up a puppet
jevime in Manchuria and North China,
Other officials had similar fears. In a telegram from Moscow,
Chargé George Kennan questioned the assumption by Patrick Hurley,
4. Roosevelt to Churchill, Mar. 29, 1945, Map Room Files, Roosevelt Papers,
lranklin D, Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park. N.Y.
|. Barton J. Bernstein, “American Foreign Policy and the Origins of the Cold
War,’ in The Politics and Policies of the Truman Administration, ed. Barton J.
liernatein (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1976), pp. 23-27.
5, FRUS, 1945, 5:232-53.
70 MARK PAUL
ambassador to China, that Stalin would ‘‘unqualifiedly” support
American policy in China. Words mean different things to Stalin than
they do to Americans, Kennan explained: When Stalin endorsed a free,
united, democratic China, the Russian leader meant a nation under
Communist domination, friendly to the Soviet Union, The Russians
would see “maximum power with minimum responsibility” in Asia
by exerting pressure—more likely by veiled rather than direct methods—
upon various areas deemed important to Soviet security. Although
Kennan’s analysis of Soviet ambitions was more measured than Harri-
man’s, he too saw an urgent need to reconsider U.S. policy: “It would
be tragic if our natural anxiety for Russian support at this stage,
coupled with Stalin’s cautious affability and his use of words which
mean all things to all people, were to lead us into an undue reliance
on Russian aid or even Russian acquiescence in the achievement of our
long term objectives in China.”’ Reading this message, Truman “realized
only too well the implications. . . .”°
There was nothing novel in Harriman’s and Kennan’s alarms about
Soviet behavior; both had harbored such fears for many months. But
in the spring of 1945, a congruence of events made possible a recon-
sideration of American policy. The long simmering dispute over Poland
came to full boil, heating up anxieties about Russian intentions. Be-
cause of Roosevelt’s death, these anxieties quickly came to play a role
in policy making, since Truman was ill prepared to deal with foreign
policy issues and unready to conduct the personal diplomacy of his
predecessor. Heavily dependent on his advisers for an interpretation
of what the Roosevelt foreign policy had been, and anxious to prove
his leadership by being blunt and decisive, Truman found congenial
the counsel to take a firmer stand in relations with the Soviets.
What gave these attitudes a fuller play in American policy making,
however, were the changes in the military situation in the Far East.
At the time of the Yalta meetings, Allied strategic plans still called
for a Soviet attack on Manchuria to be coordinated with the U.S.
invasion of Japan. This action, it was hoped, would prevent the transfer
to Japan of the Kwantung army, thereby weakening the ability of the
Japanese to resist the American thrust. The Soviet invasion, combined
with air attacks mounted from bases in Siberia, was expected to con-
tribute directly to shortening the war and saving American lives. By
April 1945, though, American military leaders had revised their calcula-
tions. On April 24 the Joint Chiefs of Staff canceled plans for B-29
6. For Harriman’s views on Russian aims in China, see ibid., 7:341-42, Kennan’s
cable is in ibid., pp. 342-44. Truman’s reaction is quoted in Harry 5, Truman,
Memoirs: Year of Decision (Garden City, N,Y.: Doubleday, 1955), p. 85.
DIPLOMACY DELAYED 71
bases in the Amur River region of Siberia after discovering that the
additional bomb tonnage provided by the airfields would not justify
ithe effort needed to transport equipment to that distant area, More
important, on the same date military planners concluded that because
U.S. naval and air forces could shut off transport between Japan and
the Asian mainland, ‘“‘early Soviet entry into the war against Japan
and attendant containing of the Kwangtung army is no longer necessary
io make the invasion feasible.’””
Now free of the military constraints that had made the concessions
at Yalta seem essential, American leaders began to reconsider their policy
in Northeast Asia. The most pressing issue was what to do about the
Yalta accords. Roosevelt and Stalin had agreed to delay revealing the
apreements to Chiang K’ai-shek, fearing that a breach of security in the
Chinese capital would tip off the Japanese to the Soviets’ intention to
enter the war. By May 1945, however, much of the need for secrecy had
passed: the Soviets had abrogated their treaty with the Japanese, and
Chungking was rife with rumors of the approaching Soviet invasion, Cit-
ing these facts, Ambassador Hurley cabled Truman on May 10, arguing
that the time had come to inform Chiang of the Yalta agreements.®
Hurley’s cable precipitated an immediate flurry of activity in high
policy-making circles. In the month since Roosevelt’s death, leaders had
entertained many doubts about the wisdom of American policy in the Far
liast. Navy Secretary James Forrestal had formulated the issues when,
during a May 1 meeting with Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson and act-
ing Secretary of State Joseph C. Grew, he questioned the basic objectives
of U.S. policy in the Pacific. “How far and how thoroughly do we want
(o beat Japan?” he had asked. ‘‘What is our policy on Russian influence?
Do we desire a counterweight to that influence? And should it be China
or should it be Japan?”? Now, with Hurley’s message, Harriman hur-
ried around Washington from the White House to the Pentagon to the
State Department, arguing that the time had come to consider again
what would be American policy on Russian entry into the war, the
future of China and Korea, and the occupation of Japan. Truman replied
to Hurley on May 12 with orders to keep the Yalta agreements secret
until further notice.!°
7. U.S. Department of Defense, The Entry of the Soviet Union into the War
against Japan: Military Plans, 1941-1945 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1955), pp. 28-
}1, 60-68; the quotation is from p. 67.
8. Hurley to Truman, May 10, 1945, FRUS, 1945, 7:865.
9. Walter Millis, ed., The Forrestal Diaries (New York: Viking Press, 1951),
p. 52, Concerning the fear of Soviet intentions in Asia, see Joseph C. Grew, Tur-
bulent Era (2 vols. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1952), 2:1445-46,
10. Truman to Hlurley, May 12, 1945, FRUS, 1945, 7:869. For Harriman’s
72 MARK PAUL
During the next week policy makers looked again at their plans
for the Far East. Following his May 12 meeting with Harriman and
Forrestal, Joseph Grew answered Harriman’s request for a definition
of American policy by writing a memorandum to the secretaries of
war and navy. The State Department believed, explained Grew, that
the United States should seek from the Russians new commitments on
the Far East prior to any American action to implement the Yalta
agreements. The Soviets should be asked to push the Chinese Com-
munists to accept unification under the leadership of Chiang K’ai-shek,
and the United States should get a Soviet promise to honor the Cairo
Declaration on territorial changes in the Far East and accept a four-
power trusteeship in Korea. Having set forth the State Department’s
position, he posed the central issue:
1, Is the entry of the Soviet Union into the Pacific War at the earliest possible
moment of such vital interest to the United States as to preclude any attempt by
the United States Government to obtain Soviet agreement to certain desirable
political objectives in the Far East prior to such entry?
2. Should the Yalta decision in regard to Soviet political desires in the Far
East be reconsidered or carried into effect in whole or in part?
Upon receiving Grew’s memo, Stimson noted in his diary that “these
are very vital questions and I am glad that the State Department has
brought them up... .”!2
After some “hard thinking,’’ however, Stimson decided the rush
to reassess policy in the Pacific was less opportune than he had first
imagined. Stimson too had been disturbed by Soviet actions in Eastern
Europe, and though he had been more cautious than Harriman or
Forrestal in recommending policies that might lead to an early break
with the Soviets, he had given careful thought to tactics that might
get ‘fa Russia that we could work with.” As the events of 1945 un-
folded, he had increasingly turned to the yet untested atomic bomb
as the ‘‘master card’? in America’s relations with the Soviet Union.
Now, in response to Grew’s memorandum, he once again realized that
the questions Grew had asked were ‘“‘powerfully connected with our
success with S-1 (the atomic bomb).”?!%
round of meetings, see Millis, Forrestal Diaries, pp. 55-56; Diary of William D,
Leahy, May 11, 1945, William D, Leahy Papers, Library of Congress, Washington,
D.C.; W. Averell Harriman and Elie Abel, Special Envoy to Churchill and Stalin,
1941-1946 (New York: Random House, 1975), pp. 461-62.
11. Grew to Stimson and Forrestal, May 12, 1945, FRUS, 1945, 7:869-70;
Grew to Stettinius, May 12, 1945, Joseph C. Grew Papers, Houghton Library,
Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.
12, Diary of Henry L. Stimson, May 13, 1945, Stimson Papers, Yale University,
New Haven, Conn,
13. Ibid,, May 18, 14, 1945,
DIPLOMACY DELAYED 73
On May 14 Stimson discussed the Grew note with John McCloy, his
assistant secretary:
I told him that my own opinion was that the time now and the method now
to deal with Russia was to keep our mouths shut and let our actions speak for
words. . . . I told him this was a place where we really held all the cards. I called
it a royal straight flush and we musn’t be a fool about the way we play it. They
(the Russians) can’t get along without our help and industries and we have coming
into action a weapon which will be unique. Now the thing is not to get into un-
necessary quarrels by talking too much and not to indicate any weakness by talking
too much; let our actions speak for themselves, +
The following morning, Stimson, in a “pretty red hot session” with
Grew, Forrestal, and Harriman, elaborated his argument for a delay in
any discussions with the Soviets on Northeast Asia. “I tried to point
out the difficulties which existed and I thought it premature to ask
those [Grew’s] questions; at least we were not yet in a position to
answer them.’’ If the United States found it necessary “to have it
out with Russia’? on China and Korea, it would be advantageous to
do so from the strongest bargaining position. ‘Over any such tangled
wave of problems the S-1 secret would be dominant. . . .” he told them.
li “seems a terrible thing to gamble with such big stakes in diplomacy
without having your master card in your hand,”!®
Although Grew and Harriman agreed to delay Harriman’s return
to Moscow “‘to think out these things a little bit harder,” they were
not swayed by Stimson’s argument, Later that day they called on the
president, urged him to consider meeting with Stalin and Churchill
ul an early date, and repeated their advice that reassessment of policy
in the Far East should be completed before Harriman’s departure for
Moscow. The president agreed.!© But the following day, May 16,
Stimson visited the president to argue for delay. Believing that the
atomic bomb would be the master card in America’s diplomacy with
the Russians, Stimson was troubled by the prospect of a Big Three
meeting to discuss European and Far Eastern issues before the bomb
wis tested. ‘We shall probably hold more cards in our hands later,
(han now,” he told the president, Truman apparently agreed.!”
14. Ibid., May 14, 1945.
15. Ibid., May 15, 1945.
16, FRUS, Potsdam, 1:12.
17, Stimson to Truman, May 16, 1945, Stimson Papers, Yale University. See
also Diary of Joseph Davies, May 21, 1945, Davies Papers, Library of Congress;
and Stimson Diary, June 6, 1945. There remains considerable controversy over
(his point. Harriman has written that “it is utter nonsense to believe—as some
listorians apparently do—that Truman postponed the Potsdam Conference in order
(oy have the bomb go off before the end of his meeting with Stalin’ (Harriman,
74 MARK PAUL
It is important to recognize the meaning and logic behind Stimson’s
strategy, particularly as it applies to Far Eastern issues. At least one
historian has seen this decision to delay the Big Three meeting as the
beginning of a subtle strategy to postpone Sino-Soviet negotiations on
the Yalta concessions and end the war in the Pacific before Soviet
armies entered the fighting.!® In truth, Stimson had far more modest
aims. Unlike Grew and Harriman, who were pushing for an immediate,
tough stand against the Soviets, Stimson recognized that the United
States had little leverage over the Soviets in the Far East. He made
clear his analysis in his reply to Grew’s memo: ‘““The concessions to
Russia on Far Eastern matters which were made at Yalta are generally
matters which are within the military power of Russia to obtain regard-
less of U.S. military action short of war.” An effort to revise the
Yalta agreements, even one backed by the threat of American non-
compliance, would not, he believed, influence the Soviets. Nor would
it create ‘‘much good will.”? This last consideration was important to
Stimson, for he, like Truman and the military, still wished to have
Soviet help in the Pacific. Soviet entry was no longer essential to the
defeat of Japan, but it was desirable because “‘it will materially shorten
the war and thus save American lives.’? Stimson had no objection to
the State Department’s attempt to get the Soviets to clarify their
intentions in the Far East, but he doubted the Soviets would bow to
American wishes.'? If the United States and Russia were going to
disagree over Northeast Asia, Stimson preferred to do so at the Big
Three meeting when, as he put it in his diary, “we shall probably
hold more cards in our hands.”’?° Then the president and his advisers
would know if the atomic bomb test had been a success, and they
would be better able to judge how far the United States wanted to
go to retain Soviet cooperation in the Pacific, and whether the bomb
would be, as Stimson hoped, a valuable bargaining chip to obtain
American objectives in Europe and Asia. Stimson was indeed counseling
that the options be kept open for atomic diplomacy—he and Roosevelt
had long seen the bomb as a potential political weapon—but his advice
Special Envoy, p. 490). Yet the evidence cited above seems to permit no other
conclusion, For the best assessment of the evidence, see Barton J. Bernstein,
“Roosevelt, Truman, and the Atomic Bomb, 1941-1945: A Reinterpretation,”’
Political Science Quarterly 90, no. 1 (Spring 1975):41.
18. Gar Alperovitz, Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam (New York:
Vintage Books, 1965), pp. 95-116.
19. Stimson to Grew, May 21, 1945, FRUS, 1945, 7:876-78.
20. Stimson Diary, June 6, 1945.
DIVLOMACY DELAYED 75
was neither part of a strategy of delayed showdown nor a plan to keep
the Soviets out of the war in the Pacific. It was instead the counsel of
cautious realism, of recognizing that America’s ability to realize its
goals in Asia would rest ultimately on the balance of power between
America and Russia.*}
That Truman agreed with Stimson’s reasoning should not seem
surprising. The new president, in office for only one month, was
unprepared for the diplomatic tasks he faced. From the first he was
hit with an unending flow of problems and crises, each important and
complex. Now, in the middle of May, he was being advised to re-
examine the agreements on the Far East that had been made by his
predecessor, and to meet immediately with Stalin. In these circum-
slances, It seems natural that Truman would have found Stimson’s
advice convincing. What president, new to his responsibilities and
uncertain of his position, would have doubted his senior military
adviser when told that he should not rush into serious negotia-
lions without the weapon that would be his master card? Harri-
nan and Grew were telling him to be bold and take risks; Stimson
wus asking him to be cautious and do nothing for the moment. Both
us an approach for securing American interests and as an answer
(o his personal anxieties, Stimson’s counsel sat well with Tru-
man.??
The president was not content, however, to let the issues between
the United States and the Soviet Union go unexplored. At Roosevelt’s
funeral and again early in May, he had asked Harry Hopkins to go to
Moscow to sound out Russian attitudes and reassure Stalin that Roose-
yvelt’s death had not changed American policy. Originally conceived to
leak the stalemate over Poland, the Hopkins mission now became a
convenient way for Truman to discover as well what intentions Stalin
iwight have in the Far East. On May 19, Truman met with Hopkins to
yive him instructions for the mission. There is no adequate record of
these instructions, but Truman later remembered that he had wanted
Hlopkins to get ‘‘as early a date as possible on Russian entry into the
war against Japan,” and to emphasize to Stalin that the United States
expected the Russians to carry out their agreements. “I told Harry
21, See Bernstein, ‘Roosevelt, Truman, and the Atomic Bomb,” pp. 39-42;
and Martin J. Sherwin, A World Destroyed: The Atomic Bomb and the Grand
I/liance (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1975).
22. See Sherwin, A World Destroyed, pp. 146-50, 186-92, for a sensitive por-
trayal of Truman’s anxieties and their influence on these decisions,
re
76 MARK PAUL
he could use diplomatic language, or he could use a baseball bat if he
thought that was [the] proper approach to Mr. Stalin.”?9
Hopkins also received from the State Department a list of de-
sired ‘‘commitments and clarifications” on the Far East. In China,
the State Department wanted detailed promises that the Soviets would
refrain from using any but Chinese government military units in op-
erations against Japan, respect Chinese territorial integrity, and use
their influence with the Communists to speed Chinese political and
military unification. The department also presented for the first time
a detailed proposal for Korea’s future. This called for a four-power
trusteeship in Korea that would last for five years; during this time
the trustees—Great Britain, China, the Soviet Union, and the United
States—would be equally represented in all the bureaus of an interim
Korean government. They would administer the country while training
“reliable and capable local Koreans in the performance of various
governmental and technical duties.” All Allied armed forces, except
a token force from each trustee, would be withdrawn upon the estab-
lishment of the trusteeship. Worried about Soviet domination of North-
east Asia, the State Department was asking Hopkins and Harriman to
secure detailed assurances that the Russians would not seek such
gains.”*
Hopkins’s discussions with Stalin on the Far East produced, in late
May, a reaffirmation of Russian intentions to adhere to the Yalta
accords, In their third meeting, on the evening of May 28, Stalin told
Truman’s emissary that Soviet forces would be ready to attack the
Japanese by August 8, though the date of the invasion would depend
on having secured a treaty with the Chinese. Stalin agreed once again
that China should be unified under Chiang K’ai-shek’s leadership, and
he told his American visitors that only the United States would have
sufficient resources to play an important economic role in postwar
23. Appointment book of Matthew Connelly, May 19, 1945, President’s Secre-
tary’s Files (hereafter PSF), Truman Papers, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence,
Mo. The origin of the Hopkins mission is still somewhat hazy. The account here
follows Truman’s recollection (Truman, Year of Decision, pp. 257-59). However
Harriman and Charles Bohlen say that the idea of sending Hopkins to Moscow
was Bohlen’s, that Truman opposed the idea, but later relented. See Harriman,
Special Envoy, p. 459; Charles E. Bohlen, Witness to History, 1929-1969 (New
York: Norton, 1973), p. 215; Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 885-87.
See also Truman’s note in Connelly appointment book, May 18, 1945, PSF, Tru-
man Papers.
24, FRUS, 1945, 7:878-83 (emphasis in the original). Hopkins was also provided
Stimson’s May 21 reply to Grew's question; see Grew to Forrestal, May 21, 1945,
Grew Papers, Harvard University.
DIPLOMACY DELAYED UA
China. On the delicate issue of Soviet military action and its relation
to the Chinese domestic struggle, the Soviet leader said that even
if unification had not been achieved before Russian entry, the Kuo-
mintang would be allowed to set up civil administrations in areas
controlled by the Red Army. Stalin also repeated his support for a
four-power trusteeship in Korea.?? None of these discussions of Far
Eastern issues was as detailed as the State Department memorandum,
but even the skeptical Harriman was pleased with the results, It was
decided not to pursue Far Eastern issues further.?6
Truman also welcomed the news from Moscow. Happy to have a
date for Russian entry into the war and reassured that the Soviets
would support American leadership in Asia, Truman boasted to Stim-
son on June 6 of Hopkins’s accomplishments. But Truman and Stimson
were not counting on Soviet assurances alone. Again they discussed the
atomic bomb. The meeting of the Big Three had been delayed until
July 16, Truman told Stimson, ‘“‘to give us more time”’ for testing the
new weapon, Agreeing with Stimson that quid pro quos should be
established before the United States shared its atomic secret with
the Russians, Truman mentioned Poland, Romania, Yugoslavia, and
Manchuria as areas where the bomb might prove a valuable bargaining
counter, Although the final political outcome of the war in the Far
Kast was still uncertain, Truman was optimistic, for he had the promise
of Soviet cooperation and the prospect of a master card that could turn
promise into reality.?”
Il
By the time of the Potsdam Conference, it was clear to all American
leaders that there was a pressing need for specific agreements with the
Soviets that would safeguard American interests in Northeast Asia.
This was particularly true in regard to Korea. The Russian attack on
the Japanese was now less than a month away, and State Department
officials—who had long recognized that a Soviet military occupation
of the Korean peninsula could have undesirable effects there—were
anxious to have a more comprehensive understanding of Korea’s future.
In June, in a policy paper prepared for Stimson, the department had
predicted that ‘‘the Soviet Government will, no doubt, establish mili-
(ary government in the portion of Korea under its control and may
25, For the minutes of the Hopkins-Stalin talks, see FRUS, Potsdam, 1:41-47,
26, For the reaction of Harriman and Hopkins to their discussions with Stalin,
see ibid, pp. 61-62; and FRUS, 1945, 7:893.
27, Stimson Diary, June 6, 1945,
78 MARK PAUL
subsequently wish to establish a Korea regime friendly to the Soviet
Union composed at least partially of Korean leaders groomed in the
Soviet Union.” Chaos and revolutionary ferment would likely follow
the defeat of Japan, the State Department believed, and in this situa-
tion, “‘the policy and activities of a Russian-sponsored socialist regime
in Korea might easily receive popular support.”*? To counter this
possibility, the State Department sought prior agreement from the
Soviets that the great powers would work in concert to prepare Korea
for eventual independence, and it included this matter in its list of
objectives to be achieved at the Potsdam Conference.”?
The attitude displayed by the Russians in July in their discussions
with the Chinese on the Yalta concessions had also sharpened American
awareness that it was necessary to negotiate arrangements for Northeast
Asia after the war. Taking advantage of the loose wording of the
Yalta accords, Stalin had proposed to Chinese Foreign Minister T. V.
Soong an agreement that went far beyond what American leaders
considered legitimate Russian needs in Manchuria and that appeared
to challenge the Open Door policy in China.°° The Chinese govern-
ment, looking to the Soviets for support in its internal struggle against
the Communists, could not hope to withstand alone the Soviet pres-
sures to permit Russian hegemony over portions of Manchuria. Nor
could it protect the American interest in free commercial access to
Manchurian ports and railways. Realizing that only U.S. action could
prevent an eventual Sino-Soviet treaty inimical to the interests of both
China and the United States, Truman and Secretary of State James F,
Byrnes had moved to resist the Russian demands and involve the United
States in what were ostensibly bilateral negotiations. On July 6, Byrnes
had cabled Harriman—who was conferring with Soong throughout the
negotiations—that the United States would expect to be consulted
before any Sino-Soviet agreement was concluded, He had also backed
the Chinese in their interpretation of the provision of the Yalta agree-
28. “An Estimate of Conditions in Asia and the Pacific at the Close of the
War in the Far East and Objectives and Policies of the United States,” June 22,
1945, FRUS, 1945, 6:556-80; the quotation is on p. 563.
29. Potsdam Briefing Papers, FRUS, Potsdam, 1:309-15. The Russians too saw
a need for more discussions on Korea. Chinese Foreign Minister T. V. Soong re-
ported to Harriman on July 3 that Stalin had agreed to a four-power trusteeship
for Korea, but that Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov thought trusteeship “an
unusual agreement” and believed ‘‘that therefore it would be necessary to come to
a detailed understanding.”” FRUS, 1945, 7:914.
30. The course of the Sino-Soviet negotiations may be followed through Harri-
man’s reports in FRUS, 1945, 7:910-15, 919-28, 932-34. For a State Department
analysis of the Yalta agreements that recognizes the ambiguities in the document,
see ibid,, pp, 955-42,
DIPLOMACY DELAYED 79
ments on Outer Mongolia and the Manchurian railways.*! Stalin’s
expansive interpretation of the Yalta accords underlined the immediate
need for the United States to discuss the Far East with the Russians
und reinforced Truman’s desire to reach an understanding on Northeast
Asia at Potsdam.**
As the American delegation to the Potsdam Conference came
together in the middle of July, Far Eastern issues occupied the atten-
tion of many policy makers, Averell Harriman, arriving from Moscow
und the recently suspended negotiations between Soong and Stalin,
‘was much worked up over his fears of the Russian plans for Manchuria
and wanted help.’*? A week earlier, on July 9, he had suggested, with
byrnes’s agreement, that the State Department prepare for use at
Potsdam a study of the American interpretation of the Yalta agree-
ments and the proposed Korean trusteeship.**
Henry Stimson was equally concerned. Prime advocate of the policy
ol delaying negotiations on the Far East until the Big Three conference,
Stimson now used every opportunity to impress upon the president
ind secretary of state the importance of these issues, On July 16 he
presented to Truman a memorandum dealing with the end of the war
and the subsequent political arrangements. He urged the president to
see that ‘no concessions should be made which would permit Russia
(0 control or prohibit trade through Dairen or any other commercial
port in Manchuria.’”’ Such concessions, he warned, would mean aban-
doning the Open Door policy and endangering ‘‘our clear and growing
‘1, Ibid., pp. 914, 916-17. It has been argued that Byrnes and Truman inter-
yvened in the Sino-Soviet discussions to stall the negotiations, hoping thereby to
delay or prevent Soviet entry into the war (Alperovitz, Atomic Diplomacy, pp.
101-26, especially 120-26). This is incorrect. Prior to Potsdam, American leaders
sill wanted Soviet intervention (see the record of Truman’s June 18 meeting with
lis military advisers, FRUS, Potsdam, 1:903-10). There is no evidence that, before
Votsdam, the United States wished to stall the negotiations; on the contrary,
Ilurriman tried to convince Soong of the importance of obtaining an agreement
lwtore Soviet troops entered Manchuria, and he suggested that the terms Chiang
had offered for the ports at Dairen and Port Arthur were not sufficiently generous.
(1 RUS, 1945, 7:924-26.) Byrmes’s purpose in stiffening the Chinese position was
fol to delay a settlement, but to assure an agreement compatible with Chinese
wid American interests in Manchuria. With the scheduled Soviet offensive still
‘iore than a month away, it seems extremely unlikely that Byrnes was hoping that
iw actions could affect the date of Russian entry into the war. It was not until
luler in the month that he saw a chance to make this tactic work.
‘2. Por indications that Truman intended to discuss these matters with Stalin,
we ibid., pp. 899, 906-7; Stimson Diary, June 6, 1945.
S%, Stimson Diary, July 15, 1945,
Nd, FRUS, 1945, 7:924, 934-42.
80 MARK PAUL
interest in the orient.’’ He also suggested that the Korean trusteeship
idea be pressed and, contrary to Stalin’s wish that no foreign troops
be stationed there, he wanted at least a token American force on the
peninsula during the four-power regime:
The Russians . . . have already trained one or two divisions of Koreans, and,
I assume, intend to use them in Korea. If an international trusteeship is not set
up in Korea, and perhaps even if it is, these Korean divisions will probably gain
control, and influence the setting up of a Soviet dominated local government,
rather than an independent one. This is the Polish question transplanted to the
Far East.
The next morning, he met with Byrnes and again advised that the
United States oppose Stalin’s plans to make Manchuria an exclusive
Russian economic sphere.*®
The talks Stimson advocated were never held. In the two weeks of
negotiations at Potsdam, Truman and Stalin discussed the Far Eastern
situation only once, In that brief session Stalin summarized the Soviet
position on the Soong negotiations and Truman and Byrnes offered
an occasional query, no more. The president abandoned his plans to
obtain from the Russians an agreement to abide by the American
interpretation of the Yalta accords. He did this despite numerous
suggestions from Stimson, Harriman, and State Department officers
that American interests required opposing Stalin’s demands in Man-
churia and reaching a more detailed understanding on the Korean
trusteeship. When the meetings ended early in August, these matters
were still unresolved.
What is the explanation for this surprising omission? Why, after
having delayed detailed discussions of these matters until the Big
Three meeting, did Truman leave Potsdam without settling them?
The key is the atomic bomb. In May, Truman had postponed talking
to the Russians about the Far East until he knew whether the bomb
worked. Now, in July, the success of the atomic bomb test became the
occasion for a reconsideration of policy in the Far East, out of which
grew a new strategy of delay.
The American party at Potsdam received its initial news of the
successful atomic test on July 16. As detailed reports replaced the
first sketchy messages, policy makers were sure that the diplomatic
situation had been decisively transformed. Since the spring, American
leaders had understood that the bomb would powerfully influence
35. Stimson’s memo is reprinted in sections in RUS, Potsdam, 2; the portions
quoted are from pp, 631, 1223-24. See also Stimson Diary, July 16, 1945,
36, Stimson Diary, July 17, 1945,
DIPLOMACY DELAYED 81
the whole complex of issues involved with the end of the Pacific war:
the entry of the Soviet Union into the war, the Japanese surrender,
the future of Asia. But as Stimson later recalled, “‘the bomb as a merely
probable weapon had seemed a weak reed on which to rely, but the
bomb as colossal reality was very different.”37 The news from Alamo-
yordo greatly cheered the president and gave him “new confidence.”
According to Stimson, “the president was tremendously pepped up
by it and spoke to me of it again and again.”
Buoyed by his new confidence, Truman was now ready to recon-
sider the American course of action in the Far East. One of his primary
objectives in going to Potsdam had been to get full Russian assistance
against the Japanese. Now Truman wondered if the United States
might dispense with Soviet aid. On July 23, Truman told Stimson that
lie was eager to learn from General Marshall whether the United States
needed the Russians in the war. After discussing the matter with
ihe chief of staff, Stimson reported the next day that Marshall believed
‘that the Russians were not needed.’? This opinion greatly changed
lruman’s conception of his task at Potsdam. There was no longer any
ieuson for the president to go ahead with his effort to bring the Rus-
jiuns into the war; as Stimson later recalled, the bomb ‘‘made it clear
\o the Americans that further diplomatic efforts to bring the Russians
into the Pacific war were largely pointless.’ Russian entry promised
io benefits and threatened to put the Soviets in a position to dominate
Manchuria and Korea. Indeed, no longer needing the Russians, the
\mericans wished the Soviets would stay out: “It is quite clear that
the United States do not at the present time desire Russian participa-
(ion in the war against Japan,’? Churchill cabled London on July 23."!
If the bomb created a consensus among American leaders that
Soviel participation in the Pacific war was no longer needed or desired,
1 did not lead to similar agreement about how they should deal with
unresolved matters in Northeast Asia. Stimson, Harriman, and officials
lyom the State Department still believed that it was necessary at Pots-
(ium to come to a firm understanding with the Russians so that Ameri-
oan goals would be clear. Even though the president believed that his
livat conversation with Stalin “had clinched the Open Door in Man-
‘fiir,’ Stimson urged Truman to discuss the matter with Stalin
‘7, tlenry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and
Wwe (New York: Harper & Bros., 1947), p. 637.
tH. Stimson Diary, July 23, 24, 1945.
10. Ibid,
10, Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, p, 637,
11, Churchill is quoted in John Ehrman, Grand Strategy: October, 1944 to
fuguet, 1975 (London: HH. M, Stationery Ollice, 1956), p, 292,
ae al
82 MARK PAUL
“detail by detail’? to leave no room for Russian misunderstanding.”
Harriman reminded Byrnes that the Sino-Soviet talks were at an im-
passe, that the Chinese could not resist by themselves Stalin’s demands,
and that the United States must present to Stalin its interpretation of
the Yalta agreements if it hoped to protect its interests in Manchuria.
‘Although it may not be desirable for us at this time to show any
concern over the question of Russia’s entry into the war against Japan,”
Harriman wrote, ‘it would seem that there are substantial advantages
in the reestablishment of friendly relations between the Soviet Union
and China, particularly the agreement that the Soviet Government
will support the Chinese National Government as the unifying force
in China.’*? Although neither Stimson nor Harriman was happy with
the prospect of the Soviets invading Manchuria and Korea, neither
thought that the Soviets could be kept from getting into the war
when it served Russian interests. They believed firm agreement with
the Russians might limit Soviet influence in Manchuria and protect
the interests of both the United States and Chiang K’ai-shek.
Secretary Byrnes, however, opposed further negotiations. He saw
no promise in Stimson’s and Harriman’s efforts to bring the Soviets
to acceptable terms, Stalin would be satisfied only through “radical
concessions’? by the Chinese.** Rejecting diplomacy, Byrnes pinned
his hopes on a rapid end to the war. As he told Forrestal on July 28,
he was “anxious to get a Japanese surrender before the Russians got
into the war, hoping thereby to deny the Soviets control over Port
Arthur and Dairen.’*° Accordingly, Byrnes devised diplomatic tactics
to delay Soviet entry. His ploy involved the uncompleted negotiations
over the Sino-Soviet treaty. “‘JFB [Byrnes] determined to outmaneuver
Stalin on China,’ noted Walter Brown, Byrnes’s aide, on July 20.
“Hopes Soong will stand firm and then Russians will not go in war.
Then he feels Japan will surrender before Russia goes to war and this
will save China.’ On July 23, Truman sent Chiang a message, pre-
pared by Byrnes, that asked the Chinese to resume their negotiations
42. Stimson Diary, July 17, 18, 1945.
43. FRUS, Potsdam, 2:1243-44, Harriman had the support of other State
Department officials at Potsdam including Donald Russell, special assistant to
Byres, and John Carter Vincent, chief of the Division of Chinese Affairs; see
ibid., pp. 1227-30, 1241-43; also Harriman, Special Envoy, pp. 493-94,
44, Leahy Diary, July 16, 1945.
45. Millis, Forrestal Diaries, p. 78; James F. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly (New
York: Harper & Bros., 1947), pp. 207-8.
46. “W. B.’s Notes,” July 20, 1945, James F. Bymes Papers, Cooper Library,
Clemson University, Clemson, S.C. For Byrnes’s account of this strategy, see his
All in One Lifetime (New York: Harper & Bros,, 1958), p, 291,
DIPLOMACY DELAYED 83
with Stalin, while informing them that the United States did not expect
(hem to extend concessions in excess of the Yalta agreements. The
following day Brown noted that, ‘‘Byrnes still hoping for time, believ-
ing after atomic bombing Japan will surrender and Russia will not get
in so much on the kill, thereby [not] being in a position to press for
claims against China.’*” Having settled upon these tactics, Byrnes
rejected the advice of Stimson and officials in the State Department
that he negotiate further with the Russians.
‘Truman supported his secretary of state in this course of action. In
spite of warnings that the Manchurian and Korean issues were still
unsettled and without regard to Molotov’s request on July 22 that
ihe Big Three exchange views on Korea, Truman dropped these issues
irom discussion.* Whether the president shared Byrnes’s hopes for
(elaying Soviet entry—as Byrnes later claimed—is unknown. Truman
wis undoubtedly aware that the Russians might enter the fighting
without an agreement with China, and that it was within their power
(0 take the concessions they wished.*? He seems, however, to have
seen some advantage to the United States in postponing settlement of
(he Manchurian and Korean issues until after Japan’s defeat, perhaps
helieving that the military balance in the Far East would later permit
the United States and China to drive a better bargain with Stalin,
jarticularly if Russian entry was delayed or prevented. On August 2,
lyuman and his delegation left Potsdam with the fate of Korea as
\jncertain as it had been when the conference began two weeks earlier,°?
47, “W. B.’s Notes,’ July 24, 1945, Byrnes Papers, Clemson University. Tru-
i\an's message to Chiang is in FRUS, 1945, 7:950.
18, For Stimson’s warning, see Stimson Diary, July 16, 17, 18, 1945. Stimson
ino worried that, if the British and French insisted on keeping Hong Kong and
fnilochina, Stalin would insist on solitary control of Korea. He may have mentioned
(iis to Truman. See Stimson Diary, July 23, 1945. Molotov’s request is recorded in
1 RUS, Potsdam, 2:253.
19, According to Leahy, Truman and Byrnes recognized that the Russians could
tuhe what they wanted in China: “They feel that an agreement between the Soviets
ji China can only be reached through radical concessions by China and Stalin
will enter the war whether or not such concessions are made, and will thereafter
witinty Soviet demands regardless of what the Chinese attitude may be.’’ Leahy
Hiary, July 17, 1945. General Marshall also thought the Soviets could get what they
wanted by military force, and Stimson may have communicated this opinion to
Human (Stimson Diary, July 23, 1945).
‘0, John Carter Vincent wrote a memo on July 23 that argued against the view
(it the United States would obtain better terms in Manchuria by postponing dis-
‘ueions until a later date, It seems likely that he was attempting to challenge what
hv understood to be the rationale behind the decision not to discuss Far Eastern
jotiew any further (FRUS, Potsdam, 2:1242-44), The subject of Korea did come up
i) the discussions briefly, On July 24, Soviet General Antonoy asked the Americans
84 MARK PAUL
Ill
In deciding to forego at Potsdam any detailed discussions of the
political future of China and Korea, Truman and Byrnes were abandon-
ing the approach that the State Department had hoped would contain
Russian power in Asia. American leaders had long assumed that the
political balance in Asia would be decisively influenced by the disposi-
tion of the competing forces at war’s end; yet they had hoped that,
through prior diplomatic agreement with the Soviet Union, American
political influence might be preserved in areas—such as Korea and
Manchuria—that Russian armies would likely liberate. There was no
guarantee that the Soviets would abide by such agreements, but having
no prior agreements seemed riskier still. Soviet armies were poised
on the Manchurian border, awaiting their orders to drive into Man-
churia, Korea, and North China. The experience of Eastern Europe
had already convinced American officials that Soviet political influence
followed Russian arms; and in Asia, where the Chinese Communists
and other revolutionary forces were expected to be prime competitors
for power, they feared that, without some form of American counter-
action, a Soviet sphere of influence would develop. Since American
strategists had rejected heavy U.S. military involvement on the Asian
mainland, the option of using American forces as a counterbalance to
Russian influence was severely limited. Nor could the United States
expect Chiang K’ai-shek to serve as proxy. China’s military strength
was totally drained, its economy near collapse, its government under
attack from all sides, Although committed to Chiang’s government,
Washington had no illusions that he could impose his rule over all
of China, let alone resist Russian pressures.”!
What was true for the entire region applied particularly within
if it would be possible for U.S. forces to operate amphibiously against the Korean
coast in coordination with the planned Soviet offensive against the Japanese.
Marshall replied that such operations could not be contemplated (ibid., p. 351).
This was in keeping with the previous American strategic decision to direct U.S.
power against the Japanese home islands; operations in Korea were judged to be
more difficult and less decisive than an invasion of Kyushu. See Marshall’s presenta-
tion at the June 18, 1945 White House review of military plans; ibid., 1:904-5;
and McFarland to Leahy, June 2, 1945, Record Group (hereafter RG) 218, Records
of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, Geographic Series, CCS, decimal file 383.21,
Korea (3-19-45) sect. 1, National Archives, Washington, D.C. (hereafter, JCS
Records).
51. See “Estimate of Conditions in Asia. . . ,”” June 22, 1945, FRUS, 1945,
6:556-80. See also the Office of Strategic Services estimate, ‘‘Problems and Ob-
jectives of United States Policy,”’ April 1945, Donovan Chronological File: April-
May 1945, Truman Papers, Truman Library; and John Paton Davies, Jr., memo,
July 10, 1945, ‘Estimate of Soviet Policy in Bast Asia,” “RUS, 1945, 7:928-
i
: !
DIPLOMACY DELAYED 85
Korea, The State Department estimated that twenty to thirty thousand
Koreans served in the Red Army. These troops, presumably recruited
from among the large community of Soviet Koreans in Siberia or
incorporated from guerrilla units driven out of Manchuria by the
Japanese, were expected to be prominent among the forces invading
Korea, The State Department also believed it likely that Korea would
be swept by revolutionary ferment. Communists within Korea had
for twenty-five years bravely resisted Japanese rule, and during the
thirties, they had been leading opponents of the Japanese, organizing
struggles among workers, peasants, and students. With Japanese rule
removed, these experienced revolutionaries could be expected to be
active once again in Korean politics.5?
Under these circumstances, Byrnes’s and Truman’s abandonment
of diplomacy seemed to entail great risks. But they thought otherwise.
Stalin’s interpretation of the Far Eastern provisions of the Yalta ac-
cords had confirmed their fears of Soviet intentions and had dimmed
their hope that Russia would follow American leadership in Asia.
Diplomacy no longer appeared to offer any benefits. Instead, Truman
and Byrnes, their confidence bolstered by the atomic bomb, chose to
assert openly and unilaterally the American definition of postwar
Asia and to back that definition as fully as possible with the military
power available to the United States. No longer having anything to
lose by firmness and doubting the value of a conciliatory approach,
‘Truman and Byrnes set off on a bold, new course.
They first demonstrated this new boldness in the Sino-Soviet
negotiations in Moscow. On August 5 Byrnes and Truman for the
first time authorized Harriman to inject into the discussions the Ameri-
can interpretation of the Yalta accords. Harriman was instructed to
‘ell Stalin that, in the American view, Soong had already met the terms
of the Yalta agreements, the inclusion of Dairen in the Soviet military
zone was unacceptable, and that the United States wished the Soviets
\o agree formally to respect the Open Door policy in Manchuria, On
August 8, after the Soviet Union entered the war, Harriman met with
Stalin, The Russian leader assured Harriman that American interests
in Manchurian trade would be recognized, but he insisted that the
Soviet proposal for Dairen was consistent with the Yalta agreements
und necessary to guard Soviet interests. Harriman was not convinced:
“It is difficult for me to believe,” he cabled Washington, “in spite
52. FRUS, 1945, 6:561-63. For Communist activities in Korea, see Dae Sook
Suh, The Korean Communist Movement, 1918-1948 (Princeton: Princeton Univer-
uity Press, 1967), pp. 53-141, 189-208; and Se Hee Yoo, “The Communist Move-
ment and the Peasants: ‘The Case of Korea,” Peasant Rebellion and Communist
Revolution in Asia, ed. John Wilson Lewis (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
1974, pp, 61-76,
86 MARK PAUL
of Stalin’s assurances, that there can be a truly free port under Soviet
management with security control by Soviet secret police and I see in
the Yalta Agreement nothing which would obligate us to support an
arrangement of the kind described.”*? He was further agitated by a
new Soviet demand that they receive some share of the Japanese enter-
prises in Manchuria as ‘‘war trophies.”’ This threatened American hopes
that Manchuria, the most industrially developed region of China, would
become the base from which to rebuild the crippled Chinese economy.
Byrnes told Harriman to oppose strongly any removals by the So-
viets.>*
However, Harriman apparently believed that the Soviets would not
be moved by more diplomatic entreaties. With Soviet forces pushing
ahead in Manchuria, Soong was on the verge of making further conces-
sions that might compromise American interests. Firmer steps were
required. If the United States was to protect its interests in Asia, it
would have to do so unilaterally. On August 10, Harriman cabled his
recommendation to Truman and Byrnes:
While at Potsdam General Marshall and Admiral King told me of the proposed
landings in Korea and Dairen if the Japanese gave in prior to Soviet troops occupy-
ing these areas.
Considering the way Stalin is behaving in increasing his demands on Soong |
recommend that these landings be made to accept surrender of the Japanese troops
at least on the Kwantung Peninsula and in Korea. I cannot see that we are under
any obligation to the Soviets to respect any zone of Soviet military operation, ”?
Harriman’s cable arrived in Washington on the same day as the
Japanese offer to surrender. Japan had accepted the terms of the
Potsdam declaration ‘‘with the understanding that the said declaration
does not comprise any demand which prejudices the prerogatives of
53. Byres to Harriman, Aug. 5, 1945, FRUS, 1945, 7:955-56; George Kennan
memo, Aug. 8, 1945, ibid., pp. 960-65; the quotation is from Harriman to Truman
and Byrnes, Aug. 8, 1945, ibid., p. 965. Truman later recalled that he was not
hopeful about the results of the Sino-Soviet negotiations; Truman, Year of Deci-
ston, p. 424.
54. For Stalin’s new demand and the American reaction, see Harriman to
Byrnes and Truman, Aug. 8, 1945, FRUS, 1945, 7:958-59; and Byrnes to Harri-
man, Aug. 9, 1945, ibid., pp. 965-66. For the importance American leaders at-
tached to the industries in Manchuria, see Truman to Chiang K’ai-shek, Oct. 3,
1945, ibid., pp. 1354-55; and the minutes of meetings between Edwin A. Locke,
Truman’s personal representative and economic adviser to the Chinese government,
and the Chinese economic adviser to the Chinese government, and Chinese eco-
nomic experts, Sept. 1945, Edwin A. Locke Files, Truman Library.
55. Harriman to Byrnes and Truman, FRUS, 1945, 7:967. Truman received
a similar recommendation from Edwin Pauley; see Truman, Year of Decision,
p. 433.
DIPLOMACY DELAYED 87
His Majesty as the Sovereign Ruler.’? Meeting at the White House early
on the tenth, Truman, Byrnes, Forrestal, and Leahy discussed the
American response. All were anxious to have the war ended quickly,
and Leahy and Stimson advised Truman to guarantee the emperor.
But Byrnes balked at making such a guarantee, both because he did
not wish to alter the formula of unconditional surrender and because
he feared domestic political repercussions if the administration granted
the Japanese condition. After some discussion, Truman decided to send
a note accepting the Japanese offer but providing no guarantee of the
emperor. Instead, the United States specified that the emperor would
be subject to the Allied supreme commander, an oblique answer in-
tended to convey American willingness to retain the imperial institu-
tion if the Japanese so chose.®
By refusing to guarantee the emperor, Truman and Byrnes risked
prolonging the war, a possibility that would allow the Russian armies
more time to drive through Manchuria and, Stimson feared, to legiti-
mize a Soviet claim to share in the occupation of Japan. However,
Truman was not sure that a Japanese surrender would stop the Russian
invasion, Harriman’s reports of Russian intransigence in the negotia-
tions with Soong seem to have convinced him that Stalin’s appetite in
Northeast Asia would not be quickly satiated. He suspected, he told his
advisers, that the Soviets might not acknowledge the surrender, in
which event the United States would act unilaterally and go on with the
occupation of Japan.>’ Moreover, agreeing with Harriman that the
protection of American interests required the swift insertion of a U.S.
presence in Manchuria, Korea, and North China, Truman moved quickly
to replace, as far as possible, Japanese power with American, On August
11, before he had received the recommendations of the State-War-Navy
Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) or the JCS on surrender arrange-
ments, Truman ordered the military to arrange “to occupy the port
of Dairen and a port in Korea immediately following the surrender
of Japan if those ports have not at that time been taken over by Soviet
forces.”°8 With the negotiations in Moscow still stalled over the issue
56. There are accounts of this meeting in Truman, Year of Decision, pp. 427-
29; Stimson Diary, Aug. 10, 1945; Leahy Diary, Aug. 10, 1945; Diary of James
V. Forrestal, Aug. 10, 1945, Forrestal Papers, Princeton University, Princeton,
N.J. For a thorough analysis, see Barton J. Bernstein, “The Perils and Politics
of Surrender: Ending the War with Japan,” Pacific Historical Review, February
1977,
57. Truman, Year of Decision, pp. 431-32; Stimson Diary, Aug. 10, 1945;
Vorrestal Diary, Aug. 10, 1945.
58. Message, WARX 48004, Aug. 11, 1945, reproduced in JWPC 264/10,
“Examination of the Practicability of Concurrent Occupation of Tokyo, Dairen,
88 MARK PAUL
of Dairen, and Stalin threatening to allow the Chinese Communists
into Manchuria, the president decided, as he phrased it in his Memoirs,
“to counter Russian intransigence with action,””°9
Thus the United States joined the scramble for territory and politi-
cal advantage in Asia. With Japan’s defeat sealed, and in the absence of
any diplomatic agreements that allocated political influence, the
political outcome of the war in the vast areas of Asia still occupied
by Japanese forces remained in doubt. There was little question that,
in the short run at least, the outcome would be profoundly influenced
by which army accepted the Japanese surrender in a given area. Hence,
even though the end of the war was in sight, the battle raged on. In
Manchuria and Korea, the Russian armies plunged ahead; in China,
Chu Teh, commander of the Communist armies, announced to his
forces that they should demand the surrender of Japanese troops
wherever they encountered them. And in Washington, at the same time,
the SWNCC was meeting in a marathon session to draft the surrender
instrument and General Order No. 1, the document that assigned to
each Ally its zone of immediate military occupation,
General Order No. 1, drafted by SWNCC on August 10-12, ap-
proved by Truman on August 14, and issued by MacArthur on August
15, was the American effort to define, within the restraints imposed
by limited military resources, the political shape of Asia. Incorporating
as far as possible Truman’s desire to deny to the Soviets and Chinese
Communists important territorial objectives, the surrender plan al-
located to the United States and Chiang K’ai-shek’s regime responsibili-
ties far in excess of their immediate military capabilities. It specified
that Japanese commanders in China surrender only to Chiang K’ai-
shek’s government, in effect prolonging the war in the areas of North
and East China where the Communists were the only anti-Japanese
resistance. It gave to the Russians the responsibility of occupying
and Keijo, and Early Occupation of a North China Port,” JCS Records, CCS,
decimal file 386.2, Japan (4-9-45), sect. 4. The JCS had first discussed plans for
the rapid occupation of ports in Asia at a meeting on July 26. It was these plans
to which Harriman referred in his cable and that Truman ordered implemented.
See JCS minutes, “Examination of the Practicability. . . ,” July 26, 1945, in ibid,
Earlier plans prepared in the Pentagon had assigned the responsibility for occupying
Manchuria, including Dairen, to the Soviets; see JWPC 375/2 “Occupation of
Japan and Japanese-held Territories after Collapse or Defeat of Japan” (U.S.
Military Policies), June 28, 1945, RG 319, Records of the Army Staff, ABC,
decimal file 014, Japan (4-13-44), National Archives; and JWPC 264/6 “A Plan
for the U.S, Occupation of Strategic Positions in the Far East in the Event of a
Japanese Collapse or Surrender Prior to ‘Olympic’ or ‘Coronet,’” July 19, 1945,
JCS Records, GCS, decimal file $86.2, Japan (4-9-45), sect, 3
59, Truman, Year of Decision, p, 432,
89
DIPLOMACY DELAYED
Manchuria, though the American military was still under orders to take
Dairen if its troops could reach the city before the Soviets. To the
United States was reserved the sole duty of accepting the surrender of
i entous
Japan proper. And, in what would soon prove to be a moment
decision, it divided Korea at the thirty-eighth parallel, with Russian
forces to accept the surrender north of the line, American forces south
ol it.
The thirty-cighth parallel was chosen out of a desire to permit
\merican forces to occupy as much of Korea as possible, given the
relative positions of Soviet and American armies. Secretary of State
lsyrnes had asked SWNCC to draw the surrender line as far north as
practical, but the shortage of available troops and the long distance
letween Korea and the nearest U.S. forces made that task difficult.
‘The military view was that if our proposals for receiving the surrender
wreatly over-reached our probable military capabilities, there would
he little likelihood of Soviet acceptance—and speed was the essence
of the problem,” recalled Dean Rusk, then an officer on the War
\epartment general staff who participated in the long SWNCC delibera-
lions on August 10-11. Nevertheless, Rusk and a fellow staff officer,
Gol, C. H. Bonesteel III, recommended, and the SWNCC accepted,
(he thirty-eighth parallel as the dividing line even though they believed
ii was further north than American troops could reach should the
Soviets choose to disagree. ‘‘We did so because we felt it important to
include the capital of Korea in the area of responsibility of American
ivoops,” Rusk remembered.®! On August 14, the JCS approved this
division of Korea and passed General Order No, 1 on to the president
with the explanation that ‘the parallel 38° north has been selected in
Korea since this gives to U.S. forces the port and communications area
ol Keijo [Seoul] and a sufficient portion of Korea so that parts of it
night be apportioned to the Chinese and British in case some sort of
(juadripartite administration eventuates.”
60, General Order No, 1 is printed in FRUS, 1945, 6:658-59. Chu Teh’s order
iy reprinted in FRUS, 1945, 7:514-15. For reports from China with recommenda-
(ions that the United States help block the Chinese Communists, see Hurley to
iyrnes, Aug. 12, 1945, ibid., pp. 515-16; and Wedemeyer to Department of War,
\\iy, 12, 1945. JCS Records, CCS, decimal file 386.2, Japan, sect. 4.
61, Dean Rusk memo, July 12, 1950, FRUS, 1945, 6:1039; Benjamin Block
iy Gol, J. A. Frank, Apr, 30, 1947, U.S. Department of State, Department of
Stute Records, decimal file 740.0019, Control (Korea)/4-3047 for a similar ac-
rount, Block says that Secretary of the Navy Forrestal wrote Byrnes on August 11
‘ingesting that the thirty-eighth parallel be selected as the line dividing Russian
wil American zones in Asia, This was to permit an American occupation of Dairen,
| have been unable to locate this letter, +3
G2. Gen, A, J, MeFarland to SWNCC, Aug, 14, 1945, FRUS, 1945, 6:657-58,
90 MARK PAUL
In making these moves, American leaders did not even offer a show
of consulting with the Soviets: “The preceding months had shown us
that Stalin and his colleagues did not view matters in the same light
we did,’’ Truman wrote later in his Memoirs, and this difference of
opinion made discussions of surrender terms unnecessary. General
Order No. 1 was sent to the Soviets on August 15, at the same time
as it went out to Gen, Douglas MacArthur, giving the Russians the
Opportunity to suggest revisions only after the fact. Only the JCS
made any effort to have the Soviets apprised of American intentions
prior to the moving of American troops onto the Asian mainland.
They suggested that the president send a message to Stalin, explaining
that the American landings in Dairen, Seoul, and other Asian coastal
cities were only for the purpose of ending the fighting and preventing
sabotage of port facilities and would not affect the final peace settle-
ment.® Such a message, however, was never dispatched. Although
Truman made clear in his orders that he wished no military confronta-
tion with the Russians, he did not shrink from a political showdown
in Asia, a test that would determine if the Soviet Union was willing to
accommodate itself to the American conception for postwar Asia when
those goals were firmly and bluntly stated.
In the short run, Truman’s bold policy paid off. On August 14,
Stalin, backing away from his most extreme demands about the control
of the port at Dairen, signed a treaty with the Chinese. The Soviet
leader also approved the greater part of General Order No, 1—although
a sharp exchange ensued between Stalin and Truman over the American
refusal to grant the Russians a zone of occupation on Hokkaido. Thus
the United States had attained the greater part of its objectives in
Northeast Asia: Soviet support for Chiang K’ai-shek’s regime, Chinese
sovereignty over Manchuria, sole American control in Japan, and an
American foothold in Korea. The actions also proved to American
leaders the value of firmness in dealing with Moscow,.™
63, Truman, Year of Decision, p. 435. The suggestion from the JCS is the
enclosure of McFarland to SWNCC, FRUS, 1945, 7:660.
64. For the culmination of the Sino-Soviet negotiations, see Harriman to
Byrnes, (2) Aug. 14, 1945, FRUS, 1945, 7:971-74; the Treaty of Friendship and
Alliance between the Republic of China and the U.S.S.R. is printed, with its sub-
sidiary agreements, in U.S. Department of State, United States Relations with
China: With Special Reference to the Period 1944-1949 (Washington, D.C.: GPO,
1949), pp. 585-96. For the exchange between Stalin and Truman, see FRUS, 1945,
6:667-68, 670, 687-88, 692, 698-99. Harriman saw the benefits of firmness in
Harriman to Byrnes, Aug. 23, 1945, ibid., pp. 689-90. The effort to occupy Dairen
ceased when it became clear that Russian forces would arrive in the city ahead of
the Americans: JCS to Wedemeyer, Aug. 18, 1945, JCS Records, CCS, decimal file
386.2, Japan, sect, 4. Although Stalin had apparently approved the thirty-eighth
DIPLOMACY DELAYED 91
But if Truman’s policy paid dividends to the United States, it was
tragic for Korea. By Truman’s decision to postpone a Korean settle-
ment, the rushed attempt to occupy Seoul, and the division of the
country at the thirty-eighth parallel, Korea was thrust directly into the
developing cold war. Almost inevitably, Korea would have been a
scene of rivalry between the United States and Russia after the Second
World War, But it is easy to imagine that Korea might have been spared
at least part of the horror and bloodshed it was to suffer if its future
had been fully discussed before Japan surrendered. The atomic bomb
and American hubris prevented this. Korea thus emerged from the war
free at last of Japanese rule, but subordinate to two new masters who
brought with them no design for the relief of a liberated people nor
any plan for the reunification of the peninsula.
parallel as the dividing line in Korea, American officials feared the Russians would
not stop there. Hence, the rapid occupation of Seoul remained the second charge—
after the seizure of Tokyo—on American resources in the Pacific, See JCS to
Wedemeyer, MacArthur, and Nimitz, Aug. 24, 1945, JCS Records, CCS, decimal
file 383.21, Korea (3-19-45), sect. 1,
U.S. Decisions
on Korean Policy, 1943-1950:
Some Hypotheses
STEPHEN, PELZ
HARRY S. TRUMAN’S COSTLY DECISION TO ENTER THE KOREAN CIVIL WAR IN
1950 has drawn much scholarly attention and produced a variety of
contending interpretations. Historians have explained Truman’s deci-
sion as inspired by Wilsonian idealism, by realism in the face of Com-
munist aggression,! by overreaction to a crisis, and by cynical oppor-
The author wishes to acknowledge the aid and comments provided by the
following organizations and individuals: the Research Council of the University of
Massachusetts/Amherst; the National Fellows Program, Hoover Institution, Stan-
ford, California; the International Security Studies Program of the Woodrow Wilson
International Center for Scholars, Washington, D.C.; the East Asian Institute,
Columbia University; Michael Baron, Thomas Bernstein, Dorothy Borg, Ronald Car-
idi, Warren Cohen, Robert J. Donovan, Alexander George, Al Goldberg, Waldo Hein-
richs, Michael Hunt, Chong-sik Lee, James W. Morley, Andrew Nathan, Tom Paterson,
William Taubman, Nancy Tucker, Allen Whiting, Larry Weiss, and Marilyn Young.
|. James I. Matray, ‘‘An End to Indifference: America’s Korean Policy during
World War II1,’? Diplomatic History 2, no, 2 (Spring 1978):181-96; ibid., ‘“Tru-
man's Plan for Victory: National Self-Determination and the Thirty-Eighth Parallel
Decision in Korea,’ Journal of American History 66, no, 2 (September 1979):
414-533. John Spanier, The Truman-MacArthur Controversy and the Korean War
(Cambridge, Mass.: W, W. Norton, 1959), passim,
94 STEPHEN PELZ
tunism when presented with a chance to convince the American people
and Congress to rearm the United States and Western Europe.” The
following study differs from other historical accounts by concentrating
on the process of American decision making and by generating explana-
tions of some of the key decisions, using theories of decision making
and organization.
To explain the origins of this war, we must make some basic as-
sumptions about how wars begin. While its deeper causes lie in social,
ideological, and economic conflicts, the proximate causes of war lie in
the mismanagement of conflicts at the governmental level. In the
case of Korea, American leaders were free to decide whether or not
Korea was worth the risk of a war and, if they decided affirmatively,
to deter the North Koreans, Chinese, and Russians. To deter an ad-
versary, the decision makers must threaten to inflict greater losses
on an opponent than that opponent can hope to gain by attacking,
and they must make that threat credible. The United States, however,
never made a conclusive decision to hold Korea, nor did it make a
credible military threat against its adversaries there.?
Decision-making theory can help to explain this failure to apply
deterrence. A decision-making analyst asks questions that narrow the
problem to manageable size: Who were the key decision makers and
how did they picture the world? When did they make decisions that
closed out their options by committing them to certain kinds of action
or by dooming them to inaction? When they made these key decisions,
what did they perceive as the limits that their domestic and interna-
2. I’ve reconstructed Glenn Paige’s interpretation from a series of his publica-
tions in which his attitude toward the quality of Truman’s decision shifts drasti-
cally: The Korean Decision (June 24-30, 1950) (New York: Free Press, 1968);
“Comparative Case Analysis of Crisis Decisions: Korea and Cuba” in International
Crises: Insights from Behavioral Research, ed. Charles F, Hermann (New York: Free
Press, 1972), pp. 41-55; ‘‘On Values and Science: The Korean Decision Recon-
sidered,” American Political Science Review 71, no. 4 (December 1977): 1603-9;
the most recent historical analysis based on declassified documents supports the
main points of Paige’s account; see Barton J. Bernstein, ““The Week We Went to
War: American Intervention in the Korean Civil War,” Foreign Service Journal
54, no. 1 (January 1977):6-9, 33-35; and ibid., 54, no. 2 (February 1977):8-11,
33-34, Joyce and Gabriel Kolko, The Limits of Power: The World and United
States Foreign Policy, 1945-1954 (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), pp. 565-87.
3. For a clear definition of deterrence, see Y. Harkabi, cited in Patrick Morgan,
Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1977), p. 22, and
Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy:
Theory and Practice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), p. 60; George
and Smoke treat the case of Korea in 1950 as one in which deterrence was not
tried; see ibid., pp. 140-72.
DECISIONS ON KOREAN POLICY 95
tional environments placed on their choices? Did they gather informa-
tion on the problem and apply rational cost-benefit analysis, or did
they make important decisions routinely and rapidly, without asking
what costs their policy might entail ?*
Organizational theorists can also help explain why policy making
is muddled, for decisions often are made in unintegrated series, as the
pressure of events and the functioning of the governmental machine
push problems to the decision makers at the top. Setting goals, select-
ing diplomatic means, framing military and aid budgets, deciding
on which strategic plans to adopt and which weapons to produce all
take place at different times and with somewhat different personnel
involved. When there is an inadequate integrating mechanism at the
top, such a process often fails to produce a coordinated policy of
deterrence for a country with world-wide commitments.’ In such a
system, strong-minded bureaucratic leaders may pursue the interests
of their organization or their personal inclinations fairly freely, even
though such actions may overexpand diplomatic commitments while
undermining deterrent postures.®
The central decision makers in a great power often face a number
of important decisions each week, and they usually survey each prob-
lem rapidly, work out a policy incrementally different from the un-
satisfactory one, and hope that their new policy will preserve a mini-
mum of each of the values that are threatened by the failure of the old
policy. Herbert Simon labels this practice “‘satisficing,” since it com-
prises piecemeal decisions by extremely busy men who prefer to accept
the first generally satisfactory solution they can find, rather than make
a long search for an ideal policy.” A satisficing decision maker neither
investigates his values carefully, nor calculates the likely costs and
benefits of a range of policies, and consequently he often finds that
4. The fullest description of the decision-making method is Richard C. Snyder,
Il. W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin, eds., Foreign Policy Decision-Making: An a
proach to the Study of International Politics (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1962),
5. On the selection of goals and Strategies in large organizations, see Richard
M. Cyert and James G. March, A Behavioral Theory of the Firm (Englewood
Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963), pp. 16-19, 26-38, 114-27; on disjointed serial
decision making, see David Braybrooke and Charles E. Lindblom, A Strategy of
Decision: Policy Evaluation as a Social Process (New York: Free Press 1963)
pp. 99-102. 5
6. Two highly influential treatments of bureaucratic politics are Morton H
Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.: Sraslancs
Institution, 1974), and Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the
Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971), ;
7. Herbert Simon, Models of Man: Social and Rational (New York: Wiley
1957), pp. 2038-6, 246-53, :
’
96 STEPHEN PELZ
he has postponed trading one goal for another, and that his policy costs
too much for the benefits it promises. Satisficing decision makers get
into trouble by hoping for too much success at too little cost.
As satisficed decisions accumulate, diplomatic commitments grow.
At the outset decision makers may assume that they can reverse their
course if they run into trouble, but as their policy becomes public
they find themselves psychologically, politically, and diplomatically
committed to a particular line of action. The first decisions on a prob-
lem are often the most critical in establishing diplomatic goals, but
the decision makers must make them when the potential sources of
trouble are part of the future and therefore the eventual costs of the
policy are difficult to calculate. Consequently the decision makers
gradually increase their investment by marginal modification of their
policy, hoping to redeem their original commitment.®
A series of uncoordinated incremental decisions may combine with
unexpected shifts in the international environment to produce a crisis,
during which the pattern of satisficing decision making disappears.
Crisis decision making is a parody of rational process, in which a small
group of central decision makers face an overwhelming amount of
obscure information, oversimplify the problem, make false analogies
with the past, rapidly agree on a single option, and expel dissenters
from their ranks.? But such crises rarely spring out of thin air; they
arrive at the end of a series of decisions, for which the leaders are re-
sponsible and which give the adversary’s action supercharged meaning.
At different points on the road to war, then, different types of
decisions will occur—rational maximizing, satisficing, uncoordinated
incremental, and bureaucratic—and each of the key decisions closes
out some of the decision makers’ options, until they believe they have
no choice but to fight when challenged, even if no vital national interest
is at stake. Between 1943 and 1950 American leaders made no single,
well-calculated decision about the value of Korea to American security,
but rather they made a series of satisficed, incremental, disjointed,
and crisis decisions that effectively committed them to defend South
Korea, while undermining their ability to deter a North Korean at-
tack,!°
8. For an analogy to a car accident in which the process of simultaneous serial
decision by two parties leads to a collision, see Bruce M. Russett, “Cause, Surprise
and No Escape,”’ Journal of Politics 24 (February 1962):3-22.
9, The literature on misperception during crises is extensive. See, for example,
Charles F, Hermann, Crisis in Foreign Policy: A Simulation Analysis (Indianapolis:
Bobbs-Merrill, 1969) and Ole R, Holsti, Crisis, Escalation, War (Montreal: McGill-
Queens University Press, 1972),
10, Historical accounts that stress the inadvertent and slipshod nature of Ameri-
DECISIONS ON KOREAN POLICY a7
At the key decision points on the road to war, the behavior of their
adversaries certainly shaped the options available, and in some cases,
such as the June 1950 attack, narrowed the choices drastically, but
domestic factors also played a key role in producing the conflict in
Korea.
Roosevelt did not organize his White House staff and the State
Department to frame and implement an integrated foreign policy, for
he preferred to conduct foreign relations in what one observer has
called a “highly personal and shambolic manner.”!! Roosevelt was
his own geopolitician who secretly set goals and moved toward them
on an often obscure and zig-zag course. Between 1941 and 1945
Roosevelt paid little attention to the future of Korea, for he concen-
trated on directing military campaigns, marshaling public support for
the war, and maintaining the uneasy coalition against the Axis. Given
his wartime preoccupations and his decision-making style, he paid
little attention to the departmental committees that were supposedly
preparing peace terms, and he left the State Department out of many
of the major negotiations that shaped the peace.!2
Roosevelt’s Korean policy began aboard the U.S.S. Augusta in
Placentia Bay off Newfoundland in August 1941, when Roosevelt
met Churchill and drafted a statement of principles. Churchill and
Roosevelt promised self government for all peoples, including those
nations “forcibly deprived” of their sovereign rights. Six months later,
after the United States had entered World War II, Roosevelt implied
that this Anglo-American Atlantic charter applied to Korea, with its
“experience of enslavement” by the Japanese.!® The purpose of Roose-
velt’s idealistic statements was to convince the American people to
aid England, enter the war, and take a continuing part in international
relations; Korea was an afterthought, yet the president had promised
to make at least some effort to achieve its independence. The president
a a a a ee
can decisions are Soon Sung Cho, Korea in World Politics 1940-1950: An Evalua-
tion of American Responsibility (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of Califor-
nia Press, 1967) and John Lewis Gaddis, ‘“‘Korea in American Politics, Strategy, and
Diplomacy, 1945-1950,” in The Origins of the Cold War in Asia, ed. Yonosuke
Nagai and Akira Iriye (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), pp. 277-98.
11. Christopher Thorne, Allies of a Kind: The United States, Britain, and the
War against Japan (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), p. 715,
12. Robert Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932-
1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), p. 532; Wm. Roger Louis,
Imperialism at Bay, 1941-1945: The United States and the Decolonization of
the British Empire (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), pp. 87, 475-96,
13. Dallek, Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, pp. 281-84; Roosevelt
reaffirmed these principles in the Declaration of the United Nations in 1942, ibid,,
pp. 317-20; Matray, ‘End to Indifference,” p, 182,
98 STEPHEN PELZ
established a goal long before he had to consider the costs of carrying
it out.
Roosevelt’s underlying plan for the postwar world envisioned
drawing Britain and Russia into a condominium to police the world
through the United Nations, and in former colonial areas where the
interests of the great powers overlapped he proposed to establish
multipower trusteeships, which would prepare the colonial peoples
for self government, while providing forums for continued great power
cooperation. According to Robert Dallek, he was ‘‘less concerned with
the details of these postwar arrangements than with their impact on
attitudes at home and abroad.’’!* Chiang K’ai-shek had been maneuver-
ing to insure a friendly regime in postwar Korea by subsidizing the
exiled Korean Provisional Government of Kim Ku, and Roosevelt be-
lieved that a Korean trusteeship involving China, Russia, the United
States, and Great Britain would head off future Sino-Russian friction in
the peninsula. Trusteeship was a satisficing device. It would have to
be worked out slowly, thereby postponing the explosive issue of
postwar boundaries until after the war had been won; it promised
independence, which encouraged anti-Japanese resistance in the oc-
cupied countries and approval from the Americah people; and it prom-
ised a stable postwar world by providing forums for the resolution
of great power disputes in areas where spheres of influence overlapped.
Roosevelt discussed his proposals during his meetings with Stalin
in 1943, but only briefly and casually. The president went to Cairo and
Tehran mainly to keep the Chinese in the war against Japan and to
secure eventual Russian entry into the Far Eastern war, and not to
arrange a postwar settlement. Throughout 1943 Chiang K’ai-shek had
been castigating the Americans for breaking their promises of increased
aid, and the Chinese leaders warned repeatedly that they might leave
the war. Since Roosevelt had little war material to give the Chinese,
he decided to encourage Chiang by treating China formally as an
equal and by offering to return Manchuria and Formosa (Taiwan)
to the Chinese after the war.!® Having raised the issue of the disposal
of the Japanese Empire, he then had to deal with Korea as well. In
the Cairo declaration he and Chiang promised that “in due course
Korea shall become free and independent.” Before the Cairo conference
Roosevelt had only discussed the Far Eastern settlement briefly with
his diplomatic advisers, and during the conference Harry Hopkins
hastily drafted the declaration without further consultation with
14, Dallek, Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, p. 343.
15, Matray, “End to Indifference,’’ pp, 183-86,
16, Dallek, Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, pp, 382-99, 425-30,
DECISIONS ON KOREAN POLICY S9
Washington.!’ The Cairo declaration publicly committed the United
States to make an effort to build a “free and independent” Korea in
the postwar period.
Stalin was reluctant to discuss entering the East Asian war, since he
wanted to avoid giving the Japanese an excuse to attack him before the
war against Germany was over, and consequently he kept discussions
of East Asia on an informal basis. In any case the future of Korea
ranked near the bottom of his list of priorities. During his wartime
conferences with Churchill and Roosevelt, Stalin persistently pressed
for an early commitment of Anglo-American forces in Europe, a
weakened postwar Germany, a buffer zone in Eastern Europe, and as-
surances against a separate peace by the western powers. At the Tehran
meeting, Stalin privately endorsed Roosevelt’s idea of a trusteeship
for Korea.!8 1944 was an election year and trusteeship served Roose-
velt’s political needs as well as his international plans, for he was
wooing the independents and old progressives to whom Wendell Willkie
had appealed in 1940. In 1943 Willkie published a best-seller titled
One World, in which he called for “the orderly but scheduled abolition
of the colonial system.’’!9
Roosevelt set the fundamental direction of his Korean policy quite
early, and his motives for choosing trusteeship were mixed, to say the
least. He hoped (1) to encourage the Chinese and the Russians to
fight the Japanese; (2) to inspire his fellow citizens to bear the burden
of world leadership; (3) to win over Willkie’s “cone worlders”; (4) to
establish a stable system in postwar Northeast Asia; (5) to acquire
bases for the policing powers; and (6) to lead the Koreans toward
good government and independence. Some of his goals conflicted,
for Chiang and Stalin made unlikely trusteeship partners, and a long
trusteeship contradicted the ideal of national independence.
Roosevelt committed himself to his Korean policy without inves-
tigating its chances for success. The Americans, Russians, Chinese,
and English had not worked together easily against the Axis, and
the chances of setting up a harmonious joint administration of Korea
were slight indeed, especially in the absence of a common enemy. In
any case, most Korean politicians favored independence, rather than
17, Herbert Feis, Churchill Roosevelt Stalin: The War They Waged and the
Peace They Sought (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), pp. 251-52;
Roosevelt did not take a State Department representative to Gairo and planners
for the Korean trusteeship were surprised by the announcement; see Louis, Im-
perialism at Bay, pp, 70, 275-83,
18. Feis, Churchill Roosevelt Stalin, pp. 246-79; Bruce Cumings, The Origins of
the Korean War: Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes 1945-1947
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), p. 109,
19, Louis, Jmperialivm at Bay, Pp. B; Dallek, Roosevelt and American Foreign
100 STEPHEN PELZ
trusteeship, which made easy implementation of his program doubtful.
Nor did Roosevelt try to win over the Korean exiles through the OSS,
even though the State Department warned in 1944 that the Russians
were training 35,000 Koreans for postwar duties. Roosevelt also paid
little attention to plans for implementing his Korean trusteeship. Staff
work occurred intermittently in the lower and middle levels of the
State Department in February 1942, September 1943, and in the early
spring of 1944, but by the spring of 1945 the planners had still not
proposed the precise structure of the trusteeship authority, nor had
they decided how long trusteeship should last.?°
When Roosevelt met Stalin at Yalta in early 1945 to arrange for
Russian entry into the Far Eastern war, he again treated the subject
of Korea perfunctorily. The two decision makers discussed the Russian
proposals for an East Asian settlement ‘tin a few brief patches of
private talk . . . ’’ and Roosevelt endorsed Stalin’s terms. Russia would
continue to maintain a Soviet-controlled regime in Outer Mongolia,
while acquiring major railroads and ports in Manchuria, as well as
South Sakhalin and the Kuriles. In return Stalin promised to support
a coalition government in China led by Chiang. The American and
Russian military staffs also agreed that Russia would invade Manchuria,
while the Americans would strike directly at Japan. They left North
China and Korea in limbo, since they all expected the Japanese to
conduct a fighting retreat in Manchuria and Kyishi, and consequently
there seemed no need to draw occupation boundaries for the American
and Russian forces, which would be separated by hundreds of miles
and several determined Japanese armies”!
In retrospect, Roosevelt’s decision to stick with trusteeship for
Korea at a time when he was retreating from a similar arrangement
for Indochina seems unfortunate, for he might well have left Korea
in the Soviet occupation sphere, thereby avoiding troubles such as he
was having over the makeup of the Polish government. The costs of
his satisficing at Yalta, however, were greater than he could have
imagined, for he did not live to oversee the denouement of his Korean
proposal.
After Roosevelt’s death in April 1945 Truman inherited Roosevelt’s
Policy, pp. 482-84.
20. Matray, ‘End to Indifference,” pp. 182, 188, 191; for Kim Il-sung’s ex-
perience in the Soviet Union, see Robert A, Scalapino and Chong-sik Lee, Com-
munism in Korea, Part I: The Movement (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of
California Press, 1972), pp. 223-30; for Soviet training of large numbers of Soviet-
Koreans as a future liberating force, see Joungwon Alexander Kim, Divided Korea:
The Politics of Development, 1945-1972 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1975), pp. 86-87; Cho, Korea in World Politics, pp. 30-31,
21, Peis, Churchill Roosevelt Stalin, pp, 511-18,
DECISIONS ON KOREAN POLICY 101
Korean policy, but the new president’s personality and decision-making
style doomed him to continue stumbling ever deeper into Korea,
Truman’s limited education and his lack of experience in foreign
affairs made him fear that he was unqualified to be president (an
opinion at least one major columnist shared), and he was therefore
frequently timorous when facing important problems.”* To compensate
for his own weaknesses he indulged in bravado and tried to find good
men to whom he could delegate responsibility. In turn he expected
that his trusted lieutenants would bring him the facts on a problem
and recommend a solution to it; if he thought the solution correct,
he would let them proceed and support them against their critics,
as long as they kept him informed and paid the proper deference to
him and his office.
The new president tended to make diplomatic, military, and budget
decisions separately, usually face to face with the official involved, and
unlike Roosevelt, he reacted to events day to day, rather than pursue
long-term goals. When he found that his uncoordinated satisficing
painted him into a corner, he would lash out, blaming subordinates for
his own troubles. Resignations and firings were frequent in the Truman
years. He also was quite deferential to the anti-Soviet patricians who
increasingly staffed the national security establishment, like Averell
Harriman and Dean Acheson, for their anticommunism resonated with
the president’s own suspicions of the Russians.
Truman followed Roosevelt’s example by trying to be his own chief
of staff in foreign affairs, for he did not designate a single national
security adviser in the small White House staff to coordinate diplo-
matic, military, and budgetary affairs. But the tasks of the modern
presidency were too large for him to be able to play the role himself.
Staff meetings, consultations on patronage and legislative strategy,
and ceremonies consumed many mornings and part of most afternoons;
meetings with the cabinet and national security council, speech revi-
sion, travel, speechmaking, and press conferences consumed many
afternoons, and exercise and poker took up leisure hours. His only
time for reflection was in the early morning, when he read the news-
papers, and in the late evening, when he read memoranda.*? On June
16, 1950, he wrote to his cousin:
22. Truman’s insecurities and low self-esteem appear frequently in his personal
papers; see Robert H. Ferrell, ed., Off the Record: The Private Papers of Harry
S. Truman (New York: Harper & Row, 1980), pp. 75-76, 114-15, 135, 158; for
one syndicated columnist’s contemporary opinion of ‘Truman, see Ronald Steel,
Walter Lippman and the American Century (Boston; Little, Brown, 1980), pp.
433-39, 454-55,
25. For Truman's administrative practices, see the admiring, though revealing
102 STEPHEN PELZ
This letter was started at 9:15 this morning and I’ve been adding to it in sec-
tions. I’ve had a cabinet meeting—an important one, seen a thousand people in
groups, made four speeches and have had a dozen individual appointments with
Congressmen & Cabinet members—and oh yes, I’ve vetoed a controversial bill,
signed forty others, made a dozen criminals honest men by signing full pardons for
them and now I only have to read a dozen or so documents and start about that
many orders to various people on their way, get this letter off to you, one to Mary
Jane and one to “Lizzie.’” How would you like to be President?“*
Nor could his cabinet officers provide the coordination necessary.
None of Truman’s secretaries of state stayed long in the job before
1949, and Truman was reorganizing the Department of Defense be-
tween 1947 and 1949. Worse still, in 1948-49 Secretary of Defense
Forrestal suffered a nervous breakdown, and _ his replacement, the
abrasive Louis Johnson, was barely speaking to Secretary of State
Dean Acheson by early 1950.*° The National Security Council was
supposed to meld proposed military and foreign policies into integrated
national security advice, but the organization was new and its leaders
no match for johnson or Acheson, The council also lacked control
of the national security budget process, and therefore had little leverage
over plans and programs. Even more damaging to the NSC was presi-
dential neglect, for Truman neither attended NSC meetings regularly
nor paid much attention to its recommendations.”©
Between the Yalta Conference in February 1945 and the Potsdam
Conference in July, American attitudes on postwar territorial questions
stiffened. Truman believed that much of the friction with Russia
stemmed from conflicting interpretations of the Yalta agreements,
and he was determined to carry out Roosevelt’s policies and keep
Stalin from twisting the agreements to Russia’s advantage. As he put
it, “I told ‘em U.S, had ceased to give away its assets without returns.”
