===
Amsterdam University Press
Chapter Title: The Movement to Redress the Japanese Military “Comfort
Women” Grassroots’ Concerns and Responses Today
Book Title: Calculated Nationalism in Contemporary South Korea
Book Subtitle: Movements for Political and Economic Democratization in
the 21st Century
Book Author(s): Gil-Soo Han
Published by: Amsterdam University Press. (2023)
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctv37363q5.8
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3 The Movement to Redress the Japanese
Military “Comfort Women”
Grassroots’ Concerns and Responses Today
“우리 스스로가 역사를 잊어버리면, 이런 사실이 있었다는 것 조차 없어질 수 있다.”(If we forget history, this horrific incident could be wiped away),
Park Soo-Nam, Director of Silence: The Rising Voice of “Comfort Women.”
Abstract
Chapter 3 analyses grassroots’ concerns about the
Japanese military “comfort women,” who were forcibly recruited to military
“comfort stations” during the Second World War. Gyeongsang-Namdo Province had
the greatest number of victims of this type of forced labour. Citizens of
Tongyeong and Geoje cities in Gyeongsang-Namdo Province developed a website to
support the victims from the communities. The website represents the
contemporary citizens’ nationalism and national identities with reference to
the crimes committed by imperial Japan and the community’s efforts to seek
redress. South Korea’s advanced economic status and increasing power in the
international community make important elements in the efforts.
Keywords: Japanese
military “comfort women,” forced labour, sexual slavery, “comfort station,” Dagagagi website
Introduction
The legacies of Japanese colonialism have been
lingering and deeply embedded in Korean society. How Korea can overcome the
negative memories and impact, which is real,
has been an important national mission. Forced
Han, G.-S., Calculated Nationalism in Contemporary South Korea. Movements for
Political and Economic Democratization in the 21st Century. Amsterdam:
Amsterdam University Press 2023 doi: 10.5117/9789463723657_ch03
labour and sexual slavery have caused trauma and
horror to the victims, supporters, and the nation. Between 1932 and 1945, the
estimated number of sexual slavery victims reached around 200,000; these women
were coercively recruited, and most of them have now died (Hicks 1995; Yoshimi
1993). Since 1992, 234 victims have been reported to the Korean government
(Choi 2010: 3). Beyond this period, a large number of the pro-Japanese (친일)
Koreans sustained the high status and wealth that they gained at the expense of
fellow Koreans, which led them to form a wealthy and powerful group. This has
been a national concern for decades and provided an impetus to redressing the
pro-Japanese traitors (친일청산).1 Apart from North Korea, Japan is the
foreign nation-state with the shortest distance from Korea, but emotionally the
farthest. Contrasting the Japanese condescending perception of the Korean
peninsula since the 19th century, Koreans have considered Japan the competitor
to fight against in terms of economy, technology, and sports. Korea-Japan
Football Rivalry attracts the whole nation’s emotional attachment to the games
(Mangan, Park, and Ok 2018; Ok and Mangan 2018). The Korean media, in general,
and the conservative ones in particular,2 have reportedly
underestimated Korea’s achievement in most areas in comparison with Japan,
making the psyche of Korean people overwhelmed with an inferiority complex for
decades, largely based on flunkeyism.
However, the changes to Korean
perceptions of Japan have been accumulative. This chapter examines contemporary
Korean nationalism and identities concerning the Japanese military “comfort
women” (Military Sexual Slavery by Japan), a term agreed by the victims in
broader Asia. A particular focus is the socio-historical contexts that enabled
Koreans to reformulate their attitudes towards the “comfort women” and
undertake a closer examination of contemporary Korean views of the matter.
Theoretically speaking, the national and structural context has been
transformed and has engendered emergent cultural properties, in the process of
which the agents have been enabled and have actively pursued the elaboration
and re-elaboration of the changes to further structural and cultural changes.
Two major controversial matters are sitting at the heart of
the difficulties in resolving the case of “comfort women” between contemporary
Korea and Japan. One is about whether the girls were forcibly removed from
their home,
1대하는 민족문제연구소 10가지 ‘궤변’들 (The Centre for Historical Truth and Justice).
2016. “‘” (The Center for Historical Truth and Justice, Ten Mad Reasons against
https://www.minjok.or.kr/archives/54971,친일파 청산’을 반
accessed
Cleansing the Pro-Japanese). March
23, January 3, 2020.
2 Chosun Ilbo and Donga Ilbo are
conservative and pro-Japanese from the time of the colonial period.
which consequently led them to the “comforting
stations” in Manchuria, China, Myanmar, Malaysia, Indonesia, Pacific Islands,
Japan, and Korea. The other is that the Japanese government and military admit
that they were involved in operating the “comforting stations,” however, they
argue that it was the managers and recruiters of the “comforting stations,” who
directly engaged in illegal activities such as human trafficking (Seo 2016:
212–214). Questioning this enforcement has instigated much debate. In regard to
the legality of the military “comfort women,” the “service” clearly breached
not only the law within Japan but also the related international conventions
that Japan joined at the time of the Second World War (Korean Women’s
Development Institute 2016).
Unfortunately, the Japanese
government’s intention to raise the legality was simply to avoid its
responsibility and also dilute the central issue of the problem. The Japanese
government is missing the point by raising the legality of it, rather than paying
attention to the irreversible damage inflicted against the women (Seo 2016:
214). Kawata Humiko is a Japanese author and activist who has been sympathetic
to the “comfort women” victims and wants to see the Japanese government’s
sincere effort to restore the victims’ dignity. Kawata argues that the crux of
the matter is not whether or not imperial Japan had a role in operating the
“comforting stations,” but the assault was by force as the “comforting
stations” were under the auspices of the Japanese government.3
The issue of “comfort women” is
sensitive and complex, and the attempt to understand and redress it has
considered racism, nationalism, human rights, masculinity, war, and
colonialism. It cannot be reduced to one or two elements. However, the most
tragic of all is how a deeply sovereign agent’s dignity has been violently
trampled down. With the end of the Second World War, the “comfort women” were
either murdered or abandoned in the war fields. Some remained there for
different reasons and some returned to Korea. Many returnees could not return
to their hometowns and stayed silent about their stories of victimhood. The
victims lived with acquired diseases, psychological pains, and social
prejudice. A list of important questions here is: Why did it take half a
century for the victims to speak out? Why did the individual victims take so
long before demanding apologies from Japan? From the viewpoints of contemporary
Korean grassroots, what are their core concerns? My immediate assumption is
about their sympathy towards
3
신동아 (Shin Dong-a). 2017. “가와타
후미코 일본전쟁 책임자료센터 공동대표” (Kawata
Humiko, Co-Representative of Japan’s War Documents).
May 15, https://shindonga.donga.com/ Print?cid=532646, accessed
January 9, 2020.
the victims and anger towards imperial Japan. It has
been the grassroots movement to redress the “comfort women” since the 1990s
that has kept the “comfort women” as a socio-historically important matter to
resolve especially when the Japanese government denied its responsibility and
reparation and when the Korean government downplayed it (Lee 2017: 80; Kim
2018b: 120; Son 2018). The movement was sustained by the Wednesday
demonstrations in front of the Japanese Embassy in Seoul, leading to the
construction of the Statue of Peace (소녀상) and recording the history in
textbooks (Chung 2013). This chapter discusses grassroots perspectives towards
the phenomenon, the public perceptions of which have changed, influenced by the
improvement of the national economy and the Korean nation-state’s international
status.
Literature Review
There have been four key strands of the scholarship
on the Japanese military “comfort women” (Lee and Bae 2019). First, the
victims’ life trajectories as portrayed in the memorial museum and through
interviews (Kim 2010; Choi 2010; Son and Cho 2009). Second, media report frames
social movements about the “comfort women” in Korea and/or Japan (Lee and Min
2011; Kim and Woo 2016). Third, memories and discourses as represented in
documentaries, school texts, and the Statue of Peace (Jeong 2016; Kim 2018b).
Fourth, reparation for the victims as it relates to diplomatic relations
between Japan and Korea (Kim 2018a; Kwak 2006; Do 2008; Choi 2005).
First, the earlier research on
the “comfort women” started with an attempt to describe the victims’ life
journey, of which forced sexual slavery was the most painful incident. The
exhibition of relevant incidents of the “comfort women” in the museum recreates
the memories under the current context and distributes them widely. In this
process, the memories are recontextualized at present, which may be influenced
by the current socio-cultural context (Kim 2010: 179; Kim 2005). Kim E. (2010:
183–184) notes that the Independence Hall of Korea (독립기념관) is a particular
outcome of political leaders’ implementation of top-down nationalism to
stimulate bottom-up nationalism, which contributes to the political legitimacy.
Kim E. (2010: 183–184) also contends that the Independence Hall needs to better
represent “gender and class dimensions,” and the patriarchal view of gender and
sex needs to be corrected, and that peaceful solidarity with the “comfort
women” survivors of other countries needs to be displayed. Much attention is
given to “observing the exhibition of past incidents today” to redress the problematic practice of the past and
present. This is in part what I will further explore by analysing the
grassroots’ views on the incident, including the views of the younger
generation today.
Kim E. (2010: 181) was concerned with the non-existence or
the limited exhibitions of the issues of the “comfort women,” which restricts
further research of the related exhibitions. The Women and War Museum (과 여성
인권박물관 전쟁
) was opened in 2012 and this led
to further research (Chun 2018; Park 2014a; Kim et al. 2013). The research of
the exhibitions necessarily links the past incident to contemporary Koreans.
However, as the memories are recreated to remind contemporary Koreans, what are the ways in which the
memories affect Korean nationalism in the 21st century, as opposed to the early
20th century?
Second, studies have examined
media report frames of social movements about the “comfort women” in Korea
and/or Japan (Lee and Min 2011; Kim and Woo 2016). Lee and Min (2011: 42), in
their study of the media reportages on social movements about the “comfort
women,” attempt to overcome the limitations of the analysis of the media text,
by taking into consideration the politico-historical contexts—employing
“collective action frames” (Benford and Snow 2000; Snow 2007; both cited in Lee
and Min 2011). The approach aims to reveal the level of seriousness,
unfairness, and immorality of the social condition, ascertain who or what the
origins of the problem are, and how to redress the problem (Snow and Benford
1992; cited in Lee and Min 2011: 43). In brief, the level of strength of a
social movement and the media’s effective report of it can influence the
success of the movement (Gamson 2007; Cooper 2002; Lee and Min 2011: 46). These
research findings reiterate that the issue of the “comfort women” is not only concerned
with the victims, but it needs to be understood in the social, national, and
international context.
