동아시아의 평화와 화해의 정치학 Scrapbook: FRAMEWORK FOR KOREA-JAPAN RELATIONS : Dong Suk Park

2025-04-01

FRAMEWORK FOR KOREA-JAPAN RELATIONS : Dong Suk Park

RISS 검색 - 학위논문 상세보기

A NEW ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR KOREA-JAPAN RELATIONS : THE “THREE FORCES” MODEL

https://www.riss.kr/link?id=T16594852

저자 Dong Suk Park

발행사항 서울 : 서강대학교 국제대학원, 2023

학위논문사항 학위논문(박사) -- 서강대학교 국제대학원 , EastAsianStudies(includingKoreanStudies) , 2023. 2

발행연도 2023

작성언어 영어

주제어

Korea-Japan Relations ; 3-Forces-Model ; Kominka ; De-Japanification ; Holistic Historiography ; 한일관계

발행국(도시)

서울

형태사항

169p ; 26 cm

일반주기명

지도교수: 손대권

UCI식별코드

I804:11029-000000069873

소장기관

서강대학교 도서관 소장기관정보

===

Abstract

This dissertation sheds new light on the subject of Korea-Japan relations by

introducing a neoteric analytical framework. As an alternative framework to existing

theories, a ‘3-Forces’ model was developed for better understanding the fluctuations of

Korea-Japan relations which continues to be a field of paramount interest to South Korea, Japan, and the United States.

The three-forces, herein, are

(1) the Polarity Force,

(2) the Leadership Force, and

(3) a Societal Force.

Whereas a fair amount of earlier studies have

excluded the United States in analyzing the Korea-Japan equation, this dissertation

asserts that the totality of Korea-Japan relations cannot be aptly understood without

including the United States.

Moreover, former state leaders in Korea and Japan were analyzed for hypothesis generation.

In the Societal Force domain, the dark shadows of Imperial Japan’s Kominka-Undo are paired together with South Korea’s DeJapanification movement for analysis and hypothesis generation.

Upon applying the formulated 3-Forces model as an analytical framework to Korea-Japan relations, it is argued that a furtherance of South Korea’s de-Japanification process —with assistance from like-minded leaders inside both the United States and Japan— will paradoxically help push South Korea and Japan closer together as to best pursue common regional goals and interests with triangulated congruity rather than ruction.

Keywords: Korea-Japan Relations, 3-Forces-Model, Kominka, De-Japanification,

Holistic Historiography.

Table of Contents

Abstract

Acronyms and Abbreviations

List of Figures

List of Tables

Chapter 1: Introduction .................................................................................................. 1

1.A Purpose of Study and Key Research Question.................................................... 1

1.B Ongoing Issues and the Trilateral Relationship................................................... 4

1.C Korea-Japan Relation’s 50th Year Anniversary................................................... 5

1.D Thesis Structure................................................................................................... 8

Chapter 2: Literature Review ....................................................................................... 14

2.A Period I: Park Chung-hee’s Presidency (before Yushin)..................................... 15

2.A.1 Major Events on Korea-Japan Relations, 1961 to 1972 .................................. 15

2.A.2 Existing Interpretations ................................................................................... 19

2.A.3 Lacunae and Limitations of Earlier Studies .................................................... 23

2.B Period II: Park Chung-hee’s Presidency (after Yushin) ...................................... 25

2.B.1 Major Events on Korea-Japan Relations, 1972 to 1979 .................................. 25

2.B.2 Existing Interpretations.................................................................................... 32

2.B.3 Lacunae and Limitations of Earlier Studies..................................................... 34

2.C Period III: Chun Doo-hwan and Roh Tae-woo................................................... 36

2.C.1 Major Events on Korea-Japan Relations, 1979 to 1993 .................................. 37

2.C.2 Existing Interpretations.................................................................................... 44

2.C.3 Lacunae and Limitations of Earlier Studies..................................................... 46

2.D Period IV: Kim Young-sam ................................................................................ 47

2.D.1 Major Events on Korea-Japan Relations, 1993 to 1998 .................................. 48

2.D.2 Existing Interpretations................................................................................... 54

2.D.3 Lacunae and Limitations................................................................................. 56

2.E Summary: Literature Review.............................................................................. 57

Chapter 3: Research Design and Hypotheses............................................................... 60

3.A Deficiencies of the Classical View: History as the Culprit................................. 61

3.B Shortfall of Existing IR (International Relations) Theories................................ 65

3.C The ‘3-Forces Model’ as Explanatory Variables and Hypotheses Definitions ... 70

iii

3.D Data Collection and Methods............................................................................. 86

Chapter 4: The ‘3-Forces-Model’ Hypotheses Verification.......................................... 89

4.A Park Chung-hee (I), before Yushin: 1961 to 1972 (Period I).............................. 89

4.A.1 Case No. 1: The 1965 Normalization Protests ............................................. 95

4.B Park Chung-hee (II), after Yushin: 1972 to 1979 (Period II).............................. 96

4.B.1 Case No. 2: The Assassination of Yuk Young-soo (August 15, 1974)........... 100

4.C Chun Doo-hwan and Roh Tae-woo: 1980 to 1993 (Period III) ........................ 101

4.C.1 Case No. 3: Yasukuni Shrine Visit by Nakasone (August 15, 1985)............. 102

4.C.2 Case No. 4: Removal of Japanese Era School Uniforms (March 1986)........ 103

4.C.3 Case No. 5: Japanese Emperor’s Visit to South Korea (after May 1990)...... 103

4.D Kim Young-sam: 1993 to 1998 (Period IV) in a Unipolar World .................... 104

4.D.1 Case No. 6: Newspapers adopt Korean without Hanja (after May 1990) ..... 107

4.E Summary: The ‘3-Forces-Model’ Hypotheses Verification .............................. 108

Chapter 5: Conclusion................................................................................................ 111

Glossary of Names and Terms.................................................................................... 113

Appendix A: Alternative look-up names spelt in the CIA database ........................... 115

Appendix B: Was the U.S. involved in the 1965 Korea-Japan Treaty?...................... 116

Appendix C: Restoring Korea-Japan Relations with U.S. Involvement .................... 128

Appendix D: The Nixon Era Shocks.......................................................................... 134

Appendix E: Revisionist Views Held by Japan’s Top Cabinet Members .................. 137

Bibliography............................................................................................................... 141

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Chapter 1: Introduction

1.A Purpose of Study and Key Research Question

The purpose of this study aims to answer why Korea-Japan relations have

become increasingly problematic for the United States (US) in Northeast Asia. This

research question is predicated on the fact that the United States was, and continues to

be, deeply involved in an ongoing triangulated relationship in East Asia with imperative

weight. It also implies that the totality of Korea-Japan relations cannot be aptly

understood without including the United States.

This is mainly because the United

States has kept a strong ‘security’ foothold in South Korea and Japan since the end of

World War Two up until today with enduring geo-strategic influence on both countries.

In addition to frequently resurfacing issues related to the Comfort Women,

Dokdo/Takeshima, and Yasukuni Shrine visits by high-ranking Japanese government

officials, 2

the list of contentious point has recently grown to include the General

Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) and Japan’s exclusion of South

Korea in their export-control ‘whitelist’ of nations.3 The unexpected assassination of

Abe Shinzō on July 8, 2022 has also turned the spotlight on the vexing problem of how

Korea-Japan relations had rapidly deteriorated since Abe’s 2013 ritual offering to the

Yasukuni Shrine as the Prime Minister of Japan (PMOJ).4 Abe further paid an official

1 Korea is used throughout this dissertation to denote, and interchangeably used with, South Korea

(a.k.a. the Republic of Korea, or ROK) unless mentioned otherwise.

2 Ed Payne and Yoko Wakatsuki, “Japanese Prime Minister Abe visits controversial Yasukuni war

shrine,” CNN, December 28, 2013.

3 Troy Stangarone, “Korea’s Dispute with Japan Spills into National Security,” The Diplomat,

August 27, 2019.

4 Haiqing Wang, “Commentary: Japanese lawmakers' visit to notorious shrine exposes cowardice

of politicians,” XinhuaNet English News, April 23, 2013.

visit to the Yasukuni Shrine, that same year, during December that created further

rigidities between Seoul and Tokyo.

5 From Japan, the word ‘Korea Fatigue’ has been

shared with the US to voice its exasperations.

6 Furthermore, other exacerbating points

of contention include the 2018 South Korean Supreme Court decisions over forced

laborers at Nippon Steel (October 30, 2018) and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (November

29, 2018).

For the United States, maintaining a cooperative relationship between South

Korea and Japan is an imperative East Asia ‘alliance’ vector in its foreign policy. This is

a particularly salient point for the Joe Biden’s administration as it attempts to build upon

its Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) in the wake of an expansionist China that

is being led by Xi Jinping.

8 With the current rise of an autocratic China, the ‘hub-andspoke’ model for Korea and Japan is now undergoing a thorough review process with

broader security experimentations.

9 This has heightened the importance of the KoreaJapan equation in protecting the US-led rules-based liberal international order in East

Asia.

Earlier studies on this subject, as noted in Chapter 2 (Literature Review), have

“Japan PM Shinzo Abe visits Yasukuni WW2 shrine,” BBC, December 26, 2013.