Until the last days of 1945 he continued to hope that his strong stand
a eee
treatments in Francis H. Heller, ed., The Truman White House: The Administration
of the Presidency 1945-1953 (Lawrence, Kans.: University of Kansas Press, 1980),
passim; for a balanced view of Truman’s administrative style, see Alexander L.
George, Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of
Information and Advice (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1980), pp. 150-52; on Tru-
man’s susceptibility to anti-Communist advice, see Daniel Yergin, Shattered Peace:
The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin, 1978), pp. 69-86.
24. Ferrell, Off the Record, p. 183.
25. Heller, Truman White House, p. 12;
26. Ibid., pp. 205-11; Mark M. Lowenthal, ‘‘The National Security Council:
Organizational History,’ Gongressional Research Service, Library of Congress,
pp. 14-16,
DECISIONS ON KOREAN POLICY 103
on a series of diplomatic issues and the American monopoly of atomic
bombs would succeed in securing Russian cooperation.2’
Truman’s all-or-nothing approach to relations with the Russians
was too simple to be effective, for Stalin maintained a mixed policy
toward the West between 1945 and 1947. In the long run the Russian
dictator expected that economic crises would drive the western nations
into internecine wars for world markets, but in the short run he feared
that the Soviet Union was in danger, due to the damage it had suffered
during the war. He was afraid that the western powers would incor-
porate western Germany and Japan into their spheres and once again
attack the Soviet Union, and consequently as a minimum goal he
sought buffer zones in key areas along the Soviet borders, though he
would have been happy to control postwar Germany and part of
Japan as well. The advance of the Anglo-American armies prevented
him from taking Germany, and he settled for Eastern Europe, while
refraining from ordering immediate revolts in France, Italy, China,
and the Third World. In the short term, then, he sought an understand-
ing on spheres of influence with Truman and a continuing entente
with the West that would produce loans and reparations to rebuild
the USSR.
Through negotiation, Stalin sought a weak Germany and Japan,
and through direct intervention he established puppet regimes in
Poland, Bulgaria, and Romania within his sphere of interest. Through
intimidation he sought further buffers in northern Iran and at the
Dardanelles, but in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Italy, and France he
encouraged local Communists to cooperate in coalition governments,
and Korea was a candidate for neutralization as well. In Korea Stalin
remained open to a coalition between the local Communists and the
so-called bourgeois democrats well into 1946.28
Truman, however, wanted to carry out Roosevelt’s trusteeship
plan for Korea, which would require the powers to prepare the Koreans
to select their own government through free elections. In May 1945
the president sent Harry Hopkins, one of Roosevelt’s special envoys,
27. On Truman’s hopes and fears about dealing with the Russians, see John
Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War 1941-1947
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), pp. 198-200, 230-33, 243, and
Yergin, Shattered Peace, pp. 69-86; the quotation is from Ferrell, Off the Record,
p. 55.
28. Fora recent account of Stalin's aims, see William Taubman, Stalin’s A meri-
can Policy: From Entente to Detente to Cold War (New York: W. W. Norton,
1982), pp. 38-41, 73-139, 151-54; see also Adam B. Ulam, Expansion and Co
existence: The History of Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-1967 (New York: Praeger,
1968), pp. 398-410,
104 STEPHEN PELZ
to discuss Russo-American relations with Stalin, and the president
assured Hopkins that he ‘‘could use diplomatic language or a baseball
bat’” to persuade the Russians to honor their commitments. At this
time Truman and Hopkins were primarily concerned with convincing
Stalin to admit non-Communist Poles into the Warsaw government,
to support Chiang in China, and to solve an imbroglio over the new
United Nations, and consequently Hopkins, who was dying from
cancer, concentrated on these goals and ignored his instructions from
the State Department to negotiate a detailed trusteeship arrangement
for Korea. In a brief part of their conversations, Hopkins and Stalin
simply reaffirmed that Korea would have a trusteeship.”
When Truman met Stalin at Potsdam in July, he remained deter-
mined to insist that the Russian ruler carry out the Yalta agreements
as the Americans understood them. During the negotiations, James F.
Byrnes, the new secretary of state, succeeded in securing Russian
participation in the Far Eastern war, but he had to work hard for
compromise solutions on questions of reparations, European peace
treaties, and Poland’s borders. In the end the summit talks did not
break down, but the diplomats had to agree to postpone a number of
other issues, such as the future of the Dardanelles and trusteeships
in North Africa and Korea, The foreign ministers’ conference, to
which these issues were transferred, met in September and led to the
feared deadlock on the peace treaties. Consequently nothing was
settled.°?
In mid-August Japan’s sudden surrender caught the decision makers
by surprise and forced them to face the issue of Korea, Truman arrived
in the capitol from Potsdam on August 9 and found himself immersed
in a “dizzy whirl” of activity caused by Japan’s surrender, “.. . I had to
issue orders so fast that several mistakes were made and then other
orders had to be issued,” As the Japanese collapsed, Russian forces
moved into Korea, and State Department officials, who had been
charged with planning for trusteeship, suggested sending American
29. Gaddis, U.S. and Origins of the Cold War, pp. 213-14, 220, 229, 232-36.
30. For the Potsdam and London conferences, see Yergin, Shattered Peace,
pp- 109-32; James I. Matray argues that at Potsdam Truman decided to scrap
trusteeship and use the newly tested atomic bomb to force a Japanese surrender
before the Russians could move into Korea, but there is no direct evidence that
such was the purpose of Truman or Byrnes though both were bolstered by the
news of the bomb; the American decision makers pursued a Korean trusteeship,
though without much fervor, in May, October, and December, 1945, and therefore
it is likely that Korea simply got lost in the shuffle at the summit in July; for
Matray’s argument, see “Captive of the Cold War: The Decision to Divide Korea
at the 38th Parallel,” Pacific Historical Review 50, no. 2 (May 1981); 145-68.
DECISIONS ON KOREAN POLICY 105
troops to occupy that country as far north as possible to gain leverage
for trusteeship negotiations. American military leaders opposed stretch-
ing the American occupation zone beyond japan to the very limits
of their logistic capacity, but the diplomats won the day in a hasty
series of interdepartmental meetings. The Americans asked that their
occupation zone reach to the thirty-eighth parallel, and the Russians
agreed,
Of all the steps that led to the American involvement in Korea, the
dispatch of American troops was the most important, for it signified
that Truman was committed to carry out past pledges of support for
an independent Korea. In part the decision was automatic, since Roose-
velt’s policy for Korea was trusteeship and Truman was determined
to carry out Roosevelt’s policy to the letter to demonstrate his reliabil-
ity and toughness to Stalin, but in part it was also a crisis decision
brought about by the Japanese collapse, and as a result Truman and
his advisers failed to consider other plausible alternatives.?! Each side
might have agreed to send in token forces to take the Japanese sur-
render and then to leave the peninsula with the understanding that
the Koreans would establish a neutral regime. Or Truman might have
followed military advice and allowed the Russians to assume the
occupation duties for the four trustees in Korea, while the United
States occupied Japan and administered it for the Allies. Instead
U.S. troops went to Korea.
In the calmer postwar days of 1945, the American decision
makers might have realized that their occupation forces were over-
extended, particularly since demobilization was proceeding rapidly,
For a variety of reasons, however, Truman continued from day to
day in the fall of 1945 without reconsidering his foreign policy.
Truman and Byrnes still hoped to tame the Russians by trading re-
construction loans and atomic information for concessions on Eastern
Europe and Germany, and during the bargaining it was important to
31. Ferrell, Off the Record, p. 62; Bruce Cumings argues that Truman sent
American troops to Korea in August to hold at least the southern part of the
peninsula for an American sphere of influence, and he attributes this decision
to the increased influence of anti-Soviet State Department bureaucrats and poli-
tical advisers. See Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, pp. 111-31; there is
little evidence that Truman or Byrnes considered Korea vital to the security of
Northeast Asia or of the United States, and Truman probably was implementing
established policy, American troops on the ground would help secure Stalin’s
cooperation in establishing a trusteeship and decisive American action
in Korea would help to convince Stalin that the Americans have to be reckoned with
in negotiations on Lastern Europe, Germany, and China,
106 STEPHEN PELZ
maintain a firm diplomatic stance around the world.** The daily press
of events also distracted and exhausted the new president, for the fall
of 1945 was an extremely busy time. The abrupt end of the war forced
Truman and his unprepared staff to make many detailed policy deci-
sions on demobilization and on the easing of wartime economic con-
trols, in addition to producing a domestic program to replace the New
Deal. Between September 1945 and January 1946, Truman proposed
a new economic stabilization program, held a National Labor-Manage-
ment conference, introduced a program for the peacetime control and
development of atomic energy, asked Congress for a national health
insurance program, sought legislation to unify the defense departments,
and held a summit conference with Prime Minister Attlee of Great
Britain, Too rapid decontrol of prices led to increased inflation, while
strikes broke out across the country, forcing White House mediation
in the most serious cases.°?
Truman was occasionally overwhelmed by the pressure, and he
complained repeatedly that he had not asked to be president, jokingly
adding that what he really should have been in life was a piano player
in a whorehouse. Harold D. Smith, the director of the Bureau of the
Budget and a man Roosevelt had brought in to improve the organiza-
tion of the White House, at first hoped that Truman would improve
the management of the operation, but he found the new president
even less orderly than Roosevelt. Worse still, Smith thought, Truman
was often unready to face issues because of inadequate staff work.
Preparations for important diplomatic meetings, such as the one with
Attlee, were ‘‘completely unorganized” and “‘irregular,” another
observer noted. “‘All the top men ... are trying to do too much...”
confessed Charlie Ross, Truman’s press secretary. On October 13, 1945,
Truman himself complained that ‘“‘The pressure here is becoming so
great I can hardly get my meals in.” Secretary of State Byrnes’s style
compounded the difficulty, for he operated alone, traveling the diplo-
matic circuit and considering high policy with a few aides, while allow-
ing the White House and his subordinates in the bureaucracy to handle
other matters, ranging from summitry to routine matters of imple-
mentation, such as Korean occupation policy.”
A clumsy arrangement for administering occupied Korea com-
32. Patricia Dawson Ward, The Threat of Peace: James F. Byrnes and the
Council of Foreign Ministers, 1945-1946 (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press,
1979), pp. 18-22; Gaddis, U.S. and Origins of the Cold War, pp. 244-76.
33, Robert J, Donovan, Conflict and Crisis: The Presidency of Harry $8. Tru-
man, 1945-1948 (New York: W. W, Norton, 1977), pp. 119-84,
34, [bid., pp. 119, 135-36, 145,
55, Ward, The Threat of Peace, pp. ix, 18-20,
DECISIONS ON KOREAN POLICY 107
pounded the difficulty of recognizing the growing problems on the
peninsula. The State Department set occupation policy while the
Department of the Army carried it out through a chain of command
that stretched from the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) in Washington
through MacArthur’s viceregal headquarters in Tokyo to Seoul. The
State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee of upper level officials con-
cerned themselves with Korea only occasionally. As a result the State
Department continued to press a reluctant John R. Hodge, the com-
manding general of the American military government in Korea, to
work for a four-power trusteeship and to resist the demands of the
Koreans that they become independent forthwith.2° MacArthur gave
Hodge wide latitude and sympathized with Hodge’s resentment of
State Department meddling, and consequently Hodge felt free to
undercut the goal of trusteeship. In part Hodge did so because his
personal ideology made him deeply suspicious of cooperating with
the Russians and the Korean Left.9? More important was his belief
he needed the South Korean Right to help run his occupation adminis-
tration in the face of nationalist demands for immediate independence.
And since his orders were broad and infrequent, he continued to
operate under standard army procedure, which let field generals enjoy
tactical flexibility while carrying out broad strategic mandates.
In August 1945 the War Department ordered Hodge to go to
Korea, remove Japanese imperialism, maintain order, and prepare
the Koreans for eventual self government, but it did not give him
enough troops or military government personnel to run the occupation
zone in the face of a resentful population. Consequently Hodge had
to choose between working through the provincial governments,
police, and courts staffed by Koreans left over from the Japanese
colonial period, or through the Korean Peoples’ Republic (KPR),
a coalition of anti-Japanese Koreans who had established governmental
committees and armed forces in most provinces throughout the pen-
insula. Hodge chose to work with the former Japanese collaborators,
rather than the KPR leaders who wanted immediate independence
and acted as if they comprised the legitimate government. Worse still,
in Hodge’s eyes, was the presence of Communists in some of the
KPR’s key positions. By December Hodge had established a South
Korean government and an embryonic military constabulary to help
him maintain order and suppress the KPR government committees
in the provinces and cities of the south.*8 Hodge’s decision saddled
36. Cho, Korea in World Politics, pp. 110-11.
37. Cumings, Origins of the Korean War, pp. 122-29, 135-51.
38. Ibid., pp. 151-213; Cumings stresses the Americans’ ideological sympathies
108 STEPHEN PELZ
him with a sizable group of collaborators whose future would be
grim if the more nationalistic KPR won out.
While Hodge went his own way in Korea, Byrnes pursued an agree-
ment with the Soviet Union, and at the Moscow foreign ministers’
conference in December 1945 he was able to strike deals on a variety
of issues, including Korea, The Americans and the Soviets agreed that
a joint commission of their occupation officers in Korea would unify
the country economically, establish a provisional government, and
administer a trusteeship for five years. At this point there was still a
chance for a neutralist solution in Korea, as there was in Czechoslovakia
and Hungary, since elements were available in Korea for a diverse
domestic coalition. In North Korea Cho Man-sik, a Christian moderate,
had established his own party and was calling for independence, while
in the South the independent Syngman Rhee and Kim Ku, the head
of the wartime exile government in Chungking, were building substan-
tial followings? The KPR political committees in the capital and
the provinces had attracted numerous Koreans of all political persua-
sions“? while divisions among the Communists permitted hope that the
parties of the Left would not act as a bloc. The Communists split
among Soviet Koreans (many of whom held dual membership in the
Communist party of the Soviet Union and the KCP); the pro-Soviet
Kapsan group of former guerrillas led by Kim Il-sung; the Yenan
group of Koreans whose training had been in China, and the domestic
Korean party members who were even less susceptible to discipline
than the Kapsan and Yenan groups."
If Truman had not concluded that Korea was a test case, and if
Hodge had not already sided with the collaborationist Right in South
Korea, there would have been a chance for the Americans and the
Russians to create what Stalin would term a bourgeois-democratic
government. The two great powers might then have rapidly turned
over to this new regime the responsibility for elections, withdrawn
their troops, and neutralized the country. Political tides were running
against such a solution, however. When the news of the Moscow agree-
ment reached Seoul, pro-independence strikes and demonstrations
broke out, making Hodge’s job difficult. Gen. Archer L. Lerch, Hodge’s
aide, sought to undercut Korean anger by publicly blaming the Soviets
ee ee ee ee
with the Korean Right, but it is difficult to see how Hodge could have carried out
his orders by cooperating with nationalistic leftists and centrists, who wanted
immediate independence,
459, Cho, Korea in World Politics, pp. 83-86.
40, Cummings, Origins of the Korean War, pp. 68-91, 267-89.
41, lpyong J. Kin, Communist Politics in North Korea (New York: Praeger,
1975), pp, G7,
DECISIONS ON KOREAN POLICY 109
for the trusteeship, and the Russians revealed that the Americans were
the party that had insisted on trusteeship all along. Hodge then com-
pounded the imbroglio by threatening to resign, and Truman decided
to let Hodge control the joint commission negotiations.”
By early 1946, when Hodge threatened to resign, Truman was
moving toward a policy of containing Stalin, rather than cooperating
with him, Charges were beginning to mount that Truman’s State
Department was soft on communism. In November 1945, Patrick J.
Hurley, Truman’s mediator in the Chinese civil war, accused the State
Department of favoring Mao’s forces over Chiang’s nationalists in
China, and Truman decided to back Chiang.4? In December 1945
and in early 1946 Arthur H. Vandenberg and other leading Republicans
compounded Truman’s difficulties by accusing Byrnes of appease-
ment* —a charge that threatened to disrupt the Democrats’ political
coalition, Truman had offended labor leaders by opposing wage in-
creases, and he was in danger of losing large chunks of the ethnic labor
vote in such swing states as Vandenberg’s Michigan if he appeared
soft on issues such as atomic energy and Poland, In January 1946 the
Republican congressional leadership opened the campaign year by
denouncing ‘‘any betrayal of the small nations in the making of the
peace.”” And on February 27, 1946, Senator Vandenberg proclaimed
that Truman should draw a line beyond which he would not com-
promise.” In early January Truman decided to repudiate Byrnes’s
Moscow settlement, for he believed that he had to threaten Russia
“with an iron fist and strong language’’ to prevent another war. And he
concluded, ‘“‘We should maintain complete control of Japan and the
Pacific. We should rehabilitate China and create a strong central gov-
ernment there. We should do the same for Korea.”*6
Stalin grew tired of waiting for an American loan and for a concilia-
tory policy on Eastern Europe and the Far East. In the latter area he
had accepted American domination of Japan, Chiang’s control of
China, and a trusteeship for Korea, only to be denounced by Lerch
for forcing trusteeship on the Korean people, and he complained
personally to Harriman about Lerch’s behavior.*” On February 9 he
made a major speech declaring that war and capitalism were linked
42. Cho, Korea in World Politics, pp. 105-23; Foreign Relations of the United
States (heareafter cited as FRUS) 1946, vol. 8, The Far East (Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1971), pp. 617-19.
43. Donovan, Conflict and Crisis, pp. 149-52.
44, Ward, The Threat of Peace, pp. 79-80.
45, Gaddis, U.S. and Origins of the Cold War, pp. 290-96.
46, Ferrell, Off the Record, p. 80.
47, FRUS, 1946, 8:622.
110 STEPHEN PELZ
inextricably and that the Soviet Union had to mobilize its economy.
Truman reciprocated Stalin’s suspicions. On February 22, George
Kennan’s long telegram calling for containment arrived on Truman’s
desk and through February telegrams came in describing the breakdown
of the U.S.-USSR negotiations in Korea and difficulties in Iran. On
February 25, Eben Ayers recorded in his diary that ‘“The President
pulled a number of telegrams... out of the holder on his desk...
with a comment that we were going to war with Russia or words
to that effect. He said that the situation looks bad and said there
are two fronts, one Korea.’”*® In the end Truman gave Hodge latitude
to insist that only the Korean Right be consulted in establishing an
interim government for all Korea, while Stalin insisted that the Right
and center be excluded, and only the protrusteeship Left, which
followed Moscow’s line, be consulted.*? The superpowers had helped
to polarize the Korean political scene, and the Americans began pre-
paring in earnest to establish a separate regime in the south, Truman’s
attempt to carry out Roosevelt’s trusteeship policy in August led to a
commitment to a South Korea led by the Right in December.
For a year after the spring 1946 deadlock in the joint commission
the Americans continued to maintain their occupation troops in Korea,
while working for a diplomatic solution that would favor anti-Com-
munist Koreans, but they had no success. By the fall of 1947, however,
a variety of factors led them to begin the fatal process of withdrawing
from South Korea, while maintaining a primarily verbal commitment
to a UN-sponsored South Korean government. Due to severe economic
and political crises in Western Europe and the Middle East in 1947,
Truman and Marshall decided to increase economic and military aid
for the Atlantic and Mediterranean areas, just at the time when the
Republican congress was insisting that Truman cut the budget.2° Funds
were not available to continue an expensive occupation, and, in any
case, there were not enough troops left in South Korea to deal with
strikes and demonstrations, if the proindependence forces decided on
a nationwide campaign. Robert Patterson, the secretary of war, told
Truman that the troops should be redeployed to Europe, while the
State Department warned that withdrawal from Korea would lead to
a Communist takeover and a severe blow to American prestige in Asia.>!
48. Diary of Eben A. Ayers, Feb, 25, 1946, Eben A. Ayers Papers, Truman
Library, Independence, Mo.
49. Gumings, Origins of the Korean War, pp. 227-52.
50. Gaddis, ‘Korea in American Politics,’ pp. 278-83.
51. Ibid,; William Whitney Stueck, Jr., The Road to Confrontation: American
Policy toward China and Korea, 1947-1950 (Chapel Will, N.C.: University of
North Carolina Press, 1981), p. LOL,
DECISIONS ON KOREAN POLICY 111
The result of the clash between the two bureaucracies was a satis-
ficed policy negotiated under the auspices of the new National Security
Council. The decision makers agreed to turn the Korean problem over
to the UN, a move that would allow the United States to withdraw
its troops and minimize the bad effects if South Korea fell.°? In May
1948 the UN held an election in the South, and a National Assembly
convened the same month. The Americans hoped to protect the new
republic with words and limited aid, but not deeds—a policy of bluff.
In April 1948 the State and Defense Departments persuaded the
president to ratify another bureaucratic compromise in NSC 8/2.
The Americans would try to redeem their commitment to South Korea
by providing enough military aid to enable the South to defend itself
against domestic insurrection and border raids, thereby allowing
eventual withdrawal of American occupation troops, but they would
undertake no commitment to defend South Korea in the future, for
there were not enough troops to go around. In staff studies for the
JCS, however, the planners admitted that a North Korean invasion
could overwhelm the South’s forces that would be set up under the
aid program, In case of a full-fledged attack, Gen. Omar N. Bradley
expected that the United States would appeal to the United Nations
Security Council,>* but Acheson told the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations that while the United States “would take every possible
action in the U.N. [,] I do not believe that we would undertake to
resist. . . by military force.” He explained that “probably [U.N.
action] would not be taken because they [the Russians] would veto
172%
Publicly Acheson declared that the South Koreans could rely on the
UN (and therefore the United States) to aid them; privately the Amer-
icans agreed that they would not allow themselves to be drawn into
a war to save the South Koreans. But in June 1950, they reversed
this private resolve. There were a variety of reasons for this rever-
sal—reasons others have explored in great detail. First, the history
of U.S.-South Korean relations left the Americans with a commitment
to uphold the UN-sponsored government in Seoul and if Truman had
52. Gaddis, “Korea in American Politics,’ pp. 282-83.
53. Stueck, Road to Confrontation, pp. 84-102.
54, FRUS, 1947, 7:944-78; ‘‘The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The
Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy,” mimeographed, Modern Military Branch,
National Archives, Washington, D.C., vol. 3, James F. Schnabel and Robert J. Wat-
son, “The Korean War,” part 1 (n.d.), pp. 25-26.
55, U.S. Gongress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings Held in
Lixecutive Session, Reviews of the World Situation: 1949-1950, 81st Cong., Ist and
2nd sess., p. 191.
112 STEPHEN PELZ
deserted the UN and the elected government of South Korea while
they were under fire he would have damaged the international cred-
ibility of the United States and invited further aggression. This ra-
tional calculus is insufficient to explain Truman’s decision fully, how-
ever, for intervention in Korea forced Truman to assume grave military
risks in Europe—risks that deeply concerned the western European
states and far outweighed the potential damage in Korea. At the out-
set of the Korean hostilities the JCS estimated that the Russians had
enough troops in East Asia to expel American forces from the pen-
insula and in July their intelligence staff estimated that even Chinese
intervention would require such a large expeditionary force as to
“jeopardize ... our ability to implement the current emergency war
plan to an unacceptable degree.” On July 14, 1950, Acheson told
the cabinet that the threat of Russian and Chinese intervention had
provoked a feeling in Europe of “petrified fright.” °® Second, his-
torians have stressed that the shock of the invasion of June 24-25
produced a crisis atmosphere and a sense of necessity, but the adminis-
tration had stood by when Communist forces had driven from Man-
churia into North China and from North China across the Yangtze,
into larger and more valuable areas than Korea,
The external factors above are important, but insufficient by
themselves to explain why the value of South Korea increased dras-
tically for Truman and Acheson after the North Korean invasion,
After all, the American leaders might have justified inaction by citing
the JCS’s repeated declarations that Korea was expendable and by
blaming the South Korean defeat on the incompetence of Syngman
Rhee as they had blamed the fall of China on Chiang. We must there-
fore explain why Truman misperceived the Korean situation at a
time when his secretary of state still hoped to split some of the Chinese
Communist leaders away from Stalin. Truman needed to see the North
Korean invasion of South Korea as part of a global challenge directed
from Moscow at American collective security systems, for he was
vulnerable to serious charges from his domestic critics if he did not
intervene,
Truman would have had grave difficulty if he had tried to justify
letting South Korea fall by blaming the military weakness of the
United States and its Korean protégé on Republican congressional
56. FRUS, 1950, 7:216-17, 346; Frank Pace to JCS, probably July 1, 1950,
and Joint Strategic Plans Committee, Military Estimate of the Korean Situation,
JSPC 853/5, July 1, 1950, Record Group (hereafter, RG) 218, Records of the
United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, CCS, decimal file 383.21, Korea (3-19-45),
sec, 24, National Archives; Minutes of cabinet meeting, July 14, 1950, Dean Ache-
son Papers, box 65, Truman Library,
DECISIONS ON KOREAN POLICY 113
budget cutters, for he would have risked an expanded McCarthyite
investigation into the military reasons for the loss of China and South
Korea—an investigation that would have revealed that Truman himself
had a very poor record in military planning between 1946 and 1949.
Truman knew well the kind of headlines that would result from such
hearings, for he had made his reputation by conducting hearings into
military mismanagement during World War II, and he had helped to
set off the emotional Pearl Harbor attack investigation by publishing
an article advocating defense unification in 1944.2” The Republicans
would have found many points to make against Truman. After the end
of the Second World War, Truman had allowed demobilization to
progress so far that he had only 1.5 million men under arms in 1946-
47, while the Russians retained 4 million, according to contemporary
estimates. Truman believed that economic and political restrictions
prevented him from spending the sums that the service heads said were
required to defend the commitments that the United States had as-
sumed around the world. To avoid inflation Truman sought a balanced
budget, which led him to adopt a curious budgeting procedure. He
subtracted anticipated domestic expenditures from anticipated reve-
nues, and then gave the military what was left. As one analyst put it,
“any relationship between America’s foreign policy goals and its
military strategy was purely coincidental.”58 Since the military plan-
ners lacked funds for the necessary conventional forces, they increas-
ingly turned to atomic weapons as the only way to deter the Russians
from attacking Europe.
Truman based his atomic strategy on the unfortunate assumption
that the USSR would not have a strategically significant number of
atomic weapons for ten to twenty years. Gen. Leslie R. Groves assured
the president in 1945 that the Russians had no high-grade uranium of
their own and that the Americans and British had gained control of
97 percent of world uranium production through a program of pre-
emptive buying. The Russians, he predicted, would have to figure out
how to use low-grade ore and could only produce a small number of
bombs after a long period of development. James B. Conant, the
57, Martin V. Melosi, The Shadow of Pearl Harbor: Political Controversy over
the Surprise Attack, 1941-1946 (College Station: Texas A & M University Press,
1977), pp. 71-82.
58. “History of JCS,” vol. 2, Kenneth W. Condit, 1947-1949,” pp. 18-19,22;
Verrell, O/f the Record, pp. 160-61, For Truman’s military budgeting, see Warner R.,
Schilling, Paul Y. Hammond, and Glenn H, Snyder, Strategy, Politics and Defense
Budgets (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), pp, 28-266; the quotation
is from David S, McLellan, Dean Acheson: The State Department Years (New
York: Dodd, Mead, 1976), p. 168,
es STEPHEN PELZ
atomic scientist, and State Department experts warned Truman that
the Russians might have the bomb in three to five years, but the presi-
dent chose to believe Groves. In 1949, when the Russians exploded
their first bomb, the press rightly portrayed Truman as surprised.”?
Encouraged by illusions of atomic monopoly, Truman failed to
push the atomic program sufficiently in 1946-47 to create a real
deterrent, even though the Russians had refused to accept his proposals
for nuclear disarmament. Problems in plutonium production delayed
bomb construction, and until late 1948 the weapons builders were
still constructing Mark II plutonium-implosion bombs—each of these
laboratory weapons required a team of twenty-four men to work two
days to arm, Truman had allowed the civilian assembly teams to dis-
band in 1946 and the first military team was not trained and ready
until December 1947, Worse still, there were few bombs available with
which to deter or fight the Russians: one bomb was ready; twelve
were unassembled; and the factories were producing only two bombs
per month. In April 1947, when David E. Lilienthal, the new chair-
man of the AEC, briefed Truman on the state of the nuclear program,
Truman was shocked—‘‘a grim, gray look on his face.” By the fall of
1947 Truman was trying to gloss over atomic deficiencies; he told
Eben Ayers, an assistant press secretary, that “he did not believe there
were over a half-dozen A-bombs in the United States,” although, he
added, “‘that was enough to win a war.” At exactly this time the war
planners told the JCS that to carry out their strategy of “killing a
nation” they would need approximately 400 Nagasaki type bombs
to drop on 100 Soviet cities.®! In early 1948 the Air Force had only
33 heavy bombers capable of delivering atomic bombs, and in mock
raids on New York City and Dayton, Ohio in 1947 and 1948, attrition
due to lack of repair and misses due to poor navigation were appalling,
In the Dayton raid, which took place at night, not one bomber reached
the target.®
Truman reconfirmed his own reliance on atomic strategy and his
59. Gregg Herken, The Winning Weapon: The Atomic Bomb in the Cold War
1945-1950 (New York: Knopf, 1980), pp. 37-38, 98-112, 273, 312-14.
60. See David Alan Rosenberg’s treatment of the whole evolution of the atomic
strategy, “‘American Atomic Strategy and the Hydrogen Bomb Decision” Journal
of American History 66, no. 1 (June 1979): 65-67; the information on the lack of
assembly teams is from an unpublished version of this paper; Herken, Winning
Weapon, pp. 196-99.
61. David E. Lilienthal, The Journals of David R. Lilienthal, vol. 2, The Atomic
Energy Years, 1945-1950 (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), p. 165; Ayers diary,
Oct, 14, 1947, Truman Library.
62. Herken, Winning Weapon, pp. 241, 243-99.
DECISIONS ON KOREAN POLICY 115
slighting of conventional forces after the Republican Congress cut
taxes in 1948—a presidential election year. In the fiscal year 1949
budget he did provide extra funds for small increases in personnel
and aircraft strength, and he secured a revived selective service system,
but he also publicly set a limit on the military budget of approximately
fifteen billion dollars for FY-1950.° The JCS repeatedly warned the
president between 1947 and 1950 that he was extending America’s
diplomatic commitments beyond the nation’s existing military means.
James V. Forrestal, secretary of defense, asked the State Department
and the National Security Council in July 1948 to define the American
foreign policy objectives, which should serve as a guide to military
policy. The eventual result was NSC 20/4, a paper that predicted that
the Soviet Union might be drawn into a major conflict with the United
States by an accidental clash. Commenting on the NSC paper, the
JCS warned that ‘“‘current United States commitments .. . are very
greatly in excess of our present ability to fulfill them either promptly
or effectively.” In 1948 the chiefs suggested a phased build-up to be
completed in 1952 that would provide fourteen ready divisons and a
seventy-group air force. The three service chiefs estimated that the
Fr Y-1950 budget for these forces, which “would be capable of meeting
the initial requirements of a joint emergency war plan,’? would be
thirty billion dollars, exactly twice what Truman was willing to spend,
and they refused to allocate funds under the fifteen billion dollar
ceiling. Truman needed to choose between raising taxes or trimming
foreign commitments, but he chose not to make trade-offs,
In 1949 Truman continued to ignore the worries of the JCS. To
reinforce his stand against increased military spending he appointed
as secretary of defense Louis Johnson, a party fund-raiser and former
assistant secretary of war, who promised to cut defense spending.
Truman backed Johnson’s efforts. In January 1949 the president told
Congress that he was ‘‘convinced” the military budget should stay at
approximately the same level ‘in the foreseeable future,” and in
mid-1949 he tried to cut the FY-1951 budget further.
Truman also failed to force his military advisers to produce war
plans that could support the weight of his foreign policy. Between
1945 and 1949 the JCS had grave difficulty agreeing on a unified
war plan, since the tight budget required difficult choices and since
each service wanted a major role in implementing the strategy. Finally
63. Robert J. Donovan, ‘The Devastating Time: Truman, the Hydrogen Bomb,
China and Korea,” International Security Studies Program Working Papers, no.
6 (Washington, D.C.; Wilson Center, Apr. 19, 1979), pp. 16-18,
64, Condit, “History of JCS,” 2:225, 226, 231, 257, 271.
116 STEPHEN PELZ
in December 1949, the JCS adopted the short range emergency plan
known as OFFTACKLE.©
OFFTACKLE did not offer much hope to the South Koreans, or
even to the Europeans in the event of war. In the plan, the JCS assumed
that “‘the USSR and/or her satellites” would begin a global war by
seizing all of continental Western Europe (with the possible exception
of Spain) and large parts of Asia. Both sides would use atomic bombs,
but the Russian atomic campaign would be limited because of low
production and problems with delivery. After the initial Russian
successes, the United States, Britain, and Canada would re-fight World
War II by standing on the defensive in the Pacific while launching
a strategic air offensive against the Soviet homeland and by reinvading
Europe, Great Britain would provide a vital base for launching the
atomic offensive, possibly supplemented by Okinawa and Egypt. When
war broke out with the USSR or one of its satellites, first priority
would go to securing the British Isles from invasion and helping the
Spanish hold the Pyrenees, thereby securing the Mediterranean line
of communication. After a steady atomic and conventional bombing
campaign, American and British forces would invade Europe from
England and North Africa, thereby cutting the Russian remnants off
from their homeland by a huge pincer movement. The allies would
then liberate the satellites and force the Soviets to disarm. To ensure
the success of OFFTACKLE, the Americans would have to concentrate
their limited conventional forces in the European theater, thereby
sacrificing Korea and most of the rest of the world. Consequently,
the only war plan in existence for Korea provided a program for evacu-
ating American military advisers.
New defense liabilities made OFFTACKLE outdated even before
it was formally adopted. The NATO pact implied that planners had
to provide for the defense of a line in Western Europe, while the
Russian acquisition of atomic weapons made a nuclear strike against
Russia infinitely more dangerous. Air Force intelligence officers pre-
dicted that the Russians would be able to hit American targets with
ten to fifty atomic bombs in 1950 and that the Russian attacks “could
seriously impede our mobilization” and cause ‘‘more than one million
casualties.”’
Failure to provide for an air defense for the continental United
65. For the reasoning behind the JCS’s conclusion that United States strategy
required abandoning Korea in case of war, see “MOONRISE” (J.W.P.C. 476/1),
June 16, 1947, RG 218, CCS, decimal file $81, USSR (3-2-46), sect. 5; the over-all
war plan in effect at the time of Korea was “OFFTACKLE” (JCS 1844/46),
approved on Dec. 8, 1949, and renamed “SHAKEDOWN” on July 19, 1950; for
“OFFTACKLE” see ibid., seet. 41.
DECISIONS ON KOREAN POLICY pUty,
States was particularly striking. There were only a handful of radars
available and few planes to intercept Russian attacks if they were spotted.
On November 16, 1949, Vandenberg warned the other chiefs that “al-
most any number of Soviet bombers could cross our borders and fly to
most targets in the United States without a shot being fired at them.’
Even the ability of the Air Force to deliver an atomic attack suf-
liciently devastating to retard the Russian advance into Europe was
in doubt, though the atomic stockpile had grown significantly by 1950.
kecause American bombers would have to travel over a lot of enemy
\erritory, they would meet a fair amount of enemy resistance, and they
would lose one-third to one-half of their planes in the process, After
considerable investigation official estimators argued that the Russians
would shoot down so many bombers that the attack would fail to be
decisive and that even if the bombers got through, the Russians would
not surrender, but continue their assault.®”
The military planners’ struggles over budgets, roles, and missions
became public in 1949. During congressional hearings on the B-36 the
admirals denounced the Air Force strategy of retaliation against Soviet
cities and war industries and argued instead for carrier-based atomic
attacks on the Soviet armies’ lines of communication as the best way
to defend Europe. But Louis Johnson suppressed the internal reports
that questioned the effectiveness of the atomic strategy and Truman
quashed the admirals’ revolt.
Because of Truman’s budgetary restrictions, he had to rely on
conventional ground and air forces to deter an attack in East Asia—
forces that were clearly inadequate. In the spring of 1950, one in-
vestigator declared, “We have no tactical air force worthy of the name
-” and Allied planners feared that they lacked enough fighters
\o protect the airfields in Great Britain—the bases from which the
bombers delivering the main atomic stroke against Russia would leave.
66. Rosenberg, “‘American Atomic Strategy,” p. 31; Apr. 13, 1950, Vannevar
hush, director of the Office of Scientific Research and Development during World
War H, had warned Bradley that America’s military situation was appalling, and
lie questioned whether the United States had enough fighters to protect the United
States or enough bombers to penetrate Soviet defenses to deliver the blow en-
Visaged in “OFFTACKLE”; Bush’s letter is in FRUS, 1950, 1:227-34; the Air
loree admitted that some of Bush’s fears were justified, though Air Force planners
vccasionally insisted that their strategic bombing force was adequate; see the
memorandum from Trevor H. Landon to H. Vandenberg, June 13, 1950, RG 341,
Kecords of the United States Air Force, OPD, decimal file 381, National Archives;
on continental air defense, see Condit, ‘History of JCS,” 2:536-40,
67, Condit, “History of JCS,” 2:352-53; Herken, Winning Weapon, pp. 293-99,
68, Herken, Winning Weapon, pp, 295, 308-10.
69, Vannevar Bush to Bradley, Apr. 18, 1950, FRUS, 1950, 1.227.384,
118 STEPHEN PELZ
The army had only ten trained divisons, each of which was under
strength by a third.
General MacArthur had left a record of protests against the weak-
ness of his forces, complaining bitterly that Truman’s force reductions
endangered the safety of his command. The army had reduced the
Far Eastern Command well below half of its authorized strength, and
lack of maintenance rendered the army ill-equipped for an emergency.
On June 25, 80 percent of the army’s sixty-day reserve of equipment
was unusable, and the Far Eastern Command had only a forty-five day
supply of ammunition available in its depots. With justice, MacArthur
could have laid the unreadiness of his command at the feet of Truman
and his budget cutters.’
Truman not only failed to provide the atomic and conventional
forces necessary to make the Russians, Chinese, and North Koreans
stay their hand, but he also neglected to provide the South Koreans
with the weapons necessary to deter a conventional invasion, He had
adopted a token aid program for Korea (and for other areas of low
priority to the war planners), to permit the bulk of American military
aid to go to Europe.
During the first five months of 1950, the Russians gave the North
Koreans an offensive force—tactical aircraft, armor, trucks, and artil-
lery—and the Chinese sent experienced Korean contingents from their
army to man the spearheads, but even during this build-up, Truman
and Acheson did not reinforce the South Korean armed forces with
tanks, antitank guns, artillery, and planes. Intelligence reports indicated
that the North Koreans were acquiring heavy weapons, but the Ameri-
cans remained reluctant to increase their economic and military aid to
Rhee while he was jailing his critics, postponing elections, threatening
to invade the North, and failing to curb inflation. Truman had the
funds to give Korea the planes and tanks needed to deter the North
Koreans, for Congress had provided $75 million for aid to the general
area of China, Administration officials did draw up a tentative list
of eventual recipients of the money, but they did not even include
Korea on the list.”!
The Truman administration’s new central intelligence system also
had not functioned properly. Conflicting reports masked the accurate
warnings, which consequently did not dent complacency about Korea’s
70, J. Lawton Collins, War in Peacetime: The History and Lessons of Korea
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1969), pp. 67-68, 78-81, 84-85; James F. Schnabel,
United States Army in the Korean War, Policy and Direction: The First Year
(Washington, D.C.: U.S, Office of the Chief of Military History, 1972), pp. 46,
62-54, 58-60,
71, See FRUS, 1950, 7;8-11, 30-38, 43-44, 107-9,
DECISIONS ON KOREAN POLICY 119
safety in the upper ranks of government.’* The South Koreans ap-
pealed repeatedly to the Truman administration to help deter the
North Koreans, but Ambassador Jessup had told the Koreans not to
“sit back and hope that the United States will cope with the situation
alone. The strength of your defense against communism will be based
on the strength of your economy and of a fundamental policy of politi-
cal freedom.” Even the commander of the U.S. Military Advisory
Group in Korea, Gen. W. L. Roberts, reported in May that “Korea is
threatened with the same disaster which befell China,” due to a lack
of equipment and spiraling inflation.’ Such quotations combined with
the failure to provide the South Koreans with a military commitment
or adequate aid, would have provided Truman’s critics with wonderful
hooks on which to hang days of critical questions during hearings.
Truman compounded his vulnerability to a hostile investigation
by downplaying the deficiencies. In late March 1950, Dwight D. Eisen-
hower, president of Columbia University and recently one of Truman’s
military advisers, told the Senate Appropriations Committee that
Truman had reduced certain parts of America’s defenses below the
safety limit. Truman not only denied the charge completely but
replied that he would have sought additional funds in the defense
budget if he thought Eisenhower correct. When the drafters of NSC 68
called for a massive emergency rearmament program, Truman warned
his subordinates of his desire “‘that no publicity be given to this report
or its contents without my approval,” and he sent the report out to the
departments for cost analysis.’* His critics might well complain that
Truman had endangered the security of our allies and friends.
A second factor that helps to explain Truman’s hasty decision
is the influence of the anti-Communist campaign that gathered force
in early 1950. In the six months immediately preceding the Korean
decision, there were repeated attacks on Truman and Acheson’s foreign
policy. After the Republicans’ surprising loss of the 1948 election, the
conservative leaders of the party concluded that Thomas E, Dewey,
72. See Central Intelligence Agency, Reviews of the World Situation for May
17, 1950, and for June 14, 1950, in National Security Council Meetings, nos. 57
and 58, President’s Secretary’s Files, Harry S. Truman Papers, Truman Library;
Schnabel, U.S. Army, pp. 61-65.
V3. FRUS, L950) £222, 93:
74, Truman quotes no. 32, Special File, Truman, Harry S., box 1182, Robert A.
‘Taft Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.; for NSC 68, see FRUS, 1950,
1;234-92; Truman was not only hostile to large defense increases in the spring of
1950, but actually considering cutting the nondefense budget in order to hold the
line, for he noted that tax receipts were falling and that the national debt ceiling
was in danger; see Ayers diary, Apr, 20, 1950; this evidence undercuts assertions
that Truman wanted to use the Korean crisis to increase the defense budget,
120 STEPHEN PELZ
their presidential candidate, had been toogentle in his campaign against
Truman, and they therefore decided to engage in bare-knuckle cam-
paigning in the future. In the wake of the fall of China, they declared
that Dean G. Acheson, Truman’s secreiary of state, and Philip C,
Jessup, Truman’s ambassador-at-large, were soft on Communists at
home and abroad. Republican leaders lid long since been charging
that Truman’s lax security procedures woild result in the United States
losing the secret of the A-bomb to the Russians, and during the cam-
paign of 1948 the charges of espionage against Alger Hiss and the
nuclear scientist Edward Condon led Trunan to dismiss the spy scare
as a “red herring’’—a phrase that becanr a campaign issue and that
Truman would regret after the Russians exploded their first bomb.”> A
series of shocking events fueled the chaxes that Truman had let the
secret of the bomb slip away to the Rusians: the serious atomic spy
case of Klaus Fuchs (who confessed in Fibruary 1950); the arrests of
Harry Gold, David Greenglass, and Julius Rosenberg on similar charges;
and worst of all, the jury’s conclusion jin January 1950 that Alger
Hiss, Acheson’s former State Departmat colleague and_ personal
friend, had lied during his espionage tril. These attacks combined
with the Russian blockade of Berlin, th Soviet acquisition of the
A-bomb, and the signing of the SinoSovid alliance to scare the Ameri-
can people badly.
The story of these irresponsible attacks the Truman administration
is well known, what is less well remembered the extent to which Truman
and Acheson yielded to the pressure. To unlercut charges of laxity in in-
ternal security, Truman conducted a revyiewind purge of government offi-
cials and put eleven leaders of the AmericanCommunist party on trial for
conspiring to advocate the violent overthnw of the government.’ In
1949 and 1950, Truman also yielded to kepublican demands that he
harden his stance in East Asia, for the Rewblicans had begun to con-
centrate heavy fire on Truman’s policy jn that region.
The initial assault came during the llapse of Chiang’s China.
After Mao conquered Manchuria and equiped his armies with Ameri-
can weapons that had been surrendered ly the Nationalists, Truman
considered stopping further arms shipmeis to China to prevent ad-
ditional losses of American weapons to th:Communists. Arthur Van-
denberg, the usually cooperative Republian leader on the Senate
75. Herken, Winning Weapon, pp. 28, 272-7) Donovan, Conflict and Crisis,
pp. 414-15; Dewey did not make much of the atic espionage issue in the 1948
campaign.
76. Alonzo L, Hamby, Beyond the New Deal;|larry §. Truman and American
Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press,973), pp. 386-87.
DECISIONS ON KOREAN POLICY 121
Foreign Relations Committee, protested, and by March 1949, fifty
senators had joined in petitioning Truman to send $1.5 billion worth
of money and arms to Chiang (an amount that approximated 10
percent of the American defense budget), The administration refused,
arguing that Chinese forces had plenty of guns but lacked the will
to use them, and Chiang’s regime collapsed. On December 1, 1949,
Senator H, Alexander Smith, a moderate Republican from New Jersey,
recommended that Truman finally draw a line in Asia by occupying
Formosa; and in January 1950, Senator Robert A. Taft of Ohio, a
leading conservative candidate for president, joined Senator William F.
Knowland of California and former President Herbert Hoover in ad-
vocating a cheaper means to accomplish the end—simply send the
Seventh Fleet to the Formosa Strait. But the Democrats rallied behind
Acheson when he refused to extend military support to Chiang.’” If
Truman and Acheson agreed to save the Nationalists on Formosa, they
would be admitting that they had been wrong about Chiang’s abilities
during the earlier Chinese civil war.
In early January 1950, the Republican attack mounted in intensity.
The State Department made the mistake of informing its public rela-
tions officers that they should blame the impending fall of Formosa
on Chiang and that they should explain that Formosa was of little
military value to the United States. Someone in Tokyo, probably in
MacArthur’s headquarters, released the gist of this paper to the press,
and as a result, an outraged Knowland warned Acheson that the Re-
publicans would denounce the administration’s “spirit of defeatism.””®
l'o stop the campaign for aid to Formosa, Truman and Acheson tried
to clarify their policy. On January 5, 1950, they responded to “leak
and counterleak, gossip and counter-gossip” by stating that the United
States had recognized that Formosa was part of China at the end of
World War II. Acheson declared that the Americans could not retract
their action at this late date by trying to reoccupy the island, nor did
they desire to reenter the Chinese civil war by sending military aid or
77. A good summary of the China debate may be found in H. Bradford Wester-
field, Foreign Policy and Party Politics: Pearl Harbor to Korea (New Haven: Octa-
yon, 1955), pp. 343-82.
78. For the paper and Acheson’s explanation of its origins, see U.S, Congress,
Senate, Committees on Armed Services and Foreign Relations, Military Situa-
tion in the Far East: Joint Hearings to Conduct an Inquiry into the Military Situa-
tion in the Far East and the Facts Surrounding the Relief of General of the Army,
Douglas MacArthur, from his Assignment in that Area, testimony of Dean G, Ache-
won, vol, 3, 82nd Cong., Ist sess, (Washington, D,C,: GPO, 1951), pt. 3, pp. 1667-74;
for Knowland’s threat, see FRUS, 1950, 6;258-63,
122 STEPHEN PELZ
American forces to the area.’? The Truman administration signaled
Mao to take the island.
In response to the Republican attacks, however, the Truman ad-
ministration was willing to take a harder line in the rest of Asia to
compensate for their action on Formosa. On January 12, Acheson
made a speech to the National Press Club in which he dealt with Ameri-
can policy in all of Asia. His tone was unbowing. Mao had not won
because “‘we are incompetent; Chiang lost China because the Generalis-
simo displayed the ‘grossest incompetence ever experienced by any
military command.’”? Acheson asked his audience to take comfort
from the coming realization by the Chinese people that Stalin had
large territorial ambitions in Northeast Asia—ambitions that Acheson
contrasted with America’s more modest defense perimeter in Asia,
which ran from the Aleutians through Japan and Okinawa to the
Philippines. Formosa, Korea, Indochina, and Indonesia were not
included in the American defense lines and they would have to rely on
the UN for protection.8° In the rest of his speech Acheson pointed
with pride to the administration’s program of economic aid to true
nationalists who would oppose Communist subversion, and he pointed
to successes of greater or lesser degree in Japan, Korea, Indochina,
and the Philippines,
Acheson hoped these statements would bring “clarity out of
confusion,’®! but things went very badly for the administration,
for the Republicans immediately made good Knowland’s threat to
denounce Democratic defeatism in Asia. Taft had already told the
Senate that the State Department was subverting Truman’s contain-
ment policy, since it “thas been guided by a left-wing group who ob-
viously wanted to get rid of Chiang, and were /sic/ willing at least to
turn China over to the communists for that purpose.” Styles Bridges,
the Republican senator from New Hampshire, exclaimed that “China
asked for a sword, and we gave her a dull paring knife,”82 During
79. Statement by the president, Jan. 5, 1950, U.S. Department of State, Ameri-
can Foreign Policy, 1950-55, Basic Documents, General Foreign Policy Series,
no. 117, Department of State Publication 6446 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1957),
pp. 2448-49; remarks by the secretary of state at a special news conference, Jan. 5,
1950, ibid., pp. 2449-56.
80. Address by the secretary of state, Jan. 12, 1950, ibid., pp. 2310-32; news
conference, ibid., p. 2452.
81. Ibid., p. 2450.
82. Speech of Hon. Robert A. Taft of Ohio in the Senate of the United States,
Jan. 11, 1950, Robert A. Taft Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress,
box 497, Legislative, Ch-Ci. Richard M. Fried, Men against McCarthy (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1976), p. 4,
DECISIONS ON KOREAN POLICY 123
the furor over Formosa, Acheson emerged as “the administration’s
most vulnerable political target,’’ when he said on January 5, 1950,
that he would not turn his back on his friend Alger Hiss, in spite of
the latter’s conviction for perjury.
The Republicans welcomed the opportunity to charge the secretary
of state with protecting a den of left-wing Communist sympathizers
in the State Department, The Republican National Committee and the
House and Senate Republican conferences opened the 1950 congres-
sional campaign by promising a purge of “all communists, fellow
travelers, and communist sympathizers.’*? And Senator Taft, possibly
thinking of his own nascent candidacy, asserted that “The only way
to get rid of the communists in the State Department is to change the
head of government.” Republican senator Kenneth Wherry of Nebraska
even charged that Acheson himself was a “bad security risk.”** The
Republican attacks succeeded in shaking Acheson’s standing with his
party. Congressman John Jennings, a conservative Democrat, declared
that Hiss and Acheson were ‘“‘two birds of a feather,” and Senator
Scott Lucas, the Democratic majority leader in the Senate, warned
that he would not defend Acheson’s statement on Hiss if he were
challenged to do so on the floor.®®
The attack intensified when Joseph R. McCarthy (R., Wisconsin)
seized the headlines by promising to name the traitors in the State
Department and forced the Democrats to establish a committee to
investigate his charges. Although Senator Millard Tydings, the Demo-
cratic chairman of the committee, and his Democratic colleagues
tried to spike McCarthy’s guns with facts, McCarthy outwitted them
through the spring and early summer by rapidly shifting from one set
of charges to another. Meanwhile Truman’s loyalty reviews for govern-
ment personnel, which he set in motion to quell McCarthy’s charges,
lent credence to McCarthy’s attacks. McCarthy charged that Acheson
und Jessup were ‘“‘dilettante diplomats” who “whined” and ‘whim-
pered”’ and “cringed” in the face of communism.®® Democrats were
scared and demanded further concessions. On April 12, Tydings warned
‘Truman that it was essential to ‘re-establish the White House and the
‘Truman administration as the foe of communism at home as well as
abroad,’ and the Democratic Majority Policy Committee devoted
83. Fried, Men against McCarthy, pp. 14, 21.
84. Robert Griffith, The Politics of Fear: Joseph R. McCarthy and the Senate
(Lexington: Haydon, 1970), pp. 47, 73, 103, 173.
85. Fried, Men against McCarthy, pp. 14, 67.
86. Newspaper clippings, June 20, 1950, and undated, White House Central
Niles, Confidential Vile, box 22, folder 1, Korean Emergency, Truman Papers,
lruman Library; Griffith, Politics of Fear, pp. 67-87; 89-90,
124 STEPHEN PELZ
careful attention to McCarthy’s campaign at each of its meetings from
March 14 through May 2 as did Truman’s personal staff.8’
Step by step, Truman and Acheson yielded to Republican pressure
and to the pleas of their colleagues. To avoid charges of a cover-up of
internal security problems, Truman handed over the personnel files
that the Tydings Committee demanded; the administration indicted
William Remington, a Commerce Department employee, on an es-
pionage charge; and they discharged a number of suspected homo-
sexuals from the State Department.’ Acheson also tried to blunt the
edge of attacks on him by advocating “total diplomacy,” a policy that
comprised no negotiations with the Russians until the creation of
“situations of strength”? that would force the Russians to recognize
the boundaries between their sphere and that of the Americans; resis-
tance to Soviet efforts to confuse and divide the American people; and
a defiant fight against the Communist doctrines that the Russians were
using as tools in their campaign to control the world.®?
Acheson and his subordinates also responded to the Republican
attacks by extending containment in Asia, When Stalin and Mao recog-
nized Ho Chi Minh’s government in January 1950, Truman and Ache-
son recognized the French puppet regime of Bao Dai and extended
military aid to it. And in late May, Acheson agreed to spend some of
the remaining economic aid funds in Formosa. Acheson’s projected
“situation of strength’? in East Asia thus took shape partially in re-
sponse to McCarthyite attacks on the eve of the Korean War. NSC 68
was a trump card that Acheson suggested that Truman play by making
a “powerful and concrete speech on foreign affairs,” when the paper
on massive rearmament was ready for implementation.”
Truman was quite concerned about the McCarthyite attacks. He
wrote to Senator Bridges asking him to tone down his attacks on
Acheson, and he considered delivering a radio talk to the nation on
security matters. One of his press aides argued that such an address
was necessary, for “there is growing confusion among the people and
87. Fried, Men against McCarthy, pp. 74-76; Ayers diary, Mar. 27, Apr. 2,
1950, Truman Library.
88. Ibid., pp. 15, 75.
89. R. Love to R.G. Barnes, summary of the main points concerning the
relationship between the U.S. and the USSR brought out by Secretary Acheson in
his public announcements since Feb. 8, 1950, June 5, 1950, Memoranda of Conver-
sations, Acheson Papers, Truman Library, box 65, 5-1-50 to 6-28-50.
90. FRUS, 1950, 6:694-95, 716-19, 743-47, 786-87; Westerfield, Foreign Policy
and Party Politics, pp. 368-69; Acheson’s memorandum of conversation with the
president, May 1, 1950; Memoranda of Conversation, Acheson Papers, box 65,
5-1-50 to 6-28-50.
DECISIONS ON KOREAN POLICY 125
something in the nature of hysteria spreading among them that only
the President can halt.’! And Truman himself was vulnerable to
McCarthyite smears. McCarthy was charging that Acheson had direct
tics to Owen Lattimore, an Asianist from Johns Hopkins University
who had served as an adviser to Chiang K’ai shek, and whom McCarthy
had accused of being the most important Soviet agent in the United
States. In April, Truman’s press aides discovered an exchange of letters
between Truman and Lattimore in 1945 that indicated that Truman
had made a special effort to meet Lattimore before leaving for the
Potsdam Conference. Worse still, the letters made clear that Lattimore
had urged Truman not to back Chiang completely, but to keep the
door open to the Chinese Communists to persuade the Russians
to accept a stable Asian settlement. The newspapers were already
charging that Lattimore had met with Acheson, and Acheson was
denying it.9? The same question might prove embarrassing for Truman,
if McCarthy asked it of him or of Lattimore.
President Truman tried to shore up his own standing by bringing
in two certified anti-Communist Republicans to help Acheson make
foreign policy; he appointed John Sherman Cooper and John Foster
Dulles as ambassadors-at-large. Dulles agreed to enter the Truman
administration on the condition that he would have a large say in
future decisions on East Asian policy. On April 28, 1950, Dulles told
Truman that he would only be able to restrain Senators Taft, Milliken,
and Bridges (McCarthy’s more respectable supporters), if Truman
allowed Dulles to plan some “early affirmative action” against the
“communist menace,” If he had no role in policy, Dulles said, then he
would have little influence with his more aggressive colleagues. He
continued, “‘A good deal would, of course, depend on whether I was
in a position to help work out policies that I could genuinely endorse.
The President said he fully understood that this would be the course
events would have to take... .’? Dulles added that “many Americans
have lost confidence as a result of what happened, particularly in the
Hast, It was this lack of confidence which . . . made it possible for men
like McCarthy to make a deep impression, . . . If we could really get
going, the American people would fall in behind that leadership and
attacks like McCarthy’s would be forgotten.” Dulles informed Acheson
that the president ‘‘quite agreed with my analysis.”
91. Ayers diary, Mar, 27, 1950.
92. Ibid., Apr. 2, 1950.
93, Dulles to Acheson, May 2, 1950, enclosing his Personal and Confidential
Memorandum of Conversation with President Truman, Apr. 28, 1950; Memoranda
of Conversation, Acheson Papers, box 65, 4-38-50 to 4-28-50; Truman did not find
Dulles an altogether satistactory instrument for he accused Dulles on Aug. 17,
126 STEPHEN PELZ
Truman and Acheson began reaping benefits from their attempt to
reestablish bipartisanship. After Dulles’s appointment, Governor
Dewey, Dulles’s sponsor and a perennial presidential candidate who
was highly critical of Truman’s record in Asia, began consulting Ache-
son by phone before speaking out on China policy.** Dulles, however,
quickly joined a group within the administration advocating the exten-
sion of military aid to Formosa. Dulles and Dean Rusk, the new assis-
tant secretary of state for Far Eastern Affairs, set out to persuade
Truman that Taiwan was a good place to ‘‘draw the line .. . [for the is-
land was important] politically if not strategically.’’ For the past year
Louis Johnson, the secretary of defense and the leader of the Asian
hard liners, had been trying to convince the JCS to agree to a military
commitment to help Chiang defend Formosa, and in June Johnson
traveled to the Far East to consult General MacArthur on the question,
MacArthur sent Johnson and Bradley home with a memorandum
strongly endorsing the extension of aid to Formosa,”
Rusk and Dulles also decided to harden the administration’s stance
on South Korea. By threatening to cut economic aid to Korea, Acheson
had been trying to persuade Syngman Rhee to release his political
prisoners, to hold elections on time, and to adopt a budget and tax
system that would help to control inflation. Senator Tom Connally
then increased concern among the advocates of the hard line in Asia.
by declaring on May 5 that Russia could “overrun Korea just like she
probably will overrun Formosa, . . .” When an interview asked whether
or not Korea was an essential part of America’s defense perimeter, Con-
nally said that it was not.°® Acheson allowed Dulles to travel to South
1950, of writing an attack that Republican senators on the Foreign Relations Com-
mittee had made on administration foreign policy. Dulles replied that he had not
written it and that he had tried to make changes in it, but had failed; Ayers diary,
Aug. 17, 1950.
94, L.D.B[attle] memo, Apr. 10, 1950, Acheson Papers, box 65, 4-3-50 to
4-28-50.
95. See Dulles’s memorandum of May 18, 1950, which seems to have strayed
from the FRUS volume on China into FRUS, 1950, 1:314-16; the story of the
developing drive within the administration to yield to the Republicans by includ-
ing Formosa in the American defense perimeter can be followed in FRUS, 1950,
vol. 6; see especially memoranda by Fischer Howe and Dean Rusk of May 30,
31, 1950, pp. 347-51; see Jessup’s covering note of June 30, 1950, on his record
of the Blair House meeting of June 25, 1950, in box 65, Memoranda of Conver-
sation, May 1, 1950, to June 28, 1950, Acheson Papers; the thoughts of Bradley
and MacArthur on Formosa, and the opposition of the service chiefs to assuming
the burden of Formosan defense, may be found attached to Bradley’s memo
of June 25, 1950, to H. Vandenberg, et al. in RG 218, CGS, decimal file 381,
Formosa (11-8-48), sec. 3, National Archives.
96, See FRUS, 1950, 7:43-44, 65-66,
UECISIONS ON KOREAN POLICY 127
\\orea and tell the National Assembly that South Korea did not stand
ulone in the struggle against communism as long as it behaved in a
worthy fashion, Dulles made his declaration five days before the
North Koreans invaded ,9”
In the weeks preceding the North Korean invasion, then Truman
und Acheson found a storm gathering over their Asian policy Felis o
Dulles, Rusk, and MacArthur were about to renew their deniands on
lruman extend military aid to Chiang; Dulles was hardening the Ameri-
can commitment to South Korea; and McCarthy was gaining round
with charges of lax security and softness on communism, At ae end
of April, after his appointment of Dulles, Truman had been o cnn
about discrediting McCarthy through Senator Tydings’s ver i ibe
but by early June he had given up on Tydings, who was in ‘a ba a
panic” and had ‘“‘fallen down.” On June 22, Senators Tydings ae
McMahon joined Clark Clifford, one of the president’s ON oliti
cal advisers, in telling Truman that the Communist issue mache e
the Democrats in the coming campaign; they proposed the creation a
special commission to investigate McCarthy’s charges. The matter ses
still pending when the Korean War broke out. Meanwhile, in the Gall
Se for May, Truman sank very low indeed: 44 percent ala paeed
ee Ler cial 19 percent were undecided; and only 37 percent
Truman and Acheson decided for war without a full debate on the
military implications of their decision. Ernest R. May has demonstrated
that Truman made his basic decision to intervene against the North
Koreans very early in the decision-making process, though the president
waited five days before engaging ground troops.%? Truman dela ed th
dispatch of American ground forces by MacArthur for a Wherkis ie
reasons: he wanted to let the South Koreans try to stop the neh
on their own (he told a relative on June 26 that “the Korean Situation
~ + is not as bad as people would have you think”); he had to brin
his cabinet into line; and he needed to reassure himself that eae
forces were not massing for an attack elsewhere. But there is Consider-
able evidence that he had made up his mind to do whatever Was ne
sary from the outset and therefore only considered how best to aes.
bill See U.S. Department of State, State Department Bulletin, July 3, 1950
98. Ayers diary, Apr. 29, June 8, 1950; Fried, Men Against McCarthy ‘ 84.
85; U.S. News & World Report, May 5, 1950, ier
99. Ernest R. May, “Lessons” of the Past: The Use and Misuse of History in
American Foreign Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973) Pp, 70-78;
May argues that Truman made up his mind in the first day; we now have ; {
Gi: ‘ : : ; , ‘ | fO0€
evidence that he hoped to avoid sending troops until June 26 and that he id |
‘ i > made
up his mind completely by June 28 (see note LO8),
128 STEPHEN PELZ
vene. On Sunday, June 25, one of Truman’s aides told a reporter,
“The boss is going to hit those fellows hard,” and on the same day,
Margaret Truman told her diary “Communist Korea is marching in on
Southern Korea and we are going to fight.”!
Truman seriously prejudiced his decision even before he met his
advisers during the Blair House conferences. He had Acheson ask the
United Nations Security Council to seek a North Korean withdrawal
and on the next day, Truman told the American people that the “law-
less’”” North Koreans were engaging in “unprovoked aggression.’? He
promised that the United States would “vigorously support” the
efforts of the UN “‘to terminate this serious breach of the peace.” !!
The records of the two Blair House meetings of June 25 and 26
indicate that Truman invited the generals of the JCS to join the group
from the outset and that he and Acheson pushed the discussion toward
military action. On June 26, with Seoul in danger, Acheson proposed
escalatory steps at the outset of the meeting, and Truman approved
each one immediately, without inviting discussion. And when Louis
Johnson, Frank Pace, and Omar Bradley warned Truman against
sending ground troops to Korea, the president greeted their advice with
silence, When the director of the Joint Staff of the JCS told the mem-
bers of the Joint Strategic Survey Committee to recommend a course
of action in case American air strikes did not stop the North Korean
invasion, he warned its members that the JCS “‘do not want to commit
troops,”!? but Truman did not ask the chiefs to calculate the potential
military costs.
Before consulting his military advisers, then, Truman tilted the
debate toward the question of how to save Korea, rather than whether
to save it, and Truman and Acheson did not fully consider either a
face-saving retreat by appealing to the Security Council for economic
sanctions or accepting the loss of Korea,!> while blaming the loss
on MacArthur’s failure to anticipate the attack and on the Republicans’
demands for a balanced budget.
The politically explosive question of Formosa reappeared imme-
100. Truman to Grace Sumner, June 26, 1950, PSF, Family Correspondence
File, box 331, Truman Papers; Paige, Korean Decision, p. 114; Margaret Truman,
Margaret Truman’s Own Story: Souvenir (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1956),p.
275.
101. FRUS, 1950, 7:127-28, 171; italics are mine.
102. Ibid., pp. 167-75, 178-83, 255; May makes the point that Truman in-
cluded the JCS from the outset; see May, “Lessons,” p. 70, Schnabel and Wat-
son, “History of JCS,” 3, pt. 1:101.
103. See May, ‘‘Lessons,”’ p. 73, for a treatment of options.
DECISIONS ON KOREAN POLICY 129
diately on June 25, setting the Korean decision in the context of parti-
san attacks on the administration’s East Asian policy. At the first Blair
House meeting, before any discussion of Korea, Bradley, who had just
returned from visiting MacArthur with Johnson, read aloud MacArthur’s
memorandum in which MacArthur endorsed the McCarthyite position
on military aid to Chiang.!%
Pressure from the Republicans for action in South Korea mounted
from the start of the attack. On June 26, when it appeared that the
South Koreans might succeed in blunting the invasion, the Senate
Republican Policy Committee declared that the United States should
give maximum military aid to Korea, but it covered its bets by also
asserting that Truman should not allow the clash to drag the United
States into a war. Other Republicans were much more willing to press
for action. Dulles cabled from Tokyo on June 25 that “U.S. force
should be used even though this risks Russian counter moves,’?!%
Senator William F. Knowland (R., Calif.) warned on the same day that
difficult decisions could not be “permanently pushed aside,” and in a
bitter exchange with Senator Tom Connally (D., Texas) he asked
whether ‘“‘we should sit back and twiddle our thumbs... 2” Senator
George W. Malone (R., Nevada) said, “It is fairly clear that what hap-
pened in China and what is now happening in Korea were brought
about deliberately by the advisers of the President at Yalta and by the
advisers of the State Department since then.” And after Senator Wil-
liam E, Jenner (R., Indiana) endorsed Malone’s charge, Senator Mc-
Carthy inserted a severe attack on Acheson into the Congressional
Record. On June 27, Republicans and Democrats alike joined in ap-
proving Truman’s decision to use air and sea power against the North
Koreans, though Malone and Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. (R.
Mass.) urged the use of ground troops, if necessary.
During the late morning of June 28, Senator Robert A, Taft (R.,
Ohio), a leading presidential contender, charged that two factors had
produced the Korean crisis: “First . . . the outrageous aggressive at-
titude of Soviet Russia, and second . . . the bungling and inconsistent
foreign policy of the administration.” Taft told the Senate that Truman
>
104. FRUS, 1950, 7:157-65, and Jessup’s covering letter of June 30 on his
minutes of the June 25 meeting in Memoranda of Conversation, box 65, 5-1-50
to 6-28-50, Acheson Papers.
105. Paige, Korean Decision, p. 154. For Dulles’s telegram, see FRUS, 1950,
7:140; after the decision to send troops, Dulles covered himself by explaining
to Acheson that he had only meant for Truman to send air and sea forces, not
troops; see “Memo of Conversation,” July 1, 1950, Dulles Papers, Princeton, cited
in “History of JCS,” 8, pt. 1:70, n. 31,
130 STEPHEN PELZ
was guilty of dividing Korea, withdrawing U.S. armed forces from the
South, and failing to resist Communist expansion in China. When Taft
suggested that Acheson resign, McCarthy, Jenner, and the Senate
galleries burst into applause. Meanwhile cries of betrayal came in from
Korea. Rhee told the press that he was “greatly disappointed with
American aid... ,’’ which was “‘too little and too late,771%
The Democrats, both liberals and conservatives, demanded action.
Senator Richard B. Russell of Georgia said, “I believe we have a respon-
sibility to assist South Korea,” and John A, McCormack, House Demo-
cratic leader, declared, ‘‘One has to wait to see what develops, but...
Stalin and his gang are out to control the world.’”’ Senator Connally
told the Senate that the president was carefully pondering a decision
to send military forces, but Connally added that Truman “‘is not
going to tremble like a psychopath before the Russian power,’””107
Liberal Democrats were also worried about the Republican onslaught.
Senator Joseph C. O’Mahoney’s letter of June 27 establishes the politi-
cal context of Truman’s decision:
Dear Mr. President:
This is a hasty note to confirm in writing the message I shall presently tele-
phone to Mr. Connally /sic] for your information,
The testimony which is being offered to the Appropriations Committee in-
dicates that although for more than a year Central Intelligence has been reporting
evidence of aggressive preparations in North Korea, no steps have been taken under
the Mutual Defense Assistance Program to provide South Korea with any equip-
ment capable of use in resisting an invasion from the north. .. .
You will see that the testimony which I have sketchily summarized will un-
doubtedly be used to support a charge that our policy was soft toward the Com-
munists in Korea.
O’Mahoney suggested that Truman announce that the United States
would veto the admission of Communist China into the UN. In re-
ply Truman admitted to half of the failure, but assured the worried
senator that he had the remedy to Republican attacks. While Ameri-
can prewar aid had only been for “‘internal security and to prevent
raids across the Northern border ... I think we have now covered the
situation [by using air and sea forces against the North Koreans] to
a point where we will either get results or we will have to go all-out to
maintain our position. Ee
106. Paige, Korean Decision, pp. 150-56, 193-200, 216-18; see also the speech
titled ‘‘The Korean Crisis Caused bv Wavering Foreign Policies of Administration:
By Taft in the Senate,’ June 28, 1950, 1950 Political Campaign Misc., G-L, box
258, Taft Papers; Washington Post, June 27, 1950.
107. Washington Post, June 27, 1950.
108. For O’Mahoney’s letter of June 27, 1950, and Truman’s reply of June 28,
1950, see box 243, Korean War File, Truman Papers, Truman Library (italics mine).
DECISIONS ON KOREAN POLICY 131
On June 27, the day O’Mahoney called the White House, Truman
told congressional leaders that the United States was committed to
defend South Korea from invasion and at the same time he announced
that he was neutralizing Taiwan by sending the Seventh Fleet to patrol
Formosa Strait.
Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson tried to use Taft’s criticism to
finish off Acheson. On June 29, in Harriman’s presence, Johnson called
Senator Taft on the phone to congratulate him on his Senate speech of
the previous afternoon in which Taft called for Acheson’s resignation,
Johnson then turned to Harriman and said if they could get Acheson
out he (Johnson) would see that Harriman was made Secretary of
State. During Truman’s preparatory briefing for his press conference
that same day the president’s press aides warned him that newspaper
columnists were claiming that Taft had predicted that Acheson was
on his way out, because Acheson had unsuccessfully opposed the
Korean intervention and because Truman had reversed the secretary’s
Formosan policy. Truman’s aides blamed the stories on Johnson,
and Truman said, “‘If this keeps up, we’re going to have a new Secretary
of Defense.” Truman added that the charges against Acheson were
untrue, and when he met the press he chastised Taft for his “political
statement”’ during a period of national crisis.!°9
In the early hours of the following morning, when MacArthur
demanded permission to send American troops into combat to prevent
all of South Korea from being overrun, Truman agreed to commit a
regimental combat team, and he did so without further consultation
with his military advisers. For both international and domestic political
reasons he could not afford to reject MacArthur’s request.!!9
Political needs as well as the impact of crisis created mispercep-
tion. Truman and Acheson needed to interpret the North Korean at-
tack as part of a global challenge to justify reversing their Asian pol-
icy, and they therefore argued that by saving South Korea, they would
also preserve East Asia, the Middle East, Europe, and the UN from
the Communist onslaught.!!1 They were well aware that the decision
109. Ayers diary, June 29, 1950; June 29 press conference in Public Papers of
the Presidents of the United States, Harry §. Truman, Containing the Public Mes-
sages, Speeches, and Statements of the President, Jan. 1 to Dec. 31, 1950 (Washing-
ton, D.C.: GPO, 1965), pp. 496-504.
110. For Truman’s fears of MacArthur as a political threat see Ayers diary,
July 1, 1950.
111. For Truman’s justification of the Korean intervention in terms of a global
" ewe ig . : . bor,
challenge, see Public Papers, pp, 491-92, and Elsey’s minutes of Truman's meeting
with congressional leaders, June 27, 1950, Korea Vile, George Klsey Papers
” * 7 tat ‘ : “a
Truman Library; for Acheson’s position in which he restricted the probability of
132 STEPHEN PELZ
to send forces into Korea imposed real military risks. On June 28,
during an NSC meeting, Truman expressed fear of becoming so deeply
involved in Korea that the United States could not meet an attack
elsewhere, and Acheson warned that “the Soviets might not inter-
vene themselves in Korea, but might utilize the Chinese Commu-
nists.””!!?_ Nevertheless Truman consoled himself with the hope that
the United States could drive the North Koreans back to the thirty-
eighth parallel with only a small number of divisions.
America’s Korean decisions in the years from 1940 to 1950 were
poor indeed, Roosevelt considered Korea a very minor problem and
hoped to dispense with its international complications under the
unsuitable trusteeship formula, which was the only option he con-
sidered, Truman tried to implement Roosevelt’s trusteeship policy by
sending troops to Korea and then failed to reconsider his Korean
involvement when costs began to mount. What started as rhetoric
with Roosevelt hardened into an American commitment under Truman,
but Truman refused to accept his liability. He did not create a deterrent
force structure on the peninsula, nor did he make a clear verbal com-
mitment to defend the area, thereby inadvertently inviting the attack,
Satisficed or uncoordinated decisions by both Truman and Roosevelt
led to crises in August 1945 and in June 1950, and the crisis decisions
of these months saddled the Korean people with foreign occupation
and eventually with three years of devastating war.
falling dominoes to Asia, see Acheson’s memo of conversation with Ambassa-
dor W.M.de Morgenstierne, June 30, 1950, Memoranda of Conversations, box
65, 5-1-50 to 6-28-50, Acheson Papers.
112. Minutes of 59th meeting of the NSC, June 28, 1950, PSF, Truman Papers,
Truman Library.
The Local Setting of the Korean War
JOHN MERRILL
LITTLE IS KNOWN, EVEN YET, ABOUT THE ORIGINS OF THE KOREAN WAR, IT
has become commonplace, in fact, to preface discussions with the
disclaimer that, like the morning fog that covers that not so peaceful
land, there is much about the war that remains clouded, obscure, and
wrapped in mystery. It is not for lack of theories. The war has been
variously attributed to the perfidy of Syngman Rhee, factional disputes
within the North Korean leadership, the first stirrings of the Sino-Soviet
conflict, and the imperatives of either U.S. or Soviet foreign policy.
Political satirists have begun to exploit the potential of this confusion,
Kim Tong-gil’s recent best seller, The President’s Laughter,! which
barely made it past the Korean censors, is one example. The book
spins a surrealistic tale of how Stalin, his senses numbed by an excess
of wine and beautiful P’ySngyang kisaeng (geisha, entertainer), finally
agreed to Kim Il-sung’s persistent requests to support an attack on the
1, Kim Tong-gil, Taet'ongny3ng iti usitm [The president’s laughter] (Seoul
1975),
138
134 JOHN MERRILL
South, As history, Kim’s satire is probably not much worse than many
of the more serious attempts to explain the war put forth by both
scholars and propagandists.
There are several reasons for this lack of understanding, but perhaps
most important is that our images of Korea were set at the height of
the cold war in the mold of our World War II experience with surprise
attacks across international boundaries. There was an understandable
tendency to interpret Korea in these same terms, and to relate it
exclusively to the global pattern of interaction between the United
States and the Soviet Union. This inclination was reinforced by the
long history of great-power involvement on the peninsula that made
it natural to see events in Korea as determined by what went on else-
where in the international system.
Information on Korea has also been limited. Interest in Korea has
never been great, and during the years preceding the war both Syngman
Rhee and the American Military Government took care to censor
news leaving the country. The public was thus not prepared for the
North Korean attack. Moreover, until recently primary sources neces-
sary for a study of the origins of the war have not been available.
Karunakar Gupta’s article, which appeared in the China Quarterly, is
a good example. His account is based entirely on newspaper clippings
he collected during his student days in Europe on events that occurred
during the first days of the war.”
The two Koreas have not been forthright in their versions of the
origins of the war.> The history of these years poses special problems
since it raises questions concerning the legitimacy of the two states, the
role of leading personalities in prewar events, and responsibility for
the war. Most North Korean accounts have been either official white
papers on alleged U.S. aggression or party histories of Kim Il-sung’s
struggle against factional elements in the Workers’ party. South Korean
accounts have tended to be military histories compiled by committees
of scholars that are less than candid about the extent of violence in
the Republic of Korea (ROK) before the war. The problem is com-
pounded by the reluctance of North Korea’s allies to discuss any-
thing about the war that might damage their relations with the Demo-
cratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK).
Authors have begun to examine previously neglected local factors
and to reconsider the relationships of the two Koreas to their allies.
2. Karunakar Gupta, “How Did the Korean War Begin?” China Quarterly,
October-December 1972, pp. 699-716.
3. Recent accounts are Kim Chum-kon, The Korean War (Seoul: Kwangmy6ng
Publishing Co., 1973); and The U.S. Imperialists Started the Korean War (P’yong-
yang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1977).