Park (2014b) found that the
Japanese newspapers’ common framing in their reports on the “comfort women” is
that private recruitment companies coerced the girls into sexual slavery, but
denied the Japanese government’s direct involvement in the coercion (Kim and
Woo 2016: 85). The Japanese news has been particularly concerned that the
Japanese diplomatic effort to have the issue of the “comfort women” resolved
has unintendedly led to the impression that the Japanese government had a key
role in causing all the inhumane conduct during the Second World War (Nam
2014). I argue that Japan’s and the Japanese news’ continuing denial of the
historical incident has been in part due to the unequal power relations between
Korea and Japan. There is a sign of change with this, which in part I explore
in this chapter and the volume. Kim and Woo (2016: 112) find that Korean
newspapers have a primary focus on the origins of the problem and Japan’s
appropriate apologies and compensation, whereas Japanese newspapers are tired of
lingering on the problem and want to move forward. Thus, the tension between
the two nation-states over the problem continues. Again, the unequal power
relations between the two seem to be an obstacle to the resolution.
Third, Jeong (2016) investigates
the films and documentaries on the records and narratives of the “comfort
women” victims produced since the 1990s, and the documentaries’ impacts on
public discourses on the topic. Jeong contends that because of the filmmakers’
close rapport with the victims, the documentaries brought about a significant
awareness and even led the public to demand an apology from the Japanese
government (p. 160). The “1987
June Struggle” was also a turning point when the Korean public
became much more aware of the gendered perspective of the “comfort women”
(e.g., women’s rights), raising awareness of the problems of patriarchy (Jeong
2016: 168; Jung 2013). I would add that the broader political and economic
development of the Korean nation-state in the 1990s is another significant
element which made those films impactful in terms of developing the public
discourse and social movements on the topic.
Kim M. (2018b) examines the
transformation of the historical incident into public trauma, then leading to
the massive grassroots movement of the citizens and high-school students to
protest against the Japanese government. The movement has been global in
solidarity with the victims in other countries as well as advocates for women’s
rights. Kim M. (2018b) finds that the interactions between the victims and the
public, the memory of the victims’ narratives as represented on the Statue of
Peace, and the formation of the public/social memories have resulted in the
massive grassroots movement. Again, why have these movements taken place since
the 1990s, and not before? I argue it is due to the emergent structural and
cultural contexts nationally and internationally that enabled the movements and
the expression of calculated nationalism.
Fourth, Kim C. (2018a: 231) notes
it is the complexity of the “comfort women,” which makes the resolution of the
matter difficult. The problems around the “comfort women” at the time of, and
later, the crime, encompasses Japanese imperialism, patriarchy and
authoritarianism of Korean society, historical and diplomatic conflicts between
Korea and Japan, and the breach of human rights of the women during the war.
This is why it took over forty years before the Korean women publicly raised
the matter for the first time for a resolution in the late 1980s. The 2015
Japan-South Korea “comfort women” Agreement was a hastily and ill-prepared
agreement, in which the victims’ needs and sufferings were not considered. The
Agreement was to reword the Kono Statement on August 4, 1993, which included,
“The then Japanese military was, directly or indirectly, involved in the
establishment and management of the comfort stations” (p. 234). The activists’
and victims’ frustration with the slow progress for the resolution led to their
appeal to the international community. In July 2007 the U.S. Congress adopted a
resolution that the Japanese government restore the victims’ dignity and human
rights, and provide apologies and compensation. The Parliaments of the
Netherlands, Canada, and the European Union followed the suit. The Japanese
government continues to refuse to offer full apologies or legal reparation. The
“comfort women” have now become a transnational mission to resolve in
solidarity with the relevant transnational organizations to “protect the
universal value of human dignity and human rights” (Doh 2008: 67). Elizabeth
Son’s (2018: 19, 21) work focuses on “the process of redress, of remedial
actions” for the survivors by analysing their “actions of remembrance,” emphasizing
the victims’ deep commitment toward women’s rights in a transnational context.
Many research projects have so
far been somewhat “past-oriented” or “static” in the sense that “why and what
happened” needs to be better understood and also the studies have paid
attention to how the “comfort women” are depicted in an exhibition, film, and
textbooks. They are all interested in revealing Korean nationalism against
Japan to some degree. Past studies of memorial museums, media reports of social
movements on the topic as well as public memories of the topic have reflected
the grassroots’ concerns or their nationalistic sentiment over the issues to a
significant degree. It is also fair to note that past studies represent
academic concerns more than public awareness. There is an opportunity to build
further on these past studies in terms of contemporary Korean perception of the
issues of the “comfort women.”
Yuki Tanaka (2002) demonstrates
that Japan’s racism and nationalism were intertwined symbolically in male
soldiers’ gang-rape during the Second World War (Damousi 2003: 1122). This is a
form of exertion of nationalist superiority against the members of the
subordinate nations—a typical example of nouveau-riche nationalism (Han 2016).
How about the experiences of the victims and their fellow countrymen/women over
a long period? These are not simply the topic of tensions between the victims
and perpetrators, but involve domestic and international relations and
contexts. These are the precise questions that Damousi raised:
Further consideration could have
been given to considering shifts over time. It is indisputable that political
and sexual domination are interlinked; at what point, and under what
circumstances, did these issues begin to be contested, challenged, brought into
question? What impetus gave rise to these critiques? (Damousi 2003: 1123)
The response to these questions becomes complex when
the nation-state of the victims has significantly gained its power and
influence in the international community. A specific question that I raise in
this chapter is what are the contemporary
Korean people’s responses to the Japanese soldiers’ mass sexual crimes against
Korean women during the Second World War? Such a question involves Korean
nationalism in a shift in the context of the new international order,
especially with reference to Korean people’s perception of Japan.
In brief, a few remaining
questions resulting from the identified shortcomings of current literature are
as follows. (1) Under what circumstances have the victims and fellow Koreans
been able to raise the concerns? That is, what have been the socio-historical
contexts that have enabled contemporary Koreans to raise concerns over the
“comfort women?” (2) What do contemporary Koreans make out of the Japanese
military “comfort women,” with reference to Korean nationalism and national
identities? These questions are still relevant to contemporary Korea and Japan.
Japan has never offered formal apologies to the “comfort women.” Korean
economic and political development in recent decades and also a heightened
awareness of human rights have made a large proportion of Koreans aware of the
sufferings that the victims experienced, as illustrated in numerous
contemporary cultural artefacts such as films.
Research Methods
The internet portals such as Daum.net and Naver.com
host numerous online cafés, but they have a relatively small number of members
ranging from five to seventy. For example, The Site to Remember the Military
“Comfort Women” (기억연대 일본군정의연 “위안부위안부” 기억의할머니들께 터),4 and To the Military
“Comfort 정의
Women/Grandmas” (“ ” ).5
The Korean Council for Justice
and Remembrance for the Issues
of Military Sexual Slavery by Japan ( or )6 is the leading and significant non-profit
organization
4 https://cafe.naver.com/peacememory
5 https://cafe.naver.com/lymbhj2?iframe_url=/ArticleList.nhn%3Fsearch.
clubid=24177822%26search.menuid=17%26search.boardtype=L)
at the national level to restore the dignity of the
victims. Its website is rich and informative. The Council receives some limited
funding from the Korean government and supportive citizens. The Council’s
achievements are significant and many researchers have written about them. The
question of these sites is about whether or not they represent the views of the
grassroots.
Between 1992 and 2006, 234
“comfort women” survivors were registered with the Korean government. Of the
192 registered in 2001, 56.5 per cent of them were from Gyeongsang-do Province
and 31 per cent from GyeongsangNamdo Province, in which Tongyeong and Geoje are
two cities. These regional areas located at the bottom of the peninsula and
close to Japan were some of the most severely affected. I have selected the Tongyeong Geoje Citizens Community Website
that Supports the Japanese Military “Comfort
Women” (일본군 “위안부”할머니와 함께하는 통영거제시민모임, http://
dagagagi.org)
for analysis as I considered it to be one of the best and most significant to
represent contemporary grassroots perspectives.7 This group is well
represented through its local media but has been given no scholarly attention
despite its potential to represent grassroots nationalism in regional
districts, in which social movements are less active. This community, Dagagagi (literally meaning,
getting closer to the grandmas), was formed on August 15, 2002 to relieve the
pain of the survivors and to have their dignity restored. At the time, there
were four survivors in Tongyeong and two in Geojedo. All of them were in their
80s and the community provided them with welfare support such as birthday
parties, picnics, human rights camps, and seeking redress from the Japanese
government for the crimes and reparate for the damage. The website’s front page
indicates the contents of the online community: introduction, names of the six
local survivors, activities to restore their dignities, community bulletin to
inform and share, resources, advocate/donation. The community bulletin had 280
posts as at May 18, 2020, including high-school students’ petition postcards to
the members of the Japanese Diet (parliament) calling for Japan to compensate
the victims. The victims also had a visit to Japan and delivered the students’
postcards. The bulletin’s first posting was written on October 15, 2010 and
continued till June 24, 2019. I downloaded the contents of the whole website in
February 2020 and continued until March 1, 2020. The amount of data reached
single-spaced 360 pages in A4. The community website includes the postings from
other regional and national associations concerned with
7 A similar website to support the “Comfort Women”
victims in Gyeongsang-Bukdo Province is 정신대 할머니와 함께 하는 시민모임 (Daegu Citizens
Forum for Halmeoni—Grandmas), http://www.1945815.or.kr/
the “comfort women” as well as from the local actors
residing in Tongyeong and Geoje cities. The “external” postings reflect the
thoughts of local actors and agents, so they are posted on the website. As a
way of substantiating and triangulating the Dagagagi
website, I have consulted academic literature, media, and relevant websites.8
Most of the related official websites on the “comfort women” represent the
viewpoints of governments, the learned, or researchers rather than the
grassroots, although there is significant overlap amongst them. Thus, the
website of Dagagagi is particularly meaningful
and represents grassroots perspectives.
A descriptive and analytical
analysis of data has been undertaken based on the principles of the grounded
theory methodology, involving open-, axial-, and selective coding. Open coding
is to analyse sentences and paragraphs, which leads to developing concepts and
categories. Axial coding is to identify the connections between subcategories
to larger categories and ascertain the links among major categories, the latter
of which may have the structure and context of the society. Selective coding
mainly deals with the main categories and how they are supported by
subcategories (Glaser and Strauss 1967; Strauss and Corbin 1990).
A Morphogenetic Background of the Military Sexual Slavery by Japan
The
1965 film, Sunset on the Sarbin River (사르빈강에
노을이 진다, dir.
by Jung Chang-Hwa), depicting the Second
Sino-Japanese Warfield in the late 1930s, has a short segment of conversation
between two Koreans in China: a Japanese military “comfort woman” and a
“supposedly voluntary” student soldier. The soldier asks the woman how she
ended up in China. The woman said, “I was misled on the way to be a nurse.” The
soldier responded, “You must be confused yourself. Imperial Japan would not
mislead you like that.” The woman replied, “Have you not been cheated by
imperial Japan so far?” Professor Park Yu-Ha notes that the woman is precise to
the point that the soldier might have felt that he was not forcibly recruited,
but in
8 They
include: Digital Museum, The Comfort Women Issue and the Asian Women’s Fund
(디지털 기념관 위안부 문제와 아시아 여성기금 Ministry of Gender Equality
and Family: e-Museum of the Victims of Japanese Military ), http://www.awf.or.jp/k3/oralhistory-00. html;
Sexual
Slavery (연구소 여성가족부
일본군 “위안부동북아역사재단”피해자 e-역사관),
https://www.nahf.or.kr/main), http://www.hermuseum일본군 “위안부”문제..
go.kr/; Northeast
Asian History Foundation (
do; Research
Centre for the Japanese Military “Comfort Women” Issue ( ),
http://www.kyeol.kr/.
fact, he was indeed under the given structure of imperial Japan at that
time despite his lack of knowledge about it.9 The social climate in
the 1960s was that the majority of Koreans were preoccupied with meeting their
basic needs for everyday life, distancing themselves from anything beyond, such
as human dignity. The Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic
of Korea, signed on June 22, 1965, was an attempt to make up the relationships
between the two nations in tension resulting from Japanese colonialism.
