Vogel. China & Japan, Ch 12 Facing the New Era

 Ch 12  Facing the New Era.

WHAT IS THE NATURE of the new era that China and Japan face, now that China occupies the dominant position in the relationship? How might the two nations work together in the new era for the benefit of both nations and the rest of the world?

Sino-Japanese Relations after 2014.

Until the arrival of Western explorers, merchants, and missionaries, China and Japan were linked in a loose regional order dominated by Chinese civilization. But now the two countries are part of a global order, which, though highly imperfect, operates according to a far more complex structure of rules and procedures that were originally established by Western countries. Even as China surpasses the United States to become the world's largest economy, it remains part of this global structure created by Westerners. As China gains influence and leverage around the world, it is beginning to take on a larger role within existing organizations. It is taking the lead to form new regional and global institutions that, despite being established by China, operate less in the way China has traditionally dealt with the outside and more like the institutions established under the leadership of the United States and other Western countries. Japan, which has been subordinate to the United States since the days of the Allied Occupation, remains a major global economic power and will continue working within the framework of the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance. But since the administration of Donald Trump, which is loosening its links to regional and global institutions, Japan is gaining more independence and beginning slowly to take more initiative in its global political role and in its relations with China.

People in China and Japan now have far more contacts with each other than they had at any time in history. Due to the advances in industrial production and transportation that spread to China in the early decades after reform and opening began in 1978, the scale of goods and people exchanged between the two countries is more than a hundred times what it was in 1972, when they first reestablished formal diplomatic relations. More goods are exchanged, and more people travel between the two countries, in a single day now than in an entire decade during the centuries of the Qing dynasty (1644­1912) and the Tokugawa period (1603-1868). Between World War II and 1972, trade between the two countries never reached $1 billion a year, but by 2017 the countries were trading $300 billion in goods per year.' In 1965, the peak year for Japanese visitors to China before normalization, aside from some Japanese visitors to the Guangzhou trade fair, fewer than 5,000 Japanese travelers visited China during the entire year.' In 2018, more than 8 million visas were issued to Chinese travelers going to Japan and more than 4 million visas were issued to Japanese individuals going to China. By 2018 an average of more than 20,000 Chinese visitors were arriving in Japan each day, and the number of tourists was continuing to grow.

More than 30,000 Japanese companies now operate in China, far more than companies from any other country. Pragmatic Chinese officials in charge of local economic relations have been willing to work with the Japanese, despite public expressions of anti-Japanese sentiment. Japanese companies are also playing a role in supplying products to Chinese consumers through e-commerce.

However, between the political leaders of Japan and China, the level of trust and empathy and the number of frank discussions is low compared with those between the leaders of other major nations, and the nature of their exchanges tends to be more formal. No high-level political leader on either side has close friendships with or deep knowledge about the people in the other country. Top leaders of the two nations occasionally have their own brief side meetings at gatherings of regional or international organizations, but long discussions between them have not taken place more than once every five years. By Chinese standards for welcoming foreign guests, Japanese officials are often not given honored treatment, and sometimes they are not received at all.

Until the Sino-Japanese War of 1895, most Chinese people living outside of the major east coast cities were hardly aware of Japan's existence. Even during the Sino-Japanese War of 1937-1945, unlike those living near large cities or Japanese military camps, the 80 percent of the Chinese population living in rural areas without access to radio had little awareness of what Japanese soldiers were doing in China. Now, every day, virtually everyone in both Japan and China has access to electronic media presenting news or stories about the other country. In China, state media officials supervise the content of information presented to the public, and between 1992 and 2014, images of Japanese aggressors were widely available to Chinese viewers. Japan did not have an organized propaganda department as it did during World War II, but coverage of China in the Japanese media included televised pictures of Chinese protestors throwing stones at Japanese shops in China, and Chinese ships and planes harassing Japanese ships near the Senkaku / Diaoyu Islands. The result of such media coverage in both countries was a widespread, mutual public antagonism that peaked between 2010 and 2014. Yet as Chinese incomes began to rise, Chinese people acquired a high regard for Japanese industrial products.