6 Clint Richards, “US Voices Exasperation Over Japan-ROK Disputes: Bickering complicates U.S.

strategy in Northeast Asia and could lead to a less effective alliance,” The Diplomat, August 21,

2014.

7 Sarah Kim, “Mitsubishi Heavy appeals asset seizure,” The Joongang Daily, January 4, 2021.

Iftikhar Gilani, “Biden revives strategic pivot to Asia to contain China’s influence,” Anadolu

Agency, May 30, 2022.

9 The North Atlantic Treaty Organization plus four (NATO+4) and the Free and Open Indo-Pacific

(FOIP) are two examples of this experiment.

10 G. John Ikenberry, “American Hegemony and East Asia Order,” Australian Journal of

International Affairs, Vol. 58, No. 3 (September 2004), pp. 353-367.; also see, Bill Hayton,

“NATO knows Asia is vital to protecting global security,” Chatham House, June 28, 2022.; also

see Sheila A. Smith, “The Quad Is Getting More Ambitious in the Indo-Pacific,” Council on

Foreign Relations, May 27, 2022.

pointed to ‘history’ as the culprit for the tumult between Seoul and Tokyo;11 others have

alluded to ‘collective memory’ as a deterministic agent.12 Furthermore, the idea of an

‘identity-clash’ has also been theorized to square away this question.13 Each of these

theories has, however, fallen short in the provision of an overarching and effective

framework to analyze Korea-Japan relations.

Therefore, and in order to tackle this limitation, this thesis postulates —as a

new analytical framework— the existence of three underlying forces (or ‘three

explanatory forces’) which conjointly act to simultaneously effect the outcome of KoreaJapan relations within the context of U.S.-led regional geo-strategic politics and

domestic social development.

The three forces working herein as ‘explanatory variables’ vis-à-vis KoreaJapan relations are: (1) the Polarity Force, (2) the Leadership Force, and (3) the Societal

Force. Consequently, one main objective of this study shall be to validate the

hypothesized ‘3-Forces’ model by examining them one-by-one via method of qualitative

analysis.

This dissertation subscribes to an interdisciplinary approach in the field of

‘Korea and East Asia’ studies that amalgamates (i) historical events analysis, (ii)

concepts from international relations theories, (iii) analyses on democratization and

modernization movements, and (iv) Area Studies.

11 Alexis Dudden has highlighted Japan’s apology failure —not its failure to apologize— and the

existence of a multi-million dollar ‘denial’ industry in Japan. See, Alexis Dudden, Troubled

Apologies among Japan, Korea, and the United States (New York: Columbia University Press,

2008), pp. 33-34. Also see, Hiro Saito, The History Problem (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i

Press, 2017).

12 See, Kan Kimura, “Discovery of Disputes: Collective Memories on Textbooks and Japanese—

South Korean Relations,” The Journal of Korean Studies (Spring 2012), Vol. 17, No. 1, pp. 97-

124.

13 Brad Glosserman and Scott A. Snyder, The Japan-South Korea Identity Clash: East Asian

Security and the United States (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015).

14 The term ‘modernization’ is used within this dissertation to correspond primarily with the word

1.B Ongoing Issues and the Trilateral Relationship

Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan (2007) had once asked, “Why is there no

Non-Western International Relations Theory?” 15 In their work, they referenced Robert

W. Cox (1986) who wrote about Social Forces, States and World Orders.16 Acharya and

Buzan pointed out that Cox had once asserted, “Theory is always for someone and for

some purpose.” 17 Along this line, one of the key motivations (or purpose) for writing

this thesis is to conceptualize a non-Western theory which incorporates multi-language

data points, social forces, and historic events from a Korean’s perspective by using the

English language to reach beyond the narrow limitations of a Korean-speaking audience

(someone). Moreover, would it be possible to conceptualize an analytical framework by

using the concept of ‘forces’ that explains why Korea and Japan are constantly locking

horns? What hypotheses may we extrapolate from such theorized forces?

Another motivational factor (purpose) for pursuing the previously mentioned

research question is to assess (A) whether the strain in Korea-Japan relations is purely

‘bilateral’ or (B) whether the Korea-Japan relationship requires the ‘inclusion’ of the

United States for analysis in order to be understood and explained. A few earlier studies

(see Chapter 2: Literature Review) have proceeded by taking approach (A). The

approach for this dissertation takes into account concept (B), and argues that the Korea-

geundaehwa (근대화 近代化, which is pronounced kindaika in Japanese). Koreans and Japanese

have held very different views toward what defined modernization in the twentieth century with

stark contrast.

15 Amitva Acharya and Barry Buzan, “Why is There No Non-Western International Relations

Theory?” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Vol. 7, No. 3 (2007), pp. 287-312.

16 Robert W. Cox, “Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations

Theory,” in Robert O. Keohane (ed.), Neorealism and Its Critics (New York: Columbia

University Press, 1986), pp. 204–254.

17 Op. cit., p. 289.

Japan relationship cannot be fully explained without including the United States of

America.

By using information from the U.S. Office of the Historian Foreign Relations of

the United States (FRUS) series, for example, events leading up to the 1965 Korea-Japan

Normalization Treaty were reconstructed (see Appendix B) to explicitly show as

evidence the ‘U.S.’ factor that is asserted within this dissertation.

18 In similar fashion,

historical timelines within this study were reconstructed by incorporating the use of

FRUS online documents and US Presidential online libraries as sources for U.S. related

Korea-Japan information (see Appendix C).

1.C Korea-Japan Relation’s 50th Year Anniversary

On the occasion of commemorating the 50th anniversary of the normalizing

relations between South Korea and Japan a series of forums were held in 2015. World

leading experts on Korea-Japan relations gathered and spoke at these forums about

continuing issues, and further discussed constructive ways to move forward. A few

arguments given by these panelists on Korea-Japan relations were pre-selected from

these forums to serve as a preliminary baseline assessment for analysis prior to

conducting the Literature Review (see Chapter 2). Their summarized views are,

subsequently, presented below to see in what context Korea-Japan may be understood:

 Brad Glosserman —who was the former Executive Director of the Pacific Forum

at CSIS (Center for Strategic and International Studies)— stated that leaders

from all three countries, namely the United States, Japan, and South Korea, must

be courageous in order to bring about change. He saw the bureaucracies in each

18 See the ‘About Us' webpage of the Office of the Historian, Foreign Service Institute, United

States Department of State. https://history.state.gov/about (Search date: January 5, 2021).

of the three countries as key actors from a US-Japan-South Korea trilateral

rebalancing perspective, and advocated for Japan and South Korea to sign a new

treaty.

 Kawamura Takeo —a member of the Japanese Diet and former Chief Cabinet

Secretary during the Aso Taro’s administration— spoke about how Japan needs

Korea as a strategic partner and close friend. He went on to say that 'triangular

cooperation' between the United States, Japan, and South Korea, with the United

States involved, is critical not only for Japan and South Korea, but for all

countries in the region.20

 Richard P. Lawless —who was a former Deputy Undersecretary for the Office

of Asian and Pacific Affairs in the Department of Defense— saw the United

States as the ‘Alliance Manager’ for Korea-Japan relations. He advocated for

strong third-party engagement in order to move away from negativity.

 Oshima Shotaro —who was a former Japanese Ambassador to South Korea and

Deputy Foreign Minister of Japan— observed that a change in Korea’s political

regime occurred at the end of the Cold War. The transition in South Korea was

from a military regime to democratization. He predicted that, in the future, Korea

and Japan would be squeezed between China and the United States.22

 Park Cheol-hee —Director at the Institute for Japanese Studies at Seoul National

“Brad Glosserman & Scott Snyder: The Japan-South Korea Identity Crisis,” YouTube: uploaded

by 日本外国特派員協会オフィシャルサイトFCCJchannel, July 7, 2015; also see Brad Glosserman

and Scott A. Snyder, The Japan-South Korea Identity Clash: East Asian Security and the United

States (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015).

“Alliance Challenges in Northeast Asia: Perspectives on U.S.-Japan-South Korea Relations,”

YouTube: uploaded by The Heritage Foundation, July 24, 2014.

“Japan-Korea Relations at 50: The Weakest Link in Asia,” YouTube: uploaded by American

Enterprise Institute, March 13, 2015. Richard P. Lawless had worked for the CIA (US) from

1972 to 1987; and became the deputy assistant secretary of defense under Donald Rumsfeld and

took charge of ROK-US and ROK-Japan military issues. On his past career, see Young-june Yeh,

“Lawless Says Goodbye,” Korea Joongang Daily, April 8, 2007.

“Japan-Korea Relations: The Next Fifty Years for Japan and Korea,” YouTube: uploaded by

Carnegie Live, October 15, 2015.

University— asserted that under the Democratic Party of Japan (DJP), KoreaJapan relations were on improved terms with a liberal government in Japan. He

went on to say that there has been a ‘conservative backlash’ in Japan since the

1998 ‘Kim-Obuchi Statement’.

 Dan C. Sneider —a journalist, lecturer at Stanford University on East Asian

Studies and International Affairs, and the son of a former US Ambassador to

South Korea— argued that the US should play a role in Korea-Japan relations

because of historical responsibility. He claimed that avoiding the ‘elephant’ in

the room by Americans would not improve Korea-Japan relations.