However, President Park Chung-Hee’s primary interest was financing from Japan
to rebuild the national economy (Hicks 1995), which was a way to legitimize his
leadership acquired through a military coup
d’état. They paid little attention to the victims of the forced
labour who suffered during Japanese colonialism.
Professor Yun Jeong-Ok, during
her youth, saw some of her friends being taken away to be the Japanese military
“comfort women.” Yun published her research findings on the “comfort women”
over four reportages in Hankyoreh
Shinmun in January 1990 (Yoon 2015: 124).10 These
reportages came as a humiliating shock and erupted a wave of anger in the
Korean nation-state. Ms. Kim Hak-Sun first spoke about her victim history and
accused the Japanese government on August 14, 1991, following the Japanese
government’s denial of the war crime (Choi 2010: 18). These open reports and
accusations waited for forty-five years after the National Independence in
1945. I argue that there were some emergent structural
and cultural factors in operation that
conditioned the given contexts, which discouraged the victims to speak out.11
First, Japan’s cooperation with, and technological support for, the Korean
industries, was a stimulus for the continuing economic development of South
Korea. However, in the 1970s and 1980s, Sex Tours (기생관광) were an important
source of foreign monies. Kang Jun-Man reported that there were 100,000
Japanese tourists to Korea in 1971 and the number increased to 650,000 in 1979,
85 per cent of which were men (Kang 2017; Lie 1995; Bishop and Robinson 1998;
Norma 2019). One could argue that this was a new version of the “comfort women”
in operation although its features are not totally comparable.
Second, it was in the
authoritarian Korean governments’ interests to keep up with the
industrialization and modernization of the nation, which
9 “제국의
위안부 2” (The ‘Comfort Women’ under Imperial Japan 2). June 5, 2015, accessed January 7, 2020. https:// www.youtube.com/watch?v=iwEWxaA20_Y,
10Labour). The report was entitled, “정신대 원혼의 발자취” (In Search of the
Origins of the Forced
11 The “comfort
women” victims in China could not “come out” for the related structural
reasons.
also provided an important element to legitimize the
military dictatorial leadership (Yoon 2015: 214; Choi 2010: 13; cf., Han and
Sharp 1997). The government and patriarchal Korean society avoided dealing with
the issue (Lee and Min 2011: 46), and there was no social momentum to raise it.
However, in the early 1990s, the Korean government became proactively
supportive of the victims, providing housing and medical needs.12 In
1997–1998 the government requested that the Japanese prime minister send an
official letter of apology to the individual victims (Choi 2005: 21). These
changes in national policies led to further changes in the social milieu, in
that the victims were given the channel to share their victimhood narratives
and the public elevated the individual trajectories into the public and
national discourses (Choi 2010: 21–22; Kim 2000). According to Lee and Min
(2011: 50), before 2000, the newsletters of The Korean Council for the Women
Drafted for Military Sexual Slavery by Japan (정대협)13 described that
the
“comfort women” were the people of a colony of the Japanese
imperialism and they were the rape victims of the imperial soldiers. That is, a
primary focus before the 2000s was on the helpless nation-state of Korea as the
chief cause of the misfortune of the victims—bashing the victim nation-state.
Since then, the interpretation of the “comfort women” has been extended to
consider feminism, the Korean government’s inability to resolve the matter with
the recalcitrant perpetrator, Japan, and the U.S.’s indifference and unequal
relations in the broader world system (Lee and Min 2011: 52–53). The movement
to restore the victims’ dignities has become international, reaching out to
national assemblies in some foreign countries. For instance, there was the U.S.
House of Representatives’ resolution that Japan formally apologize and accept
responsibility. In April 2008, other countries followed suit in demanding an
apology, such as France, the Netherlands, North Korea, China, and the
Philippines, despite Japan’s continuing refusal (Choi 2010: 22).14
Third, during the Japanese colonial period, women’s rights
enjoyed some degree of nationalist support, e.g., advocating for the abolition
of the Confucian legacy which looks down on women (Kim 1996). However, in the
1980s, Korea was going through rapid westernization and there were mixed views
about feminism especially from the viewpoints of elites. It appears that as
12 Each
received $21,000 from the Korean government and $4,344 from a civilian fund
(Min
2003: 946).
13
한국정신대문제대책협의회.
14 The Guardian, “Japan Rejects US Calls for Apology over ‘Comfort
Women.’” July 31, 2007, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/jul/31/usa.japan, accessed
April 16, 2020.
far as grassroots were concerned their significant
expression of women’s rights was relatively limited. Korean society was much
more conservative in the 1970s and 1980s than it is now, and it was not
conducive enough for the victims to speak about what they had gone through.
“Speaking out” or confessing the experiences would have only caused
victim-blaming. For example, a “comfort woman” victim, Ms. Kim Hak-Sun’s
husband ridiculed her in front of their son about her life trajectory (Yoon
2015: 92; Kim 2010: 189). Importantly, the individual agents, who were clearly
able to “calculate” what was most gainful, would naturally be reluctant to
speak out in the given cultural context. Thus, calculated nationalism was in
operation. According to a survey, following the Independence in 1945, four out
of six victims returned to Korea but chose not to return to their hometown
(Yoon 2015: 89–92). Some had to leave their hometowns due to the shame put on
them or the community’s accusation of them, reflective of the socio-cultural
context. Returning from gender oppression in the brutal “comforting station”
under the Japanese military government, Korea’s patriarchal ideology prolonged
the victims’ suffering (Min 2003: 948). Fourth, the Japanese military “comfort
women” turned up as a topic of scholarly attention in 2007, and an in-depth and
broader academic debate commenced in 2013 (e.g., Park 2013; Yoon 2013).
Since the 2000s, the Korean
economy has significantly grown and South Korea has emerged as a notable
middle-power in the international community. This structural change of Korean
society enabled the government provision of financial support for the “comfort
women” and the active social movements to have restored the dignity of these
women. This was under the cultural climate of an increasing
institutionalization of women’s rights especially from 1997 to 2007 (Kim and
Kim 2011). The social actors became aware of the contextual change and have
demanded that the Korean and Japanese governments work separately, as well as
collaboratively, for a resolution. The Japanese government has been
non-responsive.
Findings
Margaret Archer’s (1995) critical realist approach to
the understanding of social change and social movement analyses the
intersections between structure, culture, and agency. The structural properties reflect unequal relationships, e.g.,
the relation between a company owner and her employees or the relation between
imperial Japan and the annexed Chosun. The level of unequal relationship is not
static but fluctuates, and influences the characteristics of the emergent cultural properties. Then, the
actors mobilize the ideas and bring about change to, or reproduce, structure or
culture, i.e., bring about change to the society or maintain the status quo.
Let me briefly illustrate the
broader interactions between structure, culture, and agency to bring about
changes regarding the “comfort women.” The 2015 Korea-Japan agreement on the
Japanese military “comfort women” was an attempt to facilitate the diplomatic structure and relationship without
any effort to acknowledge or resolve the legacy of the “comfort women.” This
was in part for the sake of economic benefit at the expense of the victims’
rights. The year 2015 happened to be the time for “reboot feminism” and there
was a clear social milieu or a culture
not to persevere with any kind of sexual harassment (Lee 2017: 89). Further,
the Statue of Peace brought out a large number of citizens to the grassroots
protests all around the regions of South Korea against the Japanese government.
The erection of over one hundred statues all over Korea particularly encouraged
high-school boys and girls to participate in the grassroots movement—igniting
the changes of the primary
agents to social
actors. “The Statue of Peace,” involving grassroots’ participation
and financial donations as well as artistic work, was much more influential
than the commemorative statues erected by the government (Kim 2018b: 127–128,
136).
Structural Emergent Properties
The Power Imbalance between Chosun Korea and
Imperial Japan:
Revisiting the Past to Discuss the Present
The
1965 Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea
was the Japanese imperial admission of its past misconduct to Korea on the one
hand, and an attempt to erase the misconduct on the other hand.15
Overcoming the destruction and the loss of life through Japanese imperialism
and the Korean War, the bruised Korean nation-state and its leaders occupied a
subordinate position to Japan. The victims, like the Japanese military “comfort
women,” were not given space to complain or ask for any compensation. As argued
earlier, the trajectory of the social movement to restore the victims’
dignities indicates that they considered their misfortunes as part of their
sorrows because they were the people of the impoverished nation-state in the
past, but that they anticipated seeing their better off nation-state offer its
people what is commensurate with the wealth and power of the nation (The Korean
Council for the Women Drafted for Military Sexual Slavery by Japan 2004: 8).
Thus, the victims’ reproach against the
15 평화를 만드는 여성회등, August 29, 2005. (Peace
Making Women’s Association, etc.), August 26, 2005, cited in Dagagagi
nation-state was kept silent for as long as possible,
but has been expressed publicly in recent decades (The Korean Council for the
Women Drafted for Military Sexual Slavery by Japan 1996: Ch.2).16 It
took half a century for Korean victims and their fellow countrymen/women to
speak out and this is the time taken for Korea to bring up its political and
economic development to a stage strong enough to enable the victims to speak
out. That is, structural emergent properties grew influential enough to bring
about emergent cultural properties, which in turn enabled primary and corporate
agents to take social actions. Why it took half a century for the victims to
speak out is clear based on the critical realist method of retroduction.
Moreover, the method of abduction illustrates how the victims and
primary/corporate agents in affluent South Korea speak out and demand apologies
from the Japanese government. This is an important task of this chapter.
The community website (i.e., Dagagagi) under analysis contains
informative knowledge and is full of passion to restore the dignities of the
women and the nation. The forced sexual slavery took place in the past, and was an epitome of Japan’s
“barbaric rule and a crime against humanities, based on violence, oppression,
and the survival of the fittest.” Referring to the past crime is inevitable as part of the contemporary
movement to redress the effect of the crime. Indeed, Japanese imperialism was
full of “national oppression and discrimination, political oppression, economic
exploitation, and obliteration of every human right.”17 Any kind of
Korean movement to gain national Independence or any resistance movement
accompanied by minor criticisms faced unrelenting violence and horrific
control. Deceptive assimilation policies were pursued to erase Korean
identities, and the Japanled Second Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945) and the
Pacific War (1941–1945) drew all the available material and human resources
from Korea to the Warfield, leaving the Korean peninsula devastated. The
Japanese military
“comfort women” were part of the forced human
resources (Min 2003: 945).18
Once the past crime is raised today it has become a present issue that necessarily
requires the consideration of the past and present structures of
16정부 탓 Hankook Ilbo. 2020https://www.hankookilbo.com/News/Read/202005121297320429.. “최봉태 변호사, 이용수 할머니의 분노, 위안부 청구권에 소홀한 May 12,
” (Grandma Lee Yong-Su’s
Anger about the Government’s Timid Approach to Seeking the Compensation).
accessed May 15, 2020.