INTERNAL WARFARE IN KOREA 135
This trend has been strengthened by the burgeoning literature on the
“big power of small allies” and the growing volume of revisionist
histories of the cold war. Nevertheless, the lack of primary sources
on the war has caused some authors to resort to exercises in textual
exegesis to extract from the available material (sometimes in transla-
tion) more than is there. There is also the difficulty of choosing an
appropriate time frame. The question of the origins of the war can be
completely sidestepped if, as is often true of Communist accounts, one
talks only about the subsequent U.S. intervention, Viewing the North
Korean attack as an impulsive decision also ignores the need to ex-
amine the local background. Where is the best place to begin? With
the liberation in 1945, when the American Military Government’s
decision to suppress the People’s Committees becomes the crucial
event? With the outpouring of popular discontent evident in the dem-
onstrations against the military government in October 1946? Or
later? Finally, there is the failure to place the war within some wider
theoretical framework, a failure characteristic of many recent West-
ern works. This is a problem especially if one sees the war as the re-
sult of a complex interplay of local and international factors and
not simply of U.S. imperialism or Communist aggression, which tell
us nothing about the timing of the attack except in the most round-
about way. The words ‘‘civil war’ and “intervention” are frequently
used to describe the war and they offer a useful starting point, but
no attempt has yet been made to place the Korean case within the
extensive literature on these subjects.
Korea continues to be a major trouble spot, with the highest
concentration of weapons and men under arms anywhere in the world.
The Carter administration’s aborted plan to withdraw U.S. ground
forces from the peninsula focused new attention on the issue of Korean
security. Critics of Carter’s policy appealed to the lessons of the past
by pointing to the disastrous consequences of our troop withdrawal
from Korea in 1949. But, given the controversy that still surrounds
the war, it is not clear just what these lessons are. American liberals
are poorly equipped to come to grips with either the war or present
policy toward Korea, They have always been somewhat ambivalent
about our involvement in Korea, and their unease has grown with
recent revelations of influence buying in Washington and human
rights violations in Seoul, Many American liberals, otherwise committed
to internationalist views of collective security, are troubled by the
difficulty of reconciling the negative consequences of our involvement
in Korea with the ideals that it once so clearly represented, The Korean
War fits neither the World War Il model nor our more recent experience
in Vietnam, A better understanding of the history of the war may not
136 JOHN MERRILL
resolve present policy dilemmas, but it is a necessary first step to any
new departures. Finally, the Korean War is important as the forerunner
of a type of intervention by lesser powers that has become increasingly
common in the post-World War II international system, A long-run
trend toward greater equalization of military power has permitted
smaller states, acting independently or with the support of their allies,
to intervene much more frequently in neighboring countries disrupted
by civil strife. Korea is a useful test case for theories of interventionary
behavior and a means to explore its early stages.
The following discussion examines the outbreak of the Korean War
in the context of domestic political violence. The relationships between
local and international factors are explored, and the North Korean
attack is studied from the perspective of theories of interventionary
behavior, Rather than adopting a decision-making approach that would
require data unavailable for North Korea, the analysis will look at the
background of the North Korean attack in broad situational terms.
PATTERNS OF NORTH-SOUTH INTERACTION BEFORE THE WAR
The most striking characteristic of Korean domestic politics in the
years before the war was a persistent pattern of political violence that
resulted in approximately one hundred thousand casualties before
June 1950. This civil war between Left and Right has received only
little attention, but it is impossible to understand the origins of the
war without considering it. Gregory Henderson points out that the
October 1946 uprisings in the American zone established ‘‘an enduring
pattern of subversion and repression . . . from which an unbroken
chain stretched to the subversion attempts of Communists in later
months, the infiltration of the constabulary, the revolt of Ydsu in
1948, and the rise of guerrilla activity thereafter, which ebbed only
in the spring before the Korean war.’* The account presented here
begins somewhat later, with the arrival of the United Nations Tempo-
rary Commission in early 1948, and takes Henderson’s analysis a step
further by viewing the war itself as the last link in the chain of internal
violence,
U.S. Army data contain a great deal of information about internal
warfare in Korea during this period. The most accessible is the Far
Eastern Command’s daily Intelligence Summaries, which about every
two weeks listed in tabular form information on both guerrilla activity
in the ROK and incidents along the thirty-eighth parallel. The notorious
“body counts” of Vietnam have put us on guard when examining such
4. Gregory Henderson, Korea: The Politics of the Vortex (Cambridge; Harvard
University Press, 1968), p, 147
INTERNAL WARFARE IN KOREA 137
statistics, and it would be foolish to deny that there are similar prob-
lems with the army data for Korea. Every border incident, for instance,
is reported as initiated by the North, although we know from other
sources that the majority were started by the South. Moreover, casualty
figures on the northern side must have been virtually impossible to
determine, Finally, the border clashes seem to have been deliberately
played up by the South to demonstrate their need for more arms.
For these reasons, statistical data on border incidents have not been
presented here.
The army data on guerrilla incidents in the South are better, yet
they should not be viewed as indicating the absolute magnitude of
political violence in South Korea before the war. They greatly under-
state the seriousness of these incidents for several reasons, First, many
incidents from remote rural areas (where the guerrillas were strongest)
were not reported due to inadequate communications facilities. Second,
the FEC data are several stages removed from the actual events, and
many incidents may have been filtered out in the reporting process.
Where field reports by American observers are available as a cross
check—such as for some periods of the Cheju-do Rebellion—they
indicate a much higher level of guerrilla activity, Third, since the
data were conveyed through army channels they probably do not
fully reflect casualties caused by the Korean police, Finally, the report-
ing system itself seems to have broken down during periods of es-
pecially heavy fighting, such as at YOsu. Nevertheless, the data do
reveal the seriousness of internal violence and its general trend.
The data are summarized in figure 1. Looking at the figure, three
things become apparent: first of all, it is clear that the level of political
violence surged after the establishment of the two governments in
Korea in the fall of 1948, specifically with the YOsu Rebellion in
October, two months after the establishment of the ROK. (Although
not shown, border incidents also increased markedly as the August 15
date for the transfer of authority to the Rhee government approached,
and American troops began to turn over their positions on the parallel
to their South Korean counterparts; the last U.S. tactical forces, how-
ever, did not leave until June 1949.) Second, the intensity of fighting
increased greatly in the months after YSsu and peaked during the
winter of 1949-50. Thereafter, guerrilla activity declined sharply in a
period of artificial quiet in the months before the war. Third, the chart
shows a number of distinct periods in the development of internal
warfare in South Korea between 1948 and 1950, Used in conjunction
with other information, they can serve as a guide to the changing
pattern of interaction between the two Koreas in the years before the
war. The broad outlines of six such periods can, in fact, be identified,
138 JOHN MERRILL
Y Osu rebellion
Number killed
2000
ROK counterguerrilla drive
1500
1000
May 10 elections
1948 1949 1950
Fig. 1, Far East Command data on guerrilla activity in South Korea, 1948-1950
(data on YOsu rebellion from MBC and Dong-a Ilbo, Sinydn Kwa yongkwang ii
minjok-sa |Seoul, 1975] ).
In each of them, the extent and type of foreign involvement, the issues
around which the political struggle revolved, and the military balance
on the peninsula were different.
In general, the approach used here in describing the interaction
between North and South Korea before the war is similar to Charles
McClelland’s in his analysis of the Taiwan Strait crisis. McClelland
found that the development of a crisis is not random, but exhibits
patterns of action and reaction, temporary status quos, and systems
of tacit communication that can be uncovered by charting the flow
of events. Once the main stages in the evolution of a crisis are identified
and their characteristics described, the reasons for the transitions from
one to another can be analyzed. This approach has the advantage of
bypassing the thorny problem of trying to determine the real motives
of statesmen in situations where sufficient information is unavailable.
We can summarize the stages in the development of the Korean
crisis as follows:
1. A period of rapidly escalating political violence and polarization
of opinion between Left and Right, precipitated by the arrival of the
INTERNAL WARFARE IN KOREA 139.
UN Commission in January 1948, and culminating in the Cheju-do
Rebellion in April.
2. A lull in guerrilla activity during the summer of 1948 as both
the South Korean Labor Party (SKLP) and the American Military
Government concentrated on preparations for the establishment of
rival governments.
3. A period of acute crisis for the new ROK government after the
Y6su Rebellion during which its very survival seemed at stake.
4, An upsurge in border clashes and naval incidents in the spring
and summer of 1949 caused primarily by a much more aggressive
southern policy vis-i-vis the North.
5. A period of heavy fighting in South Korea during the winter of
1949-50 in which the military arm of the SKLP was virtually de-
stroyed.
6. A period of artificial quiet just before the war when the political
situation in the ROK and the regional balance of power in East Asia
underwent major changes.
The first period (fall 1947-spring 1948) began with the establish-
ment of the UN Temporary Commission, which made the Korean
question no longer a matter of bilateral Soviet-U,S, negotiations and
began the process that led to the setting up of separate governments
in the two occupation zones. The Commission’s presence in the South
prompted an opposition campaign by the SKLP that escalated from
demonstrations to sabotage to a major popular rebellion on Cheju-do,
The period also saw the isolation of moderate and right-wing opponents
of Rhee, who alone among major political leaders supported separate
elections in the South, The pull of Korean nationalism was great
enough to attract many of Rhee’s opponents to a North Korean-
sponsored unification conference held in Haeju, The U.S. government,
anxious to pull out of Korea, pushed hard for UN involvement.> The
decision to hold separate elections ran counter to the opinion of most
members of the UN Commission and Korean political leaders. The
SKLP campaign against separate elections plunged Cheju-do into
more than a year of bloody internecine warfare, resulting in the deaths
of 15 percent of its population (some thirty to forty thousand people),
The complexity of the Communist response to the UN Commission
5. I have relied on three recent Ph.D. dissertations for details on the evolution
of American policy towards Korea during the 1948-1950 period: Charles M. Dobbs,
“American Foreign Policy, the Cold War, and Korea” (Indiana University, 1978);
James I, Matray, “The Reluctant Crusade; American Foreign Policy in Korea,
1941-1950" (University of Virginia, 1977); and Kenneth R, Mauck, “The Forma-
tion of American Foreign Policy in Korea, 1945-1953" (University of Oklahoma,
1978).
140 JOHN MERRILL
reflected deep divisions within the Korean leadership over the proper
strategy to adopt toward the commission. The initial reaction to its
formation in the North Korean press was relatively mild. And although
the commission was not admitted into the Russian zone, the P’ydng-
yang authorities ordered a sprucing-up drive to prepare the city for a
possible visit. Most SKLP leaders believed that a wave of arrests
earlier in the year had left the party too weak to actively oppose the
work of the commission, but Pak Hdn-ySng’s more militant view was
that the SKLP should lead a mass campaign against it ‘‘modelled on
the October 1946 People’s Resistance.’” He was later criticized for
leading an ‘‘adventurous charge” that needlessly exposed the party
organization to attack, but his position made sense at the time. There
was widespread public speculation about the extent of divisions within
the commission, and Pak may have felt that a show of opposition
would influence its decision.®
The SKLP called a three-day general strike beginning on February 7
that was accompanied by sabotage, mass demonstrations, and attacks
on police boxes. More than forty railroad locomotives were disabled
in one night, and communications links were cut in hundreds of places.
Several thousand demonstrators were arrested and more than forty
people killed. Such incidents continued sporadically through late
February.?
These tactics had some success. Unable to gain entrance to the
North and faced with the opposition to separate elections by most
southern leaders, the commission deferred to the UN Interim Assembly.
There, in a virtual coup that ran counter to the ‘‘nearly unanimous
opinion of the members of the Commission,” the United States pushed
through a resolution calling for ‘‘elections in that part of Korea acces-
sible to the (UN) Commission.”!° Thereafter, the UN group confined
itself to doing what it could to ensure a free atmosphere for the elec-
tions. The elections were held on May 10 amid great tension, with the
main responsibility for “processing voters” entrusted to the right-wing
6. Far Eastern Command (hereafter FEC) Intelligence Summaries (hereafter
IS), Jan, 17, 1948, National Archives, Washington, D.C,
7. IS, Jan. 30, 1948.
8. See Glenn D, Paige, ‘‘Korea,’’ in Communism and Revolution, ed, Cyril E.
Black and James P. Thornton (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), p. 222.
Also, Kim Min-ju, ed., Cheju-do inmin dill ii 4.3 mujang t’ujaeng sa—charyejip
[Materials on the April 3 armed uprising of the Cheju-do people] (Osaka, 1963),
p. 7.
9. U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, ‘Communist Capabilities in Southern
Korea’ (ORE-44-48), Oct. 28, 1948, Record Group (hereafter RG) 319, ORE-44-
48, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
10. 7S, Mar. 15, 1948.
INTERNAL WARFARE IN KOREA 14]
Community Protective Associations formed by the American Military
Government. Polling places were ringed by members of this group,
police, and constabulary men, who searched all voters before allowing
them to cast their ballots.!!
On Cheju-do, at least, all these precautions were needed. On April
3, a popular rebellion broke out as guerrilla units descended from
Halla-san, the volcanic peak that dominates the island, and occupied
most of the coastal towns. Seoul newspapers speculated that U.S.
tactical forces would have to be called in to contend with the “three
thousand armed rioters” who controlled most of the island.!2 Voting
was disrupted in two of the three electoral districts on Cheju-do where,
“during election week, there were fifty assorted demonstrations,
disorders, arson cases, and attacks on rightists’ offices and houses,
Sixty-three towns were attacked, in addition to three government
buildings,’*}8
Although the official casualty figures were low, many “‘stories were
told of raided villages where there were found the bodies of hanged
women and children run through with spears. Tales of villages nearly
wiped out kept coming in. Numbers of rightists and police were kid-
napped, then hanged or beheaded.”!* Additional police and right-
wing youth association members were rushed to the island to restore
government control, A U.S. destroyer took up station between Cheju-do
and the mainland to prevent guerrilla infiltration, and planes flew over
the island in a show of force.
The fighting subsided once the elections were over, but flared up
again in the following October and January. Before it ended, the
rebellion claimed some 30,000 lives, about 10 percent of the island’s
population. Throughout the rebellion, the guerrilla forces persisted
in the face of extremely adverse circumstances. (This was in marked
contrast to the peasant rebellions that occurred on the island at the
turn of the century, which tended to melt away at the first show of
government force.) Class divisions on the island do not appear to have
been as important as the tight clan structure and social solidarity of
the islanders in contributing to the rebellion. Many of the leaders of
(he uprising were returnees from Japan and teachers in the island’s
schools, The SKLP also had considerable support among the locally
recruited constabulary forces stationed on the island, The efforts of
11. JS, “Special Edition on the Korean Elections,” May 30, 1948,
12. United States Armed Forces in Korea (hereafter USAFIK), South Korean
Interim Government Activities (Seoul, May 1948), pp. 156-57; and April, p, 179
13, FEC, “History of USAFIK,” pt. 3, p. 18, ms, on file at the U.S, Army
Genter for Military History, Washington, D.C,
l4, Ibid,
142 JOHN MERRILL
government troops were hampered by information leaks, assassinations
of key officers, defections to the guerrillas, and a poor relationship with
police and rightist groups, which made coordinated action impossible,
Some Japanese arms were probably available on Cheju-do, which was
heavily garrisoned during World War II. The importance of this factor,
however, is greatly exaggerated in South Korean accounts. The SKLP
probably did not plan the rebellion; more likely it was the result of
the island’s remoteness, the weakness of government control, and the
long-standing grievance against the mainland authorities.
During the second period (summer, 1948) internal violence in Korea
subsided markedly. The elections were over and both sides were preoc-
cupied with laying the foundations for the governments to be estab-
lished in the Soviet and American zones, While the South was embroiled
in a constitutional debate in the newly elected National Assembly, the
SKLP attempted to carry out an underground election in late July and
August to select delegates to the conference that would formally estab-
lish the DPRK in early September. With the formation of two rival gov-
ernments in Korea, each claiming exclusive jurisdiction over the whole
peninsula, the process begun by the UN Commission was nearly complete.
The SKLP was busy with three main tasks throughout the summer.
The first was a shake-up of the party organization to make it more
responsive to central control. Pak HOn-ySng was reported to be greatly
dissatisfied with the party’s performance in the February resistance
campaign. Local cadres were reassigned and a greater centralization
imposed on provincial party branches to ensure that future directives
would be more effectively implemented.!® The second goal was the
creation of guerrilla ‘‘flying columns’? in mountain bases to provide
the party with the strong military arm that was lacking during the
February campaign. The most important task, however, was the August
underground elections, Communist claims that elections were held
to establish the DPRK in the southern zone as well as in the North
have usually been received with extreme skepticism, if not entirely
dismissed. Nevertheless, U.S. sources indicate that the SKLP did
organize a signature-gathering campaign in the summer of 1948 to
select delegates to the conference that established the DPRK. As much
as 25 percent of the rural population may have participated in this
drive, whether they voted “knowingly” or out of fear.!”
15. For details see my article, ‘The Cheju-do Rebellion,” Journal of Korean
Studies, vol. 2 (1980), pp. 139-98.
16. IS, Sept. 27, 1948; and USAFIK, Weekly Report, Sept. 6, 1948, copy in
Supreme Command, Allied Powers (SCAP) Adjutant General’s File, RG 331,
National Archives.
17. Exchange of messages between Department of the Army (Sept. 10, 1948)
Jv. (Ret.), “Pre-War South Korea Questionnaire Response,’
INTERNAL WARFARE IN KOREA 143
As this period drew to a close, a fundamentally different situation
emerged. Two hostile governments now faced each other across the
parallel, Tensions began to mount along the border as U.S. and Soviet
troops turned their positions over to their Korean counterparts. Rumors
were rife of an imminent invasion from the North. The presence of
wecupation forces still prevented direct military conflict, but the
Soviets announced that their troops would be withdrawn by the end
of the year and the United States began a similar pullback, Another
diplomatic round remained to be fought in the General Assembly
debate in the fall of 1948, but the lines of the future conflict in Korea
were now essentially drawn.
The third period (fall 1948-winter 1948-49) was a time of acute
crisis for the ROK government with its very survival at stake. The
period opened with the October 19 Ydsu Rebellion. Two thousand
South Korean constabulary troops mutinied as they were about to
embark for Cheju-do. The rebellion revealed a widespread Communist
penetration in the constabulary, undermining public confidence in
the security forces and widening the gulf between the police and the
urmy. The South Korean leadership was poorly equipped to handle
the crisis. The cabinet was split by dissension and personal rivalries,
und President Rhee, according to one report, was showing signs of
“incipient senility.’? Moreover, there was fear that the United States
was about to abandon the South; this anxiety was aggravated by a
steady stream of invasion rumors floated by the North. The DPRK’s
policy toward the South seemed to follow a dual course, On the one
hand, it attempted to undercut the legitimacy of the Rhee government
by unsettling the domestic situation in the South. On the other, it
launched a diplomatic offensive against the ROK with the aid of the
Soviet bloc in the fall General Assembly debate.
Renewed fighting on Cheju-do in early October led to the decision
to reinforce the constabulary forces operating on the island with the
Vourteenth Regiment from YOsu. As it was about to embark, the
regiment rebelled.!8 The uprising seems to have been prematurely
und General Hodge (Sept. 30, 1948) on the elections in SCAP Adjutant General’s
Vile, National Archives.
18. The account of the Yosu Rebellion is based on the following sources:
Maj. John R. Reed, ‘The Truth About the Yosu Incident,’’ ms. on file at the
U.S. Army Center for Military History, Washington, D.C. Maj. Bernie W. Griffith,
> ms. in answer to the
author’s inquiries, January, 1979; Capt, James H. Hausman, ‘‘History of Rebellion,
idth Constabulary Regiment,’ interview with a “long-time observer of Korean
security affairs,’ Seoul, Nov. 30, 1977; and the JS reports on the incident in the
weeks following the rebellion.
144 JOHN MERRILL
precipitated by a special set of local circumstances. The regiment had
been reinforced for duty on Cheju-do with light mortars and machine
guns drawn from other constabulary units. It also had just been sup-
plied with M-1 carbines but had not yet turned in the japanese rifles
with which it was originally equipped. A statement by the Soldiers’
Committee published in the YOsu papers while the city was under rebel
control explained that the soldiers “refused to murder the people of
Cheju-do [fighting] against imperialist policy.” SKLP cells in the
regiment and neighboring towns cooperated in staging the rebellion,
People’s courts were established in YSsu and Sunch’dn, and police
and rightists were searched out and executed. The rebels never intended
to hold the two towns, and retreated to the nearby Chiri massif to
carry on protracted guerrilla warfare. Since two American combat
divisions were still stationed in Korea, it seems unlikely that the rebel-
lion sought the immediate overthrow of the Rhee government. Its
main goal was to obtain a large supply of arms and set up a guerrilla
infrastructure in the Chiri mountains. The absence of immediate
support to the guerrillas from the North also suggests that the rebellion
was not centrally planned.
The rebellion had immediate and far-reaching consequences, YSsu
was a major embarrassment to the ROK in the fall UN debate and
produced a tremendous sense of insecurity among the South Koreans.
The military situation was touch and go for the first few days after the
rebellion, No one was sure whether the revolt was planned and if it
would spread to other constabulary regiments. Enough incidents
occurred elsewhere to keep alive doubts about their reliability. The
Soviet announcement of its troop withdrawal from the North put
pressure on the United States to make a similar move. American with-
drawals after YOsu slowed down on the entreaties of the Rhee govern-
ment, but it appeared for a time that the United States might leave
the ROK to face its fate alone. A CLA study made shortly after YOsu
mirrored this pessimism in its title—‘‘Prospects for the Survival of the
ROK.” Its conclusion was that the Rhee government would flounder
without substantial amounts of American military and economic
aid, and that even then its chances were no better than even.!9 Exact
casualty figures for YOsu are not available, though South Korean
accounts state that about 1,200 civilians and progovernment forces
were killed, as against 1,500 rebels and their supporters.2° Warning
19. U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, ‘‘Prospects for the Survival of the Re-
public of Korea,” Oct. 28, 1948, RG 319, ORE 44-48.
20. Dong-a Ibo, Siry¥n kwa y¥nggwang Wi minjok-sa [History of the trials
and glories of the nation] (Seoul, 1975),
INTERNAL WARFARE IN KOREA 145
that Korea had never before in its history had as many traitors, Rhee
also pushed a National Security Act through the National Assembly,
tightened control of the press, and embarked on a widespread purge
of the constabulary in which over a thousand persons were arrested.
The fourth period (spring through summer of 1949) was charac-
terized by an outbreak of large scale fighting along the parallel and the
opening of a major guerrilla offensive in the South. The border fighting,
which began in the midst of discussions between the ROK and the
United States over troop withdrawal, reflected a new assertiveness
by the Rhee government towards the North. This so-called ‘policy
of bluff” involved a series of military, diplomatic, and propaganda
activities designed to secure an American security commitment, pry
loose additional aid, and maintain pressure on the North?!
By the spring of 1949, the Rhee government was prey to a mood
of self-confidence that verged on bravado. The new ROK had success-
fully weathered the difficult challenges that faced it in its first months.
The Y6su Rebellion had been suppressed. On Cheju-do, an all-out
pacification drive begun in February had prepared the island for Rhee’s
April visit. Accompanied by a large entourage of foreign and domestic
reporters, Rhee scored a “‘public relations home run’’ on his swing
through the troubled southern provinces.?? Furthermore, the South
had been successful in winning widespread recognition among the
Western powers after the fall UN debate. Most likely, the southern
leaders felt that they had been too long on the receiving end of Com-
munist attacks and that they were now in a position to return the
fire. There were several aspects to this much more active southern
policy.
For one thing, Rhee and his ministers made repeated public calls
for a march north. All that held Rhee back was the knowledge that
this would result in a break with the United States, and the South’s
lack of sufficient offensive weapons (especially an air force). To attract
more American military aid, the Ministry of Education mobilized tens
of thousands of students to participate in ‘‘give us arms’’ demonstra-
tions in front of the U.S. Embassy in Seoul, A parallel effort in Wash-
ington involved lobbying congressmen and Defense Department of-
ficials.
A diplomatic offensive was also begun as Rhee threw his support
behind a Philippine initiative for a Pacific pact. Modeled on NATO,
21. Yi Ho-jae, Han’guk oegyo ch®ngch'aek ti isang kwa hyBnsil: Yi Stingman
vegyo wa miguk [The ideal and reality of Korean diplomatic policy: Syngman
Rhee’s diplomacy and America (1945-1953)| (Seoul, 1975),
22. Roberts to Wedemeyer, May 2, 1949, in U.S. Department of the Army,
G-3 Plans and Operations Viles (hereafter ? & O Piles), National Archives,
si JOHN MERRILL
the goal of the proposal was to draw a reluctant United States into a
more definite commitment to the security of its allies in Asia. Discus-
sions progressed to the point of a visit by Chiang K’ai-shek to Chinhae
in August for a conference with Rhee. Although Chiang offered fighter
squadrons in return for Korean bases to bomb the mainland, Rhee
wisely balked at becoming involved in the Chinese civil war. The
release of the U.S. White Papers on China on the final day of the
conference killed any chances of agreement with the Nationalists.
Ultimately, the proposal for a Pacific pact turned out to be a major
embarrassment that further isolated the ROK when it was excluded,
along with the Nationalists, from the Baguio Conference early in 1950.
But more was involved than threats, lobbying, and diplomacy.
Serious fighting also broke out for the first time along the parallel.
Three points should be made. First, unlike previous incidents, these
were not spontaneous outbursts. Some were undoubtedly started on
the initiative of local commanders, particularly on the southern side;
General Roberts feared that these “boy scout tactics” might provoke
a major conflagration. Not much seems to have been done, however,
by the Rhee government to control these commanders. In at least
some cases, they were acting on the direct orders of political leaders,
not on their own. The North exercised much tighter control over its
forces along the parallel. While the DPRK started its share of incidents,
these were limited engagements designed to drive home political points.
The North had a relatively restrained posture, concentrating on the
build-up of a “revolutionary base” in the North and supporting a
limited guerrilla offensive in the South. A second point about the
border incidents is that they were closely related to political events:
the withdrawal of American occupation forces, the formation of a
Democratic Front for the Unification of the Fatherland (DFUF), the
visit of Chiang K’ai-shek, and a propaganda campaign against “South
Korean border provocations.” Finally, a close examination of the
pattern of these incidents reveals a complex sequence of actions and
reactions as each side adjusted and responded to the moves of the
other. Since only fragmentary newspaper accounts of these battles have
been available in English, it is necessary to examine them in some detail
here,
The fighting started in early May 1949 when ROK forces began a
“general consolidation of the parallel” in the midst of discussions with
the United States over troop withdrawal. The first incident occurred
near KaesOng on May 4 when North Korean border guards pushed
South Korean troops from newly occupied positions straddling the
parallel, touching off four days of heavy fighting that eventually
involved battalion-sized units, On May 5, elements of two ROK bat-
INTERNAL WARFARE IN KOREA 147
tallions, in the most serious instance of disaffection in the security
forces since Y8su, defected to the North in the Ch’unch’Sn area.
Unsettled by these incidents, Rhee went public with his doubts on
troop withdrawal, demanding that the United States “sit down im-
mediately and state its policies and plans in respect to the immediate
future of Korea.” In an attempt to offset the effects of the defections
the South Korean media played up the deaths of “ten brave soldiers”
killed in a suicide charge on the North Korean positions during the
Kaesng fighting. The heroism of the “ten human bombs” received so
much publicity, in fact, that the phrase entered the language in the
South, ROK forces also attempted to ambush North Korean border
guards in the UijSngbu area on May 7 by baiting them with a staged
defection. During the course of this unsuccessful operation, South
Korean units penetrated ‘four kilometers into the North and shot up
several villages,”’
The North responded on May 18 with an attack by several com-
panies of border guards in the Packch’Sn area that carried almost ten
kilometers south of the parallel before it was repulsed by South Korean
reinforcements rushed to the scene, A more serious incident occurred
three days later when a series of minor clashes escalated into a major
attack by two North Korean battalions in the Turak mountain area
on the Ongjin peninsula. The South poured reinforcements into the
peninsula by landing ships from Inch’Sn, rapidly expanding its forces
from a few companies at the onset of the fighting to more than eight
battalions by early June, Despite this massive build-up, adverse terrain
and North Korean superiority in artillery made it difficult to dislodge
the DPRK forces from their five-kilometer deep salient. During the
course of the fighting, a South Korean guerrilla unit attacked T’aet’an
some ten kilometers north of the parallel, in an attempt to put pressure
on the rear of the northern forces, The ROK forces finally succeeded
in retaking most of their positions and occupying Unp’a-san, a moun-
tain several hundred meters north of the border dominating the ap-
proaches to the North Korean city of Haeju. By the end of June, the
situation on the peninsula had stabilized, About half the southern
lorce was withdrawn, and the chief of staff of the ROK Army guided
members of the UN Commission and reporters on a tour of the area
declaring that the South had “recovered the initiative on all fronts,”
Serious fighting continued through June and July in numerous
small unit engagements, In June, a company of South Korean guerrillas
lrom the Ho-rim (Forest Tiger) unit was captured while on a deep
penetration raid into the North, According to American sources com-
menting on northern propaganda on their trial in P’ySngyang in Sep-
tember, ROK guerrilla units had previously been reported attacking
148 JOHN MERRILL
targets as far north as the outskirts of Wdnsan on the east coast, al-
though the exact extent of their operations was unknown, In July,
elements of an ROK batallion were also beaten back in an attack ona
guerrilla base at Yangyang, just across the parallel. The minister of
national defense may have been referring to the ROK’s ability to
stage successful incursions on the east coast when he told reporters on
July 17 that the army was “awaiting an order from President Rhee
and [was] confident of completely occupying Yangyang or Wdnsan in
a day.” '
Heavy fighting flared up again in August as clashes involving bat-
talion-sized units broke out at Ongjin, Kaesdng, and Ch’unch’dn. The
incidents began on July 25 when a South Korean battalion attacked a
northern observation post on Hill 488, a few hundred meters north
of the parallel, overlooking Kaesdng. The position changed hands twice
over the next few days. KaesOng itself was shelled in a fierce artillery
duel between the two sides that lasted a week. The incident was sig-
nificant since it demonstrated an overwhelming northern superiority
in artillery, and marked the first major involvement by the North
Korean army in support of the border guards. Another battle broke
out on Ongjin on August 4, causing a brief panic among the southern
forces in which an order was nearly given to evacuate the whole penin-
sula. A third incident began two days later when North Korean forces
occupied several strategic hills along the parallel near Ch’unch’dn. Two
weeks of heavy fighting followed before ROK troops retook the heights
in a regimental assault supported by artillery. General Roberts, the head
of the Korean Military Advisory Group (KMAG), described these
August clashes as follows:
Each was in our opinion brought on by the presence of a small South ‘Korean
salient north of the parallel, Each was characterized by the CO’s screaming “in-
vasion, reinforce, ammo!” . . . The South Koreans wish to invade the North. We
tell them that if such occurs, all advisors will pull put and the ECA spigot will be
turned off. In case they’d lost the Ongjin peninsula, they felt they’d have to invade
to Chorown about twenty miles in, in order to save face. . .. Most incidents on the
parallel are due to needling by opposing local forces. Both North and South are at
fault. No attacks by the North have ever been in serious proportions.
These Kaesdng battles appear to have been designed by the South to
exploit the attention focused on Korea by the upcoming visit of Chiang
K’ai-shek to discuss a Pacific pact. The Ongjin and Ch’unch’6n incidents
may have been Northern attempts to embarrass the ROK during the
Chinese leader’s visit.
23. Roberts to Bolte, in ‘Personal Comments on KMAG and Korean Affairs,"
Aug. 19, 1949, in P & O Files, National Archives,
INTERNAL WARFARE IN KOREA 149
There was no ambiguity about the causes of several serious naval
engagements that also took place during this month, South Korean
intelligence personnel disguised as fishermen sailed from Inch’5n early
in August to raid North Korean coastal shipping. ROK vessels also
shelled shore installations near the mouth of the Taedong River on
August 11. The most serious incident occurred six days later when a
ROK task force of six mine sweepers attacked the military harbor of
Monggump’o, capturing one North Korean ship and sinking four,
The naval chain of command was bypassed in this attack with the
commander of the ROK ships, Lee Yong-woon, acting on the direct
orders of the minister of national defense, an ex-navy man, After the
incident, Lee was quickly reassigned by his patrons to an obscure port
command to get him out of harm’s way as Ambassador Muccio and
KMAG advisers clamored for disciplinary action,*# Although American
advisers seem to have been kept in the dark, learning about these ac-
tions only after the fact, port calls by U.S. warships over the summer
and ROK-initiated discussions concerning basing agreements may have
contributed to the South Korean naval offensive.
The parallel remained relatively quiet after this until mid-October.
In the midst of a North Korean campaign against ROK border provoca-
tions, two battalions of the DPRK’s forces pushed southern troops
from the positions they still held on Unp’a-san on the northern side of
the parallel. Concerned about the continuing fighting on Ongjin, where
ROK forces would be trapped if war broke out, KMAG pressured the
South Korean military to pull back from the exposed peninsula. ROK
strength was further reduced to two battalions and Colonel Paek In-ydp
was assigned as the new commander with orders to keep things quiet.
Despite these instructions, Paek staged a surprise attack in mid-Decem-
ber on the North Korean positions to “increase morale,” Briefly retak-
ing Unp’a-san, Paek brought the northern forces into a hasty counter-
attack in which one of their battalions was badly mauled in a ROK
ambush, After this, the Ongjin peninsula, and the border in general,
was quiet until just before the war.
24, This account of the border clashes is based upon the following sources:
Committee for the Compilation of War History, Han’guk ch¥njaeng-sa I, Haebang
kwa k&n’gun [History of the Korean War, vol. 1: The liberation and the establish-
ment of the army] (Seoul, 1967), pp. 506-37; Sasaki Harutaka, Han "gukch&n-bisa,
sang-gwon: kon’gun kwa sirydn [Secret history of the Korean War, vol. 1: The
establishment of the army and its trials} (Seoul: Py&nghaksa, 1977), pp. 417-62;
and U.S, Military Attache (USMILAT), and /S reports for the period. Interestingly,
the second edition of Han'euk ch Unjaeng-sa omits all reference to the border Clashes
since they were regarded as being “too political.” Interview with Yi HySng-sdk,
chairman of the Gommittee for the Compilation of War History, Seoul, 1978.
150 JOHN MERRILL
While these border incidents clearly marked a major escalation in
the confrontation between the South and the North, it is difficult to
gauge their seriousness, General Roberts believed that the clashes were
deliberately exaggerated by the South to obtain more aid and “a
general rule of thumb” was to discount casualty figures by a factor
of ten. KMAG estimates, on the other hand, were biased in the opposite
direction and tended to downplay the seriousness of the military
situation in Korea, The size of the units involved and the weapons
employed suggest that some of those border engagements were major
battles. Reliable casualty figures are not available, but they must
have been heavy. Intelligence reports mentioned North Korean trains
crowded with wounded after some engagements and a KMAG observer
reported seeing South Korean dead ‘‘stacked in a tent like cordwood”
during one phase of the Ongjin fighting.
It is apparent that both sides initiated some engagements and that
neither considered the parallel an international boundary. The North
seems to have gotten the worst of it in the actual fighting. The reason
for this was that it garrisoned its border with a lightly armed police
force under the ministry of the interior, like most Communist states,
while holding its main forces in reserve. The South was often able,
therefore, to achieve local superiority in the initial stages of an engage-
ment before the North could bring its army into play. But the fighting
was a costly diversion for the South. It reduced the readiness of ROK
forces by cutting down on training and using up scarce supplies. Sus-
picion of Rhee’s motives among American policy makers growing out
of these incidents also contributed, along with economic constraints
and consideration of responsibilities elsewhere, to the decision to
limit military aid to “defensive weapons.’’ The border incidents, more-
over, made it more difficult to read the DPRK’s intentions. The gradual
deployment of North Korean forces toward the parallel that began in
the fall could easily be interpreted as a defensive reaction, The North
was clearly worried by the border fighting: rumors of an invasion from
the South began to be heard in the North for the first time as the
DPRK began a major campaign against southern “‘border provocations.”
One conclusion follows from these border incidents. Although one
of the best arguments against the Gupta thesis that the war began with
a small South Korean incursion at Haeju is the relatively restrained
response of the North to the incidents during the earlier period, the
cumulative effect of these incidents may well have been to create an
image among the northern leadership of a long-term threat from the
South, Therefore this may have lent a certain preemptive quality to
the June 1950 attack,
At any rate, North Korean and Soviet policy underwent a decisive
INTERNAL WARFARE IN KOREA 151
shift early in this period, By the spring of 1949, the DPRK had aban-
doned any hopes it might have had of gaining support for its position
in the United Nations. The North suffered a major diplomatic setback
when the General Assembly adopted a U,S. resolution recognizing
the ROK as the only legitimate government on the peninsula, Pak
H6n-y6ng, the DPRK’s foreign minister, announced soon after that
the North would henceforth “rely on its own resources” to unify the
country. Soviet policy also changed. In March 1949, Kim Il-sung and
Pak headed a high-level North Korean delegation that traveled to
Moscow for negotiations with the Soviet leadership. The trip resulted
in cultural and economic treaties as well as a secret military aid agree-
ment. It is apparently to these meetings that Khrushchev refers in his
memoirs, when he recalls how Kim pushed for an attack that would
touch off a domestic uprising in the South. That something unusual
was afoot seemed to be indicated by the failure to sign a mutual se-
curity treaty. Observers surmised that this departure from normal
practice might indicate a Soviet unwillingness to become involved if
a conflict flared up in Korea, It is doubtful, however, that a decision
(o attack the South was reached at this point. Stalin had a reputation
lor extreme caution in his foreign policy initiatives, and was unlikely
to commit himself irrevocably to such a course of action so far in
advance. The initial Soviet arms deliveries were limited, probably not
yreatly exceeding the standard satellite level and certainly not bringing
the North Korean forces up to the strength of the Soviet occupation
troops formerly in the country, That the Soviets were not munificent
in their initial aid to the DPRK is also suggested by the formation of
u Military Sponsorship Committee in July to solicit contributions
\o purchase arms. The main build-up of the North Korean forces did
not occur until the fall, and arms were still arriving in the spring of
1950 when war broke out, The main thrust of North Korean policy
was a renewed emphasis on armed guerrilla struggle in the South,
The major unification initiative on the northern side during this
period was the formation of the DFUF on June 25 in response to an
appeal by leftist groups in the South for a united front against the
Khee government. Despite its name, the formation of the front re-
‘lected the intensified suppression of leftists in the ROK, which made
open political action in concert with opponents of Rhee impossible.
Sull, the president was taking no chances. The day after the establish-
inent of the DFUF, his chief opponent on the Right, Kim Ku, who
had been in touch with the North in an attempt to form a Peaceful
Unification Conference, was assassinated, The DFUF was also an
attempt to capitalize on the pull-out of the last American combat
troops (five hundred KMAG advisers remained behind) in June, The
152 JOHN MERRILL
main proposal to come out of the inaugural meeting of the DFUF
was a call for elections in the North and South to form an all-Korea
legislative body by September.
Along with the formation of the DFUF, the SKLP opened a large-
scale guerrilla offensive in the South. Aided by the diversion of ROK
forces to the parallel clashes, the remnants of the Chiri-san guerrillas
succeeded in regrouping and breaking out of the remote mountainous
areas to which they had been confined over the winter by the pressure
of ROK operations. In a ‘‘surge of activity,” the guerrillas began to
expand their base areas ‘‘and increase their hit-and-run attacks on
villages, police boxes, police stations, and small government installa-
tions, such as power stations. Roadblocks were established in remote
areas and other transportation was harassed. Atrocities became com-
mon practice ... by late spring or early summer of 1949, these guerrilla
bands had become a real problem.””°
The North supported the offensive by infiltrating several guerrilla
units trained at the Kangdong Political Institute into the South. A
second base area was established in the Odae mountain area, just below
the parallel on the east coast, with the dispatch of some six hundred
guerrillas in June and July. The revival of the insurgent movement
was reflected in a shift in casualty figures, which began to tilt in the
guerrillas’ favor. The police also began to pull back from isolated
outposts, and formed special units to guard railroad and other com-
munications links, By midsummer, guerrilla bands were ‘‘attacking at
will” in many areas of the South,
A more serious wave of attacks came in early August as the SKLP
attempted to implement the call for all-Korea elections in September.
A captured directive urged the guerrillas to make an all-out effort,
stating that “‘the final reckoning was at hand.” The offensive was
supported by two more infiltrations of guerrillas on the east coast.
Three hundred guerrillas, commanded by Kim Tal-sam, the leader of
the Cheju-do rebellion who had fled to the North, penetrated into the
Andong area in early August to establish a third base area. Three
hundred and sixty guerrillas infiltrated into the T’aebaek mountains
under Yi Ho-je in five separate groups a month later. With these
new infiltrations, the guerrilla movement reached a peak strength of
some three thousand men, with three to five times as many supporters
in the base areas. Why the September elections were never held remains
something of a puzzle. While some accounts have speculated that the
25. USMILAT, Weekly Report, Sept. 24, 1949; and the captured North Korean
newsfilm of the trial, “Ho Rim Army Group Trials, Oct. 1949,” MID 5402, RG
242, National Archives,
INTERNAL WARFARE IN KOREA 153
SKLP may have been encouraged by Kim Il-sung to exhaust its strength
in futile attacks to undercut the position of Pak Hdn-ySng, or was
forced to call off a planned attack under Soviet pressure, neither
explanation seems convincing. The most likely explanation is that the
guerrillas were unable to demonstrate enough strength to make a
northern initiative possible, Although the guerrilla groups were ap-
parently in contact with the North by radio, they were isolated from
each other and unable to effectively coordinate operations. The guer-
rillas, all of whom were originally from the South, received almost no
support from the North after their infiltration and had to rely on a
greatly weakened SKLP organization. When it became clear that the
offensive was not achieving its objectives, Radio P’ySngyang simply
dropped all mention of the elections.
Guerrilla activity also fell off in mid-September, but picked up
again early the next month. Responding to calls for a ‘‘winter offen-
sive,’ the guerrillas shifted tactics to large-scale attacks on towns.
On October 2, Kim Tal-sam’s unit launched coordinated assaults on
the police station, prison, and army barracks at Andong, Later in the
month, on October 27, several hundred Chiri-san guerrillas mounted
an attack on Chinju, the base of the newly formed ROK Marine Corps.
Guerrilla units on the east coast also began to consolidate their forces.
The badly mauled remnants of Yi Ho-je’s guerrilla unit joined up
with Kim Tal-sam’s group in the P’ohang area, when they were re-
inforced on November 6 by one hundred men infiltrated by sea. De-
spite the continuing play given by radio P’ySngyang to their activity,
it was apparent that the North was losing touch with the guerrillas.
The truth was that the guerrillas were falling back as an ROK counter-
offensive, launched in October, gathered momentum,
During the fifth period (winter of 1949-50), most of the fighting
shifted to the interior of the ROK. To deal with the revival of guerrilla
activity, the South Korean government launched a major offensive
against the guerrillas that succeeded over the winter in breaking the
back of the insurgent movement. The substantial SKLP party organiza-
tion also came under increasing attack by ROK security agencies
utilizing the National Guidance Alliance, a network of former Com-
munist informants. But if the internal situation in the ROK was improv-
ing, its international position seemed to be increasingly in question.
Doubts about the American security commitment were raised early in
the new year by Secretary of State Acheson’s speech excluding the
ROK from the U.S. defense perimeter in Asia and the vote of the
House of Representatives to cut off Korean aid. The military balance
on the peninsula, meanwhile, was tilting sharply in the DPRK’s favor
as large quantities of Soviet aid arrived and Korean veterans of the
Chinese Communist forces returned to the North,
154 JOHN MERRILL
The South Korean offensive against the guerrillas began in early
September and continued throughout the winter. Several hundred
separate counterguerrilla operations were conducted by the ROK
army and police, some of them involving several battalions of troops.
The offensive was designed to break the hold of the guerrillas on the
countryside by employing a classic strategy of area clearance. The
first step was to blockade the base areas by setting up check points,
roadblocks, and a coast watcher system to prevent the guerrillas from
moving freely and to stop reinforcements from reaching them, In
the second stage, the rural population in areas of guerrilla activity was
relocated by the police to villages under government control, thus
depriving the insurgents of food, shelter, and manpower. Along the
western margins of the Chiri mountains alone, more than ninety thou-
sand persons were moved out of villages exposed to guerrilla attacks,
Village guard forces were established to watch fields at night, man
roadblocks, and assist in operations against the guerrillas. The evacuated
areas were considered “‘free fire zones” in which anyone remaining
behind was assumed to be associated with the guerrillas. During the
final phases of the operations, government forces conducted sweeps
of the isolated base areas one by one. The increasingly desperate
situation of the guerrillas was reflected in their changing pattern of
activity as the winter continued. Avoiding contact with the ROK
forces whenever possible, the guerrilla units began to conduct foraging
raids over wider areas to secure food and supplies. Winter operations
in the South Korean mountains were extremely difficult, even for
the government task forces, with many deaths from exposure,
The military operations were coupled with highly effective meas-
ures to undercut popular support for the guerrillas. An amnesty pro-
gram begun in late October, lasting five weeks, succeeded in inducing
over forty thousand defections. The activities of the 200,000-member
National Guidance Alliance also helped to uncover SKLP sympathizers
and assisted the police in maintaining surveillance of former Com-
munists. The stepped-up pressure began to pay off in late March when
Kim Sam-nyong and Yi Chu-ha, the two top-ranking leaders of the party
remaining in the South, were arrested in Seoul. Their prominence is
suggested by the DPRK’s proposal to exchange them for Cho Man-sik,
a nationalist purged by the Soviets in 1946 for refusing to go along
with trusteeship. The swap fell through because of suspicions of both
sides. In fact, the SKLP organization was beginning to crumble, Even
though CIA reports and Khrushchev’s memoirs agree in placing the
SKLP’s strength at half a million members, widespread arrests had
badly disrupted its communications and seemed to render it incapable
of taking coordinated action.
INTERNAL WARFARE IN KOREA 155
Things were not going so well, however, for the Rhee government in
its relations with the United States, As mentioned, in a still contro-
versial speech delivered to the National Press Club on January 12, the
U.S. Secretary of State Acheson seemed to exclude the ROK from the
American defense perimeter in Asia. The speech seemed to represent
a new departure in policy, and its delivery by an authoritative spokes-
man to an audience of news editors gave it much greater prominence
than any previous statement on the subject. For some weeks after-
wards, Rhee made a habit of buttonholing every American that he
encountered to lecture him on the inconstancy of U.S, policy with
the aid of a pocket map with Acheson’s defense perimeter outlined
in red ink,*6 According to a former North Korean journalist, Kim Il-sung
was also “much excited’? when informed of wire service reports of
Acheson’s remarks.*” The rejection of the Korean aid bill by the House
of Representatives a week later, though subsequently reversed, only
compounded the adverse impact of the speech, Serious tensions were
also developing in the Korean-American relationship over Rhee’s
drift towards authoritarianism and his casual handling of economic
problems, Rhee was seen by many Americans as a “little Chiang K’ai-
shek”? whose government was likely to go the same way as the Kuomin-
tang in China. Increasing strains in the relationship culminated in an
aide-mémoire on April 25 threatening a cut-off in assistance if National
Assembly elections were not held on schedule and if steps were not
taken to curb inflationary pressures on the ROK economy,
At the same time the DPRK’s conventional military capabilities
were rapidly expanding. In addition to the flow of arms from the
Soviet Union, the DPRK’s forces were augmented by the return of
Korean veterans who had served with the Chinese Communists. The
victory of the People’s Liberation Army over the Nationalists in the
fall of 1949 made possible the repatriation of as many as forty thou-
sand of these troops to the DPRK. These experienced and ideologically
committed volunteers were incorporated as units into the North Korean
army in a major addition to the DPRK’s military strength. There
were several signs, moreover, that DPRK policy was in a state of flux.
The North apparently began to reassess its strategy toward the South
at a three-day meeting attended by several members of the SKLP
faction in P’ySngyang at the end of the year. A North Korean delega-
tion headed by Kim Tu-bong also reportedly attended an ‘Asiatic
26. Interview with a “long-time observer of Korean security affairs,” Seoul,
Nov. 30, 1977.
27. According to the story of Han Ghae-ddk, now deceased, as recounted in
interviews with Yi Chong-hak, Seoul, July 28, 1978 and James Lee, Seoul, June 16,
1978.
156 JOHN MERRILL
defense discussion” held in Moscow in late December. Future courses
of action in Korea may have been discussed, moreover, during Mao’s
visit to the Soviet Union early in the year, although there is no definite
evidence one way or the other on this point.
The sixth period (spring 1950) was characterized by an artificially
quiet military situation and a series of fast-breaking political develop-
ments, Guerrilla activity and border clashes fell off dramatically in the
months before the war. The only border fighting occurred when the
remnants of the east coast guerrillas attempted to exfiltrate to the
North in early March. Two heavily armed units of over six hundred
men assigned to escort them were almost completely wiped out by
ROK forces. The political atmosphere in the South also heated up
during this period with opposition proposals for a constitutional
amendment leading to a cabinet-dominant system, disputes between
the legislature and Rhee over the budget and scheduling of elections,
and the May 30 National Assembly elections. Radio P’ySngyang made
increasingly strident attacks stating that Korea was at a crossroads
and only through the overthrow of Rhee could the country be saved.
In late March, the guerrilla units that had been sent South over
the previous summer attempted to make their way back to the North,
Much reduced in size, the guerrilla bands came under heavy pressure
as they tried to reach the parallel. On March 24 and 26, two groups
of about three hundred members each were sent to guide the remnants
of the guerrillas to the North. The relief columns were unable to carry
out their mission and were almost totally wiped out by the ROK Army.
The exfiltration of these east coast guerrillas, who would have been
ideally placed to support a North Korean attack, suggests to some that
the decision to invade the South was made after this point.
The National Assembly elections were finally held on May 30
after strong representations by the United States. While the election
results represented a setback for Rhee, their importance in the timing
of the North Korean attack has been greatly exaggerated. The
composition of the new legislature was still not clear on the eve of the
war. While the main winners were independent candidates who had
sat out the 1948 balloting, this was not necessarily a defeat for Rhee.
Rhee himself had encouraged independents to run, realizing the weak-
ness of his own organization and the lack of a leader of comparable
stature around whom opponents could rally. The main conservative
opposition group, in fact, had lost even a greater percentage of its
seats than had supporters of the president. Moderate and progressive
candidates had captured about a quarter of the seats. What the election
results seemed to show was the existence of considerable latent dis-
satisfaction with the government and greater willingness to explore
INTERNAL WARFARE IN KOREA 157
an accommodation with the North. But Rhee had been in tight spots
before, and still had ample resources to bring the new assembly into
line.
The North made two unification proposals in the weeks before the
war. The first proposal was made by the DFUF on June 7 as a counter
to the South Korean elections. It called for new all-Korea elections to
choose representatives to a unification conference to be held either in
Haeju or Kaesdng, the goal being to unify the country by August 15,
the fifth anniversary of liberation. The second unification initiative
calling for the merger of the two Korean legislatures into a single body
was made by the Supreme People’s Assembly on June 19. The initiative
probably represented an attempt to feel out the opinion of the new
assembly, whose members might be more receptive to a scheme that
did not call for a new round of elections.
The final decision to attack was apparently made sometime in
April or May. Three days after the first unification proposals were
made, a hundred heavily armed guerrillas were infiltrated into the
South with orders to split up and contact provincial SKLP committees
to organize uprisings when war broke out. There is no mention of an
attack in captured Central Committee and cabinet documents dated
early in the year. That the decision to intervene in the South came
suddenly does not necessarily mean that the North “jumped the gun”
on an invasion scheduled for later in the year.7® The same factors
determining DPRK policy (one step removed, with somewhat different
weight, and combined with considerations of global strategy) would
also have influenced a Soviet decision. Even if the exact moment of the
attack could not be foreseen, the Korean crisis had been building
toward an explosion for several years. Little was required to set it off,
TOWARD A MODEL OF THE NORTH KOREAN INTERVENTION
In light of the widespread violence in the South before the war, it
is useful to look at the North Korean attack as a case of intervention
in a situation of civil strife. No claim is made for the exclusiveness of
this approach, but it does seem able to bring out aspects of the war
that are obscured in other accounts. Admittedly, the divided-country
context makes Korea an extreme case. But the theoretical issues in-
volved may stand out with greater clarity for just that reason, and
Korea, after all, may not be so different from other third world coun-
tries where arbitrarily drawn borders cut across ethnic, racial, and
28. Robert R. Simmons, The Strained Alliance: Peking, Pyongyang, Moscow
and the Politics of the Korean Civil War (New York: Free Press, 1975); Wilbur
Hitchcock, ‘‘North Korea Jumps the Gun,” Current History (March 1951)
158 JOHN MERRILL
religious groups. Looking at the war from this perspective can also
facilitate comparison with similar interventions by lesser powers else-
where. These have become increasingly common in recent years and
Korea seems to have been one of the first. The most important reason
for looking at the war in this way, though, is that it may help resolve
several issues in the literature: Was the war primarily civil or interna-
tional in character? Was the DPRK acting as a proxy for the Soviet
Union, or is Korean nationalism the key to understanding the attack?
How important was the group centered on Pak Hdn-ySng in the North
Korean decision? Were the border clashes in the summer of 1948 a
factor in the North Korean decision? What determined the timing of
the attack?
A starting point in answering these questions is the framework of
four variables proposed by C. R. Mitchell for the comparative study of
interventions.” The factors, which would seem to apply to any dyadic
relationship, are: (1) the progress of the guerrilla struggle in the dis-
rupted state; (2) the linkages between it and the potential intervening
state; (3) the structure of the latter’s decision-making process; and
(4) how conducive the international environment is to intervention.
Mitchell suggests that all four factors are systemically related in deter-
mining the ‘‘threshold of violence’’ at which intervention is likely to
occur, That is, neither “‘civil war’ nor “unprovoked aggression’? is
likely to prove helpful, by itself, in understanding intervention in
general, or the North Korean attack in particular.
As for the first factor, the most important conclusion to be drawn
is that the war came at a time when the guerrilla movement in the
South had been virtually destroyed. The SKLP organization was also
crumbling under successive waves of arrests and was a rapidly wasting
asset for the DPRK. North Korean hopes of achieving unification
29. C. R. Mitchell, “Civil War and the Involvement of External Parties,”
International Studies Quarterly 14, no, 2: 166-94. The venturesome reader is also
referred to C.A. Insard and E,C. Zeeman, ‘Some Models from Catastrophe Theory
in the Social Sciences,” reprint from The Use of Models in the Social Sciences
(London: Tavistock Publications, 1976); Zeeman et al., “A Model for Institutional
Disturbances,” British Journal of Mathematical and Statistical Psychology 29,
no. 1: 66-80; and Rodney G. Tomlinson, ‘“‘The Application of Catastrophe Theory
to International Events Flows,’ paper presented at International Studies Asso-
ciation meeting, March 1977. I have been working with Professors John Deiner
(political science) and Stanley Samsky (mathematics) at the University of Dela-
ware to see if similar models may be developed for interventions by ‘‘outside
parties” in situations of civil strife. The FEC data on internal warfare events in
Korea have been coded (by type of incident, date, location, initiator, weapons
used, forces involved, and casualties) for some 1,800 incidents. The analysis,
however, has only begun and results are not yet available,
INTERNAL WARFARE IN KOREA 159
through a united front with opponents of Rhee, through the Soviet
initiative for simultaneous troop withdrawal, and through armed guer-
rilla struggle had been successively dashed. The only weapon remain-
ing was its conventional military force, which held an overwhelming
advantage over the South. So long as the guerrilla movement seemed
to have a chance of success, the DPRK held back from exercising
this option, exhibiting some restraint in the border clashes over the
summer of 1949. But by the spring of 1950, a conventional military
attack was the only alternative left.
With regard to the second factor, it is possible to distinguish several
types of linkage operating in the Korean case, The most important of
these was the pull of Korean nationalism, The country had been liber-
ated from thirty-six years of Japanese colonial rule only to find itself
divided into two hostile states. All political groups considered unifica-
tion to be an immediate and pressing goal. The strength of this commit-
ment was strong enough to induce many non-Communist political
leaders in the South, at some personal risk, to boycott the 1948 elec-
tions, and to come to the P’ySngyang Conference instead. A more
volatile linkage was the interaction of the two Koreas along the parallel.
An obvious counterpoint to the North’s view of the potential of the
guerrilla movement was its perception of the threat from the South,
The border clashes in the summer of 1949 left no doubt about the
bellicose stance of the Rhee government. North Korean pique over
these incidents and nervousness concerning southern intentions was
evident during a campaign in the early fall focused on “border provoca-
tions.”” The Rhee government’s future course of action as it increased
its military capabilities, moreover, must have been clear to the North,
There was also a “penetrative” linkage between the two halves of the
country based on a partially overlapping leadership. Members of the
SKLP faction involved with Pak H6n-ySng continued to direct guerrilla
operations in the South while holding positions in the North Korean
party and state structure.
The third set of variables, the decision-making characteristics of
the intervening state, is a difficult subject to research. Little informa-
tion is presently available on the day-to-day operation of the North
Korean political system, and decision-making approaches demand
large amounts of inside information that must be analyzed anew for
every policy shift. There is also the thorny question of the degree of
autonomy of the North Korean leadership. Probably, neither the
“puppet” nor “independent actor” model wholly applies. Instead
the relationship was most likely characterized by a broad middle
range of influence and consultation,
We do know that there was a factional debate within the North
Korean leadership over the proper strategy to pursue toward the
160 JOHN MERRILL
South. This suggests that the DPRK had some independence in for-
mulating policy. The outlines of this debate are far from clear, but
most speculation centers on the role of Pak Hdn-ydng. There seem to
be three main views.°° Kim Chum-kon, Kim Ch’ang-sun, and the
Japanese ‘‘Neighboring Countries Research Institute” maintain that
Pak advocated a two-pronged strategy of keeping up pressure on the
South through the guerrillas, and seizing border areas to discredit
Rhee and force the ROK into political negotiations. The position
of Kim Nam-sik is that Pak pushed for the war, assuring the DPRK
leadership and the Soviets that the SKLP would rise up to support
a North Korean attack. The third opinion, held by Pak Kap-dong and
Kim Sam-kyu, is that Pak opposed the war as “leftist adventurism,”
saw the role of the guerrillas as keeping the South tied down so as to
prevent an attack on the DPRK, and continued to advocate united
front tactics.
Caution is necessary in sorting through these differing interpreta-
tions, Although most of the accounts assume that factional positions
remained constant over time, it seems reasonable to expect that they
would change in response to a developing situation. The first view of
Pak’s role is particularly open to criticism since U.S. intelligence
reports indicate that this position had jelled as early as February 1949.
It also seems, at least on the surface, to be somewhat self-serving to
place responsibility for the border incidents solely on the North. The
main objection to the third account, which seems to be a minority
opinion, is that it appears to contradict what is known about Pak’s
character. The problem with Kim Nam-sik’s view, which otherwise
seems the most plausible, is that there is considerable evidence to
indicate that the North was well aware of the desperate plight of the
SKLP. It may be, however, that the DPRK leadership felt that the
only way to galvanize the remaining SKLP organization into action
was through a military thrust across the parallel. Kim Nam-sik’s views
of Pak’s role are supported to some extent by the accusations leveled
against the SKLP leader when he was purged after the war. The grava-
men of the charges against him was that he had “engaged in circulating
false reports” that misled the DPRK about the strength of the Com-
munist movement in the South. What is most interesting about this
charge is its implication that the North indeed started the war. In
evaluating the importance of factionalism in the origins of the war,
30. Kim Chum-kon, The Korean War (Seoul: Kwangmyong Publishing Co.,
1973), pp. 197-211; Sasaki, Han’gukchon-bisa, pp. 470-74; Han’guk chonjaeng-sa,
pp. 503-5; interviews with Kim Nam-sik, May 22, 23, and June 1, 1978; /S and
USMILAT reports for the period,
INTERNAL WARFARE IN KOREA 161
it is necessary to keep in mind that it was only one of the factors
bearing on the decision to intervene. Its importance has probably been
overblown in some accounts. In general, its effect seems to have been
to bias North Korean decision making toward a somewhat more active
policy vis-a-vis the South,
The final factor influencing the threshold of violence at which
intervention will occur is the conduciveness of the international environ-
ment, International factors were obviously very important in the Korean
case. The initial division of the peninsula owed to outside interference,
The superpowers sponsored the establishment of rival governments
in their respective occupation zones, and lent the two Koreas political,
economic, and military support. At the same time, as Okonogi Masao
points out, their continuing presence led to a kind of “stabilization by
deterrence,’ which temporarily froze the inherently unstable situation
they had created on the peninsula. With the disengagement of the two
superpowers, however, the status quo began to come unstuck as the
confrontation between the North and South escalated in its intensity
and directness. The situation had developed by the spring of 1950 to
a point where a major conflict was virtually inevitable. In addition
to this “built-in’’ pattern of outside interference, support, and dis-
engagement, sudden changes in the international environment in the
winter and spring before the war produced a situation that was ex-
tremely permissive of North Korean action. The victory of the Chinese
Communist movement, the Soviet explosion of the atomic bomb, and
the increasing tensions in the Korean-American relationship all worked
to remove the barriers to North Korean action, Several possible com-
binations of domestic and international events may have triggered the
North Korean attack. But there is little point in speculating on these
precipitating events without also considering the mix of factors that,
over a period of years, had built the situation in Korea to the point
of an explosion.
In this paper, I have attempted to sketch the pattern of political vio-
lence in Korea before the war and to outline the complex interaction of
local and international factors influencing it. Looked at against this
background, the Korean war appears as merely the last and most
serious escalation in the increasingly violent confrontation between
the two halves of the divided country. After the establishment of
separate regimes and the pull-out of occupation forces, it was only
a matter of time before a major conflict broke out. Both sides were
deeply committed to unification and tried their best, with the instru-
ments available to them, to achieve it on their own terms. The North’s
162 JOHN MERRILL
decision to resort to conventional warfare came only after other policy
options had been tried and had failed. Far from being crazy or irra-
tional, northern behavior seems to have been closely keyed to develop-
ing events on the peninsula and the situation it found itself confronted
with by the spring of 1950.
Commentary
JON HALLIDAY
JOHN MERRILL IS TO BE COMPLIMENTED ON HIS EXCELLENT PAPER, IT NOT ONLY
introduces important new material, but also handles the evidence with
scrupulous fairness, His contribution destroys numerous stereotypes
about the background of the Korean War and helps set it in its correct
context. My comments are limited to a few key points.
1, Merrill opts for a methodology based on work by Charles Mc-
Clelland that, he says, “has the advantage of bypassing the thorny
problem of trying to determine the real motives of statesmen where
sufficient information is unavailable.” Later, he introduces a model
developed by C. R. Mitchell to determine “the threshold of violence
at which intervention is likely to occur.”
Neither McClelland nor Mitchell contributes anything substantial
to Merrill’s discussion, which, in my opinion, would be strengthened
by eliminating reference to them, McClelland’s approach is weak
because it does not address the necessity of examining as thoroughly
as possible, and however sketchy the information, why a people, or
a political movement, or a state do fight. Neither the guerrilla war in
Korea prior to June 1950, nor the Korean War itself—any less than
say, the Vietnam War—can be understood without tackling the question
of why the people were fighting. Merrill posits as an essential precondi-
tion for his own method identifying the characteristics of a given
crisis. Yet a failure to examine and assess the motives behind the
light is likely to lead to the sort of manipulative approach widespread
among technocratic U.S. policy makers in the mid-sixties. Strong
evidence to this effect is provided by Merrill who does not fail to
speculate on motives when it comes to June 1950. Mitchell’s model
presents a different problem: as Merrill acknowledges, Korea was a
divided country, not a country threatened from without, This is a
crucial point; surely the very specificity of the Korean situation is that
it was one country, Finally, the third of Mitchell’s variables, the struc-
ture of the intervening state’s decision-making process is, by Merrill's
own admission, of little use regarding the Democratic People’s Republic
of Korea (DPRK) given present knowledge,
164 JON HALLIDAY
2. Merrill raises the fundamental question of the legitimacy of the
two states and also notes the difficulty of choosing an appropriate
time frame. These two issues go together. On the latter, one must
go back to 1945, however cursorily, This is when Korea was divided,
and the question of ‘North versus South” or “Left versus Right”
cannot be answered fairly without going back this far. Without due
emphasis on the division and its origins, it is hard to answer the main
question: Why the Korean War? If one compares Korea with Vietnam,
it is striking that no one asks who started the Vietnam War. It is simply
not deemed relevant. The repeated emphasis in the West (and in the
socialist countries, too) on who started the Korean War dehistorizes
the issue of class struggle in Korea.
A discussion of the Korean War must be set firmly in the con-
text of class struggle from 1945 on, and it must also consider fairly
the legitimacy of the two Korean regimes, The reasons for the war—
and the nature of the war itself—are integrally tied to the legitimacy
of the two regimes. To his great credit, Merrill does raise this issue,
but in my opinion fails to explore it deeply enough. If one takes just
three basic criteria—political origins, social policies, and degree of
dependence on outside forces—the DPRK had an incomparably
stronger claim not only to legitimacy, but to represent the Korean
people as a whole. The DPRK leadership emerged out of the anti-
Japanese struggle and guerrilla warfare; the Republic of Korea (ROK)
regime, including the army and police, was heavily staffed by former
members of the Japanese occupation and collaborators, The DPRK
carried out a major land reform and formally recognized the equality
of women in 1946; in the South, although some land reform did
take place, social and economic relations were not changed substan-
tially. As for foreign dependence, the Soviet Red Army had with-
drawn from the North by 1949, certainly formally and perhaps de
facto. (This is controversial; the evidence is inconclusive, but even
by hostile Western estimates, its presence was considerably weaker than
the U.S. military’s in the South.) The United States left behind a major
military organization in the South in 1949, the Korean Military Advi-
sory Group (KMAG), which, according to official U.S. Army history,
expanded as U.S. troops withdrew.!
Unlike most commentators and analyists, Merrill also mentions
a number of episodes in 1948 that bear directly on the claims of
P’ySngyang and Seoul to represent the Korean people. In particular,
Merrill provides valuable information on the summer 1948 underground
1, Robert K. Sawyer, Military Advisors in Korea: KMAG in Peace and War
(Washington, D,C.: Office of Chief of Military History, 1962), p. 42.
COMMENTARY 165
plebiscite, and also refers to the Haeju Conference, attended by leaders
from both South and North. By now the evidence that the majority
of Korea’s population was against separate elections in 1948 is over-
whelming. But | think two further points need to be made, First, the
discredit and political ostracism cast on the Rhee regime as a result of
its collaboration with an operation devised and imposed by outside
forces, and that split the country—perhaps the greatest crime in the
eyes of the Korean people—must not be underestimated, The Haeju
and P’ySngyang conferences (the latter was attended by virtually
every political leader in Korea except Rhee,” all of whom agreed on
a basic minimum platform) gave, I believe, tremendous legitimacy to
the DPRK’s claim to represent the Korean people and, conversely,
delegitimized the Rhee regime. Second, it is also necessary to scrutinize
the DPRK’s claims as they were put forward. The DPRK has always
centered its case on the summer 1948 underground plebiscite. This has
usually been dismissed in the West either as never having taken place
at all, or as an overwhelmingly fraudulent claim. Merrill’s most valuable
information (from U.S. sources) helps to put this claim into perspective
and confirms that a referendum did indeed take place. But can this
be considered good grounds for the DPRK claim? In my opinion it
cannot, on the basis of current evidence. The whole point of the DPRK
claim is to establish legal grounds for its legitimacy. But such grounds
need firm proof. It is not only a question of whether the DPRK claims
are true or not; it is also a question of the essentially nonverifiable
nature of the evidence, and the inherently unsatisfactory conditions
in which the poll took place (of course, the DPRK cannot be blamed
for this). My point is that it is necessary to consider all of this evi-
dence—the Haeju and P’ySngyang conferences, plus the underground
plebiscite—and weigh each aspect independently. In my opinion, the
Haeju and P’ySngyang conferences are compelling evidence in favor
of the DPRK’s claims, and the plebiscite is not.
3. Closely related to this is the role of the United Nations. Merrill
notes that “the decision to hold separate elections ran counter to the
opinion of most members of the UN Commission and Korean political
leaders.’ I would have liked to see more emphasis on this important
point, which is still not generally given adequate attention in the
West, For the UN role in 1947-48 ties in directly with its role in 1950.
In 1947-48, the UN intervened in Korea in tremendous ignorance and
sanctioned the division of Korea against the wishes of the Korean
2. George McCune, Korea Today (Cambridge; Harvard University Press, 1950),
p. 263; John Gunther, The Riddle of MacArthur (New York: Harper and Bros.,,
1951), p. 170,
166 JON HALLIDAY
people. Not only that, it lied in order to do so. Its claim to have “ob-
served” the 1948 elections when the team briefly visited only 2 per-
cent of the polling stations? is like a referee for a jousting match
who, without making a proper check of the weapons each side carried,
looks at part of the field for less than two minutes, Anyone claiming
to have “observed” such a match would be called a liar, and his evi-
dence treated with circumspection, The UN role deserves even more
attention because its sloppy work was repeated in 1950, as was its
use by the United States to swing world opinion.
4. Merrill’s paper leads up to the start of the Korean War in June
1950, The author gives us very valuable information about both the
guerrilla warfare in the South and the level of fighting along the thirty-
eighth parallel prior to June 25, 1950—especially the letter from
General Roberts to General Bolté (Aug. 19, 1949), which pins the
responsibility for heavy fighting across the parallel in the summer of
1949 squarely on the ROK. Nevertheless, the information about the
fighting near the parallel could be drawn more tightly together with
information about the guerrilla warfare, and the latter with the high
level of general political struggle throughout the South from 1945 on.
The war was not just a military episode, and in my opinion its causes
are found at the political level. The 1946 Taegu riots and the popular
uprisings of 1948 are two links in a long chain of political struggle,
which is the essential background of the guerrilla struggle and the
outbreak of full-scale warfare in June 1950. Second, Merrill does not
properly categorize the decision by the DPRK to cross the parallel in
force in June 1950, nor set this decision in context, Given that Korea
was one country, that the legitimacy of the Rhee regime was open to
serious question, and that there had been heavy fighting across the
parallel initiated by the ROK, it would seem fair to compare the North’s
“invasion” of the South to the 1944 “invasion of France’? (as it is
called, interestingly). In other words, whatever one’s reservations about
the DPRK regime in 1950, what was the political nature of the attempt
to topple the Rhee regime, remembering that the DPRK (like the
ROK) claimed to represent all of Korea? Did de Gaulle invade France
in 1944 or help to liberate it? Or both?
5. Merrill discusses relations between the southern and northern
Communists prior to June 1950. Evidence on this issue is flimsy, but
it is an important question, not least because the North’s decision to €x-
ecute the top southern Communists at the end of the war continues to
affect the attitudes of the Left in the South toward the northern
$3, Jon Halliday, ‘“The United Nations and Korea,” in Without Parallel: The
American-Korean Relationship Since 1945, ed, Frank Baldwin (New York; Pan-
ee TY | ee Gr ) |
COMMENTARY 167
regime, and deeply influences the attitudes that outsiders sympathetic to
the Korean people hold toward the DPRK leadership and reunification.
Without going too deeply into the strength of the evidence, it
must be said that the case made by the DPRK on this issue is uncon-
vincing. In a verbal presentation, Merrill noted that U.S. intelligence
reports indicate that Pak Hdn-ydng had a cautious policy. In any event,
it is hard to believe the accusation that Pak misled the DPRK leadership
as to the political situation in the South. First, as a southern emigré
once put it to me, ‘Pak Hon-ydng knew the South like the back of his
hand.” Given the lack of evidence that Pak was in any way an adven-
turer, plus his acknowledged close awareness of the situation in the
South, it is unlikely that he was responsible for giving misleading
information or advice. But, second, the content of the accusation is
completely irrelevant. The evidence (e.g., in General Dean’s memoirs)*
is that popular support for the overthrow of Rhee and for the Korean
People’s Army (KPA) was high, even if actual political organization was
poor (as claimed by Kim Il-sung, for example, in his speech to the
Aliarcham Academy in Indonesia in 1965).° But in any case, this was
not the factor that led to the failure of the DPRK to reunify the
country. The crucial factor was the scale and swiftness of the U.S.
intervention. If Pak had been accused of failing to predict this, the
accusation would at least have been relevant (although it could still
have been misplacing the blame).
Moreover, if the accusation about misleading the DPRK leadership
were true, then Pak should have been fired in 1950, as was Mu Jong,
for example (another important case that raises disturbing questions).
That Pak was not removed in 1950, but only tried with the other
top southern leaders after the end of the war, raises questions about
the relationship between northern and southern Communists that
badly needs further study. The timing makes it tempting to think that
the problem had more to do with the ending of the war (although this
could be misleading, since it might have been thought best to postpone
the trials until after the war was over, even if the accusations referred
to earlier events).
Last, and most interesting, the upshot of the accusation is that
the North did indeed ‘‘invade” the South. The DPRK decision to cross
the parallel in force on June 25 was based on criteria other than the
very narrow one adduced then and now by the DPRK—namely repelling
4. William F. Dean, General Dean’s Story (New York: Viking Press, 1954),
p. 68.
5, Kim Ibsung, “On the Socialist Construction in the DP RK and the Revolution
in South Korea,”’ Lecture at the Aliarcham Academy of Social Sciences, Indonesia,
Apr. 14, 1965, in Kim, Selected Works, 2 (P’yOngyang, 1965): 554-55,
168 JON HALLIDAY
an ROK Army invasion earlier that morning. The DPRK has never
produced evidence to show that whatever the ROKA did early on the
morning of June 25 was anything out of the ordinary, in a military
sense. Indeed, the information given me by KPA officers (who had
been on the front line on June 25) whom I interviewed in P’yS6ngyang
in July 1977 was that the ROKA advance did not get very far—only
some two kilometers.® In other words, the accusation against Pak is
indirect confirmation that the DPRK decision was based on political
criteria—namely, cross the parallel and topple Rhee—and that the size
of any military action initiated by the ROKA on June 25 is of second-
ary importance (which does not rule out the possibility that there
was indeed some fairly major ROKA assault, or that the North inter-
preted some ROKA action to be particularly serious).
6. Finally, two points of detail. First, I cannot quite agree with
Merrill’s criticism of the study by Karunakar Gupta in China Quarterly.’
Admittedly, Gupta did present limited evidence, but his basic claims
were not dented by his critics, and he raised important, still unanswered
questions, The second point concerns the famous Acheson speech of
January 1950 about Korea and the U.S. “defense perimeter.” I am not
at all sure that the conventional interpretation of this speech—either
what Acheson meant, or how the speech was read in P’ySngyang or
Moscow—is accurate. After all, the United States had KMAG going
strong in Korea and was training Koreans in Japan. There may have
been room for serious doubt about U.S. intentions, but I think if
the Acheson speech is to be relied on as a major piece of evidence,
then it must be weighted both against U.S. deeds in Korea and sub-
sequent acts, particularly the appointment of John Foster Dulles in the
spring of 1950 to supervise U.S. Far East policy, and his specific
activities and commitments in Korea immediately before June 25.
6. Interview with six senior KPA officers, P’yOngyang, July 26, 1977.
7. Karunakar Gupta, ‘How Did the Korean War Begin?” China Quarterly,
no. 52 (1972); Gupta’s critics in China Quarterly, no. 54 (1973), with Gupta’s
reply.
Korea: Test Case of Containment in Asia
JAMES I. MATRAY
ON JUNE 29, 1949, THE UNITED STATES WITHDREW THE LAST OF ITS COMBAT
forces from Korea, thus ending almost four years of military occupa-
tion, Less than one year later, a well-equipped North Korean army
launched a massive assault across the thirty-eighth parallel in pursuit
of forcible reunification. Almost immediately, some observers charged
that President Harry Truman was in large part responsible for the out-
break of the Korean conflict. After creating an anti-Communist govern-
ment in South Korea, critics explained, the Truman administration
refused to provide the Republic of Korea (ROK) with sufficient moral
and material support to ensure its survival.! Far worse, American
military withdrawal from South Korea constituted an invitation—a
1, Leland M. Goodrich, Korea: A Study of U.S. Policy in the U.N. (New York,
1956), pp. 94-95; Gregory Henderson, Korea: The Politics of the Vortex (Cam-
bridge: Harvard University Press, 1968), p. 149; Soon-sung Cho, Korea in World
Politics 1940-1950: An Evaluation of American Responsibility (Berkeley and Los
Angeles: University of California Press, 1967), p. 244; Robert H. Ferrell, “George
©, Marshall,’’ in American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy, ed. Samuel
Flagg Bemis and Robert H, Ferrell (New York: Cooper Square, 1966), pp, 248-49,
ima
————
170 JAMES I, MATRAY
green light—for North Korea to invade. For many analysts, Truman’s
decision to order military disengagement from Korea clearly indicated
his reluctance to practice containment outside Europe and his rejection
of a firm commitment to halt Soviet expansion in Asia.
Such an assessment of Truman’s Korea policy, however, does not
provide an accurate picture of the nature and extent of American
commitments in South Korea prior to the North Korean attack. For
more than three years, Truman had resisted strong pressure from
American military leaders to withdraw from South Korea at the earliest
possible date. The president accepted instead the State Department’s
argument that the United States could not abandon the ROK because
a Communist seizure of control throughout Korea would seriously
damage American credibility in the international community and
preclude the successful containment of Soviet expansion in Asia. The
Truman administration’s consideration of its Korea policy after 1946
increasingly involved a search for a strategy that would allow the
United States to withdraw militarily from South Korea without giving
up the area to Soviet domination, The administration wanted to avoid
a complete commitment of American power and prestige in defense of
South Korea, Truman’s determination to reduce defense spending and
balance the federal budget also encouraged a limited approach. The
State Department sought international approval and support for the
ROK to bolster morale and thus contribute to internal strength and
stability. Moreover, since the United Nations had advocated publicly
an early Soviet-American withdrawal from Korea, the United States
could not remain in military occupation without undermining the
ROK’s claim to legitimacy. Truman’s decision to authorize American
withdrawal from the Korean peninsula came only after he had con-
cluded that a continuation of military occupation was not essential to
the survival of South Korea.