The panelists’ perspectives tentatively suggest that (1) improving the Korea-Japan

relationship remains a topic of mutual interest for the US, Korea, and Japan; (2) there is

a wide gap between how Japanese LDP conservative politicians and non-LDP liberals

view the Korean peninsula; (3) historical issues between Korea and Japan began to

resurface from hibernation after the democratization movement in South Korea which

successfully replaced an oppressive military government; and (4) the Korea-Japan

relationship's constant ups and downs, or fluctuations, cannot be fully explained by

methods of a ‘single’ explanatory variable theory.

This prefatory baseline assessment suggests that the democratization

movement, which had taken place in the 1980s, in South Korea and how Japanese

politicians individually viewed Korea differently are worthy of further examination for

understanding Korea-Japan relations. The vicissitudes of the Korea-Japan relationship

over time additionally suggest that the nature of this dissertation’s question is not locked

“Asan Plenum 2015, Session 4 – Never Been Worse? Korea Japan Relations," YouTube:

uploaded by The Asan Institute for Policy Studies, May 14, 2015.

“Dan Sneider on Korea-Japan Relations,” YouTube: uploaded by The Korea Society, November

19, 2014.

in a single period but dynamic and constantly evolving across time and space. This

means that choosing a short time window for analysis may not render accurate results.

Hence, four periods were selected in this dissertation to cover more than a quarter of a

century. Furthermore, these expert panelists have suggested that at least one

‘international’ variable and at least one ‘domestic’ variable are necessary to

conceptualize an overarching analytical framework. One imperative question, therefore

becomes, what exactly are these two (or even three) explanatory variables?

1.D Thesis Structure

This thesis is divided up into five chapters.

The key research question and purpose of study are presented as the centerpiece Chapter 1 (Introduction).

It was

underscored that this dissertation subscribes to an interdisciplinary approach for ‘Korea

and East Asian’ studies which amalgamates (i) historical events analysis, (ii) concepts

from international relations theories, (iii) analyses on democratization and

modernization movements, and (iv) area studies which further includes research into

heterogeneous fields of study such as Japan’s ‘Kokka-Shinto’ religion and ideology.

Chapter 2 (Literature Review) includes (1) important key events, (2)

assessment of existing interpretations and studies, and (3) identification of existing study

limitations and lacunae. In terms of timeline, this literature review covers four major

periods with reference to South Korean presidents.

These periods are (A) The Park

Chung-hee era before the proclamation of his Yushin Constitution, 1961 to 1972; (B)

Park Chung-hee from Yushin to his death, 1972 to 1979; (C) Presidents Chun and Roh,

25 Japan’s Meiji Constitution of 1889 (a.k.a. the Ishin ‘維新’ Constitution), which granted sacred and

inviolable authority to the Emperor of Japan, was also analyzed from a governance perspective.

The majority of modern constitutions had ‘restricted’ power rather than granting a ‘monopoly’ to

its ruler. In this regard, the Empire of Japan —and its Ishin-Jidai 維新時代— was highly unique.

1980 to 1993; and (D) President Kim Young-sam, 1993 to 1998. The total timespan

covered for assessment is, therefore, 1961 to 1998, or roughly 27 years. In this section,

previous studies related to Korea-Japan relations were classified into either (a) single

explanatory or (b) multiple explanatory categories; and also viewed in terms of (c) time

bound or (d) time-independent arguments. Upon putting together a timeline that

interwove information released by the U.S. Office of the Historian and existing publicly

available data for our periods of interest, the literature review process revealed that there

was ample room for constructing a new analytical framework for better understanding

Korea-Japan relations due to the limitations of existing studies. This bespoke

construction, subsequently, became an obligatory mission for fulfilling this

dissertation’s purpose of study.

Presented in Chapter 3 (Research Design and Hypotheses) are the concepts,

new ideas, and the overall methodology for answering this dissertation’s research

question. Paramount emphasize for research design was initially placed on ‘causality’

by applying a positivist’s mindset. However, all efforts to establish a causative

mechanism with independent variables was redirected mainly due to hurdles

surrounding difficulty in measurement and the applicability of control variables in

argument. Thus, the term ‘explanatory variable’ was adopted and used in the new

analytical framework. Nonetheless, and despite taking a step down, this dissertation’s

research design did consider incorporating the ontological and epistemological aspects

of social science research. The overall design thought process led to a point that all

methods were recognized as being, to some extent, imperfect as was once argued by

Katie Moon and Deborah Blackman (2014).26 It also accepted what Alexander Wendt

saw as “epistemic risks associated with inference” in his thoughts related to causal

theorizing in term of philosophical underpinnings.

In agreement with Victor Cha

(1999), the history variable is deemed as “necessary but not sufficient” in design.28 In

addition, domestic politics was included in design by taking into account what Cha had

called “democratic maturation” in his work.29 However, and unlike Cha, it is argued that

the different structures of monarchy in Japan and a republic in South Korea have created

‘democratic competition’ rather than ‘democratic peace’ because of varying thoughts

between South Korea and Japan toward history, social development, and modernization.

A ‘Clash of History’ and ‘Holistic Historiography’ models were newly developed and

utilized in this thesis for hedging epistemic risks. Moreover, and in direct connection

with the ‘Three Forces’ model, the definitions and a set of four hypotheses linked with

these forces were theorized for test (or ‘proof-of-concept’) verification. Chapter 3 also

includes a high-level review of existing International Relations (IR) theories to point out

its limitation for explaining Korea-Japan relations by attempting to seek answers from

existing theories.

Further included in Chapter 3 is the contextualization of different from views

that were held by Japanese (the colonizer) and Koreans (the colonized) with particular

focus on the period after Japan’s February 26, 1936 Incident up until Korea’s

26 Katie Moon and Deborah Blackman, “A Guide to Understanding Social Science Research for

Natural Scientists,” Conservation Biology, Vol. 28, No. 5 (June 24, 2014), pp. 1167-1171.

27 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press, 1999), p. 81.

28 Victor Cha, Alignment Despite Antagonism: The US-Korea-Japan Security Triangle (Stanford:

Stanford University Press, 1999), pp. 34-35.

29 Ibid., p. 223.

Independence in 1945.30 The definition of anti-Kōminka (or de-Japanification) and antiIshin (or democratization) movements as a ‘Societal Force’ in South Korea are presented

in detail. It is argued in Chapter 3 that de-Japanification, after 1945, became a ‘reaction

and an ongoing process’ in South Korean society in response to Japan’s Kōminka and

Ishin-autocracy.

31 It is also argued in Chapter 3 that the Societal Force gained strength

and greater momentum after South Korea’s democratization movements that exploded

during the 1980s. One cardinal takeaway point from this Chapter is that threeexplanatory variables were defined as the minimum set of variables required to

understand and explain Korea-Japan relations. One variable was addressed the

international level, the second was at the state-level, and the third corresponded to the

society-level.

In Chapter 4 (The ‘3-Forces-Model’ Hypotheses Verification), the three forces

are examined in further detail with the purpose of hypotheses validation and existential

verification. To achieve this end, test cases were developed in two parts by differentiating

them into macro and micro categories. First, the macro tests were done at the presidential

period level. Second, micro level tests were done against specific events in time and

history to exhibit how the 3-Forces interactively worked to dynamically explain the state

of Korea-Japan relations. Of the four presidential periods examined, the analytical

framework identified that the worst period of Korea-Japan relations was during the Park

Chung-hee after-Yushin era to his death (1972 to 1979). All three forces returned

30 Koreans at this particular time period, under Japanese rule, were called Koukokushinmin (皇国臣民, KR: 황국신민) which means Showa’s (or the Emperor Hirohito’s) imperial subjects, with possessive form, when written in English.

31 See Charles R Kim, Youth for Nation: Culture and Protest in Cold War South Korea (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2017) for more information on the word of de-Japanification.

negative values. This outcome contradicts the conventional theory that Korea-Japan

relations during Park Chung-hee’s era were good because he was a Japanophile (or a

Chinilpa). The analytical framework affirms, by hypotheses verification, that three

factors combined are sufficient for explaining of Korea-Japan relations. If anyone of

these factors, however, renders a large negative value, it may override the other two

factors which may be acting as positive forces. Thus, it is important to distinguish from

where the negative outcome originates in terms of the Polarity Force, Leadership Force,

or Societal Force. In certain instances or a particular point in time, the originating force

may be two, all three, or simply one of these three forces.

===

Ch 2

===

Ch 3

===

Chapter 4: The ‘3-Forces-Model’ Hypotheses Verification

This chapter presents the results of hypotheses verification that were defined in

the previous chapter. Hereunder are a list of ‘test-cases’ where there ‘3-Forces’ (x, y, and

z) have simultaneously worked together to effect Korea-Japan relation outcomes. The

verification process is broken down into two-parts. First presented is the ‘macro’

validation step where an entire period is evaluated. Second layers of tests are presented

in a series of ‘micro’ validation steps that are performed in a ‘case’ analysis format. The

binary ‘macro-and-micro’ approach attempts to demonstrate that the ‘3-Forces’ model

is simple-in-design, with respect to parsimony, and a survivable postulate for

understanding and explaining Korea-Japan relations.

It is important to take into consideration that the Polarity and Leadership Forces

change with long time period cycles. For example, international polarity from a bi-polar

world to a quasi-multipolar world took roughly 17 years (1945 to 1972). The change

from a quasi-multipolar world to unipolar took 27 years (1972 to 1989). In terms of the

leadership force, the time period for change in South Korea is now set at 5 years with its

presidential terms. What this means is that the ‘macro’ verification focuses on, relatively

speaking, longer periods whereas the Societal Force is concentrated on events that may

collide depending on ‘micro’ day-to-day events or specific confrontation occurrences

which are escalated within shorter time periods.