제시민모임1718the Loss of Sovereignty), April 24, 2020,
cited in 진실과미래진실과미래, , 국치국치 100 100년사업공동추진위원회년사업공동추진위원회Dagagagi일본군 (Truth and Future Commission to Remember (Truth and Future Commission to Remember ,
April 24, 2009, accessed May 17, 2020. ‘위안부’ 할머니와 함께하는 통영거 the Loss of
Sovereignty), April 24, 2009, cited in “
.” http://dagagagi.org/, April 24,
2009, accessed May 17, 2020.
Korea and Japan, and their political and economic
relations. Contemporary Koreans’—i.e., primary and corporate
agents’—identifying the “women’s violated human rights” as their own makes the
crime “the present problem there and now.”19 Structural emergent
properties have been the underpinning factor that has enabled the agents’
properties to stand against past wrongdoings. That is, as soon as the Korean
economy has strengthened enough and Korea has more to say in the international
economy, the problem of the past is not simply a problem of the past, but the
present. Korean civilians and scholars have made sincere efforts to have the
dignities of the “comfort women” restored since the 1990s when the victims
first spoke out, and there has been significant progress. However, the Japanese
government offers no official apologies for their imperial invasion of Korea,
and Japan has even justified the past history and their invasive war, which has
exacerbated the tension between Korea and Japan.20 Japan’s
continuing distortion of history is still a stumbling block in developing any
harmonious relationship between the two nations.21
Japan has been indifferent to
the fact that the core of the resolution of the “comfort women” is about
Japan’s revelation of the full details of imperial Japan’s planning and
operation of the military “comfort women,” apologies, legal reparation, and the
prevention plan of the same in the future.22 In brief, being aware
of the emergent structural properties of Korea and Japan, and their
relationship, the social actors and victims demanded that the dignities of the
“comfort women” be restored.23 Yet, Japan in particular is reluctant
to accept the new reality of the emergent structural properties.
Japan
is Reluctant to Apologize, Accept a New Structure and Relationship The
Japanese governments have argued for the ownership of Dokdo Island and have
continued to pay tribute to the war criminals at the Yasukuni Shrine which has
memorialized thousands of innocent victims of East Asia. The
19 “일본군 ‘위안부’ 할머니와 함께하는 통영거제시민모임.” http://dagagagi.org/, July 20,
2004, accessed May 17, 2020.
20 “일본군 ‘위안부’ 할머니와 함께하는 통영거제시민모임.” April 25, 2009, accessed May 17,
2020.
21 Japan has a
long record of distorting history regarding its imperialism. Based on Lee
Min-Jin’s historical fiction novel Pachinko (2017,
Grand Central Publishing), the American produced series, Pachinko, is internationally popular in early 2022 and
ironically educating the world how imperial Japan inhumanely treated Koreans in
Japan and also how Koreans courageously fought against the brutality.
22 평화를 만드는 여성회등
(Peace Making Women’s Association, etc.), January 3, 2006, cited in Dagagagi, April 24, 2009, accessed May 17, 2020.
23 Dagagagi, August 31, 2011, accessed May 17, 2020.
dangerous imperial mindset is still in operation in
the minds of the present politicians in Japan.24 There is an active
rejection of a new structure and relationship. Japan’s continuing exertion of
power towards victimized nations, causing the prevalent power imbalance, is the
obstacle to having the past crime resolved and having the women’s dignities restored.
The social actors in support of the victims are well aware of the economic
disparity between Japan and many Asian countries which also suffered under
Japanese imperialism. The actors argue that all the affected Asian nations must
actively demand that the Japanese government attend to the resolution of the
military “comfort women,” illustrating what happened in Europe after the Second
World War. The nations around Germany actively searched for the Nazi war
criminals and brought them to justice. However, the Asian nations with war
victims have actively avoided even reporting the war criminals. Especially, the
issue of the Japanese military “comfort women” has been a taboo not to raise in
their own nation-states. Unfortunately, this has been an impetus for Japan to
smother the war crime and ignore its legal responsibilities. In fact, Japan is
trying hard to regain the superior military and imperial power that it had in
the past, which is a potential threat to world peace.25 Korean
activists/actors have commanded that the well-off Japan apologize, legislate,
and reparate in regard to the military “comfort women.” In a
mass-petition-writing-campaign to Japan, high-schooler Kim Bo-Yun writes to a
member of the Japanese Diet that “it is not only the economy which represents a
nation-state but also its capacity to acknowledge and rectify the mistake.”26
I contend that such a writing campaign has been in part enabled by the growing
economic status of Korea and the nation’s international influence, which have
engaged even the youth. Although Korean social actors are working in solidarity
with the victims in other Asian nations, those nations with lesser economic achievement
have not been as active as Korea. In fact, even the Korean governments have
been treading carefully in their dealing with Japan, not proactively
representing the interests of the “comfort women” victims.
The Korean government should not be
an onlooker, turning a blind eye to the victims who have been rancorous
throughout their lives and now
24 진실과미래, 국치
100년사업공동추진위원회Dagagagi (Truth and
Future Commission to Remember , April 24, 2009, accessed May 17, 2020. the Loss
of Sovereignty), April 24, 2020, cited in
25가하고 연대하는 2006년 3월 15일 세계 각국에서 일본군 단체와 시민들 (Activists
and Civilians from around the World, Participating “위안부” 문제 해결을 위한Dagagagi, March 17,
2006, accessed 700차 수요시위에 참
in the 700th Wednesday Meeting),
March 15, 2006, cited in May 17, 2020.
26 Dagagagi, October 31, 2010, accessed May 17, 2020.
dying. This new year, 2006, the
government should set the “comfort women” as the key diplomatic concern and
pursue aggressively the solution to the problem.27
The Korean government totally
ignores the victims’ sorrowful screams, and does not protect its own people.
Pragmatic diplomacy disregards the victims’ human rights and dignities and
invites shame from the international community.28
The Korean government’s inactive pursuit of the
resolution is partially due to the victims’ poor family backgrounds with
limited politico-economic influence (Min 2003). Watching President Roh
Moo-Hyun’s making no progress in his summit with Japanese Prime Minister
Junichiro Koizumi in July 2004, the “comfort women” victims cried out to Roh,
“Are you president of Koreans or Japanese?” The social actors argued that “the
crushed human rights were run over again, and that the victims were put to
death again.”29 The actors’ and victims’ disappointments continued
recurrently not only because the Korean government lacked the will for the
resolution, but also because the Japanese government has not given priority to
it.30 The local social actors in Tongyeong and Geoje cities were
dismayed at the Korean National Assembly’s not even deliberating the
legislation to resolve the matter in conjunction with Japan.31 The
local actors and the members of the Geoje City Council were particularly
anxious as more victims were dying.32 The local activists maintain
close links with the local “comfort women” victims, crying out for a resolution
to the Korean and Japanese governments, but their demands fall on the deaf
ears.33
27 평화를 만드는 여성회등
(Peace Making Women’s Association, etc.), cited in Dagagagi, January 3,
2006, accessed May 17, 2020.
28 Song Do-Ja
in Dagagagi, October 30, 2009, accessed
May 17, 2020.
29 한국정신대문제대책협의회(or
정대협) (The Korean Council for the Women Drafted for
Military Sexual Slavery by Japan), cited in Dagagagi, July 23, 2004, accessed May 17, 2020.
30 평화를 만드는 여성회등
(Peace Making Women’s Association, etc.), cited in 정대협Dagagagi, January 3, 2006, accessed May 17, 2020.; The 125
Victims of the “Comfort Women,” , and the Concerned Civilians at the 700th
Wednesday Meeting, March 15, 2006, cited in Dagagagi, March 17,
2006, accessed May 17, 2020.
31 Song Do-Ja
in Dagagagi, January 7, 2008, accessed
May 17, 2020. This is complicated by a significant number of the members of the
Korean National Assembly who oppose a stance against Japan. However, my primary
focus here is an analysis of the contents of the website. 32 Dagagagi, November 2 and December 24, 2009, accessed May 17,
2020; 거제인터넷신문. 2009.
“일본군 ‘위안부’문제해결 촉구결의안 채택 (Passing the Resolution for
the Japanese Military
‘Comfort Women’ Issue).” December 25,
http://www.gjn.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=3316, accessed
July 10, 2020.
33 Dagagagi, December
24, 2009, accessed May 17, 2020.
Japan Should Legislate and Establish a Set of
New Standards, Starting with Apologies
Tongyeong and Geoje cities are relatively near Japan.
The civilians and actors of Dagagagi
have close interactions with the local “comfort women” victims and have hosted
the campaigns to write letters to the Japanese National Diet (parliament).
Again, these campaigns presuppose the improved power, status, and structure of
the Korean nation-state in the international community. However, Japan has
ignored the Korean request that Japan legislate and reparate to have the
victims’ dignities restored. Unless Japan accepts the new reality and
relationships and is able to realize potential benefits from a new
relationship, Japan may not be forthcoming with the resolution.
Ji Yejin, a senior high-school
student, has an earnest plea to the Japanese National Diet. Ji said that she
has kept in touch with the “comfort women” victims and is deeply concerned with
the sufferings and sorrows that they have been through. Ji cannot help weeping
when thinking of the “grandmas” who were taken overseas for sexual slavery when
they were Ji’s age. She went on to say:
I do not hate Japanese. It’s wrong
to hate contemporary Japanese because of what their forefathers did. However,
it is wrong to deny and cover-up past mistakes. What would you think if your
daughter were taken away overseas and worked as forced sexual slavery? That is
exactly what happened to the military “comfort women” and that is the feeling
we suffer as the descendants of the “grandmas.” Revenge or money is not at the
centre of the grandmas’ protests, but sincere apologies from the bottom of the
heart. Historical facts can’t be erased. … Please, the Japanese National Diet,
have the issue resolved, so that the grandmas can forgive you and can “go to
sleep” in peace.34
The Japanese government has not come to the table to
have a meaningful discussion and resolution of the issue of the military
“comfort women.” However, from the viewpoint of Korea, its social actors want
past misconduct rectified and are persistently demanding apologies and
reparation for the victims. These represent the cultural emergent properties. Cultural Emergent Properties: Projection of
the Prevalent Ideas
The Korean government has provided the victims with
the costs of living and healthcare, which they gratefully received. However,
the injured dignities,
34 Dagagagi, October
15, 2010, accessed May 17, 2020.
which are non-material, can be restored from
apologies and forgiveness, which are yet to occur. There have been ongoing
cultural activities aiming to re-establish the importance of the ideas and
values to promote human rights and peace, reflecting the economic and cultural
changes nationally and internationally. Further, along with the economic
development, women’s rights have led to the establishment of a relevant
government sector since the 1980s and the formation of the Ministry of Gender
Equality and Family in 2005. International feminist movements such as the
so-called third-wave feminism in the early 1990s were part of the broader
background and a source for providing an impetus for cultural values.