His assessment rested on the basic assumption that Stalin would
not resort to open aggression to extend the area of Soviet control, but
would rely instead on the tactics of subversion and political penetra-
tion, Through the extension of economic aid, technical advice, and
limited military assistance, the administration believed it could help
South Korea to achieve the internal political and economic strength
necessary to withstand Communist political pressure.2, For Truman
2. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committees on Armed Services and Foreign Relations,
Military Situation in the Far East: Joint Hearings to Conduct an Inquiry into the
Military Situation in the Far East and the Facts Surrounding the Relief of General
of the Army Douglas MacArthur from his Assignment in that Area, testimony of
Dean G, Acheson, vol. 3, 82nd Cong,., Ist sess., 1951, p. 1991; Harry S, Truman,
Memoirs: Years of Trial and Hope (Garden City, N.Y. Doubleday, 1956), p. 331;
2
TEST CASE OF CONTAINMENT 171
and his advisers, the ROK’s eventual capacity for self-defense, rather
than American combat troops or a firm guarantee of military protec-
tion, was the key to containment in Korea, The administration’s
decision to withdraw, therefore, did not reflect a desire to abandon
American commitments in South Korea; disengagement marked only a
shift in policy from reliance on military to economic means—and
reliance on the ROK to beat back an attack, at least in the initial
stages—as the crucial element in Truman’s strategy for containing
Soviet expansionist ambitions in Korea.
During the spring of 1946, Soviet-American negotiations for the
reunification of Korea reached a deadlock, largely because the two
sides could not agree on a representative group of Korean leaders with
which to consult in the formation of a provisional government. Ini-
tially, Truman was confident that if the United States remained patient
and refused to compromise, the Soviet Union eventually would become
frustrated and accept the American position, By late 1946, however,
it was obvious that the administration’s policy of delay was a complete
failure, Not only had Moscow refused to resume negotiations, but
South Korea was suffering from violent political unrest and steady
economic deterioration.> Perhaps more important, the War Department
was beginning to pressure Truman to approve disengagement from
Korea at the earliest possible date, Rapid postwar demobilization had
led to serious shortages in manpower and material. American military
leaders argued that the United States could make better use of its
limited resources in areas greater in strategic importance than Korea,*
Consequently, the Truman administration clearly recognized early in
1947 the need to develop a more positive course of action to resolve
the Korean predicament,
Muccio to Acheson, June 9, 1950, U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations
of the United States (hereafter, FRUS), 1950 (Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 1967), 7:99-101; George F. Kennan, Memoirs, 1925-1950 (Boston:
Little, Brown, 1967), p. 485; for analysis and interpretation, see John Lewis
Gaddis, “Korea in American Politics, Strategy, and Diplomacy, 1945-50,” in The
Ongins of the Cold War in Asia, ed. Yonosuke Nagai and Akira Iriye (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1977), pp. 283-84, 286-87; Akira Iriye, The Cold War
in Asia: A Historical Introduction (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1974), p. 177;
William Reitzel, Morton A, Kaplan, and Constance G, Coblenz, United States
Voreign Policy 1945-1955 (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1956), p. 2.
3, James I. Matray, ‘“The Reluctant Crusade: American Foreign Policy io Korea
1941-1950” (Ph.D, diss,, University of Virginia, 1977), pp, 192-234,
4. Norstad memo, Nov, 26, 1946, Record Group (hereafter, RG) 319, Records
of the Army Staff, Plans and Operations Files (hereafter, P & O Files), decimal file
$37, TS, sec. 1, box 73, cases 2-24, National Archives, Washington, D.G.; and
Norstad memo, Jan. 4, 1947, in ibid,, decimal file 091, Korea, sec, 3 bine 87
cases 16-50, '
172 JAMES I, MATRAY
On January 29, 1947, the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee
(SWNCC) met to consider American problems in Korea, Secretary of
War Robert Patterson opened the discussions with the flat statement
that Korea was the “single most urgent problem now facing the War
Department.’’? The American zone of occupation had made little
progress in economic recovery because of insufficient transportation
facilities, electrical power, and fertilizer. Without additional financial
resources, Patterson warned, the United States could not safely main-
tain an occupation force in South Korea. In response, the SWNCC
decided to approach Congress with a request for financial assistance.
It created a special interdepartmental committee to formulate a specific
aid program for Korea,°
After nearly a month of study, the committee concluded that
continued occupation of Korea would be impossible if the United
States attempted to maintain its present policy. At the same time,
American military withdrawal and the creation of a separate govern-
ment would produce only further economic deterioration and even-
tually lead to Soviet domination of the entire peninsula. Nor could
the United States refer the Korean matter to the UN, because that
would be an admission of failure and invite Soviet charges of bad
faith. The committee’s report portrayed the Soviet-American con-
frontation in Korea as a “test of strength” that the United States could
not lose without serious world-wide complications. Consequently, the
special committee recommended the adoption of a plan for $600 mil-
lion in economic assistance over three years. Such a program would
demonstrate to Congress Truman’s determination to fulfill American
commitments in Korea, and to Moscow, the extent of America’s
resolve. In addition, the committee decided Washington should raise
the Korean issue at the next meeting of the Council of Foreign Minis-
ters and thereby publicize Soviet inflexibility.®
Administration officials thus demonstrated an early preference for
economic means to counter Soviet expansion in Korea, just as Truman
had in regard to Greece and Turkey in early 1947. If the United States
spent enough money, the committee assumed, Stalin would be unable
to match the American commitment and would have to retreat. The
War Department enthusiastically endorsed the committee’s recom-
mendations, although it doubted Congress would approve the aid
package. American military leaders voiced particularly strong support
5. SWNCC memo, Jan. 29, 1947, in The Forrestal Diaries, ed. Walter Millis
(New York: Viking Press, 1951), pp, 241-42.
6. Special Interdepartmental Committee memo, Feb. 25, 1947, in FRUS,
1947, 6:609-18,
TEST CASE OF CONTAINMENT 173
for an immediate approach to the Soviet government with a request
to resume negotiations. Apparently the War Department expected
that implementation of the committee’s plan would open the way to
American withdrawal, either in conjunction with the Soviets or after
the creation of a separate government in South Korea, Despite its
firm opposition to a new overture to the Soviet Union, the State
Department also advocated adoption of the recommendations of the
special committee,’
Truman now possessed an aggressive policy alternative designed to
break the Korean deadlock. Unfortunately, the administration con-
fronted a difficult situation both at home and abroad early in 1947 that
hampered decisive action. For Truman to implement the committee’s
proposal, he needed congressional authorization for economic assis-
tance to Korea. As a result of the 1946 off-year elections, however,
the Republicans had gained control of Congress and were able to block
increased expenditures for defense and foreign aid. Simultaneously,
the crisis in Greece forced the administration to focus attention on
events in Europe. Nevertheless, work on an aid program for Korea
continued, During Senate hearings on aid to Greece, Undersecretary
of State Dean Acheson confirmed that the administration was contem-
plating a three-year economic and technical assistance program for
Korea. In its final form, the plan envisioned $540 million in aid once
the Koreans had elected a provisional government to rule the entire
nation. If the Soviet Union refused to permit reunification, the United
States would implement the program in South Korea on its own. Ac-
cording to the plan, within three months the State Department would
assume responsibility from the War Department for American policy in
Korea, On March 28, Acheson informed Patterson that the budget
proposal for fiscal 1948 would include a provision for aid to Korea.?
7. U.S. Department of War, Intelligence Division memo, Feb, 11, 1947, P & O
Files, decimal file 091, Korea, sec. 3, box 87, cases 16-50, and Norstad to Robert
P. Patterson, Feb. 25, 1947, ibid,., decimal file 092, TS, 1946-1948, case 85; John
Carter Vincent and John M, Hilldring to George C, Marshall, Feb, 28, 1947, in
FRUS, 1947, 6:618-19.
8. Diary of William D, Leahy, Feb. 27, 1947, William D, Leahy Papers, box 5,
Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.; Joseph Marion Jones, The Fifteen Weeks
(February 21-June 5, 1947) (New York: Harcourt, Brace, & World, 1955), pp. 90-
91; John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War 1941-
1947 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), pp, 317, 352.
9. New York Times, Mar. 21, 1947, p. 12, and Mar, 25, 1947, p. 8; Hilldring to
Vincent, Mar, 25, 1947, and Vincent to Hilldring, Mar, 27, 1947, in RG 59, General
Records of the Department of State, decimal file 740,00119, Control (Korea)/3-
2747, National Archives; Acheson to Patterson, Mar, 28, 1947, in FRUS, 1947,
6:621-23,
174 JAMES I. MATRAY
Truman’s advisers had thus devised a policy to contain Soviet
expansion in Korea without a major commitment of American military
power. Once Korea had developed the economic and political stability
necessary for self-defense the United States could safely withdraw. The
SWNCC also formulated a program for limited military assistance to
Korea. The United States would provide small arms and enough radios,
vehicles, and spare parts to equip the existing constabulary army of
25,000 men. An American attempt to match Soviet military power in
Korea would be unwise and dangerous. In summary, State Department
official John Carter Vincent explained that ‘‘our program seems to
us to be the only feasible way of accomplishing” the reduction of
American commitments ‘‘once we rule out the alternative of abandon-
ment of Korea to USSR domination,”!®
Significantly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) also supported the
Korean aid program. In a report submitted to the SWNCC in May 1947,
the JCS ranked Korea second to the Philippines in its strategic unimpor-
tance to American national security in East Asia; on the other hand,
only Greece, Italy, and Iran had a greater need than Korea for assis-
tance. The JCS concluded then that the United States had to adopt
an economic aid program for Korea because
this is the one country within which we alone have for almost two years carried
on ideological warfare in direct contact with our opponents, so that to lose this
battle would be gravely detrimental to United States prestige, and therefore secur-
ity, throughout the world. To abandon this struggle would tend to confirm chee
suspicion that the United States is not really determined to accept the responsibili-
ties and obligations of world leadership, with consequent detriment to our efforts
to bolster those countries of Western Europe which are of primary and vital impor-
tance to our national security.
Korea’s value was thus related to America’s ideological and diplomatic
competition with the Soviet Union, rather than to strategic considera-
tions. The JCS study did, however, caution that ‘‘current assistance
should be given Korea only if the means exist after sufficient assistance
has been given the countries of primary importance. . . .”’!
In the meantime, Truman had authorized one final approach to
the Soviet government, a request to reopen bilateral negotiations. In
April 1947, Secretary of State George Marshall traveled to Moscow
for the fourth meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers. After an
exchange of several letters, Molotov and Marshall reached an agreement
for the resumption of Soviet-American discussions on Korean reunifica-
10. SWNCC Ad Hoc Committee Report on the Truman Doctrine, Feb. 21,
1947, in FRUS, 1947, 6:727-30; Vincent to Acheson, Apr. 8, 1947, in RG 59,
decimal file 740,00119, Control (Korea) /4-847,
11. JCS to SWNCC, May 5, 1947, FRUS, 1947, 6:737-39.
TEST CASE OF CONTAINMENT 175
tion. Truman and his advisers immediately concluded that the threat
of American economic assistance to a separate South Korean govern-
ment had forced the Soviets to compromise. The administration con-
fidently expected Stalin to agree to a settlement in Korea on Ameri-
can terms once the United States began to carry out its aid program,
As Acting Budget Director Frederick Lawton explained at the time,
the State Department believed that “economic improvement in South
Korea will help to overcome Soviet reluctance to reunite the two
zones,” and that reunification would facilitate the achievement of
economic self-sufficiency, thereby reducing the cost and duration of
American assistance. Containment in Korea thus promised victory at a
relatively low price. On June 3, Lawton approved the allocation of $215
million in aid to Korea for fiscal 1948 and forwarded the proposal to
Truman for signature. Concurrently, the State Department prepared a
presidential message to Congress requesting approval for aid to Korea,!2
Congressional support for the administration’s plan was far from
certain, The prolonged debate on aid to Greece convinced Truman that
Congress would be parsimonious on the issue of foreign aid regardless
of the particular nation involved. Too many requests for assistance might
also jeopardize the Marshall Plan for European recovery, and Chiang
Kai-shek was pressing the United States for more economic and mili-
lary assistance for China. Truman was reluctant to provide aid to
Chiang because of Communist military victories over the Kuomintang,
Refusal to provide assistance to China, however, would make obtaining
an appropriation for Korea far more difficult.!3 In any event, Truman
never had to take the risk. On June 27, Senator Arthur Vandenberg
informed Acheson that the Republicans would oppose any new author-
izations for foreign assistance during the remainder of that congres-
sional session, !*
12. Marshall to Molotov, Apr. 9, 1947; Molotov to Marshall, Apr. 19, 1947;
Marshall to Molotov, May 2, 1947; Molotov to Marshall, May 8, 1947; and Marshall
to Molotov, May 12, 1947,in FRUS, 1947, 6:633-34, 638-40; Lincoln to Norstad,
May 12, 1947, RG 319, P & O Files, decimal file 092, TS, sec. 5a, pt. 1, box 31,
case 85; Frederick J. Lawton to Truman, June 3, 1947, and Department of State
draft speech, June 3, 1947, Official File 471 (miscellaneous), Harry S. Truman
"apers, Truman Library, Independence, Mo.; for analysis and interpretation, see
David J, Dallin, Soviet Russia and the Far East (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1949), p. 304; Cho, Korea in World Politics, p. 158.
13. Jones, The Fifteen Weeks, p. 137; Tang Tsou, America’s Failure in China
1941-1950 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963), pp. 446-53; Walter
Lippman, The Cold War: A Study of American Foreign Policy, ed. Ronald Steel
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1972), pp. 45-46,
14. Acheson to Marshall, June 27, 1947, in RG 59, decimal file 740.00119,
Control (Korea)/6-2747; Acheson memo to “Jim” [Webb], August 1950, Dean G,
\cheson Papers, box 65, Truman Library,
176 JAMES I, MATRAY
While Congress emerged as the major barrier to Truman’s contain-
ment policy in Korea, Soviet-American negotiations for reunification of
the peninsula experienced an almost complete collapse. Consequently,
the administration decided to act with or without Soviet cooperation,
During July, john Allison, assistant chief of the Division of Northeast
Asian Affairs, formulated a proposed course of action that ultimately
would lead to the creation of a separate government in South Korea.
Under Allison’s plan, the United States would attempt to gain Soviet
approval for free elections under UN supervision to select delegates
for a legislature in each zone of occupation. These Korean leaders then
would select representatives to serve in a provisional government. After
consultations with the four major powers, the new Korean government
would arrange for the withdrawal of foreign troops and the acquisition
of economic aid, If Moscow refused to accept America’s proposal,
the United States would submit the issue to the UN and alone imple-
ment the plan in South Korea,!®
Early in August, an ad hoc committee of the SWNCC recommended
approval of Allison’s plan. In its report, the committee warned that, in
the absence of positive action, rising violence in South Korea would
force the United States to withdraw. To abandon Korea under such
circumstances would guarantee Soviet control over the entire peninsula
and ‘‘discourage those small nations now relying upon the U.S. to
support them in resisting internal or external Communist pressure.”!®
Patterson and Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal backed the adop-
tion of Allison’s proposal, presumably in the belief that it would speed
withdrawal. The State Department supported the plan as well.!” Thus,
in a letter to Molotov dated August 26, newly appointed Undersecre-
tary of State Robert Lovett proposed a four-power conference in
Washington for consideration of the Korean problem. Lovett also
recommended Allison’s plan as a basis for discussion. In Moscow,
American Ambassador Walter Bedell Smith observed that Soviet co-
operation was extremely unlikely. Stalin, he thought, would never
permit the emergence of an independent Korea because of the pen-
insula’s strategic importance.}®
On September 4, Molotov flatly rejected Lovett’s proposal. The
United States was responsible for the deadlock in Soviet-American
15. John M. Allison memo, July 29, 1947, FRUS, 1947, 6:734-35.
16. SWNCC Ad Hoc Committee to SWNCC, Aug. 4, 1947, in ibid., pp. 735-41,
17. Hilldring memo, Aug. 6, 1947, ibid., p. 742; Hilldring to Robert A. Lovett,
Aug. 8, 1947, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, decimal file 895.00/
8-847.
18. Lovett to Walter Bedell Smith, Aug. 26, 1947, and Smith to Lovett, Aug,
28, 1947, FRUS, 1947, 6:771-76.
TEST CASE OF CONTAINMENT 177
negotiations, the Soviet leader charged, and Moscow would not accept
outside interference in the Korean dispute. In accordance with Allison’s
recommendations, Lovett informed Molotov on September 16 of
Washington’s decision to place the issue of Korea on the UN agenda.
The following day, Secretary Marshall addressed the General Assembly
and requested international action for the achievement of Korea’s
independence. Since Soviet-American negotiations had failed to resolve
the Korean problem, only the UN could reunify the peninsula and
remove this serious threat to world peace,!9 Subsequently, Washington
cabled the American proposal on Korea to its delegation at the UN,
It provided for elections throughout Korea under international super-
vision within six months after the UN adopted the plan. The new
Korean legislature, reflecting the two-to-one population superiority in
the south, would formulate a constitution and appoint a provisional
government, Finally, the UN Temporary Commission on Korea
(UNTCOK), composed of eleven nations, would monitor the elections
and then report its findings to the General Assembly,?°
For many, the administration’s decision to submit the Korean issue
to the UN was a clear indication of its desire to cast aside an unwanted
burden, Truman and his advisers, critics argue, were attempting to
exploit the UN in an effort to withdraw from Korea without appearing
to abandon American commitment.*! This interpretation does not,
however, acceptably explain American actions. International involve-
ment was an essential part of Truman’s containment strategy in Korea,
Given that American leaders expected the Soviets to refuse to co-
operate with the UN, if the UN agreed to sponsor elections only in the
American zone, a separate South Korean government would emerge
with international approval. Obviously, moral and material support
lrom the world community would contribute to South Korea’s eco-
nomic strength and political stability. Perhaps more important, UN
sponsorship of South Korea might convince Congress to authorize
economic assistance, American action at the UN would also provide
the United States with an excellent opportunity to assume an un-
19. Molotov to Lovett, Sept. 4, 1947, and Lovett to Molotov, Sept. 16, 1947,
in ibid,, pp. 779-81, 790; Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, pp. 324-25; George C,
Marshall, *‘A Program for a More Effective United Nations,” U.S. Department of
State, Department of State Bulletin, no. 17, Sept. 28, 1947, p. 619; New York
limes, Sept. 18, 1947, pp. 5, 8, 24,
20, Lovett to Warren Austin, Sept. 18, 1947, FRUS, 1947, 6:794-95,
21. Denis Stairs, The Diplomacy of Constraint: Canada, the Korean War, and
the United States (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974), pp. 5-6; Cho,
Korea in World Politics, p. 205; Tsou, America's Failure in China, p. 557; Hender-.
son, Korea, p. 150; Goodrich, Korea, pp. 37-41,
178 JAMES I. MATRAY
equivocal stance in defense of national self-determination before the
world community.”
Truman’s advisers now began to consider more seriously an Ameri-
can military withdrawal from Korea, Early in September, the Policy
Planning Staff (PPS) concluded that Korea’s minor significance for
American national security seemed to justify disengagement (see
chapter one), Before making its final recommendations on withdrawal,
the SWNCC requested comments from the JCS on the relationship
between occupation of Korea and American national security. In a
famous memorandum, the JCS responded categorically that ‘from
the standpoint of military security, the United States has little strategic
interest in maintaining present troops and bases in Korea. . . .” Tru-
man’s military advisers believed that any American offensive on the
Asian mainland would bypass Korea and that an enemy position on
the peninsula would be vulnerable to air attack. The United States
could contribute more effectively to its national security if it deployed
the Korean occupation forces in areas of greater strategic importance,
The JCS also warned that in the absence of a major program for social,
political, and economic rehabilitation, disorders and unrest in Korea
would thoroughly undermine America’s position, Forced withdrawal,
rather than voluntary disengagement, would be humiliating and inflict
far greater damage to the international prestige of the United States.9
Nevertheless, many American leaders rejected withdrawal. Francis
Stevens of the Division of East European Affairs, for example, strongly
disagreed. Certain ideological imponderables, he insisted, were more
important than Korea’s strategic value. Stevens opposed withdrawal
on political grounds, explaining that Korea
is a symbol to the watching world both of the East-West struggle for influence and
power and of American security in sponsoring the nationalistic aims of Asian
peoples. If we allow Korea to go by default and to fall within the Soviet orbit, the
world will feel that we have lost another round in our match with the Soviet Union,
and our prestige and the hopes of those who place faith in us will suffer accord-
ingly. In the Far East, the reliance of national movements on American support
would be seriously shaken, and the consequences might be far reaching.
A complete Communist victory in Korea, he felt, would only reinforce
22. Dean Rusk to Ernest Gross, May 9, 1947, RG 59, decimal file 895.00/
5-947; Reitzel, Kaplan, and Coblenz, United States Foreign Policy, pp. 176-77;
Jon Halliday, “‘The United Nations in Korea,” in Without Parallel: The Ameri-
can-Korean Relationship since 1945, ed. Frank Baldwin (New York: Pantheon
Books, 1974), p. 119.
23. JCS to SWNCC, Sept. 26, 1947, in ibid., pp. 817-18; James V. Forrestal
to Marshall, Sept. 26, 1947, Korean Documents, David Lloyd Papers, box 10,
Truman Library.
24. Krancis B. Stevens memo, Sept. 9, 1947, FRUS, 1947, 6: 784-85.
lEST CASE OF CONTAINMENT 179
Stalin’s devotion to his expansionist strategy of subversion and indirect
‘iggression,
In addition, after visiting Korea on a fact-finding mission during the
summer of 1947, Gen, Albert Wedemeyer warned against premature
withdrawal. Any ‘‘ideological” retreat in Korea, he explained, would
increase Soviet prestige in Asia and undermine America’s position in
Japan, Wedemeyer emphasized that ‘every possible opportunity must
he used to seize the initiative in order to create and maintain bulwarks
of freedom.’> In Korea, Lt. Gen. John Hodge, the occupation com-
mander, agreed with Wedemeyer’s assessment. During discussions with
the new Secretary of the Army Kenneth Royall, he stressed that the
United States could not tolerate further Soviet expansion without
severe damage to American prestige. Although he shared the JCS’s
assessment of Korea’s limited strategic value, Hodge favored only
staged withdrawal over a nine-month period. Prior to departure, the
United States would have to train and equip a strong local army.
Since economic self-sufficiency was the key to South Korea’s survival,
lodge also advocated implementation of a five-year rehabilitation
program,”6
Apparently these warnings convinced Truman’s military advisers
(hat outright abandonment of Korea was not the proper course of
action, The Department of the Army now decided in favor of the
adoption of a one billion dollar aid program for Korea over five years,
which would permit the United States to withdraw safely, But it
adamantly opposed continuation of the current American policy,
lest Korea become a permanent and unprofitable liability. Through
interdepartmental coordination and congressional cooperation, the
\rmy Department speculated that the United States could build an
“ideological bridgehead on the Asian mainland.” Hodge indicated in
i subsequent cable, however, that American expectations were far
more grandiose, Once South Korea developed economic and political
strength, he predicted, ‘national feeling among the north Koreans
inay be aroused and sufficient pressure brought to bear upon the
Soviets to compel them to permit . . . an amalgamation of the two
areas,”"?? If successful, containment in Korea thus held the promise
ol eventual liberation of the entire peninsula.
Moscow responded to Washington’s adoption of a more positive
25, Albert C, Wedemeyer report, Sept, 19, 1947, FRUS, 1947, 6:796-803.
26. T.N. Dupuy to Norstad, Oct. 2, 1947, RG 319, P & O Files, decimal file
O91, Korea, sec. 3, box 89, case 106,
27, Economic Report on Korea, Sept. 23, 1947, and Department of the Army
memo, Sept. 23, 1947, RG $19, P & © Files, decimal file 091, Korea, box 89, case
106; and John R, Hodge to JCS, Nov, 21, 1947, ibid,, TS, FW 38,
180 JAMES I. MATRAY
approach in Korea with a surprising ploy of its own, On September 26,
the Soviet occupation commander recommended Soviet-American
military withdrawal from the peninsula, arguing that the Koreans
could then resolve their own differences. It seems that Stalin was
attempting to force American disengagement prior to the application
of containment in Korea.*® Administration officials thought that
without American military protection, South Korea’s survival was
doubtful, given North Korea’s presumed economic and military superi-
ority. Yet Moscow’s proposal also would provide justification for
American withdrawal once Korea had achieved the capacity for self-
defense.2? As a result, when Ambassador Warren Austin formally
presented the American proposal on Korea to the UN, the resolution
included provisions for Soviet-American military withdrawal ninety
days after the creation of a Korean provisional government. On Novem-
ber 14, 1947, the United States accomplished a major policy objective
when the General Assembly voted by a wide margin to approve the
American-sponsored resolution on Korea.*9
International involvement in Korean affairs added urgency and
importance to the administration’s task of developing a definitive
plan for future American action in Korea, Without a strong American
commitment, Washington feared that the UN would eventually aban-
don its responsibilities in Korea. In December 1947, Truman therefore
instructed the State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee
(SANACC) to formulate a program for building a stronger constabulary
army in Korea and implementing a multi-year plan for economic
development. The SANACC agreed that the United States had to fulfill
its obligations in Korea or risk severe damage to American prestige.*!
Meanwhile, American military leaders completed a tentative timetable
28. Joseph E. Jacobs to Marshall, Sept. 26, 1947, FRUS, 1947, 6:816-17;
New York Times, Sept. 27, 1947, p. 1; Arthur C. Bunce to Edwin Martin, Sept, 28,
1947, RG 59, decimal file 740.00119, Control (Korea)/9-2847, National Archives.
29. Department of State memo, Sept. 24, 1947, ibid., 9-2447, National Ar-
chives; W. Walton Butterworth to Lovett, Oct. 1, 1947, FRUS, 1947, 6:820;
cabinet meeting, Sept. 29, 1947, The Forrestal Diaries, pp. 321-22; several Ameri-
can observers at the time expressed opposition to withdrawal from Korea. New
York Times, Sept. 27, 1947, p. 14; Time, Oct. 6, 1947, p. 31; Business Week,
Oct. 4, 1947, pp. 109-11.
30. Austin to Trygve Lie, Oct. 17, 1947, FRUS, 1947, 6:832-35; New York
Times, Oct. 18, 1947, p. 14; memo, Nov. 4, 1947, RG 319, P & O Files, decimal
file 091, Korea, sec. 3, box 87, cases 16-50; Austin to Marshall, Nov. 14, 1947,
FRUS, 1947, 6:857-59.
31. Schuyler to Blum, Jan. 2, 1948, RG 218, Records of the United States
Joint Chiefs of Staff, CCS, decimal file 383.21, Korea (3-19-45), sec. 14, National
Archives.
TEST CASE OF CONTAINMENT 181
for military withdrawal. This Department of the Army study speculated
that Korean elections would occur no later than March 31, 1948. If
the national assembly convened by May 15, the report continued,
Korea would have a provisional government no later than August 15.
In accordance with the UN resolution, the United States would com-
plete military withdrawal ninety days later, or on November 15, 1948.
Meanwhile, the administration would present a financial aid request to
Congress for Korea. Such limited assistance, it was hoped, would place
Korea on the road to economic self-sufficiency .°*
Beginning in January 1948, Army Department officials started
to press the State Department to complete a financial assistance
program for Korea, If the administration did not submit a request
to Congress before March 1, they cautioned, American military with-
drawal could not proceed on schedule.*? Truman’s diplomatic advisers
were suspicious of the military’s apparent desire to get out quickly.
W. Walton Butterworth, director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs,
observed that the United States possessed a moral commitment to
Korea and had to avoid any appearance of attempting to “scuttle and
run.’ Although it was willing to support withdrawal by November 15,
the State Department was convinced that flexibility was essential:
South Korea must have an adequate security force prior to Ameri-
can departure, Secretary Marshall expressed serious misgivings about
whether the Army Department plan would permit enough time to
train a constabulary army sufficiently powerful and disciplined to
prevent a North Korean invasion. Consequently, the State Depart-
ment decided to encourage Army Department officials to begin im-
mediate shipment of arms to Korea and to train more Koreans for
military service.4
Undersecretary of the Army William Draper was dissatisfied with
the State Department’s attitude, Marshall and his colleagues, he com-
plained, seemed to consider the adoption of a firm date for withdrawal
as synonymous with appeasement. During his testimony before the
House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Draper emphasized that the
United States could not remain in occupation of Korea forever. Sooner
32. Memo to Wedemeyer, Nov. 24, 1947, RG 319, P & O Files, decimal file
O91, TS, sec. 3, cases 3-15; Schuyler to Arnold, Dec. 30, 1947, ibid., sec. 5; War
Council meeting minutes, Dec. 5, 1947, General Correspondence 1945-1947,
box 23, Robert P. Patterson Papers, Library of Congress.
33. Seedlock memo, Jan, 31, 1948, RG 319, P & O Files, decimal file 091,
Korea, TS, sec. 3, cases 3-15, and Maddocks memo, Feb, 9, 1948, RG 319, CSA
decimal file O91, Korea, T'S,
$4. Butterworth to Marshall, Mar, 4, 1948, and Allison memo, Mar, 5, 1948,
FRUS, 1948 8:1137-41,
182 JAMES I MATRAY
or later, the Koreans would have to resolve their own problems.”
Draper’s consternation was understandable. During February 1948, the
JCS concluded that the United States could not block a Soviet thrust
into Europe without congressional approval of a $9 billion supplement to
the defense budget. Truman refused to approve the request, explaining
that the United States could not counter Soviet expansion everywhere
and still maintain its domestic economic strength.*© Such limitations
on defense spending meant that withdrawal from those areas not vital
to American security was inevitable. Truman therefore decided to
authorize the JCS to prepare for disengagement from Korea before the
end of 1948.97
On April 2, 1948, Truman received the final SANACC report on
American policy in Korea, The proposal, National Security Council
(NSC) Paper 8, outlined steps for the creation of a separate and in-
dependent South Korea with a sound economy, a progressive educa-
tional system, and strong popular support. NSC 8 noted that South
Korea suffered from serious economic problems and the threat of
military invasion from a Soviet-sponsored regime in the north. To
abandon South Korea to Communist domination would improve the
Soviet political and strategic situation with respect to China and Japan
and weaken America’s position in Asia, Consequently, NSC 8 recom-
mended that the United States provide $185 million in economic aid
to Korea for fiscal 1949 and sustain a small constabulary army capable
of self-defense ‘‘against any but an overt act of aggression by north
Korea or other forces.”” The paper also projected American military
withdrawal from Korea no later than December 31, 1948. Significantly,
NSC 8 included a warning that the United States should “not become
so irrevocably involved in the Korean situation that any action taken
by any faction in Korea or by any other power in Korea could be
considered a casus belli for the U.S.’°8
Truman’s approval of NSC 8 was indicative of his desire to pursue
a middle road in responding to the Soviet challenge in Korea. The
United States could not ‘‘cut and run’’; America’s allies and adversaries
alike would condemn Washington for exploiting the UN as a cover for
35. Biddle to Wedemeyer, Mar. 5, 1948, RG 319, P & O Files, decimal file 091,
Korea, TS, sec. 3, box 21, cases 3-15; Herbert Druks, Harry S. Truman and the
Russians 1945-1953 (New York: Speller, 1966), p. 226.
36. Warner R. Schilling, ‘‘The Politics of National Defense: Fiscal 1950,” in
Strategy, Politics and Defense Budgets (New York: Columbia University Press,
1962), p. 41.
37, Army to Douglas MacArthur, Mar. 18, 1948, RG 319, P & O Files, decimal
file 091, Korea, TS, sec. 1, box 20, case 1.
38. Sidney Souers to Harry S. Truman, Apr, 2, 1948, FRUS, 1948, 8:1163-69,
TEST CASE OF CONTAINMENT 183
abandonment of Korea. Nor was Truman willing to guarantee fully
South Korea’s political independence and territorial integrity against
open military aggression from any quarter, The Soviet military advan-
tage on the Asian mainland would make such a guarantee foolhardy at
best. Instead, the Truman administration would attempt to foster
indigenous economic strength, political stability, and military power so
that South Korea could provide for its own protection. Truman based
his decision on the crucial assumption that the Soviet Union would not
permit a North Korean invasion for military conquest of the entire
peninsula, As Truman’s Chief of Staff Admiral William Leahy explained
at the time, the administration was confident that “the U.S.S.R. does
not intend to accomplish its political purposes by the use of armed
forces but will continue its efforts by infiltration and underground
activities,”°9
Immediately thereafter, Royall and Draper traveled to South Korea
in the company of four American economic experts to gather the
necessary information for a specific assistance program, After three
days of discussions with prominent local businessmen and political
leaders, Truman’s advisers observed that the Koreans were anxious
to assume control over their own affairs. In its report, the army com-
mittee offered this conclusion:
For a time after withdrawal . . . the new independent Korean government will
require continuing American aid, advice, food and raw materials in order to main-
tain at least the present ration level and to achieve necessary rehabilitation and
governmental effectiveness. This assistance we feel should be provided for an
interim period, with steps taken to assure that it is properly utilized. The Com-
mittee believes that firm support by the United States and the United Nations to
the new Korean government will inestimably help to develop participation in
future Far Eastern trade on a basis valuable to the Korean people and to their
neighbors,
Financial assistance alone, the committee reasoned, would provide
Korea with the means to train technicians and to exploit its own re-
sources. Eventually, South Korea would realize the capacity for self-
sufficient economic growth,
State Department officials voiced immediate support for the army
committee’s recommendations, As a result, the Truman administration
decided to continue financial assistance through fiscal 1949 to guaran-
tce safe American withdrawal with minimal loss of prestige. If the new
39. Ibid.; Leahy diary, Jan. 8, 1948, Leahy Diaries 1948-1950, box 6, Leahy
Papers,
40, U.S. Department of the Army, Economie Position and Prospects of Japan
and Korea and Measures Required to Improve Them, U,S, Army Committee Re.
port, Apr. 26, 1948,
184 JAMES I. MATRAY
Korean government “shows more vitality than they expect it will,”
American leaders then would consider implementation of a major re-
covery program during fiscal 1950,*! Despite such reservations, Truman
and his advisers were optimistic about the prospects for successful
containment in Korea. The economic recovery and political stability
the Koreans could achieve with American aid and advice would frus-
trate the Soviet strategy of expansion. South Korea would emerge as a
viable, democratic Asian nation capable of self-defense and worthy of
emulation,
As expected, the Soviet Union refused to cooperate with the UN
plans for elections in Korea, and denied it access to North Korea. In
addition, some members of UNTCOK strongly opposed further UN
action, arguing that separate elections would confirm the permanence
of Korea’s partition. In response to considerable diplomatic pressure
from the United States, however, the UN authorized the supervision of
elections in South Korea alone.** On May 10, 1948, Koreans living
south of the thirty-eighth parallel elected delegates to a “national”
assembly. Over 90 percent of all registered voters cast ballots and, at
some polling places, the election process took only four hours. Joseph
Jacobs, Hodge’s political adviser, remarked candidly that the extreme
efficiency of the election “should give rise to a certain degree of cau-
tion and reservation in our appraisal. . . .”4% Nevertheless, American
officials in the United States and Korea were pleased with the results,
Secretary Marshall, in his message of congratulations, explained that the
extent of voter participation, “despite the lawless efforts of a Com-
munist-dominated minority to prevent or sabotage the election, is a
revelation that the Korean people are determined to form their own
government by democratic means,’
41. Seedlock memo, Apr. 16, 1948, RG 319, P & O Files, decimal file 091,
Korea, TS, sec. 4, box 22, cases 16-30; Lovett to Jacobs, Apr. 16, 1948, FRUS,
1948, 8:1179-80.
42. New York Times, Jan. 24, 1948, p. 14; Jacobs to Marshall, Feb, 2, 5, and 6,
1948, FRUS, 1948, 8:1089-91, 1093-95; Goodrich, Korea, p. 50; Marshall to
certain embassies, Feb. 9, 1948; Marshall to Austin, Feb. 18, 1948; Marshall to
British Embassy, Feb. 21, 1948; Marshall to Indian Embassy, Feb. 24, 1948; Austin
to Marshall, Feb. 24, 1948, ibid., pp. 1098-99, 1116-17, 1124-25, 1127-29;
New York Times, Feb. 25, 1948, p. 8, and Feb. 27, 1948, p. 1; see also Leon
Gordenker, The United Nations and the Peaceful Unification of Korea: The Politics
of Field Operations 1947-1950 (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1959), pp. 71-75.
43. New York Times, May 11, 1948, p. 11; Jacobs to Marshall, May 12, 1948,
decimal file 895.00/5-1248; Gordenker, The United Nations and the Peaceful
Unification of Korea, p. 105; Jacobs to Marshall, May 13, 1948, FRUS, 1948,
8:1195-97,
44, Marshall statement, Mar, 12, 1948, in Department of State, Department of
State Bulletin, no, 18, May 30, 1948, p. 700.
TEST CASE OF CONTAINMENT 185
The elections meant that the United States could proceed with
military disengagement on schedule. On May 22, the JCS ordered
Hodge to implement the first phase of withdrawal—code-named Crab-
apple? Soon after, American military dependents began to leave
Korea, At the same time, Hodge authorized the transfer of surplus
equipment and supplies to the constabulary and in Washington, Secre-
tary of the Army Royall ordered the shipment of a six-month supply
of ammunition and spare parts. Tactical troop withdrawal would
start on August 15, Royall then asked the State Department to organize
an embassy to relieve the occupation as soon as possible.*© The depart-
ment, however, was determined to resist a hasty retreat. On July 8,
Lovett reminded Royall that NSC 8 called for a flexible policy on
withdrawal, and coordination with the UN. The Army Department
could initiate disengagement, but the State Department insisted that
it might suspend, adjust, or delay the operation at a moment’s notice,*”
Some Army Department officials now charged that the State
Department was unwilling to accept responsibility for American policy
in Korea. They urged Royall to demand that Truman’s diplomatic
advisers cease hampering American withdrawal. Military leaders also
complained that the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA)
was not demonstrating any interest whatsoever in Korea, Army Depart-
ment officials strongly recommended that Truman appoint an ex-
perienced and capable administrator for the Korean aid program and
provide him with long-range instructions. More important, they said,
the United States had to withdraw as soon as possible because con-
tinued military occupation would embarrass the new Korean govern-
ment and substantiate Soviet charges of American imperialism.*®
Obviously, the Army Department had far more confidence than the
State Department in South Korea’s ability to defend itself. During the
orientation of John Muccio, the new American ambassador to Korea,
45. Gilchrist memo, May 19, 1948, RG 319, P & O Files, decimal file 091,
Korea, TS, sec, 1, pt. 3a, case 1.
46. New York Times, May 21, 1948, p. 7; Lawson memo, May 25, 1948, P & O
Viles, decimal file 091, Korea, TS, sec. 1, pt. 3a, case 1; Lawson memo, June 9,
1948, ibid., sec. 5, box 88, case 66; Royall to Marshall, June 23, 1948, ibid.,
sec, 3, box 21, cases 3-15; Charles E. Saltzman to Lovett, July 30, 1948, FRUS,
1948, 8:1265.
47, Lovett to Royall, June 23, 1948, and July 8, 1948, ibid., pp. 1224-25,
1234-35; in Korea, Joseph E. Jacobs, Hodge’s political adviser, also urged delay
because he feared withdrawal would ‘tcomplicate if not jeopardize our hope that
[the United Nations Temporary Commission] will give formal approval to new
yovernment.’’ Hodge to Bradley, June 17, 1948, RG $19, P & O Files, decimal file
O91, Korea, sec. 5, box 88, case 65.
48. Schuyler to Wedemeyer, July 28, 1948, ibid., see, 4, box 21, cases 16-50,
186 JAMES I, MATRAY
Truman’s military advisers insisted that containment in Korea did not
require the presence of American combat forces. Stalin would not
order an invasion across the parallel, they argued, because his strategy
was subversion and indirect aggression. Moreover, Syngman Rhee, the
newly elected president of the ROK, was, “as a result of the Army’s
substantial effort in training and equipping the South Korean forces,
in a strong bargaining position to talk with the North Koreans on
unification,” In response, Muccio agreed to advocate a greater role for
the State Department in supervising Korea’s economic recovery.*9
Truman’s diplomatic advisers were reluctant to assume complete
responsibility for South Korea’s economic rehabilitation “owing to a
feeling that Congress did not want State to handle programs of this
nature.’” Draper completely rejected the validity of this explanation,
Marshall and his colleagues, he said, were attempting to shun their
responsibilities, If State Department indifference persisted, Draper
suggested that the Army Department might order the removal of all
military equipment from Korea intended for transfer to the constabu-
lary army. American military leaders argued logically that if the State
Department did not consider Korea important enough to sustain
any interest in its future survival then it would be foolish to leave a
substantial military investment in an area destined for Soviet domina-
tion.°°
Truman acted quickly to end this interdepartmental dispute, On
August 16, the president instructed the departments involved to decide
which agency was best able to manage the Korean rehabilitation pro-
gram. During subsequent discussions, the Army Department insisted
upon the rapid termination of its obligations in Korea. The State
Department claimed that it did not possess enough trained personnel
to supervise the program and, besides, Congress had indicated its desire
to exclude the diplomatic branch from involvement in foreign aid,
Paul Hoffman, the ECA director, strongly supported the Army Depart-
ment’s contention that the military should not administer assistance
programs,”! recognizing that the ECA was the only logical candidate
to supervise the Korean aid program. He expressed doubts that Con-
gress would ‘“‘continue to pour money into Korea, which was a rather
questionable investment.’’ Nevertheless, he agreed to formulate a
specific assistance plan for inclusion in the budget proposal for fiscal
1950 in cooperation with the State Department. Yet, as one Army
49, H. A. B. to Schuyler, Aug. 9, 1948, ibid., sec. 5, box 22, case 31.
50. Schuyler memo, Aug. 9, 1948, ibid.
51. Lawton to Truman, Aug. 16, 1948; Truman to Lawton, Aug. 16, 1948,
Official Pile 471, Truman Papers, Truman Library; GC, V, R, S, to Schuyler, Aug.
20, 1948, RG 319, P & O Files, decimal file 091, Korea, TS, sec. 5, box 22, case $1
TEST CASE OF CONTAINMENT 187
Department memorandum revealed, Hoffman was not satisfied and
questioned the logic of the entire venture:
The whole problem is one of State Department foreign policy. It has no economic
justification. He would not hold out hope that Korea would offer any kind of eco-
nomic bulwark. He gathers that it has no strategic importance from a military point
of view. ECA will look to the State Department for leadership in the program to be
carried out. He regards the operation as a holding one—making good on pledges to
Korea.
On August 25, Truman ordered the Army Department to transfer its re-
sponsibilities to the ECA on January 1, 1949. Hoffman began immedi-
ately to recruit personnel and to organize an aid mission to South
Korea.®?
Charles Saltzman, assistant secretary of state for occupied areas,
completed work on a draft proposal for aid to Korea in early Sep-
tember. Saltzman’s memorandum rejected continued reliance on annual
relief appropriations and emphasized instead the advantages of a
multi-year program for the development of economic self-sufficiency,
The proposed plan provided for American assistance to begin in 1949
and would require congressional approval for $180 million in economic
aid to South Korea during fiscal 1950. Hoffman urged adoption of
Saltzman’s proposals, Its implementation would permit the United
States to end wasteful expenditures on relief and to achieve withdrawal,
while fostering genuine economic recovery in Korea, Draper was also
pleased with the proposal, believing that the State Department finally
had taken a direct role in Korean affairs. But he was doubtful that
Congress would approve the appropriation. Lovett agreed and stated
flatly that the program was ‘too rich for my blood.” Together with
other similar requests, aid to Korea would place an excessive strain on
the American economy. Yet Lovett admitted that the United States
could not abandon South Korea and he therefore approved Saltzman’s
draft proposal and promised to work for congressional support.°?
On August 15, the United States formally transferred political
authority to representatives from the ROK. Gen. Douglas MacArthur
attended the inauguration ceremonies, declaring in his congratulatory
speech that the thirty-eighth parallel “barrier must and will be torn
down, Nothing shall prevent the ultimate unity of your people as
free men of a free nation.””™
52. Lawton to Truman, n.d., Official File 471, Truman Papers, Truman Library;
Truman to Marshall, Aug. 25, 1948, FRUS, 1948, 8:1288-89; Claxton memo,
Sept. 1, 1948, decimal file 895,50 Recovery/9-148,
53. Saltzman memo, Sept, 7, 1948; Lovett to Paul G, Hoffman, Sept. 17, 1948;
Hoffman to Lovett, Oct. 1, 1948, FRUS, 1948, 8:1292-97, 1804-5, 1312-13,
54. New York Times, Aug, 15, 1948, p, 1; Aug, 15, 1948, sec, 4, p. 8; Time,
Aug. 23, 1948, p, 24,
188 JAMES I. MATRAY
The new Korean government experienced incredible difficulties
from the start. Serious shortages of food and other commodities
produced high inflation; insufficient electric power severely impeded
economic recovery. Political grappling between the legislature and
Syngman Rhee represented a further complication. Then in September,
the North Koreans announced the establishment of the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and requested Soviet-American
military withdrawal. Observers recognized that the ROK could not
withstand political and military pressure from the north without
sustained American protection,
Political and economic deterioration in South Korea worsened in
October when a major rebellion brought the ROK to the verge of
total collapse. Near the town of YOsu, a group within the constabulary
staged an uprising that spread quickly to nearby counties. More than
three thousand individuals joined the rebellion and South Korean
military forces restored order only with great difficulty.°° The adminis-
tration reacted to news of the rebellion with profound shock and
dismay. Although many of the rioters were Communist sympathizers,
the favorable popular response exposed the depth of local grievances.
Muccio predicted that ‘if the internal South Korean situation worsens
. the North Korean Army would intervene under the banner of
restoring order and aiding ‘democratic’ elements of the population.”
Only continued American military occupation, he concluded, would
prevent the complete demise of the ROK. Now suddenly the United
States had to consider delaying withdrawal.>’
In the aftermath of the Ydsu Rebellion, Truman’s diplomatic
advisers strongly opposed fixing a specific date for the completion of
withdrawal. Marshall, Lovett, and Saltzman insisted that disengagement
55, Owen T. Jones to Marshall, Sept. 15, 1948, decimal file 895.00/9-1548;
Jacobs to Marshall, Aug. 25, 1948, decimal file 895.00/8-2548; New York Times,
Sept. 1, 1948, p. 7, Sept. 11, 1958, p. 4, and Sept. 25, 1948, p. 16; Kohler to
Marshall, Sept. 19, 1948, FRUS, 1948, 8:1306; “Position on Withdrawal of Troops
from Korea,” Department of State, Department of State Bulletin, no, 19, Oct. 10,
1948, p. 456; Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, p. 328; Time, Sept. 27, 1948,
p. 32; see also Joungwon A. Kim, Divided Korea: The Politics of Development,
1945-1972 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975), pp. 107-8, 123.
56. John J. Muccio to Marshall, Oct. 28, 1948, FRUS, 1958, 8:1317-18;
O’Byrne memo, Nov. 15, 1948, RG 319, P & O Files, decimal file 091, Korea,
sec. 5, box 88, case 65; New York Times, Oct. 21, 1948, pp. 1, 26, Oct. 25, 1948,
p. 12, and Oct. 27, 1948, pp. 9, 26.
57, Muccio to Marshall, Oct. 26, 1948, decimal file 895.01/10-2648;
Muccio to Marshall, Nov. 4, 1948, decimal file 895.00/11-448; Muccio to Marshall,
Nov. 16, 1948, decimal file 895.00/11-1648; Muccio to Marshall, Nov. 12, 1948,
FRUS, 1948, 8:1325-27.
TEST CASE OF CONTAINMENT 189
at this time of extreme chaos would be premature and prejudicial to
American security interests. Moreover, the United States had to delay
withdrawal until the UN extended recognition to the ROK.*® But
Army Department officials were reluctant to authorize another post-
ponement of the withdrawal operation—now code-named Twinborn,
Military leaders were anxious to end the occupation because of its
drain on the Army Department’s limited financial resources. While
the JCS was fighting further large reductions in military expenditures,
Truman absolutely refused to raise the ceiling on defense spending
for fiscal 1950.59 For the Army Department, the administration’s
devotion to a balanced budget meant that the United States could not
afford to maintain the costly occupation of Korea unless it was vital
to American security interests, Nevertheless, the JCS ordered Mac-
Arthur to halt disengagement from Korea and to retain one regimental
combat team there until the UN formally requested an end to American
military occupation,
On December 12, 1948, the UN approved a resolution naming the
ROK the only legal government on the peninsula and requested the
withdrawal of all foreign troops ‘as soon as practicable,’’®! Less than
two weeks later, Undersecretary Draper approached the State De-
partment and requested approval for total military disengagement no
later than March 31, 1949. Since the protection of the ROK was not
worth a major war, he explained, the American occupation forces
would be a liability in the event of military conflict in Asia;® political
und diplomatic factors reinforced the military justification for with-
drawal. On December 30, the Soviet Union announced it had com-
pleted withdrawal and called upon the United States to do likewise.
58, Claxton memo, Oct, 29, 1948, decimal file 501BB, Korea/10-2948; Saltz-
ian to Wedemeyer, Nov. 4, 1948, decimal file 501BB Korea/11-448; Lovett to
Marshall, Nov. 5, 1948; Saltzman to Wedemeyer, Nov. 9, 1948, FRUS, 1948,
8:1319, 1324,
59. Leahy diary, Nov. 4, 1948, Leahy Diaries 1948-1950, box 6, Leahy Papers;
lorrestal memo, Oct. 5, 1948; Forrestal to Marshall, Oct. 31, 1948, in The For-
restal Diaries, pp. 498-99, 508-10; Schilling, “The Politics of National Defense,”
pp. 175-76.
60. JCS to MacArthur, Nov. 15, 1948, RG 218, decimal file 383.21, CCS,
Korea (3-19-45), sec. 18; in response, MacArthur informed Washington that
although he had delayed withdrawal he did not consider it part of his assigned
mission ‘to secure or to make plans to secure Southern Korea.” Department of
the Army memo, Jan. 10, 1949, RG 319, P & O Files, decimal file 091, Korea,
I'S, sec. 1, box 162, cases 5-16,
61, John Foster Dulles to Marshall, Dec. 12, 1948, FRUS, 1948, 8:1336; “U.N.
Recognizes Republic of Korea," Department of State, Department of State Bul:
letin, no, 19, Dec, 12, 1948, p. 728; New York Times, Dec. 13, 1948, p. 3,
62, William I, Draper to Saltzman, Dee, 22, 1948, FRUS, 1948, 8: 1841-45,
190 JAMES I. MATRAY
Moscow charged that continued American occupation and plans for
economic assistance constituted imperialism and proved the United
States sought to exploit Korea. Truman and his advisers understood
that delaying withdrawal was risky. The Soviet Union would use
America’s continued presence in Korea as a propaganda weapon to
discredit the ROK and undermine the international prestige of the
United States,™ cation
And yet a new element emerged to complicate the situation.
Communist successes in China convinced other American leaders that
the United States had to postpone disengagement from Korea in-
definitely. One State Department official argued that, with the loss of
China, American abandonment of the ROK would destroy the con-
fidence and morale of all nations in Asia. Perhaps worse, Communist
conquest of South Korea would greatly advance the Soviet drive to
dominate Japan—‘‘a target of prime importance to world Communism.”
The United States, he believed, should attempt to create a ring of
strong states in Asia capable of halting further Soviet expansion.
J. Leighton Stuart, the American ambassador to China, even urged
Washington to seize the military and diplomatic initiative in Korea,
Some decisive action was imperative if the United States expected to
counter the loss of prestige it would suffer with the anticipated fall
of Chiang’s regime.™ Butterworth summarized these views in a memo-
randum to Lovett and recommended an immediate redefinition of
American objectives in Korea under NSC 8. In January 1949, Lovett
referred the Korean matter to the NSC for a policy reassessment.©
At the thirty-sixth meeting of the NSC on March 22, Truman and
his advisers began a reappraisal of American policy in Korea. The
State Department review of events in Korea during the previous year
concluded that, despite American aid and advice, the new Korean
government had not developed sufficient military and economic strength
to defend itself against the Soviet puppet regime in North Korea, If
the United States withdrew abruptly, the report declared, this “dis-
engagement would be interpreted as a betrayal by the U.S. of its
friends and allies in the Far East and might contribute substantially
to a fundamental realignment of forces in favor of the USSR through-
63. Muccio to Acheson, Jan. 6, 1949, decimal file 895.00/1-649; McGeorge
Bundy, ed., The Pattern of Responsibility (Boston: Kelley, 1952), p. 287.
64, Bishop to Butterworth, Dec. 17, 1948, FRUS, 1948, 8:1337-40; Stuart to
Marshall, Dec, 29, 1948, ibid., 7:695.
65. Butterworth to Lovett, Jan. 10, 1949; Saltzman to Draper, Jan. 25, 1949,
FRUS, 1949, 7, pt. 2:942-45; Secretary of State Acheson did not want to even
discuss withdrawal. Acheson to Royall, Jan, 25, 1949, Korean War Documents,
Background File, box 1, ‘Truman Papers, Truman Library.
EST CASE OF CONTAINMENT 19]
out that part of the world.’’ In addition, premature American with-
drawal would shatter the confidence of South Korea and thus guarantee
the rapid demise of the ROK. A dramatic Communist victory would
damage American interests because it would destroy the viability of
the UN and force smaller countries to seek an accommodation with
the Soviet Union. The study (NSC 8/1) therefore concluded that,
despite the uncertain prospects for success, the United States had to
continue to provide South Korea with diplomatic support and eco-
nomic, technical, and military assistance,
NSC 8/1 also acknowledged however that American military with-
drawal was necessary since the UN had requested the removal of all
foreign troops. Both Muccio in Korea and MacArthur in Japan had
concluded that the United States could withdraw safely if the adminis-
tration satisfied certain conditions. First, Washington had to train,
equip, and supply a security force in Korea sufficiently powerful to
maintain internal order and deter an open attack from the north.
Second, the ECA had to implement a three-year program of technical
and economic aid. Finally, the UN had to maintain diplomatic and
political support as a boost to South Korea’s morale. Such a plan
would not preclude the possibility of invasion, the report admitted,
but further postponement of total withdrawal would not diminish
the risk of attack either. In fact, NSC 8/1 ominously predicted that
if the United States delayed departure the “occupation forces remain-
ing in Korea might be either destroyed or obliged to abandon Korea
in the event of a major hostile attack, with serious damage to U.S.
prestige... ...7°67
Truman approved NSC 8/1 on March 23, 1949, with certain signifi-
cant revisions. In its final form (NSC 8/2) the paper represented a
compromise that attempted to accommodate the conflicting desires
of both diplomatic and military leaders. The administration assumed
a stronger commitment to get congressional approval for a three-year
economic aid program for South Korea and military security prior to
American withdrawal. Economic strength not only would promote
political stability in South Korea, but would also encourage the realiza-
tion of democratic self-government throughout the Korean peninsula.
In addition, the United States would provide enough equipment and
amie maintain a security force of over one-hundred thousand
men,
NSC 8/2 set June 30, 1949, as a firm date for the total withdrawal
66. NSC 8/1, Mar. 16, 1949, RG 319, P&O Viles, decimal file 091, Korea,
sec. la,
67, Ibid,; see also, Royall to Acheson, Jan, 25, 1949, ibid,, box 165,
68. NSC 8/2, Mar, 22, 1949, FRUS, 1949, 7, pt, 2:969278,
192 JAMES I, MATRAY
of American combat forces. The final plan also set specific limits on the
size of the army (65,000), coast guard (4,000), and police (35,000).
The United States would equip these forces with light weapons; the
creation of a Korean navy was explicitly ruled out. Obviously American
military leaders wanted to eliminate any potential for South Korea to
attempt forcible reunification and thereby ignite a major war. At the
same time, NSC 8/2 emphasized that American military withdrawal
would in no way lessen the administration’s interest in the ROK’s
future survival.®? Three months later, the United States removed its
last combat forces from the Korean peninsula. The administration’s
decision to withdraw without a firm guarantee of military protection
for South Korea did not constitute an abandonment of the ROK:
Truman and his advisers had concluded that containment in Korea did
not require an American commitment to military defense any more
than it did in Greece and Turkey. Truman’s strategy anticipated that
containment through economic means would act as a liberating force
in Korea, Eventually, the North Koreans would recognize that the
ROK possessed a superior political and economic system and clamor
for immediate reunification.”? These expectations were at best overly
optimistic and at worst utterly naive, since a successful rollback of
the Soviet sphere depended upon the weakness of the North Korean
regime and the development of genuine democracy and economic
prosperity in South Korea.
By the spring of 1949, Korea had thus come to assume far greater
significance for the administration’s overall approach in Asia than
previous scholars have acknowledged. Truman and his advisers accepted
as valid the fundamental assumption that if the people of Asia were
able to exercise freedom of choice, a substantial majority would elect
to follow the American model for political and economic development.
As a result, national self-determination promised the creation of a series
of governments in Asia friendly to the United States and supportive
of American policies in international affairs. With limited American
assistance, these Asian nations could then develop the ability to defend
themselves against the threat of Soviet expansion, The fall of China
reinforced the administration’s confidence in its strategy. Despite
extensive American aid, Chiang K’ai-shek had lost the support of the
Chinese people because he rejected reform and refused to satisfy
69. Ibid., see also Maddocks to army chief of staff, Mar. 7, 1949; Maddocks to
secretary of the army, Mar. 22, 1949, RG 319, P & O Files, decimal file 091, Korea,
TS, sec. 1, boxes 1, 163; Robert K. Sawyer and Walter G. Hermes, Military Ad-
visors in Korea: KMAG in Peace and War (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1962), p. 38.
70. Ibid., pp. 15-16; Bunce to James K, Penfield, Jan, 20, 1948, decimal file
895.00/1-2048; Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, p. 330.
TEST CASE OF CONTAINMENT 193
popular needs and desires. In Korea, however, the United States had a
second chance to prove that its policy of containment through indirect
means would succeed. On June 7, 1949, Truman indicated in a message
to Congress the importance of the American commitment in Korea
when he proclaimed that ‘the Korean Republic, by demonstrating the
success and tenacity of democracy in resisting communism, will stand
as a beacon to the people of northern Asia in resisting the control of
the communist forces which have overrun them,’”7! For Truman,
Korea was more than a bulwark of democracy; it was his test case of
containment in Asia. When the test finally came on June 25, 1950,
Truman and Acheson responded to the Korean crisis with measures
that, given the evolution of containment from 1947 to 1949, do not
now seem so surprising.
71. Harry S. Truman, Presidential Message to Congress, Department of State,
Department of State Bulletin, no, 20, June 19, 1949, p. 781.
The March to the Yalu:
The Perspective from Washington
WILLIAM STUECK
THIS PAPER SEEKS TO ANSWER TWO QUESTIONS: WHY, EARLY IN THE FALL OF
1950, did the United States attempt to unify Korea by ordering Ameri-
can as well as South Korean troops to push north of the thirty-eighth
parallel? Then, after the intervention of Chinese Communist combat
forces in North Korea in late October, why did the United States,
faced with a possible military setback in that area—and even global
war—fail to halt its ground units in their advance toward the Yalu
River?
Until recently, scholars have based their answers to these questions
on a variety of sources: published memoirs, congressional hearings,
and interviews with the actors (all of which were written or conducted
months, even years, after the event) on the official army histories of
the Korean War, and only occasionally on contemporary documents
from the executive branch. In the past several years, however, a large
This paper first appeared in The Road to Confrontation: American Policy
toward China and Korea, 1947-1950, by William Stueck (copyright 1981 by the
University of North Carolina Press), and has been reprinted by permission,
196 WILLIAM STUECK
body of such documents has been released to the public by the De-
partments of State and Defense, the National Security Council (NSC),
and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Although uncertainty
remains on many points, historians are able better than ever before to
reconstruct the decision-making process in Washington in the critical
months between June and December 1950.!
President Truman did not decide to send American ground forces
across the thirty-eighth parallel until September 27. Yet that move
was in the making long before then. Less than three weeks after the
outbreak of hostilities in Korea on June 25, both the State and Defense
Departments were discussing possible United Nations (UN) ground
action in North Korea. Two events sparked this activity. First, on
July 13, CBS reported a statement by South Korean President Syngman
Rhee to the effect that North Korean aggression “had obliterated the
38th parallel and that no peace and order could be maintained in Korea
as long as the division [of the peninsula] at the 38th parallel re-
mained,”’ In response, an American army spokesman allegedly asserted
that U.S. forces had intervened merely to push the invaders north of
the thirty-eighth parallel and would ‘use force if necessary” to halt
South Korean troops at that point.” Second, on July 12, at a briefing
in Tokyo of Gens, J. Lawton Collins and Hoyt Vandenberg, the army
and air force chiefs of staff, Gen. Douglas MacArthur, the commander
of UN forces on the peninsula, expressed confidence that the North
Korean advance would be halted and a counteroffensive launched. He
also stated his intention to destroy North Korea’s forces rather than
simply drive them back across the parallel.°
By July 15, a debate was raging within the State Department
between the Policy Planning Staff (PPS), headed by Paul Nitze, but
1, Memoirs include Harry S, Truman, Memoirs: Years of Trial and Hope (Gar-
den City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1956; Dean G. Acheson, Present at the Creation
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1967); Matthew B. Ridgway, The Korean War (New York:
Doubleday, 1964); J. Lawton Collins, War in Peacetime: The History and Lessons
of Korea (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1969), Congressional hearings of interest:
U. S. Congress, Senate, Committees on Armed Services and Foreign Relations,
Joint Hearings to Conduct an Inquiry into the Military Situation in the Far East, vols.
3, 5; 82nd Cong., Ist sess. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1951).
One firsthand account is Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Power: The Politics of
Leadership (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1960), pp. 123-51. Among Army
histories are Roy E, Appleman, South to the Nakton, North to the Yalu (Washing-
ton, D.C.: GPO, 1961), and James F. Schnabel, Policy and Direction: The First
Year (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1972). For compilations of documents, see U.S.
Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950 (hereafter
FRUS), vol. 7 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1977).
2. FRUS, 7:373.
3. Schnabel, Policy and Direction, p. 107; Collins, War in Peacetime, pp. 81-83,
MARCH TO YALU 197
still influenced by its previous director, George F, Kennan, and the
Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, led by John Allison, Herbert Feis,
of the former, urged that the U.S. government publicly disassociate
itself from Rhee’s statement. Otherwise, he argued, a rift with our
allies might develop, the Chinese Communists and Russians might
send their own troops into the fighting, and Soviet charges of American
aggression in Korea might gain credibility outside the Communist
world,*
Allison made a stinging reply to this analysis, Perpetuating the
division of Korea, he exclaimed, would make “impossible” the imple-
mentation of the Security Council resolution of June 27 calling for a
restoration of “peace and security in the area.” If the United States
accepted the status quo ante bellum, it would lose the confidence of
South Koreans in its “moral position.” ‘[T] he aggressors’’ would go
“unpunished,” thereby encouraging aggression elsewhere. Finally,
Allison rejected the claim that America’s allies would be put off by a
military venture into North Korea, Most of our friends, he believed,
agreed that the continued division of Korea was “utterly unrealistic.”
A diplomatic offensive by the United States could eliminate most
allied opposition to such military action. He “most strongly urge[d]”
that the Truman administration avoid any public statement committing
the United States to halt its troops at the thirty-eighth parallel or
implying a willingness to accept a restoration of the status quo as of
June 25.5
While middle-level State Department officials debated the issue,
Collins and Vandenberg returned from the western Pacific and reported
on conditions in Korea to President Harry S. Truman, On July 17,
the chief executive instructed the NSC to prepare recommendations
on what the United States should do once North Korean forces had
been pushed back to the parallel. At the same time, the Joint Strategic
Survey Committee, a staff organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
(JCS), launched a study of the matter, Thus, well before UN forces
had halted the North Korean advance, governmental machinery in
Washington had commenced deliberations on what should be done
once the tide of battle turned.®
Despite this activity, Secretary of State Dean Acheson was not
particularly interested in the question. He cabled John J. Muccio, the
American ambassador in South Korea, that U.S. officials must avoid
4. Unfortunately, the memo is not printed in FRUS but it is summarized by
Allison in his memo to Rusk of July 15 in FRUS, 7:393,
5. Ibid., pp. 393-95,
6, Ibid., p, 410,
198 WILLIAM STUECK
public statements committing their country to a future course of
action. To him, it was too early to establish policy to meet circum-
stances that could not be clearly foreseen,’
Nevertheless, Acheson’s position on the diplomatic front during the
summer served to narrow the options available to the United States later
on when its military position in Korea improved. In July and again in
August, the secretary of state squelched maneuvers by Great Britain
and India aimed at early resolution of the conflict in Korea. Both of
the overtures in July involved American concessions—Chinese Commu-
nist admission to the U.N. and the withdrawal of the Seventh Fleet from
the Formosa Strait. The Indian proposal, as it turned out, did not even
provide for the simultaneous reestablishment of the thirty-eighth paral-
lel in Korea.8 Acheson’s determination not to reward aggression had
merit. Yet his definition of what constituted concessions was overly
rigid, and he failed to recognize that exploratory exchanges involving
the United States, the Soviet Union, and Communist China might serve
a useful purpose even if they failed to bring an early end to the fight-
ing in Korea, This failure of perception became important in late
September when the diplomatic process lagged behind military events.
Acheson’s position in this case derived from broad assumptions
about the Communist world. The Communist victory in China in
1949, coupled with the Soviet Union’s explosion of an atomic device,
had created tremendous apprehension in Washington. Early in the
following year, the secretary of state began arguing publicly that
successful negotiations with the Communists required the creation
of “situations of strength’’ for the United States. Soon thereafter, a
top secret document—the now famous NSC 68—emerged from the
NSC staff. It envisioned at least a threefold increase in American
defense spending over the next several years. The North Korean attack
merely reinforced the view that the Russians would exploit cases in
which they or especially their satellites had the military advantage
over local anti-Communist forces. Until the scales tipped in favor of
the United States or its allies, it was useless to try and bargain with
Moscow. The appropriate course was to move forward rapidly with a
major expansion of America’s physical power in Korea, at home, and
in Europe. In theory, this endeavor aimed to produce conditions in
which fruitful negotiations were possible. In fact, its object was circum-
stances in which the United States could dictate rather than negotiate.
7. Acheson, Present, p. 451.
8. For more extensive treatment of these overtures, see Stueck, The Road to
Confrontation: American Policy toward China and Korea, 1947-1950 (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 1981), pp. 199-202,
MARCH TO YALU 199
Despite Acheson’s hard line, he was by no means as extreme as
Allison. Although the PPS had argued that the risks of Soviet or Chi-
nese intervention in Korea in response to American troops crossing the
thirty-eighth parallel outweighed the advantages to be gained by the
unification of Korea, on July 24, Allison advocated throwing caution
to the wind:
We should recognize that there is grave danger of conflict with the USSR and the
Communist Chinese whatever we do from now on—but I fail to see what advantage
we gain by a compromise with clear moral principles and a shirking of our duty
to make clear once and for all that aggression does not pay—that he who violates
the decent opinions of mankind must take the consequences and that he who takes
the sword will perish by the sword... .That this may mean war on a global scale is
true—the American people should be told and told what it will mean to them... .
When all legal and moral right is on our side, why should we hesitate??
Had the secretary of state responded to this diatribe he probably
would have noted that, despite America’s superiority in atomic weap-
ons, the United States was not necessarily militarily superior to the
Soviet Union, at least for the short term; that, with global war an
increasingly likely prospect, Korea was a poor place to commit large
numbers of American troops, not only because of its limited strategic
significance to the United States, but because the peninsula’s location
gave the Soviets a military advantage there; and that American adven-
turism in Korea might create divisions within the Allied camp that
would undermine collective efforts in the event war spread to Europe.
In sum, Acheson stood closer to the PPS, which on July 22 concluded
the following: “In the unlikely event that there is a complete disintegra-
tion of North Korean forces together with a failure of the Kremlin and
Communist China to take any action whatever to exert influence in
North Korea, United Nations forces acting in pursuance of an addi-
tional Security Council resolution, might move into North Korea in
order to assist in the establishment of a united and independent
Korea.’?!°
Still, Allison made his mark, partly because he had the support of
his immediate superior, Assistant Secretary of State for the Far East
Dean Rusk. The PPS paper of July 22 conceded that under certain
conditions American ground forces might move into North Korea. This
position was more flexible than that of Feis. Three days later, the
Nitze-headed group gave further ground when it concluded that “‘the
necessity to maintain a realistic balance between our military strength
on the one hand and commitments and risks on the other hand, to-
9, FRUS, 7:460-61.
10, Ibid,, p, 452,
200 WILLIAM STUECK
gether with the need for additional information which depends upon
political and military developments in the near future, make it impos-
sible to take decisions now regarding our future course of action in
Korea.’’!! Thus, during July, the PPS moved from an initial position of
total opposition to any move across the thirty-eighth parallel, to one
of defining narrowly the conditions under which such operations might
be undertaken, and finally to a simple wait-and-see attitude. This last
posture remained a good distance from that of Allison, but it left
open an option that the group had previously sought to eliminate.
From late July onward, there was no high-level state department
official, with the exception of George Kennan, who consistently took
a stand against a UN move into North Korea. And Kennan, who did
not enjoy Acheson’s confidence, left for the Institute for Advanced
Study at the end of August.!*
The Department of Defense accepted in part the PPS’s position
in late July. The Pentagon advocated a military effort to unify Korea,
but only under two conditions: that the United States mobilize suf-
ficient resources to both ‘‘gain its military objectives in Korea’? and
strengthen “‘its military position in areas of strategic importance,”
and that the Soviet Union neither intervened nor initiated general
hostilities in Korea. Like the PPS the military regarded Soviet interven-
tion in North Korea—either through the use of its own or Communist
Chinese troops—as a major possibility once it became clear that UN
forces would not be pushed off the peninsula. Most important, both
groups anticipated that such a move would occur before UN forces
reached the thirty-eighth parallel.!3
But the Department of Defense analysis went far beyond State
Department papers in outlining the advantages of unifying Korea under
a non-Communist regime. The diplomats, including Allison, viewed
the advantages essentially in defensive terms; that is, Korea should be
united so as to prevent a future North Korean attack across the parallel,
to discourage Communist aggression in the future by punishing it
in the present, and to avoid both the wrath and demoralization of
South Koreans, who yearned for national unity. The PPS also antici-
11. Ibid., p. 472.
12. For Kennan’s views, see ibid., pp. 623-28.
13. Ibid., pp. 471, 503-4, 506-7. Military leaders—from the JCS in Washington
to MacArthur in Tokyo—consistently rejected American involvement in a land war
on the Asian mainland. Korea, however, was a kind of twilight zone between the
mainland and offshore islands. Because it was connected to the continent on only
one side, MacArthur hoped to greatly restrict Soviet and Chinese assistance to
North Korea through intensive bombing. See Collins, War in Peacetime, p. 82,
and Francis H. Heller, ed., The Korean War: A 25-Year Perspective (Lawrence:
Regents Press of Kansas, 1977), p. 185.
MARCH TO YALU 201
pated public and congressional pressure for a ‘‘final” solution in Ko-
ea.!* Military planners, however, viewed the unification of the pen-
insula in a broader light. They anticipated that such a ‘‘... [p]ene-
tration of the Soviet orbit . . . would disturb the strategic complex
which the USSR is organizing between its own Far Eastern territories
and the contiguous areas. Manchuria, the pivot of this complex outside
the USSR, would lose its captive status, for a free and strong Korea
could provide an outlet for Manchuria’s resources and could also
provide non-communist contact with the people there and in North
China.” Such circumstances might lead the Communist Chinese to
reassess their “dependent”’ relationship with Moscow, It would also
boost the morale of anti-Communist forces throughout Asia. Thus
total victory in Korea would help to reverse ‘‘the dangerous strategic
trend in the Far East of the past twelve months,’’!®
This analysis fit into the pattern of military thinking on China going
back to 1947. Since that time, a serious division had existed between
the JCS and the State Department as to the extent to which the United
States should seek to prevent Communist domination of that country.
Following Gen. George C. Marshall’s failure during 1946 to resolve
peacefully the differences between the Communists and the National-
ists, military leaders in Washington had pushed for increased support
to Chiang K’ai-shek in the form of American officers to advise National-
ist commanders in tactical field operations, The State Department, now
led by Marshall, demurred, arguing that such action would not have
a decisive effect, that it would commit the United States irrevocably to
the Nationalist cause, and that China simply was not of sufficient
strategic importance—given the limits of American capabilities—to
warrant such a commitment. A major assumption was that the Com-
munists would probably be little more successful than the Nationalists
in uniting and ruling China. This underestimation of Communist
capabilities, which persisted after 1947, was to be important in shaping
American policy toward Korea in the fall of 1950. For our analysis,
however, it is enough to note that the JCS had been frustrated for years
in their policy preferences regarding China, and that now, with the op-
portunity presented by war in Korea, they were anxious to undo at
lcast some of the perceived damage to American interests resulting from
past State Department domination of the policy-making process.!’
14, FRUS, 7:471-72. This consideration probably made the Policy Planning
Staff less aggressive than it otherwise might have been in the interdepartmental rift,
15. Ibid., p. 506,
16, Ibid., p. 508,
17, Stueck, The Road to Confrontation, chap, 2.
202 WILLIAM STUECK
Yet another factor inclining the JCS toward an aggressive Korea
policy was the towering presence of MacArthur as field commander of
UN forces. The aging general was a rabid ‘‘Asia-firster’’ who deeply re-
sented America’s slighting of the western Pacific area after World War
Il. A supreme egoist, he sometimes had difficulty distinguishing be-
tween himself and the Almighty. As a would-be poet of the American
fleet in the Pacific noted in 1944, one day the Lord was even likely to
“thear a deep voice say, ‘Move over God, it’s Mac.’ ” !8 Whatever his rela-
tionship to the deity, there can be little doubt that he saw in the out-
break of war in Korea an opportunity to reverse the timid Asian policy
of the United States. “To hell with the concept of business as usual,”
he declared to Collins and Vandenberg in mid-July, “it is how you
play your poor hands rather than your good ones which counts in
the long run,’”!9
Doubtless, MacArthur held an exalted position with the JCS, He
had received his first commission in the U.S. Army in 1903, twelve
years before the JCS’s chairman, Omar Bradley. He became army chief
of staff in 1930, eleven years before Bradley received his first star. On
the eve of war in 1941, he came out of retirement to become com-
mander of U.S. forces in the western Pacific. During the next four
years, he served brilliantly in the fight against Japan. At war’s end, he
took on the huge task of commander of Allied occupation forces in the
defeated island-nation. Most observers felt that he made the transition
from field commander to military statesman with ease.
There were other reasons as well for MacArthur’s influence on
the JCS. First, he was the commander in the field and military tra-
dition dictated that his views on Korea be given the utmost considera-
tion, Second, his presence was Olympian. As one retired general re-
cently recalled, ‘He could charm the birds off the trees.”? The
outbreak of war in Korea insured that his audience in Tokyo would
include, more often than ever before, top personages from Washington,
His persuasive powers, formidable as they often were at a distance,
were all the more so in person. In August, he even talked the highly
dubious General Collins and Adm, Forrest Sherman, chief of naval
operations, into permitting him to launch a major counteroffensive
at the port of Inch’dn, despite prohibitive natural obstacles. Third,
he was almost universally regarded as an expert on Asia, although
18. See ‘‘Doug’s Communique,” written by an unidentified commander aboard
Adm, William Halsey’s flagship in the Pacific, in the Harry S. Truman Papers,
President’s Secretary’s Files, box 138, Harry S, Truman Library, Independence,
Mo,
19. Collins, War in Peacetime, p. 82.
20. Interview with Gen. Thomas Timberman, Aug, 13, 1974,
MARCH TO YALU 203
he spoke no Asian languages and had traveled little on the main-
land.
It would be a mistake, nonetheless, to view MacArthur’s influence
as pivotal on the issue of an American military campaign in North
Korea, True, certain of the views presented by the Far Eastern com-
mander to Collins and Vandenberg during their Tokyo visit of July did
reappear in the Defense Department paper at the end of the month:
American bombing near the northern border of Korea was seen asa
possible means of preventing a major Soviet or Chinese intervention,
Also, a rapid American build-up and counteroffensive would tend to
discourage such intervention, Furthermore, this last belief, and the
lecling that unification of the country under non-Communist rule
would tend to draw Communist China away from Russia, may have
rested on MacArthur’s conception of the Chinese mentality, which in
August he summarized as follows: “it is the pattern of Oriental psy-
chology to respect and follow aggressive, resolute and dynamic leader-
ship—to quickly turn on a leadership characterized by timidity or
vacillation.’”* Yet on broad issues it is likely that MacArthur merely
strengthened pre-existing inclinations. For instance, he did not modify
the Europe-first orientation of the JCS; he did, on the other hand,
play upon their long-standing discontent with American policy in
Asia. In midsummer his influence was secondary; from late October
onward, however, it would become more central.
U
During August, State Department officials and the NSC staff
developed and refined the position papers of late July, but did little
to alter basic arguments, On September 1, a paper drafted in the State
epartment emerged for consideration by the NSC. Eight days later
it came forth essentially intact. On September 11, the president ap-
proved the document as NSC 81.23
As of late July, decision makers thought it too early to render
final judgments on crossing the thirty-eighth parallel, The key questions
remained: Would the Soviet Union and/or Communist China intervene
direc in North Korea? Would America’s friends in the UN support
major non-Communist ground operations north of the line?
Regarding the second question, State Department officials were
increasingly confident that the answer was yes. They felt this matter
particularly important because Allied unity, especially if expressed
#1. Schnabel, Policy and Direction, pp. 149-53; William Manchester, American
Caesar: Douglas MacArthur, 1890-1964 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1978), pp, 578.77,
22, U.S, Congress, Military Situation in the Far Kast, pp. 3479.80,
23. FRUS, 7:671-79, 685-93, 712-21,
204 WILLIAM STUECK
in concrete form in a resolution by the UN, might discourage China and
Russia from intervening militarily in North Korea.”4
Yet the State Department, as well as the JCS, continued to regard
Soviet action as likely, provided the Kremlin felt it “would not involve
a substantial risk of global war.” Since Soviet movement into North
Korea after American troops had entered that territory would inevi-
tably result in a clash between the superpowers—which could easily
escalate into World War II—Russia would probably act before UN
ground forces reached the parallel. Chinese intervention in North
Korea was possible, though less likely, as the Soviet Union regarded
that area as its own sphere of influence.