4.A Park Chung-hee (I), before Yushin: 1961 to 1972 (Period I)

For this first ‘macro’ period, the polarity of the international system was bi-polar with

the Cold War and South Korea has an ‘autocratic military dictator’ with ‘LDP’ in power

in Japan.

 Polarity Force (x: international variable): The polarity force, under bipolarity,

effected for Korea-Japan relations in a ‘positive’ way.

Hypothesis 1a (definition): The United States, in a bipolar world, works to actively

encourage positive Korea-Japan cooperation in order to achieve and sustain balance

of power against its primary military adversary in East Asia since Japan’s surrender

in 1945.  True

 Leadership Force (y: domestic variable, state-level): The leadership force, with a

military dictator in South Korea and LDP in Japan effected Korea-Japan relations

in a ‘positive’ way.

Hypothesis 2b (definition): A combination of an autocratic military dictator in

South Korea and LDP leaders in Japan will also yield ‘relative good (positive)’

results without severe altercations.  True

 Societal Force (z: domestic variable, society-level): The societal (modernization)

force effected Korea-Japan relations in worked in a ‘negative’ way.

Hypothesis 3 (definition): In response to Japan’s ‘Kōminka’ policies that had taken

place prior to 1945, an equally bellicose ‘de-Japanification’ (anti-Kōminka) process

emerged with force in South Korea after 1945. Whenever these two incompatible

societal forces collide, sparks flare up and trigger confrontation.  True.

In the run-up to 1965, the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Second Indochina War

(Vietnam War) shows that world polarity was bipolar with reference to the Polarity Force

(PF) value. With bipolar Hypothesis ‘1-a’, the United States worked in earnest to bring

Korea and Japan closer together to combat Communist threats. Park Chung-hee was a

military dictator managed who had worked relatively well, before his Yushin period,

with LDP’s Kishi Nobusuke, Ikeda Hyato and Sato Eisaku in terms of the Leadership

Force (LF) which ties in with the ‘returned/tested’ value Hypothesis ‘2-b’. Park Chunghee put up the statue of Admiral Yi Sun-sin in April 1968 in what is today’s

Gwanghwamun Plaza; whereas Takasugi Shinichi had stated that Japan should have kept

Korea for another 20 years but the end of war had prevented this from happening.277

This is an example of how conflict sparks in terms of the Societal Force (SF). The below

list of chronological events is a reconstruction of historical facts, as material evidence,

that were used in this verification process.

 May 28, 1945 Before the Manhattan Project’s atomic bomb ‘Trinity’ test,

former U.S. President Hoover meets with Truman at the

White House and advises to stop the war with Japan by way

of negotiation (i.e., to find a diplomatic solution vis-à-vis

military). Hoover suggested to President Truman to leave

open an option for the Japanese to retain Korea and Formosa

as a trustee under the “world trustee system” in his

‘Memorandum for Ending the War with Japan.’

278  「PF:

Polarity Force」

 January 1947 George Marshall, as Secretary of State, asked Dean Acheson

for a plan to “organize a definitive government of South

Korea and connect-up its economy with that of Japan.”

279

「PF」

 Autumn of 1960 Edwin O. Reischauer wrote in 1964, (quote) "During a visit

to Korea in the autumn of 1960, I became convinced that,

without the economic boost that Korean-Japanese

normalization would bring to Korea, we would never be able

to build a solid economic foundation on which a viable

political regime could develop there. I promised certain

Korean leaders that I would try to convince people in

Washington of this when I got back. I was in Washington for

this purpose in January 1961 when the Department asked me

to take my present job" (unquote).280  「PF」

277

“Gobinsuseokdaepyo Jungdaesireon [高彬首席代表(고빈수석대표) 重大失言(중대실언)],” Dong-A

Ilbo, January 19, 1965, front page.

278 Joan Hoff Wilson, “Herbert Hoover’s Plan for Ending the Second World War,” International

History Review, Vol. 1, No. 1 (January 1979), p. 101; also see, “Operation Downfall,” Timeline –

World History Documentaries, YouTube (uploaded August 3, 2020), from 33:45 to 34:08.

https://youtu.be/VZfObRnZiw0?t=2024

279 Bruce Cumings, Korea’s Place in the Sun: A Modern History. 1997. Reprint. (New York: W.W.

Norton & Company, 2005), p. 210.

280 “348. Letter From the Ambassador to Japan (Reischauer) to the President’s Special Assistant for

 April 12, 1961 Reischauer departs for Tokyo with the purpose of starting his

new position as JFK’s U.S. Ambassador to Japan. 281

mentioned at his first press conference that normalizing

Korea-Japan relations is vital for America’s interests.282 He

also clarified, however, that he did not have a solution.283

「PF」

 April 23, 1962 Robert Komer sends a memo for the President JFK to give

an update on Japan-Korea relations indicating that the ROK

military regime "… is interested in an early settlement

because General Pak [Park Chung-hee] needs money for his

ambitious development program."284 「PF」

 April 24, 1962 John F. Kennedy, in his NSAM-151 (National Security

Action Memorandum No. 151), pointed out to the Secretary

of State, Dean Rusk [with cc: to McGeorge Bundy and

Robert Komer], the need to make every effort to bring the

Japan and Korea negotiations to a prompt and successful

conclusion. JFK further pointed out, in NSAM-151, that we

[the United States] may want to run certain risks, if certain

pressures and inducements turn out to be essential to bring

the two parties [Japan and Korea] together.285 「PF」

 November 1, 1962 Before returning to Korea, Kim Jong-Pil met with Dean

Rusk (Secretary of State), Ave Harriman (Assistant Secretary

of State), Robert Kennedy (Secretary of Justice), Maxwell

Taylor (Chair of Joint Chiefs of Staff) and John McCone

(CIA). The translator at this meeting for Kim was Pak Bo-hi

(1930-2019: a lieutenant colonel at the Korean Embassy in

National Security Affairs (Bundy),” Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volume

XXIX, Part 1, Korea, Document 348, Office of the Historian, August 21, 1964.

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v29p1/d348

281 Hanil-gukgyo-e Choeseon Ra-daesa Duim-apseo Seongmyeong 한일국교에 최선: 라대사 부임앞서

성명[Newly Appointed Ambassador Reischauer says that he will try his best to establish KoreaJapan relations before starting in his new position], Kyunghyang Shinmun 경향신문, April 12,

1961.

https://newslibrary.naver.com/viewer/index.nhn?articleId=1961041200329201015&editNo=1&p

rintCount=1&publishDate=1961-04-

12&officeId=00032&pageNo=1&printNo=4677&publishType=00020

282 Ibid.

283 Ibid.

284 National Security Action Memoranda [NSAM]: NSAM 151, Re: Impasse between Japan and South

Korea," John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum, Digital Identifier JFKNSF-336-007-

p0003, https://www.jfklibrary.org/asset-viewer/archives/JFKNSF/336/JFKNSF-336-007

285 Ibid., pp.4-5

Washington D.C.) who later became affiliated with the

Unification Church.286  「PF」

 November 12, 1962 the ‘Kim-Ohira Memo’ between KIM Jong-Pil and Japan's

Foreign Minister OHIRA, Masayoshi met to set boundaries

to loan and economic-aid amounts. This rekindled of KoreaJapan talks that had stalled for a period of 10 years. 「LF:

Leadership Force」

 November 21, 1962 Kodama Yoshio (nickname the ‘fixer’) meets with KCIA

Director Kim Jong-pil in Seoul. 287

According to CIA

‘internal’ documents released under FOIA (the Freedom of

Information Act), Kodama Yoshio, a backstage politician,

was “deeply involved in the normalization of Korea-Japan

relations in the mid-1960s.”

288 Nakasone Yasuhiro, in 1973,

called upon Kodama Yoshio to suggest solutions for the Kim

Dae-jung (also spelt as Kim Tae-chung) kidnapping. 289

「LF」

 August 3, 1964 In a memorandum from Robert W. Komer (National Security

Council Staff) to McGeorge "Mac" Bundy (the President’s

Special Assistant for National Security Affairs), Komer said,

“we now have State brought around to point where it agrees

US should take a direct hand in pushing ‘ROK/Jap’

settlement through. We’ve got LBJ saying so orally to Park

Chung Hee through Winthrop Brown, and we’ve got Brown

ginned up and willing to fire up Reischauer.”

290 「PF」

 January 11, 1965 On Japan-Korea Settlement, James C. Thomson, Jr. —of the

National Security Council Staff— wrote to President

Johnson on the subject of his upcoming meeting with

286 Jae-oh Lee, p. 82.

287 Young-il Cho 조영일, "Ageup jeonbeom • jamindang geurigo gimjongpil A급 전범·자민당 그리고

김종필" [Class A War Criminal, Japan's LDP and Kim Jong-pil] Hankyoreh 21 한겨례21, No. 1081

제1081호, October 7, 2015, http://h21.hani.co.kr/arti/culture/culture_general/40445.html; (Search

date: October 11, 2021).

