Korea Journal
Refracted Modernity and the Issue of Pro-Japanese Collaborators in Korea
(Vol.42. No.3 Autumn, 2002 pp.18~59)
Chung Youn-tae
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Types: Articles
Subject: History
About the author(s) Chung Youn-tae (Jeong, Yeon-tae) is Associate Professor of Korean History at Catholic University of Korea. He received his Ph.D. in History from Seoul National University in 1994. He has published many articles on various social and political policies of Japanese imperialism and Westerners' observation of Korea, including "Crisis and Discord in Colonial Korean Agricultural Society during the Great Depression" (1998) and "Westerners' Observation on Korea in the Late 19th and Early 20th Century" (1999). His research focuses on the social and economic changes reflected in colonial modernity during Japanese imperialism. (E-mail: ytchung@catholic.ac.kr)
Articles
Refracted Modernity and the Issue of Pro-Japanese Collaborators in Korea
Chung Youn-tae
Introduction
In recent years, Korean society has been filled with an air of an increasing fever over the issue of "settling the past" (gwageo cheongsan) even to the degree that the expression has now found a place on the list of terminology on Korean history. There are many factors behind the emergence of "settling the past" as a central issue of social interest and political controversy. The key among these factors is the recent progress in democratization in Korean society, including an end to military dictatorship and a peaceful shift in the ruling power. Building on this accomplishment, social activists and progressive intellectuals began to search for historical truth, countering the concealment, manipulation and distortion of Korea's history under the military dictatorship since the division of the nation. It is in this context that the task of "settling the past" is recognized as a movement to "set straight the history of Korea." (yeoksa baro seugi) However, at the heart of the issue is the fact that the problem is not limited to the past or to memory. Social activist and progressive intellectuals raised the issue of "settling the past" because they perceived it a refracted modernity in twentieth-century Korea, and thus determining the path of Korean society in the twenty-first century. In this regard, the debates over the issue of "settling the past" can be interpreted as a struggle over how to reform Korean society, manifested in a contestation over memory.
The fierce struggle over memory is related to the dramatic experiences of modernity in Korea throughout the twentieth century. In a way, Korean society during the twentieth century can be seen as a rare showcase of modernity in which the complex mixture of negative and dynamic aspects of modernity were manifested. Simultaneously, twentieth-century Korea was also a historical space that was filled with dramatic moments of change. On the one hand, modern Korea has experienced the greatest tragedies of modernity in succession: foreign invasion and colonization, national division and war, dependence and political dictatorship. On the other hand, Korea has achieved miraculous economic growth, almost unprecedented in world history, and has also made steadfast progress in democratization while reducing the political conflict in the Korean peninsula, thus fully revealing the dynamic aspects of modernity and potential toward a new way of developing the modernity project. Now, as a result, Korea��a country which had been marginalized and neglected as "the land of morning calm" in world history until as late as the early twentieth century��has risen up to a society that deserves much world attention and praise.
Nevertheless, the foundation of democratization, economic growth, and peace that Korean society achieved throughout the twentieth century still remains vulnerable. It is the remaining negative legacies of modernity��colonialism, the Cold War, national division, the war, dictatorship, and political dependence��that have prevented Korean society from heading toward further progress and peace. Korean society is now standing at a crossroad of history. The next steps will determine the path of Korea toward either regression to a backward society threatened by another war, severe social inequalities, and human rights violations caught up in the negative legacies of the twentieth century, or progression to an advanced society with an overflowing sense of freedom, equality, and peace through further social reforms that build on the accomplishments of the twentieth century. A realistic assessment of the current state of society is why the social activists and progressive intellectuals have been raising the issue of "settling the past" so actively in their search for a solution to the problems in Korea based on their realistic assessment of the current state of the society.
The continuing legacy of colonialism is the most deeply rooted and long-lasting of the "the affairs of the past" that requires settling in contemporary Korea. The colonial legacy refers to the harmful effects of Japanese colonialism that had been passed down to the various realms of Korean society, including the human, material, institutional, and cultural, among others. At the heart of the colonial legacy is the human legacy, that is, pro-imperial Japanese collaborators. Above all, it is the human legacy that maintains and continues to reproduce coloniality in the material, institutional, and cultural realms. Moreover, whereas the pro-imperialist collaborators had been purged in the countries that had been occupied by Nazi Germany or in most of postcolonial nations newly founded following World War II, pro-imperial Japanese collaborators in Korea were not only able to avoid purges but also revived and spread like a disease in the whirlwind of the Cold War, national division, the Korean War and the dictatorship, thus helping to multiply the negative aspects of modernity. In this sense, it is not an exaggeration to identify the issue of pro-imperial Japanese collaborators as the key to understanding the structure and characteristics of the negative aspects of modernity in Korea. In this paper I attempt to highlight the development of the issue of purging the pro-imperial Japanese collaborators and examine the future direction of this social movement that has been rapidly spreading throughout contemporary South Korea in recent years.
Before further examination of the topic, I would like to clarify the usage of the expression "pro-imperial Japanese collaborators" (ilje hyeomnyeokja). The term is unfamiliar even to historians, not to mention the common person in Korean society. The expression "pro-Japanese" (chinilpa) is frequently used instead to refer to the same group. According to a Korean dictionary, "pro-Japanese" means those who are close to Japan, or to those who acted against national interests prior to 1945. In general and in academic usage, the term more often refers to the latter definition. The term came into usage at the end of the Joseon dynasty, and was used in a derogatory sense simply to refer to those who were close to Japan. However, as the impending invasion of imperialist Japan became apparent, the term came to mean those who were antinationalists or collaborators. Now, the term is being reassessed as "as a legitimate historical term with a specific historical meaning" (Yi Man-yeol 2001, 4; CCBDPC 1997, 258-259).[1] Nevertheless, in this study, I use the expression "pro-imperial Japanese collaborators," or just "collaborators" for short, in specific reference to those who collaborated actively and consciously in favor of the activities concerning the actual invasion or occupation of Korea as well as those in favor of the aggressive war between the Protectorate Treaty of 1905 to liberation in 1945. I employ the term "collaborator" in this study for a number of reasons. First, whereas "pro-Japanese" can be used as a transhistorical term, "collaborators" refers directly to the collaborators, who are the historical legacy of Korea's relationship with Japan in the imperialist era.[2] Second, in a social atmosphere where anything pro-Japanese is equated as anti-Korean, it is likely that the general public will fall prey to an anti-Japanese consciousness and fail to build an autonomous and balanced anti-imperialist consciousness, thus suppressing even progressive efforts to develop a sound and cooperative relationship between Korea and Japan solely due to the friendly approach to Japan. Third, the term "collaborators" has currency not only in Korean society but across the world.
Anti-Japanese Consciousness and Enthusiasm to Purge Collaborators in Colonial and Postcolonial Korea
The Formation of Collaborator Groups and Their Rationale
Collaborators can be divided into several groups depending on their specific activities and the time of their collaboration. First are collaborators involved in the Japanese invasion, who actively assisted imperial Japan in the colonization of Korea between 1905 and 1910. This group includes not only the leaders of pro-Japanese organizations, such as the Advancement Society (Iljinhoe), and the participants in the instigation and signing of the Protectorate Treaty of 1905 and the Korea-Japan Annexation Treaty of 1910, but also the apostates who had originally engaged themselves in various reform movements in their pursuit of the independence and modernization of the nation by cooperating with Japan through movements such as Coup d'Etat of 1884, the Gabo Reform of 1894, the Independence Club, the Self Strengthening Movement and others. The second group includes collaborators involved in the occupation, who consciously cooperated with imperial Japan in its occupation of Korea from the Annexation of 1910 to the second Sino-Japanese War in 1937. This group largely consists of government and public officials, high-level authorities, leaders in pro-Japanese organizations, anti-independence movement participants, and intellectuals. The third category��collaborators involved in war��refers to those who actively participated in the aggressive war by imperial Japan from the second Sino-Japanese War to liberation. This group includes the officers who voluntarily served in the Japanese Army in the war of aggression, those who openly supported the war and persuaded or forced Koreans to serve Japan's war cause as students, drafted or volunteer soldiers, "comfort women" and laborers; those who supplied monetary and material resources for the military; and those who ran businesses for military industries and actively participated and cooperated with the policy to uproot Korea as a nation.[3] In particular, there were many among the leaders of the nationalist movements during this time period who engaged in collaborationist activities, either voluntarily or under threats and coercion.