NSC 81 anticipated that MacArthur would be given authority to
move ground forces beyond the parallel, “provided that at the time of
such operations there has been no entry into North Korea by major
Soviet or Chinese Communist forces, no announcement of intended
entry, nor a threat to counter our operations militarily in North
Korea.’’2° American officials hoped that North Korean forces would be
so thoroughly destroyed in the south that only Republic of Korea
troops would be needed for operations in the north, This would not
necessarily reduce the likelihood of Russian or Chinese intervention,
but it would lessen the risk that such intervention would lead to general
war.
The prospects for outside intervention, however, could be dimin-
ished by avoiding ground operations near the Soviet or Chinese borders:
“It should be the policy not to include any non-Korean units in any
U.N. ground forces which may be used in the north-eastern province
[of North Korea] bordering the Soviet Union or in the area along the
Manchurian border.”’?’ This aspect of NSC 81 represented the only
significant alteration of the State Department draft of September I,
The earlier paper had stated simply that “[i] n no circumstances should
. . . [non-Korean] forces be used’’ in those regions.*8 Undoubtedly
military officials made the change. In view of subsequent events, it
is clear that military leaders regarded the phrase “it should be the
policy” as less absolute than “in no circumstances.” But State Depart-
ment planners may not have grasped this until later. The change re-
flected a somewhat lesser concern on the part of military men about
Soviet and Chinese sensitivity to American activity near their borders.”
24. Ibid., pp. 656, 667-69, 679-83.
25. Ibid., p. 672.
26. Ibid., p. 716.
27. Ibid., pp. 714-15.
28. Ibid., pp. 687-88.
29, This point is further demonstrated in the State-Defense conflict between
MARCH TO YALU 205
Ul
NSC 81 made no provision for a diplomatic approach to the Soviet
Union. The paper merely stated that if the Kremlin initiated diplomatic
action to end the conflict while hostilities continued below the thirty-
eighth parallel, the United States ‘should be prepared to negotiate a
settlement favorable to us.’ Such a settlement should “‘not leave the
aggressor in an advantageous position that would invite a repetition
of the aggression,”’ nor should it ‘‘undermine the authority and strength
of the United Nations.’”°
With the exception of Kennan, no official advocated direct Ameri-
can overtures to Russia.*! In late August, the PPS did devise a plan
for the peaceful unification of the peninsula, but it was to be advanced
only in the event that the Kremlin indicated a willingness, “before the
tide of battle . . . turned . . . to negotiate a settlement involving the
withdrawal of the North Koreans to the 38[th] parallel.” In brief, the
plan went like this: North Korean forces would retreat to positions
north of the thirty-eighth parallel, while American troops advanced to
the thirty-sixth parallel and their South Korean counterparts to the
thirty-eighth. Then the UN Commission would move into the North
to supervise the demobilization and disarmament of Communist forces.
The Commission would proceed to conduct elections to provide north-
em representation in the government of the Republic of Korea (ROK).
Upon the request of the commission, South Korean constabulary units
could enter North Korea to assist in this process.??
While no one suggested that this plan serve as a framework for a
direct initiative to Moscow, John Paton Davies, the China expert on
the PPS, and John K. Emmerson of the Office of Northeast Asian
Affairs did favor a more subtle maneuver. They wanted to inform
India of the proposal under the assumption that from New Delhi
it would “reach Peiping’s /sic/ ears,” and eventually fall into the
hands of the Kremlin. This, they reasoned, “would irritate the Rus-
sians, promote the cleavage [presumably between Moscow and Peking]
und might possibly intrigue the Chinese Communists.’’3
Rusk rejected the plan. He argued that the Korean issue was “pri-
marily a concern for’? the Security Council and UN members who
a ee ee eee eee
mid-August and mid-September over the bombing of Rashin (see ibid., pp. 721-22),
lor evidence of a distaste among military leaders as far back as July for the pros-
pect of halting American forces at the narrow neck, see ibid., p. 503,
30, Ibid., p. 714.
$1. For Kennan’s view, see ibid,, p, 627,
32. Ibid,, pp. 615-16.
$3. Ibid., p. 616n,
206 WILLIAM STUECK
currently supported the collective action on the peninsula. Imple-
mentation of the plan would commit the United States to a particular
approach to Korea’s unification prior to its clearance with other
friendly nations. Such a commitment would ‘‘tend to create .. . future
complications” abroad and, since it had not been established as “a
Government position,’ within the executive branch at home as well.
In any event, “‘the existing military situation in Korea and the posi-
tion of both Moscow and Peiping” made consideration of the plan
outside the Security Council premature. He conceded, nevertheless,
that the substance of the proposals for a settlement of the Korean
problem had much merit and should ‘‘be kept on ice for possible future
se;
It is doubtful that Rusk spoke only for himself, that he rejected
the Davies-Emmerson idea without first approaching Acheson,*? Thus
the response reveals much about top-level State Department attitudes.
It reflects the significance accorded the maintenance of unity within
the non-Communist camp. More broadly, it suggests once again the
disinclination of Acheson to deal with the leading Communist powers
in anything but an adversary relationship. To him, complex maneu-
vers with the Russians and the Chinese were likely only to result
in confusion and division in the Allied camp. They were best avoided,
therefore, or at least postponed until it was clear that other alterna-
tives were less satisfactory. If he thought in depth about the circum-
stances under which an American diplomatic initiative would be worth-
while—and there is no evidence that he did—he probably felt it would
be in response to an unambiguous threat by the Soviet Union and/or
Communist China, following a reversal of the military balance in
South Korea, that they would enter the North if UN forces crossed
the thirty-eighth parallel. Given that Korea was a poor place for the
United States to engage in military activities against either of those
nations since global war was not desirable and the unification of Korea
was, negotiations in the face of such a threat would be the least un-
attractive option, Naturally, however, he hoped this situation would
not arise.
u
34, Ibid., p. 709.
35. I base this judgment on two things: first, the style of the Rusk memo (“It
is believed ... ,”’ “It is suggested . . .”’) suggests that the views of others were being
taken into account; second, Rusk was a cautious man, He undoubtedly knew of the
close relationship between Acheson and Nitze and of Nitze’s high regard for Davies,
Thus he probably would have regarded independent action on his part in this case
as endangering his own position with the secretary of state. This view of the per-
sonalities involved is based on interviews with Nitze, Jan, 9, 1975, Philip Jessup,
June 6, 1972, Niles Bond, June 30, 1977, and Rusk, July 24, 1972.
MARCH TO YALU 207
IV
During the second half of September, Acheson’s hope appeared to
be on the brink of fulfillment. Early on September 15 (Korea time)
the American Tenth Corps, of just under seventy-thousand men, backed
by massive air and naval support, landed at Inch’dn, some twenty miles
from Seoul, on the west coast. The American units met little resistance.
Their advance was rapid, their losses slight. Within eleven days they
had seized control of the South Korean capital and linked up with
elements of the eighth Army, which on September 23 had burst out of
the Pusan perimeter. North Korean forces were now ina headlong and
often disorderly retreat toward the thirty-eighth parallel. By the end of
the month, UN forces approached that boundary. At the beginning of
October, South Korean troops crossed into the North. A week later
their American counterparts followed. North Korea’s military machine,
which less than three months earlier had been close to dominating the
entire peninsula, was now in rout and threatened with total extinction.
At the same time, neither the Soviet Union nor China made a definite
move to intervene in the fighting,
Even in the face of unimpeachable evidence that plans in Washing-
ton for crossing the thirty-eighth parallel were far advanced prior to
mid-September, it is difficult to deny the Inch’3n operation’s impact
on future events. For one thing, the counteroffensive represented a
great personal victory for MacArthur. The JCS had maintained serious
doubts about the enterprise right up until its date of implementation,
When it succeeded brilliantly, therefore, military leaders in Washington
became less inclined than ever before to question MacArthur’s judg-
ment,
This fact was to become critical from mid-October onward. The
Inch’6n landing had a more immediate impact, however, on interna-
tional politics. With the alteration of the balance of forces on the
peninsula, the Soviet Union sent out strong signals that it was interested
in negotiations, In New York, Russian diplomats pursued what was for
them a most conciliatory course. On September 21, Soviet Foreign
Minister Andrei Vyshinsky delivered a comparatively sober speech at
the opening session of the General Assembly. Rather than centering
on the U.S. Taiwan policy and Communist China’s admission to the
United Nations—as his subordinates had done in August—Vyshinsky
expressed concern regarding the war in Korea, relations among the five
permanent members of the Security Council, and the trend toward
rearmament in Western Europe. The speech seemed to be more than
the usual Soviet propaganda tirade, James Reston observed that Soviet
diplomats had abandoned their “stone faces” in private to become
“elaborately jovial.’’ The Soviet delegates to the United Nations not
208 WILLIAM STUECK
only attended a reception for Acheson at the Waldorf-Astoria, they
actually ‘‘appeared to be enjoying themselves.’? They talked openly
about the necessity of ending the Korean War.*©
At the beginning of October, more explicit signals appeared. On
September 29, Great Britain and seven other nations introduced a
resolution, partially drafted by the United States, to the General
Assembly. The resolution included four recommendations, the most
important of which called for ‘‘appropriate steps’’ to “insure conditions
of stability throughout Korea’’ and for UN-supervised elections over
the entire peninsula to establish ‘“‘a unified, independent, and demo-
cratic government” for the country.?”
Russia responded with a resolution of its own, Although this
countermeasure was unsatisfactory to the United States in several
respects, it did call for UN-supervised elections throughout the pen-
insula, a major alteration of the Kremlin’s past position, And Vyshinsky
expressed a desire to negotiate on the resolutions through a subcom-
mitte of the First Committee.*®
Vyshinsky also approved private talks on Korea between a low-level
Soviet diplomat and the Norwegian representatives to the United
Nations, In these discussions, the Russian mentioned the possibility of
disarming the North Koreans and permitting a UN commission to
conduct elections, When, on October 7, American troops entered the
North, however, the Soviets broke off the contact.*9
The United States did not flatly reject negotiations. American
leaders feared, nevertheless, that these would place them under irresis-
tible pressure from allies and neutrals to halt UN ground operations at
the thirty-eighth parallel at least temporarily.*” The success at Inch’&n
had given friendly forces tremendous momentum. An opportunity
appeared to be at hand for total military victory at little cost in time
and resources. To halt UN troops in the midst of their rapid march
north would hurt morale, especially within South Korea’s contingents,
and give North Korean soldiers, some thirty thousand of which had
eluded entrapment in the South, time to regroup. Thus, although
Washington did not openly reject diplomacy, it did shy away from
procedures that might compromise its military advantage on the pen-
insula. Had the American counteroffensive been less dramatic in its
36. New York Times, Sept. 21, 1950, pp. 6-7; ibid., Sept. 22, 1950, pp. 1, 8.
37. Leland Goodrich, Korea: A Study of U.S. Policy in the United Nations
(New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1956), pp. 129, 223. For the text of the
resolution, see FRUS, 7:826-28.
38. New York Times, Oct, 3, 1950, p. 1.
39, FRUS, 7:878, 880, 897, 907-10, 922.
40. Ibid., pp. 771-72,
MARCH TO YALU 209
impact, had the UN advance been slower and more costly in casualties,
the Truman administration might well have regarded negotiations as
more attractive.
Vv
Yet the landing on Inch’6n influenced American policy only be-
cause leaders in Washington held certain beliefs. These included the
conviction that any show of uncertainty would produce increased
intransigence in Moscow and Peking, that negotiations with Com-
munists were not generally productive, and were often harmful, and
that, for the present, the Soviet Union and Communist China wished
to avoid a direct military confrontation with the United States.
The view that Moscow and Peking wanted to avert hostilities with
the United States led, in turn, to the conclusion that, if either of the
top Communist powers were going to intervene directly in North
Korea, it would do so well before UN forces reached the thirty-eighth
parallel. This presupposed that if major Chinese or Russian units moved
into North Korea, American troops would not, and that Moscow and
Peking recognized this. Thus, when no Chinese or Russian soldiers
entered North Korea immediately following the Inch’3n landing—and
the Soviets assumed a relatively conciliatory posture in New York—the
way seemed clear for a UN military offensive to unify the peninsula,
The fallacies in this thinking are clear, First, Washington over-
estimated Moscow’s ability to read American intentions. Since the
Kremlin was uncertain as to how the United States would react to
Soviet intervention in North Korea, such intervention involved major
risks, Then, Washington misread the failure of Russia or China to send
\roops into Korea as a confession of helplessness to influence events
on the peninsula. On the one hand, top American officials failed to
yrasp Russia’s cautiousness regarding its own role in Korea, and on the
other, they miscalculated Russia’s ability and willingness to play the
Chinese card at a later date.
Perceptions of Peking’s intentions were influenced by reports from
China indicating that the Mao regime would avoid direct involvement.
Information flowing into Washington was often contradictory. On
September 5, and again a week later, James R. Wilkinson, the American
consul general at Hong Kong, reported to Washington that Chinese
sources on the mainland indicated that the government planned to
send forces into North Korea if American troops entered that area.
On September 23, the American embassy at Taipei transmitted a
report from the Nationalist Chinese defense minister, which was “pur-
tially confirmed by [an] outside source,” that Communist China would
send two-hundred and fifty-thousand troops into Korea, Earlier intelli
210 WILLIAM STUECK
gence reports from both London and Tokyo disclosed that since July
large numbers of soldiers had been moving from southern and central
China into Manchuria, *!
Yet, on September 20, Loy Henderson, the American ambassador
to India, relayed to Washington the assessment of K. M. Pannikar, his
Indian counterpart in Peking. Pannikar stated that the Chinese Com-
munists had ‘shown no undue interest [in Korea] beyond expres-
sion[s] of sympathy. Even that has been notably slackened during
the last two weeks. In such circumstances direct participation of China
in Korean fighting seems beyond [the] range of possibility unless of
course a world war starts as a result of UN forces passing beyond the
38th parallel and [the] Soviet Union deciding directly to intervene.’’**
Additional evidence supporting this conclusion included the failure
of the Chinese to take ‘‘even elementary precaution against air raids
of their cities’? which, given the recent experience of North Korean
cities, were likely to accompany a Sino-American clash. Also, aside
from the “strengthening of defenses in Manchuria,’ there were no
apparent military preparations in progress. In the following days,
Wilkinson presented information that reinforced Pannikar’s view.
Three reports from the mainland indicated that, because of the Peking
regime’s desire for entry into the UN and its preoccupation with
internal reconstruction, it would provide only limited and indirect
support to North Korea.*
It is easy to see why the reports from Pannikar were more persua-
sive than those from Taipei. The Nationalist government, Washington
surmised, hoped to further alienate the United States from the main-
land Communist government by presenting evidence of that regime’s
aggressive intent. The Indian ambassador and his government were also
likely to overstate the prospects of Communist Chinese intervention,
albeit for a different reason: The Indians generally sought to restrain
the United States from action that might result in an expanded conflict.
Hence, when Pannikar concluded that Peking would not send forces
across the Yalu, State Department officials took special notice.
Pannikar’s analysis also gained special credence because it fit
prevailing State Department attitudes regarding Communist China.
Acheson’s condescension toward that nation appeared most baldly
in an interview with CBS commentator Eric Sevareid on September 10:
41. Ibid., pp. 563, 698, 724-25, 765n; Far Eastern Command, Intelligence
Summaries (hereafter JS), Aug. 26, 1950, Records of the Occupation of Japan,
National Records Center, Suitland, Md.
42. FRUS, 7:742.
43. Ibid., pp. 765, 768.
MARCH TO YALU 211
Now, I give the people of Peiping credit for being intelligent enough to see what is
happening to them. Why they should want to further their own dismemberment
and destruction by getting at cross purposes with all the free nations of the world
who are inherently their friends and have always been friends of the Chinese as
against this imperialism coming down from the Soviet Union I cannot see. And
since there is nothing in it for them, I don’t see why they should yield to what is
undoubtedly pressures from the Communist movement to get into the Korean
row.
This remark had at least a kernel of truth. Russian influence in
Manchuria was considerable and, in all likelihood, the Sino-Soviet
relationship was less than smooth. One intelligence report of late
August indicated that the Chinese were much irritated by the Soviet
attempt to direct their activities and embroil them in the Korean
conflict.” Surely the Peking regime was not anxious to confront the
United States at a time when its tasks at home—both political and
economic—were so burdensome, Yet Acheson’s suggestion that “free
nations’? were the friends of the Chinese and that, deep down, the
Communists knew this, was arrogant and naive. It revealed a basic
insensitivity to the depth of Communist resentment toward the United
States for its past and present support of the Nationalist Chinese. It
reflected a failure to grasp the deep-seated fear and apprehension in
Peking regarding American intentions in Asia. Finally, it demonstrated
an underestimation of Communist China’s determination—even in the
face of severe domestic problems—to prevent the forces of a hostile
great power from marching to its border,
Despite these misperceptions, reports from China from the end of
September onward produced considerable unease in Washington, On
September 27, the British reported that Pannikar had altered his views
and now believed China “had decided on a more aggressive policy”
and would intervene indirectly in Korea on an expanded scale, Two
days later, Alan Kirk, the American ambassador in Moscow, reported
word from the Dutch foreign office that its chargé in Peking believed
the Communists were actively considering military intervention if
American troops crossed the thirty-eighth parallel. At the beginning
of October, the American embassy in the Netherlands repeated this
warning from the Dutch diplomat in China, From Hong Kong, Wilkin-
son sent a partial text of a September 30 speech by Chou En-lai stating
that “the Chinese people absolutely will not tolerate foreign aggression
nor will they supinely tolerate seeing their neighbors being savagely
invaded by imperialists.” Finally, on October 3, the State Department
44, U. S. Department of State, State Department Bulletin, Sept. 18, 1950,
pp. 460-64,
45. IS, Aug, 26, 1950,
212 WILLIAM STUECK
received word of Pannikar’s midnight meeting with Chou in which the
latter stated that China would intervene if the United States sent its
troops into the North,*
Livingston Merchant, Rusk’s top assistant, asserted at a meeting in
Under Secretary of State James Webb’s office that the report should be
treated ‘‘with extreme seriousness”? and not be discounted as a bluff.
U. Alexis Johnson, the deputy director of the Office of Northeast Asian
Affairs, suggested that consideration be given to using only South
Korean troops “for the subjugation of North Korea.” At the China
desk, O. Edmund Clubb made somewhat similar proposals.*”
Yet these counsels of caution were rejected. “Hesitation and timid-
ity,’ Acheson argued on October 4, would involve “greater risk [than
a] firm and courageous” stand.*® This statement reveals that, mixed
with his condescension, there was a measure of fear as well. To him,
China’s flaunting of traditional standards of diplomatic behavior—the
most outstanding examples of which were the mistreatment in the fall
of 1949 of American diplomat Angus Ward and the confiscation in
January 1950 of American consular property in Peking—was childish
and inexcusable, It was also dangerous. In 1969 the former secretary of
state recalled: “In fact, I was always a conservative. I sought to meet
the Soviet menace and help create some order out of the chaos of the
world. I was seeking stability and never had much use for revolution, As
a friend once said, we had plenty of chaos, but not enough to make a
world.’*9 A prerequisite to an orderly world was the acceptance by its
national units of certain rules of conduct. If the United States bent in
the face of improper behavior, the prospects for stability and order
would diminish, To flinch when the Chinese threatened or remon-
strated, therefore, was to Acheson most distasteful to contemplate.
In any event, by early October the momentum for sending Ameri-
can troops across the thirty-eighth parallel was nearly irresistible. On
September 27, Washington had sent orders to MacArthur authorizing
an American campaign in the North.®? Two days later, the eight-power
resolution approving such a campaign had gone before the General
Assembly. In the midst of a heated congressional election campaign,
a substantial majority of both editorial writers and those questioned
in a national poll favored a military effort to unify Korea.®! Short of
46. FRUS, 7:784, 821-22, 848, 852, 858.
47. Ibid., pp. 848, 849, 864-66.
48. Ibid., pp. 868-69.
49. “Mr. Acheson Answers Some Questions,’? New York Times Book Review,
Oct. 12; 1969;;p. 2,
50. Schnabel, Policy and Direction, pp. 182-83.
51. U. S, Department of State, Office of Public Affairs, Monthly Survey of
MARCH TO YALU : 213
clear evidence that Soviet or Chinese troops had crossed into North
Korea, or a direct threat of Soviet entry, there was no stopping the
northward march of the UN forces,>”
VI
The prospects for productive negotiations on Korea remained un-
certain. Perhaps Russia sought merely to undermine American resolve,
or to enhance its own image as a force for peace in the world. Never-
theless, there was much in the early fall to cause disquiet in the Krem-
lin. The United States was more determined than ever to move toward
a peace treaty with Japan. Congress and the president finally appeared
willing to accept a level of military spending commensurate with
American objectives abroad. West German rearmament appeared
imminent. The balance of forces in Korea had shifted greatly to the
disadvantage of the Communists. Direct Soviet intervention could
reverse this development, at least temporarily, but it might also provoke
the unleashing of American military-industrial power against the
Soviet homeland. Large-scale Chinese Communist intervention in
Korea could probably turn the tide on the peninsula, but it was un-
palatable to Peking, which had serious domestic problems to contend
with. Moreover, in the long run, China’s assumption of the major
burdens in Korea might weaken Soviet influence over the Communist
movement in Asia and elsewhere.>® Finally, if former Soviet premier
Nikita Khrushchev was correct when he stated in his memoirs that the
Kremlin did not anticipate the sharp American response to the North
American Opinion, September and October 1950, George Elsey Papers, box 81,
Truman Library; Public Opinion News Service, Oct. 15, 1950; New York Times,
Sept. 25, 1950, p. 5.
52. It might be argued that a direct threat in public of Chinese Communist
intervention would have led to a halt of American forces. I doubt it, unless the
threat had come well before October. By then the momentum, combined with the
antagonism and contempt for Communist China, were such as to require more
concrete evidence of Peking’s intentions. A threat from Moscow, however, probably
would have been taken more seriously, first because Russia was militarily stronger
than China and second because a Soviet-American confrontation in Korea was
likely to escalate into a similar collision in Europe.
53. For an analysis of possible Soviet calculations in September, see Adam
Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence: The History of Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-
1967 (New York: Praeger, 1968), pp. 508-11, 527-31. Ulam argues that the Soviet
resolution of October 2 was not aimed toward achieving a settlement in Korea,
because it called for an immediate withdrawal of foreign forces from the peninsula.
Such a proposal, Ulam observes, was obviously unacceptable to the United States.
This is correct, but the Russians did show a willingness to negotiate on the dif-
ferences between their resolution and that of Great Britain and to permit nation-
wide supervision of elections by representatives of the United States,
214 WILLIAM STUECK
Korean attack in June, it may be that in the fall Soviet leaders were
uncertain what Washington’s response would be to Chinese intervention
in Korea. They may even have feared direct American retaliation
against Russia.™*
Ultimately, these considerations may not have been sufficient to
make Moscow and Peking accept a Korean settlement satisfactory to
the Truman administration, but a secretary of state intent on keeping
options open should have made an effort to find out if this was the
case, Simultaneous overtures to the Russians and the Chinese might
even have revealed divisions within the Communist camp.
Domestic politics offered no major deterrent to talks, as Americans
traditionally approved negotiations even when they stood little chance
of success.°° Of those questioned in a national poll in mid-October,
52 percent felt that a meeting between Truman and Stalin to seek an
end to their countries’ differences was a “good idea.” Only 35 percent
viewed it as a “poor idea,’”®
This response, however, said nothing about the political risk of
halting American troops at the thirty-eighth parallel while discussions
took place. Certainly such a course would have stimulated serious
dissent in Congress and the press. Nevertheless, had the United States
moved toward negotiations well before October, their conclusion—or
at least a sense of their prospects—might have been attained before
American troops were ready to enter North Korea. And public dissent
might have been reduced had the Truman administration, from mid-
August onward, publicly delineated the dangers of a military campaign
in the North rather than emphasized the need for political unity in
Korea. In any event, military operations in the northern half of the
peninsula—especially if they involved no American ground forces—
did not necessarily preclude East-West discussions regarding Korea’s
future.
But Acheson was more intent on negotiations to solidify the
Western alliance against Communist expansion than with talks on the
54, Nikita Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers, 2 vols., ed. and trans. Strobe
Talbott (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970) 1:367-70.
55. For instance, in February 1950 a national survey was taken on the question
of whether or not to develop a hydrogen bomb, Seventy-seven percent of those
polled responded in the affirmative, while only 17 percent answered in the negative,
But 48 percent believed that the United States should try again to work out an
agreement with Russia to control the atomic bomb before an attempt was made
to make a hydrogen bomb. Forty-five percent disagreed. Only 11 percent thought
negotiations with the Russians would be successful. Seventy percent thought they
would be unsuccessful (Public Opinion News Service, press release, Feb. 8, 1950).
56. Ibid,, Oct. 20, 1950.
MARCH TO YALU 215
Korean situation. As Adam Ulam has observed, the secretary of state,
ever suspicious of Soviet motives and none too sensitive to subtle
signals from Moscow—where officials sought to convey a desire to
bargain while obscuring Russian weakness—perceived neither the
strength of the American position in the fall of 1950 nor the limits
to which that position could be enhanced,*’ As a result of this failure,
the United States embarked on a dangerous course before exploring
prospects for an advantageous settlement without a successful Ameri-
can military venture in North Korea.
That venture was particularly ill-advised in view of Allied and
neutral opinion. Although the British continued to support American
policy, Peking’s threat of intervention made them extremely uneasy.®
In the General Assembly, India maneuvered furiously to reconcile the
ecight-power and Soviet resolutions on Korea, Sir Benegal Rau, the head
of the Indian delegation, proposed the creation of a special subcom-
mittee to seek a compromise, The move coincided with an effort by
Secretary-General Trygve Lie to negotiate an agreement on a unified
Korea. Lie hoped that P’ySngyang would disband its forces and allow
a UN commission into North Korea to conduct an election that would
serve as a basis for unification. If North Korea rejected this plan, Lie
was willing to support a UN effort to consolidate the territory mili-
tarily as a prelude to political unification.
Ambassador Austin objected to the Indian proposal claiming that
it would delay action on the British resolution, thereby “permitting
the aggressor to prolong his activities.” In an attempt to meet Austin’s
objections, Rau agreed that the projected subcommittee would have to
submit any proposals before October 6. The Soviet Union reacted
favorably to India’s initiative.©” As in July and August, however,
Indian efforts failed. On October 4, the First Committee defeated
India’s plan by a vote of thirty-two to twenty-four with three absten-
tions.
Although the eight-power resolution eventually passed the General
Assembly by a forty-seven to five margin, the support for the Indian
57. Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence, p. 510.
58. Homes to Acheson, Oct. 4, 1950, FRUS, 7:867; Allison memo, Oct. 4,
1950, ibid., pp. 868-69; Rusk memo, Oct. 6, 1950, ibid., pp. 893-94; Lord Tedder
to Bradley, Oct. 5, 1950, Record Group (hereafter RG) 218, decimal file 383.21,
Korea, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
59. Trygve Lie, In the Cause of Peace (New York: Macmillan, 1954), pp. 344-
45.
60. Austin’s arguments are printed in United Nations, General Assembly,
Official Records, Virst Commitice, 350th meeting, Oct. 3, 1950, pp. 55-56,
61, New York Times, Oct. 5, 1950, p, 1,
216 WILLIAM STUECK
maneuver in the First Committee suggests widespread unease with
America’s Korean policy. India’s opposition to an immediate American
move across the thirty-eighth parallel was especially important, first
because of that nation’s stature in Asia, and second because New
Delhi’s relations with Peking were under increasing strain over the
latter’s pressure on Tibet. The fall of 1950, therefore, was an especially
opportune time for the United States to build a more constructive rela-
tionship with India.®*
At the very least, Washington should have halted American troops
at the parallel and pursued negotiations in New York, Even permitting
South Korean soldiers to move into the North presented problems. In
all likelihood, they could not have destroyed enemy forces or pacified
the territory. A South Korean campaign, therefore, raised the specter
of indecisive fighting on the peninsula over an interminable period,
Yet had the United States halted South Korean units at the parallel
in October 1950, considerable resentment would have arisen, both
within the Rhee government and throughout the populace. American
soldiers, in fact, might have found themselves forcefully restraining
their South Korean counterparts. However imperfect these choices
may have been, they were far less dangerous in their implications than
a possible Sino-American clash in Korea. Such a clash would raise
doubts in Western Europe about the prudence of the United States
and weaken relations with India; most important, it would produce
a major drain on American resources in an area of secondary strategic
importance and, for the short term, solidify Peking’s allegiance to
Moscow.
It was silly to argue that a failure to punish the Communist world
for the North Korean attack would encourage future aggression. Cer-
tainly the American response to the June crisis, both locally and
worldwide, was enough to discourage Communist adventurism gener-
ally—or even again in Korea, In sum, by October the United States
had profited much internationally from its action in Korea, Now, in
trying to gain a little more, it was about to incur a serious deficit.
VI
Before moving on to the fateful military campaign in North Korea,
some discussion on the role of personalities is in order. Would the
outcome in early October have been different had someone other than
Rusk been the officer in charge of American policy toward East Asia,
or had someone other than Allison been director of the Office of
62. For documents on Indian and American exchanges regarding the Tibetan
matter, see FRUS, vol. 6. In later October, Communist China invaded Tibet.
MARCH TO YALU 217
Northeast Asian Affairs? It is clear that these two men were among
the least likely to support a cautious policy regarding military activities
in North Korea. It is clear that Merchant and Clubb, just below Rusk,
and Johnson, just below Allison, were more deeply disturbed by the
risks entailed in an American advance beyond the thirty-eighth parallel.
What if, in the spring of 1950, W. Walton Butterworth had been
retained as assistant secretary of state for the Far East? Butterworth
was a Princeton graduate of the same class as Kennan, Like Kennan,
who was a good friend, he was a career foreign service officer. Unlike
Rusk, Butterworth was independently wealthy, a man who had no
financial need to keep his job. Though a team player, he was a tough,
forceful personality in the intricate game of bureaucratic politics.
More than Rusk, he was a cool-headed realist, suspicious of narrow
moral and legal arguments. His views on China were moderate. Whereas
Rusk had begun his government career in the military during World
War II and had maintained close contacts with army officials afterward,
Butterworth had no such background and generally held military
men in contempt. Although he could often see both sides of an issue,
Butterworth rarely had difficulty making up his mind, whereas de-
cisiveness was never one of Rusk’s outstanding qualities. Finally,
Clubb had served under Butterworth in China in 1946 and 1947, and
the latter had great esteem for his subordinate’s knowledge of and
judgment in Chinese affairs.
Would Butterworth have given greater weight than did Rusk to
Clubb’s analysis of early October—as well as to Johnson’s and Mer-
chant’s apprehensions? Would he have conveyed them more vigorously
to Acheson? Perhaps so, but to what degree? It would have taken a
strong man indeed to forcefully resist the momentous pressures that
existed at that time. Surely Butterworth’s position would have been
strengthened had Johnson been in Allison’s place. Then the two men
with the greatest responsibility for reporting to Acheson on Korea
might have been of one mind, and the secretary of state might have
listened, as he was not one to ignore strong advice from below. Yet
given his attitudes toward China and the likelihood that, if the Truman
administration halted the American advance at the thirty-eighth par-
allel, a politically risky confrontation with the victorious MacArthur
would ensue, it remains doubtful that the evidence available in early
October could have been brought to bear upon Acheson forcefully
63. This comparison of Rusk and Butterworth is based primarily on interviews
with Rusk, Butterworth (Nov. 16, 1971), Clubb (Mar, 16, 1977), Niles Bond, and
Gen. Thomas Timberman, but also on O, Hdmund Clubb, The Witness and I (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1974), pp, 87-88, and George I, Kennan, Mem-
oirs, 1925-1950 (Boston: Litde, Brown, 1967), p, 152,
218 WILLIAM STUECK
enough to change his mind. The most that can be said is that a Butter-
worth-Johnson combination in the State Department from the summer
onward might have led to somewhat different circumstances in early
October, and thus to a different policy outcome.
It can be said with greater assurance that, in late September, per-
sonalities had an important impact on the framing of a new directive
for MacArthur. As we have seen, planners in Washington anticipated
that no American troops would be used in the provinces bordering on
Russia and China, but that the State Department was less flexible on
the issue than the Defense Department.™ The orders sent to MacArthur
on September 27 stated that: “Under no circumstances . . , will your
forces cross the Manchurian or USSR borders of Korea, and, as a
matter of policy, no non-Korean ground forces will be used in the
northeast provinces bordering the Soviet Union or in the area along
the Manchurian border.’ The distinction between action in Man-
churia or Russia and action in Korea’s border provinces implied that
the prohibition against the second was not as firm as that against the
first. Military men, in fact, understood that a difference existed be-
tween an order and a statement of policy, although the precise nature
of that difference was uncertain,® In any event, State Department
officials spotted the discrepancy in the JCS draft of the new instruc-
tions and took up the matter with the Pentagon,”
At this point, a recent change in top personnel in the Defense
Department became significant. On September 21, General Marshall
became secretary of defense, replacing the recently fired Louis John-
son, whose relations with the State Department had been at best
frigid, at worst explosive, In contrast, Marshall had outstanding rela-
tions with the diplomats. During the first six months of his stewardship
of the State Department, Acheson had been his top assistant. The
secretary of state was a great admirer of the general, as were the presi-
dent and virtually all top State Department officials. With Johnson at
the helm in the Pentagon, Acheson had had no peer in influence at the
White House on foreign policy matters. With Marshall’s accession, he
now had one, While Acheson did not hesitate to initiate and perpetuate
disagreements with a Johnson-led Defense Department, when Marshall
took over, the secretary of state became less combative. So did his
subordinates,
As Paul Nitze later recalled, had Johnson responded to the State
64. See pp. 200-201.
65, FRUS, 7:781.
66. Interviews with Gen. Matthew Ridgway, Nov. 26, 1971, and J. Lawton
Collins, July 21, 1974.
67. Interview with Nitze.
MARCH TO YALU 219
Department inquiry regarding MacArthur’s new orders, the diplomats
probably would have resisted pressure to retain an element of flexibility
on American troop involvement in the extreme northern provinces of
Korea. When Marshall responded, however, they simply suppressed
their doubts.®* Certainly timing was important, as the issue arose at
the peak of optimism in Washington following the Inch’6n counter-
offensive and when Acheson was in New York, preoccupied with
talks on the NATO alliance and with proceedings at the UN. It appears,
nonetheless, that Marshall’s presence in Washington, which three years
earlier had been crucial in America’s avoidance of a deepening clash
with the Communists in China, now served to increase significantly
the prospects of such confrontation in Korea, But this would become
apparent only in the weeks after President Truman’s October 15
meeting with MacArthur at Wake Island.
Vill
During the week following the crossing of the thirty-eighth parallel
by American troops, the Truman administration presented a confident
face to the public. In its early stages, the American advance into North
Korea met with little resistance, Beneath the surface, however, Wash-
ington officials showed serious concern about the possibility of Com-
munist Chinese intervention. Although threats of such action from
Peking did not prevent American ground operations in North Korea,
they did result in the dispatch of further orders to the Far Eastern
Command. On October 9, in an expansion of the orders of September
27, the JCS told MacArthur that “in the event of an open or covert
employment anywhere in Korea of major Chinese Communist units,
without prior announcement, you should continue the action as long
as, in your judgment, action by forces now under your control offers
a reasonable chance of success.” The Far Eastern commander was to
“obtain authorization from Washington prior to taking any military
action against objectives in Chinese territory.”
Between October 8 and 14, Communist China repeated its warnings
in domestic newspapers, and intelligence reports indicated that Chinese
troops were massing in Manchuria near the Yalu River. Still, an army
analysis concluded that they were unlikely to cross into Korea on a
major scale. Without Soviet air and naval support, Chinese intervention
might not be as decisive as earlier, and Soviet aid would increase Rus-
sian influence in Manchuria, Moreover, an attack on American forces
might lead to countermeasures that could threaten Mao’s regime, ?
68. Ibid.
69. JCS to MacArthur, Oct, 9, 1950, FRUS, 7:915,
70. Schnabel, Policy and Direction, yp, 201,
220 WILLIAM STUECK
The intelligence branch of the Far Eastern Command held similar views,
asserting that Peking and Moscow had probably ruled out “further
expensive investment in support of a lost cause.”’! Thus fears in
Washington were not adequate to alter the American course in Korea.
They may have provided some impetus, however, for the presi-
dent’s trip to the western Pacific to talk to MacArthur. Yet domestic
politics were the primary motive for Truman’s pilgrimage to Wake
Island. Surely it was not intended as a major policy-making event.
Acheson was not informed in advance of Truman’s decision to go, and
he neither attended nor desired to do so.’* As former presidential aid
Charles Murphy recalled, the trip was the idea of the White House
staff, which viewed it as good public relations for the Democratic
party on election eve.”
What is important about the meeting is that MacArthur left it
with a greater sense of freedom than when he had arrived. In his talks
with the president, Harriman, Rusk, General Bradley, and others, the
Far Eastern commander exuded confidence about Korea.”4 He asserted
that it was unlikely that the Communist Chinese would intervene, and
that, if they did, UN forces would easily prevail. The latter claim was
especially important, as later on it would add to Washington’s delibera-
tions the question of Peking’s capabilities rather than merely its inten-
tions. In a private meeting, MacArthur even apologized to the com-
mander in chief for the Veterans of Foreign Wars letter.” When, over a
decade later, Truman recalled that MacArthur “‘kissed my ass” at the
meeting, he erred only in a literal sense.”© Acheson described the mood
of the presidential party upon its return to the United States as “full of
optimism and confidence in the General.”’” And MacArthur returned
to Tokyo equally self-assured of his own authority to do as he pleased
in Korea. On October 17, he ordered UN soldiers to move 50 to 100
miles into the provinces bordering Manchuria and the Soviet Union,
A week later he removed all restrictions on the use of non-Korean
troops near the northern boundary.’8
Apparently the JCS did not take notice of the first move. After the
second, however, they wired MacArthur, stating that although he
71. IS, Oct. 14, 1950, Federal Records Center.
72. Acheson, Present, p. 456.
73, Oral history interview with Charles Murphy, Truman Library.
74. FRUS, 7:948-60,
75, Truman, Years, p. 416.
Bis Merle Miller, Plain Speaking (New York: Berkeley Publishing Corp., 1974),
p. ;
77. Acheson, Present, p. 457.
78. Collins, War in Peacetime, p. 177; Schnabel, Policy and Direction, p. 218.
MARCH TO YALU 221
“undoubtedly had sound reasons for issuing these instructions they
would like to be informed of them.’”? The Far Eastern commander
replied that ‘military necessity’? dictated his move. South Korean
forces, he asserted, were inadequate to hold North Korea’s border
regions. He had legal justification for his action, he continued, because
the JCS had stated that their directive of September 27 was not final.
Moreover, the restrictions on non-Korean troops had been stated as a
matter of policy rather than an order. A communiqué from Marshall
two days later had loosened even that restraint. It read: ‘‘We want
you to feel unhampered tactically and strategically to proceed north
of the 38th parallel.’”” MacArthur concluded by saying that the “entire
subject was covered in my conference at Wake Island.”®?
The JCS, as General Collins later observed, ‘‘at least tacitly accepted
MacArthur’s defense of his order by making no move to countermand
it.8! On October 26, however, President Truman stated publicly that
it was his understanding that only Korean troops would approach the
Yalu. MacArthur was kind enough to clarify the matter for the com-
mander in chief—and for the American people—with a declaration that
the UN mission was simply ‘‘to clear Korea.””®*
The Wake Island conference was not totally responsible for Mac-
Arthur’s moves. The wording of the instructions sent him on September
27 was at least partially to blame. Yet the minutes of MacArthur’s
meeting with Truman, Bradley, Rusk, and other leading administration
officials indicate that the ‘‘Proconsul of the East” implied that non-
Korean troops would be permitted into the extreme northern pro-
vinces. When questioned on the feasibility of using Indian soldiers for
occupation along the Soviet and Chinese borders, he stated the follow-
ing: “It would be indefensible from a military point of view. Iam going
to put South Korean troops up there. They will be the buffer. The
other troops will be pulled back south of a line from 20 miles north of
Pyongyang to Hamhung.’*? Assuming that the wording of the minutes
is precise, MacArthur’s statement that non-Korean troops would be
“pulled back” to the narrow neck indicated that he initially intended
to use them north of that line. Yet, no one questioned him on it, The
point may have passed over the heads of the Washington officials
present. It is likely, however, that MacArthur regarded this episode as
additional justification for moving American troops into the border
provinces,
79. Ibid.
80. Marshall to MacArthur, Sept. 29, 1950, RUS, 7:826.
81, New York Times, Oct, 25, 1950, p, 1,
82. Ibid., Oct, 28, 1950, p. 1,
83. FRUS, 7:959.
222 WILLIAM STUECK
MacArthur’s action was significant for three reasons. First, his
orders of October 17 and 24 committed non-Korean forces to a con-
tinuing offensive beyond the most convenient point for defensive
operations between the thirty-eighth parallel and the Yalu. Henceforth
supply lines became seriously overextended, thereby rendering Ameri-
can troops increasingly vulnerable to counterattack. Second, the
continuing northward march of American troops could not help but
raise anxieties in Peking, and increase the likelihood of a clash between
Chinese and American forces. Third, it insured that the first contact
between UN ground troops and the Chinese, if it occurred, would
take place after American soldiers had advanced beyond the narrow
neck, Therefore, it would be more difficult to defuse an impending
crisis because to hold at that line would involve a retreat of American
forces rather than just the halting of an advance. Given the prevailing
state of mind in Washington regarding the danger of showing timidity
in the face of Communist pressure, neither prospect was attractive,
but the first was far less so than the second. Thus the move by Ameri-
can forces beyond the narrow neck increased the chances of both a
major Sino-American confrontation and a military setback for the
United States.
The role of MacArthur is an issue that historians will never resolve
with certainty. Surely most other military men in his place would
have requested permission from Washington before sending American
troops beyond the narrow neck, and in such circumstances, the JCS
surely would have sought the views of the State Department.* It is
less certain, however, what decision would have been reached. The jJcs
had long feared a stalemate in Korea, Their worries remained, even after
the UN counteroffensive of mid-September. Enemy soldiers who had
escaped across the thirty-eighth parallel, combined with the organized
but not fully trained North Korean units that had been held back from
the June offensive, could in time become a substantial force. It was
important, therefore, to destroy the entire North Korean Army quickly,
The South Koreans alone could not accomplish this.
The position of the Defense Department during September indi-
cates that it would have favored American ground activity north of
the narrow neck, if a need arose. Intelligence reports and Chou’s
warning in early October did increase unease within the military regard-
ing the likelihood of Chinese intervention, Yet MacArthur’s statement
at Wake Island that there was little chance of a Chinese move into
North Korea and that, if such a move did occur, UN forces would
still emerge victorious, was most reassuring. We must remember that
84. Interviews with Ridgway and Collins,
MARCH TO YALU 223
the Far Eastern commander’s influence in Washington was at its peak
after the landing at Inch’dn, not only because of its success, but be-
cause MacArthur had stuck to his plan in the face of serious doubts
among the JCS. As historian David Rees has noted, that triumph was
one of “imagination and intuition,” rather than “logic and science.”®
For this very reason, military leaders later hesitated to question Mac-
Arthur’s plans, facts to the contrary notwithstanding.** In sum, before
October 25, there was far too little evidence of a possible Chinese
intervention to have led the JCS to oppose his actions, even had he
requested permission from Washington beforehand.
It is also unlikely that the State Department would have opposed
him. The diplomats, after all, were not immune to MacArthur’s in-
fluence, nor were most of them inclined toward caution. They may
have hedged a week later, however, at granting him total freedom
for ground operations within North Korea, and had State Department
doubts led to significant delay in approving MacArthur’s order, it
might never have been issued. For on October 25, South Korean
forces made initial contact with Chinese soldiers, Had this incident
occurred and been confirmed in Washington prior to MacArthur’s
announcement that all Korea was open to American troops, it would
have been easier politically, both at home and abroad, for the Truman
administration to stop them well short of the Manchurian border.
The move could then have been explained as being grounded in pre-
vious orders, rather than in direct response to Chinese pressure. From
late October onward, therefore, it is possible—even probable—that
MacArthur had a major influence on the actions (or inactions) of
Washington. His role was important both because he had tremendous
personal prestige after the Inch’6n landing and because he took liberties
with his instructions that most others would have avoided, Still, his
influence was greatly enhanced by prevailing attitudes in Washington
regarding China.
IX
On October 25 at Onjong, less than forty miles south of the Man-
churian border, the ROK’s First Division met stiff resistance from
Chinese soldiers. Many of these ‘‘volunteers”—as Peking labeled them—
were killed and some were captured. In the following days, South
Korean and American troops made extensive contact with Chinese
units in both the eastern and western sectors.®”
85. David Rees, Korea— The Limited War (Baltimore; Penguin Books, 1964),
86, Collins, War in Peacetime, p. 141,
87, Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, pp, 675-708,
224 WILLIAM STUECK
In Tokyo, strong anxieties emerged. On October 28, a Far Eastern
Command intelligence summary estimated that 316,000 “regular
Chinese ground forces,” in addition to 274,000 security troops, were
in Manchuria. All of the regulars, the report continued, “could be
employed in the Korean War .. . [and] the bulk of [them] ... are
now in positions along the Yalu River at numerous crossing sites,’’88
These figures conflicted sharply with those cited by MacArthur at
Wake Island.®° Yet G-2 chief, Gen, Charles A, Willoughby, argued
“*. .. that the auspicious time for intervention has long since passed; it
is difficult to believe that such a move, if planned, would have been
postponed to a time when remnant North Korean forces have been
reduced to a low point of effectiveness.”?°
In Washington, General Bradley also expressed considerable puz-
zlement. Peking’s actions were “halfway between” the possibilities of
large-scale and marginal involvement in Korea, General Collins viewed
the reported crossings of the Yalu as an effort to save face after the
public declaration by Chou En-lai of support for North Korea. He
conceded, however, that, despite China’s lack of air power and limited
artillery strength, its forces could seriously threaten U.S. troops. In
early November, therefore, the JCS set aside plans for cutting back
reinforcements to Korea.?!
In the State Department, Clubb conceded that the intervention
could “‘not be conceived as other than direct.” It was “unlikely,”
moreover, that the involvement would be so limited as to present a
danger that the Chinese would be ‘promptly bloodied and thrown
out by [a] force that they themselves have consistently characterized
as ‘a paper tiger.’ Chinese action probably had been coordinated
with the Soviet Union, he observed, and might well be the first step
in a broadening of the conflict to areas beyond Korea.2? On November
3, Edward Barnett, the assistant secretary of state for public affairs,
insisted that Chinese Communist propaganda alone suggested a massive
intervention in Korea.2? Even Wilkinson in Hong Kong, who through-
out October had belittled the chances of large-scale Chinese involve-
ment on the peninsula, was worried.°* Yet no one proposed a halt to
88. IS, Oct. 28, 1950, Federal Records Center.
89. MacArthur’s figures at Wake were 300,000 troops in Manchuria, 100,000 to
125,000 along the Yalu, only 50,000 to 60,000 of which could be moved into
Korea.
90. Quoted in Schnabel, Policy and Direction, pp. 233-34.
91. Maj. Gen, C. V, R. Schuyler to Maj. Gen, Robinson E, Duff, Oct. 31, 1950,
in ibid., pp. 234, 237-39.
92. Clubb to Rusk, Nov. 1, 1950, FRUS, 7:1023-25.
93. Barrett to Rusk, Nov. 3, 1950, ibid., p. 1030,
94, Wilkinson to Acheson, Nov, 3, 1950, ibid., pp. 1084-35,
MARCH TO YALU 225
the UN advance. Despite Clubb’s fears, he continued to hope that “a
sound drubbing could be administered to Communist Chinese forces.”
It was not until November 7 that Washington officials gave serious
consideration to altering MacArthur’s mission, On the previous day,
MacArthur, in response to a denial of his request for permission to
bomb the Yalu bridges, had wired the JCS that “men and material
in large force are pouring across all bridges over the Yalu from Man-
churia. This movement not only jeopardizes but threatens the ultimate
destruction of the forces under my command,”
In response to this estimate, President Truman gave MacArthur
the authority to bomb the Korean side of the bridges. Simultaneously,
Clubb and Davies drew up detailed presentations on American options,
Both agreed that Communist China might “be on the rampage.” Both
feared that a show of weakness would reinforce Chinese aggressiveness,
Clubb noted that “Communists frequently adopt a threatening posture
with the cold-blooded purpose of so frightening their enemies that the
latter will surrender without a fight.”%° Both men advocated a com-
bination of moderation and firmness. Davies wanted mobilization at
home, negotiations with the Chinese, and abstention from any air
attacks on Manchuria. Clubb emphasized the need to build up friendly
forces in Korea with contingents from nations other than the United
States and South Korea. He regarded the maintenance of a collective
front in Korea as all important. Although he did not explicitly propose
an end to any UN military advance, he did state that “this should be
a period of some slowing up of military operations to permit political
estimates and discussions with our allies, to the end that, in our haste
to win a battle, we shall not lose the war.”®’ He was not optimistic
regarding the possibilities for fruitful negotiations with the Communist
powers, but he felt talks should be explored anyway, both with China
and Russia.28 He even suggested that the United States might dangle
before Soviet eyes the prospect of discussions on Germany.
On November 8, the Central Intelligence Agency presented the
strongest case to date in favor of halting the UN advance in North
Korea. (Actually, UN forces had temporarily stopped their forward
movement, both because of Chinese resistance and logistical problems.)
In a paper subscribed to by the intelligence branches of both the
State Department and the armed services, the CIA concluded that
combined Chinese and North Korean forces in Korea had the capacity
95, Ibid., p, 1058n,
96. Ibid., p. 1090.
97, Tbid.,:p. 1091.
98, Ibid., pp. 1078-85, 1087-93,
226 WILLIAM STUECK
to force their enemy to withdraw to ‘defensive positions farther
south.” Furthermore, China could probably make available 350,000
additional troops “for sustained ground operations in Korea. . . within
30 to 60 days.” If the military situation in North Korea were stabilized,
however, the Chinese might “well consider that, with advantageous
terrain and the onset of winter, their forces now in Korea are sufficient
to accomplish their immediate purposes.”°? The policy proposal
implicit in this analysis was that UN forces should seek to establish a
defensive position in North Korea.
On the same day, the JCS informed MacArthur that the National
Security Council would meet on November 9 to discuss a possible
alteration of his mission. They also prepared an option paper for
presentation at that meeting. It outlined three alternatives: (1) a
withdrawal of UN forces; (2) the establishment of a defensive line at
the present locations of UN troops; and (3) a forward movement of
those troops. The first was “‘totally unacceptable” from the standpoint
of America’s world-wide prestige. The second “might be a temporary
expedient pending clarification of the military and political problems
raised by Chinese intervention. . . .”? The third might “require some
augmentation of military strength in Korea even if the Chinese Com-
munist scale of effort is not materially increased.” The military leaders
concluded that the State Department should seek a political settlement
to the Korean situation, but that MacArthur’s mission should not, for
the present, be changed,!
These recommendations served as the basis for the NSC meeting
of November 9, All of those present seemed to favor negotiations with
China. Acheson introduced the possibility of establishing a ten-mile
demilitarized zone on both sides of the Yalu. This idea originated with
the thought that the Chinese simply wanted a cordon sanitaire on
their border, Apparently, the secretary of state met no opposition,
It was agreed that the United States should seek diplomatic contacts
with Peking,
Yet no one proposed a halt—even temporarily—to offensive opera-
tions in North Korea to avoid initiating large-scale Sino-American
hostilities. Why? Here the evidence is less than conclusive. Clearly
there remained some hope that a quick military victory could be
attained. No one could be certain about this until UN forces moved
northward and engaged the enemy. The greater the delay, the more
troops and supplies the Chinese could move across the Yalu. As long
as a favorable military decision remained a prospect, therefore, none
99. Ibid., pp. 1102-8.
100. Ibid., pp. 1117-21.
MARCH TO YALU 227
of MacArthur’s superiors was prepared to alter his plans for an end-the-
war offensive)!
Personalities as well as common attitudes toward China were
decisive. Only hours before the NSC meeting, some purple prose had
arrived in Washington in MacArthur’s name. “It would be fatal,” he
declared, ‘‘to weaken the fundamental and basic policy of the United
Nations to destroy all resisting armed forces in Korea and bring that
country into a united and free nation.” Now that he could use his
air power throughout Korea, he continued, he could “‘deny reinforce-
ments coming across the Yalu in sufficient strength to prevent the
destruction of those forces . . . arrayed against me in Korea.” He
projected an offensive ‘ton or about November 15,” with the purpose
of “driving to the border and securing all of North Korea.” Any lesser
move would “completely destroy the morale of my forces. . . .” It
would also ‘‘condemn us to an indefinite retention of our military
forces along difficult defense lines in North Korea and unquestionably
arouse such resentment among the South Koreans that their forces
would collapse or might even turn against us.” The idea that the Chi-
nese might restrain themselves from moving southward if left _un-
molested, he concluded, was “wishful thinking at the very worst.””!®
MacArthur went on to draw an analogy between the British desire
to give the Chinese a small strip of North Korea and their appeasement
of Nazi Germany twelve years earlier. “To give up any portion of
North Korea to the aggression of the Chinese Communists,” he warned,
“would be the greatest defeat of the free world in modern times.” He
recommended ‘‘, . . with all the earnestness that I possess that there
be no weakening at this crucial moment and that we press on to com-
plete victory which I believe can be achieved if our determination and
indomitable will do not desert us.’?!9
MacArthur was not alone in his views; Acheson and the JCS had
many of the same fears. They feared that a hint of timidity would
further embolden China, and they sought to avoid an interminable
commitment of American troops to Korea, The balance of military
lorces on the peninsula, however, was far more unsettling to them
than to MacArthur, Intelligence reports already suggested that the
Chinese build-up south of the Yalu might be too much for UN units
to overcome—and Bradley viewed the bombing of the Yalu bridges
us unlikely to stop the flow of Chinese soldiers into North Korea.
Moreover, Washington officials were deeply concerned about the
101. Ibid., p. 1205; Acheson, Present, p. 467.
102. FRUS, 7:1108.
103, Ibid,, p. 1110,
228 WILLIAM STUECK
impact of a Sino-American confrontation on the European theater.
Great Britain and France both worried that expanded American com-
mitments in Asia would compromise commitments to NATO. Mac-
Arthur cared little about allied sentiments, or about American interests
outside Asia. Nor was he apprehensive about a Sino-American clash in
Korea. 1%
Had a general with less self-assurance and less prestige been in
Tokyo at the time, Washington probably would at least have postponed
a UN advance. In contrast to circumstances five weeks earlier, leaders
in Washington, by the second week of November, had sufficient evi-
dence of large-scale Chinese involvement in Korea to accept a cautious
course. Yet in the face of MacArthur’s assurances, they could not
overcome their own strong distaste for and fear of Communist China
and face reality. In this crisis, MacArthur simply brought out the worst
in them rather than the best.
In fairness to MacArthur, he undoubtedly assumed: that massive
Chinese intervention in Korea would force Truman to order direct
American action against the mainland.!% Later events showed that
this was not the case, but prior to December, Washington officials
had not reached a decision on the matter, much less communicated
one to their field commander,
On the other hand, had MacArthur been informed that under no
circumstances would the United States retaliate directly against main-
land China, it is uncertain that he would have altered his course in
Korea. As a man prone to overestimate the strength of his own forces
and greatly confident in his ability to grasp the “Oriental mentality,”
such news from his superiors back home might not have altered his
determination to resume the military offensive. Surely he would have
protested strongly any timidity in dealing with Peking. Worse still,
the protest might have been public. Had he been ordered to halt short
of the Yalu, it is even likely that he would have launched a public
debate—and no one in the administration welcomed that. On November
7, after all, the Democrats had suffered substantial losses to the Re-
publicans in an off-year election, Especially prominent in the GOP
campaign that fall were attacks on the alleged weakness of Truman’s
policy in Asia, Acheson was often singled out for criticism by opposi-
tion politicians, After election day, Democrats blamed the secretary
of state personally for the setback. Under such circumstances, not even
104. Truman, Years, p. 379.
105. MacArthur’s most recent biographer, William Manchester, is correct on
this point, but not on much else regarding the November crisis (see American
Caesar, pp. 590-610).
MARCH TO YALU 229
a man with Acheson’s backbone would relish an open confrontation
with “the sorcerer of Inchon,’?!%
Yet apprehension on the domestic political front was merely one
of several influences on the administration. It carried weight because
of the uncertainty in all circles regarding Chinese capabilities and
intentions—and because in these circumstances such factors as concern
for American credibility, military tradition, and personalities came
into play.
x
In the two weeks after the NSC met on November 9, the State
Department moved on several fronts with regard to Korea. First,
Acheson sought to establish contact with Peking with the aim of
probing Chinese Communist intentions and possibly negotiating on
Korea. Initially, the secretary of state made overtures through Sweden,
which had relations with the Mao regime, That approach led nowhere,
but on November 16 the State Department received a report from New
Delhi that the Communist Chinese delegation assigned to discuss the
Taiwan issue before the Security Council had been granted extensive
authority to talk about Korea, both inside and outside the United
Nations. Pannikar was the source, however, and he was not even fully
trusted by the Indians. He stated that the delegation was scheduled
to arrive in New York on November 19; it did not actually do so
until five days later, the same day that MacArthur launched his end-
the-war offensive}
On November 20, a Polish delegate to the UN leaked alleged Chi-
nese peace proposals to the press. They included a withdrawal of
Chinese troops from Korea in return for the creation of a North
Korean-controlled buffer zone below the Yalu, and withdrawal of
American recognition and aid to Nationalist China. These terms how-
ever, were far from acceptable to the United States. They sparked
no new diplomatic moves in Washington,!®
The second front for American maneuver was the public arena.
There Washington sought to reassure Peking that the United States
had no aggressive designs on China. On November 15, Acheson and
Rusk spoke to this effect before a national conference on foreign
policy held at the State Department.! At a press conference on the
106, Edward Barnett to F. H, Russell, Nov, 13, 1950, Elsey Papers, box 92
l'ruman Library; Acheson, Present, p, 468,
107, FRUS, 7:1124n, 114142, 1167-68,
108, Ibid., pp. 1197-98,
109, Department of State, State Department Bulletin, Nov, 27, 1950, p, 853;
ibid,, Dec, 4, 1950, p. B89,
230 WILLIAM STUECK
following day, President Truman stated that the United States “never
at any time entertained any intention to carry hostilities into China.”!!®
In truth, the United States was actively considering sending its
planes into Manchuria in pursuit of Chinese aircraft, which were attack-
ing UN forces in North Korea. Only the strong objections of America’s
European allies prevented this.!!1 This fact reveals the framework for
American moves on the third front, the UN, The State Department
regarded unity in the non-Communist camp as crucial. The mustering
of allied support for the American position would strengthen the
United States politically—and perhaps militarily—in the event the
conflict broadened, It was also hoped that it would discourage the
Chinese from large-scale involvement in Korea. On November 10, the
United States and five other nations presented a resolution to the
Security Council calling on China “to refrain from assisting or en-
couraging the North Korean authorities” and to withdraw its troops
from the peninsula. At the same time, it requested that the UN Com-
mission on Korea ‘“‘assist in the settlement of any problems” of concern
to China and the Soviet Union in areas along the Korean border.!!*
The United States backed away from an initial inclination to bring
the resolution to an early vote—which surely would spark a Soviet veto.
From November 13 onward, the State Department became increasingly
preoccupied with the idea of establishing a buffer zone along the Yalu
River. This preoccupation grew out of pressures from Great Britain
and France and a continuing concern about Chinese intentions and
capabilities. After November 7, Chinese troops had broken off contact
with UN forces, but American diplomats remained deeply concerned.
Peking did not appear anxious to negotiate, and reports from the
mainland through Brussels and The Hague provided little assurance
that the Chinese would melt away in the face of a UN offensive,
In the meantime, friendly units in North Korea remained precariously
split, with the Eighth Army in the west over fifty miles north of
P’yOngyang and the Tenth Corps widely dispersed far to the east.
General Willoughby of Far Eastern Intelligence expressed particular
concern about a Chinese build-up on the northern and western rims of
Tenth Corps positions, !!+
On November 17, John Paton Davies of the PPS finally proposed a
110. Public Papers of the Presidents: Harry S. Truman, 1950 (Washington, D.C.,
GPO, 1950), 1p. 174,
111. FRUS, 7:1151, 1156-57, 1159-60, 1161-62.
112. Ibid, p. 1127:
113. Ibid., pp. 1138-40, 1147, 1151-53, 1161-62.
114, 7S, Nov. 15, 1950, Federal Records Center; Schnabel, Policy and Diree-
tion, pp. 263-64,
MARCH TO YALU 231
halt to UN offensive operations. ‘“The bulk of the evidence,” he argued,
pointed “to the probability that the Kremlin and Peiping are com-
mitted at least to holding the northern fringe of Korea—and, that,
against our present force they have the military capability of doing
so....” In such circumstances, the United States was unlikely ‘“‘to
outdo the enemy short of pressing phase by phase to the ultimate
action: initiating atomic warfare.” The most attractive option, he
concluded, was to declare the termination of major military operations
and seek the establishment of a demilitarized zone south of the Yalu,
This course would force Peking and Moscow “‘to bear the onus for
initiating clearly aggressive action’? and, therefore, would “probably
give them pause.”?!!5
How widespread such thinking was in the State Department remains
uncertain. If officials other than Davies expounded similar views,
documents that prove it have yet to surface. On the other hand, Gen-
eral Bolté of the Pentagon had information that ‘‘certain elements”
in the diplomatic agency were pressing for a halt to offensive opera-
tions by UN forces. A good chance existed, he thought, that the view
would be put forth at an upcoming State-Defense meeting,!!®
The meeting took place on November 21, but no one from the
State Department made such a proposal. Discussion centered on pos-
sible methods of reassuring the Chinese of America’s limited aims,
while at the same time giving MacArthur freedom of action within
North Korea, The proceedings were a pathetic display of powerful
men desperately seeking to avert disaster without provoking the wrath
of a subordinate six thousand miles away. The best they could come
up with was a plan for UN forces to move back from the Yalu after
enemy resistance ceased, with South Korean troops holding the high
land dominating the approaches to the river and other units falling
back in reserve. On November 24, the JCS dispatched this proposal
to MacArthur as a mere suggestion, Predictably, he demurred, He had
won the battle in Washington hands down; now, on the battlefield,
he would not be so lucky. Four days later, as Communist Chinese
troops counterattacked viciously in the frigid and barren terrain of
northern Korea, he conceded despondently that the UN “faced an
entirely new war,’’}!7
Communications between the State and Defense Departments
were exceedingly good at this time, and it is reasonable to assume
that Acheson at least sensed the Pentagon’s views on Korea. Certainly
115, FRUS, 7:1181-83.
116, Bolté to Collins, Noy, 20, 1950, RG 218, National Archives,
117, FRUS, 7:1204-8, 1222-24, 1231-83,
232 WILLIAM STUECK
military leaders were concerned about Chinese power and designs, but
MacArthur’s expressions of confidence deterred them from halting the
UN advance.'!8 Bolté, who was the last major military figure from
Washington to visit Japan and Korea, had been most impressed by
MacArthur’s confidence and determination. In a private meeting in
Tokyo, the Far Eastern commander had exclaimed, ‘“‘Bolté, we’ve got
‘em!’!9 Upon his return to Washington, Bolté took the lead in op-
posing any meddling with MacArthur’s directives. UN forces, he be-
lieved, could under “circumstances now prevailing” hold any position
in North Korea. The chances for localizing the conflict would improve
if Communist forces were driven from the peninsula. A show of strength
by the UN would deter further aggression, weakness would have the
opposite effect. “History,” he concluded, ‘thas proved that negotiating
with Communists is as fruitless as it is repulsive.”” He urged the JCS
to oppose any suggestion by the secretary of state to alter MacArthur’s
orders. !*
With a Johnson-led defense establishment, Acheson might have
chosen confrontation, but with Marshall in charge, he preferred con-
ciliation. Surely the secretary of state harbored many of the same
feelings toward the Chinese as did Bolté, but without a willful com-
mander in the field, prestigious leaders in the Pentagon, and a volatile
political climate nationwide, Acheson’s choices in November 1950
might well have been different. Had they been so, the president prob-
ably would have taken his advice and Marshall would have conceded
gracefully. Yet in the prevailing circumstances of doubt and fear, a
strong, often arrogant man chose to follow rather than to lead, and he
would regret it for the rest of his life.
XI
It is impossible to determine with any assurance if, by mid-Novem-
ber, a Sino-American confrontation could have been averted. Since
1946, Chinese Communist hostility toward the United States had
grown steadily, Revolutionary ideology contributed to this develop-
ment, but at several points in the half-decade after World War II, Mao
and his cohorts demonstrated more flexibility in their attitude toward
the United States than American decision makers showed toward
them, Washington’s persistent support of the Nationalist government
would have provoked antagonism among Chiang’s opponents no matter
118. On November 17, for instance, MacArthur told Muccio that the Chinese
had at most 30,000 soldiers in Korea (ibid., pp. 1174-75).
119. Interview with Bolté, Oct, 22, 1973.
120, Bolté to Collins, Nov. 20, 1950, RG 218, National Archives,
MARCH TO YALU 233
what their world view. With UN forces positioned vulnerably in North
Korea in the fall of 1950, it is entirely possible that Peking would
have launched a major offensive even if Truman had halted MacArthur’s
advance.
Yet much can be said for the argument that, short of the American
march toward the Yalu that started on November 24, the Chinese
would have avoided a major clash with the United States. As Davies
pointed out, responding belligerently to an approach of unfriendly
forces to one’s borders was quite different from attacking stationary
units many miles from the international boundary. Moreover, Mao’s
hold at home was not totally secure. Hostilities with the United States
in Korea were likely to spark American-supported attacks on the
mainland from Taiwan, Certainly a confrontation on the peninsula
would retard internal economic reconstruction and development.
American leaders, therefore, had much reason for believing that Mao
was not anxious to engage the United States in Korea. At the very
least, had UN forces halted after the initial contacts with Chinese
troops, the United States would have been in a far stronger position,
both militarily and politically, to counter Peking’s moves. Ironically,
Washington chose a course that offered minimal prospects for “negotia-
tions from strength.”
Whatever the prospects in the first three weeks of November for
avoiding a Sino-American collision, there can be little doubt that its
occurrence had a momentous impact on American politics and foreign
policy in the ensuing years. Shortly after the end of his tenure as
secretary of state, Acheson observed that “.. . this Chinese Communist
advance into North Korea . . . was one of the most terrific disasters
that has occurred to American foreign policy, and certainly . . . the
greatest disaster which occurred to the Truman administration. It did
more to destroy and undermine American foreign policy than anything
that I know about—the whole communists in Government business, the
whole corruption outcry, was really just window-dressing put upon
this great disaster,’?!*!
A generation later, this statement rings truer than ever. The ‘‘com-
munists in Government business,’’ of course, had never been far below
the surface after the first year of the Truman administration, In early
1950, in fact, the issue had moved into the limelight with senator
Joseph R. McCarthy’s charges of widespread Communist infiltration
into the State Department. Nevertheless, the Sino-American confronta-
tion in Korea made the fall of Chiang K’ai-shek’s non-Communist
121, Princeton Seminars, eb, 19, 1954, Dean Acheson Papers, box 81, Truman
Library,
234 WILLIAM STUECK
government on the Chinese mainland in 1949 appear more crucial than
ever before. Since McCarthy’s attacks on the State Department centered
on America’s China policy, the conflict in Korea could only add weight
to the charge that Chiang had been ‘sold down the river.” Even to
many Americans not disposed to see treason at home as the source
of their problems in Asia, developments in Korea in November 1950
made the Truman administration’s failure to prevent a Communist
victory in China look all the more ill-advised 122
The Sino-American collision prolonged a crisis atmosphere in the
United States and led directly to the confrontation over Asian strategy
between the president and General MacArthur. This confrontation,
in turn, served Republican politicians well in their efforts to undermine
public confidence in Democratic leadership. Thus Chinese intervention
turned what promised to be a badly needed victory in Asia for the
United States into a defeat from which the Truman administration
never recovered, even after the Chinese advance was halted and the
prewar boundary in Korea largely reestablished.
When increasing evidence of corruption at high levels in the execu-
tive branch surfaced during 1951, the administration was already on
the defensive. Added to the problems abroad, the corruption issue
encouraged Americans to dismiss their national government as the
‘‘mess in Washington.’ By the spring of 1952, despite economic pros-
perity, the president’s popularity rating in a national public opinion
poll fell to a low of 26 percent.!?3 Thus the Republican party ap-
proached the presidential election of 1952 in a most enviable position,
The long-term consequences of the Sino-American engagement
in Korea also were substantial. Prior to November 1950, the Truman
administration demonstrated some flexibility in its attitude toward
Communist China. Although in August 1949 Acheson asserted in the
letter of transmittal to the famous White Paper on China that “the
Communist leaders have foresworn their Chinese heritage and have
publicly announced their subservience to a foreign power, Russia
. 77% uncertainty remained in Washington as to the nature of the
122. On the Communist issue in American politics, see Alan D. Harper, The
Politics of Loyalty: The White House and the Communist Issue, 1946-1952 (West
port, Conn.: Greenwood Publishing, 1969) and Robert Griffith, The Politics of Fear:
Joseph R. McCarthy and the Senate (Lexington, Ky.: University of Kentucky Press,
1970).
ee Gabell Phillips, The Truman Presidency: The History of a Triumphant
Succession (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1979), pp. 402-24; also Alonzo L, Hamby,
Beyond the New Deal: Harry S. Truman and American Liberalism (New Yorks
Columbia University Press, 1973), pp. 460-66,
124. U.S. Department of State, United States Relations with China with
MARCH TO YALU 230
relationship between Peking and Moscow and the degree to which the
United States could influence that relationship. On November 17,
1949, the secretary of state proposed to the president a policy aimed
at detaching Peking from Moscow’s orbit.!*° Less than two months
later, in a major statement on U.S. policy toward Asia, Acheson argued
against any American action in defense of Chiang K’ai-shek that might
distract the new regime’s attention from Soviet domination of “the
four northern provinces of China.’?!26
Even after the outbreak of war in Korea in June 1950, the admin-
istration remained flexible in its attitude toward the government of
Mao Tse-tung. To be sure, the United States did intervene in Formosa
Strait to prevent a Communist Chinese attack on Chiang’s island for-
tress and did stiffen its policy regarding Peking’s admission into the
UN. Yet, until the Sino-American confrontation in Korea, these were
understood—by Truman and Acheson at least—as temporary positions
that would be reevaluated once hostilities on the peninsula ended.
After November 1950, however, an American retreat on either issue
seemed impossible from a domestic political standpoint and undesir-
able from a strategic standpoint. The issues, therefore, became major
impediments to improved relations between the two countries for
over two decades.
Furthermore, events in Korea in late November greatly weakened
the view in official Washington circles that, as historian John Lewis
Gaddis puts it, “‘significant differences [existed] between varieties
of communism, and that these could be turned to the advantage of the
United States.’”!®’ Marshall, testifying at the Senate hearings that
followed General MacArthur’s dismissal in April 1951, asserted that
China was acting “‘literally under the direction of the Soviet Union,’?!”8
When asked if, in effect, China had been conquered by Russia, Marshall
replied, “I think that is generally a fact.’!*9 International relations
were increasingly perceived as a zero sum game with each Communist
victory constituting a proportionate setback to “the Free World.’’!°
Special Reference to the Period 1944-1949 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1957),
pp. 2311-17.
125. Acheson memo of conversation with the president, Nov. 17, 1949, RG 59,
Kecords of the Policy Planning Staff, box 13, National Archives.
126, U.S. Department of State, American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: Basic
Documents (Washington, D.C,: GPO, 1957), pp. 2311-17.
127. John Lewis Gaddis, ‘Was the Truman Doctrine a Real Turning Point?”
loreign Affairs, January 1974, p. 397,
128. U.S. Congress, Military Situation in the Far East.
129, Ibid., p. 703,
130, U.S, Department of Defense, United States.Vietnam Relations 1945-
1967 (Washington, D.C; GPO, 1971), 8)488,
236 WILLIAM STUECK
The path to American globalism, of course, was to be long and
winding. No single event was decisive. Numerous developments between
1947 and 1950 might be regarded as turning points in the direction
of American policy.!®! And despite the universalistic rhetoric of
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, the Eisenhower administration
at times exercised restraint on the issue of committing American
forces abroad. The decision to accept a partial Communist victory in
Indochina in 1954 rather than give the French massive air support at
Din Bien Phu reflected a foreign policy that fell short of global contain-
ment. Nevertheless, the prolonged engagement in Korea left a legacy
of frustration and bitterness toward China in the United States that
continued into the 1960s, even after the surfacing of the Sino-Soviet
split. The Democratic administrations of John F, Kennedy and Lyndon
B. Johnson never forgot the success with which Republicans had
used the China issue in the early 1950s,'9? And the memory of Chinese
hordes storming UN forces in Korea served to bolster the image of
Communist China as an aggressive revolutionary power. As U.S. mili-
tary involvement in Vietnam increased rapidly after 1964, American
leaders constantly warned of the “shadow of Communist China” that
threatened Southeast Asia and the entire underdeveloped world.!™
“Moving Peiping to peaceful coexistence,” Secretary of State Dean
Rusk asserted in January 1966, was “‘the No, 1 problem in the world
today.” “If the bellicose doctrines of the Asian communists should
reap a substantial reward in Vietnam,” Rusk declared, ‘‘the outlook
for peace in this world would be grim indeed.”’!3* Thus over a decade
after the truce had been reached in Korea, the containment of China
remained a central objective of American foreign policy. If the Sino-
American collision in Korea did not lead inevitably to the tragic com-
mitment of the United States to South Vietnam in the 1960s, it cer-
tainly narrowed the options perceived by American decision makers
regarding Asia.
Perhaps the most tragic aspect of the road to confrontation with
131, The list includes the British withdrawal from Greece and the proclamation
of the Truman Doctrine in 1947, the Communist victory in China and the Soviet
explosion of an atomic bomb in 1949, and the formulation of NSC 68 and the
outbreak of war in Korea in 1950.
132, David Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest (New York: Random
House, 1972).
133. See President Johnson’s speech at Johns Hopkins University of April
1965 in Department of State, State Department Bulletin, Apr. 25, 1965, pp. 606«
10.
134. Frank M. Robinson and Earl Kemp, eds., Report of the U.S. Senate
Hearings—The Truth about Vietnam (San Diego: Greenleaf Classics, 1966), pp. 25,
85;
MARCH TO YALU 237
China in late 1950 is that with the absence of any one of several factors
on the American side, it probably would have been averted. Had the
commander in the field been less willful and less intimidating, had
Truman and his colleagues—especially Acheson—been less beleagured
on the political front at home, had Johnson been at the helm of the
Defense Department instead of Marshall, had American intelligence
known before November 24 that some 200,000 Chinese troops were
in Korea—had any of these pieces of the puzzle been altered, the
history of the Korean war might be very different.
Yet the biggest piece of all was the curious mixture of arrogance
and insecurity about the world in the minds of American leaders.
They were arrogant in overestimating their nation’s ability to shape
international events and insecure in exaggerating America’s need to
dominate certain situations, A strong sense of self-righteousness mag-
nified these aspects of their thinking. Thus they lacked sensitivity to
the legitimate interests of others and failed to realistically assess Amer-
ica’s needs in relation to its capabilities, Rarely does a nation have both
the capacity and the will to achieve all that it would like in the world,
Powerful as it was, the United States in 1950 was no exception, The
essential point missed by American decision makers was that America
was not—nor did it need to be—a major military power on the con-
tinent of Asia, Regrettably, the Sino-American conflict in Korea was
not only rooted in ignorance of this fact, but it taught certain lessons
that encouraged Washington to ignore it in the future,
The Origins of the American
Security Commitment to Korea
JOHN KOTCH
THE DECISIONS TO ENGAGE U.S. FORCES IN THE DEFENSE OF THE REPUBLIC OF
Korea and to organize a collective security effort under the UN in
June 1950 were among the most momentous of the Truman administra-
tion in the field of foreign policy. Indeed, Harry Truman considered
the Korean decision his most important as president. However, the
diverse U.S. role as defender of South Korea in a civil war against
the North, organizer of a UN collective security effort and later as
container of China created a political climate in which the clashing
of policy objectives was almost inevitable. For more than a year and
a half, after the beginning of armistice negotiations in Kaesdng in
July 1951, peace—or at least the cessation of active hostilities—re-
mained outside the grasp of the Truman administration. Consequently,
it fell to the Eisenhower administration, which took office in January
1953, to end formal hostilities and define and implement the American
commitment to Korea in the postarmistice period,
Between April and August 1953, a series of negotiations funda-
mentally altered the basis of the Korean-American security relationship,
240 JOHN BARRY KOTCH
In style as well as substance, the negotiations wereas protracted, arduous,
and bitter as the P’anmunjém talks with North Korea and China. They
took place simultaneously at two levels: between American and Korean
officials in South Korea and the United States, and between Washing-
ton (State and Defense departments and the White House) and the
field (embassies in Seoul and Tokyo and the UN Command in Tokyo),
For the United States, the principals included Gen, Mark Clark,
the UN commander; Ellis Briggs, ambassador to Korea; Robert Murphy,
ambassador to Japan; Gen, J. Lawton Collins, army chief of staff; and
Walter Robertson, assistant secretary of state for Far Eastern affairs.
In addition, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, Secretary of Defense
Charles Wilson, and President Dwight Eisenhower were directly in-
volved. On the Korean side, President Syngman Rhee and Foreign
Minister Y. T. Pyun met on a continuing basis with American political
and military officials in Seoul and with emissaries from Washington,
including Secretary Dulles and Assistant Secretary Robertson. In
addition, the Korean ambassador in Washington kept in close contact
with State Department officials.
These negotiations tested the fabric and survivability of the U.S.-
Korean security relationship. At bottom lay conflicting national inter-
ests, differing assessments of political realities and military capabilities,
and disparate conceptions of the U.S. and UN role in Korean security
and unification, Such conflicts led to open defiance by Syngman Rhee
of American policy, including not just protracted private and public
polemics, but the peremptory and defiant release of POWs and continu-
ing threats to march north to unify the Korean peninsula. The Ameri-
can reaction to Rhee’s provocations, in turn, went from strong personal
representations from the highest U.S. officials to extensive contingency
planning for a coup d’état against Rhee.