The Ideas and Values That Promote Peace and
Non-Violence
With the development of new structures and
relationships, prevalent ideas, values, and relevant cultural activities have
been reformed and settled as consequences. These cultural activities are also
backed by a series of agents’ protests. Also, nationally and globally, in
regard to the broader cultural milieu, the value of human rights is much more
strictly observed than it was decades ago. At the crux of the protests is the
hope that the sacrifice of the “comfort women” is not to be forgotten in history,
and there will be no repetition of it against the future generations.35
In addition to the structural changes discussed earlier, it is this cultural
context with new properties encouraging to the victims who could not help stand
against the Japanese government which attempts to hide their violent
misconduct, expresses no apologies, and rather prepares itself to be able to
ignite another war.36 Japan is active in distorting the history book
on their past invasion and igniting the wars and engages in cleansing those
misdeeds by paying tribute to the Yasukuni Shrine.37 This represents
Japan’s persistent refusal to accept the new cultural emergent properties in
place today.
Along with the social movements
focused on derailed justice and human rights, there are the so-called
pro-Japanese traitors (or 친일파), or the Korean standpattists, who staunchly
disagree with the social actors. The standpattists argue that the Korean
modernization is attributed to Japanese colonialism and the military “comfort
women” were not forced but volunteered (Lee 2019). I argue those standpattists’
thoughts are outdated
35 Dagagagi, October 28, 2004, accessed May 17, 2020.
36 The “Comfort
Women” Victims at the 700th Wednesday Demonstration, March 15, 2006, cited in Dagagagi, March 17, 2004, accessed May 17, 2020.
37 진실과미래, 국치
100년사업공동추진위원회 (Truth and Future Commission to Remember the Loss of
Sovereignty), February 26, 2009, cited in Dagagagi, April 24,
2009, accessed May 17, 2020.
and they refuse to observe the emergent cultural
properties in the new era (Lee 2019). Also, importantly, Korean society has not
been able to fully reconcile with the Japanese imperialism, e.g., holding the
pro-Japanese Koreans accountable for their ill-informed or treacherous
behaviours against their fellow Koreans during the colonial period, followed by
their continuing benefits. A good portion of them has formed part of the
dominant group of contemporary South Korea.38 Consequently, the
continuing tension between the majority of Koreans and the pro-Japanese (by
birth or post-birth) has been extremely destructive and wasteful. This means
that a rejection of, and an inability to embrace a new culture, new values, and
a new structure, is a continuing problem within Korean society.39
Those Koreans who learn about
the Japanese treatment of Koreans during the colonial period are determined
that the abused human rights, through the “comforting stations,” have to be
restored and that the world of justice and peace has to be rebuilt through
Japanese apologies and reparation.40 The social actors and the
victims are distressed when they learn about the wars continuing around the
world. The most vulnerable in war are women and children. They desire that no
one deserves the sorrows and injuries that the Japanese military “comfort
women” experienced.41 A new culture to appreciate the dignity of
human rights has arrived irrespective of whether one is prepared to accept it
or not. This certainly persuades the social actors to say that the victims’
injuries must not be repeated ever, and they continue their protests against
the Japanese government.42 Under the new culture, Junichiro Koizumi,
former Japanese Prime Minister (2001–2006), once wrote to the victims, “As
Prime Minister of Japan, I thus extend anew my most sincere apologies and
remorse to all the women who underwent immeasurable and painful experiences and
suffered incurable physical and psychological wounds as ‘comfort women.’”43
Unfortunately, the victims see this as no more than lip service. What they want
is “truthful apologies representing the Japanese government rather than an
individual, and other
38 The examples
are Park Chung-Hee, General Baek Sun-Yeop.
39 진실과미래, 국치
100년사업공동추진위원회 (Truth and Future Commission to Remember the Loss of
Sovereignty), February 26, 2020, cited in Dagagagi, April 24,
2009, accessed May 17, 2020.
40 Dagagagi, March 17, 2004, accessed May 17, 2020.
41 The “Comfort
Women” Victims at the 700th Wednesday Demonstration, March 15, 2006, cited in Dagagagi, March 17, 2004, accessed May 17, 2020.
42 Dagagagi, October 15, 2010, accessed May 17, 2020.
43 VAWW-NET
Japan, July 2004, cited in Dagagagi, August 9,
2004, accessed May 17, 2020; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2001,
https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/women/fund/pmletter. html, accessed
July 14, 2020.
actions to reflect their sincerity, such as
apologies, reparation, investigating the truth, education and historical
awareness.”44 Importantly, these notes are written by “Violence
Against Women in War-Network, Japan,” a Japanese activist group.
The Cultural Platforms to Publicize the Ideas
through Film, Play, and
Exhibition
The films, plays, and exhibitions have become
relatively new and prevalent platforms for demonstrating emergent cultures and
communicating them to the public. These platforms are part of the contemporary
cultural activities dealing with past events, which are of present concern.
These activities offer the public historical and cultural reflections. They are
also designed to pave a way for the resolution of the issue of the military
“comfort women,” and particularly for a peaceful world. On November 24 and 25,
2007, Tongyeong International Music Foundation Concert Hall hosted a human
rights film festival, screening some of the most successful and popular
documentaries on the topic of the “comfort women” and the legacy of Japanese
imperialism.
They included 사 일본군
위안부The Murmuring: A History of Korean Women안녕
사요나라아직도 아물지 않는 상처들우리학교지울수 없는 역 (낮은 목소리,
1995), Goodbye ( , , 2005), Our School ( , 2006), The Sorrow Yet to be Healed ( , 2003), History
that
Can’t be Erased: The Japanese Military “Comfort
Women” (
:
, 2005).45
The Murmuring, a documentary film, depicted the lives of
six victims in their shared house, concerning their past experiences in a
“comforting station,” and witnessing their painful memories in many protesting
rallies, such as the Wednesday meetings in front of the Japanese Embassy in
Seoul. Another film, Goodbye,
is meant to see off the unfortunate past and welcome a peaceful
future. Many victims of the Second World War were “forcibly” memorialized at
the Yasukuni Shrine, without the victims’ consent, which dishonours them. The
documentary narrates the story of a descendant of a Korean victim as she fights
to have her ancestor’s memorialization removed from the Yasukuni Shrine, and
also a Japanese activist’s struggle to fight for the Japanese government’s
reparation for injustice against the “comfort women.” The sorrows do not end
with the victims but continue with their descendants; however, they are
concealed. There are also many Japanese who are seeking justice as a universal
value.
44 VAWW-NET
Japan, July 2004, cited in Dagagagi, August 9,
2004, accessed May 17, 2020.
45 Dagagagi, November 15, 2007, accessed May 17, 2020.
Chosun School in the documentary
film, Our School (우리학교) was established
by the first-generation Koreans in Japan—the only such school in the whole
Hokkaido. Despite their upbringing in Japan, the students (and their parents)
choose to study in the Chosun School for the sake of maintaining their Korean
identity in Japan which remains particularly hostile against Koreans.
The ticket for each of these
documentary films costs $13 for adults and $5 for students. There were also
exhibitions of the artwork painted by the “comfort women.” Dagagagi, the community movement organization, hosted a
film festival (with eight films different from the ones screened in the 2007
film festival) and a photo exhibition on the theme of the “comfort women” at
the Tongyeong Marine Tour Park on August 23 and 24, 2008.46 This
human rights film festival hosted in 2008 was the sixth as such in the Geoje-Tongyeong
community.
The human rights film festival is
extraordinary in the sense that the contents on display are about the deep
injuries that cannot be easily healed and that destroyed the lives of many. The
festival is an expression of hope for a future without violence. All the funds
raised through the festival were used to support the wellbeing of the “victim
grandmas.”47 The films and artwork, as cultural mediums, attracted a
broad range of audiences and had a significant effect on spreading and
realizing the value of human rights and peace.48 The community
members, agents, and social actors hosting the human rights film festival were
determined that the Japanese government’s formal apologies and reparation will
repair the distorted history and heal the victims’ injuries.49 It
must be a significant struggle for the local agents and actors to see the
victims carry the vestiges of the sexual abuses in the community. However, it
is seen that the ways to support them to overcome the pain and open a peaceful
world for the next generation are through cultural activities to inform the
community members and especially young students.50
Dagagagi’s annual “Peace and Human Rights Cultural
Festival”51 is a continuing reminder of the values of national
sovereignty, independence, human rights, and human life, as conveyed on the
website. According to Song Do-Ja, a social actor,
46 Dagagagi, August 10, 2008, accessed May 17, 2020.
47 Dagagagi, November 15, 2007, accessed May 17, 2020.
48 Dagagagi, August 10, 2008, accessed May 17, 2020. 49 Dagagagi, August 10, 2008, accessed May 17, 2020.
50 Dagagagi, August 10, 2008, accessed May 17, 2020.
51 “일본군 ‘위안부’피해자기금마련 평화인권문화제.”
Koreans, hoping the national
Independence from Japanese imperialism in 1945, would remove all the pains
resulting from the Japanese oppression for 36 years. However, national
Independence was not an outcome of Koreans’ blood and tears. In the 65 years after
the Independence, deeply remaining are the girls’ blooded tears due to the
sexual slavery, the forced coal-miners’ moaning to death, the boys’ screaming
to death at the front of the warfields, the Koreans’ sorrow under the Japanese
systematic discrimination, and those suffering from the inherited diseases
caused from the atom bomb in Hiroshima and Nagasaki.52
However, Song Do-Ja believes that the national
movement, of which Dagagagi
is one, will eventually ensure the recovery of justice, human rights,
democracy, and peace, and that we will be able to see the girls’ and the
grandmas’ smiling.53 The girls may refer to the girls suffering in
the “comforting station” and the girls in the peaceful future, and the grandmas
to the “comfort women” victims waiting for the apologies and reparation.
The
first Wednesday Demonstration (수요시위/집회) in front of the
Japanese Embassy in Seoul took place on January 8,
1992, as Japanese Prime Minister Miyazawa Kiichi was about to visit Korea. The
demonstration, which was in solidarity with the movements in regional Korea,
still takes place every Wednesday, marking the 1,534th on March 11, 2022. The
Wednesday Demonstration has become an internationally unique and long-running
movement for human rights and peace. The demonstration is a cultural event to educate future
generations. It is a cultural
event in the sense that, despite the level of pain due to the human rights
abuse through sexual slavery being enduringly high, the victims and
contemporary Koreans want to express their concerns clearly and peacefully
through cultural activities. For example, Lee Tae-Hee, a university student,
notes that “I have learned what peace and human rights are through the voices
of the grandmas such as Kim Bok-Dong, Gil Won-Ok, and Lee Yong-Su, for the last
five years and right on this venue.”54 The values they advocate are
so crucial and fundamental that thousands of protesters have joined and shouted
for justice and peace for thirty years without skipping one week. The
protesters’ passion continues to grow stronger despite their requests falling
on deaf ears. Every demonstration
52 Dagagagi, July 28,
2010, accessed May 17, 2020. 53 Dagagagi, July 28,
2010, accessed May 17, 2020.