There were many factors at work in the formation of these groups of collaborators. The foremost was the policy of imperial Japan that actively fostered and supported the collaborators and the pro-Japanese organizations, and co-opted or forced activities of collaboration. Also, there were numerous cases of collaboration out of individual self-interest, such as for personal protection, employment, promotion of status, and business opportunities. At the same time, there were some collaborators whose inaccurate judgment of their social and political circumstances led them to choose the paths that they chose. Toward the end of the colonial era, there was no a small number of cases of former participants apostatizing from Korean nationalist movements to collaborate with imperial Japan for several complicated reasons. Notably, many collaborators enthusiastically argued for collaboration based on a certain rationale beyond the pursuit of self-interest and personal comfort, or their own logic to justify their collaboration.
The rationale for collaboration is exemplified in the Self-Strengthening Movement that sprouted up after Korea's loss of sovereignty in 1905. The participants in this movement formed their core activities around an interpretation of Korean society and the international environment, based on Social Darwinism which was influential in the West and Japan at the time. The logic underlying this position was that in an international arena ruled by survival of the fittest, the only way to recover national sovereignty was to strengthen national power, as a nation without power would never be able to maintain its independence and would fall victim to invasions by stronger nations. A crucial blind spot in this view is that it justified the imperialist occupation of weaker nations and accepted domination as a natural part of the civilizing and modernizing process (Bak 1992; Kim Do-hyeong 1997). Perhaps, it should not be surprising that there were many among the advocates of the Self-Strengthening Movement caught up in civilization and enlightenment supremacy ideas, who considered the "protectorate" of Japan over Korea as "the guidance of an advanced civilized nation," rather than as a violation of Korea's right to national sovereignty, accepting the annexation of Korea by Japan as a necessary stage in a process of modernization.
This logic of collaboration, in which Japan's occupation of Korea was understood as part of the civilization process for Korea, developed into an assimilationist self-strengthening principle after the complete loss of national sovereignty. The nationalist leaders who inherited the Self-Strengthening Movement concentrated on raising the political and economic strengths of the nation, rather than on pushing for immediate and absolute independence. Their work, however, was at least carried out under the belief that Korea should become an independent nation in the future, if not immediately. In contrast, the collaborators could not discard the idea that Koreans were inferior and lacked the merits to be independent. Thus, to them, the only way for Koreans to survive was to make an effort to get equal treatment as the Japanese by overcoming their inherent inferiority. By striving for civilization and self-strengthening according to the assimilation policy set by imperial Japan, and the ultimate goal would be naisen ittai (naeseon ilche, Japan and Korea are One Entity), a propaganda policy disseminated by Japanese imperialists in the late 1930s (Bak 1992; Kim Do-hyeong 1997; Yi Myeong-hwa 1997).
Simultaneously, the cultural policy, which was implemented as a political strategy by Japan to cope with the fervent reactions of Koreans against Japan following the March First Independence Movement, and the policy for the development and exploitation of resources in the colony, carried out by Japan according to the needs, appealed to many Korean intellectuals and property owners as it gave them the impression that they could still prosper under Japanese colonial rule. Particularly, the Japanese invasion of the Asian continent enabled the colonial regime to promote an image of a powerful empire, causing many Koreans to give up their hope of national independence while fostering the illusion that colonial dependence on Japan would bring development to Korea. This logic of "dependent development" as a part of the Japanese Empire was increasingly absorbed into the Japanese propaganda of naisen ittai as war ad-vanced. The expansion of imperial Japan was equated with the opening of the new, and the growth of Japan's power was equated with the progress of Korea's dependent development. In this way, the logic of collaboration, in which the fate of imperial Japan was identified with that of Korea as a nation and its national subjects was used to persuade Koreans of the necessity of cooperating in the war effort (Ji 1989; Jeong Tae-heon 1997; Yi Myeong-hwa 1997).
In sum, the rationale behind collaboration sprouted from the logic of the self-strengthening theory and then bloomed into the idea of the supremacy of civilization and enlightenment. The assimilationist idea of self-strengthening thus produced naisen ittai. This was based on a lack of vision for Korea's national independence, and it planned to promot the civilization and modernization process through collaboration with imperial Japan during invasion, domination and even war. Therefore, civilization, modernization, and development supremacy ideas, which aimed at subordinate development, at the expense of social justice and the national independence.
"Anti-Japanesism" Consciousness and Enthusiasm for the Movement to Purge Collaborators
Although Korean society has been historically invaded by Japan, it never had an inferiority complex, nor even much respect for Japan in the cultural realm. Moreover, attacks by Japanese wako or by Hideyoshi in 1592 fueled distrust, caution, and resentment against Japan in the minds of Koreans. Thus, many Koreans have long considered Japan as "a neighbor, but also an enemy for generations," "a foe for a hundred generations," or "a country with which we can never live harmoniously."[4] At the same time, Koreans have constructed a solid national identity based on a cultural tradition of a nation centralized and unified for at least 1,300 years since the Unified Silla period. Korea's cultural pride was so high that they claimed a Joseon Centrism after the fall of Ming China. Although this pride in Korea were much damaged after the Japanese invasion and occupation following the opening of ports by Japan, it was renewed and transformed into a modern national consciousness and became the source of a powerful anti-Japanese nationalist movement (Chung 2000; Kwon 2000).
For the reasons mentioned above, the theory and practice of collaboration with imperial Japan under the name of civilization, enlightenment, and modernization were never easily accepted and justified in Korean society, where there is a long history of anti-Japanese sentiment and a sense of national pride. Many Koreans expressed their anger and animosity toward the collaborators. In particular, there were historical events that aggravated these hostile feeling toward the collaborators, in which the top public officials and the Advancement Society, a pro-Japanese organization of Koreans who were in favor of the annexation of Korea by Japan, cooperated with imperialist Japan to force Korea to sign the Protectorate Treaty of 1905 and King Gojong to abdicate. Borrowing from the expressions of Jang Ji-yeon, an enlightened intellectual, and Choe Ik-hyeon and Chae Eung-eon, leaders of the Righteous Army, the ministers who collaborated with imperialist Japan were "no better than pigs and dogs who sold out their country for their self-interest and self-glory or out of false threats" (eulsa ojeok or chiljeok ogoe[5]), and "eternal foes of the nation for ten thousand generations." The animosity toward the collaborating ministers was so vehement that there was a saying that "there is not even a single member of our nation who does not want to eat their livers."[6]
The anger at the pro-Japanese Advancement Society was as fierce as that toward those ministers who collaborated with Japan. As the members of organizations for the Self-Strengthening Movement and the residents of Seoul attacked the publishing house of the Advancement Society and damaged the building and the press machines (Kang Dong-jin 1980, 142), a resolute code of action��such as "those who see but do not kill the members of Advancement Society shall be beheaded" since they are same as the Japanese foes��was proclaimed by the Righteous Army.[7] Thereafter, public's impression that eulsa ojeok and Advancement Society members were all pro-Japanese collaborators, and thus antinationalists, remains even to this very day.
After the loss of national sovereignty, as the collaborators lived as parasites of imperial Japan while oppressing and manipulating their own countrymen, the public animosity toward them move beyond mere sentiment and developed into action. Physical punishment of collaborators began. The independence movement camps adopted a code of action for unreserved punishment of collaborators regardless of region and ideology. All of these organizations, including the Korean Provisional Government (KPG) which led nationalist movements toward rebuilding of the nation, the Righteous Brotherhood (Uiyeoldan), the National Revolutionary Party (Minjok Hyeongmyeongdang), the League of Korean Independence (Joseon Dongnip Dongmaeng), the Society for the Restoration of the Nation (Daehan Gwangbokhoe), League of National Restoration (Geon-guk Dongmaeng) and not to mention a domestic underground organization, the Society for Korea Restoration Joguk Gwangbokhoe in the 1910s, considered collaborators as traitors and reactionaries who had sold out their own country. Although the detailed actions that they took against the collaborators varied from the assassination and confiscation of property to the removal of their voting rights and eligibility to be elected after liberation, all these organizations shared in their response to the collaborators specific firm and resolute codes of action.[8]
These codes of action for the struggle against the collaborators were put to actual practice. The struggle was carried out mostly by the armed Independence Army abroad. Despite the strict control of media reports by imperial Japan, there were a series of attacks against the collaborators on the Korean peninsula as well as in Manchuria by the armed Independence Army. In particular, spies for Japan, police officers with reputations for brutality, military police, officials (village heads and various other public town officials), and the leaders of pro-Japanese organizations were the targets of assassinations and arson. According to limited research carried out by Kang Dong-jin, there were at least 83 attacks of collaborators by the Independence Army during the six years from 1920 to 1925 (Kang 1980, 267-268, 284-287). There were also other methods of removing these collaborating officials, such as threats or suggestions to resign from their posts. These particular methods were actively utilized during the first year following the March First Movement, and as a result, there emerged regions where local control by Japan was halted temporarily due to the great number of resignations by Korean officials, who succumbed to the pressure to resign (Kang 1980, 271-272; Chung 1989).