The final result was a dual ROK-U.S. security relationship with
a bilateral mutual defense treaty that reinforced an existing UN struc-
ture of collective security that was also dominated by the Americans.
The broad terms of this dual security commitment are still in force
today, despite the profound changes in Korea and the international
sphere in the intervening years.
As the negotiations between the UN Command (UNC) and the
Communist forces (Korean People’s Army and Chinese People’s Volun-
teers) were drawing to a successful conclusion,’ U.S. officials began to
1. The obstacles to an early armistice at the beginning of the Eisenhower
administration were twofold: Communist intransigence over the principle of
“no forced repatriation,’ which had stalled the talks for most of the previous
year and led to an indefinite recess in October 1952; the intransigence of Syngman
Rhee who appeared determined to pursue a policy of reunification by force, The
THE AMERICAN SECURITY COMMITMENT 241
view the preservation of the UNC and the continued participation of
South Korean armed forces in it as vital elements of postarmistice
security arrangements for Korea, The original U.S. commitment of
military force had been hasty and ad hoc, with military assistance
provided piecemeal during the first week of hostilities. It was not
until the following week (July 7) that the UNC was created to direct
and coordinate assistance to South Korea and President Rhee (through
an exchange of letters), and at Washington’s insistence, placed all
ROK forces under General MacArthur’s operational control for the
duration of hostilities.
The UNC broadened its role and function as the war continued
and, with the opening of armistice negotiations, became the formal
instrument for the United States and other contributor nations in
Korea. After the war, it would be important to political stability on
the Korean peninsula. However, once hostilities had stopped, or pos-
sibly even before, President Rhee would be free, as leader of a sovereign
nation, to withdraw from the UNC. Concerned with this, Clark in-
formed the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) on April 18 that “Rhee could
make independent use of ROK forces after the armistice was signed
since no agreement on UN control in the post-truce period existed,’”*
lurthermore, the United States found itself in negotiations in which
\\orean political behavior was unpredictable. The ROK might not
accept armistice under any conditions, or it might agree to the armistice
and then withdraw from the UNC, in the most optimistic situation,
the ROK would both accept the armistice and remain in the UNC, but
there was no way of knowing in advance what path the South Korean
yovernment might choose.
Although the terms of the postwar Korean-American security
relationship were yet to be worked out, the key issues had already
surfaced. They concerned ROK demands for a bilateral security treaty
with the United States to supplement or possibly supersede the UNC,
und American worries over the future role of the UNC and the ROK’s
place in it. The idea for a bilateral security pact was first put forward
on April 3, 1953, when Korean Foreign Minister Y. T. Pyun implied
former was removed in two stages. First, the Communists agreed to a plan put
forward by General Clark to exchange sick and wounded prisoners (dubbed Opera-
lion Little Big Switch), followed by a compromise settlement of the repatriation
issue, providing for international verification of those desiring nonrepatriation, The
latter conflict continued up until the actual signing of the armistice on July 27,
1953,
2, Clark to JCS, Apr, 18, 1958, in Walter Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting
Hront, U.S, Army Historical Series, Office of the Chief of Military History (Wash.
ington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1966), p, 442,
242 JOHN BARRY KOTCH
that “such a pact would be the price of ROK cooperation with armi-
stice efforts.’’?> The rationale appeared simple. Although ROK forces
had been “voluntarily” placed under an international military com-
mand controlled by the United States, the ROK government itself
lacked an unambiguous government-to-government security commit-
ment.
Ambassador Briggs told Pyun that he would forward the Korean
request to Washington for consideration, In a parallel conversation in
Washington on April 8, Dulles informed the Korean ambassador that
the United States would prefer to consider a bilateral pact “‘after the
political conference had worked out a peaceful settlement,” although
he would discuss with the president the possibility of making a state-
ment to the effect that “the U.S. would not desert the ROK.”* Ina
letter to Eisenhower on April 14, Rhee again pressed for a security
pact, stating that it “was what the Korean people most needed to help
them continue fighting.”® On the same date, General Herren, com-
mandet of the Korean Communications Zone (rear support area),
suggested to Clark that in view of Rhee’s virulent campaign against
any armistice agreement, including mass demonstrations denouncing
the negotiations in favor of armed unification, the United States should
accede to Rhee’s request for a security pact. This would prevent a rash
act by the Korean president.® Clark shared Herren’s anxiety about the
deteriorating domestic situation in Korea, but felt that the United
States should not be pressured into offering a security pact without
further study. Primary among Clark’s concerns was his reluctance to
contravene instructions contained in the emergency war plan (JEWOP
relating to the disposition of U.S. forces in the event of general war.
The necessity to rapidly deploy troops from Korea to Japan in such a
contingency might be compromised by a security pact.
Other considerations were already at work that presaged a change
in Clark’s position, In a message to the JCS on April 4, he noted that
“at worst the Republic of Korea Government could attempt to with-
draw elements of the ROK Army from UN control and remove ROK
3. Mark Clark, Summary of Armistice Negotiations, Feb, 22-July 27, 1953,
Clark Papers, Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kans., p. 1.
4. Kenneth Young memo, Apr. 18, 1953, U.S. Department of State, Division
of Historical Policy Research, Relations between the United States and the Re-
public of Korea: A Chronology of Major Developments April 1-June 22, 1953,
Research Project No, 337, July 1953, p. 1.
5. Ibid.
6. Commander in Chief, Far East (hereafter CINCFE) to Department of the
Army, Apr, 16, 1953, in Hermes, Truce Tent, p. 442,
7. Clark to JCS, Apr. 18, 1953, ibid.
THE AMERICAN SECURITY COMMITMENT 2438
Government officials from UN influence.’’® Clark believed it essential
to resolve the postarmistice status of ROK forces as quickly as possible,
whereas the JCS held that it was better to defer the issue until the
armistice was “nailed down.” Clark regarded the continuance of opera-
tional control over ROK forces as a key element of postarmistice
security. The problem was that current UN authority over ROK forces
had been granted personally by Rhee and existed only “during the
period of the continuation of the present state of hostilities”; Clark
had a vital stake in clarifying the arrangement before an armistice
agreement to avoid a possible unraveling of his authority in the post-
armistice period.
On April 24, Ambassador Yang delivered an aide-mémoire to the
State Department that tied continued ROK participation in the UNC
in the postarmistice period to Chinese withdrawal from Korea.’ Pre-
viously, Rhee had only called for the removal of Chinese forces as
part of a five-point proposal for an armistice. On April 30, Rhee pro-
posed additionally that a mutual defense treaty accompany the simul-
taneous withdrawal of Chinese and American forces from Korea.!®
On May 12, Clark told the Korean president that “‘the armistice would
probably not contain a provision for the simultaneous withdrawal of
U,S. and Chinese communist troops,” a matter best left to the political
conference following the armistice. He also told Rhee that he hoped
the ROK would not “confront the U.S. with unilateral decisions such
as the removal of ROK troops from the UNC, failing to obey the terms
of the armistice, or ordering ROK troops to take provocative action
after an armistice.”!! Clark later stated in a message to the JCS that
“the saw no reason why a mutual security arrangement could not be
worked out as quickly as possible to satisfy the ROK goal.” The UN
commander felt that Rhee was now resigned to armistice and was
simply ‘‘bargaining to get a security pact, obtain economic aid, and
make his people feel he is to have a voice in the armistice negotia-
tions,’?}2
The implications of entering into a bilateral security agreement
8. CINCFE (Tokyo) to Department of the Army (Washington) for JCS, Apr.
4, 1953, ibid.
9. Yang to Department of State, Apr. 24, 1953, in Department of State,
Chronology, p. 9.
10. These five points included a united Korea, disarming of North Korean
forces, preventing any third party from supplying arms to Communists in Korea,
and making clear the sovereignty of the ROK and its right to a voice in interna-
tional discussions regarding the future of Korea,
11, ‘Telegram from ‘Tokyo, May 1, 1953, no, CX 62220, ibid., p, 13; Clark to
Rhee, May 13, 1953, ibid., p. 16.
12. Hermes, Truce Tent, p, 445; Clark to JCS, May 15, 1955, ibid,
244 JOHN BARRY KOTCH
independent of the UNC were also under consideration by policy
makers in Washington, They were summarized in a letter from President
Eisenhower to Clark, Briggs, and Murphy on May 22. It set forth the
rationale for rejecting a security pact with the ROK: (1) the treaty
would detract from UN efforts in Korea; (2) it might invite similar
action by North Korea’s allies; and (3) recent ROK actions in opposing
the armistice would make it difficult to explain the treaty to the
American people.!? Eisenhower thus rejected the security treaty
option and offered as alternatives the indefinite presence of UN forces
in Korea; a UN ‘“‘greater sanctions statement” (which he viewed
as the strongest possible security guarantee for the ROK); a promise
to promptly and vigorously attempt to achieve a unified, democratic,
and independent Korea and secure the rapid withdrawal of Chinese
troops at the political conference following the armistice; and military
assistance and support for a twenty-division ROK army. Rhee, pre-
dictably, was disappointed by the American rejection and found a
greater sanctions statement of little consolation. Clark, however, in
contrast to his previous opposition to the security treaty, now con-
cluded that it was a necessary “bargaining chip” in softening the
blow of concessions to be made to the Communists at P’anmunjom.,'*
At a series of interdepartmental meetings on May 29-30, senior
U.S. policy makers considered the following options: (1) the U.S.
government would support General Clark’s plan (Operation Everready)
to establish a military government in Korea by taking President Rhee
and his associates into custody in the event of ROK withdrawal from
the UNG; (2) the U.S. government would agree to the withdrawal of
the UNG from Korea in the event that President Rhee refused to
cooperate in reaching or implementing an armistice agreement; (3) the
U.S. government would offer the ROK government a mutual defense
treaty on the condition that the latter would agree to the provisions
of an armistice agreement at P’anmunjom. ®
The participants at these meetings represented a broad cross-section
of senior U.S. policy makers, including General Collins; Gen, Clyde
13, Eisenhower to Clark, Briggs, and Murphy, May 29, 1953, Department of
State, Chronology, p. 21.
14, Eisenhower telegram no. 740, ibid., pp. 18-19; telegram from Tokyo,
May 26, 1953, no. 261008z; from Pusan, May 25, 1953, no. 250539z; and from
Seoul, May 25, 1953, no. 251230z, ibid., pp. 19-20; Hermes, Truce Tent, pp. 446-
47.
15. The relevant documents include the Eddleman Memorandum, which sets
out the background for the decisions; Operation Everready, which details the plan
for implementing a coup against Rhee; the Draft Memorandum for the President,
contained in the State-JJCS Summary Notes of the May 29 meeting, and several
key messages between Washington and Tokyo and Seoul during this period,
THE AMERICAN SECURITY COMMITMENT 245
Eddleman, assistant chief of staff for plans; Admiral Lalor, secretary
of the JCS; H. Freeman Mathews, undersecretary of state; Walter
Robertson, Fredrick Nolting, Kenneth Young, and U. Alexis Johnson
of the State Department; Frank Nash, assistant secretary of defense
for international security affairs; and Everett Gleason, deputy secretary
of the National Security Council (NSC).!° At a joint meeting on
May 29, the participants discussed the above policy options, which
all assumed continued ROK hostility to an armistice agreement. Gen-
eral Collins summed up the alternatives: “‘One is to give Rhee a security
pact; the second is to take Rhee and any other ROK intransigents into
custody; and third is to get an agreement from Rhee to cooperate
with us until we could get UN forces out of Korea.’
Collins favored the second course. “I would take Rhee under
protective custody,” he said, ‘‘rather than submit to his blackmail on
the basis of its being necessary for the security of our troops,’”’ and
pressed his colleagues to give General Clark the necessary authority.
A security pact, Collins argued, would “give Rhee the whip hand.”
This was challenged by Johnson, the State Department representative,
who suggested that ‘‘we might undertake a commitment to negotiate
a pact conditional on Rhee’s agreement to an armistice.”!® In planning
a coup against Rhee, consideration was given to the role of ROK Chief
of Staff General Paek Sdn-ydp, then on an official visit to the United
States. General Collins noted that Paek ‘‘tacitly agreed to back us if
Rhee should order his forces to withdraw from the UN Command.”
liddleman added that “the would go along with us in the event Rhee
jumps over the tracks.’’ Collins also inquired whether the State De-
partment could arrange a meeting between Paek and President Eisen-
hower, to which Johnson replied: ‘‘I doubt whether a sub rosa meeting
between Paek and President Eisenhower would be advisable. It would
he difficult to keep secret and if it leaked, things might be bad.”’ Collins
replied that the State Department ‘‘ought to think it over.”
The conferees drafted a memorandum for the president outlining
16. Clyde Eddleman, ‘‘Memorandum for the Record on Current Difficulties
with the ROK Government,’’ June 1, 1953; ‘‘Notes Recorded by the Secretary
und Deputy Secretary, JCS, at the State-JCS Meeting at the Pentagon, May 29,
1953, 11:00 a.m.,’’; “Plan Everready,” Eighth Army, Seoul, CS 2056, May 4, 1953;
\iviggs to Clark, Murphy, and Department of State, May 30, 1953; Collins (chief of
staff, U.S, Army, hereafter CSUSA) to Clark (commander in chief, United Nations
Command, hereafter CINCUNC), May 30, 1953, no. DA 940238; Collins (CSUSA)
to Clark (CINCUNC), May 30, 1953, no, DA 940241,
17, Summary of Notes of JCOS-State Meeting, May 29, 1953, in Eddleman,
“Memorandum for the Record,” p. 3,
18, Ibid,
246 JOHN BARRY KOTCH
the policy options; it took note of Rhee’s unresponsiveness to ap-
proaches made by Clark and Murphy, personal messages from the
president, and Rhee’s determination to do “‘all within his capability
to forestall any armistice along present lines.” It proposed three alterna-
tives paralleling the Eddleman memorandum:
[1] The UNC would take into custody President Rhee and other intransigent
leaders, using ROK forces if possible. This might lead to the establishment of
a military government. [2] The UNC would inform Rhee that if he refuses to
cooperate in reaching and implementing an armistice or if he takes
other action that would endanger the security of UN forces, the UNC would
withdraw its units from Korea and cease the logistic support of the ROK armed
forces. [3] In lieu of either of the two foregoing alternatives, the United States
would agree to enter a bilateral security pact with the ROK providing Rhee gives
satisfactory assurances of full cooperation with the UNC, including the acceptance
of an armistice.
The memorandum concluded that “action at this time should be
limited to the approval of General Clark’s plan” and a draft message
was prepared giving Clark authority to implement that portion includ-
ing Operation Everready. The secretaries of state and defense would
not concur in the recommendation to implement Everready , however,
and the draft message was never sent. Instead, a revised message di-
rected Clark to inform Rhee that the secretary of state would strongly
recommend to the president the approval of a bilateral security treaty
with the ROK.”
On May 30, a second high-level state-defense meeting took place
at the State Department. According to the Eddleman memorandum,
General Clark should be notified that the U.S. could not concur in that part of
his plan which would establish a United Nations Command military government.
It was also agreed to recommend to the President that the U.S. authorize the
offering to the ROK Government of a mutual defense treaty, along the lines of
our current Philippine and ANZUS treaties, and conditioned upon the ROK Govy-
ernment agreeing to acceptance of an armistice along the lines most recently
proposed by the UN Command, to cooperate in the implementation of an armistice
agreement, and to leaving its armed forces under operational control of CINCUNCG
until mutually agreed between the U.S. and the ROK that such arrangements were
no longer necessary.
The conferees then proceeded to the White House and met with Presi-
dent Eisenhower, who promptly approved the recommendations.
Operation Everready amounted to a U.S.-led coup d’état against
19. Ibid., enclosure A.
20. JCS to Clark, May 30, 1953, JCS file copy, Clark Papers, Eisenhower
Library.
21. Eddleman, “Memorandum for the Record,’’
THE AMERICAN SECURITY COMMITMENT 247
the legally constituted government of the ROK in the name of the
UN. On May 4, 1953, General Clark had prepared it as a contingency
plan to be implemented in the event of continued Korean hostility
toward the armistice agreement. It was an updated version of an earlier
plan (prepared in June 1952) for possible American intervention against
the ROK government when Rhee imposed martial law. If Everready
had been carried out, the original UN mandate in Korea would have
been subverted by the very instrument—the UNC—that had been
created to protect it.
The May 29-30 meetings resulted in the elimination of the two
extreme options; the unknown factor, however, was whether President
Rhee could be persuaded to pay the price for a security treaty—com-
pliance with the armistice agreements and continued UNC operational
control over Korean forces in the postarmistice period. Although Clark
and Briggs had been authorized on May 30 to discuss the terms of a
security pact with the Korean government at their discretion, they
waited until the receipt of a letter from Eisenhower on June 6, formally
suggesting to the ROK a mutual security pact and a program of eco-
nomic and military assistance, in exchange for Korean compliance
with an armistice accord, The two American emissaries pointed out
to Rhee that negotiations toward a treaty could begin as soon as an
agreement had been signed. Rhee rejected the Eisenhower proposal,
however, and the following day Foreign Minister Pyun stated that
the ROK could not accept “any peace or ceasefire that leaves the
Chinese communists on the soil of Korea.”*? This position received
the unanimous backing of the National Assembly in a resolution two
days later. Rhee then advanced a proposal of his own calling for a
mutual withdrawal of UN and Chinese forces from Korea, The proposal
drew different reactions in Washington and Seoul. On June 2, Clark
told Rhee that “the question of withdrawal of all non-Korean forces
would have to be taken up at the political conference (following an
armistice) unless the Communists would agree to include it in the
armistice itself,’
The problem with this formulation was that the UNC would also
have to withdraw from Korea, rendering moot the basic U.S. policy
objective of retaining operational control over Korean armed forces.
Secretary Dulles believed that “‘the simultaneous withdrawal of United
Nations and Chinese Communist forces would weaken the UN nego-
tiating position since the UN needed these forces in Korea for all the
22. Department of State, unnumbered telegram, June 7, 1953, Department
ol State, Chronology.
23, Clark to JCS, June 2, 1955, JCS file copy (Hermes, Truce Tent, p, 448),
248 JOHN BARRY KOTCH
bargaining power they provided,”’** Nevertheless, the idea of a mutual
UNC-Chinese withdrawal offered some intriguing possibilities. The
United States would have achieved the basic policy objective of NSC
48/5 (May 1951), the withdrawal of its forces from Korea under ap-
propriate armistice arrangements and their redeployment to the more
critical area of Western Europe and Japan. While the Chimese would
have been compelled to retreat to Manchuria, thus eliminating its
military presence (although not its influence) in Korea, a basic Chinese
foreign-policy objective and the primary motivation for intervention
in Korea—the perceived danger to Chinese security of U.S. troops on
the Korean peninsula—would have been achieved. The fundamental
disadvantage of the proposal from both the Chinese and American
perspectives was that the Koreans would be left to implement and
monitor any armistice arrangements, a highly questionable proposition
for the two big powers.
On June 22, Clark told Rhee that the issue of simultaneous with-
drawal could no longer be allowed to stand in the way of an armistice
agreement. The United States simply “was not prepared to eject the
Chinese Communist troops from Korea by force or attempt to inject
this issue into the terms of the armistice itself.”?> This ended the
possibility of American acceptance of the Rhee proposal, although
the Korean president continued to make reference to it in future
memoranda,
The lack of success of Clark and Briggs in their earlier overtures to
Rhee prompted Dulles to write the Korean president on June 12 as
follows:
President Eisenhower and I should like as quickly as possible to establish contact
with your Government at a level which would permit of a highly confidential
exchange of views between our two governments. The ideal procedure would
be for you to come to Washington where you could talk on a confidential basis
with President Eisenhower and myself. If, however, your responsibilities in Korea
make this seem impracticable, let us think up some alternatives, Let me emphasize
that these talks must be at a high level and strictly confidential.
Although Rhee quickly declined the invitation, citing the press of
business in Korea, he readily agreed to Dulles’s suggestion to receive
Assistant Secretary for the Far East Walter Robertson in his stead.
Dulles stressed to Rhee that ‘‘Robertson could be helpful in clearing
up any misunderstandings regarding U.S. postarmistice policies and
24, Young memo of conversation of Dulles, Robertson, Paek, and Yang, June
17, 1953, Department of State, Chronology.
25. Clark to Department of the Army, June 22, 1953, JCS file copy (Hermes,
Truce Tent).
26, Dulles to Rhee, June 17, 1953, Department of State, Chronology, p. 33,
THE AMERICAN SECURITY COMMITMENT 249
that his journey would emphasize joint U.S.-ROK efforts. 7382... Cine
June 18, Rhee suddenly released 25,000 militantly anti-Communist
POWs, hits raising the basic issue of whether the UNC still exercised
operational control over Korean military forces. A UN press statement
charged that this action ‘had been secretly planned and carefully
coordinated at top levels of the Korean Government with outside
assistance furnished the prisoners in their mass escape. »28 This was
followed by a swift spate of denunciations by U.S. officials. The presi-
dent wrote Rhee on June 18 that his action was “‘in clear violation of
previous assurances to General Clark to respect the authority of the
UN Command” and that ‘unless you are prepared immediately and
unequivocally to accept the authority of the UN Command to conduct
the present hostilities and to bring them to a close, it will be necessary
to effect another arrangement [for which] the UN Command has now
been authorized to take such steps as may be necessary.” In a meeting
with ROK Prime Minister Paek, then in Washington, Secretary Dulles
similarly stressed ‘‘the impossible situation created by the ROK chal-
lenge to the authority of the UN Command”? and emphasized that
without unity and cooperation, some new arrangement would have
to be put into effect.”
The threat to “take such steps as may be necessary” suggested
direct action against President Rhee, along the lines of Operation
Everready, Clark expressed “profound shock at this unilateral abroga-
tion of your personal commitment,” and noted the UNC’s control
over ROK forces. In a letter of June 20, Rhee again told Clark that
“signing the present armistice would be considered a drastic change
in the US-ROK relationship,” and that he did not see “how the ROK
forces could remain under your command.” On the following day he
qualified this, telling Gen. Maxwell Taylor, the Eighth Army com-
mander, that “the hoped it would not be necessary to withdraw ROK
forces from the UNC.’°°
A Rhee aide-mémoire given to Clark on June 22 suggested the
following conditions for ROK adherence to American plans:
(1) If, after ninety days the political conference fails to obtain an agreement on
Chinese withdrawal, within the following sixty days, the armistice shall be declared
27. Ibid.
28. CINCFE to Department of the Army, June 18, 1954, in UNC/FEC Report,
June 1953, Source Papers, no, 217, pp. 151-297.
29. Eisenhower to Rhee; Dulles to Rhee; June 18, 1953, in Department of
State, Chronology, pp. 38-39.
30, Clark to Rhee, June 18, 1953; telegram from Tokyo, June 21, 19535,
no. GX 63521; Department of the Army telegram, June 21, 1955, no, C 65256,
in Department of State, Chronology, addendum, pp. 9, 40-41,
250 JOHN BARRY KOTCH
null and void, and ROK troops will advance north with air and naval support by
the United States. (2) The United States will enter into a mutual defense pact
with the ROK before signing the armistice. (3) The United States will give this
Government adequate military aid to build up ROK land, sea and air strength and
economic aid to rehabilitate the economy with a view toward eventual self-suf-
ficiency 2!
The second condition presented obvious difficulties for the United
States. Rhee’s determination to pursue a military solution even after
an armistice sharply conflicted with Washington’s desire to work
“peacefully” for reunification.
Was Washington’s expressed desire for peaceful reunification
realistic? In a letter to Rhee on June 12, Dulles pointed out that by
using the term “peaceful unification,” the United States was not
indulging in ‘‘empty phrases’: “I want to personally say to you that
when we talk about unification of Korea by methods other than war,
we are not using empty phrases. We have a real determination to
achieve this objective and we have hopes that it can be achieved,
hopes which are based upon ideas which we are in the process of
developing.’’2?
Perhaps the best indication that Dulles had something concrete
in mind was a statement by Senate Republican Leader William Know-
land on July 1, 1953, that had all the earmarks of a trial balloon: “You
could get a united Korea whose neutrality is guaranteed by all the
great powers, not as a UN trusteeship but as a free nation, Russia and
China would be reasonably assured that Korea would not be used as
a jumping off place for war against them, At the same time, we and
Japan would have assurance that Korea would not be used as a jumping
off place for aggression against us.”°? Dulles himself unveiled a pro-
posal in September 1953 for American withdrawal, conditional on
elections supervised by the UN for an independent but neutral Korea.
Yet not much was done to pursue this interesting option,
The immediate issues of continued ROK participation in the
UNC, a mutual security treaty, and future reunification plans all
turned on whether the ROK action in freeing the POWs imperiled
the armistice agreement, which was awaiting final approval. Whether
31. Rhee aide-mémoire, Kyung Mu Dai, June 22, 1953, Clark Papers, Eisen.
hower Library.
32. U.S. Department of State, Division of Historical Policy Research, The
Robertson-Rhee Talks and Their Aftermath: A Chronology of the Principal De-
velopments in US-ROK Relations, June 22-July 26, 1953, Research Project No,
339, July 1953, p. 31.
33. Telegram no. 8, July 2, 1953, Department of State, Chronology,
$4. New York Times, Sept. 21, 1953.
THE AMERICAN SECURITY COMMITMENT 251
the ROK would be a party to such an armistice or allow for its implemen-
tation were legitimate concerns of Communist negotiators as well as
American officials. Despite UN assurances, the Communists charged that
“the UN Command had known about the plan [to release the POWs in ad-
vance] and had ‘deliberately connived’ with Rhee to carry it out.’
On June 24, 1953, a major conference of U.S. military and civilian
officials took place in Tokyo preparatory to the arrival in Seoul of the
Robertson mission, which had been delayed by Rhee’s release of the
POWs. In addition to Robertson, General Collins (who had accom-
panied him from Washington), General Clark, and Ambassadors Murphy
and Briggs were in attendance. The principal recommendations of the
group were:
(1) An armistice should be signed as soon as possible. (2) If Rhee remains in-
transigent, Robertson should be authorized to inform Rhee that the UN will get
out of Korea. In this event, we should be prepared to make an agreement with the
Communists, independent of the ROK, for withdrawal of UN forces; also provision
for release of our POWs held by the Communists. (3) General Clark feels that
the only conditions under which there might be a possibility that the ROK Army
would take action to replace the present ROK government would be after Rhee
had been informed categorically that we intend to withdraw from Korea unless
he agrees to an armistice and the ROK Army is convinced we mean business.
The first recommendation reaffirmed the overriding U.S. policy objec-
tive in Korea: an early armistice. The second favored disengagement
and recalled Robertson’s earlier admonition to the State-JCS meeting
on May 30 that “if Rhee were taken into custody, it should be for
the purpose of getting out of Korea.’”?’ The third recommendation
clearly implied that the threat of withdrawal was to serve as a catalyst
for a coup against Rhee.
These recommendations evoked mixed reaction in Washington.
Clark was authorized “the widest latitude in the specific terms of
the armistice and handling the problem of the ROK attitude toward the
armistice provided he adhered to the principle of no-force repatriation
and undertook no obligation to the Communists to use force against the
ROK to insure its compliance with the armistice.” However, Clark
was authorized to take action that might “lead ROK political and
military leaders to believe that if ROK compliance with the armistice
was not forthcoming, the UN Command would be prepared to with-
35. Msg CX 36907, CINCFE to DA, June 18, 1953, in UNC/FEC Command
Report, June 1953, Source Papers No, 21.
36. Robertson and Collins (CINCUNC, Tokyo) to Departments of State,
Defense, JCS, June 25, 1958, Robertson-Clark-Rhee Summary, Clark Papers,
Lisenhower Library,
$7, Eddleman, ‘Memorandum for the Reeord,’’ May 29, 1953,
Zoe, JOHN BARRY KOTCH
draw from Korea,”38 A few days later, an ROK Army (ROKA) coup
against Rhee was endorsed with the proviso that it be discreetly ar-
ranged. The JCS advised Clark that “the most promising line of action
now open seems to be to cause Rhee and his advisers to believe that
we will withdraw from Korea in the event he sabotages the armistice.
If no change occurs in Rhee’s attitude, it would be our hope that
influential ROK political and military elements would themselves
take steps to bring about a situation in the ROK Government which
will assure ROK cooperation with an armistice.” Clark was specifically
directed to exploit the possibility by “quietly and adroitly creating
the impression among Rhee and ROK leaders that the UN Command
was preparing to withdraw.’”9
The internal situation in Korea, however, was far different from
that which prevailed earlier, with Rhee now enjoying the full support
of both the National Assembly and the members of his own govern-
ment. On June 24, he formed what amounted to a war cabinet: an
ROK National Defense Committee with himself as chairman, and also
included the prime minister and the ministers of foreign affairs, de-
fense, finance, and home affairs as well as the three service chiefs of
staff.40 Moreover, Rhee also enjoyed the support of senior military
officials, including Gen. Pack Sdn-ydp, the very people that American
officials were looking to as potential coup initiators. If U.S. policy
makers believed that Rhee was vulnerable to a coup from within,
they appeared to be wrong.
The Robertson talks with Rhee began on June 25. Rhee expressed
his dissatisfaction that the armistice would not require the withdrawal
of Chinese Communist forces from North Korea and argued that the
political conference would involve endless discussions and provide the
Communists with unlimited opportunities for subversion and infiltra-
tion. Robertson emphasized the advantages accruing to the ROK from
existing American assurances of support and its intention to collaborate
closely with the ROK in the political conference toward the attainment
of a free, unified, and independent Korea. He expressed the view that
the two sides were in basic agreement on an armistice, although certain
items remained to be resolved: the ROK demand for a ninety-day
limit on the political conference, economic aid, the buildup of the
38. JCS to CINCFE (Tokyo), June 25, 1953, JCS file copy, Clark Papers,
Eisenhower Library.
39. JCS to CINCUNG (Tokyo), June 25, 1953, Clark Papers, Eisenhower
Library.
40, Telegram from Pusan, June 25, 1953, no, 1465, Department of State,
Robertson-Rhee Talks, p. 9.
THE AMERICAN SECURITY COMMITMENT 253
ROKA to twenty divisions, and an immediate guarantee of a mutual
defense pact.*!
Robertson called any time limit on a political conference “an
impossible condition,” although he agreed to present Rhee’s proposal
to Dulles. He also agreed at Rhee’s request to interpret the word “‘guar-
antee” to mean that negotiations for a defense pact could begin at once
rather than await the actual signing of an armistice, although final
approval would be contingent on Senate action, which in all probability
could not take place until after an armistice had been concluded.
Finally, Robertson accepted condition three of Rhee’s aide-mémoire
of June 23, relating to military and economic assistance.*2 However,
the crucial question of an American commitment to renew hostilities
in the likely event that the projected postarmistice political conference
failed to resolve the political future of Korea remained in dispute.
On June 27, Robertson and Clark told Rhee that the United States
could not impose a time limit on other countries participating in the
postarmistice conference, but if at the end of ninety days it was clear
that the conference was not making progress and was instead providing
the Communists an opportunity to infiltrate and propagandize against
the ROK, the United States would be prepared to act in concert with
the ROK and withdraw from the conference. An addendum was in-
cluded that stipulated:
The above assurances from the Government of the U.S, are dependent upon
agreement of the Government of the ROK (a) to accept the authority of the UN
to conduct and conclude the hostilities (b) to support the armistice entered into
between CINCUNC and the commanders of the Communist forces, and to pledge
its full support and collaboration in carrying out the terms thereof, and (c) that the
armed forces of the ROK will remain under the operational control of CINCUNC
until Governments of the U.S, and ROK mutually agree that such arrangements
are no longer necessary.
Rhee rejected the U.S. position and substituted a revised text
providing for the conclusion of a mutual security pact before the
signing of an armistice agreement, and insisting on the resumption
of combat operations if the planned political conference did not
climinate the Chinese presence in North Korea. Continued ROK par-
ticipation in the UNC was tied to a U.S. commitment to military
victory.4 Robertson returned Rhee’s draft with the admonition
41. Telegram no, 28, June 25, 1953; no. 29, June 27, 1953, Department of
State, Chronology, pp, 13-14,
42. Ibid.
43, CINCUNC (at 8th Army 8) telegram, June 28, 1953, no, 2815282, Depart-
ment of State, Robertson. Rhee Talks, pp, 16-18,
44, Ibid,, p. 19,
254 JOHN BARRY KOTCH
that “it contained so many inaccuracies and so much of it was wr
relevant that it could not provide a basis for further discussion.” A
second American aide-mémoire then stated that the United States
“would be prepared to withdraw from a political conference” and
consult immediately with the ROK on what steps might properly
and reasonably be taken if no agreement on Chinese withdrawal or a
unified Korea was achieved after ninety days. In addition, it agreed
to begin immediately to draft a mutual defense treaty, although the
ratification of such a treaty ‘‘would be subject to the advice and con-
sent of the Senate.” The ROK, for its part, would agree to support
the armistice and, “in the interests of the continued security of the
ROK,” to keep its armed forces under the operational control of the
UNC until the two governments agreed that this was no longer neces-
sary. This latest American proposal met previous ROK objections
in that negotiations toward a mutual defense treaty could begin at
once; it ruled out the use of military force if the conference failed.
The administration skillfully utilized the need for congressional ap-
proval of any security treaty or military assistance program as a politi-
cal lever in restraining Rhee, Robertson explained that “whereas the
current Korean hostilities were based on a UN resolution and consti-
tuted action which the U.S. had been in a position to take because of
membership in the UN, what Rhee proposed was not a UN action but
action specifically outside the UN to be taken jointly by the ROK
and the U.S.” In a top secret cable to Robertson on July 1, 1953,
Dulles told him to “explain to Rhee that not only is his proposal
[for unilateral action] beyond the scope of authority you have from
the President but that the President, even if he wanted could not
constitutionally give the pledge which Rhee seeks. This would, in
effect, be war which the President could not conduct without author-
ization from Congress.’”*°
Congress was behind the administration on this. Senior Republican
and Democratic senators favored “a last appeal to Rhee to join in the
truce and that if this failed, General Clark would be instructed simply
to sign anyhow for the U.S. and the UN.’*” In a cable to Rhee on
July 1, Senators Knowland and Smith and Congressman Walter Judd
(all bitterly anti-Communist) expressed the hope that Rhee would
sign the armistice and thus continue the “close cooperation and friend-
ship which our two nations have had in mutual defense of Korea
against Communist aggression.” Acting Secretary of State Bedell Smith,
45. Ibid., pp. 21-22.
46. Telegram from Seoul, July 3, 1953, no. 8, and telegram to Seoul, July 1,
1953, no. 4, ibid., pp. 33-34,
47. New York Times, June 26, 1953,
THE AMERICAN SECURITY COMMITMENT 255
citing a growing lack of confidence in Rhee, told the Korean ambas-
sador in Washington that the “‘ratification of the mutual defense pact
would be dependent on what Rhee and the ROK did between then
and the time of the Senate consideration of that treaty.”
Undeterred, Rhee turned the Congressional argument around,
noting that: ‘‘The same constitutional limitations which prevented
Eisenhower from making pledges regarding future action involving
war also made it impossible for Korea to be sure of obtaining a mutual
defense pact which would have to be approved by the United States
Senate, and unless he could be sure of this pact he would have nothing
with which to secure the support of the Korean people for an armi-
stice.”*? When Rhee asked Robertson on July 6 for some concrete
evidence of congressional support for the defense pact, he was bluntly
told that “the President would not have offered the pact if he had not
believed the Senate would support him.” Yet on July 7, Rhee reiterated
his contention that the promise of a mutual defense treaty was not
“an assurance of complete and effective nature for the simple reason
that it is so dependent upon ratification of the Senate to be effective
at all. Administration warnings were supported in a blast from
Republican Senator Alexander Wiley, a key member of the Foreign
Relations Committee, expressing the view that Rhee was doing “his
nation, his Allies, the United Nations as a whole and the cause of
world peace infinite damage by his continued reckless attitude and
by displaying in his patriotic zeal an unfortunate extremism, obstinacy
and arbitrariness,’”*!
There is little question that the administration was doing about
all it could to help prepare for Senate approval of a mutual security
treaty. If, however, Rhee agreed to an armistice without actually having
a treaty in hand, where would his protection against renewed aggres-
sion lie? Kenneth Young, a member of Robertson’s party, pointed out
that the greater sanctions statement then being drawn up provided the
ROK with the necessary assurances against a future Communist attack
and that the ROK could safely leave to the postarmistice period the
negotiation and ratification of a mutual defense treaty.°2 At the
48. Telegrams to Seoul, July 1, 1953, no. 5, July 5, 1958, no. 16, Department
of State, Robertson-Rhee Talks, p. 40.
49. Young memo of conversation of Robertson, Rhee, Paek, and P
* < " un, July 4,
1953, ibid., pp. 38-39. iia
50. Department of the Army telegram, July 6, 1953, no. DT'G060600z; tele-
gram from Seoul, July 18, 1953, no, 29, ibid., pp, 42-43.
51, New York Times, July 8, 1958.
52. Young memo, July 4, 1953, Department of State, Robertson Rhee Talks
pp. 38-39, ;
256 JOHN BARRY KOTCH
same time, however, General Taylor, Eighth Army commander, was
implementing a plan developed by Clark “to induce, through covert
means, speculation as to UN Command intent at high ROK govern-
ment levels.”” Taylor broadcast a statement that UN troops would be
moved out of the line of battle in the event of an armistice, with
or without ROK cooperation, Clark’s plan included conferences among
high-level U.S, commanders, a slowdown of supplies and equipment
deliveries to the ROK, contingency plans for withdrawal, and a slow-
down of the projected build-up of the ROKA—all designed ‘‘to have
a definite impact on Rhee and influential ROK military and politi-
cal elements.”
Rhee spelled out his final position in a letter to Robertson on
July 9, in which he agreed “‘to leave his troops under the UN Command
so long as the UNC did not engage in activities which he considered to
be against the interests of Korea.” He also stated that “although we
cannot sign the truce, we shall not obstruct it, so long as no measures
or actions taken under the armistice are detrimental to our national
survival.”°* Here, at last, was an acceptable formula that Robertson
could take back to Washington.
At the armistice negotiations on July 12, the Communists de-
manded to know whether the UNC could: (1) insure that the ROKA
would in fact cease fire and withdraw upon the signing of an armistice;
(2) insure the safety of the neutral nations’ personnel; and (3) insure
that the UNC would give no support to the ROK, including equipment
or supplies, if the ROKA took aggressive action after an armistice.
Further, they refused to accept a prior UNC explanation that the
ROK was “prepared to carry out the terms of the armistice.” Without
specifying what assurances had been provided, the UNC representative
expressed the conviction that the ROKA would remain under its opera-
tional control after an armistice and that the UNC would not have
entered into an armistice unless it was prepared to carry it out.
Although not fully satisfied, the Communist negotiators did not press
the issue further.
While ultimately successful in securing a pledge from Rhee not to
obstruct the armistice agreement, the Robertson-Rhee talks had to
be backed with threats at several points. Thus, Robertson was in-
53. CINCUNC to secretary of defense, July 5, 1953, JCS file copy, Clark
Papers, Eisenhower Library; telegram from Seoul, July 8, 1953, no, 29, Department
of State, Robertson-Rhee Talks, pp. 42-43.
54. Telegram no. DTG 091125z, July 9, 1953 and no, DIG 091315z, July 9,
1953, Department of State, Robertson-Rhee Talks, pp. 49-51,
55, Armistice Meetings, July 16, 1953, ibid., p. 72.
THE AMERICAN SECURITY COMMITMENT 257
structed on July 5 that ‘if Rhee’s reply to your aide-mémoire of July 3
and letter is still unsatisfactory, the time has probably come for you to
leave if you feel that your continued presence will serve no useful
purpose.’°® Also, had Rhee not agreed to drop his demand for military
action following a political conference, U.S. policy makers could well
have urged intervention and the implementation of Operation Ever-
ready. A State Department query to Robertson on July 3 spoke of
planning by the UNC for “other arrangements referenced in Eisen-
hower’s letter of June 18 and for which CINCUNC had already been
authorized to take the necessary steps,””?’
During their conversations, Robertson and Rhee had exchanged
drafts of a mutual defense treaty. These drafts both affirmed the
existence of a direct security linkage between the United States and
the ROK and provided explicit measures for strengthening this bond.
The two versions closely paralleled each other, and the preliminary
draft was finally initialed by Dulles during his visit to Korea in August
1953. The operative provisions were as follows:
Article II, In order more effectively to achieve the objective of this Treaty,
the Parties separately and jointly by self-help and mutual aid will maintain and
develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.
Article IV. Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific region
on either of the Parties in areas, under their respective administrative control, as
such areas are now or may hereafter be mutually defined in administrative agree-
ments of the type referred to in Article V of the present Treaty, would be dan-
gerous to its own peace and safety, and declares that it would act to meet the
common dangers in accordance with its constitutional processes.
Any armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immedi-
ately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations, Such measures shall
be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore
international peace and security.
In the final version, Korea also granted the United States the right to
dispose “by mutual agreement land, sea and air forces in and about the
ROK.” This furnished the United States with a legal basis to maintain
troops in Korea independent of the UNC.
Article IV formed the heart of the treaty, but it stopped short of
an automatic commitment to defend Korea against external aggression.
First, it specified that such an obligation would come into force only
in the event of external aggression against the ROK. Aggression initi-
56. Acting Secretary of State Smith to Robertson (drafted by U. Alexis John-
son), July 5, 1953, ibid., p. 44.
57. Telegram from Seoul to secretary of state, July 5, 1953, no, 15, ibid,, p. 40.
58. Telegram from Tokyo, July 5, 1953, no, 063497, ibid., pp, 37-38.
258 JOHN BARRY KOTCH
ated by the ROK with the goal of reunification by force was excluded,
Second, as in the NATO treaty, the form of assistance to be rendered
was left open to determination by constitutional processes.
While Rhee attached great importance to a mutual defense treaty
as an expression of an unambiguous security commitment from the
United States, how much additional clout the treaty actually offered
South Korea remained unclear. The continued presence of the UNC
and a greater sanctions statement issued on the eve of the armistice
gave the ROK more than what it got in the security treaty—an auto-
matic external military commitment backed by the United States and
other countries engaged in the settlement: “If in violation of the
armistice the Republic of Korea is subjected to unprovoked attack you
may of course count upon our immediate and automatic military
reaction. Such an attack would not only be an attack upon the Re-
public of Korea but an attack upon the United Nations Command and
U.S. forces within that Command,’%? At the same time, the United
States agreed to a quasi-permanent security role in Korea, This was
expressed in a protocol between the United States and the ROK that
placed South Korean forces under the operational control of the UNC
as long as it was responsible for the defense of the ROK. The treaty
gave the United States a legal basis to formulate policy with respect
to Korea independent of the UN, thus providing insurance against any
possibility that the UN mandate might be revoked as a consequence
of shifting UN majorities, Although this was not likely to occur in
the 1950s, it nearly occurred in the 1970s, Moreover, the United
States could point to UN goals in Korea as legitimizing a continued
U.S. military presence, in essence invoking a UN mandate to pursue
unilateral policies. Finally, the compelling rationale of maintaining
the authority of the UN to resolve the issue of Korean unification,
a cornerstone of U.S. policy since 1947, was not compromised.
The ROK could continue to use the UN banner to justify its cause,
while benefiting from a direct U.S. security relationship. And as long
as the UN mandate for Korea remained in force, the participation of
Korean military forces in the UNC gave the South a powerful inter-
national political advantage over the North. The principal negative
aspect of the dual security commitment was that it ran the risk of
undercutting the concept of collective security, which was the primary
justification for U.S. intervention in Korea in the first place. While
the UN Charter (Article 51) did allow for defensive arrangements
59, Dulles to Rhee, July 24, 1953, ibid., p. 95.
60, See U.S, Department of State, State Department Bulletin, November
1954, p. 352.
THE AMERICAN SECURITY COMMITMENT 259
designed to enhance the prospects of international peace and security
such as NATO, a collective security vehicle had already been created.
Where, then, was the justification for a parallel bilateral security treaty?
The American desire for dual security was reflected in the original
U.S. draft of the Mutual Security Treaty (not part of the final version),
which stated that ‘this treaty does not affect and shall not be inter-
preted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of the Parties
under the Charter of the United Nations or the responsibility of the
United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and secu-
rity.”®! Also, in an exchange during congressional hearings on the
practical effect of the dual commitment between Senator Smith of
New Jersey and Secretary Dulles, Dulles pointed out that they were
both applicable in different ways: “This particular treaty” said Smith,
“does not contemplate apparently any participation by the United
Nations, so we are assuming now special responsibilities in Korea by
the United States alone. Is that a correct statement?” “‘It is correct,”
Dulles replied, ‘‘as far as this treaty goes; but of course as the United
Nations Charter is also a treaty and its general terms are applicable
to Korea, as to other parts of the world.”
The Mutual Defense Treaty furnished an additional legal basis for
the U.S. military presence in Korea and formalized the bilateral nature
of the U.S. security commitment to the ROK, but it also had the
twin virtues of providing for the security of the ROK against external
aggression in the absence of indigenous military self-sufficiency, and,
in effect, deterring the ROK from attempting to bring about unification
militarily. For the Americans, if not for Syngman Rhee, the protective
and preventive functions were complementary and necessary.
61. Telegram from Tokyo, July 5, 1953, no, C 63497, Department of State,
Robertson-Rhee Talks.
62. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations,
83rd Cong., 2nd sess., Jan. 13, 1954 (Washington, D. C.: GPO), pp. 10-11.
The Struggle over
the Korean Armistice:
Prisoners of Repatriation?
BARTON J. BERNSTEIN
EVEN WITH THE REVIVED INTEREST IN THE KOREAN WAR, MOST OF THE SCHOL-
arly literature continues to focus on its origins, Chinese entry into
the conflict,and the Truman-MacArthur controversy. Few have examined
the troubling problems of the lengthy negotiations to end the war.!
Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the Institute for Humane Stud-
ies in July 1978, the East Asian seminar at Stanford University in October 1979,
the Columbia University Korea seminar in November 1979, the International Stud-
ies Association convention in March 1980, the Conference for Peace Research in
History in April 1980, and the Korean War conference at the University of Washing-
ton in June 1980, The author is especially indebted to Alexander George and John
Lewis of Stanford University, and Bruce Cumings of the University of Washington
for their counsel, and to the Ford Foundation International Studies Program and
the Stanford Arms Control and Disarmament Program and the East Asian Program
for support.
1. Among those are: Walter Hermes, From Truce Tent to Fighting Front
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1966); “The History of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff: The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy,” mimeographed, Modern
Military Branch, National Archives, Washington, D,C., vol. 3, James F, Schnabel
and Robert J, Watson, ‘The Korean War,” pt. 2 (1978); Gabriel and Joyce Kolko,
The Limits of Power (New York: Harper, 1972), pp, GLO-17; Wilfred Bacchus,
262 BARTON J, BERNSTEIN
Did the United States, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) want to end the
conflict?? Why did these nations take more than two years, from July
10, 1951, to July 27, 1953, to achieve an armistice? They consumed
nearly five months quarreling over, first, the agenda, and then, viola-
tions of neutrality and the location of the armistice line, Between No-
vember 1951 and May 1952, they slowly agreed on inspections and
troop replacements, and conditionally on reconstruction of airfields
and membership on an international supervisory commission, By May,
there was only one unresolved issue—voluntary versus automatic repa-
triation of prisoners of war.
Even after a quarter century, the troubling question remains: was
this dispute over POWs actually the issue that blocked an agreement for
fifteen months? Or did one or more of the powers seize on this issue to
conceal other goals and to prevent an armistice? Such questions raise re-
lated problems. Why did the Truman administration insist on voluntary
repatriation? Did the president and his advisers foresee the lengthy
stalemate? Did the Truman administration ever consider compromising
on the issue? Was it actually important to the PRC and the DPRK? If
so, why?
Unfortunately, the sources from the Communist side are still
skimpy, so often it is only possible to suggest interpretations of their
policy. But the recent declassification of many American documents®
makes it possible to analyze, in depth, the tactics and goals of the Tru-
man administration in pursuing armistice negotiations.
OPENING NEGOTIATIONS
By the late spring of 1951, after the United States had halted two
large Communist attacks, the war was moving toward a bloody stale-
ee ee ee eee
“The Relationship between Combat and Peace Negotiations: Fighting While Talk-
ing in Korea, 1951-1953,” Orbis 17 (Summer 1973): 547-74; Robert Simmons,
The Strained Alliance (New York: Free Press, 1975), pp. 198-240; Edward Fried-
man, “Nuclear Blackmail and the End of the Korean War,’? Modern China 1 (Jan-
uary 1975): 75-91; Barton J. Bernstein, ‘“Truman’s Secret Thoughts on Ending
the Korean War,’ Foreign Service Journal 57 (November 1980): 31-33, 44; and
John Gittings, “Talks, Bombs, and Germs: Another Look at the Korean War,”
Journal of Contemporary Asia 5, no. 2 (1975): 205-17. ‘
2. Syngman Rhee and his ROK government opposed the armistice because it
would mean a divided Korea. See Barton J. Bernstein, “The Pawn As Rook: The
Struggle to End the Korean War,” Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, 10 (Janu-
ary-February, 1978):38-47.
3. Much of this material has been requested since 1975, under mandatory re-
view and the Freedom of Information Act, It includes National Security Council
(NSC) papers; the files of the Policy Planning Staff (PPS), WH, Freeman Matthews,
Korean Lot. and 795 at the Department of State; the Dean Acheson Papers, George
STRUGGLE OVER THE KOREAN ARMISTICE 263
mate on the ground. On May 30, Gen. Matthew Ridgway, UN and
American commander in the Pacific, reported to Washington that the
enemy had suffered a massive defeat—thousands of deaths, about ten
thousand prisoners, destruction of equipment, and loss of food. “For
the next thirty days,” he counseled, ‘‘the .. . Government should be
able to count . . . upon a military situation in Korea offering optimum
advantages in support of diplomatic negotiations [for an armistice] hit
The Truman administration was eager to end the war on what it
considered decent terms—a divided Korea near the thirty-eighth parallel,
inspections to bar the introduction of more foreign troops, exchange of
all prisoners of war, and an ultimate withdrawal of foreign forces. In
America, the war was bitterly unpopular. The beleaguered administra-
tion confronted strong pressures from Congress and the electorate to
pull out or to bomb Manchuria and even China. Alarmed by such de-
mands, America’s allies, especially Britain, major Commonwealth na-
tions, and some NATO members, were pushing for an armistice. The
West’s intervention in the war in 1950 had established the commitment
to stop Communist aggression, America’s allies stated. By 1951, they
wanted an end to the war, Why continue to fight an enervating war,
they asked, which drained American and allied resources, provoked de-
mands for reckless escalation, and actually weakened the western alli-
ance? Many asked if the Soviet Union were not the chief beneficiary.
Some even contended that termination of the war would free China
from its dependence on the Soviet Union and allow their enmity to
grow. America’s allies did not want victory, only a respectable settle-
ment. A divided Korea, a return to the status quo ante (at the thirty-
eighth parallel), would meet their needs admirably.®
Korean War (hereafter Materials), copies of Korean War documents (hereafter
Documents), the President’s Secretary’s Files (PSF) at the Harry S. Truman Library,
Independence, Mo.; ‘‘Pertinent Papers on the Korean War,” (hereafter ‘‘Pertinent
Papers’’) at the Truman Library and at the Office of the Chief of Military History,
Washington, D.C.; Joint Chiefs of Staff, Army, and Defense records at the National
Archives, Washington, D.C., and the Pentagon; and Army records at the Military
History Collection, Carlisle, Pa.
4. Commander in Chief, the Far East (CINCFE) (Ridgway) to Department of
the Army for JCS, May 30, 1951, C 63744, Record Group (hereafter RG), 218,
Records of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, CCS, decimal file 383.21, Korea
(3-19-45), National Archives (hereafter JCS Records).
5. NSC 48/5, May 17, 1950, NSC box, Modern Military Records, National Ar-
chives; William J. Hopkins to president, May 8, 1951, PSF, box 129, Truman Li-
brary; George Elsey to David Lloyd, May 3, 1951, ‘New Peace Proposals,” Lloyd
Files, Truman Library; Matthew Connelly, ‘Cabinet Meeting,” June 11, 1951, Con-
nelly Papers, Truman Library; ‘Briefing of Ambassadors,” June 5 and 29, 1951,
Materials; and Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation (New York: Norton, 1969),
p. 53 he
6, Denis Stairs, The Diplomacy of Constraint: Canada, the Korean War, and
264 BARTON J. BERNSTEIN
Given the aims of the administration and the anxieties of allies,
General Ridgway thought that there was little point in pushing the
Communists north some forty or fifty miles; small pieces of real estate
had little value and were not worth the cost in American lives, A major
American offensive could be even more expensive. Even if initially sue-
cessful, such an offensive would increase American casualties, provoke
China to commit more troops, expand the savagery of the war, frighten
America’s allies, and increase domestic pressures on the administration
for further escalation or withdrawal. Ridgway understood that the poli-
tics of limited war required military caution and a willingness to accept
stalemate.’
The Truman administration was looking for ways to start negotia-
tions. Fearful of holding them at the UN, where neutrals might propose
terms injurious to the United States, the administration moved to in-
formal channels, The Department of State authorized George Kennan,
former head of the Policy Planning Staff (PPS), to approach Soviet
Deputy Foreign Minister Jacob Malik. Secretary of State Dean Acheson
and others believed that Russia controlled the PRC and DPRK. On June
5, in response to Kennan’s approach, Malik privately said that the
Soviets wanted peace in Korea and recommended that the United
States talk to North Korea and China. “No doubt existed,” Acheson
later recalled, ‘‘that the message was authentic . . . [but it] left us won-
dering what portended and what we should do next.” In the next few
weeks, the United States apparently did nothing.®
the United States (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974), pp. 171-82; Brian
Porter, Britain and the Rise of Communist China (London: Oxford University
Press, 1967), pp. 116-20; Acheson to General Bradley, May 12, 1951, with “Text
of a Message from Mr. Morrison to Mr. Acheson, Dated May 10, 1951,” Acheson
Papers.
7. CINCFE (Ridgway) to Department of the Army (DEPTAR) for JCS, June
14, 1951, CX 64976, JCS Records, CCS, decimal file 383.21, Korea (3-19-45); JCS
to GINGFE (Ridgway), June 20, 1951, JCS 94501, “Pertinent Papers,” Office of
the Chief of Military History; CINCFE (Ridgway) to JCS, June 26, 1951, C 65800,
JCS Records, CCS, decimal file 383.21, Korea (3-19-45), Pentagon; J. Lawton
Collins, War in Peacetime (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1969), pp. 306-7; Matthew
Ridgway, The Korean War (New York: Popular Books, 1967), pp. 180-83; James
Schnabel, Policy and Direction: The First Year (Washington: GPO, 1972), pp. 397-
402. For an argument about army capacity and policy, see Gen, James Van Fleet in
U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings on Ammunition
Shortages, 83rd Cong., 1st sess., April 1, 1953, p. 32, and Collins in ibid., pp. 1-5;
Collins, War in Peacetime, pp. 306-7; Ridgway, “My Battles in War and Peace, the
Korean War,” Saturday Evening Post 82 (Feb, 25, 1956):130; Bernard Brodie,
War and Politics (New York: Macmillan, 1973), pp. 91-94; and Henry Kissinger,
Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (New York: Harper, 1957), pp. 50-51,
8. Acheson, Present at the Creation, pp, 532-33, On earlier Soviet efforts
STRUGGLE OVER THE KOREAN ARMISTICE 265
On June 23, after giving the State Department a few hours advance
notice, Malik declared on American radio that a settlement could be
achieved, He explained that the belligerents should discuss a cease-fire
and armistice providing for the mutual withdrawal of forces from the
thirty-eighth parallel. Two days later, China endorsed this proposal,
without renewing its earlier demands for a UN seat and Formosa.”
Appearing before a congressional committee, Acheson said that Com-
munist withdrawal behind the thirty-eighth parallel and an effective
guarantee against renewed warfare would meet American military
needs. Privately, Acheson explained to French officials, “we were
extremely anxious to have a satisfactory settlement .. . but at the same
time we were aware of the pitfalls [of] entering into any negotiations
that were basically a propaganda effort.””!°
The administration did not want to discuss political issues—the UN
seat or Formosa—with the Communists, and found support for its
wishes in a special UN interpretation to negotiate an armistice as long as
it was limited to military issues.!! The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)
favored the quest for the armistice, for they recognized the war weari-
ness at home and the wariness of allies abroad, General Hoyt Vanden-
berg, Air Force chief of staff, dissented, warning, in the words of the
minutes, ‘“‘We are now hurting the Communists badly and . . . any res-
pite given them by an armistice would only permit them to build up to
start fighting again.”” He was overruled by Truman, Acheson, and the
other members of the JCS.!* Accordingly, on June 30, acting on in-
structions from Washington, Ridgway publicly invited the Communists
to meet with American and ROK officers to negotiate a military armis-
tice.
since March, see George Elsey, “‘Memorandum for the File: Korean Peace Feelers,”
June 30, 1951, Elsey Papers, box 76.
9. Erest Gross to secretary of state, June 23, 1951, Documents; text of
speech printed in U.S. Department of State, State Department Bulletin no. 25
(July 9, 1951):45; and Foreign Broadcasting Information Service (hereafter FBIS),
Daily Report, Moscow, June 28, 1951, p. BB1. On possible Soviet motives, see
Adam Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence (New York: Praeger, 1968), pp. 533-
34; New York Times, June 26, 1951, p. 1; cf., Simmons, Strained Alliance, pp.
198-202.
10. New York Times, June 27, 1951, p. 1; G. M. Godley, “Mr. Malik’s Pro-
posal,’”’ June 27, 1951, Documents.
11. Leland Goodrich, Korea: A Study of U.S, Policy in the United Nations
(New York: Harper, 1956), p. 184; Acheson, Present at the Creation, pp. 533-
$4, For background, see John Ross to John Hickerson and Dean Rusk, ‘“Trygve
Lie’s Latest Thinking Goncerning a Cease-lire in Korea,” June 13, 1951, Docu-
ments,
12. U. A. Johnson, “Korean Armistice’ (meeting with the JOS, 10:30 am,),
June 28, 1951, decimal file 795,00/6-2851, Department of State (wource of all 795
266 BARTON J. BERNSTEIN
The Communists proposed starting negotiations in about eight days,
and suggested an immediate cease-fire. Perhaps they sincerely wanted a
quick, permanent end to the war but, as they undoubtedly understood,
a cease-fire could also benefit them, for they had suffered great losses
and could use a respite to build up fora renewed attack. Suspecting
such sinister motives, Ridgway easily gained Washington’s speedy ap-
proval to reject the offer.}3
Could a settlement be achieved? Were the Communists sincere in
seeking an armistice? How long would negotiations take? UN newsmen
were optimistic. They made up a betting pool, and the “‘pessimistic’’ es-
timate was six weeks. American leaders were suspicious and wary. Ache-
son privately counseled, in the words of the cabinet minutes, “we
should maintain [an] attitude of skepticism.” !* Officials worried that
there might be a stalemate over inspections or Communist efforts to
broaden discussions to include political issues—Formosa and the UN
seat. Gen. George C. Marshall, secretary of defense, told the cabinet
that the greatest danger was “a let-down in our defense effort.” As a re-
sult, the president warned publicly that America must continue to
rearm itself and the West, for the Soviets had not given up their design
for world conquest—an often repeated administration theme during the
two years of armistice negotiations.’
At the first negotiating session, at KaesOng on July 10, the Commu-
nists again offered an immediate cease-fire, with withdrawal of forces to
files), Washington, D.C.; see also Johnson, “‘Korean Armistice” (meeting with the
JCS, 3:15 p.m.), June 29, 1951, ibid., decimal file 795.00/6-2951.
13. Jen-min-jih-bao, NCNA, July 1, 1951, Survey of China Mainland Press
(SCMP), no. 127 (July 1-3, 1951), pp. 18-20; Ridgway to JGS, July 2, 1951, CX
66188, JCS Records, CCS, decimal file 383.21, Korea (3-19-45); Rusk, in “Brief-
ing of Ambassadors,” July 3, 1951, Materials; Truman in Elsey, ‘Korean Peace
Feelers,’”? June 30, 1951, Elsey Papers, box 76; and Elsey, “Memorandum for the
File,” July 2, 1951, Elsey Papers, box 76.
14. Rutherford Poats, Decision in Korea (New York: MacBride, 1954), p. 204;
Connelly, ‘Cabinet Meeting,” July 6, 1951, Connelly Papers; see also Acheson,
“Soviet Peace Proposals, Korea,” June 28, 1951, Acheson Papers. According to
Charles E. Wilson, defense mobilizer, “Industry is worried that we will not go ahead
with the arms program if we get peace in Korea. That is not the case but [it] isa
dangerous psychology” (Connelly, ‘Cabinet Meeting,” June 11, 1951, Connelly
Papers).
15. Marshall, paraphrased in L.D. Battle to secretary of state, July 6, 1951,
Acheson Papers, box 66. For military preparations in case negotiations failed, see
JCS 1776/240, July 13, 1951, JCS Records, CCS, decimal file 383.21, Korea
(3-19-45); preparations included expanded war in Korea, a naval blockade of China,
and expanded covert war there. ‘Truman addresses, July 4 and 23, 1951, in Public
Papers of the President: Harry S. Truman, 1951 (Washington: GPO, 1965), pp. 371-
74, 404-6,
STRUGGLE OVER THE KOREAN ARMISTICE 267
opposite sides of the thirty-eighth parallel, supervision of terms, ex-
change of all POWs, and removal of all non-Korean troops from the pen-
insula. The United States again balked, The Americans insisted upon
restricting the early discussion to establishing an agenda, for they did
not want to settle for the parallel, mistrusted the vague provisions for
inspection, and feared that withdrawal of American troops might invite
new aggression. Looking at the dispute, Ridgway concluded, “experience
shows that Communists could not be expected to bargain rapidly [but]
to adopt positions far in excess of what they expected to obtain.”!®
American intelligence suggested that the talks might fail. Moscow
wanted to end the war, according to intelligence, but China probably
expected “to get [a] more favorable truce than we are prepared to
grant.” Intelligence services thought that China might insist upon a di-
vision at the thirty-eighth parallel, rather than the more northern line
that America sought, and upon withdrawal of all foreign forces, which
America would resist. To dash some Communist hopes about an pen
can withdrawal, Secretary Acheson publicly declared that America
would keep troops in Korea to guarantee against renewed Communist
‘‘agoression,’?!7
The british expected negotiations to be “long and difficult.”’ Trygve
Lie, the UN secretary general, believed that an armistice could be
achieved, but he thought that the Soviets wanted to keep America ‘‘in-
definitely tied down in the Far East, particularly by having large forces
in Japan rather than in Europe or elsewhere,””!8
In the early days at Kaesdng, the delegations traded insults, bickered
on minor issues, and jockeyed for propaganda victories. After two
weeks, on July 26, they agreed upon these key points for an agenda
which opened the way for the next stage of the dispute: 1. Fixing fay
military demarcation line...to establish a demilitarized zone as
a basic condition for the cessation of hostilities. . .. 2. Concrete arrange-
ments for the realization of cease-fire and armistice in Korea shel
the composition, authority, and functions of a supervisory ‘Soa ;
3. Arrangements relating to prisoners of war.!® ee
16. Hermes, Truce Tent, pp. 24-26; Lt. Col. W.F. Winton, “Memorandum for
the Record,” July 11, 1951, Matthew Ridgway Papers, Military History Collection
17. Richard Neustadt to Charles Murphy, July 16, 1951, Elsey Papers; ihatieiain
in New York Times, July 20, 1951, p. 2. Ridgway informed Washington that Ache
son’s statement ‘‘will have a positive beneficial effect...” (CINCFE to DEPTAR
for JCS, July 20, 1951, C 67348, JCS Records, Pentagon),
18. U. A. Johnson, “British Views Regarding Post-Armistice Procedures for
Korea,” July 14, 1951, with excerpts from British ambassador to secretary, July 14
1951, Matthews Files; Ernest Gross to John Lickerson, “Conversation with pd
Lie on Korean Negotiations,” July 2, 1951, Documents, | a
19, Hermes, Truce Tent, pp, 24626; PRIS, Daily Report, Peking, July 16, 1951
268 BARTON J. BERNSTEIN
DISPUTE OVER THE ARMISTICE LINE
For nearly three months, from July 26 to November 23, the two
sides quarreled sharply over the armistice line. At first, the United
States, already occupying some territory north of the thirty-eighth
parallel, wanted a line even farther north, partly to demonstrate its vic-
tory and partly because the area was more defensible. The Communists,
on the other hand, insisted upon the parallel and only slowly yielded,
The negotiations were further strained because the United States,
like most bargainers, was asking for more than it expected, and the
Communists were probably doing the same. While authorizing negotiators
to ask for more than “the minimum acceptable positions,’’ Washington
warned its representatives at KaesSng “not to allow the talks to break
down except in cases of failure to accept our minimum terms; not
to appear to over-reach to an extent to cause world opinion to question
our faith; and not to so engage US prestige in a negotiating position
as to make retreat to our minimum goals impossible.” Even America’s
minimum position, Washington forecast, “will not be easy for op-
ponents to accept.” Washington did not expect a speedy agreement
and was eager to secure attractive terms, probably even at the risk of
prolonging the war a few more months.”?
For the American negotiators, all military officers, and especially
for Admiral C. Turner Joy, chief of the delegation, these instructions
were to prove frustrating and painful. Joy and his colleagues, who
lacked diplomatic experience and mistrusted both diplomacy and
compromise, did not want to bargain. They wanted to present a posi-
tion as an immutable principle and then wait for Communist com-
pliance. How, they periodically asked, could America compromise with
the Communists, who were evil? If the Communists refused to yield,
Joy and his associates were eager to terminate negotiations and escalate
the war. Unlike the JCS, who shaped negotiating instructions approved
by the State Department and the president, the men at Kaesdng took
a simple view of matters. They had little concern for the western
alliance or public opinion at home and often seemed eager to pursue
the war.*!
ee eS SS SS SS SS SS ee
p. AAA6, and P’yongyang, July 16, 1951, p. EEE1; C. Turner Joy, How Commu-
nists Negotiate (New York: Macmillan, 1955), p. 27.
20. JCS to Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (CINCUNC),
June 30, 1951, JCS Records, CCS, decimal file 383.21, Korea (3-19-45).
21. Diary of C. Turner Joy, Aug. 19, Oct. 30, and Noy. 14, 1951, Joy Papers,
Hoover Institution, Stanford, Ga.; Joy, How Communists Negotiate, pp. 173-74;
Hermes, Truce Tent, pp. 118-19, 408; George Elsey, “Memorandum for the File,”
July 2, 1951, Elsey Papers, box 76; Schnabel and Watson, “History of JCS,” 3,
pt, 2: 587-93,
STRUGGLE OVER THE KOREAN ARMISTICE 269
When the Americans pushed for a demarcation line considerably
to the north of the area then occupied by UN forces, their argument
was this: given that there were sea, air, and ground battle zones, and
that the United States had control well north of the parallel on the
sea and in the air, the loss of such superiority should be compensated
by additional territory on the ground.”?
Why were the Communists intractable? Were they simply refusing
to grant America a small symbolic victory? Undoubtedly, the DPRK
especially resented any loss of land, in what all knew would be a nearly
permanent settlement. As Pravda said, “The Korean people [do not
want to give] the American usurpers [DPRK] territory.” The Chinese
representatives, like their American counterparts, seemed to dominate
their Korean allies. For China, the loss of North Korean territory was
primarily symbolic. But there were additional, possibly complementary
explanations for Communist resistance. The Communists felt tricked—
as contemporaries recognized and Acheson belatedly acknowledged—
for they had good reason to expect the re-establishment of the border
on the parallel, That was what Malik had specified on the twenty-third,
what the Chinese had endorsed on the twenty-fifth, and what Acheson
had told a congressional committee on the twenty-sixth.?? Did not
the United States seem to be reneging, to be demanding more to
prepare the way for additional concessions?
The Communists may also have been resisting frightening American
tactics—the bombing of North Korea partly to force concessions at
the bargaining table. As part of Ridgway’s plan “for [un] relenting
pressure on Communist forces,” his air force demolished parts of
P’yOngyang on July 30 and August 14. At first, the administration
had withheld approval ‘“‘because [singling] out P’ydngyang as the
target for an all-out strike during the time we are holding conferences
might in the eyes of the world appear as an attempt to break off
negotiations,” Upon Ridgway’s appeal, Washington relented, but
insisted that there be “‘no publicity [about the] mass nature of this
raid.” The JCS even cabled Ridgway, ‘mass raids constitute effective
utilization of air power and [we endorse] similar raids against other
targets.’’ Both Washington and Ridgway knew that the bombings would
kill many civilians.”
22. Hermes, Truce Tent, pp. 35-37.
25; Pravda, quoted in Carl Berger, The Korea Knot (Philadelphia: University
of Pennsylvania Press, 1957), p. 144; Joy, Wow Communists Negotiate, pp. 12-13;
on China, see NCNA, Aug. 15 and 16, 1951, SCMP, no, 156 (Aug. 17-18, 1951)
pp. 7-10,
24. CINCFE (Ridgway) to JOS, July 21, 1951, G 67474, Matthews Files,
Ridgway said that the military targets were populated and that civilians would
270 BARTON J, BERNSTEIN
The bombings did not seem to soften the Communists. The two
sides remained at loggerheads on the issue of the demarcation line. In
early August, when the American representative refused to discuss
drawing the line on the thirty-eighth parallel, the delegates stood for
two hours and stared at one another. In Washington, some State De-
partment officials wanted to accept a division at the parallel. In con-
trast, Ridgway wished to restate the American offer and then break off
negotiations if the Communists rejected it. The administration coun-
seled patience and firmness, suggesting that Beijing and Moscow needed
time to shift on this issue. Washington did not want America to bear
the onus for breaking off negotiations.”°
Between August 22 and October 24 the two sides did not meet,
first, because the Communists halted sessions to protest alleged Ameri-
can violations of the negotiating area (Kaesdng) and, then, because the
United States insisted upon moving the meetings from this Communist-
controlled city to P’anmunjdm, which could be treated as a neutral
city. Even during this lengthy hiatus, Ridgway and Joy, as the latter
noted, believed that ‘‘an early armistice for the Commies [was] a
matter of urgency,’’ while Washington, in contrast, was “still in doubt
as to degree to which Commies desire or feel need of armistice.”
Concessions, Joy told a visiting Pentagon delegation, “will be equivalent
to making [the] first of a series of blackmail payments.” The UN’s
“tactical position,’’ he argued, ‘‘is too strong for us to appease [the
enemy]. Time is working for us.” Joy and his associates worried
be warned by leaflet, the implication being that citizens would be killed uninten-
tionally in the bombing. No one expected total evacuation of these areas; Ridgway
emphasized the military need for the raid, ibid, July 23, 1951; CINCFE to
DEPTAR for JCS, Aug. 15, 1951, C C68962, JCS Records, CCS, decimal file
383.21, Korea (3-19-45); Ridgway agreed not to provide any warnings of the raid.
He said, ‘‘Civil populace of North Korea has been warned in the past to vacate
areas in vicinity military installations and, accordingly, will be relatively insensitive
to one more warning,”’ ibid., July 25, 1951. Frank Futrell, The United States Air
Force in Korea, 1950-1953 (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1961), pp. 400-
402; FBIS, Daily Report, P’yOngyang, July 30, 1951, pp. EEE4-5; JCS to CINCFE,
July 25, 1951, JCS 97223, Matthews Files, On earlier doubts, see Col. Edwin Carns,
deputy secretary, JCS, “Memorandum for the Record,” July 21, 1951, JCS Re-
cords, CCS, decimal file 383.21, Korea (3-19-45).
25. Hermes, Truce Tent, p. 38; Secretary’s Staff Committee Minutes, Aug. 2,
1951, RG 59, General Records of the Department of State, National Archives;
CINCFE to JCS, Aug. 10, 1951, C 68672, JCS Records, CCS, decimal file 383.21,
Korea (3-19-45); JCS to CINCFE, Aug. 11, 1951, JCS 98713, ‘Pertinent Papers,”
Nine days earlier, Truman asked privately if the government knew what it would
do if the negotiations succeeded (“Summary of Meeting with the Secretary,”
Aug. 2, 1951, Matthews Files), For evidence that the administration did want an
armistice, see ibid., Sept, 20, 25, and Oct, 22, 1951, Matthews Files,
STRUGGLE OVER THE KOREAN ARMISTICE 271
that American and foreign public opinion might force the government
to yield.*®
On October 24, the Communists agreed to resume meetings. They
soon indicated they would not insist on the thirty-eighth parallel, but
would accept the line of battle at the time of the armistice as the final
line. To push ahead for settlement, the JCS directed its negotiators
“to offer the present line of contact as the armistice line” if a full
agreement could be reached within a month, Washington was willing
to make this small concession and to give up hopes for a line farther
north to achieve a prompt armistice. Dismayed and disappointed, the
American negotiators complained, charging that this proposal would
undercut their earlier firmness, embarrass them, and end their useful-
ness. How could they retreat in negotiations after taking such a strong
stand? they asked. Ridgway even pleaded for new orders, There was
need for ‘‘more steel and less silk,” he bluntly told the JCS. America
must insist ‘fon the unchallenged logic of our position [which] will
yield the objectives for which we honorably contend. ”*/
The pleas of Ridgway and Joy did not budge Washington. Truman
and Acheson wanted a settlement, and they were more flexible than
Ridgway and Joy. For Joy, the decision to offer this thirty-day period,
announced in mid-November, was the major error of the negotiations.
It encouraged what Joy deemed the dangerous belief that more conces-
sions would be forthcoming and “gave the Communists what they had
been seeking—a ‘de facto’ cease fire for thirty days which enabled them
to dig in and stabilize their battle line.” After that, according to Joy,
‘‘we lacked the essential military pressure .. . to enforce a reasonable
attitude toward the negotiations.”’®
His often-accepted analysis ignored the continuing use of American
air power to punish the enemy, and the administration’s reluctance
to engage in large-scale ground assaults, which would add casualties
and deepen American bitterness with the war. He also overlooked
the major concession made by the Communists in accepting that the
thirty-eighth parallel would not automatically be the armistice line.
The emerging pattern, based on the evidence through November,
was that the Communists were willing to compromise substantially,
26. Joy Diary, Sept. 26, 1951; ibid., Sept. 20, 1951; ibid., Aug. 19, Sept.
20, 1951.
27. JCS to CINCFE, Nov. 13, 1951, JCS 86804, JCS Records, CCS, deci-
mal file 383.21, Korea (3-19-45); Joy Diary, Nov. 14, 1951; CINGFE (Ridgway)
to DEPTAR for JCS, Noy. 13, 1951, C 57216, JCS Records, CGS, decimal file
383.21, Korea (3-19-45).
28, JCS to CINCFE, Nov, 14, 1951, JGS 86969, JCS Records, CCS, deci-
mal file $83.21, Korea ($1945); Joy, low Communists Negotiate, p. 129,
272 BARTON J. BERNSTEIN
but slowly, to achieve an armistice. China, still consolidating its revolu-
tion, could ill afford the costs of the continuing war, especially because
it increased dependence upon the Soviet Union; the DPRK, ravaged
by bombings and ground warfare, was probably also eager to end the
conflict. The administration, too, was earnestly seeking a settlement
and had demonstrated a willingness to compromise to end the war—
ideally by Christmas. Only later would the troubling issue of repatria-
tion of POWs stalemate the negotiations.
THE NARROWING OF DISPUTES
America’s thirty-day offer expired shortly after Christmas, but the
belligerents were still far from an agreement. For nearly five months,
from late November until early April, the negotiators quarreled about
the related issues of inspection of the armistice, membership on the
commission supervising the armistice, rotation of troops, and recon-
struction of airfields. By late April, these issues were narrowed to two—
Soviet membership on the supervisory commission, which the United
States resisted, and reconstruction of airfields, which the Communists
demanded,”
In spite of original American fears, the issue of inspection was
easily resolved. Gen. J. Lawton Collins, army chief of staff, had even
doubted whether inspection was necessary and had wanted to drop the
demand, Characteristically, Ridgway feared making such a concession,
arguing that it would endanger his forces. He even wanted to break off
negotiations if the Communists would not accept inspection, Washing-
ton allowed him to seek full inspection, but directed him to retreat if
he encountered strong Communist opposition, Above all, they re-
minded him, he should not break off negotiations: “‘Any decision to
cease the discussions,’’ Washington directed, “must be made by the
Communists.” For Ridgway, inspection had been essential to block re-
construction of the ravaged airfields in North Korea and thus prevent
the Communists from threatening America’s air superiority. The agree-
ment at P’anmunjdm on the principle of inspection still left unresolved
some major questions: Who would inspect? What would be the terms?
Could the nations agree that airfields would not be repaired?
29. Hermes, Truce Tent, p. 121; Brodie, War and Politics, pp. 93-99; and
William Vatcher, Panmunjom (New York: Praeger, 1958), p. 86.
30. Chief of Staff, U.S. Army (GSUSA) (Collins, signed Bolté) to CINCFE,
Nov. 19, 1951, DA 87452, ‘‘Pertinent Papers”; and Hermes, Truce Tent, p. L224
GINCFE (Ridgway) to DEPTAR for JCS, Nov. 23, 1951, CX 57838, “Pertinent
Papers”; JCS to CINCFE, Nov. 28, 1951, JCS 88226, JCS Records, CCS, decimal file
383.21, Korea (3-19-45); Hermes, Truce Tent, p. 123; CINGFE (Ridgway) to
DEPTAR for JCS, Nov. 23, 1951, CX 57838, “Pertinent Papers.”
STRUGGLE OVER THE KOREAN ARMISTICE 273
Ridgway kept warning that the United States might soon have to
break off negotiations, and he continued to criticize the Washington-
directed tactics of bargaining and compromising, which, he charged,
made the enemy more intransigent. He warned that the prohibition
against reconstruction of the airfields was, in the “unanimous judgment
of the delegates [,] the key question on which the faith of the armistice
hinges.” Ridgway counseled that it was time to force a decision by
giving the Communists two choices—an armistice or reconstructed
airfields. ‘If his choice is [airfields],’”’ Ridgway concluded, ‘then his
intention [is] to take over all of Korea, .. eee
The JCS disagreed. They did not expect renewed aggression in
Korea after an armistice. They did anticipate minor “Communist
violations [such as] demonstrations, threats, and equivocations. . . .”