54Wednesday Protests Must Continue Bearing in Mind the
Original Intentions). May 13, Hankyoreh Shinmun. 2020. “[사설] 수요시위, ‘초심’ 기억하며 앞으로 나가야 한다” (Editorial: http:// www.hani.co.kr/arti/opinion/editorial/944822.html, accessed
July 21, 2020.
has been a struggle for the old, sick, and suffering
victims in particular. The protesters’ cries and messages for peace are
directed toward the Japanese Embassy, the Japanese government, and all the war
criminals.55 There have been no meaningful responses from Japan. For
instance, Okuno Seiske, a member of the Japanese Diet, argued that the “comfort
women” were not forced, but were voluntary and that the Japanese military
provided them with transport to the “comforting stations”; this has
consequently led to distortions in history texts in Japan.56 A
Japanese gynaecologist working in the Japanese army examined 100 women and
found that twenty of them were Japanese prostitutes and eighty of them were
“Korean virgins.” Those Korean women were told they were going to work in
factories.57
Tongyeong-Geoje cities co-hosted
the 1,000th Wednesday Demonstration in the community in solidarity with many
other protests throughout the country. On December 8, 2011, thousands of
members of Tongyeong-Geoje cities gathered at the Gangguan Beach where the
victims (soon to be “comfort women”) boarded the ship and were forcibly taken
away during the colonial period. One thousand individuals either prepared their
own banners filled with protesting words and artwork or received ready-made
banners. One thousand individuals holding their own banners stood connected to
each other, making a U-shape to indicate their united minds in seeking justice
and peace. A living “comfort woman,” Kim Bok-Deuk, stood in the middle, i.e.,
500th of the U-shaped line of the protesting agents.58 Media reports
showed that the participants represented boys and girls, and young and older
members. Completing the cultural event, the representative social actor, Song
Do-Ja, recalled that she was worried about how to meet the expenses for the
event, but she had to proceed as she was looking into the sorrowful eyes of the
94-year-old grandma, Kim Bok-Deuk, who was the only remaining survivor in the
region at the time. The single most important reason to host such an event is
the hope to have the victims’ basic human dignity restored as soon as possible
or before they all die out.59 What else is more sacred than
55 Dagagagi, November 17, 2004, accessed May 17, 2020.
56 Dagagagi, March 17, 2006, accessed May 17, 2020.
57 Cited in
Miki Dezaki, producer of the film, Shusenjo—The Main
Battleground of the Comfort
Women
Issue않는다 , https://www.shusenjo.com/, “일본은 더 이상 학교에서 위안부 문제를 가르치지
| 영화 주전장” (Japan Does Not Teach
about the ‘Comfort Women’ at School). July 26,
2019, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ukSkNAJ5Ka0, accessed
August 20, 2020.
58보 Dagagagi, December
8, 2011, accessed July 17, 2020; “통영거제 1000명한산신문 정의의 인간띠잇기 화
” (1000 Tongyeong-Geoje
Citizens of Justice Connected to Each Other). , December 15, 2011,
http://www.hansannews.com/news/articleView.html?idxno=32003, accessed
July 22, 2020.
59 Dagagagi, January 7,
2012, accessed May 17, 2020.
the basic human dignity of one single human? The same
event was repeated in March 2015, accompanying the 98-year-old grandma Kim
Bok-Deuk, to commemorate the 70th anniversary of the National Independence.60
These cultural events such as
the Wednesday Demonstration continue to encourage the corporate actors and even
the grassroots to revisit human rights and peace as universal values in human
history. Irrespective of whether it has been cold and windy, humid and hot,
rainy or snowy, the social actors and the “comfort women” victims with their
ill-health continue their protests in front of the Japanese Embassy in Seoul
and at other venues. They find it unbearable to think even for a short moment
about the once prevalent culture of deceiving the young girls and women,
forcibly taking them away to put them under sexual slavery, and completely
depriving them of their human dignity, happiness, and freedom. It was the
Japanese imperialism and the invasive wars inflicted by Japan that underpinned
all the anti-human criminal activities. The social actors and community members
are still crying out to the Japanese government to apologize and reparate, and
to the Korean government to take proactive action against Japan. In fact, the
social actors are well informed of the prevalent culture of humiliation and
secret dealing that the Korean government occasionally employed in their
diplomatic relationship with Japan in terms of resolving the issue of the
“comfort women” ever since Independence in 1945.61 On August 30,
2011, Korean Constitutional Court ruled it unconstitutional that “the Korean
government has taken up no action to develop systematic ways to have the
‘comfort women’ issue resolved, leaving the victims’ abused basic rights
abandoned.” The social actors were adamant in urging that the Korean government
be aware that the victims were
desperately running out of time to have their basic dignities restored, and
that the government should carry out its duty. I think these represent the
social actors’ lamentation that the Korean government is not developing new
ideas to deal with the concern. In August 2011, there were sixty-three victims
alive although 234 of them were initially registered in South Korea.62
As at May 26, 2020, there remained seventeen survivors.63
60명 인간띠잇기 개최
Geoje Nyuseu Kwangjang (Geoje News Plaza). 2015. “‘위안부’
일본정부 배상촉구 1000
” (The Military ‘Comfort
Women’ Seeking the Japanese Government’s Reparation: 1000 Community Members
Demonstrate Human Connections). March 31, http:// www.gjnewsplaza.com/news/articleView.html?idxno=1826, accessed
July 22, 2020.
61 Dagagagi, December 26, 2011, accessed May 17, 2020.
62 Dagagagi, December 26, 2011, accessed May 17, 2020.
63 Hankyoreh Shinmun. 2020. “일본군 ‘위안부’ 피해자 별세…생존자 17명” (Passing of the
‘Comfort Women’ Victims … Now 17 Remaining Alive). May
26, http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/ society/women/946565.html, accessed
July 23, 2020.
More Cultural Programmes to Promote the Ideas:
A Scholarship
Programme, Erecting the Statues
Analysis of Dagagagi,
the website of the community movement, shows that there has been widespread
community support for the resolution of the unresolved legacy of the “comfort
women.” The social actors in Tongyeong-Geoje cities have been part of the
national level movement to influence the U.N. (United Nations), ILO
(International Labour Organization), the American Congress, Korean and Japanese
governments, which led to significant success, e.g., The U.S. House of
Representatives House Resolution 121, passing on July 30, 2007 (Lee and Halpin
2020). Dagagagi initiated and achieved a
similar resolution in the Tongyeong and Geoje City Councils, and also
Gyeongsang-Namdo Provincial Council.64 As noted, there are also
ongoing local initiatives. The students at local schools engage in fundraising
to support Dagagagi’s local activities.65
Dagagagi had its tenth anniversary
on April 27, 2012, and the commemoration was filled with reading poems,
Tongyeong Flute Ensemble’s presentations, dancing and singing performances by
Tonyeong Girls High-school, a victim’s speech (by Kim Bok-Deuk), acknowledging
those individuals and local business/labour association donating funds and
skills to Dagagagi’s activities. Mobilizing
virtually the whole community, the commemoration was all geared towards
restoring the dignity of the Japanese military “comfort women” and opening the
days of justice and peace someday, and many participants in the evening had their
eyes filled with tears.66 The Memorial Statue of Justice (정의평화의 비)
was also erected in Tongyeong, 소녀상 and The Standing Statue of Peace ( ) in
Geoje, through fundraising supported by the members of the cities.67
The aims to erect the statues were to commemorate the victims, record the
history and pave the road for human rights, justice, and peace.68
Following the erection of the statues, there followed a youth competition to
create a three-minute video clip to promote the statue. The competition was
open to all the youth in the whole nation and entitled, “Justice for the
Japanese Military ‘Comfort Women,’ Resolving It with Our Own Effort.”69
The prize-winning
64 Dagagagi, December 24, 2009, accessed May 17, 2020.
65 Dagagagi, April 16, 2007, accessed May 17, 2020.
66 Dagagagi, May 3, 2012 and August 23, 2012, accessed May 17,
2020.
67 Dagagagi, July 17, 2012, accessed May 17, 2020.
68 Dagagagi, November 6, 2012, accessed May 17, 2020.
69 Dagagagi, September 5, 2012, accessed May 17, 2020. The first
prize clip is entitled “Kkochi Pinda” (The Flowers are Blossoming), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=thP4J4FkczM, January 3,
2014, accessed July 25, 2020. The two clips that shared second prize are
entitled, “미래에
high-school students brought their impressive digital
skills to the video production, historical knowledge, and their passion to have
the “comfort women” problem resolved.70
On November 4, 2013, the grandma
Kim Bok-Deuk (96-years-old) donated her personal saving of $20,000 to the
scholarship fund of Tongyeong Girls High-school, which was “in support of the
disadvantaged students’ translating their personal dreams into reality.” I
think this action is not only a support for the future generation to enjoy a
peaceful world, but an active protest against violence. Kim also donated
another $20,000 to the construction of Gyeongsang-Namdo Province’s Historical
and Memorial Hall of the “Comfort Women.”71 Kim’s donation of the
latter $20,000, which was all the asset she had at the time, became the seeding
grant to plan the “citizens-initiated” first such construction. The community
fund-raising contributed $0.5m, the Korean central government $0.5m, and the
provincial government $0.5–$1.5m in total.72 It was not only Kim but
all the rest of the community at different levels who shared the value of
justice and peace.
There were many
other cultural events such as book talks with the authors on history or the
“comfort women.” For example, a book talk with the author of The House with Red Tile Roof (빨간 기와집,
2014), which Gawata Humiko wrote based on the life story of a military “comfort
woman,” Bae Bong-Gi, who became the first witness of her own experience.
Another book talk is with Morikawa Machiko, the author of Mun Ok-Ju, the Japanese Military “Comfort Woman” in the Burmese
Warfield옥주 (버마전선 일본군 “위안부” 문
). The book talk flyer notes that
the event is about “the contemporary Koreans talking about the past problem in
order to imagine a peaceful future.”73 In August 2018 and August
2019, Dagagagi hosted the National Youth
Competition for Poems and Painting on the “comfort women.” The items that won
the prizes were on display at the citizens’ gallery in Nagoya and Kyoto.74
우리가watch?v=rApDJEwG7Q4, 꼭 보고싶은 뉴스 January
3, 2014, accessed July 25, 2020 and “Gaehwa (Blossoming),” ” (The News We Are
Anxious to Watch), https://www.youtube.com/ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aGqtpqPsgGU, January 3,
2014, accessed July 25, 2020.