In the social disorder and lack of public security immediately following liberation, there was an explosion of anger directed toward the collaborators, manifested in spontaneous individual and group attacks against collaborators. From 16 August 1945, the day after official liberation, to 25 August, 914 such incidents were investigated around the peninsula excluding Hamgyeong-do region. Most of the attacks targeted police stations, administrative offices of towns, Japanese Shinto shrines, and they included physical assaults and threats to public officials and police officers. Among these attacks, 206 incidents of murder, physical assault, and other acts of violence were targeted at Korean police officers. According to H. Merrell Benninghoff, a State Department political adviser to J. P. Hodge, the Commander of the United States Military Government in Korea (USMGIK), these violent attacks reflected Korean's abhorrence of collaborators, who had achieved their high social positions under the Japanese, and was as severe as that against their former colonizers. The people's zeal to purge pro-Japanese collaborators was that strong.[9]
Above, I have discussed the growing anti-Japanese sentiment and sense of pride during the last days of the Joseon dynasty and the Japanese colonial rule, the codes of action to punish the collaborators set by the organizations that had led the independence movement, and the people's zeal to purge collaborators around the time of national liberation. This examination shows that there was an established and shared sense of obligation among the people regarding the punishment of collaborators following liberation, and subsequently and naturally, they carried out that task in the midst of the temporary public instability after the end of the colonial regime.
The Anticommunist Dictatorship Structure and the Reemergence of Pro-Japanese Collaborators
Anticommunist Nationalism and the Transformation of the Pro-Japanese Collaborators
Immediately following liberation, the natural and enthusiastic but unorganized people's movements to punish collaborators faced an unexpected obstacle as the United States Armed Forces remained in South Korea and established an American military government in September 1945. Like the Japanese colonial authorities, the USAMGIK dominated all fields of South Korean Society��legislation, administration and the court, with no striction on its power. Based on the core of the American occupation policy��anticommunist, anti-Soviet and antirevolutionary��the new foreign military government decided to maintain the bureaucratic personnel and institutions from the Japanese colonial government, rather than try to eradicate the colonial legacy. As a result, it was literally impossible to punish collaborators without permission from USAMGIK, which instead protected and promoted the wholesale reemployment of collaborationist personnel while controlling and suppressing the people's zeal for severe punishment (Yi Heon-jong 1990a; Kang Jeong-gu 1997).
The treatment of pro-Japanese in South Korea was in sharp contrast to that in North Korea at the time. The North's zeal to punish collaborators developed smoothly into a thorough housecleaning, thus removing much of the colonial legacy. The local authorities, such as the people's committees carried out a purge of collaborators with the support of the Soviet military forces. They also enacted land reform and other adjustments successfully to erase the overall colonial legacy (Kim Nam-sik 1993; Kim Chang-sun 1995). In South Korea, therefore, the occupation policy by USAMGIK was the critical factor that distorted and refracted the issue of purging pro-Japanese collaborators since it sought to maintain the status quo following liberation.
The issue of punishing collaborators entered a new stage toward the end of 1945 with the controversy over the trusteeship that had been decided at the Moscow Conference. As the right and the left wings took uncompromising, opposing positions over the trusteeship, the issue of purging collaborators became intertwined with this internal tension and became further refracted at this point. The right-wingers, centered around leadership of Kim Gu, led an anti-trusteeship, protest immediately, building on the fundamental nationalist sentiment appealing to the long-lived desire for national independence. In the process, the right-wingers announced that all those who did not support their anti-trusteeship position would be considered to be against the nation, which forced the people and the political power groups to accept a simplistic dichotomy in determining who is pro- and antinationalist. As a result, the task of punishing collaborators soon became a secondary issue to the more controversial one of trusteeship. In other words, the issue of purging the collaborators, crucial to the nation and to social justice, became subordinate to the dichotomous logic of being either altogether for or against the trusteeship, pro- or anticommunist, and a patriot or a national traitor. This black and white polarization was the second refraction that was added to the task of purging collaborators after liberation. Following the anticommunist Right, many collaborators participated in the anti-trusteeship protests, and were thus able to present themselves as patriots and nationalists, whereas those who took the pro-trusteeship side were often stigmatized as "traitors" of the nation despite their contribution to the nationalist independence movement during the colonial period (Seo 1992, 305-317).
In addition to the USAMGIK regime and the controversy over trusteeship, there was another factor in the contemporary political environment that complicated the issue of punishing the collaborators: the conflict between the left and right over the political leadership of liberated Korea. The position that many right-wing political leaders took, including Kim Gu and Syngman Rhee, was establishment of an independent Korean government as a prerequisite to punishing the collaborators (a theory of establishing the government before the purge of the collaborators). Kim, Rhee, and many others took this position because their support base was not strong enough to secure their domestic political leadership. Their position also reflects the fact that most of the right-wingers in Korea would not be exempted from punishment for their previous collaboration with the colonial regime. In particular, Syngman Rhee defended the collaborators since he allied himself with the Korean Democratic Party, which was largely made up of collaborators. In contrast, the left consistently argued that collaborators should be excluded entirely from participating in the formation of an independent Korean government (a theory of exclusion of collaborationist personnel prior to establishment of government). Considering that significantly fewer left-wing leaders were suspected of collaboration with Japan during the colonial era compared to right-wing leaders, the position taken by the Left reflects a strategy to secure political hegemony by excluding right-wingers from the process of establishing an independent nation-state. Based on this strategic judgement, the left maintained a strict and aggressive attitude toward the issue of purging collaborators, as the decision of the Moscow Conference encouraged democratic principles and the eradication of the colonial legacies as well. Accordingly, the left took action, including the announcement of specific criteria to who determine who had been a collaborator (Yi Heon-jong 1990a; Yi Gang-su 1998).
It was the South Korean Interim Legislative Assembly (SKILA), which was the advisory council of the USAMGIK and had many active moderate rightists, including Kim Gyu-sik, that first came up with a concrete plan to punish the collaborators and moved beyond the gap between the Left and the Right. The SKILA was made up of only right-wing elected representatives and the moderately rightist appointed representatives due to the absence of the leftist delegation including the moderate left. A bill to define and deal with collaborators was finally put forward at the initiative of the appointed representatives from SKILA. The bill was called A Special Law Concerning Traitors of the Nation, Pro-Japanese Collaborators, and Racketeers and it specified the definition, scope, regulations, and procedure regarding the punishment of collaborators. Although the bill was pared down following objections from rightists, significantly reducing the scope and degree of punishment for collaborators, it was the first concrete and systematic bill to remove the collaborationist elements and the first that originated from a consensus among the different political forces in liberated Korea. The program proposed in the bill could have immediately cleared up the issue of collaboration if there had been the approval necessary from the USAMGIK (Yi Heon-jong 1990a; Yi Gang-su 1998; Heo Jong 2000).
The USAMGIK, however, was not cooperative in punishing collaborators. Its policy regarding the issue was clear in the views of the Commanding General of the Military Government J. R. Hodge and the Governor-Generals A. V. Arnold, A. Lerch, C. G. Helmick, and W. F. Dean. First, the members of Korea as a nation could not help but collaborate with Japanese in their daily lives in order to survive as individuals or families (theory of the colonial environment). Second, it was necessary to utilize the knowledge and skills of the collaborators in order to serve the nation due to a scarcity of trained personnel (theory of utilizing available human resources). Third, it was extremely difficult to identify someone as a collaborator with absolute certainty. From these reasons, the military government decided to reemploy collaborationist bureaucrats from the early days of its occupation, and when the advisory council SKILA, passed the bill of the pro-Japanese charges, usamgik postponed its approval, in effect refusing to take on the task. The U.S. response to the issue reflected its primary policy toward Korea at that time: it aimed to make Korea into a bulwark for its anticommunist, anti-Soviet, and anti-revolutionary policy by protecting the anticommunist right-wingers in Korea, centering on Syngman Rhee and his Korean Democratic Party (Kang Jeong-gu 1997; Heo Jong 2000).[10] Consequently, the efforts of the people and the independence movement forces in Korea to settle the matter of punishing collaborators prior to the establishment of the new government ended in failure.