288

“Special Collection: Kodama Yoshio Vol. 1, No. 0004,” CIA Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)

Electronic Reading Room, Document No. 519cd81a993294098d515e50.

https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/519cd81a993294098d515e50

289 Ibid.

290

"346. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the

President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy), " Office of the Historian,

August 3 (Washington), 1964. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-

68v29p1/d346

Japanese Prime Minister Sato: “State calculates that a JapanROK settlement will save us $1 billion over the next ten

years ($600 million in Japanese grants and loans, the rest in

anticipated private investment). We are once again at a point

where a settlement is within reach. If we miss this time, it

will be very hard to get negotiations started again.”

291

「PF」

“Sato’s heart is in the right place; but he needs a real push by

you, perhaps along the following lines: We fought the

Korean War in the interest of Japan’s security as well as our

own. A viable Korea is an essential buffer to us, doubly

essential to Japan. Nothing the Japanese could do right now,

in 1965, would advance the Free World’s interests more

successfully than a settlement.”292 「PF」

 February 17-20, 1965 Japan's Foreign Minister Shiina Etsusaburō visits Korea to

meet with Yi Tong-Won. The big outline of the 1965 KoreaJapan Normalization Treaty is tentatively agreed upon with

Shiina.  「LF」

 May 18, 1965 President Park met with Secretary Rusk on May 18 and

briefly discussed the Korea-Japan negotiations. Secretary

Rusk urged an early conclusion to the talks, but President

Park raised the issue of Tokto (Dokdo) Island (JP:

Takeshima), to which both Korea and Japan laid claim,

characterizing it as an intractable problem between the two

countries. Secretary Rusk suggested erecting a jointly

operated lighthouse, allowing both sides a share of the island

and gradually diffusing the issue. President Park commented

that such a project “just would not work.”

293 「PF」

 June 3, 1965 Some thirty-thousand students took to the streets in Seoul on

June 3, 1961 to protest against Park Chung-Hee, by burning

an effigy of him, and his efforts to normalize relations with

291

“40. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)

to President Johnson,” FRUS, 1964–1968, Volume XXIX, Part 2, Japan, Office of the Historian,

Document 40. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v29p2/d40 (Search date:

November 7, 2022).

292 Ibid.

293

“363. Editorial Note,” FRUS, 1964-1968, Volume XXIX, Part 1, Korea, Office of the Historian,

Document 363. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v29p1/d363

Japan.294 According to Lee Jae-oh (2011), the protests were

so severe that the United States had to decide whether it

would allow the regime to fall, or not. 295

Ambassador

Berger and Hamilton H. Howze took a helicopter to the Blue

House earlier, and at 8:00 PM that day, President Park

Chung-Hee declared martial law. 296

「SF: Societal

Force」and「PF」

 June 22, 1965 The 1965 Normalization Treaty is signed, then ratified on

August 14; and finally promulgated on December 18, 1965.

 「PF」

 October 3, 1967 Groundbreaking work is launched for what would eventually

become Pohang Iron and Steel Co., Ltd. 「SF」(reducing

dependency on Japan).

 February 1968 Construction of the Seoul-Busan Highway began. 「SF」

 April 27, 1968 A statue of Admiral Yi Sun-sin is opened at Gwanghwamun

Plaza as a symbol of De-Japanification. 「SF」

4.A.1 Case No. 1: The 1965 Normalization Protests

The values returned are [Polarity Force (true, positive effect)] and [Leadership

Force (true, positive effect)]. In the run-up to the 1965 Normalization Treaty, the Polarity

Force was intensive. Park Chung-hee and Sato Eisaku; Kim Jong-pil and Ohira

Masayoshi; and Yi Dong-won and Shiina Etsusaburo worked in the Leadership Force

domain with strenuous but cooperative spirit. However, in the Societal Force domain,

there were opposing voices in both South Korea and Japan and the value returned was

[Societal Force (true, negative effect)].

On March 24, 1965, the United States Embassy reported that student

294 "South Korea: Deadly Choice," Newsweek, June 15, 1964. p.38

295 Jae-Oh Lee 이재오. "Hanil hoedamgwa bandae undong 1951-1965 한일회담과 반대운동

1951~1965년." [Korea-Japan Normalization Talks and Opposition Movement: 1951 to 1965]. Seoul

서울: Palabugseu 파라북스, 2011. p.92.

296 Ibid.

demonstrations against impending settlement “revealed widespread public fears of

subsequent Japanese domination as well as misgivings about terms of settlement and

dissatisfaction with way negotiations conducted.”

297

That situation coupled with

strengthening political opposition led to speculation that the Park Chung-hee

government could be overthrown.298

4.B Park Chung-hee (II), after Yushin: 1972 to 1979 (Period II)

During this second macro period, and with U.S. rapprochement with China,

world polarity transitioned from a bi-polar world to a ‘quasi-multipolar’ world. South

Korea continued with its ‘autocratic military dictator’ under Yushin and ‘LDP’ continued

to dominant in Japan. Under this scenario pairing, according Hypotheses the United

States.

 Polarity Force (x): The polarity forced worked in a ‘negative’ way for Korea-Japan

relations.

Hypothesis 1c (definition): The United States, in a quasi-multipolar and multipolar

world, seeks to further secure its national interests in East Asia by leveraging Japan

more than South Korea in order to maintain stability and security. Under this

hypothesis, the relationship between Korea and Japan will deteriorate or become

confrontational.  True.

 Leadership Force (y): The leadership force worked in a ‘negative’ way for KoreaJapan relations.

Hypothesis 2b (definition): A combination of an autocratic military dictator in

South Korea and LDP leaders in Japan will also yield ‘relative good (positive)’

results without severe altercations.  FALSE.

297

“U.S. Efforts To Encourage Normalization of Relations Between the Republic of Korea and

Japan,” FRUS 1964-1968, Volume XXIX, Part 1, Korea, Document 339.

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v29p1/d339

298 Ibid.

 Societal Force (z): The societal force worked in a ‘negative’ way for Korea-Japan

relations.

Hypothesis 3 (definition): In response to Japan’s ‘Kōminka’ policies that had taken

place prior to 1945, an equally bellicose ‘de-Japanification’ (anti-Kōminka) process

emerged with force in South Korea after 1945. Whenever these two incompatible

societal forces collide, sparks flare up and trigger confrontation.  True.

The Park Chung-hee after Yushin period (1972-1979) was when Korea-Japan

relations were at their worst as ‘all’ three-forces returned ‘negative’ values. This is a

period when (1) U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam, (2) the Nixon Shocks (see Appendix D),

(3) Jimmy Carter’s support for an increase in military spending in Japan and withdrawal

of forces from South Korea were attributes of the Polarity Force. After the kidnapping

of Kim Dae-jung and the death of Yuk Young-soo, the relationship between Park Chunghee and leaders in LDP’s Japan were extremely strained. Domestically within South

Korea, Park Chung-hee’s Yushin constitution meant it was a backward step toward a

militarized-autocratic ruler that was experienced during Imperial Japan’s Ishin-Jidai.

 1972 General Motors (GM) of the United States become a

substitute and new business partner at South Korea’s Shinjin

Motors by acquiring Toyota’s shares. 299

「SF」(DeJapanification).

 December 10, 1972 Philip Habib drafts a ‘policy paper’ proposal which, among

other things, endorsed the reduction of US forces in South

Korea beginning Fiscal Year 1974, and a complete

withdrawal in the years of 1975 to 1976.

300 「PF」

299 Jordi Catalan, “Strategic Policy Revisited: The Origins of Mass Production in the Motor Industry

of Argentina, Korea and Spain, 1945-87,” Business History, Vol. 52, No. 2 (April 2010), pp. 207-

230.

300

“231. Memorandum from Richard Kennedy of the National Security Council Staff to the

President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, January 16, 1973,”

FRUS, 1969–1976, Volume E–12, Documents on East and Southeast Asia, 1973–1976,

Document 231. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve12/d231; also see

National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 544, Country Files, Far East,

Korea, Volume 6, January 1973–October 1973. An annotation near the bottom reads, “John

 February 18, 1973 The dissolution of the United Nations Commission for the

Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK) was

asked by Zhou Enlai to Henry Kissinger during their meeting

in Beijing. 301

Zhou also mentioned his concerns over

Japan’s entry into South Korea.302 「PF」

 August 9, 1973 Korea-Japan relationship, however, began to debilitate with

the abduction of future South Korea President Kim Dae-jung

by the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) in Tokyo

on August 8, 1973.303 Kim Jong-pil remarked years later that

the Kim Dae-jung kidnapping case was the first major crisis

with Japan since the 1965 normalization treaty.304 Nakasone

Yasuhiro called upon Kodama Yoshio to suggest solutions

for the Kim Dae-jung kidnapping.305 「LF」

 July 15, 1974 Tachikawa Masaki and Hayakawa Yoshiaru who were

accused of being a link between North Korean and Japanese

Communists and anti‐Government students in South Korea

were sentenced to 20 years in prison.

306 「SF」

 August 15, 1974 President Park Chung-hee’s wife, Yuk Young-soo, was shotdead on August 15, 1974 by a Korean (Chongryon) Japanese

who had entered South Korea with a Japanese passport.307

Holdridge concurs.” Kissinger initialed his approval of the recommendation. Habib’s proposed

policy paper enclosed in A–432 from Seoul, December 10, 1972 and the draft backchannel

telegram are attached but not published. Backchannel telegram 30190 from Kissinger to Habib,

January 24, is ibid., Box 411, Backchannel Messages, Southeast Asia, vol. 1.