70 Dagagagi, November 15, 2013, accessed May 17, 2020.
71 Dagagagi, November 10, 2013, accessed May 17, 2020.
72 Hankyoreh Shinmun. 2019. “경남 일본군 위안부 역사관 건립 추진” (Constructing Gyeon-
gsang-Namdo Province’s Historical and Memorial Hall of
the ‘Comfort Women’). October 28, http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/area/yeongnam/914838.html, accessed
July 25, 2020.
73 Dagagagi, June 14, 2017, accessed July 25, 2020.
74 Dagagagi, July 30, 2018, August 5, 2019, and June 24, 2019,
accessed May 17, 2020.
People’s Emergent Properties: The Capacities of
Component Members
Depending upon the emergent structural and cultural
properties, people’s emergent properties appear accordingly, attempting to
maximize their own life chances in the given context. These three types of
emergent properties are conceptually distinct from each other. However, it is
not a straightforward task to distinguish one from another when illustrating
them empirically. Emergent structural and cultural properties are conditioning
the structural and cultural context, in that the component members not only form
part of the contextual changes, but also take active roles in calibrating the
context to bring about changes. In this process, individual agents go through
changes themselves, from primary agents to social actors, thus displaying
double morphogenesis. I have already presented many of the protest activities
as the social actors have engaged in opening the future of justice and peace.
The following sections are to further illustrate their social movements, most
of which were underpinned by the above-discussed emergent structural and
cultural properties, then enabling the people’s actions
What the Victims Have Gone Through: Turning
from the Victims to
Advocates and Voluntary Social Actors
The most proactive actors in the whole movement are
the “comfort women” victims themselves. Their personal lives during and after
the suffering as the “comfort women” have demonstrated an extreme level of
resilience beyond most people’s comprehension. Their resilient lives as well as
witnessing what they have gone through have been a strong impetus for the
social movement to fight for justice and peace in the future. Despite their age
and frailty status, the victims have been the most proactive actors, witnessing
their own experiences during the Wednesday Protests, community rallies, and
international forums such as the United Nations, which has been well reported
on the Dagagagi website and the major news
outlets.
Dagagagi informs the community members of the victims’
ailing health, their treatment in hospitals, recoveries, or eventual deaths.
Their ill-health is due to the combined impact of the life-long post-traumatic
anguishes and old age. During their ill health, the social actors remain the
close aides to those grandmas without their own families. Indeed, social
activists are much more than the children of the grandmas in terms of caring
for them.75 Also critical is the companionship of the co-sufferers
who smile and
75 Dagagagi, April 5, 2007, accessed May 17, 2020.
weep at each other’s pain and recovery from
ill-health.76 Their unexpected hospitalization raises a great
concern among the actors since the movement is making little progress.77
However, every human life is
mortal. The death of the victims is one of the few most frequently discussed
topics on the Dagagagi
website. Losing about one grandma per month throughout the country in 2004 was
causing serious concern as the grandmas were dying without receiving apologies
from the Japanese government.78 Every posting of their death is
accompanied by their brief life trajectory and their final days of ailing
health. According to the Dagagagi
postings, the victims were typically from disadvantaged families and
deceivingly recruited to a factory in their late teens or early twenties. They
ended up in “comforting stations” in China, Singapore, New Guinea, and Myanmar,
and they slaved for a few to several years. In addition to sexual assault, there
was physical and verbal violence against the victims far beyond what one can
endure, which has been illustrated in numerous studies and films. At the end of
the Second World War, many were killed or abandoned (Yun 1997: 291). Only some
of those who returned to Korea were reunited with their families. The health
impact of the assault has been lifelong. In the victims’ last moments of life,
their supporters and actors have nothing but to say, “We are sorry since we
still could not get the apologies from Japan. We will continue to fight to have
your dignities restored.”79 Reading the postings, one realizes that
these are desperate cries determined to see the resolution of the matter. The
social actors’ determination is the last message that the victims leave behind,
i.e., ensuring a peaceful world for the next generation.
Grassroots Movement and Community Activities in
Support of the Victims and Peaceful Future: Postcard Writing
As discussed, there have been numerous
community-based protests in support of human rights and a peaceful future.
First, Dagagagi hosted a historical tour
for the local citizens on September 1, 2012. It was a guided tour on foot,
taking the participants to historically significant places in terms of Koreans’
fighting for national Independence and the “comfort women” issue—the Gangguan
Port where the girls were boarded and kidnapped, the post office, district
office, fishnet manufacturing factory, theatre, market, and an Independence
activist’s memorial site.80
76 Dagagagi, August 5, 2012, accessed May 17, 2020.
77 Dagagagi, October 10, 2006, accessed May 17, 2020.
78 Dagagagi, October 5, 2004, accessed May 17, 2020.
79 Dagagagi, February 19, 2006, accessed May 17, 2020.
80 Dagagagi, August 23, 2012, accessed May 17, 2020.
Second, a notable movement in
Tongyeong-Geoje cities is to write postcards to the members of the National
Diet of Japan. This campaign to write to the members mobilizes the whole
citizens of Tongyeong and Geoje cities, especially the students of middle and
high schools. Teaching young people the history of Japanese imperialist
behaviours is an important part of the whole social movement and the movement
also aims to ensure a peaceful world for them. Having the youth involved in the
grassroots movements helps them participate in remembering the dark history, so
that the younger and older generations reflect on the history and plan actively
for a better future (Kim 2018b; Lee 2016), which is intended for an effect of
influencing the participants to change from primary agents to corporate agents,
and then to social actors. Then, the reflection on the history offers a
meaningful opportunity to think about the value of “public history” (de Groot
2009; Sayer 2015; cited in Kim 2018b). Thousands of students have participated
in the writing campaign, and the postcards were beautifully packed and
delivered to the National Diet of Japan. The following is an example:
Dear Sir/Madam, I am a high-school
student in Korea. I am a member of a support group for the “comfort
women/grandmas” and we are their chat companion. Seeing some of them pass away,
we are desperately realizing the limited time left before they all die. Can you
please legislate for the resolution of the issue of the Japanese military
“comfort women?” Please do not forget the grandmas (Kim Ga-Eun).81
The agents’ and actors’ postcard writing reminds
the members of the National Diet that Japan forcibly took away the grandmas and
that they await sincere apologies and reparation from Japan.
Please, help their human rights be
restored. I trust you will respond to my request. Thank you, Sir/Madam (Lee
Seong-Hun, Geoje Jeil High-school).82 When taken away, the grandmas
were as young as me and with lots of dreams. Their hopes and dreams were all
crushed (Kim Ji-Eun, Geoje Jeil High-school).83
I am saddened and angered by all
the sufferings the grandmas are still going through (Lee Eun-Jeong, Tongyeong
Girls’ High-school).84
81 Dagagagi, October 31, 2010, accessed May 17, 2020.
82 Dagagagi, October 29, 2010, accessed May 17, 2020.
83 Dagagagi, October 30, 2010, accessed May 17, 2020.
84 Dagagagi, November 1, 2010, accessed May 17, 2020.
Dagagagi
also organized the campaign to write postcards to the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR) from September to November 2013.85
In conjunction with a good number of Japanese activists with shared interests
in justice and peace, members of Dagagagi
visited Japanese local governments as well as the National Diet of Japan,
exchanging declarations for a peaceful world and raising awareness in the
public.86 Mostly working to raise awareness of the issue of the
“comfort women,” Dagagagi has only
partly accomplished its goals which are still in progress. However, Dagagagi has run into obstacles in
making any progress with any meaningful responses from the Korean and Japanese
governments. Dagagagi has
urged both to work together for the resolution of the matter. Dagagagi members have been
particularly disappointed with the Park Geun-Hye government, for showing little
understanding of or sympathy for the suffering of the military “comfort women.”
Park has not only refused to meet the victims but her government allowed the
publication of a misinformed history book, which Dagagagi understands was “for the sake of brainwashing the
youth and misleading them. These ahistorical and pro-Japanese approaches are
against the restoration of human rights and justice.”87 These
misinformed approaches to human rights and justice are disturbing.88
There are numerous community
supports and encouragement for the “comfort women” grandmas and Dagagagi activities. For example,
donations from anonymous Koreans living overseas,89 birthday parties
for the grandmas,90 attending nationwide human rights camps,91
a trip to spa, and Mt. Jiri,92 a local Rotary club inviting the
grandmas to a buffet lunch,93 overnight excursions to nature,94
and Dagagagi leaders’ monthly meetings.
These activities require a significant level of commitment and sacrifice in
terms of time, effort, and financial contribution. These social actors see the
grandmas as historical victims, who cannot be forgotten if
85 Dagagagi, September 13, 2013, accessed May 17, 2020.
86 Dagagagi, December 14, 2009, accessed May 17, 2020.
87 Dagagagi, September 16, 2013, accessed May 17, 2020.
88 Hankyoreh Shinmun. 2020. “[사설] 광복절 ‘친일 청산’ 다짐조차 트집 잡는 통합당” (Edito-
rial: United Future Party is Against the Independence
Day Speech to Settle the Matter of the Pro-Japanese Fellows). August 16, http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/opinion/editorial/958002.html, accessed
August 18, 2020.
89 Dagagagi, August 4, 2004, accessed May 17, 2020.
90 Dagagagi, August 30, 2004, accessed May 17, 2020.
91 Dagagagi, October 4, 2004, accessed May 17, 2020.
92 Dagagagi, November 11, 2004, accessed May 17, 2020.
93 Dagagagi, July 18, 2005, accessed May 17, 2020.
94 Dagagagi, May 23, 2007, accessed May 17, 2020.
justice and peace are to be ensured for future
generations. Dagagagi as a
social movement raises its voice against pro-Japanese traitors (친일파). For
example, Tongyeong Police Station maintained a ritual to commemorate Kim
Deok-Bo (1852–1941) as she donated ¥170,000 to the construction of the station.
Dagagagi demanded that the
commemoration be stopped and the commemoration stone be removed since the
police stations under Japanese imperialism were at the forefront of oppressing
Koreans.95
International Solidarity with the Victims and
Supporters around the World, and Including Those in Japan
Dagagagi
is located far from the capital area, but it is a strongly determined,
well-connected, and strategic protest group. The victims and social actors make
an integral part of the national movement working closely in international
solidarity with the victims and supporters in North Korea, Japan, and other
continents. First, Dagagagi
actors and local victims participated in the 698th Wednesday Demonstration
(combined with Human Rights Camp) in Mt. Keumgang in North Korea on March 1,
2006 to commemorate March First Independence Movement. The site was at what was
then a South Korean-run resort complex in North Korea. The camp was an
opportunity to unload the shared pain and strengthen solidarity with the
victims in North Korea, and also improve mutual understanding between the
victims and social actors, which would lead to a more effective social
movement. The camp also aimed to offer the grandmas a refreshing time in the
beautiful Mt. Keumgang, which is a nationally significant place.96
Second, Dagagagi is connected to like-minded Japanese and Koreans
in Japan. Grandma Kim Bok-Deuk and two social actors were invited to Nagoya.