The collaborators were not punished at the time of Korean liberation. Instead, they transformed themselves into bureaucrats under the USAMGIK and the pro-American forces while continuously bolstering their new social status. At the same time, they participated in the anticommunist and anti-trusteeship movement in their attempts to be regarded as anticommunist patriots. In this disguised transformation of the collaborators, the coalition between the United States, which wanted to establish Korea as an anti-Soviet and anticommunist buffer zone and Syngman Rhee and other anticommunist right-wing leaders, who tried to gain political hegemony in liberated Korea, found common ground in the formation of the Cold War structure within the context of a changing international environment. The coalition between these two is at the heart of the suppression and distortion of the people's zeal to build a national spirit and enforce social justice through a purge of the collaborators in a new and liberated Korea.
Resurgence of Pro-Japanese Collaborators and the Logic for Their Defense
The bill to punish pro-Japanese collaborators, which was still born due to the refusal of the USAMGIK was eventually handed down to the Constitutional National Assembly to be written into law, resulting in Special Act on the Punishment of Collaborationist Actiivities against Nation (hereafter Anti-Collaboration Act). The forces behind the enactment of this law were neutral and independent representatives of a younger generation. They took the initiative in legislating the law based on their judgment that it was imperative to punish the traitors of the nation in order to rectify the spirit of the nation and solidify the foundation of a fledging nation. The people's enthusiastic support of the law greatly assisted in its establishment. People who were frustrated and outraged at the collaborators as they were watching them "making endless crafty excuses and walking shamelessly on the street" under the protection of the USAMGIK, instead of repenting of their collaboration with Japan, warmly welcomed this legislation. On the eve of the establishment of the South Korean government on 14 August 1948, the social organizations and the progressive press that enthusiastically supported the enactment of the law issued statements declaring that "as we recover our national sovereignty, what is most needed today is a national spirit" (O 1979; Yi Gang-su 1999).[11] As a result, despite the objections of Syngman Rhee and the Korean Democratic Party, the special law was finally promulgated in September 1948. The task of punishing collaborators was from then on carried out under the leadership of the National Assembly. The legislators formed the Anti-Collaboration Committee for the Investigation of Collaborationist Activities against the Nation (hereafter referred to as the Anti-Collaboration Committee) and appointed a special judge and a special prosecutor to carry out the preparatory investigation of collaboration and to enforce the special law. These new institutional devices began to seriously enforce the Anti-Collaboration Act to punish collaborators, starting with the arrest of comprador capitalist Bak Heung-sik on 8 January 1949 and the prosecution of the son of King Gojong's cousin Yi Gi-yong.
As the Anti-Collaboration Act was enacted and the task of punishing collaborators began to be actively carried out, Syngman Rhee, the Korean Democratic Party, collaborators, and other anticommunist right-wingers feverishly voiced their opposition. The collaborators were, of course, the foremost leaders of this opposition. They hindered the legislation process and the activities of the Anti-Collaboration Committee through slander, instigation of mass demonstrations, distribution of leaflets, and terrorist acts. There was even an attempted assassination of a member of the Anti-Collaboration Committee by some high-ranking police officers who had collaborated with imperial Japan. As this case demonstrates, the fiercest objection to theAnti-Collaboration Committee's activities came from the Korean police, which is not surprising since many former colonial police officers remained in power after liberation, despite their notoriety for pursuing and torturing nationalist activists and the general populace.
Syngman Rhee also held the Anti-Collaboration Committee in check because it threatened his own political support groups. Early on he expressed his opposition to the National Assembly's legislation and made public statements aimed at blocking further activities by the Anti-Collaboration Committee. The National Assembly Communist spy incident, which occurred at an opportune time for Rhee and others who were opposed to purging collaborators, became a useful instrument for Rhee to use in attacking the younger generation of legislators who were active in enacting the Anti-Collaboration Act and carrying out the tasks of the Anti-Collaboration Committee. Rhee tried to hinder the activities of the Anti-Collaboration Committee by accusing some young legislators of their involvement in the incident while they were leading the Committee's activities. Rhee's animosity toward the Anti-Collaboration Committee climaxed over an incident in which collaborator, high-rank police officials were arrested for their government-inspired conspiracy to slancherone of the Anti-Collaboration Committee members as a communist after it was revealed that they had instigated a demonstration behind the scenes. In a flagrant abuse of hispowers, Rhee had the police force violently attack the Anti-Collaboration Committee over this incident. After these two shocking incidents, the Anti-Collaboration Committee's activities were curtailed to a significant degree, and the Anti-Collaboration Act was revised to reduce the period during which collaborators could be prosecuted up to one year. As a result, the task of the Anti-Collaboration Committee to punish collaborators came to an end in less than a year (O 1979; Kil Jin-hyeon 1984).
As shown above, the task that was led by the Constitutional National Assembly completely failed to accomplish its goal of purging collaborators due to the former collaborators and Syngman Rhee government's systematic and persistent opposition and interference. Only twelve were sentenced to penal servitude, while five were placed on probation with a stay of execution, and the remaining seven were released the following spring by commutation of their sentences upon a filing of appeal or by a termination of execution (O 1979). As a result, the Anti-Collaboration Committee's achievement fell far short of punishing the estimated number of collaborators as had been originally set by the SKILA, including 100,000-200,000 pro-Japanese collaborators, approximately 1,000 traitors, 200-300 war criminals, and 10,000-30,000 racketeers.[12]
Collaborators further achieved legal exemption upon the termination of the official activities of the Anti-Collaboration Committee. Moreover, while successfully climbing the social ladder to the ruling class, the collaborators continued to back up the anticommunist dictatorships under Syngman Rhee, Park Chung-hee, Chun Doo-hwan, and Roh Tae-woo. In the First Republic under Syngman Rhee, as much as 34 percent of ministers and 68 percent of chief justices and justices of the Supreme Court were collaborators, and there were even collaborationist legislators in the National Assembly, though the number itself is relatively small compared to the other two branches. In 1960, 70% of senior superintendents, 40% of police captains, and 15% of police lieutenants had all served in the Japanese colonial government and still remained as police officers following liberation. Other statistics show that 20% of plainclothes policemen and 10% of uniformed policemen among the total force of 33,000 in South Korea at the time were able to continue their careers from the time prior to liberation (Im 1991; Kil 1984). Statistics compiled by a private research organization indicate that among the highest public officials in Korean society, 121 had been collaborators, including the president, chief justice, prime minister, chiefs of the staff in the Army, Navy, and Air Force, prosecutor-general, senior superintendent, mayors, and provincial governor.[13]
Collaborators have occupied major positions in the economy, media, education, culture, art, and religion in postcolonial Korean society. Cheongsan haji motan yeoksa (Unresolved Issues in History)[14] includes articles on 60 collaborators and their personal backgrounds, most of whom were in positions of leadership in every area of Korean society after liberation. In particular, they played crucial roles in maintaining the anticommunist dictatorship and in the modernization process in South Korea. Indeed, many of those collaborators are buried in the National Cemetery as national heroes who contributed to the nation under the anticommunist dictatorial regimes (Jeong Un-hyeon 1999). So, it is no exaggeration to say that the collaborators dominated the South Korean society. Former President Park Chung-hee, an officer in the Japanese imperial army during the colonial era and a long-term developmentalist dictator who gained political hegemony through a coup d'Etat, is the epitome of this historical irony.
