Why hasn't Japan signed the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons? | The Japan Times

Why hasn't Japan signed the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons? | The Japan Times



Why hasn't Japan signed the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons?


People gather in front of the Atomic Bomb Dome in Hiroshima on Jan. 22, the first anniversary of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons coming into force, calling for Japan to ratify the agreement. | KYODO




BY PETER CHORDAS


CONTRIBUTING WRITER



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Mar 22, 2022



HIROSHIMA – When it comes to nuclear disarmament, two things are certain: that the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) stands as the most uncompromising regulation on nuclear ambitions to date; and that Japan, as the only nation ever attacked with such weapons, sees itself as playing a key role in sweeping them from the global stage.

Given these points, many both within Japan and beyond find it perplexing that the government has yet to sign the TPNW — which entered into international law on Jan. 22 last year — especially considering its supermajority support among the Japanese public, with around 75% in favor of signing, according to a 2020 study.



Yet the Foreign Ministry seems inclined to ignore the TPNW outright, having so far given the treaty only the diplomatic equivalent of an occasional curt nod.

Japan has signed other disarmament treaties — the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1970 and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1996.

So, what’s the holdup on the TPNW? How does it differ from other nuclear arms treaties? And what obstacles would Japan face if it ratified the agreement?


Nuclear past and present

If Japan had a Facebook page, it would read: “In a relationship with: Nuclear Weapons. Status: It’s complicated.”

Hiroyuki Nagayama | PETER CHORDAS

On the one hand, Japan has experienced the trauma of nuclear weapons firsthand with the U.S. bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and remains home to living A-bomb survivors and their descendants. The public in Japan, as in most places around the world, dislikes nuclear weapons in general, and the government has opposed them since the end of World War II.

On the other hand, three of Japan’s neighbors — China, North Korea and Russia — all have nuclear capabilities. Nor is Japan’s relationship with them overly sunny. The result is a perceived three-sided nuclear threat that Japan has so far dealt with via a reliance on American nuclear capabilities.

Then there’s Article 9 of the Constitution, which outlaws settling disputes through war and prohibits maintaining armed forces with war potential — language many would assume precludes nuclear weapons.

Not so, says Hiroyuki Nagayama, a professor of international politics at Hiroshima University of Law.

“The government’s current interpretation of Article 9 allows for the manufacturing and possession of small-yield nuclear weapons for defensive purposes,” Nagayama says, “though first-strike systems like intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles and long-range bombers would be off the table.”

Atomic-bombing survivors and peace campaigners collect signatures seeking the establishment of a treaty outlawing nuclear weapons in Tokyo’s Shibuya district in March 2017. | KYODO

Further complicating matters, Japan’s national policy includes the so-called three non-nuclear principles adopted in 1967, which prohibit “producing, possessing or hosting nuclear weapons.”

At least on paper.

In 2010, a government-appointed panel confirmed a long-denied series of Cold War-era secret agreements that allowed the U.S. to station nuclear weapons in Japanese territory.

The Foreign Ministry has since declared the clandestine agreements void.

(See? It’s complicated.)

And then there’s nuclear deterrence, which is where Japan signing the TPNW tends to stall out.


Deterrence: a double-edged sword?

The laws of Japan include no prohibition against ratifying the TPNW. Nor does the U.S.-Japan security treaty.

In other words, Japan could sign the TPNW tomorrow, were it so inclined.

The problem is politics.

At a news conference in January, Foreign Minister Yoshimasa Hayashi said: “The TPNW is an important treaty that can be described as an exit to a world without nuclear weapons.” (Curt nod.) “However, the cooperation of nuclear-weapon states is necessary to change the reality, but not even one nuclear-weapon state has signed the treaty.” (Ouch.)

Alicia Sanders-Zakre | INTERNATIONAL CAMPAIGN TO ABOLISH NUCLEAR WEAPONS

To be fair, the strategy behind the TPNW doesn’t require nuclear arms states to sign, but instead aims to make nuclear weapons politically counterproductive. But for the government, that’s probably beside the point.