Kim engaged in describing Japan’s war crime against the “comfort women” to the
Japanese public, and the Korean-Japanese associations, and through media
interviews.97 Kim Bok-Deuk, Song Do-Ja (the representative of Dagagagi), and the social actors
from Gyeongsang-Namdo Province attended public meetings in Tokyo and Osaka,
supported by the Japanese activists. Kim’s description of her broken arms due
to physical violence and suffering in the “comforting station,” and the
screening of a twenty-minute video, Somang
(The Hope), made the eyes of all the audience fill with tears. The Japanese
activists displayed the Japanese translation of the postcards that the
high-school students wrote. The Women’s Active Museum on War
95 Dagagagi, March 3, 2010, accessed May 17, 2020.
96 Dagagagi, February 23, 2006, accessed May 17, 2020.
97 Dagagagi, September 20, 2007, accessed May 17, 2020.
and Peace in Tokyo provided the delegates with ideas
on how to build a similar museum in Gyeongsang-Namdo Province.98
Third, the military “comfort
women” victims and the voluntary social actors of Dagagagi in Tongyeong-Geoje cities and their counterparts
in Changwon City (eleven persons in total) visited the National Diet of Japan
in October 2010. The aim was for the victims to convey their messages to the
National Diet before they all died. Their messages were to remind the Japanese
leaders of the crimes committed during the war, the values of women’s rights
and peace, and the need to have the victims’ basic dignities restored. The
eventual hope was to seek the possibility of establishing solidarity between
Korea and Japan to build a peaceful world.99
Fourth, facing the persistent
resistance from Japan to the resolution of war crimes such as the Japanese
military “comfort women,” seven relevant representative groups from Asia and
the United States formed an international movement in solidarity (Min, Chung,
and Yim 2019). The Asian countries included North and South Korea, Japan,
Taiwan, the Philippines, and China. Ninety-four social actors, including
several victims, from the seven countries attended a forum in Seoul, May 21–22,
2004. The forum was particularly concerned with the victims of Japan’s war
crimes, including the 800,000 people under forced labour, 1 million massacred,
and 200,000 “comfort women.” The Seoul forum passed the resolution to initiate
a massive petition in each country and take the collected petition to the U.N.;
the representatives from each country were to work with the Parliament in their
own country; hold protest rallies simultaneously in each country; and host the
international forum regularly.100 The eighth forum in Seoul included
the participants, in addition to those from the seven countries, from
Indonesia, the Netherlands, Germany, and Australia.101 Grassroots
movements such as these have mixed results, acquiring meaningful support from
the parliaments overseas on the one hand, and continuing to face obstacles due
to no action from the Japanese government on the other. The U.N. and ILO
benefit from receiving Japan’s financial contribution, which may influence
their lack of action to resolve the above-mentioned matters.102 Nonetheless,
Dagagagi and other national and
international movements with the same goal remain determined and continue to
pursue their goals.103
98 Dagagagi, December 10, 2010, accessed May 17, 2020.
99 Dagagagi, September 9, 2010, accessed May 17, 2020.
100 Dagagagi, June 2, 2004, accessed May 17, 2020.
101 Dagagagi, May 24, 2007, accessed May 17, 2020.
102 Dagagagi, March 17, 2006, accessed May 17, 2020. 103 Dagagagi, March 17, 2006, accessed May 17, 2020.
I think it is appropriate to
finish with a couple of students’ pleas to the Japanese government:
Please apologize and reparate, and
enable them to forgive you [Japan] before they die. So that they can go in
peace. Please put yourself in the shoes of the grandmas (Kim Su-Bin and Ma
Hee-Ju).104
Unlike us studying in an
air-conditioned classroom, the grandmas were abused by the Japanese soldiers
who were aggressive and violent in the warfield. It is not about money. Please
apologize before too late so that the grandmas can forgive you (Kim Min-Ji).105
These are desperate appeals from the high-school
girls. How can they refuse to listen to them and respond to their requests?
Yet, the requests have constantly been ignored, as the human rights of the
“comfort women” have also been. Disappointingly, it is this kind of helpless
and desperate feeling that corporate agents and voluntary social actors of the
movement find it difficult to overcome. They feel like running into a brick
wall, facing the brazen-faced Japanese governments, Korean governments’ indifference,
and Korean peoples’ increasing impatience to fight against injustice over a
period.106
Discussion and Concluding Remarks
The suffering of the Japanese military “comfort
women” is a historical incident inflicted by the powerful Japanese nation-state
and its agents, who committed acts of violence against other weaker
nation-states and their people. Putting women under sexual slavery is the
complete destruction of their human dignity. Even after the end of sexual
slavery with the end of the Second World War, the victims had nowhere to
complain or ask for compensation because of the continuity of the uneven power
relationship between the superpower (Japan) and the weaker nation-state
(Korea). These processes greatly differ from Nazi Germany and its victimized
neighbouring countries. At the time of Korea’s rapid economic development, the
Korean government’s interest was not to disturb the (unequal economic)
relationship
104 Dagagagi, October 15, 2010 and October 17, 2010, accessed May
17, 2020.
105 Dagagagi, March 17, 2006, accessed May 17, 2020.
106 Hankyoreh Shinmun. 2005. “정신대 할머니와 함께 하는 시민모임” (The Citizens to Support
the ‘Comfort Women’ Victims). August 11, http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/PRINT/56756.html, accessed
August 19, 2020.
between Japan and Korea, so that Japan would be
“willing enough” to transfer technologies to Korea and support its economic
development. A predominant proportion of Koreans was cooperative with the
governments’ concerted efforts for the nation’s development, which was used as
a source of legitimizing the authoritarian and undemocratic regimes. Therefore,
structural development was at the centre of the whole nation, backed up by the
people, and there was little room to reflect on the victims of Japanese colonialism
such as the military “comfort women” and the forced labourers, till the late
1980s. Further, Koreans under their cultural traditions around gender and
sexuality turned their backs on the victims. Many families could not embrace
the returned and injured daughters after the Second World War, which has
similar features to honour killings from other cultural and historical
contexts.
Following the successful hosting
of the 1988 Seoul Olympics, which was a turning point for Korean economic
development, Koreans started enjoying the fruits of their decades-long diligent
work. The restriction on travel overseas was lifted in 1988 and Kim Hak-Sun, a
victim of the military “comfort women,” spoke out for the first time in Korea
on August 14, 1991. The Japanese government’s official denial, in June 1990, of
engaging in the forced recruitment of the “comfort women” and establishing the
“comforting stations” angered the victims. Then, the victims’ peace movement
had an impetus to commence the long battle to redress the damages (Yoon 2015:
197–198). A private research institute, The Center
for Historical Truth and Justice (민족문제연구소)107 was established in
February 1991 and launched a massive project to research and reveal a list of
thousands of Koreans and their activities, who betrayed their nation and acted
pro-Japanese to the Japanese imperialists and their subordinates. With the significant
economic development in Korea, the victims have become confident enough to
publicly raise their sufferings and demand compensation, and there has been a
dramatic culture change to appreciate human dignity and human rights. The level
of public protests has exponentially strengthened in the last two decades.
A good number of social
movements at the national level have been pursuing ways to rectify the legacies
of Japanese colonialism, e.g., the proJapanese continuing to enjoy the
privileges acquired as a result of betraying their fellow Koreans. There have been
significant efforts by academic and grassroots communities to address these
issues for the sake of human rights and justice, which had been ignored for a
long period. The Korean National
Assembly has been a significantly supportive force in
this process. However, the turn-coats have been enjoying their privileges for
so long and they have caused significant obstacles in re-establishing the
values of justice and fraternity. The advanced status of the Korean economy and
its place in the international community have made remarkable differences
domestically and internationally. However, Japan’s imperialist policies and
attitudes, especially towards South Korea, have little changed, and are closely
reflected in the Japanese media and school textbooks. Thus, these have blocked
any possible breakthrough of a broad range of Korean governments’ or social
movements’ seeking the Japanese government’s apologies and reparation for the
Japanese military “comfort women.”
Nonetheless, the majority of the
Korean public has displayed the change from primary
agents to corporate
agents to use Archer’s words (2003), increasingly aware of the
social problems and making their public commitment. Grassroots social movements
have been formed and pursued rigorously, and their commitment has been
extraordinary. Dagagagi is a
movement within one of the most affected districts—Tongyeong-Geoje cities. The
changes in cultural contexts enabled by structural changes have provided the
Korean public and grassroots with the confidence to actively engage the local,
national, and international movements. The social movements to restore the
dignities of the “comfort women” have hosted numerous cultural events such as
film festivals, exhibitions, competitions to create video clips, erecting the
Statues of Peace, and writing postcards to the Japanese Diet, which have been
extremely successful in mobilizing the grassroots and have a large number of
them meaningfully engaged in the social movement. The social activists, in
cooperation with Dagagagi, and
in solidarity with their counterparts in other affected nations have won the
hearts of National Assemblies of the U.S., Canada, the Netherlands, and the
European Union, which have passed the resolution to demand the Japanese
government’s apologies and reparation for the “comfort women” victims. One of
the significant aspects of Dagagagi’s
grassroots movement is that the older generation encouraged the youth to be
involved since all the corporate actors are determined not to see the violence
repeated against future generations. This is a concentrated and transcendental
form of nationalism deeply embedded in the minds of Koreans today.
Most victims have passed away
and only sixteen live as at July 7, 2020,108 but the crimes remain
unresolved. The movement has to continue until Japan provides its formal
apologies to the victims. However, the Japanese
108 The number
is down to fourteen as at May 3, 2021; and twelve as at February 24, 2022.
government and the majority of people have not
offered apologies. In recent years with the Moon Jae-In regime, supported by
the 2016–2017 Candlelight Revolution,
the structure of Korean politics and economy has changed significantly, and so
has the relationship between Korea and Japan. Supported by the increasingly
strengthening status of the Korean economy and its roles in the international
community, Korea’s corporate and voluntary social actors, in particular, want
to and are determined to see the impact of the changes through the resolution
of the issue of the “comfort women.” As I have discussed, different historical
stages have significantly changed the Korean public perceptions of the “comfort
women.” The most recent stage is the Japanese trade provocation in 2019 and the
Korean people’s protest, the “No Japan, No Abe” movement, which I will analyse
in another chapter. I argue that these successful protests against Japan will
further galvanize the movement to demand apologies and reparation for the “comfort
women.” All these movements are important processes in restoring some degree of
the dignity of the victims, and the nation-state as well as national identities
in the 21st century. There are enough geopolitical reasons for Korea and Japan
to collaborate, but this is unlikely unless the grassroots are provided with
the reasons to change their views about Japan.
Calculated nationalism in this
chapter is not as apparent, but subtle. Korean grassroots have been calculating
“time and space” in terms of choosing the right time and methods to confront
the Korean and Japanese governments. Further, the grassroots are not blindly
standing against the Japanese in general, but its past misdeeds in history to
have rectified. This certainly demonstrates the grassroots’ calculated
nationalism.
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