As collaborators became members of the ruling class in every sector of society, there were frequent incidents which would be impossible in a society ruled by common sense. First, there was no small number of cases in which collaborators acted as judges to determine who had contributed to the independence movement, and received awards as national heroes of the liberation. The judges and the recipients of the March First Award which was established with the intent of celebrating the spirit of the March First Independence Movement, also included many collaborators. Second, the lives of collaborationist politicians, scholars, artists, and writers have been celebrated through special events and awards, and various projects to build commemorative statues, monuments, memorial halls, and other sites glorfying their lives have been carried out by individuals, groups, and central and local governments. Third, the descendents of the most notorious collaborators, such as Yi Wan-yong and Song Byeong-jun, filed lawsuits to recover the ownership of their ancestors' property, which had been accumulated during the colonial era at the expense of the interests of their countrymen and confiscated as state property following liberation. Some of the plaintiffs, in fact, won their cases (Jeong Un-hyeon 1999).[15]
What kind of rationale did the collaborators use to justify themselves and to gain the protection of the USAMGIK and the right-wingers in the process of raising themselves up to the status of the ruling class? The foremost excuse was a passive and defensive position, pointing to the colonial environment and the logic of "all Koreans as collaborators." As stated earlier, the excuse of the colonial environment was shared by the Governor-General of the USAMGIK and by the right-wingers, including Syngman Rhee. As argued by Syngman Rhee or Yun Chi-ho, the logic of "all Koreans as collaborators" was the idea that all Koreans were collaborators unless they had fought against the Japanese imperialists while physically residing in Korea. According to this position, most Koreans were collaborators, and therefore, it was impossible to punish them (Kil 1984; CCBDPC 1997).[16]
On the other hand, the theories of "utilizing human resources," "merits and demerits," and "national integration against Communism" were aggressive defense position, and by considering collaborators as indispensable in maintaining the existing social structure and furthering the development of the nation, justified and advocated them. The theory of "utilizing human resources" is evident in the thoughts of the Governor-Generals of the USAMGIK, as discussed above. The theory of "merits and demerits" was based on the logic of the former justification, and was used to defend figures who had originally participated in the nationalist movements, yet later collaborated with the imperialist regime. Many of these collaborators rose to positions of social leadership in various areas after liberation. This position argued that, despite their mistakes, these collaborators should get full credit for their initial participation in independence movements prior to their betrayal, and for their contribution to the construction and maintenance of the anticommunist nation as well as its modernization. The theory of "national integration against Communism" stemmed from the propaganda of "unconditional solidarity of all" that Syngman Rhee had used to bring about immediate unity of the nation. This logic later became the most aggressive defense for collaborators, as it was developed into propaganda for national solidarity and consensus in order to maintain the system of division under the anticommunist dictatorship. This idea advocated that, given the situation where solidarity was imperative in order to secure the foundation of an anticommunist social structure, all activities that caused division and national insecurity would eventually benefit the Communists in the north. Accordingly, the advocates of this rationale worked to paint all organizations that initiated or supported the issue of punishing collaborators as Communist while presenting themselves as patriots fighting against Communism. This logic, which resembles McCarthyism, is still favored by anticommunist conservatives in attacking others who take different political view (Kil 1984; CCBDPC 1997).
The two core ideas behind the aforementioned defense strategies of the collaborators were anticommunist nationalism, which became the rationale for the ruling class in the system of division under dictatorship and modernization supremacy, in which capitalist modernization was the ultimate goal. The idea of the modernization supremacy was the same logic that had advocated collaboration with imperial Japan during the colonial era, and defended collaborators and dictatorship by the right-wingers after liberation. Anticommunist nationalism was the rationale that enabled collaborators to disguise and transform themselves into a ruling class within the domestic and international political context, and brought forth the alliance between the collaborationist forces and the right-wingers. These two key values became integrated into one that advocated modernization for the sake of fighting against Communism, and enabled collaborators and the right-wingers to meet and complement each other only to justify their rule over the rest of Korean society.
The Development of the Nationalist Democratic Movement and the Issue of Collaborators
A New Understanding of the Collaborator Problem in the Nationalist Democratic Movement
Korean society, burdened by both the colonial legacy and national division, fell into a quandary through the breakout of the Korean War. The streets were filled with masses of people suffering starvation and illness after the total destruction of their livelihoods. The national economy was heading toward complete bankruptcy. In addition, during the civil war, the vicious circle of assault and revenge aggravated social distrust and hatred, and further intensified the ideological confrontation and conflict not only between the North and South but also within South Korean society. The Cold War in the twentieth century had its first vicious outcome in the Korean War, and destroyed Korean society by fostering extreme ideological confrontation in every corner of society and in the heart of every Korean. In particular, the extreme right-wing forces propagated the idea that the cause of poverty, sickness, and social disorder was the evil Communists in the North who had provoked the war, and that leftists and their families as well as those who supported them, and any who criticized the existing political regime were all pro-Communists who collaborated with the North. This powerful propaganda paralyzed the judgment of the people in the South, thus allowing South Korean society to be manipulated by the system and ideology of the Cold War.
As the Cold War structures hardened, the collaborators, who were able to disguise themselves as anticommunists and thus patriots, rose to higher and more influential social positions than during the colonial era in every realm of society. The unresolved issue of punishing collaborators quickly disappeared from the public and became taboo, even among progressive intellectuals. Even the progressive journal Sasanggye (World of Thought) was no exception despite the fact that it was founded by the progressive nationalist and democracy fighter Jang Jun-ha in 1953 and abolished by government forces under the regime of Park Chung-hee in 1970. There was no article that discussed the problem of collaborators, let alone problematize it until the first half of the 1960s. In contrast, many of the authors for the journal were themselves collaborationist writers, and some of them, including Choe Nam-seon and Yi Gwang-su, were considered the best writers in the journal despite their collaborationist past (Yi Heon-jong 1990b, 118-120). The memoir of Im Jong-guk, who is considered the "father" of research on the problem of collaborators, clearly reveals how completely the issue of collaborators was buried even until the mid-1960s. When the first and the most representative of Im's works Chinil munhangnon (Treatise on Collaborationist Literary Writings) was published in 1966, the response of readers and the literary world was so indifferent that it took ten years to sell the 3,000 copies of the first edition. The indifference to the issue of collaborators was to the degree that college students at the time threw out the question, "Collaborationist writings? Is this a book about Korea-Japan Friendship through Literature?" (Im 1991, 5)
It was the April Revolution (1960) that first dug out the unresolved issue of punishing collaborators, which had been buried in oblivion. There were two interrelated factors that made this possible. First, through the uprising, the nationalist democratic movement advocating national sovereignty, democracy, and reunification and rejecting the Cold War ideology based on anticommunist nationalism and dictatorship began to take root. Second, a military regime was established by a coup after crushing the uprising, and despite strong opposition from the people, the new regime pursued normalization of diplomatic relations between Korea and Japan (1965) for the sake of the American foreign policy toward East Asia and the tactical needs of the new military regime. These two factors revealed the insecure domestic base for the military regime and its tendency to rely on foreign power. The issue of settling the matter of former collaborators took on a new meaning as the deep-rooted cause of these problems with the contemporary South Korean political regime. The statements of the organizations participating in the uprising called for the recognition of the problem of collaborators, and research on the pro-Japanese collaborationist organization Advancement Society or the work of Im Jong-guk were the first fruits of this renewed interest in academia.[17]
Nevertheless, it was not until after the establishment of the Park Chung-hee regime that the problem of collaborators began to be actively examined again. Following the reopening of Korean-Japanese diplomatic relations, the overdependence of Korean economy on Japan was revealed. At the same time, after the emergence of Park's military regime, which was the embodiment of an extreme anticommunist dictatorship, the forces of the student-led Nationalist Democratic Movement increasingly heightened its fierce resistance to the current regime. These forces criticized Park's government not only as anti-democratic and dictatorial, founded against the will of the people, but also as anti-nationalist in its pursuit of overdependence on foreign countries, especially Japan, fostering of comprador capital, and revival of colonialist education.[18] Progress in the Nationalist Democratic Movement and criticism of the existing political structure played important roles in prompting intensive studies of the long overdue issue of the punishment of collaborators after liberation. Beginning with Kim Dae-sang's work on the process of purging the collaborators and the unsuccessful attempt by Anti-Collaboration Committee in the National Assembly to settle the issue, several studies on other related topics were conducted until the end of the Park regime. In particular, Kim argued that the failure to punish collaborators after liberation allowed colonial legacies to remain, and as a result, brought about the long-term dictatorship of Syngman Rhee and a treacherous path for the ensuing constitutional government, thus "preventing the democratization of Korean society." As the later assessment of Kim's work made clear, although the author could not specify this due to the threatening political atmosphere of the time under Park's military regime, the May 16 coup d'etat and the military dictatorship by Park Chung-hee were also the result of the failure to settle the matter of punishing collaborators (Kim Dae-sang 1973).
Following the fall of the Park regime, the collaborator issue received full public attention, resulting in serious studies on the topic. In particular, Im Jong-guk and the Institute for Research on Anti-National Activities (renamed as Institute for Research on Collaborationist Activities in 1995) took the initiative to collect and examine historical documents regarding the issue of collaboration. This Institute was founded by Im Jong-guk's students to carry on Im's work and spirit. Aimed at "building up the spirit of the nation by revealing the crimes of those who worked against the nation and making their systems and rationale known as well as setting history straight," the institute has led activities such as collecting and organizing source materials, academic research, and publishing books targeting the general public. As a result, there have been studies on the scope, substance, and rationale of the collaborators' activities in each time period across the political, social, cultural, and religious realms of Korean society, detailed activities of individual and organizational collaboration with the colonial regime prior to liberation as well as their activities in liberated Korea, and case studies on the efforts to purge imperialist collaborators in foreign countries. In addition, all the fruits of these projects became available in publication either as general reading materials or as academic articles according to a general readership.[19] Mass media also occasionally reported on the issue of collaborators or on the Anti-Collaboration Committee in special programs. For example, a popular television station, MBC TV, aired a three-part series called Banmin teugwi (Anti-Collaboration Committee) in August 1990 which reached an audience rating of up to 45 percent (Yi Heon-jong 1990b). This issue has received enough social interest and attention that recently, a progressive on-line newspaper OhmyNews, that is as influential as, if not more than, printed newspapers, wrote about this issue as its special column of the year.