The main deterrent to major aggression, the Joint Chiefs asserted, was
the threat of full American retaliation—against North Korea and, by
implication, against China.**
Who was to staff the ‘‘neutral’? commission that would conduct in-
spections? The Communists insisted upon membership for the Soviet
Union. The United States refused, though it was willing to accept Soviet
satellites. Why not the Soviet Union then? According to Truman’s anal-
ysis, the Soviets were deeply involved in the war and therefore he could
not allow them to participate on a presumably neutral commission,
Truman suggested an oblique compromise—if the commission was no
longer called “‘neutral,’’ he would accept Soviet membership on it.
Otherwise, the American position was “firm and irrevocable.””°?
By mid-March, with both of these issues still in dispute, American
leaders considered proposing a “package” deal: yielding on the airfields,
with the Communists backing down on Soviet membership and also
on repatriation of POWs, This package proposal, Washington concluded,
would have certain advantages: ‘‘, . . it would be to our advantage
that Commies be forced to reject our proposals on several grounds
and thereby emphasize their intransigence.[If the Communists move
for a recess] the package deal seems to us to have advantage of hav-
ing recess occur with 3 items open rather than merely the issue of
POW’s.””**
31. CINCUNC to DEPTAR for JCS, Dec. 18, 1951, HNC 588, JCS Records,
CCS, decimal file 383.21, Korea (3-19-45).
$32. JCS to CINCFE, Dec, 19, 1951, JCS 90083, JCS Records, CCS, decimal
file 383.21, Korea (3-19-45). For carlier presidential doubts about allowing recon-
struction of airfields, see naval aide (Williamsburg) to JCS, Dec. 8, 1951, DA IN
7586, and reply, Dec. 8, 1951, both in “Pertinent Papers,”
33, JCS to CINGFE, Feb, 27, 1952, JGS 902160, “Pertinent Papers,”
$4, JCS to CINCFL, Mar, 20, 1952, JCS 904101, JCS Records, Pentagon, lor
eit BARTON J. BERNSTEIN
On April 28, in executive session at P’anmunjdm, the United
States unveiled its package. The Americans did not issue an ultima-
tum despite Ridgway’s entreaties. It might decrease the likelihood
of Communist acceptance and, if the offer was rejected, would raise
“domestic and international expectations of prompt decisive military
action.’> Such an ultimatum might provoke hope and fear at home
and alarm abroad, thus making more difficult the administration’s
struggle to defend itself from right-wing assaults in America while
allaying the anxieties of allies in Europe,
American leaders did not expect total Communist accepeenes)
Nor were they surprised by the angry denunciations at P’anmunjom.
On May 2, predictably, the Communists endorsed part of the package—
withdrawal of the Soviet Union from the commission in return for
unrestricted reconstruction of airfields. On May 7, 1952, the powers
announced to the world their stalemate on the POW issue. It was now
the single issue separating the belligerents from an armistice agree-
ment.°”
ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN POSITION ON REPATRIATION
The Communists insisted upon the return of all prisoners and the
United States asserted a new standard—voluntary repatriation. In
American terms, the issue was cast as voluntary versus forcible repatria-
tion. For the Communists, who distrusted the American screening of
POWs and disliked the results, the issue was phrased as the withholding
of prisoners versus their automatic return.
How did this controversy arise? Originally conceived for propa-
ganda and humanitarian purposes as part of the cold war struggle, the
American position on voluntary repatriation had a curious history.
It was advanced tentatively in the summer of 1951, criticized by some
military leaders, challenged briefly by Acheson, and introduced as a
bargaining position in negotiations; it ultimately hardened into firm
policy when Truman and Acheson endorsed it in February 1952.
The 1949 Geneva convention on prisoners of war—which the
United States had signed but not ratified—seemed, at first glance, clear
Ridgway’s recommendations, see CINCUNC to DEPTAR for JCS, Mar. 11, 1952,
NHC 1033, ‘Pertinent Papers,” and for the compromise, see LDB (Battle), S/S
(meeting with president), Mar. 14, 1952, Acheson Papers, box 66.
35. JCS to CINCFE, Apr. 22, 1952, JCS 906923, JCS Records, Pentagon; and
Hermes, Truce Tent, p. 173,n. 76.
36, Connelly, “Cabinet Meeting,” Apr. 25, 1952, Connelly Papers; and JCS
chairman to CINCFE, Apr. 25, 1952, JCS 907341, JCS Records, CCS, decimal
file 383.21, Korea (3-19-45),
$7. Hermes, Truce Tent, pp. 172-74.
STRUGGLE OVER THE KOREAN ARMISTICE ann
on the subject: “Prisoners of War shall be released and repatriated
without delay after the cessation of hostilities.”°8 This provision
reaffirmed customary recent practice, and may have been devised
to deal with such cases as those involving the Soviets, who, after World
War II, had retained some German and Japanese prisoners to aid in
reconstruction. Unfortunately, the provision did not deal with another
case also involving the Soviets after World War II: the reluctance of
many Soviet citizens who had defected to Germany’s armies to be
returned to their homeland. After World War II, both the United
States and Britain had returned these reluctant soldiers to the Soviet
Union.°*?
The Korean War, involving the recently divided nations of Korea
and China, created difficult problems in handling POWs. The DPRK
had incorporated some captured ROK troops and citizens into its
armies. And some DPRK residents, who had fought with the DPRK,
wished to defect to the South, The ‘‘volunteer” troops of the PRC
also included some who were loyal to the Nationalist cause and who
had been pressed into service. Often these troops were placed in the
front lines and therefore were more likely to surrender, The result
was that some of the captured troops in UN camps did not want to
be repatriated. Moreover, as the war raged back and forth across the
thirty-eighth parallel, some Korean civilians had been captured along
with the Communist soldiers, and the origins of these civilians were
often muddled,
How many prisoners might resist repatriation? In mid-1951, when
the issue first arose in secret American deliberations, there were no
recorded estimates, but no American leader foresaw that the numbers
would be large. By early 1952, after more careful calculations, the
estimates were greater, ranging between about 10 and 25 percent of
the captured troops. The most thorough estimate concluded that
approximately 28,000 of 132,000 DPRK and PRC troops and about
30,000 of 38,000 civilian internees might oppose repatriation to the
Communists.” Even these estimates proved far too low.
38. Quoted in U.S, Department of the Army, Geneva Convention of 12 August
1949 for the Protection of War Victims (Washington: GPO, 1950), p. 129.
39. See New York Times, Feb. 24, 1980, p. 34, For related materials, see
“Operation Keelhaul’’ materials in General Archives Division, Suitland, Md.; and
Cabinet Paper (46) 210, “‘Repatriation of Soviet Citizens,” May 29, 1946, Public
Record Office, London,
40, Hickey forecast that 15,900 troops ‘would [violently] oppose return,”
including 11,500 Chinese; of the anticipated 28,400 opposing return, 15,000
would be PRC troops (Lit, Gen, Doyle Hickey memo for General Hull, Feb, 19,
1952, with “Staff Study Relating to Repatriation,” RG 319, Records of the Assis-
tant Chief of Staff, G-3, decimal file $85.6, TS, case 5/1, National Archives); John-
276 BARTON J. BERNSTEIN
Until the summer of 1951, when armistice negotiations were about
to begin, American leaders comfortably shared the unexamined assump-
tion that all prisoners would be automatically returned after a settle:
ment, But on July 5, Brig. Gen. Robert A. McClure, army chief of psy-
chological warfare, raised questions about automatic repatriation,
“Many Chinese and North Korean prisoners will probably be severely
punished and. . . [killed] upon their repatriation,” he predicted,
That would impair future American psychological warfare, McClure
warned, “Inducements to surrender will be meaningless [in the future
if it] results in the prisoner’s death or slavery.” His solution was to
repatriate the Chinese to Taiwan, which was still China, and, by im-
plication, the Koreans to South Korea. In this way, he suggested,
America would not be violating accepted practices, for the POWs
would be returned to their own nation, but not to the same govern.
ment.*!
To other military leaders, the proposal was attractive but danger-
ous. Both General Collins and Robert Lovett, the new secretary of de-
fense, liked McClure’s solution, but warned that it might sacrifice what
they deemed the “paramount consideration’’—the safe and speedy re
turn of all UN prisoners. Ridgway also liked it, but he feared that it
might set a dangerous precedent and thus allow an enemy to hold back
captured Americans by claiming that they did not want repatriation,
In short, as a JCS committee concluded, voluntary repatriation was
attractive because it was humanitarian and aided psychological warfare,
but dangerous because it violated the Geneva convention and created a
precedent that might injure America.”
Jn SS SSS SS Cee
son forecast that ‘‘some 10 percent”’ of the POWs would resist return (U. A. John.
son in John Hickerson, “Memorandum of Conversation: Korean Armistice Negotia»
tions,” Feb. 7, 1952, decimal file 795.00/2-752). Charles Stelle to Paul Nitze, Jan.
28, 1952, Matthews Files, estimated that 3,000 PRC and maybe 30,000-40,000
DPRK troops would not want to return. Amb. John Muccio estimated for July
1951, “before much exposure to [the] reorientation program,” that three-quar-
ters of the DPRK troops had wanted to return (Muccio to secretary of state,
Jan. 29, 1952, decimal file 795.00/1-2952).
41, Brig. Gen. Robert McClure to army chief of staff, “Policy on Repatriation
of Chinese and North Korean Prisoners,” July 5, 1951, RG 319, G-3, decimal
file 383.6.
42, Army chief of staff (Collins), ‘‘Policy on Repatriation of Chinese and
North Korean Prisoners,’ July 6, 1951, ibid.; Lovett for JCS, Sept. 25, 1951,
JCS 2095/5, JCS Records, Pentagon; CINGFE to JCS, July 21, 1951, C 67459,
RG 319, G-3, decimal file 383.6, TS, case 4; JCS 2095/3, cited in Maj. Gen, Reu-
ben Jenkins, ‘Policy on Repatriation of Chinese and North Korean Prisoners,”
Aug. 7, 1951, ibid, On August 8, 1951, the JCS agreed to voluntary repatriation
after all Gommunist-held UN prisoners were returned (Bradley to secretary of
STRUGGLE OVER THE KOREAN ARMISTICE 277
Secretary Acheson, a widely respected attorney, decided in August
that voluntary repatriation would violate the Geneva convention and
probably jeopardize the return of allied POWs, The secretary rejected
the proposal but not its goals. Because Acheson recognized the advan-
tages to “psychological warfare [of voluntary repatriation] and its hu-
mane objectives,” he flirted with another strategy to accomplish most
of its purposes: shortly before the armistice, release the prisoners who
might be injured or killed if returned. This strategy, Acheson con-
tended, was compatible with the Geneva convention, ®
Acheson’s strategy was dangerous, Ridgway warned Washington.
The Communists would regard it as ‘‘a breach of faith,” and might end
the negotiations and keep the allied prisoners. To allay Washington’s
fears that America might be repudiating its promises to enemy prison-
ers, Ridgway stressed that his psychological-warfare propaganda had
“scrupulously avoided the subject of non-repatriation” and had never
offered asylum. He proposed a bargaining strategy: the United States
should start by seeking a one-for-one exchange of POWs; if that offer
threatened to disrupt negotiations or block the return of allied prison-
ers, then “‘we are prepared to agree to any ratio up to and including
all-for-all exchange,”’*#
Ridgway’s strategy did not triumph in Washington. Instead, the
still-tentative position of voluntary repatriation was slowly moving
toward policy. On December 10, Ridgway received his orders: start by
seeking a one-for-one exchange, and if that failed, then seek an agree-
ment allowing POWs to be screened; those resisting repatriation could
stay with their captors; all the others would be sent back.*° What
would happen if the Communists refused these terms? So far, there was
no agreement in Washington on the next step.
Why had the advice of Ridgway and the doubts of Lovett been
overridden? Probably the wishes of Acheson and the inclinations of
Truman were already shaping the emerging policy. Acheson may have
defense, ‘‘Policy on Repatriation of Chinese and North Kore i
an P: ”
19ST EEE risoners,’”’ Aug, 8,
43. Dean Acheson to George Marshall, Aug. 27, 1951, appendix to JCS 2095/4
JCS Records, Pentagon.
44, CINCFE to DEPTAR for JCS, Oct. 27, 1951, CX 55993, Matthews Files;
Joy Diary, Dec. 12, 1951; cf. Department of the Army, Psychological Warfare
Division, G-3, leaflet to CPV soldiers, ‘Choose Freedom,” in William Vatcher
Papers, box 12.
45. JCS to CINCFE, Dec 10, 1951, JCS 89172, JCS Records, Pentagon; Her-
mes, Truce Tent, pp. 138-40, For suspicions that public pressure might compel the
government to modify its stand on POWs to gain return of American POWs, see
JCS to CINGFE, Jan, 15, 1952, JCS 92059, JCS Records, Pentagon,
278 BARTON J. BERNSTEIN
already reversed himself and decided that voluntary repatriation was
compatible with the Geneva convention. He knew that Truman did not
like automatic repatriation. It was inequitable, the president had told
an assistant in late October, since the UN would be returning many
more prisoners than it would receive. Furthermore, Truman worried
about the possible killing of those prisoners who had cooperated with
the UN. When the assistant pointed out that “all other matters might
be settled and a final settlement might rest on the exchange of prison-
ers, . . . the President [retreated somewhat], saying that he certainly
would not agree to any all-for-all settlement unless we received for it
some major concessions which could be obtained in no other way.’746
Truman’s inclination for voluntary repatriation would soon harden into
a moral principle and firm policy.
By mid-December, Ridgway was raising new doubts about the
emerging policy, “It is highly improbable,” he informed Washington,
“that Commies would agree to any formula which involves individual
expressions of opinion (whether or not they want to be repatriated)
because of extremely adverse affect that large scale defection would
have on world-wide Commie prestige.” Only a complete return of all
military POWs would meet Communist expectations, he contended,
while worrying that the promise of asylum for defecting POWs might so
appeal to the humanitarian sentiments of the American people that the
administration might have to stick with voluntary repatriation,*” Like
most of the JCS and Secretary Lovett, Ridgway wanted primarily to
reclaim allied prisoners. He feared getting trapped in what seemed to
him a marginal issue that might block the desired armistice.
In January, acting on instructions, the UN delegation at P’anmun-
j6m introduced the issue of voluntary repatriation and stressed that the
Communists had already followed this policy when they had released
ROK troops at the front and allowed them to join the DPRK army.
Not surprisingly, the Communists rejected a formal policy of voluntary
repatriation, They undoubtedly feared humiliation when some captured
soldiers refused to return home. How could the Communist leaders
reject their own earlier practices, Joy asked rhetorically. Since the
Chinese army was composed entirely of “volunteers,” he asked, why
was China so worried? Weren’t the “volunteers” loyal to the PRC? The
PRC delegates knew that many of the Chinese POWs were Nationalists,
men not loyal to the revolution, Since the Chinese delegates could not
46, James Webb, “Meeting with the President, Monday, October 29, 1951,
Korean Negotiations,’’ Oct. 29, 1951, Korea Lot Files,
47. Ridgway to JCS, (probably Dec. 11 or 12, 1951), quoted in Joy Diary,
Dec. 12, 1951; CINCUNG to DEPTAR for JCS, Dec, 18, 1951, HNC 588, JCS
Records, CCS, decimal file 383.21, Korea (3-19-45).
STRUGGLE OVER THE KOREAN ARMISTICE 279
admit that fact, they presented another argument. They correctly
charged the UN with trying to sway the POWs through “indoctrina-
tion’’—a technique also employed by the Communists. The discussions
at P’anmunjém speedily turned into an exercise in mutual invective.
To strengthen the American position, the State Department be-
latedly sent its delegation a new interpretation of the Geneva conven-
tion justifying voluntary repatriation. Under the convention, the de-
partment maintained, the belligerents could make special arrangements
on prisoners of war as long as they were not deprived of their other
rights. Since the spirit of the agreement was to protect the rights of
individuals, the State Department found that voluntary repatriation
did not violate the convention.”
THE TRUMAN-ACHESON POLICY OF VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION
By the end of February, Truman and Acheson had defined volun-
tary repatriation as an irrevocable moral principle. In so doing, they
swept aside or minimized the then skimpy evidence and occasional
forecasts that their decisions could mean a stalemate and might signifi-
cantly prolong the war.
In mid-January, middle-level CIA, State, and Army officials con-
cluded at a meeting, with one dissent, that the Communists would
probably break off negotiations if America insisted upon voluntary
repatriation. But they recommended that America should insist on
this position. “A basic moral principle of political freedom was in-
volved,” they reasoned. ‘‘To give way on this point now would under-
mine the whole basis of psychological warfare since neither soldiers or
civilians would defect from Communist rule if they thought they would
be returned.’’ These officials warned that ‘the crucial psychological
problem would arise when the issue had to be faced: is this issue impor-
tant enough to resume the war and run the risk of world war?”
Within the State Department’s PPS, at least one member, Frank
Stelle, vigorously criticized the emerging American position as violating
the Geneva convention and thus undermining America’s claims to
moral superiority. America’s allies, he stressed, were eager to end the
war and would not endorse the breaking off of negotiations on this
issue. Nor would the American position encourage its “defector pro-
gram,” designed to weaken Communist states. “The critical factors in-
48. Joy Diary, Jan. 2, 1952; see also Jan. 3-14, 1952.
49. JCS to CINCFE, Jan. 21, 1952, JCS 92490, Matthews Files.
50, Joseph Phillips, ‘Psychological Aspects of Negotiations on Exchange of
Prisoners of War in Korean Armistice,’ Jan, 17, 1952, decimal file 795,00/1-1752.
lor a forecast of impasse, see John Hickerson, “Korean Armistice Negotiations,”
Feb, 7, 1952, decimal file 795,00/2-752,
280 BARTON J, BERNSTIIN
fluencing defection are always local,” he contended, “and thus the
return of prisoners in Korea cannot be expected to have major inflw
ence on the decisions of Russians, Balkans, or Poles.”°!
Such counsel received little support. How can we return unwilling
prisoners of war? asked Charles Burton Marshall, another member of
the PPS. He argued that automatic repatriation would violate con:
science, offend Congress, and repudiate the spirit of the Geneva conven:
tion, Morality, politics, and law combined, he found, to produce the
same conclusion—voluntary repatriation, If necessary, Marshall pro-
posed, “we had better hang on in Korea long enough [to force] the
enemy [to concede on voluntary repatriation] se
On February 8, Acheson urged Truman to endorse voluntary repi-
triation. While briefly acknowledging that this stand might block an
agreement, endanger the allied prisoners, and ultimately provoke do-
mestic and especially international opinion, he stressed the advantages,
Domestic and international public opinion would initially be strong,
(About sixty congessmen, led by Senator William Jenner, were oppos:
ing the forcible return of prisoners, and thus the administration would
avoid a battle with Congress.) The most persuasive argument, for Acht»
son, was not domestic politics but morality and the cold war. “Any
agreement . . . which would require [us] to use force to turn over t@
the Communists prisoners who believe they would face death if re
turned, would be repugnant to our most fundamental moral and
humanitarian principles on the importance of the individual, and would
seriously jeopardize the psychological warfare position of the United
States in its opposition to Communist tyranny.” Acheson’s argument
may have been designed to appeal to Truman, who regretted that un-
willing Soviet soldiers had been forcibly returned after World War 8 Ba
51. Stelle to Nitze, “The POW Issue in the Armistice Negotiations,” Jan. 24,
1952, PPS Files.
52. Marshall to Nitze, Jan. 28, 1952, ibid,
53. Acheson, Feb, 8, 1952, with memo for the president, Feb. 8, 1952, PPS
Files. For background on State-DOD-JCS discussions, see U. A. Johnson, “Posi:
tion on POWs in Korean Armistice Negotiations,” Feb. 4, 1952, decimal file 795.00/
2-852; Acheson, Feb. 8, 1952, with memo for the president, Feb. 8, 1952, PPS
Files; Johnson, “Position on POWs in Korean Armistice Negotiations,” Feb. 8,
1952, decimal file 795.00/2-852; ‘“Secretary’s Daily Meeting,” Feb. 6, 1952;
“Resolution”? (Jenner), n.d. (about Feb, 14, 1952), Ridgway Papers, box 20;
“Draft Memorandum Covering Meeting of Secretary Acheson, Secretary Lovett
..., Lloyd... ,’? n.d. (about Nov. 16, 1952), Acheson Papers, box 67. In this
meeting Lovett claimed that sixty senators had signed Jenner’s petition, Curiously,
there is no reference to it in the New York Times, major periodicals, or key sena-
torial collections, Acheson, Feb, 8, 1952, with memo for the president, Feb, 8,
1952, PPS Files. For an earlier canvassing of issues, see Johnson to Matthews,
“Questions on Korea for Discussion with the Secretary,” Jan, 28, 1952, decimal
|
STRUGGLE OVER THE KOREAN ARMISTICE 281
Secretary Lovett, who also attended the meeting of the eighth, still
had doubts about the wisdom of Acheson’s policy. The sketchy min-
utes suggest that Lovett was constrained and dubious, but unwilling to
argue a counter-case. Splits among the service secretaries and possibly
among the JCS on the issue meant that Lovett lacked adequate support
in the Pentagon. More important, because Lovett was still new to
office, he was probably reluctant to oppose the persuasive and powerful
Acheson, who was telling the president what he wanted to hear. As a
result, Lovett settled for what proved an empty concession: the presi-
dent said that he was not then taking a final position.™*
In mid-February, U. Alexis Johnson, the deputy assistant secretary
of state for Far Eastern affairs, and Gen, John Hull, the army vice-chief
of staff, journeyed to the Far East to discuss ways out of the possible
impasse on voluntary repatriation. Johnson proposed that the United
States would remove from the POW lists the names of those resisting
return and then offer to send all the others back. Both Ridgway and the
negotiators strongly objected, charging it would violate the Geneva
convention, compromise their moral position, and possibly encourage
the Communists to hold back some of the allied POWs. It was “dis-
honorable,” Joy bluntly concluded,*®
There was still little evidence about Communist intentions. While
the DPRK and PRC delegations had strenuously resisted voluntary repa-
triation, there was still the problem of interpreting their hostility.
Would it be permanent? Or would the Communists yield on this matter,
as they had in the autumn on the thirty-eighth parallel issue? Joy him-
self had wavered between predictions that the Communists would reject
the American position and that the chances of agreement were fifty-
fifty.2® Why should Washington trust such oscillating predictions?
By late February, amid accumulating predictions that the Com-
munists would refuse voluntary repatriation, Acheson pushed for a firm
administration commitment to that position. Key allies, including
Britain, Commonwealth nations, and France, had been consulted, he in-
formed Truman, and “‘none . . . indicated any disagreement with our
position on this question. °°
On February 27, Truman conferred with Acheson, Lovett, Gen,
file 795.00/1-2852. On Acheson’s attitudes in 1945, see Mark Elliott, Pawns of
Yalta (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1982), pp. 109-14, 247.
54. Acheson, Feb. 8, 1952, PPS Files.
55. H. M. Briggs, “Discussions Held 18 February 1952 at Munsan-ni,” Feb. 19,
1952, Joy Papers, box 1; and Joy Diary, Feb, 18, 1952.
56. Briggs, ‘Discussions, Feb, 19, 1952, Joy Papers, box 1.
57, “U.S. Position on Forcible Repatriation of Prisoners of War,” Feb, 27,
1952, Acheson Papers,
282 BARTON J. BERNSTEIN
Hoyt Vandenberg (Air Force chief of staff), Adm, William Fechteler
(chief of naval operations), General Hull, Deputy Assistant Secretary
Johnson, and Secretary of the Treasury John Snyder to define policy.
With only Admiral Fechteler dissenting, they agreed not to return unwill-
ing POWs.®® Why had Lovett and some of the others, except Fechteler,
fallen in line with Truman and Acheson? No definite answer is possible,
but it is most likely they did not wish to oppose the president, who had
earlier indicated his wishes, and they had long liked the policy. Their
earlier objections had been practical, a combination of political and
military fears: that this position might block an armistice and endanger
the twelve thousand allied (especially 3,200 American) POWs. Truman’s
authority had silenced the fears and doubts of most subordinates.
Acheson and Truman, who were the key decision makers, did not
realize that this position would produce a lengthy stalemate, prolong
an already costly war, weaken the support of allies, and ultimately con-
tribute to the president’s political death. They still seemed to believe
that the Communists would concede, that some way could be found of
achieving voluntary repatriation; perhaps selective bombing and stead-
fast negotiating could break the impasse. At most, they thought, they
were adding only a few months, not more than a year, to the war.°?
For Truman and Acheson, morality, domestic politics, anticom-
munism, and international politics all coalesced to produce their final
decision—no forcible repatriation, Truman and Acheson judged auto-
matic repatriation inhumane and unconscionable. They savored the
prospective propaganda victory when the Communist troops refused to
return home. Such a triumph would be sweet in the international
struggle for the hearts and minds of neutrals, especially Asians. It would
also constitute a useful political victory at home. Although the president
was settling for a divided Korea, he could claim that America had both
stopped Communist aggression and won a dramatic psychological vic-
tory. Beyond that, there was another important cold war dimension. If
America established the precedent that prisoners would not be auto-
matically returned, how could Communist states trust their soldiers not
to defect in future wars? The fear of voluntary repatriation, as Acheson
58. Ibid.; and Diary of Hoyt Vandenberg, Feb, 27, 1952, Vandenberg Papers,
box 2, Library of Congress. General Vandenberg had disagreed with this position as
late as February 5 (Johnson, ‘‘Position on POW’s in Korean Armistice Negotia-
tions,’’ Feb. 8, 1952, decimal file 795.00/2-852).
59. Princeton Seminars, Mar. 14, 1954, reel 1, track 2, pp. 8-10, Acheson
Papers; ibid.; “U.S. Position on Forcible Repatriation of Prisoners of War,” Feb. 27,
1952, Acheson Papers. The conclusions about bombing and negotiating are based
upon earlier and later policy, not these documents, On expectations, sce also Joy,
How Communists Negotiate, p. 152; and “Memorandum of Conversation: Korean
Armistice Negotiations,’ Sept, 24, 1952, PPS Files,
STRUGGLE OVER THE KOREAN ARMISTICE 283
stressed, might even deter future Soviet aggression, Just as Truman had
committed troops in Korea largely to halt Communist aggression
elsewhere, he was now adopting a principle to block aggression else-
where. War and diplomacy could help accomplish the same purpose:
to make the Communists, especially the Soviets, fear unleashing an-
other attack.®
Domestic politics had not dictated—but smoothed the way for—the
Truman and Acheson decision, It was what Congress wanted, which
confirmed the ideological and moral positions of the president and his
secretary of state.®! And the alternative—automatic return of POWs—
would have created problems with Congress and the electorate, But had
Truman preferred automatic repatriation, he might have devised tactics
to silence many potential critics. He could have cited the Geneva con-
vention and charged them with urging America to violate it, He might
have asked how a moral America could repudiate the convention, He
could also have co-opted powerful congressmen by consulting them pri-
vately, warning them of a lengthy stalemate unless America returned all
POWs, and stressing that the critics would have to bear the onus for a
prolonged war. Would Americans, he might have asked the congress-
men, support an extended war and more American deaths to block the
return of some enemy soldiers who had tried to kill Americans in the
war?
THE ROAD TO AN IMPASSE
For nearly two months, in March and April, Washington tried to
avoid an impasse. In early March, Washington proposed that the unwill-
ing POWs be removed from the lists and all the others be repatriated.
This proposal would have achieved most of America’s aims but pro-
tected the Communists from having to endorse the principle of volun-
tary repatriation, The Communists objected. In late March, they
offered a minor compromise by acknowledging that some POWs might
be exempted from repatriation. In early April, after an American dele-
gate had estimated that about 116,000 POWs could be returned,
the Communists implied that a settlement might be reached and sug-
gested that the Americans screen the prisoners they held.
60. Princeton Seminars, Mar. 14, 1954, reel 1, track 2, pp. 8-11.
61, Some administration members wondered whether they should ask Congress
formally to oppose forcible repatriation and concluded that there would be mini-
mal opposition (*Secretary’s Daily Meeting,” Apr. 18, 1952, Department of State),
For rare opposition in the press to voluntary repatriation, see Lynchburg [Va.]
News, Jan, 29, 1952, Joy Papers.
62, G. D, Eddleman to army chief of staff, “Status of Korean Armistice Nego-
284 BARTON J. BERNSTEIN
Until the screening, the Americans privately estimated that they
could return 116,000 of 132,000 POWs and 18,000 of 38,000 ci-
vilian internees. According to these rough calculations, about 28,000
POWs and 30,000 civilian internees would prefer not to return, but
only 16,000 POWs and 20,000 civilian internees might forcibly re-
sist repatriation.
Much to the surprise of top officers in the Far East Command,
however, the numbers fell drastically short of the 116,000 predicted
at P’anmunjdm. Only about 70,000 agreed to return: 5,000 of 21,000
Chinese; 54,000 of 96,000 North Koreans; 4,000 of 15,000 South
Koreans; and 7,500 of 38,000 civilian internees. These results shocked
Ridgway and Joy, who had known of the secret American program to
indoctrinate POWs to turn them into “avowed anti-Communists,”
but none had foreseen such extensive hostility to repatriation.™
On April 19, the American delegation informed the Communists
that only 70,000 could be returned, The chief Communist negoti-
ator, struggling to conceal his shock and outrage, immediately moved
for a recess. Resuming discussions the next day, he charged the United
States with deception: “You flagrantly repudiated what you said
before [when promising 116,000].” The United States, he claimed,
had contrived this affair to embarrass the Communists. He accused
the Americans of being in league with “the stooges” of Chiang and
Rhee to coerce POWs into resisting repatriation. Full of self-right-
eousness, the American negotiators lashed back at their accusers.
However, as the Americans knew, there was some, albeit limited,
a
tiations as of March 4,” Mar. 4, 1952, RG 319, G-3, decimal file 091, Korea,
TS, sec. 2; Joy Diary, Mar. 17, 1952; and NCNA, May 2, 1952, SCMP, no. 328
(May 3-4, 1952), pp. 20-21.
63. Lt. Gen. Doyle Hickey to Hull, Feb. 19, 1952, with “Staff Study Relat-
ing to Repatriation,’ RG 319, decimal file 383.6, TS, case 5/1; and CINCFE
to DEPTAR for JCS, Feb. 3, 1952, C 66228, Army records, Military History
Collection.
64. Joy Diary, Apr. 7-14, 1952; JCS to CINCUNC, July 10, 1951, JCS 95977,
JCS Records, Pentagon; Haydon Boatner to army chief of staff, Nov. 20, 1975,
with attachment, Boatner to Gen. Harold K. Johnson, Jan. 4, 1976, Boatner Pa-
pers, Hoover Institution; Muccio to secretary of state, Jan. 29, 1952, decimal
file 795.00/1-2952. For a denial of indoctrination, see Dean Rusk in Princeton
Seminars, Mar. 14, 1954, reel 1, track 2, p. 13.
65. Joy Diary, Apr. 19, 1952; Hermes, Truce Tent, pp. 171-72; and FBIS,
Daily Report, P’y®ngyang, Apr. 30, 1952, pp. EEE1-2; Joy Diary, May 9, 1952;
Joy, How Communists Negotiate, pp. 140-44; CINCFE to DEPTAR for JCS,
HNC 1242, May 15, 1952, JCS Records, CCS, decimal file 383.21, Korea (3-
19-45); FBIS, Daily Report, P’y8ngyang, May 8, 1952, pp. EEE5-7; see also
STRUGGLE OVER THE KOREAN ARMISTICE 285
merit to these Communist charges. Despite official American denials,
some of Chiang’s troops were actually used as guards in the Chinese
camps and they helped establish a reign of terror there. Ambassador
John Muccio later called them ‘“‘Gestapos,” Furthermore, one State De-
partment official, Frank Stelle of the PPS, had earlier forecast the im-
possibility of securing an honest count. “The prison camps for Chinese,”
he had explained in January, “‘on the basis of firsthand reports from
Departmental officers, are in effect run by the inmates themselves. The
exercise of authority . . . is direct, violent, and brutal . . . , in effect, a
reign of terror.”’ America lacked the personnel and probably the will to
try to correct conditions, he acknowledged, ‘“‘but this should not blind
us to the fact that our prisons for Chinese are violently totalitarian [and
run by] thugs... pe
Ridgway and Joy were aware of these problems, In fact, according
to Joy, two translators who had participated in a preliminary screening
had described the coercion to him. When the Nationalist leaders in the
prison compound asked who wished to return to the PRC, Joy recorded
in his diary, ‘those doing so were either beaten black and blue or killed
. . the majority of the POW’s were too terrified to frankly express
their choice. All they could say in answer to the question was ‘Taiwan’
repeated over and over again.” The two translators forecast that an
honest screening in the Nationalist-dominated compounds would find
85 percent, not the recorded 15 percent, seeking repatriation, When
Joy pleaded for a total rescreening, Gen, James Van Fleet, commander
of the Eighth Army, warned of the likely bloodshed, since he lacked
adequate military police and facilities. Ridgway decided to defer the
matter, and in the meantime to report the 70,000 figure to the Com-
munists, even though (as Joy lamented in his diary) the Chinese POWs
“were the nub of the question in our opinion.” Joy, among others,
anticipated that the Communists would reject the offer.”
The United States actually conducted some rescreening in late
“Prisoners, P’anmunj$m, and Peace.” New Statesman, 43 (May 17, 1952):573;
and Jen-min jen-bao, NCNA, May 9, 1952, SCMP, no. 332 (May 9-10, 1952),
pp. 6-8.
66. Oral history interview, John Muccio, 100, Truman Library. On October 24,
1952, Acheson told the UN that the interrogation of Chinese POWs ‘“‘was done
exclusively by United States military personnel” (Acheson, “The Truce Talks in
Korea,’ Harpers 203 [January, 1953]:25), Charles Stelle to Nitze, “The POW Issue
in the Armistice Negotiations,’ Jan. 24, 1952, PPS Files.
67. Joy Diary, Apr. 7-14, 1952, For the questions to be asked of POWs, see
“Questionnaire” (for Operation Scatter), n.d, RG 407, Records of the Adjutant
General’s Office, Suitland, Md.
286 BARTON J. BERNSTEIN
April and early May. Its count of prisoners seeking repatriation increased
to about 82,400—76,000 Koreans and 6,400 Chinese. Despite the pleas
of the American delegation at P’anmunjdm, however, Washington
would not allow any offer of these new numbers, The numbers might
prove unreliable, Washington feared, and they would certainly discredit
the earlier count and thus seem to justify the Communist charges of
coercion and deceit. After all, how could the United States comfortably
explain that the number of repatriates had increased by 12,400?
Would it have been possible for the United States, by employing
coercion and deceit, to produce a higher number, say, about 100,000
or so repatriates, including more of the Chinese? It might have been,
As Acheson later admitted, the United States had used various deceitful
tactics to categorize some former soldiers as civilian returnees. Just
as brutality in the camps could raise the number resisting repatriation,
it might also produce more repatriates. Such a strategy could have
been concealed from the American public. Probably some word of
such orders would have leaked out, but the American government,
had it chosen, could have denied and effectively quelled the charges.
Ideology barred Washington from proposing such tactics. The president
fully believed, as he soon publicly explained, “We will iat ay an
armistice by turning over human beings for slaughter or slavery.
No one in Washington, so far as the records indicate, had come to
the cynical conclusions of Gen, Haydon Boatner, who was soon to
command the POW camps. He became a strong foe of voluntary repa-
triation. ‘Is it not crass hypocrisy for the United States,” he argued,
“to restrict immigration in times of peace when men are relatively feats
yet take pride in the conversion of our erstwhile enemies to ‘our side
by their ‘free choice’? Especially when they were in fact in our pom
subject to our indoctrination and therefore not free to make a ‘free
choice.” He later told the army, “P_O.W.’s defect primarily because
they believe by such actions, feigned or otherwise, their own chances
for survival are increased.”’ Upon taking over the camps, he refused to
allow more prisoners to choose defection. “I was afraid we would run
short of [the] number [of returnees expected by the Communists] and
the armistice [would] be delayed,” he later explained,
i -9, 1952.
es Le Mar. 14, 1954, reel 1, track 2, p. 12. On efforts to
increase the number of repatriates, see Henry Owen to Paul Nitze, May 29, 1952,
PPS Files. Truman statement, May 7, 1952, Truman Papers, 1952, B 321; chy
FBIS, Daily Report, Peking, NCNA, May 9, 1952, pp. AAAL-5, and P’yongyang,
i 5 REE2-4.
conan of War for Sale,” Amertcan Legion Magazine, August
1962, p. 39, Boatner to army chief of staff, Nov, 20, 1975, with Boatner to Gen,
re ——————— ll
STRUGGLE OVER THE KOREAN ARMISTICE 287
Had the numbers accepting repatriation been larger, would an
armistice have been achieved? American negotiators thought so, They
believed that the Communists would have settled for about 116,000
and accepted the defection of about 16,000 troops. As Joy lamented
in his diary, 70,000 was grossly inadequate.’1 Nor would the Com-
munists accept the American proposal for a recount by an impartial
agency like the International Red Cross. Feeling duped and embar-
rassed, they charged the United States with deceit, and probably
realized that even an independent assessment would not raise the
numbers by the desired 46,000. Both the PRC and the DPRK faced
the prospect of a humiliating defeat, which would be especially painful
to China, still trying to consolidate its revolution, How could the
PRC comfortably explain that only a quarter of its captured “Vvolun-
teer’’ troops wished to return home?
By May, there was strong evidence that the war could not be
quickly ended, The high-level administration decisions of February,
played out in the negotiations of March, April, and early May, had
produced the unexpected stalemate. On May 7, in announcing the
deadlock at P’anmunj3m, Truman informed Americans, “[F] orced
repatriation . . . would be repugnant to the fundamental moral and
humanitarian principles which underlie our action in Korea,””?
The british government publicly supported the Truman decision.
Some other allies were more troubled, but their objections seldom
reached the American public. In America, no mainline politician—
neither Republican nor Democrat—objected and very few newspapers
raised doubts. There was a rough consensus on the rectitude and
necessity of the administration’s position. One prominent politician,
Sen. Paul Douglas, probably expressed the prevailing opinion when
he declared that the return of the POWs would have meant their deaths
and “would have discouraged future defections from the Communist
Camp 9973
SS ee Ee ee
Harold K, Johnson, Jan. 4, 1976, Boatner Papers, Boatner memo to Hoover Institu-
tion on “POWs in Asia,”’ Dec. 5, 1975, Boatner Papers.
71. Joy Diary, Apr. 21, 1952. Ridgway thought that any number over 100,000
would meet the Communist expectations (CINCFE to DEPTAR for JCS, Apr. 2,
1952, C 66397, and Apr. 4, 1952, C 66397, Army records, Military History Collec-
tion; see also William Vatcher memo to Colonel Greene, July 9, 1952, Vatcher
Papers, box 11).
72. Truman statement, May 7, 1952, Truman Papers, 1952, pp. 321-22.
73. Britain sought to bring the Commonwealth nations into line behind the
United States (Gifford to secretary of state, Apr. 26, 1952, decimal file 795.00/4-
2652). For other British support, see London Times, May 8, 1952, pp. 6-7; cf.,
ibid., May 23, 1952, p. 7, For another hint of Allied doubts, see New York Times,
May 11, 1952, p, E-5, “Monthly Survey of American Opinion in International
288 BARTON J. BERNSTEIN
For Truman, his stand on voluntary repatriation was a reaffirmation
of national morality and will. Stand up to the Soviets on this issue,
he believed, and a future war might be deterred. For him, the Chinese
and North Koreans were pawns; the Soviets pulled the strings in the
armistice negotiations. America’s actions, he declared, “in Greece and
Turkey, in Berlin and Korea [are] beginning to make an impression
on the Soviets [and thus could bring] world peace,”’* Moreover,
voluntary repatriation, he and Acheson probably hoped, might even
unsettle the revolutionary regime in China, Some of its armies might
defect since the West could offer them freedom.
ESCALATING MILITARY PRESSURE TO FORCE AN ARMISTICE
Until the late spring, when negotiations foundered on the POW
issue, the administration had expected an early armistice. On January 6,
1952, Acheson had confided to British leaders, “I would guess that
[the armistice] would come about toward the end of January,” The
administration was eager to achieve a settlement on its own terms,
and did not seem to worry, despite some warnings by military planners
and the Nationalist Chinese, that an agreement would free the PRC
to send troops to Indochina, If that occurred, Acheson concluded,
America might have to bomb or blockade China, He did not anticipate
committing forces to another ground war in Asia.”
In a January 1952 meeting in Washington, however, Prime Minister
Winston Churchill told Truman, Acheson, and their associates that
“from a military point of view an armistice was probably a mistake,”
The Soviet Union had proposed it, he believed, because China was
ee ee a ee Soo
Affairs” (May 18, 1952, Elsey Papers) mentioned the objections of the San Fran-
cisco Chronicle. Paul Douglas to Truman, May 14, 1952, Official File 471B, Tru-
man Library. In an editorial, the New York Times claimed, “Most of these prisoners
surrendered on United Nations promises of safety and ultimate freedom” (May 8,
1952, p. 30). Ridgway had earlier informed the JCS that his command had not
made such promises because they would have been a “radical departure” from the
Geneva convention (CINCFE to DEPTAR for JCS, Nov. 5, 1951, CX 56642, JCS
Records, Pentagon).
74. Truman to Sen. Paul Douglas, May 21, 1952, Official File, 471B.
75, Acheson, ‘Memorandum of Conversation at British Embassy, Sunday,
January 6, 1952,” Jan. 7, 1952, Acheson Papers; ibid, memorandum of conversa
tion with Amb, Oliver Franks, June 17, 1952, Acheson Papers; “Summary of Meet-
ing with the Secretary,’’ Dec, 18, 1951, Matthews Files; NSC 105, “Results of the
Conversations between the President and the French Prime Minister,” Feb. 25,
1951, PSF; Acheson-Eden minutes of conversation, September 1952, summarized
in copy provided by David McLellan. French For, Min, Robert Schuman had
feared that an armistice would unleash PRC troops into Indochina (“Meeting of
U.S.-U,K.-French Foreign Ministers,” Sept. 14, 1951, Materials),
STRUGGLE OVER THE KOREAN ARMISTICE 289
suffering in the war. He implied that America should seize the oppor-
tunity to punish China and to gain more territory in Korea before
seeking a settlement.’
The American position was more cautious but ultimately more
dangerous than Churchill’s. Gen. Omar Bradley, chairman of the
JCS, explained to Churchill America’s tactics: military success on the
ground might simply provoke China to commit more troops, and thus
escalate the conflict before producing another bloody impasse, But
if there was no armistice or if one was achieved and China broke it,
Acheson wanted Britain’s agreement on bombing and blockading
China,”
At the January meeting, Churchill opposed the blockade because
it would not be effective. The British did not stress what was probably
their main reason: they did not want to antagonize China and thus
risk losing Hong Kong and their valuable trade. The British economy,
strained by rearmament and still suffering from World War II, could
ill afford more financial losses. America was in the awkward position
of wanting strong but dependent allies, and of wanting them to take
actions that, while popular in America, might also injure the alliance.
These contradictions continued to plague leaders on both sides of the
Atlantic.”
Similar strains were visible in the British-American discussion of
bombing China. The Labour government had secretly agreed in 1951
that it would sanction American bombings of Manchuria and China
if they were necessary to stop massive air attacks on allied troops
in Korea. So far, of course, such Communist attacks had not occurred.
Now, America was contemplating bombing China to force an armistice
settlement, Churchill, anticipating the outrage in Britain and the
assault upon his government, seemed anxious to resist. Even when
American leaders argued that they were not “talking of bombing
population centers; all the targets would be military targets; and the
effort would be to break up transportation and air concentrations,”
the British still did not grant approval.’9
76. Acheson, “Memorandum of Conversation at British Embassy, Sunday,
January 6, 1952,”’ Jan. 7, 1952, Acheson Papers.
77. Ibid.
78. Ibid.; see also Eden to State Department (Dec.?, 1951), Bradley File,
JGS Records, National Archives; Acheson to American Embassy (London), Apr. 30,
1951, Documents; Brian Porter, Britain and the Rise of Communist China, pp. 117-
23; and Robert Boardman, Britain and the People’s Republic of China, pp. 77-87.
79. Herbert Morrison to Acheson, May 10, 1951, Documents; Bradley to Bill
[Air Marshall Sir William Elliott], Sept. 2, 1952, Bradley File, JCS Records, Na-
tional Archives; Great Britain, Parliamentary Debates (Commons) (l'eb, 26, 1952),
290 BARTON J. BERNSTEIN
At one point in the discussions, Churchill asked uneasily whether
America was considering the use of nuclear weapons. He probably
found little comfort in Bradley’s explanation, according to the minutes,
“that it was not our intention to use these bombs, since up to the
present no suitable targets were presented.” “If the situation changed
in any way,” Bradley acknowledged, “a new situation would arise.”
In America, as Churchill undoubtedly knew, a majority of the citizens
favored using atomic bombs in Korea. Such action could have de-
stroyed NATO, whose citizens lived in the shadows of the Soviet
nuclear arsenal; fear of a Soviet reprisal against NATO might have
shattered the alliance.*°
Both the British government and its citizens were far more cautious
about escalation than were their American counterparts. How could
the British or other Europeans endorse the bombing of China unless
it was essential to save allied troops in Korea? Bombing China to
force the Communists to accept the American position on repatriation
was dangerously close to MacArthur’s scheme in 1951—one that had
alarmed allies and unsettled the administration. For Acheson, Truman,
and Bradley, the discussions with Churchill were probably valuable
as a way of assessing British tolerance for possible American tactics.
Those tactics would have to be shaped to avoid frightening major allies.
“The situation in the Far East is becoming more and more diffi-
cult,” Truman complained in his diary on January 27. “Dealing with
communist governments is like an honest man trying to deal with...
the head of a dope ring.’’ Echoing General Vandenberg’s earlier fears,
Truman concluded that the Chinese might have opened negotiations
in mid-1951 to gain a respite in the war while they imported materials
and resupplied their front lines, Truman poured his frustration into
his diary and savored extreme tactics. He wrote of giving Moscow an
vol, 496, cols. 968-78. For Australian fears, see J. H. S. Shullaw, “Question of Pos-
sible Retaliatory Action against Manchurian Airbases in Event of Large-Scale
Enemy Air Attack,’’ Apr. 18, 1951, Matthews Files. Acheson “Memorandum .. .
at British Embassy... , January 6, 1952,” Jan. 7, 1952, Acheson Papers. Herbert
Morrison had warned earlier of provocative American actions against China and
stated that the USSR was keeping China out of the UN. He didn’t want to help
cement the Sino-Soviet alliance and feared that if the Allies became more involved
in the Far East, ‘‘the Soviets would likely start trouble elsewhere” (meeting of the
U.S.-U. K. Foreign ministers, Sept. 10, 1951, PSF).
80. Acheson, “‘Memorandum . . . at British Embassy. . . , January 6, 1952,”
Jan. 7, 1952, Acheson Papers (emphasis added). Answering ‘Do you think the
United Nations forces should or should not use the atom bomb on enemy military
targets?”’ in a poll of Nov. 11-16, 1951, 41 percent said “should,” 10 percent a
“qualified should,’ and 33 percent said “should not” (George Gallup, ed., The
Gallup Poll [New York: Random House, 1974], $:1027-28),
STRUGGLE OVER THE KOREAN ARMISTICE agi
ultimatum that America would blockade China and bomb Manchuria
unless Russia and China stopped aiding the DPRK forces, Although
he knew that such a plan was politically reckless because it would
split the NATO alliance, he indulged himself further, in the safety of
his diary, and even fantasized about the atomic bombing of Moscow,
Lesngrad, Beijing, Shanghai, and other major Soviet and Chinese
cities,*!
The need to maintain the NATO alliance compelled the administra-
tion to refrain from openly spreading the war beyond Korea in 1952.
As a result, the State Department vetoed a JCS plan in February for
an air force and navy “sweep along the China coast.”? In March, when
Adm. Arthur W, Radford, commander of the Pacific fleet, proposed a
similar plan, Ridgway, probably influenced by the State Department
veto, opposed it. In April, a JCS planning committee flirted with
“the tactical use of atomic weapons, the use of Chinese Nationalist
forces, [and] commando operations and acceleration of guerrilla
operations [against China] .” Their aim was to break the stalemate and
coerce the Communists into yielding, but most of their tactics were
rejected as too dangerous."
With the negotiations at P’anmunjim at an impasse, Truman
poured out anger into his diary. He wrote a self-righteous diatribe, as
if it were a script for his negotiators in Korea: “Now do you want an
end to hostilities in Korea or do you want China and Siberia destroyed?
. . . You either accept our fair and just proposal or you will be com-
pletely destroyed.” Truman never used this angry ultimatum.®3
The air force was eager to apply pressure to force a settlement, In
early spring, it began campaigning to bomb the large North Korean
power complex near the Yalu. When Ridgway resisted because the
power complex served the domestic Korean economy and its destruc-
tion would “have no appreciable effect on hastening Communist
agreement to an armistice on our terms,” Gen, O. P. Weyland, the air
force commander, appealed to Washington. The bombing would weaken
the North Korean war effort, he contended, produce “‘a serious psycho-
logical effect and may impress N. Koreans with the price they are
81. Truman Diary, Jan. 27, 1952, PSF; and Bernstein, “Truman’s Secret
Thoughts,” pp. 33, 44,
82. Gen. Marshall Carter to Matthews, Feb. 12, 1952, with Adm. W. M. Fech-
teler, ‘Proposed Sweep along the China Coast,” Feb. 8, 1952, decimal file 795.00/
2-1252; Webb to Acheson, ‘‘Re: JCS Proposal for Show of Force in Far East,”
Feb. 14, 1952, ibid.; JCS 1776/287, Apr, 3, 1952, JCS Records, CCS, decimal file
383.21, Korea (3-19-45) (emphasis added),
83, ‘Truman Diary, May 18, 1952, PSF; Bernstein, ‘*Truman’s Secret Thoughts,”
pp. 32, 44,
292 BARTON J, BERNSTEIN
paying for their continued recalcitrance”—a position reaffirmed by
General Vandenberg, the air force chief of staff,™4
Upon replacing Ridgway, Gen. Mark Clark, the new American and
UN commander, speedily agreed to bomb the power complex—a deci-
sion sanctioned by the JCS, Secretary Lovett, and Truman, As a result,
in late June, American planes bombed the key Suiho plant near the
Yalu and ten other hydroelectric installations, thereby creating a
two-week blackout in North Korea.
The bombings caused problems in the European alliance. Britain’s
Labour Party, fearing an expansion of the war, savagely attacked
Churchill’s government, which narrowly averted censure. Not only
had the State Department failed to inform Britain, which Acheson
speedily admitted was a lapse of courtesy, but European critics feared
that these attacks might drive China to break off negotiations and
widen the war. In America, in contrast, the bombings were widely
popular and briefly assuaged many critics, who sharply inquired why
the installations had been exempted from bombing until then.*6
The bombings were part of America’s expanded naval and air war de-
signed to force concessions from the Communists. On the ground, the op-
posing armies were stalemated in mostly small battles. The two sides were
roughly matched and the United States could not push ahead, except
with high casualties. The American aim was to reduce its casualties,
84, CG FEAF (Tokyo) to HQ USAF, Apr. 29, 1952, VCO 118 CG, JCS Re-
cords, CCS, decimal file 383.21, Korea (3-19-45); air force chief of staff to JCS,
“Destruction of Electric Power Installations in North Korea,” May 1, 1952, JCS
Records, CCS, decimal file 383.21, Korea (3-19-45). For other thinking, see
Maj. Gen, C, P. Cabell to Bradley, ‘Future Action in Korea in Case Negotiations
Break Down,’ May 13, 1952, ibid.
85. JCS to secretary of defense, ‘Removal of Restriction on Attacks against
Yalu River Hydroelectric Installations,” June 19, 1952, JCS Records, CCS, decimal
file 383.21, Korea (3-19-45); JCS to CINCFE, June 19, 1952, JCS 911683, “Per-
tinent Papers.” For the whole record, see Cabell to chairman, JCS, “Chronological
Record of Communications on Hydroelectric Plant Bombings,” June 24, 1952,
JCS Records, CCS, decimal file 383.21, Korea (3-19-45); Futrell, U.S. Air Force
in Korea, pp. 451-52. American officials told members of foreign governments
that the bombing was “‘a military operation for military reasons and any political
effects are only incidental’’ (“Memorandum of Conversation: Briefing of Foreign
Government Representatives and Korea,” June 24, 1952, Materials; cf., FBIS,
Daily Report, P’yOngyang, July 7, 1952, pp. EEE2-3).
86. Porter, Britain and the Rise of Communist China, pp. 126-29; Acheson,
Present at the Creation, pp. 656-57; “Monthly Survey of American Opinion in
International Affairs,” June, 1952, Elsey Papers, box 66; Acheson to secretary
of state, June 26, 1952, Materials; JCS to CINCFE, July 3, 1952, JCS 9127, “Per-
tinent Papers”; ‘Monthly Survey of American Opinion on International Affairs,”
June, 1952, Elsey Papers.
STRUGGLE OVER THE KOREAN ARMISTICE 293
to make the war more palatable at home, but still to punish North
Korea and compel a settlement. In line with this strategy, the air force
pounded cities and villages, usually after giving civilians warnings, and
thus carried on a policy of “psychological warfare,” according to the
official history. On May 8, the day after the deadlock at P’anmunjim
was announced, the air force launched what was then its largest attack
of the war against the ancient city of Suan, a key military depot. Soon
there were larger attacks. On July 11, August 4, and August 29, the
air force bombed P’ydngyang, hitting military targets and killing
civilians, “I have always felt that a forceful action is more conducive
to agreements with the Communists than a softer approach,” Clark
told Washington.®’
Was the bombing carefully calibrated to events at P’anmunjOm?
The evidence is skimpy because so many records remain classified.
The attacks of May 8, promptly following the acknowledgment of
the stalemate, and those of July 11, immediately preceding a new
American offer, do seem carefully orchestrated to events at P‘anmun-
jdm. The bombing of July 11 preceded by two days America’s offer,
after a rescreening, to return 82,400 POWs (not the originally estimated
70,000).°8
The Communists rejected this offer, but suggested they would
compromise by retreating from 116,000 to 100,000 or 110,000, if
the total included all the Chinese, China, eager to end the war but
perhaps fearful of embarrassment, was offering a modest concession—
one that sacrificed DPRK soldiers. Perhaps the DPRK was even more
anxious for an armistice and willing to pay this small price.®?
87. Futrell, U.S. Air Force in Korea, pp. 480-84, and see p. 484 for State
Department fears of publicity about “‘mass-bombing of military targets in or near
heavily populated areas.’ New York Times, May 9, 1952, p. 1; Futrell, U.S. Air
Force in Korea, pp. 481-84. On July 10, Clark cabled Bradley, ‘‘I agree that we
should include at least one other target to eliminate press attention solely to
P*ySngyang, and have so arranged’? (Clark through Bolling to Bradley, July 10,
1952, 1063, JCS Records, CCS, decimal file 383.21, Korea [7-31-50] ). On July 3,
Clark had delayed the bombing of P’yOngyang because of the “delicate stage” of
negotiations, but decided to go ahead if there was no improvement (Clark to
Bradley, July 7, 1952, 1206, ibid.).
88. Clark to Bradley, July 7, 1952. Hermes, Truce Tent, pp. 270-75,
89. CINCUNC (Clark) to DEPTAR for JCS, July 18, 1952, HNC 1406, “‘Per-
tinent Papers.’’? The compromise at 110,000 was also implied on the 6th (CINCUNC
[Clark] to DEPTAR for JCS, July 8, 1952, HNC 1374, “Pertinent Papers”). In
June, Ambassador Gifford had reported that China was seeking only 100,000 or
110,000 POWs, including 20,000 from the PRC, and would allow others not to
return home (Gifford to secretary of state, June 18, 1952, Matthews Files), See
also McClurkin to Allison, ‘‘Panikkar’s Discussion with Chou En-lai on the Dead-
lock on Repatriation of Prisoners of War,” June 18, 1952, and “Panikkar’s Dis-
294 BARTON J. BERNSTEIN
Had the July bombing produced this slight retreat? The evidence
is mixed. Indian officials charged generally that American bombings
impaired the chance for a settlement, According to the Indians, Ameri-
ca’s June bombing on the Yalu, rather than intimidating the Com-
munists and producing concessions, had killed an important Chinese
compromise offer—the creation of a neutral nation commission to
determine which prisoners did not want repatriation, After the bomb-
ings, according to the Indians, the Chinese decided not to present
this compromise, lest they appear to be yielding to force. American
officials, in turn, denied publicly that China had been ready to com-
promise. Although these officials may have been correct, they failed
to admit that there had been a brief flurry of secret optimism in Wash-
ington during the Sino-Indian talks of mid-June. 9?
The American bombing strategy was cruel, but possibly deft. “Make
maximum possible use available air . . . in attacks upon all military
targets in North Korea,’ the JCS ordered, presumably with White
House approval, but “avoid public statements [about the attacks]
so that Communist prestige is not . . . so seriously engaged as to make
more difficult ultimate Communist agreement to acceptable armistice.”
In line with this strategy, when Premier Chou En-lai visited Moscow
in mid-August, partly to request additional Soviet military and eco-
nomic aid, George Kennan, then ambassador to the Soviet Union,
suggested that the United States should increase its air attacks. Any-
thing that could be done ‘“‘to frighten’ the Chinese and to increase
their demands on Russia would be good,”’ he concluded, If this strategy
of coercion was combined with some conciliatory gesture, Kennan
counseled, the Soviet Union might push for a cease-fire, He thought
such a settlement would seem more attractive to Stalin than increased
assistance to China. This advice produced the massive raids of August
29-30 on P’ydSngyang.9!
cussion with Chou En-lai on the Question of Repatriation of Prisoners of War,”
June 18, 1952, Materials, For British optimism about a settlement, see Acheson to
secretary, June 27, 1952, Materials.
90. New York Times, July 19, 1952, p. 2; cf. JCS to CINCFE, July 15, 1952;
Chester Bowles to Secretary of state, July 24, 1952, Materials; New York Times,
July 20, 1952, sec. 4, p. 2; JCS to CINCFE, June 23, 1952, JcS 911932, and
July 12, 1952, Jcs 913418, both in JCS Records, Pentagon,
91. JCS to CINCFE, Aug. 8, 1952, JCS 915579, Jcs Records, Pentagon.
Kennan, in Futrell, U.S. Air Force in Korea, pp. 487-88. For agreement, se¢
Amb. Robert Murphy to secretary of state, Aug, 27, 1952, Materials; and CINCFE
(Clark) to DEPTAR for JCS, Aug, 27, 1952, C64277, JCS Records, CCS, decimal
file 883.21, Korea (3-19-45). In July, the CIA concluded, “Despite the capability
to continue the war in Korea, we believe that internal economic and political
considerations are probably exerting pressure on the Chinese Communists to
STRUGGLE OVER THE KOREAN ARMISTICE 295
The escalated air and sea war did not soften the Communists at
the negotiating table. In the short run these attacks probably improved
morale and united the people against their common foe—A merica.
Also, the governments of both China and North Korea may have
feared yielding to intimidation. Concessions wrung through coercion
could teach the Americans the wrong lesson: that blackmail can suc-
ceed. With the reduction in the ground war, the chief victim was not
China, whose territory remained safe, but North Korea. China, how-
ever, seemed to shape the Communist policy at P’anmunjdm, 9%
On September 29, General Clark summarized the military situation
for Washington: ‘We confront undemoralized [enemy] forces, far
superior in strength, which occupy excellent, extremely well-organized
defensive positions, in depth and with sufficient logistic support.”
Clark hoped that the administration would greatly strengthen his
forces, authorize the use of nuclear weapons, allow the bombing of
Manchuria and China, employ two of Chiang’s divisions in Korea,
greatly expand the ROK army, and let America win. Like MacArthur,
Clark chafed under the constraints of limited war and promised that
an unrestrained American military operation in the Far East could
accomplish what the negotiators at P’anmunjém had failed to achieve—
a settlement on American terms.%
Despite the earlier Acheson-Truman flirtation with bombing China,
the administration was not going to yield to Clark’s entreaties and
risk shattering the Western alliance that America had gone to war,
or so it thought, to save. But Clark did win on one measure, The
administration agreed to expand the ROK army. Until October, the
Truman administration had been moving slowly in this direction,
but when the Republican Party exploited this issue in the campaign
of 1952, the government speeded the program. If the ground war
continued, it would become, as Republican candidate Dwight Eisen-
hower had suggested, a conflict where “Asians [would] fight Asians’
while, as the air force stressed, the United States conducted its pulveriz-
ing bombing of North Korea.%
conclude hostilities” (CIA, NIE, 55/1, “Communist Capabilities and Probable
Courses of Action in Korea,” July 30, 1952, PSF),
92. Hermes, Truce Tent, pp. 381-82; and Joy, How Communists Negotiate,
pp. 12-13,
93. CINCUNC to Jas, Sept, 29, 1952, Cx 56022, JCS Records, CCS, decimal
file 383.21, Korea (3-19-45); CINCUNG to DEPTAR for JCS, Sept. 1, 1952,
C 54499, JCS Records, Pentagon; Mark Clark to Joe [Collins], Oct. 9, 1952,
RG 319, decimal file O91, Korea (10-9-52); ef,, FBIS, Daily Report, Moscow,
Nov, 25, 1952, pp. AAL.2,
94, JCS to CINGFE, Oct, 50, 1963, JCS 922607, “Pertinent Papers": Bradley
296 BARTON J. BERNSTEIN
Secretary Lovett had outlined part of this military strategy to the
cabinet: “If we stay firm [on the POW issue] we can tear them up by
air. We are . . . hurting them badly. . . . If we keep on, tearing the place
apart, we can make it a most unpopular affair for the North Koreans.
We ought to go right ahead.’”?° American leaders believed that military
force was the handmaiden of diplomacy. Success at P’anmunjém could
be won by heavy bombing.
MORE HARDENING IN AMERICAN POLICY
Though Truman was not a candidate in the 1952 presidential
election, the war was a major issue and a settlement would have greatly
assisted the Democrats. Yet neither Republicans nor Democrats criti-
cized the administration for its insistence on voluntary repatriation,
Within America, there was a comfortable consensus that the nation,
as Truman had argued, could not surrender this moral principle and
send the POWs to their death,
American politicians would not trade lives for a truce. In a war
against an evil enemy, as plain citizens and their leaders interpreted
the Korean conflict, such compromise seemed immoral. Once the
issue had been phrased publicly as a matter of moral principle, there
could be no retreat. Although the war was unpopular, and major
politicians quarreled about whether America should have intervened
in 1950, none suggested yielding to Communist demands in 1952 and
abandoning voluntary repatriation. The major dispute was whether
the administration should expand the war, possibly to China, to compel
a settlement.?”
Probably there was only one line of argument that might have
found wide electoral support for abandoning the American position
on voluntary repatriation. That argument would have required rephras-
ing the issue in terms of American lives versus enemy prisoners. Should
America sacrifice more of its young men, a politician might have
argued, to save enemy prisoners who had tried to kill American boys
to secretary of defense, ‘‘Augmentation of Wartime Republic of Korea Army and
Marine Corps,” Sept. 26, 1952, ibid.; cf., FBIS, Daily Report, P’yOngyang, Nov.
24, 1952, pp. EEE10-13. New York Times, Oct. 3, 1952, p. 1; cf., FBIS, Daily
Report, Peking, Nov. 26, 1952, pp. AAA2-3,
95. Connelly, ‘‘Notes on Cabinet Meeting,” Sept. 12, 1952, Connelly Papers.
96. Surprisingly, the New York Times index, the major periodical literature,
and the relevant files at the Truman and Eisenhower libraries, as well as the papers
of Taft, Connelly, Dulles, Barkley, and H. Alexander Smith reveal no dissent.
Cf., T. R. Fehrenbach, This Kind of War (New York: Macmillan, 1963), p. 600,
and William Winter to William Vatcher, Aug. 17, 1952, Vatcher Papers, box 1,
97. Ronald J. Caridi, The Kerean War and American Politics (Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1968), pp, 181-259,
STRUGGLE OVER THE KOREAN ARMISTICE 297
on the battlefield? Should Americans have to remain in captivity in
Communist camps to save these enemy POWs? Such arguments were
not unreasonable, The latter argument had actually shaped the doubts
of military leaders in late 1951, when they opposed making voluntary
repatriation a firm policy, but no major politician argued a similar
case in 1952. Perhaps the absence of such debate testifies to the in-
timidating power of the Jenner-led group of congressmen, who had
insisted on voluntary repatriation, and to the administration’s capacity
to shape the dialogue with an already sympathetic electorate.
Strangely, politicians did not urge the administration to release
the unwilling repatriates and thus present the Communists with a fait
accompli. Perhaps such counsel, especially during an electoral cam-
paign, would have risked inviting charges that the politician was be-
smirching morality and urging America to violate international law.
Unlike the Vietnam War, when legitimacy broke down under the
accusations of official deceit and American war crimes, the Korean
War did not puncture the widespread belief in America’s morality.
No major candidate offered a proposal for achieving an armistice
without America’s retreating on the POW issue. But in late August,
Vincent Hallinan, the Progressive party presidential candidate, sug-
gested a solution: agree on a cease-fire, exchange the willing prisoners,
and then negotiate on the others. A few days later, the president of
Mexico proposed a similar solution, with one major difference—the
unwilling repatriates, rather than staying in POW camps in Korea
(as in Hallinan’s proposal), would go to neutral nations and even be
allowed to work until a postarmistice conference settled their status.?8
Through much of September, the State Department, on the one
side, and the JCS and the Defense Department, on the other, wrangled
over whether to back these proposals. Many in the State Department
found them attractive. They might end the war and secure the return
of allied POWs, which military leaders had earlier defined as their
“paramount purpose.” From Moscow, Ambassador Kennan, noting
the American Communist party’s support for Hallinan’s plan, cabled,
“consider move excellent. ... Seems to me it would be hard for Soviets
to wiggle out of it without letting down Amer Commies badly.” Whether
or not it won Communist acceptance, the plan warranted American
support, some advisers concluded, If the Communists endorsed it,
98. Progressive Party press release, Aug. 24, 1952, American Labor Party
(hereafter ALP) Papers, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, N.J. Hallinan’s posi-
tion received almost no notice in the American press, for this proposal, like the
rest of his campaign pronouncements, was virtually blanked out. For a minor excep-
tion, see New York Times, Sept, 7, 1952, p, 46. JCS to CINCFE, Sept. 9, 1952,
JCS 917927, Matthews Files,
298 BARTON J, BERNSTEIN
thought Paul Nitze, director of the PPS, the war would be over, If the
proposal split the Soviets and Chinese, as Kennan suspected, it would
still be politically valuable. At minimum, as State Department advisers
stressed, acceptance of either proposal would have propaganda value,
for America would establish that it was being flexible and seeking an
agreement to end the war.”
General Clark opposed such ideas. He denied that they would
divide China and the Soviet Union, and outlined a military-political
case that Secretary Lovett, the service secretaries, and the JCS unani-
mously endorsed. They all feared that a truce without settlement of
the POW issue would encourage the Communists to strengthen their
forces in Korea and then reopen the war against a reduced American
army, depleted by demands to ‘“‘bring the boys home.” The military
conclusion was firm: better an armed stalemate, in which America
could keep bombing North Korea, than a fragile truce. Bombing might
achieve the desired terms in the long run; an uneasy truce could mean
defeat!
Were military leaders in Washington sincere in their judgment
that a settlement without agreement on the POW issue was very dan-
gerous? Or did they seize on this argument because they were reluctant
to allow a settlement, which would mean a reduced military budget,
the acceptance of a divided Korea, and the end of any chance of a
military victory? Put simply, were they contriving or relying upon
arguments to block a settlement for other purposes? (Clark was un-
doubtedly unhappy that victory would be impossible, but he was
deeply and sincerely worried that the Hallinan or Mexican proposal
would jeopardize his forces.) Lovett, the service secretaries, and the
JCS were not seeking military victory, and most, if not all, were eager
to end the war with an armistice. They did not fear that an armistice
would greatly weaken domestic support for the military, They knew
that the defense budget would be slightly reduced, but they anticipated
that large military budgets would endure and that America, freed of
99. Quoted in JCS to CINCFE, Aug. 29, 1952, JCS 917260, JCS Records,
Pentagon; Nitze to Matthews, “Korean Armistice Proposal,” Sept. 3, 1952, PPS
Files; Henry Owen to Nitze (draft), “Further Thoughts on the Proposed Presiden-
tial Statement,” Sept. 3, 1952, ibid.
100. CINCUNC (Clark) to DEPTAR for JCS, Sept. 1, 1952, C 54495, JCS
Records, CCS, decimal file 383.21, Korea (4-19-45). Clark stressed “firmness in
negotiations to be supported by continued heavy bombing attacks’? (CINCUNG
[Clark] to DEPTAR for JCS, Sept. 1, 1952, C 54499, JCS Records, Pentagon),
Lovett, ‘‘Memorandum for the Record: Meeting with the President on Korean
Situation,’’ Sept. 15, 1952, RG 330, Records of the Secretary of Defense, Cor-
respondence Central Section, CD, decimal file 092 (Korea),
STRUGGLE OVER THE KOREAN ARMISTICE 299
this war, would be better able to meet its military commitments else-
where.!©! They expected that Eisenhower, as the likely new president,
would maintain America’s global commitments and keep the military
relatively strong. The enervating war, with its strains upon the NATO
alliance, may, for these men, have actually constituted a greater threat
than Congress to the military budget. In short, by now they wanted
an armistice,
On September 15, Truman met with the high-ranking members of
Defense and the JCS to discuss the State Department’s stratagem (the
Mexican proposal). They argued, according to Lovett’s summary,
“that any sign of weakness on our part and any evidence to negotiate
indefinitely merely convinced the Commies we would make further
concessions.”” An armistice without agreement on the POWs would
be dangerous. And the Mexican proposal might even delay an agree-
ment by eoncouraging the Communists to believe that more conces-
sions would be forthcoming. Truman agreed, in Lovett’s words, that
there was “no real prospect of getting an armistice other than to persist
in our present course of action and increase the military pressure in
so far as possible. . . .”?!0?
During the week, Acheson tried to resolve matters with the JCS
and the Defense Department, but he found their arguments—basically
a restatement of Clark’s—weak and unconvincing. Any armistice,
Acheson contended, would allow the Communists to build up military
strength and reopen the war, and spawn demands in America for
bringing the soldiers home. Unlike military leaders, he did not think
that an armistice without an agreeement on repatriation was more
likely to provoke a renewed Communist attack, Most important, he
was sure that the Communists would not accept the Mexican proposal,
and thus, for him, the issue was not whether to take a small risk to
end the war, but, rather, whether the United States should endorse
the Mexican proposal and gain the international propaganda benefits
of appearing flexible and eager for peace.1%
The odds of the Communists endorsing the Mexican proposal were
“about one in a thousand,’? Acheson concluded. “The Chinese could
101. On the stretch-out decision on military spending, see Edward Flash,
Economic Advice and Presidential Leadership (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1965), pp. 90-97.
102. Lovett, ‘‘Memorandum for the Record: Meeting with the President on
Korean Situation,” Sept. 15, 1952, RG 330, GD, decimal file 092 (Korea).
103. U. A. Johnson, “Memorandum of Conversation: Future Tactics in Korean
Armistice Negotiations,” Sept. 17, 1952, PPS Files; and Fechteler, “Memorandum
of Conversation: State-Defense Conference on Korean Armistice Negotiations
17 September 1952," PSF.
300 BARTON J. BERNSTEIN
not possibly accept,” he explained, because “the prisoners who were
not exchanged would be sent to other countries,” and, thus, if there
was no agreement on repatriation, they would stay there to work
and settle as immigrants. In effect, then, the Communists would
have only two equally unacceptable choices—to endorse voluntary
repatriation and lose the prisoners, or to refuse and lose the prison-
ers, 104
Acheson and the military were not arguing about how to achieve an
armistice, he emphasized, but about how to achieve a propaganda vic-
tory and avoid a diplomatic defeat. With the Mexican proposal attrac-
ting the support of America’s allies in the war, Acheson did not want to
reject it and offend them. The proposal would also meet other needs,
When the Communists rejected it, Acheson forecast, the United States
could then halt negotiations. It would be what he labeled “the best
possible platform’? to justify a recess. Like the military leaders, Ache-
son believed that a recess would persuade the Communists of American
determination and might compel them to concede, 1%
Because presidential advisers could not agree on tactics, they
brought the issue to Truman. All agreed that the issue was important
enough for the president to make the final decision, Acheson did not
push vigorously for his stratagem, perhaps because he already knew
the president’s inclination, Predictably, on September 24, Truman
reaffirmed his earlier decision: no armistice until the POW problem
was settled. Toughness, he implied, would chasten the Communists,
while any concession might invite aggression, 1%
At P’anmunj$m, on September 28, five months after the package
proposal of April, the United States delivered its final offer: Let the
POWs choose, possibly under the scrutiny of a neutral nation
commission or the International Red Cross, whether they wanted to
go home. The Communists, as anticipated, promptly rejected these
terms. Ten days later, the delegations met briefly, hurled accusations,
and the Americans announced an indefinite recess and withdrew, '"’
104. No author, no title, n.d. (about Sept. 16), begins, ““The Secretary, in
considering the question . . .” Acheson Papers.
105. Johnson, ‘Memorandum of Conversation: Future Tactics in Korean
Armistice Negotiations,” Sept. 17, 1952, PPS Files.
106, Johnson, ‘Memorandum of Conversation: Korean Armistice Negotia-
tions,” Sept. 24, 1952, PPS Files. A briefing paper for Acheson noted that only
53 percent (against 61 percent in July) of Americans favored bombing across
the Yalu. Twenty-eight percent favored withdrawal, 30 percent were for holding
the line, 35 percent were for taking the offensive (44 percent in July), (U. A,
Johnson, ‘Brief for Discussion with the President,” Sept. 24, 1952, PPS Files),
107, Maj. Gen, C. D, Eddleman to army chief of staff, “Summary of Actions
STRUGGLE OVER THE KOREAN ARMISTICE 301
Negotiations would not resume at P’anmunjém for six months, and
then under a new president, who would also make oblique nuclear
threats to coerce concessions.
THE SOVIETS HELP MAINTAIN THE
AMERICAN ALLIANCE AT THE UN
During its last few months, the Truman administration struggled to
block other nations from trying to end the war by compromising on
voluntary repatriation, Acheson, having lost the dispute in Washington
over tactics, faced a difficult task: protecting the president and his ad-
ministration from embarrassment in the UN.
Many of America’s allies were eager to achieve an armistice. They
wanted to withdraw their troops and, like the neutrals, they resented
the continued bloodshed and feared that the conflict might escalate.
None publicly challenged American motives or raised cynical questions
stressed by the harried American Left: how could America napalm
many North Korean civilians but sincerely worry about the POWs?
Wasn’t America itching for a war with China, or employing the argu-
ments of humanitarians to disguise the quest for a cold war victory?!™
In early October, acting behind the scenes at the UN, Acheson
briefly rallied support to the American cause. He lined up twenty na-
tions—mostly from NATO and the Commonwealth—to cosponsor with
the United States a resolution asserting “the rights of all prisoners of
war to an unrestricted opportunity to be repatriated and [to] avoid
the use of force in their repatriation.” But this support quickly crum-
bled when V.K. Krishna Menon, the shrewd Indian delegate who mis-
trusted America, promoted a compromise similar to Hallinan’s—an
armistice, exchange of willing prisoners, and establishment of a commis-
sion to decide the future of the others. Evasive and flexible, Menon
kept his proposal fuzzy; for some time, he refused to put it in writing,
presumably so he could exploit ambiguities and avoid conflicts, Al-
though Menon seemed a masterful diplomat to many, Acheson viewed
him as deceitful, no doubt because the proposal’s main features, no
matter how muted or disguised, were unacceptable to the administra-
tion. The POWs who refused repatriation would remain captives until
they accepted a return to their homelands. That was their only route
out. “In this way,” Acheson complained, “the principle of repatria-
with Respect to Armistice,” Oct. 6, 1952, RG 310, G-3, decimal file 091, Korea
TS. On earlier orders, see Truman to CINCFE, Sept. 28, 1952, DA IN 188571,
Matthews Files, and on the meeting of the 28th, CINCUNC (Clark) to DEPTAR
for JCS, Sept. 28, 1952, Z 23092, Matthews Files.
108. Progressive Party press releases, Oct, 21 and 26, 1952, ALP Papers,
302 BARTON J. BERNSTEIN
tion and the negation of force both appear to be observed,’’ while, in
fact, each was circumvented. It was, Acheson informed the president,
“as they say in strike settlement lingo, [giving] us the words and the
other side the decision,’
Acheson aimed to hold the fragile alliance together, to block any
UN effort to direct the armistice negotiations, and even to win UN
endorsement of the administration’s policy. Such a victory would
provide some comfort at home for the politically discredited adminis-
tration, and would also destroy, he claimed, Communist expectations
for a UN-dictated compromise, For Acheson, there were two enemies
at the UN: the Soviets, who sought to drive wedges between the allies,
and the Indians, who seduced America’s allies into an unprincipled
conspiracy 11°
On November 10, when the Soviet representative, Andrei Vishin-
sky, announced that the Soviets would “not budge” on the prisoner
issue, Acheson concluded, happily, that Menon’s venture would quickly
collapse and that key allies would return to the American fold, Instead,
as Acheson later complained, the allies’ hopes survived Vishinsky’s
declaration: ‘“The Canadians thought the speech was not as bad as it
might have been; the Australians, that the Chinese wanted an armistice
but the Soviets did not,”*!4
The group of twenty allies was crumbling. The secretary of state
wanted a prompt showdown in the General Assembly, but first he had
to deal with his key allies, whom he later dubbed “‘the conspirators.”
To win back the British and Canadians, he sent for reinforcements—
American military leaders. On November 16, at Acheson’s behest,
Lovett and Bradley presented their well-rehearsed arguments that
had persuaded Truman in September. }!?