301 “13. Memorandum of Conversation,” Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976,

Volume XVIII, China, 1973–1976, Office of the Historian, February 18, 1973, Document 13.

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v18/d13

302 Ibid.

303 Bae-ho Hahn, “Korea-Japan Relations in the 1970s,” Asian Survey, Vol. 20, No. 11 (November

1980), p. 1088; for Kim Dae-jung’s abduction (August 1973), see “S Korean spies admit 1973

Snatch,” BBC News, October 24, 2007. The abduction, according to one analysis, was carried out

by the Korean Yakuza Machii Hisayuki (KR: 정건영) who’s nickname was the ‘Ginza Tiger’ in

Japan, see David E. Kaplan and Alec Dubro, Yakuza: Japan’s Criminal Underworld (Berkeley:

University of California Press, 2012), pp. 226-227.

304 Ibid.

305 “Special Collection: Kodama Yoshio Vol. 1, No. 0004,” CIA Freedom of Information Act

(FOIA) Electronic Reading Room, Document No. 519cd81a993294098d515e50.

https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/519cd81a993294098d515e50

306 Fox Butterfield, “Seoul Conviction of 2 Japanese Expected to Aggravate Strains, The New York

Times, July 15, 1974. https://www.nytimes.com/1974/07/16/archives/seoul-conviction-of-2-

japanese-expected-to-aggravate-strains-park.html (Search date: August 21, 2022).

307 Chongryon, or Chōsen Sōren (Kanji: 朝鮮総連) in Japanese, are Koreans living in Japan who are

affiliated with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK).

This incident —as reported by the Pressian in Seoul—

pressed South Korea to seriously study how Taiwan had

severed its relationship with Japan on September 30, 1972.308

Machida Mitsugu —who was working at the Japan embassy

in Seoul at the time of Yuk Young-soo’s assassination—

recalled that Ambassador Ushiroku Torao was anticipating

that South Korea may severe its diplomatic relationship with

Japan and making preparations for departing Korea within 2

days.309 「LF」

 November 5, 1974 The first of four tunnels dug by the North Koreans to invade

the South is found along the Korean Demilitarized Zone

(DMZ).310 「PF」

 February 28, 1975 Henry Kissinger is informed that South Korea, under Park

Chung-hee, plans to develop nuclear weapons and

missiles.

311 「SF」

 May 13, 1975 Emergency Decree No. 9 made illegal any criticism of the

Yushin government by Park Chung-hee. 「SF」

 July 22-28, 1975 A total of 13 LDP Members of Parliament (9 from the House

of Representatives and 4 from the House of Councilors) visit

North Korea. 312

North Korea’s Party Secretary for

International Affairs Kim Yong Nam said, “There may be

another coup d’état at the hands of another military man” in

South Korea.313 The North Koreans went on further to say

308 Han-kyu Kim 김한규, ‘Mun Se-gwang Sageon’ Euro Han-il Gukgyo Danjeol ‘Ilchokjeukbal’

[South Korea-Japan Relations was about to exploded due to the Mun Se-Gwang Incident ‘문세광

사건’으로 한-일 국교단절 ‘일촉즉발’], Pressian 프레시안, January 20, 2005.

309 Munsegwangsageonttae ilbondo dangyogago, daesagwancheolsu junbi [문세광사건때 일본도

단교각오, 대사관철수 준비], The Hankyoreh 한겨례신문, January 21, 2005.

310 See “South Korea: Discovery Of Alleged North Korean "Attack Tunnel" in Demilitarized Zone

Increases Tension Between The Divided States,” British Pathe: Reuters Historical Collection,

November 27, 1974. Film ID = VLVA8ZCG9TIAV3NVP76JPU91BCPE6.

https://www.britishpathe.com/video/VLVA8ZCG9TIAV3NVP76JPU91BCPE6-SOUTHKOREA-DISCOVERY-OF-ALLEGED-NORTH-KOREAN-ATTACK-TUNNEL-IN (Search

date: November 2, 2022).

311 William Burr, “The United States and South Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Program, 1974-1976,”

The Wilson Center, March 14, 2017.

312

“Voluntary Liberal Democratic Party MP North Korea Visit,” August 11, 1975, History and

Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of

Japan. Obtained for NKIDP by Kyungwon Choi (Kyushu University) and translated for NKIDP

by Ryo C. Kato. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/118698

313 Ibid.

100

that “they believe that the Park government is on its last

breathe, and that only if the US military withdrawals and if

Park is defeated (they said they can talk with Kim Dae-jung)

the great majority of the populace will rise up and make

unification possible.”

314 「LF」

 December 4, 1975 U.S. President Ford met with Deng Xiaoping in Beijing.315

Deng expressed that he was not concerned over North Korea

attacking the South, but asked specifically that the United

States side keep an eye on Park Chung-hee.316 「PF」

 May 2, 1979 US (Jimmy Carter) and Japan (Ohira Masayoshi) agreed to

“increased procurement of defense equipment from the

United States,” and started initiatives to increase financial

support for the stationing of United States forces in Japan.317

The two countries affirmed that the ‘Treaty of Mutual

Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United

States of America’ has been, and will remain, the

cornerstone of peace and stability in Asia.318 「PF」

 October 16-20, 1979 Anti-Yushin and pro-Democracy protests burst in Busan and

Masan, and other regions of South Korea. 「SF」

 October 26, 1979 Park Chung-hee is assassinated by his KCIA Director Kim

Jae-gyu (also spelt as Kim Chae-kyu). 「SF」

4.B.1 Case No. 2: The Assassination of Yuk Young-soo (August 15, 1974)

[Polarity Force (true, negative)]  In an era of Détente (a quasi-multipolar

world), U.S. troops were pulling out of Vietnam, and plans to completely pull U.S. troops

314 Ibid.

315 “137. Memorandum of Conversation,” Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976,

Volume XVIII, China, 1973–1976, Document 137, Office of the Historian, December 4, 1975.

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v18/d137

316 Ibid. Also see the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Digital Library.

https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/Chinatrip.asp

317 See security relations in John Woolley and Gerhard Peters, “Visit of Prime Minister Ohira of

Japan Joint Communiqué,” The American Presidency Project at UC Santa Barbara, May 2, 1979.

https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/visit-prime-minister-ohira-japan-joint-communique

(Search date: February 3, 2021); also see the “The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense

Cooperation (1978),” Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) Japan, November 28, 1978.

https://warp.da.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/11591426/www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/us/anpo/pdf/19781127

.pdf (Search date: February 3, 2021).

318 Ibid.

101

from South Korea were put on the agenda. The polarity force, in this light, was

unfavorable to South Korea. For example, the U.S. plan in the 1970s was to ‘reduce’ the

size of the US Navy from Yokosuka.

319 Unlike South Korea’s instance, U.S. forces in

Japan were planning to stay. [Leadership Force (false, negative)]  The ‘military

dictator’ in South Korea and ‘LDP’ in Japan formula did positively work (‘effect’) to

keep South Korea and Japan working amicably with each other. Hypothesis 2a, in this

case, returned a false outcome. This means that the Leadership Force is not a reliable

variable. In other words, the Leadership Force is a necessary but not sufficient domestic

variable. This is primarily because leaders are people, and people have the ability to

change their mind in terms of strengthening or weakening relationships. The relationship

between Tanaka Kakuei and Park Chung-hee was not the best primarily due to North

Korean support groups in Japan and the Kim Dae-jung kidnapping incident. [Societal

Force (Hypothesis 4, true, negative)]  Kim Young-sam had encouraged Korean

citizens to push for democracy, rather than accepting a dictatorship, in South Korea.

4.C Chun Doo-hwan and Roh Tae-woo: 1980 to 1993 (Period III)

This period is when the dissolution of the Soviet Union transformed the ‘quasimultipolar’ into a ‘unipolar’ world. The hallmark of this decade was South Korea’s

‘democratization’ movement that created a ‘bottom-up’ democracy.

U.S. rapprochement with China, world polarity transitioned from a bi-polar world to a

‘quasi-multipolar’ world. South Korea continued with its ‘autocratic military dictator’

under Yushin and ‘LDP’ continued to dominant in Japan. Under this scenario pairing,

319 Takashi Oka, “Japanese Report U.S. Plan to Cut Forces by 12,000,” The New York Times,

November 29, 1970. https://www.nytimes.com/1970/11/29/archives/japanese-report-us-plan-tocut-forces-by-12000-many-air-and-naval.html

102

according Hypotheses the United States.

 Polarity Force (x): The polarity forced worked in a ‘positive’ way for Korea-Japan

relations.

Hypothesis 1b (definition): The United States, in a unipolar world, works to actively

propagate liberal ‘democratic’ values, such as human rights and freedom of speech,

within and between Korea and Japan.320 At times of uni-polarity, the relationship

between South Korea and Japan is ripe to prosper with the spirit of mutual friendship,

respect, and regional cooperation.  True

 Leadership Force (y): The leadership force worked in a ‘positive’ way for KoreaJapan relations.

Hypothesis 2b (definition): A combination of an autocratic military dictator in

South Korea and LDP leaders in Japan will yield ‘relative good (positive)’ results

without severe altercations.  True

 Societal Force (z): The societal force worked in a ‘negative’ way for Korea-Japan

relations.