As public attention and examination of the problem of collaborators increased, a popular idea emerged that the unfinished task of punishing collaborators was at the very root of the pain and misfortune that Korean society has gone through for almost a century. The perspective grew that "pro-Japanese collaborators became advocates of the national division, who gave birth to the Cold War ideologues, who then became anti-North Koreans, anti-reunificationists, anti-pacifists," and "the roots of the collaborationist legacies remain in almost all corners of unreasonable and absurd aspects of our society."[20] Kim Bong-woo, Director of the Institute, expressed concisely this pattern of thought.
The problem of collaborators is the root of all evil in Korean society. This problem is so difficult and urgent that unless it is solved, Korean society will not survive, much less progress. The national division originated from this problem. The economic dependence on foreign countries began from here. Military dictatorship was the illegitimate child of the collaborators, and social confusion is the outcome of the very same problem. There is no social problem in Korea that is not related to the issue of collaborators.[21]
In sum, this currently popularized view reflects the idea that the root of all the negative legacies of a hundred years of modernity in Korea-colonialism, national division, war, dictatorship, dependence on foreign powers, and social injustice stem from the problem of collaborators. This new way of understanding the issue goes hand in hand with the critical view the Nationalist Democratic Movement participants had the of anticommunist dictatorship and extreme right-wing forces. Their criticism stems from their efforts to realize the ideals of progressive nationalism, including democratization, reunification, and autonomy of the nation in Korea. Above all, as the Nationalist Democratic Movement forces have had to confront the anticommunist dictatorship, their perspective on the collaborator issue, based on their progressive nationalism, could not but conflict with the anticommunist nationalism and modernization-supremacy ideas of the defenders of the collaborators.
The Movement to "Set History Straight" by Social Movement Organizations and the Efforts to Eliminate Collaborationist Legacies
The structure of the anticommunist dictatorship collapsed in the 1990s, thanks to the progress in the Nationalist Democratic Movement. As political power has been transferred from a military government to a civilian government, from a civil government to the people's government, the democratization of Korean society has been making gradual progress. The North-South summit meeting in June 2000 was a manifestation of the accomplishments in North-South exchange, and the mode of peace is extending to the Korean peninsula that is the last bastion of the Cold War in the world. Korean society presently is at a turning point from authoritarianism to democracy, and from national division to reunification. In a crucial time like this, the conservative anticommunist forces are making an anachronistic attempt to turn the direction of history backward whenever there is an opportunity, so that they can maintain their status and influence, which they enjoyed in the past under the patronage of the anticommunist dictatorship. For instance, there have been frequent attempts to glorify collaborators, such as the anticommunist dictators Syngman Rhee and Park Chung-hee, and to justify their pasts.
Various social movement organizations, including progressive research groups, civil and labor movement organizations and others, have been carrying out a campaign called "setting history straight" in order to uncover these anachronistic attempts of the conservative anticommunist forces and to bring about social reforms. The goal of this campaign is to remove the remaining negative legacies left by distorted modern Korean history��termed gwageosa (past history)��and to build a society based on human rights, peace and justice through democratization and reunification. In this sense, this is a social reform movement to settle the "past" which is an obstacle to reforming the present society.
Since the problem of collaborators is considered "the root of all evil" in Korean society this issue has always been treated as critical in the movement to set history straight. One of the notable activities that the various social movement organizations have been carrying out, either as individual entities or as coalitions, is the effort to prevent various activities commemorating collaborators including the construction of statues, monuments and memorial halls, the establishment of special cultural awards, hosting of music festivals, re-modeling houses where collaborators were born and raised, and the naming of social and cultural facilities after collaborators��all attempts to glorify collaborationist figures. Among the honored collaborators are former presidents (Park Chung-hee and Choe Gyu-ha), writers (Seo Jeong-ju, Yi Eun-sang, Mo Yun-suk), artist (Hong Nan-pa), feminist movement leaders (Kim Hwal-ran, Hwang Sin-deok), capitalist entrepreneurs (Bak Heung-sik), and religious leaders (Jeong Chun-su). The social movement organizations proved successful in counteracting the actions of collaborationist advocates through various methods such as petitions, advertisements, protests, campaigns, and academic reports.[22]
The Press Reform Movement, carried out by social movement organizations, progressive intellectuals, and the press, can also be understood in the context of the current trend toward removing collaborationist legacies. This movement mainly targets conservative family-led newspapers, the Chosun Ilbo and the Dong-a Ilbo, that grew through cooperation with the Japanese authorities at the end of the colonial era as well with the consequent dictatorial political regimes. Instead of repenting for their shameful past wrongdoings, these newspapers have supported and initiated commemorative events to honor and glorify collaborators, abusing their powerful influence in society. Furthermore, they have stood at the center of the conservative anticommunist forces while slandering reform-minded and progressive groups as pro-North Communist forces and distorting true history through the manipulation of public opinion and twisted false reports. Considering the importance of mass media in society, the success of the Press Reform Movement against conservative family-led newspapers will determine not only the direction of the movement to eradicate the collaborationist legacies, but the future of Korean society.[23]
The campaign to compile the biographical dictionary of pro-Japanese collaborators deserves particular attention since it is a fresh attempt to support the movement to remove collaborationist legacies. It started through the initiative of the Institute for Research on Anti-National Activities. Since its inception in 1991, the institute has focused on the publication of the chinilpainmyeong sajeon (biographical dictionary of pro-Japanese collaborators) and the Pro-Japanese Collaborators Series by researching, collecting, and examining relevant documents. Publications, such as Sillok chinilpa (The True History of Pro-Japanese Collaborators), chinilpa 99 in (99 Collaborators), Cheongsan haji motan yeoksa (Unresolved Issues in History), chinilpa-ran mueosin-ga (What are Pro-Japanese Collaborators), and others are exemplary research results that the institute produced as part of the project for the Pro-Japanese Collaborators Series. Despite the fact that the institute has made these publications top priority, the compilation project for the biographical dictionary of pro-Japanese collaborators has not made any significant progress due to financial difficulties. Nevertheless, this project was revived after the institute successfully carried out a campaign to collect the signatures of 10,000 professors supporting the compilation project in 1999 with the cooperation of participants within Korea and abroad. Following the announcement of the statements, a decision was made to form a foundation to oversee the finances and practical matters related to the dictionary compilation project and research. Finally, approximately 300 million won was collected at the end of 2001, and the National Culture Foundation of the Unification Era was established, which formed the Compilation Committee for the Biographical Dictionary of Pro-Japanese Collaborators. The Committee is presently carrying out its compilation project with an ambitious vision to publish the dictionary with over 3,000 entries before 2005.[24]
The active movement to remove the legacy of collaborators in South Korean society, begun by this private research institute, gained renewed momentum when 29 younger generation bipartisan lawmakers formed the Korea Parliamentary League on National Spirit (KPLNS) within the National Assembly, aimed at the very task of removing the Japanese colonial legacies in Korea. Following a media report that pointed out that many collaborators were buried at the National Cemetery, the KPLNS began a project of compiling a list of collaborators in July 2001 with the help of the Korea Liberation Association, composed of people who contributed to national independence. As a result, on 28 February 2002 they unveiled their first list of the names of 708 collaborators who allegedly helped the colonial authorities at the expense of their fellow Koreans during the colonial period. It was an historic event as the legislators selected and announced the names of collaborators for the first time since the foundation of the constitutional government. Fifty-three years earlier, the strong objection of the collaborationist force had halted the initial Anti-Collaboration Committee at the National Assembly. Among the 708 labeled as pro-Japanese were 16 prominent figures from many segments of society, including the founders of two daily newspapers, Chosun Ilbo and Dong-a Ilbo, and influential leaders of Korean society in media, culture, arts, and feminist activism. It was a big shock for many Koreans. The conservative anticommunist politicians and the two newspaper companies reacted vehemently to their inclusion in the list while many other politicians reserved comment for fear that the two conservative family-led presses might damage their careers. The conservative anticommunist groups questioned the political intentions of those 29 lawmakers and attempted to invalidate the list arguing that the legislators of KPLNS were not experts on the issue of collaboration. It goes without saying that the typical defense positions arose time and again to advocate and justify the collaborators in this debate.[25] In contrast, many media and social movement organizations reacted positively to the announcement, assessing that the overdue contribution would have long-lasting results. They praised it as it a "heroic venture 57 years after liberation," which will "bring forth animated discourse on the issue of collaborators," and "open a way to an historic punishment of collaborationist activities." They also urged the legislation of a law to examine and deal with collaborationist activities. The majority of Korean citizens also supported the KPLNP's statement: 66 percent supported the announcement of the list and 58 percent reacted positively to the enactment of a special law for the issue of collaborators. In particular, a progressive labor movement organization, the Korean Teachers and Educational Worker's Union, issued a statement that it would pursue "education on pro-Japanese collaborators' activities" as their major project for 2002 and launch a program to research and produce teaching materials on the issue.[26]
Above all, the success of such efforts as the campaign to compile the biographical dictionary of pro-Japanese collaborators and the statement of the list of collaborators, despite the strong reaction by the conservative anticommunist forces, demonstrates that the social movement to settle the unresolved problems of the past and to rectify history is becoming increasingly vigorous. Although the issue of collaborators is not yet completely resolved more than half a century after the end of the colonial era, it is important to recognize that there has been enthusiastic support for this overdue task within Korean society. In a sense, these movements can be interpreted as an indication of the positive interim result of the long and hard struggle with the negative legacies of national division, war, dictatorship, and political oppression in twentieth century Korea. In this regard, the recent movements deserve special attention in terms of Korean as well as world history.