The extensive personal contacts and economic relations between China and Japan thus rest on a fragile foundation that is threatened by widespread popular hostility and the changeability of political leaders who lack trust in their counterparts in the other country. Since much of the passion in Sino-Japanese relations is deeply rooted in perceptions of history, it will be difficult for the two countries to place their relations on a more solid, stable base, unless they deal with the volatile emotions stemming from history.

Concerns of Chinese Leaders and Their Use of History.

The concerns that Chinese leaders have about Japan are reflected in the issues they raise about history. The three most common issues raised by Chinese leaders are: visits by Japanese political leaders to the Yasukuni Shrine, Japan's failure to acknowledge the horrors of the Nanjing Massacre, and the failure of Japanese textbooks to describe accurately the Sino-Japanese War. What are the concerns underlying China's focus on these issues?

The Yasukuni Shrine.

Although many Japanese leaders have expressed goodwill toward China during the past 125 years, ultimately China suffered greatly from attacks by Japanese troops, not only from 1937 to 1945 but also during the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895, the Ji'nan Incident of 1928, the Manchurian Incident of 1931, and the Shanghai Incident of 1932. Chinese leaders recall the efforts by Toyotomi Hideyoshi to march through Korea to capture Beijing. They see in Japanese the samurai warrior spirit and the willingness to die for their country. They are concerned that Japan might again become an aggressive militarist power, and they do not believe that Japan's declarations of its peaceful intent are a reliable predictor of its behavior. Therefore, they are alert to any signs that militarists might once again rise to power in Japan. They are sensitive to discussions of increasing military expenditures, to proposals to eliminate Article 9 in the Japanese Constitution forbidding the use of war as a means of settling

international disputes, and to the activities and statements by right-wing activists.

For the Chinese, the enshrinement in the Yasukuni Shrine of the souls of Japanese military figures who were tried as class-A war criminals after World War II signals that the Japanese still respect those who took part in attacking China. Japan's failure to separate the war criminals from the place where others who died serving Japan are enshrined is seen by the Chinese as reinforcing the readiness of young Japanese to sacrifice themselves for their country. Knowledgeable Chinese are also aware that the Yushukan Museum at the Yasukuni Shrine glorifies Japanese military achievements.

Having suffered from Japanese military aggression, China's leaders are acutely concerned when they see any sign that Japan might be becoming more militaristic. For them, the return of the souls of Japanese war criminals to the Yasukuni Shrine, and visits made by Japanese political leaders to the Yasukuni Shrine since then, arouse fears that a militaristic spirit is being revived. From the perspective of the Chinese, the actions of Japanese leaders—visiting the place where Japanese war criminals are enshrined—speak louder about Japan's true intentions than their "empty" words about peace.

The Nanjing Massacre.

To the Chinese, the Nanjing Massacre represents the vicious nature of Japanese warriors. Many in China are familiar with tales about the cruelties of the Japanese. The reports of the behavior of Japanese soldiers in Nanjing resonate with what the Chinese have long heard about sword-swinging samurai and bloodthirsty Japanese pirates.

When the Chinese hear statements by Japanese scholars arguing that not as many people were killed during the Nanjing Massacre as the Chinese claim, they interpret them as playing down the seriousness of the crimes that Japanese soldiers committed in China. If the Japanese try to soften the horror of the atrocities committed by their troops, it creates doubts about whether they have really turned their backs on the behavior of earlier generations.

The Textbook Issue.

The Chinese are concerned that the next generation in Japan, rather than being trained to denounce the militarist past, will be susceptible to becoming aggressors just like earlier generations. If the Japanese are really turning their backs on their militarist past, the Chinese ask, why are they not learning the lessons of history and renouncing their past behavior in what they teach their youth? Textbooks have become a visible, concrete symbol for the Chinese to evaluate how Japanese students are being trained. Knowledgeable Chinese are aware that the textbooks used in high school social-science courses in Japan provide very little background on the two Sino-Japanese Wars. In their view, the youth in Japan today are not sufficiently aware of the horrors that were committed by Japanese soldiers and hence they do not thoroughly reject war making. If Japanese youth were to be drafted into military service by their leaders and called to war, they ask, might they not commit the same cruel acts as their grandfathers and great-grandfathers?

Chinese Leaders' Limited Contacts with Japan.