Hypothesis 3 (definition): In response to Japan’s ‘Kōminka’ policies that had taken

place prior to 1945, an equally bellicose ‘de-Japanification’ (anti-Kōminka) process

emerged with force in South Korea after 1945. Whenever these two incompatible

societal forces collide, sparks flare up and trigger confrontation.  True.

4.C.1 Case No. 3: Yasukuni Shrine Visit by Nakasone (August 15, 1985)

Both the Polarity Force and Leadership Force were positive when Nakasone

was Prime Minister. However, the ‘negativity’ between Korea and Japan arose in the

Societal Force (Hypothesis 3) domain. To the people of South Korea, the Yasukuni is a

symbol of Japan’s Kominka and Ishin Jidai. This goes much beyond, and different

from, how Western journalists call it as a symbol of Japan’s military past. In term of

320 Thomas Mowle and David Sacko have concurred that “Alliance patterns in a unipolar system

will be looser than they are in other configurations of power.” See Thomas S. Mowle and David

H. Sacko, The Unipolar World: An Unbalanced Future (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007),

pp. 86-99.

103

Anti-Kōminka (or de-Japanification) and modernization, the ‘Yasukuni of Seoul’

(properly known as the ‘Gyeongseong-hoguk-sinsa’) is no longer standing today as it

had once stood prior to 1945.

321 This is another clear example of de-Japanification in

South Korea. In this ‘case’ example, the explanatory variable was not the PF nor the LF,

but rather the SF that acted alone in a ‘negative’ direction.

4.C.2 Case No. 4: Removal of Japanese Era School Uniforms (March 1986)

Another SF event that occurred during Chun Doo-hwan’s presidency was doing

away with ‘Ishin-Jidai’ school uniforms. In Japan, the boys’ uniform is called gakuran

and the girls’ uniform is called sērā fuku. The abolishment of Japanese-style uniforms

at South Korean schools granted more freedom to students and helped promote

‘individualism’ rather than ‘group’ conformity. This micro-analysis of the Societal Force

shows how the ‘de-Japanification’ (Hypothesis 3) continued quietly across Korean

society during the 1980s.

4.C.3 Case No. 5: Japanese Emperor’s Visit to South Korea (after May 1990)

In this case, the cause for rift had originated within Japan, and not South Korea.

On May 24, 1990, Emperor Akihito delivered his wish for a revival of Japan-Korea

friendship at the Imperial Palace to South Korea’s President Roh Tae-woo. Roh and

many of his compatriots, however and according to the Washington Post, insisted that

the two neighboring nations could not move forward in their relationship until the

emperor offered a ‘clear’ apology for colonizing Korea.

322 The Washington Post article

continued by writing that “many Japanese agreed with the leader of the conservative

321 Gyeongseong-hoguk-sinsa (경성호국신사 京城護國神社)

322 Ibid.

104

ruling party who said Japan should not ‘kowtow’ to Korea.” These conservatives argued

that the Emperor, as a ‘powerless’ symbol, should not be used for state official policy.323

Years later, Ueda Masaaki (2010) also attested that Japan’s ‘right-wing’ had maeubandae (severely opposed) the Emperor’s visit to South Korea.324 In this case, we see

forces within Japan’s right-wing who are opposed to apologizing for Japan’s past

Kominka policy as the originating and source cause of friction between Korea and Japan.

In other words, Japan’s Emperor was restricted and held powerless by Japan’s rightwing.

4.D Kim Young-sam: 1993 to 1998 (Period IV) in a Unipolar World

In this fourth macro verification, the polarity of the international system was ‘unipolar’

after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. This atmosphere continued until September 11,

2001 that started the Global War on Terrorism.

 Polarity Force (x: international variable): The polarity forced worked in a ‘positive’

way for Korea-Japan relations.

Hypothesis 1b (definition): Scenario B (unipolar). The United States, in a

unipolar world, works to actively propagate liberal ‘democratic’ values, such as

human rights and freedom of speech, within and between Korea and Japan. At

times of uni-polarity, the relationship between South Korea and Japan is ripe to

prosper with the spirit of mutual friendship, respect, and regional cooperation. 

True (see, History of the Department of State during the Clinton Presidency: 1993-

2001).

325

323 Ibid.

324 Day-young Oh 오대영, “Akihito cheonhwangeun gwageo jeonjaenge daehae banseonghago isseo

[Emperor Akihito looks back at war and thinks it wasn’t good, 아키히토 천황은 과거 전쟁에 대해 반성하

고 있어], The JoongAng 중앙일보, January 11, 2010. https://www.joongang.co.kr/article/3961604

325

“History of the Department of State during the Clinton Presidency (1993-2001), East Asia and

the Pacific” Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs. Also watch and listen to the ‘Oral

History’ from Stephen Bosworth and Robert Carlin (Parts 1, 2, 3 and 4) as complied by 38 North

—A Stimson Center Publication. Interview by Joel Wit (38 North Founder & Visiting Scholar at

US-Korea Institute at SAIS), “Reflections on KEDO: Ambassador Stephen Bosworth, Joel Wit

105

 Leadership Force (y: domestic variable, state-level): The leadership force worked

in a ‘positive’ way for Korea-Japan relations.

Hypothesis 2c (definition): When a non-military civilian President in South Korea

is paired with a LDP Prime Minister in Japan, the outcome will largely depend on

what faction (or habatsu) within LDP exercises greater power at a particular point

in time.326 South Korea-Japan relations have ranged from first ‘good (positive)’

but have fluctuated toward being ‘not so good (negative)’ over time.  True

 Societal Force (z: domestic variable, society-level): The societal force effected

Korea-Japan relations in a ‘negative’ way for Korea-Japan relations.

Hypothesis 3 (definition): In response to Japan’s ‘Kōminka’ policies that had taken

place prior to 1945, an equally bellicose ‘de-Japanification’ (anti-Kōminka) process

emerged with force in South Korea after 1945. Whenever these two incompatible

societal forces collide, sparks flare up and trigger confrontation.  True.

Hypothesis 4 (definition): Following South Korea's democratization in the 1980s,

gains in freedom of speech and self-expression have amplified the cleavage between

anti-Ishin (democratization) and former ‘Ishin/Yushin’ (autocratization) forces. 

True.

 November 8, 1993 Hosokawa Morihiro of the ‘Japan New Party (JNP)’ met Kim

Young-sam in Gyeongju and apologized for the suffering of

the Korean people under Imperial Japan.327 「LF」

 February 1995 Joseph Nye, the US assistant secretary of defense for

international security affairs, published a new report that

argued for a continuance of strong U.S. military presence in

East Asia to protect American interests and foster regional

stability. 328

The move by the United States was to ease

anxieties with respect to the possibility of U.S. forces

withdrawing from Korea and Japan after the dissolution of

the Soviet Union. 「PF」

and Robert Carlin,” 38 North Video, July 19, 2012.

326 Habatsu (派閥).

327 Chong-Sik Lee and Hyuk-Sang Sohn, “South Korea in 1993: The Year of the Great Reform,”

Asian Survey, Vol. 34, No. 1 (January 1994), pp. 1-9. Also see, Paul Shin, “Hosokawa

Apologizes for Korean Suffering,” AP News, November 8, 1993.

328 Bradley Graham and Daniel Williams, “U.S. Reverses East Asia Withdrawal Plan,” The

Washington Post, February 28, 1995.

106

 March 15, 1995 After the 1994 Agreed Framework, Stephen Bosworth —

who as then the President of the U.S.-Japan Foundation—

was asked by Thomas C. Hubbard to lead KEDO. Bosworth

started KEDO in an office on Park Avenue, New York. He

started work with Choi, Young-jin from Korea and Umezu

Itaro from Japan.329 「PF」

 July 19, 1995 The Asian Women's Fund was created based upon fourpillars: (1) Support will be given to the establishment of a

fund that invites the people of Japan to atone for the

institution of ‘comfort women’; (2) The Government of

Japan will contribute funds to the welfare and medical care

of these women; (3) The Government of Japan will express

remorse and apologize; (4) Historical documents and

materials will be collated that will help make this a lesson to

be drawn on.330 「SF」

 August 15, 1995 Japanese Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi, on the

occasion of the 50th anniversary of war’s end, stated that

Japan followed “a mistaken national policy, advanced along

the road to war, only to ensnare the Japanese people in a

fateful crisis, and, through its colonial rule and aggression,

caused tremendous damage and suffering to the people of

many countries, particularly to those of Asian nations. 331

Murayama would twenty-years later in 2015 urge LDP’s Abe

Shinzo to uphold his statement.332 Specifically, Murayama

said, “China and Korea accepted my statement and things

were going peacefully, but now that Mr. Abe has stirred

things up again, all eyes are back on this issue.”

333 「LF」

329 See Oral History: “38 North Interview with Ambassador Stephen Bosworth--Part I: Establishing

KEDO,” YouTube: uploaded by 30northNK, July 20, 2012. https://youtu.be/B69ng8oix2s?t=92

(Search date: November 1, 2022). Choi Young-jin (최영진) and Umezu Itaro (至梅津).

330

“Establishment of the Asian Women’s (AW) Fund, and the Basic Concepts of its Projects,”

Digital Museum: The Comfort Women Issue and the Asian Women’s Fund.

https://www.awf.or.jp/e2/foundation-01.html (Search date: November 1, 2022).