Another point of attention is that, through the project to remove collaborationist legacies as a part of the movement for "setting history straight," a new direction has been taken for this specific issue of dealing with collaborators. The new vision is stated in the explanation of the need to settle the collaborator issue in carrying out the dictionary compilation. The first goal is to prevent same kinds of mistakes from being committed in the future through a historical assessment of their collaborationist actions, since most of the collaborators have already died making punishment impossible. The second is to remove colonial legacies, the fascist ruling structure and ideology formed under Japanese colonial rule and solidified under the Cold War system. The third is to build a sound and healthy society where justice and common sense rule by issuing a solemn warning to our present society which has long been incapable of acknowledging past mistakes. The fourth is to block the attempts to justify past wrongs such as celebratory and commemorative events for collaborators. The fifth is to prepare a true beginning of a history of the nation for truth and reconciliation while building consensus within the whole nation toward a democratic and peaceful reunification of the Korean peninsula. The sixth is to work toward establishing positive relation with Japan while reminding Japan and other former imperialist countries of their past wrongs and urging them to take responsibility (Yi Man-yeol 2001, 2-3). The vision above indicates the new direction of the movement to settle the matter of punishing collaborators; it should be based on the principles of making a historical assessment toward repentance and reconciliation inside and outside Korea, reforming society to promote justice and progress, and moving toward an open nationalism that will contribute to peaceful national reunification and sound and positive international relations. In other words, the movement to punish collaborators should stand on a balanced axis of cleansing the "past," aiming at repentance and reconciliation through historical reflection, and of reforming the "present" reality, aiming at social justice, reunification of the nation, and sound and friendly international relations.
Conclusion
There are two major points in this discussion. The first is the series of transformations of the collaborators, from their initial formation during the colonial era, to their disguise as patriots within the context of the Cold War and national division, to their rise to the ruling class through the war and within the later political context of dictatorship. Given that the long-lasting problem of collaborators has developed along with the historical processes of colonialism, the Cold War, national division, civil war, and political dictatorship, the transformation of the collaborators can be seen as a reflection of the negative aspects of the refracted modernity in twentieth-century Korea. Simultaneously, this overdue problem of collaborators in Korea manifests international contradictions, since it was strongly influenced and shaped by the American Military Government and the Cold War structure.
The second is the process through which the movement has developed. There was enthusiastic initiative and support within Korean society for their punishment during the colonial period and immediately following liberation. This resulted in a project to bring them to justice, led by the neutral political forces between the left and right during the era of the American Military Government and the subsequent Constitutional National Assembly. The movement then became animated and invigorated when the nationalist democratic movement forces took the initiative to settle this important matter after the April Revolution of 1960. The continuing efforts toward the settlement of the issue reveals the potential power of Korean citizens who have pursued the movement for the sake of national liberation, a unified nation-state, democratization, and reunification, despite Korea's tragic history. In these regards, the unfolding processes and layers of the movement to settle the matter of collaborators shows the refracted modernity in the history of Korea in which both the negative and positive aspects of modernity have become dramatically interwined.
The second core point of the discussion involves the link between the collaborators' rationale for their collaboration and the basis for their defense. If the rationale for collaboration was the idea of supremacy of civilization/modernization in which the foremost goal was dependent economic development at the expense of social justice and national independence, the key to their defense was a theory of "anticommunist nationalism and the supremacy of modernization" which was utilized to maintain dictatorial political power. It was the idea of the supremacy of modernization that was at the heart of the rationale for the collaboration, their defense, and the justification of the anticommunist dictatorship. Anticommunist nationalism was the ideological instrument that made possible the transformation of the collaborationist force and their growth into a ruling class in the domestic and international political context of the Cold War and national division. This anticommunist nationalism also brought about the integration between the collaborators and the anticommunist right-wingers, especially forces on the extreme right. The logic behind collaboration and its defense are ideologically similar in that they both ignore or reject the democratic value of social justice and the importance of an independent unified nation.
The third point concerns the unfolding path of the discussion of the movement to remove collaborationist legacies. Behind the movement flows anti-Japanese sentiment and Korean cultural pride. These sentiments became the basis for anti-Japanese nationalism during the colonial era, rejecting collaboration and its rationale, and also laid the foundation for the recent movement aimed at recovering social justice and a national spirit. This pattern of thought led to a critical awareness that the negative legacies of a hundred years of Korean modernity were rooted in the collaborator problem, in the development of the nationalist democratic movement toward progressive nationalism after the April Revolution of 1960. The "setting history straight" movement in the 1990s transformed the mode of criticism of the "present" society into a reform movement for the future with the goals of settling the "past," striving toward reflection and reconciliation on one hand, and social justice, national reunification, and constructive international relations on the other.
Lastly, an important point needs to be reemphasized regarding the characteristics of the movement to punish collaborators. The movement does not aim toward hatred and exclusion, but toward reflection and reconciliation not only within South Korea, but also between the North and the South and between Korea and its neighboring countries. In this way, the movement to punish collaborators moves toward reconciliation within South Korea, the Korean peninsula, and East Asia. However, one should remember that this movement does not believe in reconciliation without reflection and repentance. Reconciliation can only be brought about based on a thorough reflection on the past��the past of invasion, domination, war, as well as collaboration with all of these��and the history of contributing to establishing and maintaining the Cold War structure, national division, and dictatorship. Therefore, the movement to remove the collaborationist legacy cannot but confront the conservative anticommunist forces, who have refused to reflect on their past wrongdoings and have been obsessed with maintaining their privileged social status. The movement does not expect a meaningful reconciliation with Japan when it justifies and glorifies the history of invasion and domination, nor a friendly relationship as diplomatic equals with the United States when the U.S. government turns a deaf ear to calls for the recognition of its role in the Cold War, the division of the nation, and the dictatorial political structure in South Korea's recent history. Above all, this is a social reform movement to overcome the conservative extreme right-wingers' logic of domination and the rationale for their self defense through a struggle over memories. At the same time, it is a peace movement to bring about and maintain reconciliation and friendly relations through reflection and forgiveness within South Korea and the Korean peninsula as well as the East Asian region.
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* The research for this paper was supported by the Catholic University of Korea Research Fund, 2002.
Chung Youn-tae (Jeong, Yeon-tae) is Associate Professor of Korean History at Catholic University of Korea. He received his Ph.D. in History from Seoul National University in 1994. He has published many articles on various social and political policies of Japanese imperialism and Westerners' observation of Korea, including "Crisis and Discord in Colonial Korean Agricultural Society during the Great Depression" (1998) and "Westerners' Observation on Korea in the Late 19th and Early 20th Century" (1999). His research focuses on the social and economic changes reflected in colonial modernity during Japanese imperialism. (E-mail: ytchung@catholic.ac.kr.)
1. The term chinilparyu (pro-Japanese people group) began to be used around the time of the Military Mutiny of 1882 as it was seen in the expression of builbae (Japan-parasite gang), and also around the Gabo Reform of 1894 which was exemplified in the expressions such as chinil seryeok (league of pro-Japanese) or chinil gaehyeokpa(pro-Japanese reformist group). Afterwards, the term chinilpa (pro-Japanese) had been used consistently in the newspapers and articles that had been published by Koreans.