Since World War II, China's leaders, unlike Chinese students who have studied in Japan, have had few contacts with the Japanese, and therefore they have not had opportunities to witness the depth of the Japanese commitment to peace. Their perspectives, like those of the Chinese public in general, are more deeply colored by memories of the Japanese atrocities of World War II.

Chinese Leaders' Use of History.

Leaders in China have drawn on their people's historical memories to increase China's leverage over Japan. The Chinese assumption has been that when Japanese leaders show signs of reviving militarism, strong complaints and warnings will eventually deter Japan from pursuing a military course. When they see signs that Japan may be becoming more militaristic, they warn the Japanese of the anger of the Chinese people. China's leaders rallied public opinion to protest Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro's visit to the Yasukuni Shrine on August 15, 1985, for example, on the fortieth anniversary of Japan's surrender to the United States. They set off an anti-Japanese campaign when Japan announced plans in 2010 to try in a domestic court the Chinese fishing-boat captain who had rammed into two Japanese vessels near the Senkaku / Diaoyu Islands. They organized another anti-Japanese publicity campaign in 2012 when Japan announced plans to "nationalize" the islands.

The leaders of China have often called attention to Japan's aggressive history when pursuing specific goals. For example, when it appeared in the 1980s that Japan was hesitating to renew its programs to extend aid to China, Chinese complaints about Japan's handling of history became more pronounced, subsiding only after Japan decided to renew its aid. Many Chinese individuals and Chinese businesses have also criticized Japan for its past aggressions when they have failed to receive payments from Japanese individuals or companies for other offenses.

When the United Nations was considering making Japan a permanent member of the UN Security Council, the Chinese government opposed it, arguing that the position would be unacceptable because of Japan's aggressive behavior in the past. Chinese leaders mobilized their citizens to sign petitions and to take part in public demonstrations against Japan.

Following the Chinese student demonstrations at Tiananmen Square in 1989 and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 after its own domestic protests, Chinese leaders introduced the Patriotic Education Campaign to encourage patriotism among the next generation. To help build national loyalty, many articles appeared in the Chinese media that were critical of Japan for its treatment of China. The government also began using new formats—movies, video games, and other digital media—to display the brutal behavior of the Japanese and thus build greater support among Chinese youth for their leaders, who sought to protect their country from the enemy. In 2012, for example, the Chinese government approved the production of 69 anti-Japanese television series and 100 anti-Japanese films. Ever since 1915, when China opposed Japan's Twenty-One Demands, Chinese leaders have found anti-Japanese publicity to be a useful tool for building loyalty to the Chinese government and its leadership.

The Japanese History Problem.

The essence of the Japanese history problem is that although the Japanese overwhelmingly wish to pursue the path of peace, their respect for their own ancestors and their determination not to bow down to China have prevented them from satisfying Chinese demands. The Japanese have rejected military pursuits, but they want to respect their fellow countrymen, and especially their relatives, who sacrificed themselves for their nation. They believe that if their ancestors did bad things, it was not because they were inherently bad people but because they faced difficult circumstances in which they had little choice.

Except for members of some right-wing groups in Japan, the Japanese strongly believe that it was wrong for Japan to invade China, and they deeply regret that their nation caused so much suffering. But they also feel that they have paid an enormous price—in the results of the massive aerial bombing of their cities, the two atomic bombs dropped on Japan, and the seven years of Allied Occupation. The dominant view among the Japanese public is that, after the war, the best way to deal with the suffering Japan had caused in China was to offer assistance for China's modernization program. They are pleased that their country's pursuit of peace and its generosity toward other  countries have earned Japan a positive worldwide reputation, except in China and Korea. In their view, Japan has made great contributions to China, contributions that have been inadequately acknowledgecL

The Japanese recognize that the Chinese are becoming stronger, both militarily and economically. In dealings with the Chinese, the Japanese want to be treated as respected equals, not forced to submit to Chinese demands. They also believe that the Chinese use anti-Japanese rhetoric as a way of both maintaining domestic unity and extracting favors from Japan, and they respond negatively when angry Chinese leaders tell them what they must do.