Even when aided by Bradley and Lovett, Acheson could not bring
his disgruntled allies back into line. They were tired of the war and
wanted a settlement. The POW issue no longer commanded their
sympathy; the United States seemed arrogantly intractable. Diplomacy
109. Acheson, Present at the Creation, pp. 699-702; Acheson to president,
Nov. 15, 1952, Acheson Papers, box 67,
110. ‘‘Message for the President from the Secretary of State,’’ Oct. 25, 1952,
Acheson Papers, box 67.
111. Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 701,
112. Ibid.; and draft memo of Acheson, Lloyd conversation, Noy, 14, 1952,
Acheson Papers; J. B. M[atthews], “Memorandum for the Record: Armistice
Negotiations in Korea,’’ Oct. 28, 1952, RG 319, G-3, decimal file 091, Korea;
“Draft Memorandum Covering Meeting of Secretary Acheson, Secretary Lovett,
General Bradley, Mr. Selwyn LLoyd .. .” n.d. (Noy. 16, 1952), Acheson Papers,
box 67.
STRUGGLE OVER THE KOREAN ARMISTICE 303
required negotiations and flexibility, they maintained, while America
offered intransigence. The British and Canadians were eager to circum-
vent the principle of voluntary repatriation, without openly repudiating
it, and the Indians were offering an attractive route. Acheson seemed
a moral extremist to these allies,!*
The Truman administration feared that Eisenhower’s recent elec-
tion would lead both the unhappy allies and the Communists to expect
more flexibility from the new administration. After all, with his cam-
paign promise of ‘J will go to Korea,’’ Eisenhower had implied that
he would win a settlement whereas Truman and Acheson had achieved
only a stalemate. Meeting with Ike on November 18, Truman and
Acheson persuaded him to join forces with them by publicly endorsing
voluntary repatriation,!!4
Although gaining support from Ike, Acheson was unable to per-
suade the delegates of the powerful Commonwealth countries to
support the American position, so he engaged in an end run, Visiting
Canada in mid-November, he pleaded his case before the prime minister
and cabinet. America’s UN ambassador, Ernest Gross, in what may
have been a related tactic, informed the press that there was a major
split on this issue between the United States and Britain, Probably it
was a “‘leak”’ calculated to bring the British back into line. To add
more pressure, Acheson had warned allies that ‘divisions among us
on this essential matter would bring grave disillusionment in the United
States regarding collective security, which would not be confined to
Korea but would extend to NATO and other arrangements [including
military aid] of the same sort.’?!!5
In a curious way, the role of the Korean War in alliance politics
had become reversed in two years, America had entered the war largely
to save Europe from Soviet aggression. Now, by late 1952, Acheson
was warning American allies that, despite the strains the war created
in their countries, they must stick with the United States and continue
it, or risk an American reappraisal of commitments to Europe. He was
113. Ibid.; Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 702; Stairs, Diplomacy of
Constraint, pp. 263-68; Princeton Seminars, Mar. 14, 1954, reel 2, track 1, pp.
7-9.
114. Acheson, ‘‘Memorandum of Meeting at the White House between President
Truman and General Eisenhower,” Noy. 18, 1952, PSF; Sen, Alexander Wiley, in
New York Times, Nov, 20, 1952, p. 1; and Acheson, “Meeting with the President
[on] Korean Resolution in UN,’’ Nov. 5, 1952, Acheson Papers, box 67,
115. Acheson, statement before Canadian Cabinet, Nov. 22, 1952, Acheson
papers, box 67; Acheson, Present at the Creation, pp. 703-4; New York Times,
Nov. 23, 1952, p. 1; Acheson, Present at the Creation, pp. 703-4; Princeton Sem-
inars, Mar, 14, 1954, reel 2, track 2, p. 1, The inference about the purpose of the
“leak” is mine; Acheson, resent at the Creation, p, 702; draft memo of Acheson,
Lloyd conversation, Noy, 14, 1955, Acheson Papers,
304 BARTON J, BERNSTEIN
not arguing that the government wished to take punitive measures,
but, rather, that the electorate and Congress, unhappy with the defec-
tion of allies, might force a reduction of commitments. He was not
entirely wrong. The allied effort to secure peace on terms deemed
immoral in America could impair collective security and slash the aid
and military budgets. It was not peace per se, but peace on the wrong
terms, that threatened the West.
Under these pressures the Canadians were sliding back into the
American fold but the British still lingered outside. Upon Acheson’s
appeal, Truman empowered him to act at the UN without Britain, and
thus to risk widening the rift, in an American-directed effort to kill
Menon’s proposal. But that became unnecessary, when, on November
24, much to the surprise of all, Vishinsky drove the allies back together
by publicly condemning the Indian resolution. At the UN, Vishinsky
insulted the Indian government and Menon, and rejected his proposal
as ‘‘designed to . . . perpetuate [the war] .” The next day, China also
refused Menon’s terms.!!
Rebuked by the Communists, Menon tried to withdraw his resolu-
tion, but Acheson, now savoring victory, blocked him. Gaining the
backing of Latin American states, the secretary amended the resolution
to provide that a commission would free the prisoners about four
months after the armistice. Acheson thus transformed the resolution
into what Menon had struggled to avoid—an American restatement
of its own position. Acheson pushed for a vote. On December 3, with
only the Soviet bloc opposed, the General Assembly approved it,
fifty-four to fifty-five, and the PRC and DPRK quickly rejected it,
America had achieved the political victory the administration desired,
but was not closer to an armistice.!!7
The Soviet Union had actually aided the United States in patching
together its torn coalition at the UN. Did the Soviets miscalculate? Or
did they fear that the principle of voluntary repatriation would weaken
their armies by encouraging mass defections in future wars? Did the
Soviets fear that the Chinese might yield, and had Vishinsky sought
to bring China back into line? Might China have acceded if the Soviets
had not acted? Firm answers are impossible. But we know that the
Chinese had already indicated—in May and July—their willingness to
116. Acheson, Present at the Creation, pp. 703, 705; Jules Davids, U.S. in
World Affairs, 1952 (New York: Harper, 1954), p. 340; NCNA, Nov. 28-29, 1952,
SCMP, no. 462 (Nov. 29-30, 1952), pp. 1-9. The Soviets charged America (Bradley)
with atomic blackmail (FBIS, Daily Report, Moscow, Nov. 26, 1952, pp. AA13-
14).
117. New York Times, Dec. 4, 1952, p. 1; and Acheson, Present at the Crea
tion, p. 705,
STRUGGLE OVER THE KOREAN ARMISTICE 305
compromise and allow nonforcible repatriation of DPRK troops if all
PRC ‘volunteers’? were returned, That suggests that China had its own
reasons for resisting both the American position in the summer and the
revised Indian resolution in November, and that the Soviet action, at
best, may have stiffened the PRC’s resolve. And the DPRK, this skimpy
evidence suggests, would have liked to end the war, even at the cost of
losing about 42,000 soldiers who would go south,!!8
What would have happened if Vishinsky had not sunk the Menon
initiative? Would America’s key allies have bolted to support it, and
embarrassed the United States? Probably not. Their aim was to change
American policy, not to humiliate the administration and risk even
greater American intransigence. If Acheson had continued to resist
Menon’s compromise, and Vishinsky had not scuttled it, the NATO
and Commonwealth powers probably would have returned, albeit re-
luctantly, to the American fold. Then they probably would have
maneuvered to avoid any UN vote on the issues of repatriation and
America’s unilateral conduct of armistice negotiations.
THE MAINTENANCE OF PRINCIPLE
Truman was able to stick to his position on voluntary repatriation.
In January and February 1952, he had not foreseen the price he would
pay for this course: a stalemated war, many American casualties, dis-
gruntled allies, domestic cries for a bolder foreign policy, a painful
defeat for his party, and his own repudiation, That winter he had
acted in a manner that seemed politically popular at home; he had
avoided a clash with Congress, a battle with the Republican party,
and a split within his own party. Perhaps more important for him,
victory on the repatriation issue had promised a valuable cold war
triumph, which might also deter further Communist aggression by
encouraging the defection of their armies. For Truman, domestic
and international political considerations had coalesced with the
principles of morality and humanitarianism.
He had been optimistic that the Communists would soon yield,
He was not trying to prolong the war to bleed China or North Korea,
He was not trying to prolong the war to remilitarize Europe or to
118. Cf., Simmons, Strained Alliance, pp. 222-23. Kennan later claimed that
“Stalin was terrified of the cosmopolitan wing [of his party], and I think he
was always frightened that that wing would find something in common with
Menon and his people’’ (Princeton Seminars, Mar, 14, 1954, reel 2, track 2, p. 7).
See also John Gittings, The World and China, 1922-1972 (New York: Harper,
1974), p. 192; ef., FBIS, Daily Report, P’yOngyang, Nov. 26, 1952, p. EEE];
Vatcher memo for Colonel Greene, July 19, 1952, and Vatcher to General Harri-
son, July 28, 1952, Vatcher Papers, box 11,
306 BARTON J, BERNSTEIN
maintain a high defense budget; at times, in fact, he worried that
unhappiness with the war and inflation could injure his foreign and
defense policies.!!9 But when the likelihood of stalemate became
strong in the spring, he was personally and politically locked into his
position on voluntary repatriation. He would not repudiate what he
deemed a moral principle. Nor did Acheson, the adviser Truman most
trusted, counsel a reversal. Both men wanted this cold war victory.
They believed it might prevent further aggression, And Truman prob-
ably feared a backlash at home if he openly retreated and compromised
on the POW issue. Hostility in America could have impaired his foreign
policy and encouraged attacks on the mutual security program.
Had Truman wanted to reverse himself, and had he felt hemmed in
only by domestic politics, he might have maneuvered to co-opt his
critics and to gain the freedom to change policy. He could have floated
some trial balloons—speeches by administration members suggesting
flexibility on repatriation—to test the political winds. To push key
GOP members toward flexibility, he might have met with them, warned
of the prospect for a prolonged war, and implied that they would have
to bear the onus for this policy. He did not try these tactics, largely
because he did not want to reverse his position. The GOP attitudes
confirmed his own,
Ultimately, during the administration’s last seven months, it relied
upon bombing to coerce the Communists into a settlement. Truman
and his associates sought to wed military force and diplomacy. The
air war, by blasting North Korean cities and industries, might compel
the Communists to yield. By holding down American casualties, this
strategy reduced demands in America for withdrawing from the conflict
or expanding it to China. Despite the Truman administration’s hopes,
however, the strategy of bombing did not produce the desired Com-
munist tractability.
While Americans chafed at the continuing war, few asked if the
issue of voluntary repatriation justified the prolonged war. Did the
maintenance of what General Boatner deemed a dubious standard
justify the 125,000 UN casualities, including 32,000 Americans, in
the last fifteen months of the war?!*° From a less chauvinistic position,
even fewer asked, Should either side have refused to yield and thus
caused the hundreds of thousands of casualties and deaths, both military
and civilian, in those last fifteen months?
Truman and Acheson never had any doubts about the wisdom and
119. Acheson to Nitze, Sept. 17, 1952, Korea Lot File; Truman to John Sny-
der, Oct. 13, 1952, PSF; and Truman to Robert Lovett, Oct. 4, 1952, PSF.
120, Hermes, Truce Tent, pp, 500-501,
STRUGGLE OVER THE KOREAN ARMISTICE 307
rectitude of their policy. As a result, they should have found satisfac-
tion in President Eisenhower’s unwavering insistence on voluntary
repatriation. Ultimately he secured the victory on voluntary repatria-
tion that Truman had felt denied. On July 27, 1953, after Stalin’s
death, America’s nuclear threats, and America’s escalation of conven-
tional bombing, the warring powers signed an armistice agreement
that allowed voluntary repatriation and, in effect, maintained the
division of Korea, Ultimately 82,500 POWs (including 6,700 Chinese)
chose repatriation, while about 50,000 (including 14,700 Chinese)
decided not to return to their Communist homelands. !2!
Celebrating the armistice, John Foster Dulles, Eisenhower’s secre-
tary of state, publicly echoed the earlier hopes of Truman and Acheson.
The establishment of voluntary repatriation, Dulles asserted, was an
‘<mportant . . . principle.’’ Dulles explained, “The Soviet leaders fear
that, if they launch a major war of aggression, many of their soldiers
and airmen would seize the opportunity to desert [because] of the
right of enemy prisoners to enjoy political asylum. . . . As a result,
from now on, the Red Armies will be less dependable as tools of
aggression. We have increased the prospect of peace and added to the
security of our nation.’?!24
121. Truman and Walter Lippmann, among others, believed that the Eisen-
hower administration had made greater concessions (question in interview with
Bradley, Mar. 30, 1955, Post-Presidential File, Truman Library; and Walter Lipp-
mann, ‘“‘Today and Tomorrow,” Washington Post, Aug. 24, 1956, p. 19), They
were wrong, as Acheson pointed out (Acheson to Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., Sept. 27,
1954, and Acheson to Adlai Stevenson, Dec. 20, 1955, Acheson Papers). John
Foster Dulles to president, May 22, 1953, Dulles-Herter series, Dwight D. Eisen-
hower Library, Abilene, Kans.; Dwight D. Eisenhower, The White House Years,
1953-1956: Mandate for Change (Garden City: Doubleday, 1963), pp. 181-82;
Sherman Adams, First-Hand Report (New York: Harper, 1956), p. 48; cf. Fried-
man, “Nuclear Blackmail,” pp. 75-91; ‘‘The Attack on the Irrigation Dams in
North Korea,” Air University Review 6 (Winter 1953-54): 40-61; Futrell, U.S.
Air Force in Korea, pp. 623-29; oral history interview, Mark Clark (1972), 13,
Military History Collection; Hermes, Truce Tent, p. 515. Between July and Oc-
tober, 1952, the United States released about 38,000 civilian internees, including
some POWs, who, according to Acheson, were deceitfully reclassified to permit
their release (Princeton Seminars, Mar, 14, 1954, reel 2, track 1, p. 12).
122. Dulles address, Sept. 2, 1953, Department of State press release, Sept. 1,
1953, Korea Lot File,
Records in the National Archives
Relating to Korea, 1945-1950
JACK SAUNDERS
THE AMERICAN STUDENT OF RECENT KOREAN HISTORY SUFFERS MANY HANDI-
caps. The division of the Korean peninsula into two competing politi-
cal, social, and economic systems has resulted in the North being
closed off to the outside world and scholarly access restricted in the
South. The Korean War ravaged Korea’s historical heritage and to a
large extent diverted interest away from the study of the American
role in the five years preceding it. The history of Korea during this
half decade, the history of a people aspiring to reclaim national in-
tegrity, cannot be appreciated without a comprehensive understanding
of U.S. policy, its implementation, and its impact on post-World War II
Korea. In pursuing this understanding, the American student is no
longer at similar disadvantage. The records documenting U.S. involve-
ment in Korea in the years followmg World War II are increasingly
available to the public in the National Archives of the United States.
The National Archives, in addition to housing the heart of the
documentary heritage of the U.S. government, is the headquarters for
the agency of the General Services Administration entitled the National
Archives and Records Service (NARS), Of interest here are the Office
310 JACK SAUNDERS
of the National Archives and the Office of Federal Records Centers.
The former preserves, inventories, and provides reference service for
the records of the U.S. government selected for permanent preserva-
tion. The latter office controls the records centers around the country
that house federal agency documents that are used infrequently but are
nevertheless necessary to the functioning of government.
The most important requirements for doing research in the National
Archives are time and patience. The National Archives is a cultural
institution created primarily as a result of the interest of the scholarly
community, and it endeavors to be responsive to its needs. However,
the growth of its holdings over the past decade, accompanied by a
tremendous jump in the number of researchers utilizing its facilities,
has not been matched by any comparable growth in staff. Today,
it is impossible for even the most experienced and knowledgeable
member of the National Archives staff to know the system inside out,
and thus allow researchers to make maximum use of their time. This
paper, it is hoped, will ameliorate this problem for anyone interested in
Korea between 1945 and 1950 by surveying records from this period
with a particular emphasis on the General Archives Division (GAD).
Descriptions of each body of records include estimates of volume,
explanations of arrangement, current information on accessibility,
and general evaluations of the usefulness of the records.
THE MODERN MILITARY BRANCH
The Modern Military Branch (MMB) is a subdivision of the Military
Archives Division and has custody of military records that originated
after 1939. In general, these records are from the Washington head-
quarters of the military services.
Record Group 218
Records of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1942-53. The
Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) represent the views of the defense establish-
ment to the president and coordinate implementation of U.S. defense
policy. The JCS files relating to Korea show the development of mili-
tary occupation policy based largely on reports from Gen. John R,
Hodge, the commanding general of the U.S. Army Forces in Korea
(USAFIK) and Gen. Douglas MacArthur, the supreme commander
for the Allied powers (SCAP). They include papers expressing the
viewpoints of other policy-making bodies, such as the State-War-Navy
Coordinating Committee (SWNCC). The JCS records consist of policy
drafts, comments on the drafts, and policy statements; messages re
ceived from military commands; memoranda, reports, and correspon
dence, The development of JCS policy toward Korea is of particular
RECORDS IN THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES 311
interest because of the JCS’s failure to provide General Hodge with
adequate guidance concerning U.S. policy, particularly in the early
stages of the occupation. The lack of policy guidance was compounded
by the unique position of Korea as an occupied area. While Japan had
been an enemy nation, Korea had not, but its military government
was subordinate to MacArthur, who was for the most part preoccupied
with the problems of Japan. Consequently, liberated Korea received
less consideration than did defeated Japan.' One historian commented
that “The situation in Korea, like that of Japan, necessitated consid-
erable policy expression at the local level, for which prompt and timely
guidance was essential. The difference between Japan and Korea was
that General MacArthur was largely his own policy-expressor while
General Hodge was given broad and ambiguous responsibilities which
were greatly dependent upon more timely and responsible clarification
from his superiors.”
The records of the JCS for the 1942-53 period are segregated into
two sets of files—classified and declassified. In each of these they are
arranged by period as follows: 1942-45; 1946-47; 1948-50; and 1951-
53. Each period has a geographic file, arranged alphabetically by
country, and a general decimal file. The volume of records relating to
Korea totals approximately forty-six archive boxes, and about half of
those have been declassified.2 The volume of unclassified records for
the four periods, beginning with the earliest, is two, four, seven, and ten
archive boxes respectively. The general decimal file is simply a subject
file in which the various subjects are assigned decimal numbers accord-
ing to a filing system adopted in 1917, The War Department Decimal
File System.* This filing system is easy to understand, but sometimes
1. E. Grant Meade, American Military Government in Korea (New York:
King’s Crown Press, 1951), p. 76.
2. C. Leonard Hoag, “‘American Military Government in Korea: War Policy and
the First Year of Occupation, 1941-1946” (draft manuscript produced under the
auspices of the Center of Military History, Washington, D.C.), p. 475. Dr. Hoag had
official status as a Center of Military History historian while doing his research and
thus had access to most of the military records discussed in this paper. His manu-
script, and especially its citations, proved extremely useful in preparing this survey.
3. This paper will measure volume of records as so many archive or FRC boxes.
An archive box is a cardboard box capable of storing four linear inches or one-third
cubic foot of records. Most of the records in the National Archives building are
contained in these boxes. An FRC box is an eleven by fifteen by twelve-inch
cardboard box capable of storing about one cubic foot of records. Most of the
records in the Federal records centers are in FRC boxes,
4. The War Department Decimal File System: A Subjective Decimal Classifica
tion with a Complete Alphabetical Index for Use of the War Department and the
United States Army (Washington, D.C., 1943),
312 JACK SAUNDERS
difficult to use because it was not originally designed to apply to
civil affairs and military government records. It is impossible to esti-
mate the volume of records in the decimal file relating to Korea;
however, some files that one might assume are in the geographic file
are in the decimal file.
The JCS files have been reviewed for declassification and no addi-
tional review will take place without a special request under Executive
Order (EO) 11652 or under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).
EO 11652, issued in 1972, included a provision encouraging agencies
to declassify documents requested by the public. It provides for manda-
tory review of documents that have been classified ten years or more.
If a request for declassification is turned down by the agency that
originated the document, a requester may appeal to that agency’s
review committee, and if again unsuccessful, to the Interagency Classi-
fication Review Committee. EO 11652 is still in effect, although
many researchers prefer to request declassification under the FOIA.
The FOIA was enacted by Congress in 1966 and is considered
“milestone legislation that reversed long-standing government informa-
tion practices.” In 1972, the House Government Operations Com-
mittee determined that ‘‘efficient operation of the Freedom of In-
formation Act has been hindered by 5 years of foot-dragging by the
Federal bureaucracy.’© In response, Congress amended the 1966 law
over the veto of President Ford. The FOIA of 1975 allows the public
to request access to any existing records of the executive branch of
government that do not fall under any of the designated exempt
categories and that the requester can identify sufficiently to enable
the government to locate the records. It also establishes a ten-day
time limit within which the government must respond to the request.
When the National Archives is unable to comply with a request for
access under the FOIA, the most frequent reason is that the requested
5. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Government Operations, A Citizen's
Guide on How to Use the Freedom of Information Act and the Privacy Act in
Requesting Government Documents, 95th Cong., Ist sess., H. Rept. 95-783, p. 5
(Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1977). This is a comprehensive
guide, but it does not mention that the Privacy Act does not apply to records
accessioned into the National Archives. It applies to active government records.
NARS is itself responsible for protecting the privacy of individuals whose names
appear on formally accessioned records. For further information, see NARS Gen»
eral Information Leaflet No. 27, ‘‘General Restrictions on Access to Records in the
National Archives of the United States” (General Services Administration, 1976),
This leaflet contains a summary of NARS restrictions on access that illustrates the
general scope and content of NARS policies on access when national security is
not a consideration.
6. Ibid.
RECORDS IN THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES 313
document falls under one of the two following categories of records ex-
empted by the act: documents that are appropriately classified in the
interest of national security and documents that contain information
about the private lives of individuals. In protecting the privacy of both
American and foreign citizens, the National Archives staff has the diffi-
cult task of “balancing the interests between disclosure and nondisclo-
sure. The public’s right to know must be weighed against the indivi-
dual’s right to privacy.”
When the records are reviewed by NARS Declassification Division,
all documents that cannot be declassified are removed from the files.
In the case of the JCS files, classified documents can be identified by
using the listing of papers that accompany every folder. In the case of
all other record groups discussed in this paper, any document that can-
not be declassified is removed from the box and replaced by a with-
drawal card that gives enough information to identify the document,
both for refiling when it is declassified and for allowing researchers to
request that it be reviewed for declassification.
The screening of documents for information that, if released, would
invade individuals’ privacy is usually the responsibility of the NARS
staff member who is helping the researcher. In the case of the JCS rec-
ords and most of the other record groups in the MMB relating to opera-
tional planning, policy implementation, and policy development, the
problem of access to records containing personal information about
living individuals is not too serious.
Record Group 165
Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs, Civil
Affairs Division, 1943-49. The Civil Affairs Division (CAD) of the War
Department’s Office of the Chief of Staff was directly concerned with
all aspects of civil affairs and military government. The records of the
CAD reflect the many interests of the division. It was the central clear-
ing house for all army civil affairs actions and was represented on many
civilian and military advisory boards, including the SWNCC. It had
responsibility for preparing civil affairs plans and policies, advising mili-
tary commanders on occupational activities, assessing the success of the
military in the implementation of civil affairs plans, and receiving and
distributing civil affairs reports.2 The CAD records are the most com-
7. Ibid., ps 12.
8. Departmental Records Branch, Administrative Services Division, The Adju-
tant General’s Office, Guide to Civil Affairs and Military Government Records in
the Adjutant General’s Records Centers, Part 1; General Description of Records
(Washington D, C., 1952) pp. 4-5, This guide is outdated, but it contains some
very useful information on the structure of military agencies and the arrangement
314 JACK SAUNDERS
plete collection of documents relating to planning, development, and
operation of military government.?
There are six-hundred archive boxes of CAD records and these are
well indexed. Most relate to U.S. occupational activities in Japan, Ger-
many, Italy, and Austria; the exact volume of documentation relating
to Korea is difficult to determine because the records are arranged
according to the War Department decimal file system. Lists of docu-
ments included in the records are filed at the beginning of each period
into which the CAD files are divided. These lists are also arranged ac-
cording to the War Department’s decimal file system. Many of the
CAD documents relating to Korea are filed under decimal 014 for
Korea in approximately five archive boxes. Documents not found under
decimal 014 can be located using the document lists. The CAD records
have been reviewed for declassification and do not normally require
screening.
In 1946 the Operations Division (OPD) of the War Department
General Staff, in a reorganization of the military establishment, became
the Plans and Operations Division (POD) under the assistant chief of
staff, (G-3, operations). In general, the POD prepared army logistical
and operational plans. In the area of military government and civil af-
fairs, the POD shared with the CAD the responsibility for planning and
appointed a full-time liaison officer to work with the CAD.
The records of the OPD and the succeeding POD are arranged and
indexed by time period according to the War Department decimal file
system. Many of their documents relating to Korea are filed under the
decimal 091 for Korea; others are scattered throughout the files under
other subject decimals. An index to each period exists, consisting of
cross-reference sheets that give short summaries of each document,
The index for each period is located at the beginning of the records for
that particular period. Under decimal 091 are cross-reference sheets
for all documents on Korea that appear in the subsequent period,
whether or not they are filed under 091.
The volume of records is difficult to estimate, but a conservative
guess is that at least half of the substantive records relating to Korea are
filed under decimals other than 091. Under 091 there are approxi-
mately five archive boxes for all periods. These operations records
of their files. Perhaps its most useful feature is Appendix 1, entitled “Selected
Army Decimal Numbers Used in Filing Papers Relating to Civil Affairs and Military
Government Matters.” Anyone wishing to use any of the general decimal files
arranged according to the War Department decimal file system in doing research on
civil affairs or military government-related topics might want to ask a knowledge-
able NARS staff member to make available a copy of this guide.
9. Hoag, ‘American Military Government in Korea,” p, 479.
RECORDS IN THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES 315
have been reviewed for declassification and do not normally require
screening.
Record Group 165
Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs, Ameri-
can-British Conversation Files, 1942-46. The American-British Conver-
sation files, better known as the ABC files, are the designation of the
records of the Strategy and Policy Group (SPG) of the OD. In Wash-
ington Command Post, Ray S. Cline writes: “In matters of joint or
combined strategic planning and policy, the most important collection
of World War II records in Washington (with possible exception of the
JCS records) is the Strategy and Policy Group file.” He continues, “It iv
especially valuable because OPD drafts, comments, and related papers
appear ne the JCS, CCS [Combined Chiefs of Staff], and SWNOG
papers.” In addition, the ABC files reflect the fact that all commun
ications between CAD and field commanders had to be cleared with
the SPG,"!
The ABC files are arranged according to the War Department deci
mal file system, and decimals relating to Korea are seatiered through
out. Many are filed under decimal 014 for Japan, They have heen ve
viewed for declassification and screening is usually unnecessary.
Other Records
Other bodies of records in the MMB of interest to the student of
Korean history are: Records of the Adjutant General's Office, Decimal
files, 1917-54 (Record Group 407); Records of the Office of the Seeve
tary of the Army, Central Correspondence file, 1947-54 (Reeord Group
335); Records of the Office of the Secretary of War, Office of the See
retary, 1937-45 (Record Group 107); Records of the Army Stall,
Office of the Chief of Staff, 1942-50 (Record Group 319); and Reeords
of the Office of Strategic Services, Research and Analysis Branch,
1941-46 (Record Group 226). Although the bodies of records in the
MMB already discussed are more important than any of the above,
these do contain valuable documentation, In general, all but the last
of these contain documentation relating to Korea similar to that found
in JCS, CAD, POD, and ABC files. The records of the Adjutant Gene
al’s Office (TAGO) and the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) are both
massive collections of documentation. The former is of particulwy
interest because of the broad variety of records in its files; the lattes
10. Ray S. Cline, Washington Command Post: The Operations Division, United
States Army in World War II (Washington, D. C.; Center of Military History, GPO
1951), p. 383.
11. Hoag, “American Military Government in Korea,” p, 16.
316 JACK SAUNDERS
because of its detailed information on Korea and its leaders both during
and in the immediate aftermath of World War II.
The decimal files of the Adjutant General’s Office, known as the
AG central files, have over 18,000 archive boxes of records and over
5,000 rolls of microfilm. Arranged according to the War Department
decimal file system, these records consist of correspondence and other
documents originating from all divisions of TAGO in the War Depart-
ment General and Special Staffs and the Office of the Secretary of the
Army. The AG central files have been reviewed for declassification and
can usually be made available without extensive screening.
The OSS Research and Analysis Branch records in the MMB include
a library file of intelligence documents created by OSS units and other
U.S. intelligence-gathering agencies. This file consists of approximately
284,500 documents indexed by over 900,000 index cards. The index
is comprehensive, with cards on intelligence documents relating to
Korea through 1945 and even a few for 1946. One problem with access
to this file is that each document stands alone. The index cards are ar-
ranged by country and thereunder by subject, but the documents them-
selves are filed by number without any grouping by subject or geo-
graphical area. Thus, the retrieval of each intelligence document in-
volves a separate search. In addition, although most of the records are
declassified, they require careful screening.
THE DIPLOMATIC BRANCH
The Diplomatic Branch (DB) of the Civil Archives Division has
records relating to U.S. diplomacy, including all State Department rec-
ords. Records relating to Korea between 1945 and 19449 are in the deci-
mal file and the special collections of the State Department. The de-
partment has not yet released records of subsequent years, nor dele-
gated to the National Archives the authority to declassify them.
Record Group 59
General Records of the Department of State, Decimal File, 1945-
49. From 1910 to 1963, most of the records of the State Department
were indexed according to its decimal filing system, which is similar to
the War Department’s.!* Documents in the file include instructions to
and dispatches from diplomatic and consular officials, notes between
the State Department and foreign diplomatic representatives in the
United States, memoranda prepared by department officials and corre-
spondence with other U.S. government departments, private firms, and
12. A detailed explanation of the State Department filing system can be found
in Classification of Correspondence, 4th ed, (Washington, D.C.: Department of
State, 1989), available on NARS Microfilm Publication M600,
RECORDS IN THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES 317
individuals. The 9,000 archive boxes of the 1945-49 records are filed
together as one of the decimal file’s five-year segments. They have been
reviewed for declassification and screening is not usually necessary ex-
cept for documents filed under decimals that identify them as contain-
ing biographical information.
There are three indexes to the decimal file for this period: (1) a sub-
ject index with cards arranged by decimal; (2) a name index in which
the correspondence with individuals or private organizations is arranged
alphabetically; and (3) a source index in which correspondence with
U.S. embassies and consulates abroad, with foreign governments or rep-
resentatives of foreign governments, and with other U.S. government
departments or agencies is arranged alphabetically. The subject index is
the most comprehensive. The easiest way to use it is to check the cards
filed under a few basic decimal numbers that should identify docu-
ments pertaining to one’s research topic. Cards filed under these num-
bers inevitably include cross references to documents filed under other
decimals. For example, under the decimal 985.00 (internal affairs,
Korea) one can also find cards listing documents filed under 711.95
(U.S.-Korean relations).
The State Department’s decimal file contains a comprehensive col-
lection of documents of enormous importance in the study of U.S. dip-
lomatic relations. It is not, however, without its shortcomings. One
archivist on the GAD staff sharply questioned the research value of
State Department records in general and the decimal file in particu-
lar: “The most common complaint registered about the records of
the State Department is that they contain little significant documen-
tation: very little which establishes policy or delineates factions or al-
ternatives to the course of action the United States pursued. The
criticism is especially valid for the central files [decimal file] which
were a dumping ground for all sorts of useless trivia of government.”
While this criticism is perhaps excessive, members of the staff of the DB
are quick to point out that the decimal file is not without drawbacks.
Although comprehensive, it often never received copies of critical State
Department documents. Department officials were sometimes reluctant
to see their office files dispersed in the decimal files. Some of these short-
comings are compensated, however, by the DB’s special collections.
Special Collections of the Department of State
In recent years, the DB has accessioned various groups of records
that concern U.S. foreign relations but are not part of the State Depart-
13, James Edward Miller, ‘federal Records of World War Il: The European
Resistance,’’ October 1974, p. 20.
318 JACK SAUNDERS
ment’s decimal file. In some cases these records include duplicates of
documents in the decimal file, but mostly they consist of unique records
maintained as individual office, reference, or working files. They are
generally referred to as special collections, and are arranged according
to the purposes for which they were created or maintained.
Records documenting the development of U.S. policy regarding the
military occupation of Korea and the establishment of an independent
government in South Korea can be found among the 147 archive boxes of
the SWNCC and the State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee
(SANACC) for 1944-49. The SWNCC was established in 1944 to coordi-
nate U.S. foreign and defense policy and was renamed after the passage of
the National Security Act of 1947. The SWNCC and SANACC files in-
clude minutes and agenda of meetings, committee decisions, reports,
memoranda, and correspondence. The basic research aid for the files isa
box list. The SWNCC and SANACC files have been reviewed for declas-
sification and screened for privacy protection. They are now being edited
and filmed by Scholarly Resources Inc. of Wilmington, Delaware, which
will soon market them as a microfilm publication.
Sixteen archive boxes of files of the American Delegation, U.S.-
USSR Joint Commission on Korea (JCK) and seven archive boxes of
records relating to the UN Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK)
are maintained together as one of the special collections in the DB. The
JCK was established as a result of the Moscow Agreement of December
27, 1945, to facilitate the formation of a provisionary Korean govern-
ment. It first met on March 20, 1946. When an impasse was reached in
1947, the United States laid the question of Korean independence and
unification before the UN. UNTCOK was established on November 14,
1947 to report on elections in Korea, The JCK records include minutes,
agenda, and transcripts of meetings, messages, correspondence, and
reports. The UNTCOK records include documents on preparations for
Korean elections, intelligence summaries, messages, reports on the con-
duct of the election and on Korean public opinion, press releases, and
numbered special reports. These records have been reviewed for declas-
sification and no extensive screening of the files is necessary. The find-
ing aid for the JCK and UNTCOK records is a folder list.
In 1947 President Truman sent Gen. Albert Wedemeyer on a mis-
sion to China to gather information on political conditions there.
During his mission, Wedemeyer gathered data relating to conditions in
China and Korea, and four of the eleven archive boxes in the special
collection of records of the Wedemeyer Mission contain materials on
Korea. Two of these contain data on political and economic conditions
in Korea and reports on U.S. military government activities there, and
RECORDS IN THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES S19
the other two are full of original letters and memorials sent by Koreans
to General Wedemeyer while he was in China. There is a folder list to
aid in locating these records. They have been reviewed for declansition
tion and no extensive screening is necessary.
THE GENERAL ARCHIVES DIVISION
The records on Korea in the MMB and the DB emphasize the devel-
opment of U.S. military and diplomatic policy toward Korea in the
post-World War II era; in GAD they emphasize the implementation of
that policy. During the early stayes of the U.S. occupation of Korea,
General Hodge, and the tactical wnit commanders and military govern-
ment officers serving under him, lacking adequate guidance from Wash-
ington, made the decisions that later became official U.S, policy. They
based their decisions on their conception of what was happening in
Korea. Reports on the Korean political, social, and economie situation
can be found in military unit records at all levels, from the smallest
tactical or civil affairs unit to the general headquarters of the Far East
Command (FEC), or even to the intelligence files of the War Depart.
ment in Washington. These and other records relating to Korea are in
GAD, and they should be of great interest to anyone studying Korea,
not only because of the richness of the documentation, but also be
cause so few researchers have studied them to date.
GAD receives its name from the great diversity of the records in its
custody. Among its 400,000 cubic feet of records are some of virtually
every major U.S. government agency, from the 1790s to the 1970s.
These records are the ‘‘overflow”’ from the National Archives building.
GAD is located in the Washington National Records Center in the fed-
eral complex in Suitland, Maryland, but is not part of the system of
federal records centers (FRC). All the records in GAD have been acces-
sioned into the National Archives, and eventually both its records and
staff will be transferred to a new depository to be built near the Na-
tional Archives building. Almost all of the records on Korea in GAD are
military. In 1956, when the Departmental Records Branch of the Adju-
tant General’s Office was terminated, its facilities, most of its staff, and
the records in its custody became part of NARS. In 1968, the records
from the Departmental Records Branch that had not already been
transferred to the National Archives building were moved to the new
Federal Records Center. Soon after this move the enormous volume
of records of U.S. Army commands for the World War Il-Korean War
period, which were in the Kansas City Federal Records Center, were
moved to the Washington National Records Center and became part of
GAD.
The records transferred from the Departmental Records Branch had
ant JACK SAUNDERS
adequate finding aids, but more than 25,000 FRC boxes received from
Kansas City did not. In the last eight years little has been done to im-
prove the situation, and the usefulness of what finding aids there are,
consisting of cards or army shipping forms giving often outdated con-
tents and box numbers, has deteriorated. There is hope, however. The
GAD staff has grown over the last two years, and although the process
of inventorying these records will take many years, it has begun.
Records of the United States Army Forces in Korea, 1945-49
All U.S. forces in the occupation of Korea were subordinate to one
command and one man, USAFIK and General Hodge. Hodge was also
the commander of the Twenty-fourth Corps, the U.S. tactical command
in Korea, and directed civil government in Korea through his deputy,
the military governor of Korea, who was also the commander of the
U.S. Army Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK). Thus, there
were basically two subdivisions of USAFIK, the Twenty-fourth Corps
for managing the military and USAMGIK for the civil functions of the
occupation. Although this division by function should be reflected in
the existing records of USAFIK, it, unfortunately, is not.
There are approximately 10,000 FRC boxes in GAD documenting
the history of the occupation of Japan and an additional 3,000 docu-
menting the U.S. military in Japan during this period. There is a similar
volume and division of records for the occupation of the U.S. zone in
Germany. No discrete body of records, however, has yet been located
in the National Archives that can be described as the records of the
USAMGIK. Of course, the occupation of Korea was for a shorter period
of time, involved smaller forces, and was conducted at a much lower
level in the military chain of command than the occupations of Japan
and Germany, but this does not adequately account for the large gap in
the records.
There are approximately 180 FRC boxes currently shelved in GAD
as either records of the Twenty-fourth Corps or USAFIK. At least a
third of these pertains to the operations of the Twenty-fourth Corps be-
fore the occupation or are not historically significant files, should not
have been preserved, and will eventually be destroyed. The most signi-
ficant of these records consist of forty-six totally unindexed FRC boxes
labeled as follows: Record Group 332, Records of U.S. Theaters of
War, World War II, USAFIK, Twenty-fourth Corps, G-2, Historical Sec-
tion.!4 These files were set up by Twenty-fourth Corps personnel
during the occupation of Korea for the production of two lengthy
14. This designation will probably be changed at some future date to Record
Group (hereafter RG) 338 (Records of U.S. Army Commands) once they are in-
ventoried,
RECORDS IN THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES 321
manuscripts that are now in the U.S. Army’s Center of Military History
in Washington, D.C.!° The files themselves are of more interest than the
histories of USAFIK and USAMGIK that they were used to produce.
They are the most extensive available source of documents relating to
the occupation of Korea. Dr C. Leonard Hoag described this collection
in a manuscript prepared for the Center of Military History in 1970:
The richest source of materials . . . [is] the miscellaneous collections of papers of
the XXIV Corps, USAFIK, and USAMGIK. These were originally contained in
twenty-two file drawers as packaged in Korea, and are now dispersed in numbered
boxes. ... For convenience, they may be divided into five categories: 1) Admini-
strative and Operations data of USAMGIK: General Orders, ordinances, Official
Gazettes, Manuals of Organization and Operations, Weekly Reports, Proclamations,
and Outgoing Messages. This collection is extensive but incomplete; 2) Brief, incom-
plete manuscript histories of the various departments and sections of USAMGIK
with some supporting papers; 3) Folders and packages of supporting data for
specific chapters of the three volume typescript ‘“‘History of the United States
Army Forces in Korea, . . .”; 4) “Historical Journal” (Information and Historical
Section of USAFIK) which consists of thirteen loose-leaf notebooks with typed
daily records of conferences, policy decisions, contemporary events, press data,
on-the-spot interviews and analyses from 1945 to 1948; 5) Miscellaneous data on
Korean personalities, North and South Korean press translations, as well as some
reports from the 6th, 7th, and 40th Divisions to USAFIK.16
These records have been declassified and screened.
In his manuscript, Dr. Hoag expresses regret that ‘‘a potential major
source, the Commanding General’s File of General Hodge . . . has yet to
be located as a separate file.”!” This statement no longer applies. Gen-
eral Hodge’s correspondence file, consisting of approximately six inches
of documentation, is part of an eighty FRC-box series of USAFIK files
in GAD.!® These files also include historical reports on various USAFIK
operations (Ydsu, Turkey Trot, and Gun Shot), the internal situation in
South Korea, and Thirty-eighth-parallel incidents. Files for most of the
sections of USAFIK headquarters appear to be included, but they are
quite disorganized. Presently, the only way for a researcher to insure
that all records pertinent to his interest are located is to examine every
single box, This should not be as difficult as it might seem. The GAD
staff, taking into consideration the uninventoried state of many of the
15, The two manuscripts are: USAFIK, Twenty-fourth Corps, G-2, Historical
Section, “History of the United States Army Military Government in Korea, Sep-
tember 1945-30 June 1946,” 3 vols., typescript, 1947; and “History of the United
States Army Forces in Korea, 1945-1947,” 3 vols., typescript, 1947,
16. Hoag, “American Military Government in Korea,” pp. 476-77.
17. Ibid., p. 477.
18. Until these files are inventoried they can be most easily identified as RG
338, USAFIK, Unit 11071, boxes 1-36 (actually there are only 29 FRC boxes;
some numbers are missing) and Unit 11070, boxes 67-126 (52 FRG boxes),
322 JACK SAUNDERS
series of records in its custody, often feels obligated to go to the ex-
treme of pulling large numbers of boxes and hauling them to the re-
search room. In this case, however, these records must be reviewed for
declassification before researchers can see them.
Certainly after thirty years almost all of the classified documents in-
cluded in USAFIK files can and should be declassified and open to the
public. The two principal reasons they are not are volume and priority.
The volume of classified records in the National Archives awaiting
review for declassification is enormous. Among them, based on re-
searcher interest, the USAFIK files have been assigned a low priority in
the declassification schedule. The Declassification Division of NARS
did not plan on reviewing the eighty boxes of USAFIK files before
1979. At present, access to these records can only be obtained through
EO 11652 or the FOIA.'9
Record Group 319
Records of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Intelligence Library
File, 1944-54, The Intelligence Library file in GAD consists of several
records series. These include: the Army-Intelligence Project file, the
Publications file, and the Intelligence Data (ID) Document file. Of
these three, the Army-Intelligence Project file is the least significant.
The “projects” are subjects under which the records are arranged ac-
cording to the War Department decimal file system. About two boxes
of records relating to Korea are in this file for the 1946-48 period;
the same number exists for the 1949-50 period. Most of the documents
in this file are of limited value, and many are simply cover letters once
attached to documents that are now filed elsewhere. The project has
not been reviewed for declassification.
The Publications file is a much utilized source of documents. Bas-
ically, it includes serialized reports received from U.S. Army, Air Force,
and Navy commands and organizations, U.S. and Allied intelligence
agencies, the State Department, and the private sector. Among the
records in the 2,350 FRC boxes in this series are intelligence summaries
created by USAFIK, the FEC, the U.S.-Korean Military Advisory
Group, and the Twenty-fourth Corps; Allied Translator and Intelligence
Service translations of both North and South Korean documents, and
19. Records requested under both the executive order and the FOIA must be
adequately identified. NARS Declassification Division will review moderate vol-
umes of records under EO 11652 that are only identified by organization and box
number. Key boxes one might request be reviewed in the USAFIK files are: Unit
11070, boxes 67-68 (Hodge correspondence and reports on thirty-eighth-parallel
incidents), and Unit 11071, boxes 2-9, 16-17 (Adjutant General’s section reports
and G-5 section operational reports).
RECORDS IN THE NATIONAL ARGHIVES 323
research reports produced by the Central Intelligence Agency. The find-
ing aid to this series of publications is an alphabetical card file, The
records are also arranged alphabetically. The usefulness of this file is
greatly enhanced by the simplicity of both the index and the arrange-
ment of the records. This file hus been reviewed for declassification and
does not contain many records (hal require screening.
The finding aid to the ID) Document file is easy to understand, but
the file’s actual usefulness is lessened by the present security classifica-
tion of the index and the arrangement of the records. Apparently when
the War Department created the Intelligence Library file, all incoming
intelligence data were filed by subject, in the case of most serialized
publications, or by ID numbers assigned in sequence as documents
arrived from all over the world, As with the intelligence files of the Re-
search and Analysis Branch of the OSS, each document in the ID Docu-
ment file series stands alone and can only be located through a separate
search.
The index cards to the ID file are arranged by country and there-
under by subject. Each of the 3,000 to 4,000 index cards in the file for
Korea lists from one to ten documents, A card normally lists the agency
and date of origin, and the subject of each document. Currently the ID
documents are in 10,000 archive boxes shelved in the upper tier of a stack
area, so a ladder must be used to retrieve them. Many of the documents
are worth the time spent locating them. Some are easily recognizable as
possibly the only existing copy of a significant report. Most, however,
consist of either intelligence data in such raw form as to be indigestible,
or of reports more easily available elsewhere. Often, only a cross-refer-
ence sheet to the Publications file, or worse still, a twenty-year old
“‘charge-out” card is the result of a search.
Although there are probably very few cards in this entire index that
should not be routinely declassified, the index has never been reviewed
and all cards that could not be declassified removed. As for the security
status of the ID documents, the Declassification Division has declassi-
fied approximately the first third of the entire file. All documents
dated 1946, and many dated 1947, have been reviewed, but it will be
years before the entire file can be reviewed. Before any ID documents
can be released they must be carefully screened. The current GAD
policy regarding access to the ID Document file is that a researcher may
request documents relating to a topic, but only the reference staff has
access to the index.
Records Seized by U.S. Military Forces in Korea, 1921-52
Probably the most valuable collection of records anywhere in the
world outside of North Korea concerning its political, economic, and
military activities during the 1945-50 period is in approximately 1,000
324 JACK SAUNDERS
archive boxes in GAD. The research potential of these records for any-
one interested in the study of almost any aspect of North Korean his-
tory is boundless. These records include correspondence, office files,
personnel files, printed materials (both North and South Korean period-
icals and newspapers), bulletins, and photographs relating to the govern-
ment, the courts, and the army. Most of this collection appears to have
been captured when the UN forces occupied P’ySngyang during the
Korean War. Annotated shipping lists briefly describing each document
in the series provide an almost ideal index. These lists have been micro-
filmed and may be purchased from GAD. The records are not classified
and do not need to be screened. The only possible problem that this
body of material presents to the researcher is the absence of any trans-
lations. (The annotated lists are in English, but the seized records are
in Korean).
Record Group 407
Records of the Adjutant General’s Office, Unit Historical File,
1941-48, and Occupied Area Reports, 1945-54. GAD has 23,600 ar-
chive boxes of U.S. Army unit historical files for the years 1941-48.
These records are arranged by unit and besides action reports, include
daily journals, messages, and other files of the various sections of vir-
tually every army organizational entity from entire theaters of opera-
tion to the smallest military police company. Although the bulk of the
documentary materials contained in these files pertain to the actions of
army units in World War II, there are some valuable documents con-
cerning some of the units active in the occupation of Korea, For in-
stance, the intelligence files of USAFIK, the Sixth Infantry Division,
and the 971st Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment include signifi-
cant reports of the unrest and rebellion that took place throughout
South Korea in October and November 1948. These records are declas-
sified, but some must be screened.
The Occupied Area Reports consist of 1,300 archive boxes of re-
ports, intelligence summaries, directives, regulations, civil affairs hand-
books, press releases, and other materials generated by U.S. military
and State Department personnel who participated in American military
governments. There are 120 boxes in this file that contain records of
political, social, and economic affairs in Korea primarily between 1945
and 1949. Although most of this material has not been reviewed, it can
easily be declassified. Screening of these records is usually unnecessary.
U.S. Army Records
Record of the U.S. Army Forces Pacific, the Far Kast Command,
and the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, 1945-52, In April
RECORDS IN THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES 325
1945, the Pacific war was approaching its final phase with the assault
on the Japanese home islands. The JCS prepared for the last campaign in
the Pacific by designating General MacArthur commander in chief of
U.S. Army Forces in the Pacific (AFPAC), giving him control over all
army and army-air force units for the invasion of Japan. On August 15,
V-J Day, the AFPAC commander was given an additional post. As
supreme commander for the Allied powers, MacArthur accepted the
Japanese surrender and supervised the occupations of both Japan and
Korea. In January 1947, in addition to his supremacy in army and oc-
cupational matters in the East and Southeast Asian area, MacArthur
became the commander in chief in the Far East (CINCFE), and the
AFPAC command became the FEC. As CINCFE, MacArthur had vari-
ous degrees of responsibility for all army, navy, and air force commands
in East and Southeast Asia.
The 3,000 FRC boxes of records of General Headquarters (GHQ),
AFPAC/FEC, and the 10,000 FRC boxes of records of GHQ/SCAP
are arranged as they were when they were submitted. Their arrange-
ment reflects the complicated interrelated organizational structure of
these two commands.
The records of GHQ, FEC, and AFPAC are filed together, and the
records of their staff sections include many of the files of previous com-
mands, The AFPAC/FEC records of interest to most researchers study-
ing Korea are those of the G-2 (intelligence) and of the G-3 (opera-
tions) sections. Most of the AFPAC/FEC files have not been reviewed
by the Declassification Division. Special reviews can be requested for
small portions of the files under EO 11652. In this manner, the AFPAC/-
FEC daily Intelligence Summaries have been declassified through
December 1950. Each daily summary consists of a small magazine-size
publication summarizing the military, political, and economic situation
in East and Southeast Asia. These summaries were compiled from
intelligence reports received from military intelligence gathering units
throughout the AFPAC/FEC area of responsibility. They contain
estimates of the situation in North and South Korea.
The records of GHQ/SCAP should offer enormous research poten-
tial for the student of Korean history; unfortunately, however, they
offer very little, and what they do offer is so dispersed throughout the
files that it is not usually worth the trouble of searching for them. The
Government Section of GHQ/SCAP was established on October 2,
1945, and from then until a reorganization in February 1947, the two
divisions of the Government Section were the Public Administration
Division, which supervised civil government in Japan, and the Korean
Division, which “functioned as a rear echelon in ‘Tokyo for United
States Army Military Government in Korea, reported on military
326 JACK SAUNDERS
government operations there, and expedited liaison between the Tokyo
and Seoul headquarters.””° In February 1947, the Korean Division was
transferred to the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, SCAP. Only
seventeen FRC boxes of records for this office are included with the
GHQ/SGAP files. The records of the Korean Division are not among
them, and there does not appear to be any discrete body of records
relating to military government in Korea in the SCAP records. Aside
from the status and activities of the Korean minority in Japan, they are
of limited interest to someone studying Korea. As one historian wrote,
“The files of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers as located
in Washington and MacArthur Memorial Library in Norfolk, Virginia,
contain few records of major value on Korea which are not to be found
in other Army files.”?! Most of the SCAP files have been reviewed for
declassification, but they must sometimes be screened before they can
be made available.
CONCLUSION
The Carter administration is currently considering an executive
order that will eventually accelerate the declassification of records in
the National Archives. This order, however, will not significantly affect
the accessibility of records in the GAD relating to Korea, 1945-50.
Long before the Declassification Division can expand its staff and
accelerate its program, virtually all of the records in the GAD discussed
in this paper will have been reviewed and declassified. But declassifica-
tion of the records is not necessarily going to make them accessible.
First they must be inventoried, and this is a much more difficult and
time-consuming task than declassification. Moreover, after records are
declassified, arranged, and inventoried, they often cannot be made
available until they have been screened.
During the past several years the work load of the GAD reference
staff has increased such that it threatens the quality of reference ser-
vice. The project staff has expanded over the last two years to remedy
this, and the situation should improve. As inventories are prepared,
important records bearing on Korean-American relations will undoubt-
edly be discovered. The files of USAMGIK or the Korean Division of
SCAP may even be located.
20. U.S. Department of War, GHQ, SCAP, and FEC, “Selected Data on the Oc-
cupation of Japan, Organization and Activities of General Headquarters, Supreme
Commander for the Allied Powers and the Far East Command,” (Tokyo, n.d.,
[probably 1950]), p. 174.
21. Hoag, ‘American Military Government in Korea,” p. 478.
Contributors
BARTON BERNSTEIN is Professor of History at Stanford University. He
has written numerous articles on the Korean War, the Truman-Mac-
Arthur controversy, the ending of the Pacific War, and the atomic
bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. He is the editor of several volumes,
including Towards a New Past: Dissenting Essays in American History
(Vintage).
BRUCE CUMINGS is Associate Professor of International Studies at the
University of Washington. He is the author of several articles on Korean
politics, Chinese foreign policy, and American foreign policy, as well
as The Origins of the Korean War: Liberation and the Emergence of
Separate Regimes, 1945-1947 (Princeton).
LLOYD GARDNER is Professor of History at Rutgers University. His many
publications include Economic Aspects of New Deal Diplomacy (Wis-
consin) and Architects of Illusion: Men and Ideas in American Foreign
Policy, 1941-1949 (Quadrangle),
Jon HAtLmpay is on the editorial board of New Left Review and
is the author of numerous publications on Korea and Japan, including
A Political History of Japanese Capitalism (Pantheon).
Joun Korcu received his Ph.D. from Columbia University. During
the 1976 presidential campaign he served as Coordinator of the Carter
Foreign Policy and Defense Task Force. He is the author of several
articles on U.S. policy toward Korea, as well as From White Plains
to Plains: A Campaign Odyssey.
JAMES MATRAY is Assistant Professor of History at New Mexico State
University. He received his Ph.D. from the University of Virginia
in 1977 with a doctoral dissertation entitled, ‘“The Reluctant Crusade:
$27
——S—“‘ ‘w’”w!w]WwwwWwtwr”WDWWwt”” GSS
328 CONTRIBUTORS
American Foreign Policy in Korea, 1941-1950.” He is the author
of “Captive of the Cold War: The Decision to Divide Korea at the
38th Parallel,” Pacific Historical Review (1981), and ‘‘Truman’s Plan
for Victory,” Journal of American History (September 1979), which
won the Stuart L. Bernath Award.
JouN MERRILL is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Lafayette
College. He received his Ph.D. from the University of Delaware, and
he is the author of several articles, including “The Cheju-do Rebel-
lion,” Journal of Korean Studies (1980).
MARK PaAuL did graduate work at Stanford University, was an editor
at Inquiry Magazine, and now is on the editorial board of the Oakland
Tribune.
STEPHEN PELZ is Associate Professor of History at the University of
Massachusetts. He is the author of Race to Pearl Harbor (Harvard)
and, most recently, “John F. Kennedy’s 1961 Vietnam Decisions,”
Journal of Strategic Studies (1981).
Joun SAUNDERS served in the U.S. Peace Corps in Korea and is cur-
rently an archivist with the National Records Center.
WILLIAM STUECK is Assistant Professor of History at the University
of Georgia. He received his Ph.D. from Brown University, and he is
the author of The Road to Confrontation: American Policy toward
China and Korea, 1947-1950 (North Carolina).
Acheson, Dean: and march into North
Korea, 197-200, 206-8, 210-12,
214-19, 226-37; and policy toward
ending the Korean War, 264-67,
269, 271, 274, 277, 279-83, 286,
288-89, 295, 299-306; and U.S.
policy, 8, 21, 29n, 31-33, 37-38,
42, 44-50, 61-66, 101-2, 111,
112, 119-32, 153, 155, 168, 173,
175, 193
Air Force, U.S., and the Korean War,
265, 269, 271-72, 291, 293-95,
298
Allison, John, 52, 176, 197-200, 216
Ambrose, Stephen, 57, 62
Armistice in Korean War, 245-56,
258, 262-76, 288, 298
Armistice line, disputes over, 268-72
Army, U.S. Department of: position
on the march into North Korea,
196, 202; position on Korea, 107,
179, 181, 183, 185-86, 189
Arnold, Archibald V., 19
Atlantic Charter, 97
Atomic bomb: possible use of, in
Korea, 53, 290, 291, 307; and
Soviet entry into Pacific War, 72-75,
77, 79-81, 85, 91
Austin, Warren, 180, 215
Ayers, Eben, 110, 114
Bao Dai, 124
Barnett, Edward, 224
Benninghoff, H. Merrell, 12, 13
Bishop, Max, 25-26, 29, 58
Blockade, of China, 289, 291
Boatner, Haydon, 286, 506
Bombing by U.S. Air Force: of North
Index
Korea, 292-96, 298, 306; threats
to China, 290-92, 295-96; of Yalu
River power complex, 291, 292,
294, See also Civilian casualties
Bonesteel, Charles H., 89
Borton, Hugh, 12, 13, 25
Bradley, Omar N., 111, 128, 202,
220-21, 224, 289-90, 302
Bridges, Styles, 122, 124, 125
Briggs, Ellis, 240, 242, 244, 247-48,
251
Bunce, Arthur, 28
Bureaucratic politics and foreign
policy, 95
Burgess, Guy, 50
Butterworth, W. Walton, 181, 217-18
Byrnes, James F., 78-80, 82-87, 89,
103-6, 108-9
Cairo Conference, 1943, 12, 98-99
Central Intelligence Agency, U.S.,
26, 31-32, 34, 52, 118-19, 130;
and Chinese entry into Korean
War, 225-26
Chiang K’ai-shek, 60, 63, 64, 69,
71-72, 76, 82, 84, 88, 90, 98,
99, 109, 112, 121-22, 126-27,
146, 148, 175, 190, 192, 201,
232-35, 284-85, 295
Ch’oe YOng-gUn, 27
Cho Man-sik, 108, 154
Chou En-lai, 211-12, 222, 224, 294
China, People’s Republic of: entry
into Korean War, 197-200, 203-20,
222-33, 236; impact on ending of
Korean War, 262-67, 269-72, 274-
75, 278, 281, 284, 287-89, 295-96,
$04-5; impact on Korea, 25, $2,
330
34, 39, 40-42, 120, 190; reasons
for entry, 197-98, 209-12, 219-20,
224, 226-27, 232-34; withdrawal
of troops from Korea, 244, 247-49,
252-55
China, Republic of (Nationalist), 27,
76-78, 82-84, 89, 98, 120-22.
See also Taiwan
Chinese civil war, Korean forces fight-
ing in, 39-40, 54, 155
Churchill, Winston, 12, 69, 73, 81,
97, 99, 288-90, 292
Chu Teh, 88
Civilian casualities in U.S. bombing of
North Korea, 269, 270, 293-96,
301, 306
Civil war in Korea, 136-56; stages in
development of, 138-40, 157-62
Clark, Mark, 239, 241-54, 256, 292-93,
295, 298-99
Clifford, Clark, 18, 127
Clubb, O. Edmund, 52, 212, 217,
224-25
Collins, J. Lawton, 196-97, 202-3,
221, 224, 240, 244-45, 251, 272,
276
Communism: in Korea, 14, 16, 22, 25,
136-45; and left wing under U.S.
Occupation, 107, 110
Conant, James B., 113-14
Condon, Edward, 120
Congress, U.S.: and march into North
Korea, 213-14; and policy regarding
Korea, 1947-50, 175-77, 181-82,
186-87, 191, 193
Connally, Tom, 126, 129, 130
Constabulary, South Korea, 143
Containment policy: de facto, 15,
16-25, 34, 35, 43; in Korea, 16-26,
29-33, 37, 47, 49-50, 53, 55, 172-
77, 184, 186, 192-93; in U.S. global
strategy, 4-5, 7-9, 18, 23, 110
Cooper, John Sherman, 125
Counterinsurgency, in South Korea,
153-55
Crabapple, withdrawal code-named,
185
Dallek, Robert, 58, 98
Davies, John Paton, 30, 205-6, 225,
INDEX
230-31, 233
Decision-making theory, 94-97; and
Korean War, 94, 96-97, 111-12,
131-32
Defense Department, U.S., 111; and
march into North Korea, 200,
202-3, 207, 218,. 222, 231-32
Defense perimeter in U.S. policy, 46
Democratic Front for the Unification
of the Fatherland, 146, 151-52,
Loz
Dening, M.E., 61-62
Dewey, Thomas, 126
Diplomatic Branch, U.S. National Ar-
chives, 316-19
Domestic politics, U.S.: and Korean
War, 120-24, 127, 129-31, 297,
298, 304-6; and march into North
Korea, 228-29, 234, 236
Draper, William, 181-83, 186, 189
Drumwright, Everett, 61, 62
Dulles, John Foster, 4, 8, 33, 38,
49-51, 55, 64, 125-27, 129, 236,
240, 242, 247-50, 253, 257, 259,
307
Economic Cooperation Administra-
tion, 26, 37, 185-87, 191
Eddleman, Clyde, 244-46
Eden, Anthony, 12
Eisenhower, Dwight D., 119, 239-40,
244-48, 255, 295, 299, 303, 307
Eisenhower adminstration: policy on
Korea, 239-40, 242, 244, 307;
policy on peace negotiations, 239-
40, 242-44; policy on peace treaty,
245-50, 253-59
Elections in South Korea: in 1948,
139-42, 181, 184; in 1950, 155-56;
underground elections, 142, 143,
165
Emmerson, John K., 205-6
Fechteler, William, 282
Feis, Herbert, 50, 197, 199
Foreign Ministers’ Conference in Mos-
cow, 16-17, 108-9
Formosa. See Taiwan
Forrestal, James, 71-73, 82, 87, 102,
115, 176
INDEX
Fuchs, Klaus, 120
Gaddis, John Lewis, 235
General Order no, One, 88-90
Geneva Convention and _ prisoner-of-
war issue, 274, 276-81
George, Walter, 61
Gleason, Everett, 245
“Grand area’’ and U.S. global policy, 6
Great Britain, 61, 76, 89; and ending
of Korean War, 263, 267, 281,
287-90, 292, 303-4; and Korean
War, 198, 208, 227, 230
Grew, Joseph C., 71-75
Gross, Ernest, 303
Groves, Leslie R., 113
Guerrillas, Cheju Island, 22, 53, 137,
139, 141-45, 151, 154; Chiri Moun-
tains, 144, 151, 153-54; all South
Korea, 22, 39, 58, 136-42, 147-48,
152-55
Gupta, Karunakar, 134, 150, 168
Haeju Conference, 139, 165
Hallinan, Vincent, 297-98
Harriman, Averell, 15, 19, 69-82,
84-87, 101, 131
Hartz, Louis, 10
Henderson, Gregory, 136
Henderson, Loy, 210
Herter, Christian, 64-65
Hiss, Alger, 12-13, 120, 123
Ho Chi Minh, 124
Hodge, John Reed, 14-17, 19-20,
22n, 25, 27n, 179, 184-85
Hoffman, Paul, 186-87
Hoover, Herbert, 121
Hopkins, Harry, 67, 75-77, 98, 103-4;
discussions with Stalin, 76-77, 103-4
Horim (Forest tiger) unit, 147
Hull, John, 281-82
Hurley, Patrick, 67, 71, 109
Inch’Sn landing, 207-9, 219, 223, 229
India: and ending of Korean War, 294,
301, 302, 304-5; and Korean War,
198, 205, 210, 215-16, 221, 229
Inspections (mutual), and ending of
Korean War, 272-73
Intelligence, U.S,, Ge? archival mater
331
jals, 322-23
Internationalism: and U.S. global pol-
icy, 5-7, 21-22; and U.S. Korea
policy, 11-13
Iriye, Akira, 60
Jacobs, Joseph, 184
Japan and U.S. Asian policy, 19,
23-26, 34-37, 46, 59-60, 62
“Japan Lobby,” 24, 26, 36-37
Jenner, William E., 129-30, 280,
297
Jessup, Philip C., 119-20, 123
Johnson, Louis, 32, 102, 115-16,
126-29, 131, 218, 232, 237
Johnson, Lyndon Baines, 236
Johnson, U. Alexis, 212, 217, 245,
281, 282
Joint Chiefs of Staff, U.S.: archival
materials, 310-12; and Korea policy,
1947-50, 19, 20, 30, 31, 70, 87, 90,
407, Tid, 112) 415, 128; “and
Korean War fighting, 174, 178, 182,
185, 189, 197, 201-4, 207, 218-27,
231-32; and peace negotiations,
241-43, 265, 268-69, 270-72, 276,
278, 281, 291-92, 294, 297-99
Joy, C. Turmer, 268, 270-71, 278,
281, 284-87
Judd, Walter, 254
Kangdong Political Institute, 152
Kapsan faction in North Korean poli-
tics, 108
Kennan, George: and Cold War, 7,
8, 23-24; and march into North
Korea, 197, 200, 205, 217; and U.S.
Asian policy, 15, 17, 23-26, 30-31,
36-37, 45-46, 50, 52, 57-58, 60,
69, 70, 110; and U.S. policy
on ending the war, 264, 294, 297
Kennedy, John F., 236
Khrushchev, Nikita, 151, 154, 213-14
Kim Ch’ang-sun, 160
Kim Chdm-gin, 160
Kim Il Sung, 25, 27, 38-39, 48-49,
55, 65, 108, 133-34, 151, 153,
155, 167
Kim Ku, 15, 27, 98, 108, 151
Kim Namesik, 160
332
Kim Sam-gyu, 160
Kim Sam-yong, 154
Kim Tal-sam, 152-53
Kim Tong-gil, 133
Kim Tu-bong, 155
Kirk, Allen, 65, 66, 211
Knowland, William F., 121-22, 129,
250, 254
Korea and U.S. security, 3, 11-13,
20, 23, 26, 30-34, 60, 63, 68,
77-79, 81-89, 96, 98, 103-6,
111, 169-74, 176, 178-79, 192-93,
227
Korea, Democratic People’s Republic
of (North Korea), 188, 192, 205,
207, 215; and end of Korean War,
262, 264, 269, 271-72, 274-75,
278, 281, 284, 287, 293, 294, 304-
6; march into, by United Nations
forces, 195-237; people’s army in,
39-41, 118, 155
Korean-American security relationship,
239-59
Korean decision, June 1950, 111,
118-20, 124-32
Korean Democratic Party, 22
Korean Military Advisory Group, U.S.,
42, 43, 148-50
Korean People’s Republic, 107-8
Koreans in Chinese civil war, 39-40,
54, 155
Korean War, theories on origins of,
133-36, 157-62
Korea, Republic of (South Korea),
15, 22, 186-92, 204-5, 207, 216;
armed forces in, 118-19; and end-
ing of Korean War, 239-59, 262,
275
Kuomintang (KMT), 59, 77, See also
China, Republic of
Kwantung Army, 70
Labor strife in South Korea, 140
Lansing, Robert, 125
Lawton, Frederick, 175
Leahy, William, 87, 183
Lee Yong-woon, 149
Left wing in South Korea, 53, 54. See
also Communism
Lerch, Archer, 108-9
Lie, Trygve, 215, 267
INDEX
Lilienthal, David E., 114
Lovett, Robert, 176-77, 185-88, 276-
78, 281-82, 292, 296, 298, 302
MacArthur, Douglas, 29, 88, 90,
107, 117, 121, 126-29, 131, 187,
189, 191, 290, 295; and Inch’Sn
landing, 53; and march into North
Korea, 196, 202-4, 207, 212, 217-
28, 231-35; and rollback current,
9, 10n, 39, 41-42, 49-51, 53, 55
McCarthy, Joseph R., 123-25, 127,
129-30, 233-34
McCarthyism and Korean War, bakes 3
120, 123-25, 129
McClelland, Charles, 138, 163
McCloy, John, 15, 72
McClure, Robert A., 276
McCormack, John A., 130
Malik, Jacob, 264, 265, 269
Malone, George W., 129
Manchuria: and Korean War, 201,
204, 210, 211, 218-19, 224-25,
230; and U.S. policy, 23, 26, 27,
36-37, 59, 61, 77-90, 100
Mao Tse-tung, 27, 122, 219, 232-35
Marshall, Charles Burton, 280
Marshall, George C., 81, 86, 110,
174, 177, 181, 184, 186, 188,
201, 218-21, 232, 235, 237, 266
Marshall Mission, 59-60
Masao, Okonogi, 160
Mathews, H. Freeman, 245
May, Ernest, 127
Menon, V.K. Krishna, 301-5
Merchant, Livingston, 212, 217
Mexico and ending of Korean War,
297-300
Military departments, U.S.: position
on Korea, 14, 20-24, 26, 30-31, 60,
179-81. See also individual mili-
tary departments
Military expenditures by Truman ad
ministration, 115-17
Modern Military Branch, U.S. National
Archives, 310-16
Molotov, Vyacheslav, 13, 83, 174,
176-77
Muccio, John, 25, 28, 31, 38, 43, 149,
185-86, 191, 197, 285
Mu Ching, 40, 167
INDEX
Murphy, Charles, 220
Murphy, Robert, 240, 244, 246, 251
Nash, Frank, 245
National Archives documents, U.S.,
309-26
National Guidance Alliance, 153-54
National Security Council, U.S. 26, 32,
45, 102, 115, 132, 190; and march
into North Korea, 197-98, 203-4,
226-29; and security treaty, 245
National Security Council decision
memoranda: no. 8, 24, 26, 29,
111, 182, 185, 190-92; no. 48,
52-38, 43, 45, 47, 52; no. 68, 8,
32-35, 38, 47, 49, 124, 198;
no. 81, 203-5
Nitze, Paul, 196-99, 218-19, 298
Nixon, Richard, 9
Nolting, Frederick, 245
Office of Strategic Services, archival
materials of, 315-16
Offtackle war plan, 116
Oliver, Robert, 43
O’Mahoney, Joseph C., 130-31
Open door: and internationalist cur-
rent, 6-7; in Manchuria, 78-79, 81,
85
Operation Everready, 244-47, 249-52,
257. See also Rhee, Syngman
Pace, Frank, 128
Pacific Pact, 145-46
Paek In-y8p, 149
Paek S8n-yBp, 245, 249, 252
Pak HOn-ydng, 140, 142, 151, 153,
157-60, 167
Pak Kap-dong, 160
Pannikar, K.M., 210-12, 229
Patterson, Robert, 18, 20, 110, 172-
73,176
Peace negotiations in Korean War,
239, 241-42, 244, 250, 261-79
Philby, Kim, 50
Police action in Korea, 30
Policy Planning Staff, U.S., 23, 30-32,
52, 178, 196, 198, 200, 205, 230,
279-80, 298
Polk, James K., 64
Positive action,” See Rollback current
jaa
Potsdam Conference, 13-14, 16, 77-81,
83-86, 102, 104
Prisoners-of-war: as issue in the ending
of Korean War, 249-51, 262, 267,
272-88, 293, 296-98, 300-302,
304-7; release of by Syngman Rhee,
249-51, 262
Pyun, Y.T., 240-42, 247
Radford, Arthur W., 291
Rau, Sir Benegal, 215
Rees, David, 223
Remington, William, 124
Republican Party and the Korean de-
cision, 120-24, 127, 129-31. See
also Domestic politics
Reston, James, 207
Rhee, Syngman (Yi St(ng-man), 15,
22; 24, 25,'27-29, 57, 63, 108, 112;
118, 130, 133-34, 139, 143-46,
154-59, 165-66, 186-87, 196; and
ending of Korean War, 240-41,
243-59, 284; and march into North
Korea, 196, 216; possible coup
against, 240, 244-47, 249-52, 257;
and rollback current, 27, 145. See
also Operation Everready
Ridgway, Matthew, 263-77, 281, 284-
85, 291
Roberts, W.L., 29n, 119, 146, 148,
150, 166
Robertson, Walter, 240, 244, 248,
251-57
Rollback current, 4-5, 9-11, 26-27,
29-38, 43, 47, 49-53, 55, 63-64
Roosevelt, Franklin Delano: and deci-
sion-making, 97-102; policy toward
Korea, 4-7, 11-13, 58-59, 98-100,
132; and trusteeship, 97-100; and
U.S.S.R., 67-71, 74-75
Roosevelt, Theodore, 24
Ross, Charles, 106
Royall, Kenneth, 28
Rusk, Dean, 13, 33n, 89, 126-27; and
march into North Korea, 199, 205-
6, 212, 216-17, 220-21, 229, 236
Russell, Richard B., 130
Saltaman, Charles, 187-88
“Satisficing,”” 95-98, 100-101, 111,
152
334
Schaller, Michael, 58
Sevareid, Eric, 210-11
Sherman, Forrest, 202
Sherwin, Martin, 58
Simon, Herbert, 95
Smith, Alexander H., 121
Smith, Harold D., 106
Smith, Walter Bedell, 176, 254
Snyder, John 282
Soong, T. V., 78-82, 85-87
South Korean Labor Party (SKLP),
139-41, 151-54, 158-61
Soviet-Koreans, 108
Soviet Union: and ending of Korean
War, 263-67, 270, 272-73, 288-89,
294, 301-5; entry into war against
Japan, 70-79, 81-84, 86-88; and
North Korea, 40-42, 58, 60, 68-70,
118, 133, 151, 155; policy toward
Korea, 13, 16, 77-82, 85, 86,
89, 99, 110; policy toward Korea
during Korean War, 54-55, 57,
174-76, 180, 185-86, 189-90, 197-
201, 207-8, 211, 213-14, 219,
224, 230-31; possible entry of
Soviet forces into Korean War,
200-10, 21%, 213, 215; 219-20;
231; and U.S. policy, 6-12, 18-19,
93-25, 31, 33-85, 42, 44, 50,
58-60, 63, 65-86, 88-91, 116, 122;
withdrawal of troops from Korea,
180, 189
Stalin, J. V. 12-13, 38, 48, 51, 55-56,
59, 68, 70, 73, 74-90, 98-105,
1O8-10; 122; 124, 130, 133, 154;
170, 176, 178, 186, 214, 307
State-Army-Navy Coordinating Com-
mittee (SANACC), 180, 182
State Department, U.S.: archival ma-
terials of, 316-19; position on
Korea, 3, 12-15, 60, 76, 77, 100,
107, 110-11, 170, 173, 175, 176,
181, 183, 185-86, 190; position on
march into North Korea, 196-97,
201, 203-6, 210, 212, 218, 222-23,
226, 229, 230-31, 234; position on
security treaty and ending of the
Korean War, 245, 246, 278-81,
297, 299
State-War-Navy Coordinating Commit-
tee (SWNCG), 13, 21, 87-89, 107,
1790 9A 19H 19798
INDEX
Stelle, Frank, 279-80, 285
Stettinius, Edward R., 59
Stevens, Francis, 178
Stimson, Henry, 59, 71-75, 77, 79-83,
87
Stuart, J. Leighton, 190
Supreme Command for the Allied
Powers (SCAP), archival materials
of, 324-26
Taft, Robert A., 121-23, 129, 131
Taiwan: and ending of Korean War,
265; and Korean War, 198, 207,
209-11, 229, 233, 235; and U.S.
policy, 26, 30-34, 37, 42, 46, 47,
64-65, 121-23, 126, 127, 129, 131
Taylor, Maxwell, 249, 256
Teheran Conference, 98-99
Thirty-eighth parallel: decision on, 13,
30, 88-91, 104-5; military clashes
along, 137-39, 145-50, 155, 166
Thomas, Elbert, 61
Treaty of mutual defense between U.S.
and R.O.K., 240-50, 253-59
Truman, Harry S.: and atomic deter-
rence, 113-18; and decision-making,
100-106, 111-12, 118-19, 125-31;
and ending of Korean War, 262-64,
268-85, 288-307; and march into
North Korea, 196-97, 209, 220-21,
225, 228, 230, 232-35, 237; and
policy toward Korea, 4, 5, 7, As
17, 24, 32, 45, 51, 57, 59-61, 68-
71, 73, 75-91, 100-105, 108-12,
118-19, 122-32, 169-86, 188-93
Truman, Margaret, 128
Truman Doctrine and Korea, 7, 18,
26, 32, 61, 172
Trusteeship in U.S. policy, 4, 6, 11
13, 15, 16, 57-60, 68, 76-80, 98-
100, 103-10
Twinbom, operation code-named, 189
Tydings, Millard, 123-24, 127
Ulam, Adam, 215
Uprisings in South Korea, 136, 140
44, 166
United Nations: and ending of Korean
War, 244, 247, 249, 254, 258, 259,
265, 267, 301-2; and Korean War,
196-99, 205-12, 215, 229, 250;
and U.S. Korea policy, 4, 6, 8, 17
INDEX
22, 24, 28, 30-31, 45-47, 57-60, 65,
110, 112, 128, 176-77, 180-81,
185, 189, 191
United Nations Temporary Commis-
sion on Korea (UNTCOK), 22, 156-
37, 140, 147, 177, 184
United States Armed Forces in Korea
(USAFIK): archival materials of,
320-22; withdrawal of U.S. armed
forces from Korea, 22-24, 27-30,
169-71, 181-85, 188-91, 192
United States Army Military Govern-
ment in Korea (USAMGIK), archi-
val materials of, 321-22
United States-Soviet Joint Commission
on Korea, 17, 21, 109-10, 171,
175-76
Vandenberg, Arthur, 109, 120-21, 175
Vandenberg, Hoyt, 117, 196-97, 202-
35.265, 282, 290; 292
Van Fleet, James, 285
Vietnam, comparison of, with Korea,
53-54
Vincent, John Carter, 12-16, 22, 25,
53, 59, 174
Vyshinsky, Andrei, 207-8, 302, 304-5
335
Wake Island meeting, 219-22, 224
Wallerstein, Immanuel, 36
Ward, Angus, 212
War Department, U.S., position of,
on Korea, 20, 107, 111, 171-73
Webb, James, 212
Wedemeyer, Albert, 22n, 179
Wedemeyer mission, archival materials
of, 318-19
Weyland, O. P., 291
Wherry, Kenneth, 123
Wiley, Alexander, 255
Wilkinson, James R., 209
Willoughby, Charles, 41, 224, 230
Wilson, Charles, 240
Wilson, Woodrow, 66
Yalta Conference, agreements at, 66-
72, 74, 77-80, 85, 100, 102, 104
Yenan group in North Korea, 108
Yi Ch’Gng-ch’Un, 27
Yi Chu-ha, 154
Yi Ho-jae, 152, 153
Yi PBm-sdk, 27
Y&su-Sunch’Gn rebellion, 136-38, 143-
47, 188
Young, Kenneth, 245, 255
No comments:
Post a Comment