2. The gentlemen's sightseeing group of 1881 sent to Japan by the Korean government to observe contemporary Japan after Korea's opening of the port in late 19th century, and the enlightenment reformers who attempted to carry out a modern reform movement utilizing the power of Japan are two examples of the transhistorical usage of the term chinilpa (pro-Japanese). Kim Sam-ung, Chinil jeongchi 100 nyeonsa (100-Year History of Pro-Japanese Politics) (Seoul: Dongpyung, 1995), pp. 35-48. This kind of overly flexible usage of the term pro-Japanese is misleading, because these reformers would be identified as antinationalists if the term were to be applied to them when, in fact, they were not against national interest even if they kept themselves close to Japan.
3. The criteria for identifying collaborators is ambiguous as in the case of defining "conscious collaboration," "the vicious," and "the high officials," among others. This is one of the most controversial areas to determine the scope of the pro-Japanese collaborator purge ever since the liberation.
4. Kwon Tae-eok et al. eds., (Jaryomoeum) geunhyeondae hanguk tamsa (Collected Materials��A Study of Modern and Contemporary Korean History) (Seoul: Yuk Sa Bi Pyoung Sa, 1994), pp. 81-82; Yi Gwang-rin and Sin Yong-ha, eds., Saryo-ro bon hanguk munhwasa (Geundaepyeon) (Korean Cultural History Viewed through Historical Materials��the Modern Period) (Seoul: Iiljisa Publishing House, 1984), p. 210; and Bak Eun-sik, Hanguk dongnip undong ji hyeolsa (The Impassioned History of the Korean Independence Movement), vol. 1, trans. Nam Man-seong (Seoul: Seo Moon Dang Publishing Co., 1999), p. 4.
5. Eulsa ojeok refers to the five national traitors of the year 1905 who actively worked for the annexation of Korea by Japan, and chiljeok ogoe refers to the seven national traitors who actively cooperated with imperialist Japan to force King Gojong to abdicate in 1907.
6. "Siilya bangseong daegok," Hwangseong sinmun, 20 November 1905; National History Compilation Committee (NHCC), Hanguk dongnip undongsa (History of the Korean Independence Movement), vol. 1, Jaryopyeon (Collected Materials) (Seoul: NHCC, 1965), p. 669.
7. Ibid., p. 670.
8. Kwon et al., op. cit., pp. 140, 184-192, 269, 293-294, 296-297.
9. Yoshio Morita and Kanako Osada, eds., Chosen shusen no kiroku shiryo hen (Records of Wars during the Late Joseon Period), vol. 1 (Tokyo: Kannando Shoten, 1970), pp. 13-14; Bruce Cumings, Bruce Cumings-ui hanguk hyeondaesa, trans. Kim Dong-no et al. (Seoul: Changbi Publishers Inc., 2001), p. 271; originally published asKorea's Place in the Sun: A Modern History (New York and London: W. W. Norton & Co, 1998).
10. Dong-a Ilbo, 11 January and 13 November 1947; Jungoe Sinbo, 15 April 1947; Hanseong Ilbo, 9 May 1947; Chosun Ilbo, 27 November 1947; Kyung Hyang Shinmun, 13 November 1947; Mal (Talk) 183 (September 2001), p. 156. All the newspaper sources in relation to collaborators below around the time of Korean liberation are cited from "Korean History Database" in the homepage of the National History Compilation Committee (http://kuksa.nhcc.go.kr) and Compilation Committee for the Biographical Dictionary of the Pro-Japanese Collaborators, Je 1 cha gungmin gongcheonghoe jaryojip (The Collection of the First Public Hearing) (2001).
11. Ko Won-seop, ed., Banminja joesanggi (The Record of the Collaborationist Crimes Against the Nation) (Seoul: Baekgyeop munhwasa, 1949), pp. 1-2.
12. Chosun Ilbo, 9 March 1947; Kyung Hyang Shinmun, 19 March 1947.
13. Naeoe jeoneol (Naeway Journal), November 2001, a special issue on Ilje cheongsan (Removal of the Colonial Legacy), vol. I.
14. Institute for Research on Anti-National Activities (1994).
15. Daehanmaeil, 1 March 2001; "Haebang 56 nyeon teukbyeol gihoek: dasi chinilpa-reul malhanda" (Special Issue Celebrating the 56th Year after Liberation: Retelling the Story of Pro-Japanese Collaborators), Mal 183 (September 2001); "Chinilpa dongsang-eun cheolgeo doedo ginyeomgwan-eun namneunda" (Although the Collaborators' Statues Were Removed, Their Memorial Halls Remain), OhmyNews (http://www.ohmyNews.com), 3 January 2002; "Masan Yi Eun-sang munhagwan' myeongching nonran gayeol" (Fierce Debates Over the Name of Masan Yi Eun-sang Museum of Literature), OhmyNews, 2 March 2002; Chosun Ilbo, 22 January 1993 and 11 February 1995.
16. Kim In-geol et al., eds., Hanguk hyeondaesa gangui (Lectures on Korean Contemporary History) (Seoul: Dolbegae, 1998), pp. 73-74; Maeil Sinbo (Daily News), 2 and 6 November 1945; Seoul Sinmun, 12 November 1946.
17. Kim In-geol et al., op. cit., pp. 231-232, 250-253; Kim Sam-ung (1984). (Seoul: Ilwolseogak, 1984). For further bibliographical information regarding collaboration-related studies, see Institute for Research on Anti-National Activities, Burok 1: Chinilpa munje gwallyeon juyo munheon mongnok (Bibliography on Major Writings on the Issue of Pro-Japanese Collaborators) (1993).
18. Human Rights Commission at the National Council of Churches in Korea, 1970 nyeondae minjuhwa undong(Pro-Democracy Movement of Korea in the 1970s), vol. 5 (Seoul: National Council of Churches in Korea, 1987), pp. 1790-1979; Kim Sam-ung (1984).
19. For exemplary works, see Kim Min-ju and Choe Min-ji (1978); Kang Dong-jin, (1980); Im Jong-guk (1982); Kil Jin-hyeon (1984); Institute for Research on Anti-National Activities (1991, 1992, 1994); Institute for Research on Collaborationist's Activities (1997). For a representative academic journal, see Chinil munje yeon-gu (Study on Pro-Japanese Collaborators' Problems).
20. Hankyoreh, 10 March 2002; Naeoe jeoneol, November 2001, p. 62.
21. Kim Bong-woo (Kim Bong-u), "Chaek meori-e" Introduction), Chinilparan mueosin-ga (What is Pro-Japanese Collaborators?) (Seoul: The Asian Culture Press, 1997), p. 6.
22. For the relevant articles or study results, see newspapers such as Hankyoreh and Daehan Maeil (Korea Daily News), magazines such as Mal, Hankyoreh 21, Yeoksabipyeong, internet paper such as OhmyNews(http://www.ohmyNews.com) and the homepages of the Institute for Research on Collaborationist's Activities (http://www.minjok. or.kr) and the National Culture Foundation of the Unification Era (http://historyfund.com).
23. Anti-Chosun Ilbo Citizen's Solidarity (http://www.antichosun.or.kr), ed., Wae Joseonilboin-ga (Why Chosun Ilbo?) (Seoul: Inmul and sasang, 2000).
24. Kim Min-cheol, "Manggak-ui yeoksa, waegokdoen gieok" Hankyoreh 21, 372 (2001); "Machimnae 'chinil inmyeong sajeon'-i pyeonchandoeda" ("Biographical Dictionary of Pro-Japanese Collaborators" is Published at Last), OhmyNews, 3 December 2001; "Jipjung gihoek 1: Jo Mun-gi tongil sidae minjok munhwa jaedan isajang" (Special Issue 1: Jo Mun-gi, The Chief Director of the National Culture Foundation of the Unification Era), OhmyNews, 4 March 2002; "Tongil sidae minjok munhwa jaedan changnip daehoe mun-geon" (Conference Papers Presented at the Establishment of the National Culture Foundation of the Unification Era), 2 December 2001; Yi Man-yeol (2001); http://www.historyfund.com.
25. http://www.imhere.or.kr; Korea Daily News, 1 March 2002; KPLNS, "Bodo jaryo: iljeha chinil banminjok haengwija 1cha myeongdan balpyo" (Press Release Material: The First List of Pro-Japanese Collaborators against the Nation during the Colonial Era), 28 February 2002; Hankyoreh, 28 February 2002. For further detailed reports on the incident, see articles in Chosun Ilbo, Dong-a Ilbo, and JoongAng Ilbo, 1 and 2 March 2002.
26. Hankyoreh, 28 February and 3 March 2002; HanKook Ilbo, 28 February and 2 March 2002; Media onul, 1 March 2002; Korea Daily News, 8 March 2002; Kukmin Ilbo, 1 March 2002.
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