The Japanese believe that the Chinese have used the issue of history to achieve goals not in Japan's interest. They have used it to issue demands for more help and more payments from Japan. They have used it to gain cooperation from other countries that also suffered from Japanese aggression and to pull them closer to China and away from Japan. The Chinese have done this with Korea, in particular, but also with Southeast Asia and the United States. The Japanese have noticed that the Chinese have called attention to the cooperation between the Americans and the Chinese during World War II in confronting their common enemy, Japan. The Japanese were deeply disappointed that China used the history issue to keep Japan from receiving a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council, in spite of the fact that Japan was the number-two contributor to UN funding and that since 1945 Japan has been pursuing the path of peace.

It has been difficult for Japan to find an effective way to react to accusations of past aggressions. It has responded by saying that many of the complaints about Japanese behavior are exaggerated. The Japanese also feel it is grossly unfair that they are still the focus of such criticism when Americans are no longer constantly criticized for their actions against American Indians, or Belgians for their acts in the Belgian Congo, or the British and other colonial powers for behavior in the colonies that they exploited. Why, Japan's younger generations ask, must they continuously apologize to the Chinese for events that occurred more than seven decades ago, long before they were born? In the Pew polling for 2016, 53 percent of Japanese respondents said that Japan had apologized enough, while only 10 percent of the Chinese polled agreed.

Facing History While Looking Forward.

The current dialogue on history between China and Japan has focused on the unfortunate side of the relationship. Less attention has been given to the good relations between the two countries at times of great cultural borrowing, especially in the periods from 600 to 838, when Japan borrowed so heavily from China, and from 1905 to 1937 and 1978 through the 1990s, when China borrowed so much from Japan. The two cultures have changed throughout history, but there remains a broad base of commonality in the written language, literature, Buddhism, Confucianism, art, architecture, and music they share, some of which is even incorporated into popular culture, and this could form the basis for continued cooperation in the future, if permitted by national policies.

Each country has placed more emphasis on its own contributions to the other and its own suffering at the hands of the other. These images have been kept alive to strengthen loyalty to the nation and to the nation's leaders.

The Chinese, especially through popular Sino-Japanese War movies, have emphasized the negative side of Sino-Japanese relations throughout history. Many Chinese people are convinced that the Japanese are aggressive by nature. In China's patriotic narrative, the Sino Japanese War of 1937-1945 is simply the latest chapter revealing the true Japanese character. In this view, the Japanese are polite—on the surface. In the 1920s, for example, the Japanese talked about cooperation, but in the end they initiated incidents and sneak attacks against both China and the United States. The Chinese people have little awareness of the positive side of their relationship with Japan, of how much they have benefited from the "learn from Japan" programs after 1895 and the "development assistance" programs after 1978. They are not fully aware of the generosity of Japanese aid programs in the 1980s and 1990s. They are also not aware of the extent to which Japan has apologized, or how thoroughly the Japanese have renounced militarism and pursued peace.

Throughout history the Japanese have had a deep sense of the Chinese as a proud and arrogant people who demand subordination by other people. Thus, ever since 607 the Japanese have maintained a reluctance to bow down to the Chinese and a determination to be treated as political equals. For the Japanese, requests by the Chinese that they grovel in apologies represent the latest version of China's attempts to assert its superiority. The Japanese are willing to apologize, but they are not prepared to bow down and apologize in the way that the Chinese demand.

The Japanese are aware of Japan's positive contributions to China in the modernization of Manchuria and Taiwan and its contributions to China after 1895 and 1978. However, their collective historical memory directs less attention to the harm and suffering Japan caused to China, an issue that is constantly stressed by the Chinese. The Japanese government at times has not allowed textbooks critical of Japan's aggression in China to be used in its schools, and many publications and public discussions in Japan gloss over the atrocities that Japan committed in China.

What Japan and China Can Do to Face History.

Both countries could avoid aggravating the problems that arise from history by providing their citizens with a fuller and more accurate account of their history and a more balanced presentation of their current relations. They could help their citizens better understand

their long-entangled history in a way that acknowledges how much they have learned from each other and reflects their positive experiences from working together.