331 Statement by Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama “On the occasion of the 50th anniversary of

the war's end,” MOFA Japan, 15 August 1995,

https://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/press/pm/murayama/9508.html (Search date: November 1,

2022).

332 Anna Fifield, “Abe urged to uphold Japan’s apology for wartime aggression,” The Washington

Post, April 20, 2015. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/abe-urged-to-upholdjapans-apology-for-wartime-aggression/2015/04/20/b9d36d6e-e75f-11e4-8581-

633c536add4b_story.html (Search date: October 11, 2022).

333 Ibid.

107

 August 15, 1995 The demolition of the former Japanese General Government

Building in Seoul began on this date. In order remove

Japanese alterations to Gyeongbokgung (or Gyeongbok

Palace in Seoul), South Korea began to demolish the

Japanese General Government Building (a.k.a.

Jungangcheong) under instructions from President Kim

Young-sam.334

The dismantlement project began on exact

day of the 50th anniversary of Korea’s liberation from Japan,

which was August 15, 1995.335 「SF」(Hypothesis 3)

 May 31, 1996 A decision was made in Zurich, Switzerland for Korea and

Japan to co-host the 2002 Fédération Internationale de

Football Association (FIFA) World Cup. The country name

Korea was ‘officially’ placed in front of Japan in terms of

order, making it the ‘2002 FIFA World Cup Korea Japan’.

「SF」

 August 26, 1996 Former ROK Presidents Chun Doo-hwan was sentenced to

death, and Roh Tae-woo was given 22 1/2 years in prison.336

「SF」 (Hypothesis 4).

 November 21, 1997 Japanese Foreign Minister Obuchi Keizo expresses Japan’s

intention for continuing to make diplomatic efforts toward

ensuring peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, and

maintaining close communication with the Republic of

Korea and the United States.337 「LF」

4.D.1 Case No. 6: Newspapers adopt Korean without Hanja (after May 1990)

On October 9, 1995, the JoongAng-Ilbo newspaper in South Korea began to

print their newspaper by using Korean text only without Chinese characters (Hanja).

The format of this newspaper also changed from writing top-down, right to left (old) to

334 Young-sam Kim, p. 156.

335 This building was completely brought down to the ground on November 13, 1996, see Youngsoo Suh 서영수, “Chongdokbugeonmul Sarajyeossda [The Japanese General Government

Building is now gone 총독부건물 사라졌다], Donga Ilbo, November 14, 1996.

336 Sandra Sugawara, “South Korean Court Sentences ex-Rulers to Prison, Death,” The Washington

Post, August 26, 1996.

337

“Statement by Foreign Minister Keizo Obuchi on the Decision to Hold the Four-Party Plenary

Talks,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, November 21, 1997.

https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/korea/four-party.html (Search date: November 1, 2022).

108

writing left to right and moving downward (new) which is more modern, and different

from the old Japanese system. The first newspaper to write all Korean without using

Hanja was the Hankyoreh newspaper when it was established in May 1988. Their

thinking in 1988 was to revive the all Korean (Hangul) format of the Dokripsinmun that

was first issued on April 7, 1896 prior to Japanese domination.338

4.E Summary: The ‘3-Forces-Model’ Hypotheses Verification

This chapter tested the four hypotheses associated with the ‘3-Forces’ (x, y, and

z) model from both a macro and micro perspective and returned the following outcome.

In summary, the neoteric ‘3-Forces-Model’ (the three explanatory variables) designed

for answering this dissertation’s research question is useful as an alternative framework

for understanding and explaining Korea-Japan relations. In detail, this translates into the

following points.

First, in addition to one international-level variable, the Korea-Japan quagmire

requires at least two domestic variables, making a total of 3 explanatory variables. The

reason is because the ‘Leadership Force’ variable was a necessary but not sufficient

variable to explain Park Chung-hee’s Yushin period. In other words, Hypothesis 2b

returned a ‘false’ (rather than ‘true’) value. This implies that the Leadership Force is not

a reliable variable. One reason for this unreliability may be due to the fact that ‘stateleaders’ will, more times than not, place greater importance of state-interests rather than

personal relationships. Therefore, at least three (3) explanatory variables (and not 2)

were used to explain the Korea-Japan relationship.

338 Dokripsinmun = 독립신문

109

Second, the term ‘anti-Japanese’ is a misnomer that’s frequently used in the

Western world to describe ‘anti-Kominka and ‘anti-Ishin’ sentiments in the Korea-Japan

equation. These two East-Asia specific terms are more closely related to the concept of

an ‘autocratic military-centered government’ which came with a religious ‘self-sacrifice’

mandate (giving up one’s life, or Ichioku-Gyokusai, for example) in the practice of

absolute Emperor worship in the case of Japan’s past, which was entirely different from

anything found in modern western civilizations. Within the number 100 million (ichioku),

there were roughly 18-23 million living Koreans who were all included in this tally.

According to a recent Korea Times report that was released in May 2019, the names of

21,181 Koreans are still held captive at Japan’s Yasukuni Shrine. Despite a request to

remove them by their family members for ‘de-Japanification’ (anti-Kominka) purposes,

the Japanese court decided to outright deny this request.339

Third, this verification process also revealed that ‘democratization’ has doubled

in strength, in figurative terms, with respect to the ‘Societal Force’ within Korean society

since the early 1990s. During South Korea’s military dictatorships, this force was

severely oppressed by the autocrats; and thus played a smaller role in the formulation of

Korea-Japan relations prior to June 29, 1987.

Forth, the greatest weakness and limitations of the ‘3-Forces’ model are related to

measurements and Unit of Measure (UoM). In other words, calibrating the relative and

absolute magnitude for each of the three forces defined remains elusive.

339 Jae-heun Kim, “Japanese court denies request to remove Korean names from Yasukuni Shrine,”

The Korea Times, May 29, 2019.

https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2022/06/120_269713.html

110

Fifth, an attempt was made to conceptualize a viable measurement method.

However, James Delaney, a former CIA Station Chief in South Korea during the Chun

Doo-hwan era, had once mentioned and with respect to the Polarity Force, South Korea

is where the United States has (i) a four-star general, (ii) the CIA and (iii) the State

Department working together.

340 This characteristic makes measuring the Polarity Force

extremely difficult. Hence, efforts to measure the magnitude of the ‘3-Forces’ were not

included in the scope of this dissertation.

Sixth and lastly, and with respect to macro-periods analyzed, the Park Chung-hee

Yushin period has returned the ‘worst’ case values. All 3-Forces (PF, LF, and the SF)

each returned ‘negative’ value. This means that by using the ‘3-Forces’ model as an

analytical framework, former President Park Chung-hee’s Yushin period (1972-1979)

was the most difficult period in Korea-Japan relations.

340 See James Delaney’s (former CIA) appearance in “Nation Building in South Korea: Koreans,

Americans and the Making of Democracy.” YouTube: uploaded by WoodrowWilsonCenter,

November 8, 2013. https://youtu.be/WeUTJ7OwEqA?t=3103

===

Chapter 5 (Conclusion) is conclusion of this dissertation.

Here it is pointed out

—by using the new analytical framework— that the ‘Societal Force’ has hampered

Korea-Japan relations to the greatest extent as it had constantly stayed in the negative

range throughout the periods analyzed. In contrast, the two other defined forces had

fluctuated in between a positive and negative range depending on regional geopolitics

and the leadership Korea and Japan.

With respect to the Societal Force, it is argued that a major precipitating cause

which has been grossly overlooked in the South Korea-Japan equation is the inimical

impact of Japan’s Kōminka-Undō upon the Korean people. This undo (or movement)

was carried-out under the theocratic aegis of Kokka Shintō during the height of Japan’s

imperial militarism as an official state seisaku (or policy) towards Korea and the Korean

people.

As a reaction to this precipitating cause, it is added that a powerful ‘deJapanification’ process was subsumed under South Korea’s modernization movement

after the end of World War II (WW2). Kōminka was Imperial Japan’s unrelenting attempt at executing ‘ethnocide’ over anyone who was earmarked as being of Korean stock prior 13

to Japan’s surrender in August 1945. With respect to the Polarity Force, it is argued that

although Harry Truman’s ultimate decision to rebuild Japan with Hirohito (a.k.a. the

Shōwa Emperor) at its helm —without prosecution as a war criminal— was a pragmatic

strategy for the United States.

This undertaking, however, concomitantly induced

indelible complications that set aflame the current Korea-Japan quagmire with respect

to ‘anti-Kōminka’ and ‘anti-Ishin’ movements in South Korea. With respect to the

Leadership Force, it is argued that a newly elected pairings of a ‘civilian’ government in

South Korea and a ‘non-LDP’ Prime Minister in Japan had introduced new set of

dimensions to the Korea-Japan equation that hoisted the Korea-Japan relationship up on to a new plateau with non-Jimintō policy applications toward Korea. This meant, for the United States, that the Korea-Japan relationship became less predictable after the early 1990s. [???]

Finally, and in conclusion, it is argued that a furtherance of South Korea’s deJapanification process —with assistance from like-minded leaders inside both the United States and Japan— will paradoxically help push South Korea and Japan closer together as to best pursue common regional goals and interests with triangulated congruity rather than ruction.

===

Chapter 4: The ‘3-Forces-Model’ Hypotheses Verification