The Japanese prime minister and other senior officials could decide that they will not visit the Yasukurui Shrine while they are in office. The Japanese could also provide fuller accounts of the Sino-Japanese War in curriculum guidelines for compulsory high school history courses, in particular by including the word "invasion" (shinryaku) in their textbooks. Japan could produce more television programs that give a full accounting of the suffering inflicted on the Chinese people by Japan's invasions. The Japanese people, individually, could make greater efforts to understand the history of Japanese aggression in China, as well as to better understand Chinese society and the attitudes of the Chinese people.

The Chinese could teach their students more about what China learned from Japan between 1905 and 1937 as well as after 1978. They could give the public a fuller account of the Japanese turn to peace after 1945, Japanese contributions to China since 1978, and the apologies already offered by Japanese officials. They could reduce the number of anti-Japanese movies about World War II produced and shown in China and present more balanced descriptions of Japan in their museums, their classrooms, and the media.

The Chinese could also study the example of Japan's history in the first half of the twentieth century as a warning of what can happen as a country becomes richer and stronger, when support for military expansion becomes so strong that its leaders are unable to restrain superpatriotic passions that can ultimately lead to disaster.

A New Vision: Warm Politics, Hot Economics.

It has been customary for the Chinese and Japanese to describe their relationship as "cold politics, hot economics." Despite poor political relations, they have extensive business relations. The question now is whether the two nations can build on their business relations and improve their political relations.

Since 2010 the key leverage for improving relations has been in the hands of the Chinese, because China has suffered more and because China now has the larger economy and more global influence. Chinese leaders will of course consider how much it is in their national interest to work with Japan on regional and international issues. A fundamental question is to what extent Chinese leaders feel confident enough of the loyalty of their own people that they do not need to use anti-Japanese programs to strengthen nationalism among the populace. In the 1990s, war movies depicting Japanese enemies were an effective tool for strengthening patriotism, but their production and use could be reduced as Chinese leaders feel more confident of the patriotism of the public.

It is unrealistic, considering the depth of the historical passions involved, that China and Japan will quickly develop feelings of trust and become close friends. That may be a goal for several decades in the future. A reasonable goal for the next decade would be to manage their relations in a straightforward, frank, and businesslike way so that the two countries can become reliable partners. It is unrealistic to expect that China and Japan in the next decade will enjoy "hot politics." But if they can continue to expand their cooperation in such enterprises as the Belt and Road Initiative, in developing joint projects for solving environmental issues, and in multinational organizations, it is not impossible that they could achieve "warm politics."

A closer businesslike relationship between China and Japan should not be a problem for the United States. Some individual Americans might respond with alarm, but their alarm would be misplaced. A reduction of tensions between China and Japan, increased stability in the Western Pacific, and contributions from both countries toward maintaining world order are all outcomes that accord with the interests of the United States as well as those of other countries.

An Agenda for Sino-Japanese Cooperation.

From 2006 to 2008, leaders and representatives of China and Japan held a series of meetings to discuss how their nations could work together for their mutual benefit and laid out an agenda to achieve that goal.

In April 2007 Chinese premier Wen Jiabao visited Japan and gave a key speech—in Chinese, translated for a Japanese audience, and relayed back to China, where it was broadcast to the public in the original Chinese. He publicly stated what Japanese leaders had long hoped a Chinese leader would say. He acknowledged that on many occasions Japan's leaders had expressed their deep remorse and apologies, and he expressed appreciation for Japan's peaceful development. Premier Wen proposed four principles for bringing Sino-Japanese relations to a new stage: mutual trust, a big-picture perspective, common development based on equality and mutual benefit, and strengthening exchanges with an eye toward the future.

The agenda that Chinese and Japanese officials then agreed to pursue includes the following goals:

Expanded exchanges and dialogues among leaders, cabinet ministers, and high-level officials.

Exchanges of young people.

Reciprocal visits by the People's Liberation Navy and the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force.

Cooperation on issues involving North Korea.

Energy cooperation (including cooperation on energy conservation and environmental protection).

Establishment of a ministerial-level dialogue on energy.

Further cooperation in fields such as agriculture, intellectual property rights, pharmaceutical products, small and medium-size enterprises, information and communications technology, finance, and criminal justice.

This agenda from 2007 has great promise as a starting point not only for the benefit of China and Japan but fot the benefit of global peace and order.

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