“Unfortunately for Japan and many other countries, there’s a lot of pressure from nuclear arms states not to participate in the TPNW at all — whether as observers, signatories or state’s parties,” says Alicia Sanders-Zakre, policy and research coordinator at the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons.

The government’s division on the TPNW generally follows party lines, with left-wing and progressive parties in favor of signing or participating as an observer and conservative parties like the ruling Liberal Democratic Party running for cover whenever the treaty gets mentioned by name.

And even beyond potentially souring Japan’s relationship with Uncle Sam, the TPNW also raises a debate over Japan’s need for nuclear deterrence.

“Unlike Japan’s three non-nuclear principles, the TPNW is actually legally binding,” Nagayama says. “And its strict prohibitions disallow foreign states from using, or threatening to use, nuclear weapons on behalf of signatories.”

In short, bye-bye nuclear umbrella.

Yet even if one accepts nuclear weapons as necessary for Japan’s defense, it must be acknowledged that the atomic sword cuts both ways. Whether through direct possession or extended deterrence, atomic weapons pose a constant threat to neighboring nations, courting political hostility and destabilization.

After all, there’s always the possibility that someone might use them — on purpose or by mistake.

Japan’s protection from the U.S. under the nuclear umbrella forms part of the U.S.-Japan security treaty, whose 60th anniversary was marked in January 2020. | KYODO

And if one accepts that nuclear weapons might not be humanity’s best idea to date, one can only imagine what weight a Japanese signature on the TPNW would carry for the abolition movement.

“The fact that we even have this treaty banning nuclear weapons is because of Japan’s A-bomb survivors, the hibakusha and their tireless efforts to relive their trauma of experiencing nuclear weapons,” Sanders-Zakre says. “Having Japan join this treaty would be incredibly symbolic.”


What would make Japan sign?

To sign the TPNW, Japan would need to step out from under America’s nuclear umbrella — a move many perceive as a dangerous gamble. But any such maneuver wouldn’t happen in a unilateral vacuum.

“If we do away with the nuclear umbrella, of course we’ll first talk with the Chinese, Koreans and Russians about this new policy of denuclearizing our security arrangement,” says Takao Takahara, a professor of international politics and peace research at the Faculty of International Studies at Meiji Gakuin University.

From there, it’s a matter of finding a replacement for the safety — whether imagined or real — afforded by nuclear deterrence.

According to Takahara, one alternative that would pave the way for a Japanese signature on the TPNW is the creation of a Northeast Asian nuclear-free zone comprising Japan, South Korea and North Korea.

Takao Takahara | PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, MEIJI GAKUIN UNIVERSITY

“To establish that, our three nations would seek assurances from nuclear powers like China, Russia and the United States that they won’t attack any zone members with nuclear weapons,” Takahara says.

Nuclear-free zones, complete with such assurances from nuclear weapons states, now cover the majority of countries around the world.

Certainly the Koreas would require some massaging on any such initiative, especially when considering that the public of South Korea increasingly favors establishing a domestic nuclear weapons program and North Korea has historically rejected security assurances that would require its disarmament.

When viewed this way, however, denuclearization becomes just one summit within the diplomatic landscape, the journey toward which affords invaluable opportunities to improve relationships with other nations, broker peace and enhance political stability. The road likely won’t prove easy, but Takahara believes it’s one worth traveling.

“You can start with nuclear weapons,” Takahara says. “Or you can start with building a better relationship. Then you’ll find that nuclear weapons are an obstacle to going ahead.”

And in the end, nuclear deterrence comes with the ever-present risk of nuclear war, whether by accident or design. And with it, the potential of human extinction.

Any risks involved in denuclearization likely pale in comparison.

“Nuclear deterrence is not sustainable,” Takahara says. “It will collapse sometime. And when it does, it will be a catastrophe.”



Several major agreements have been reached regarding nuclear weapons, each with different features and signatories. Here’s a rundown of three of the most prominent:


Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
NPT signatories without nuclear weapons agree not to develop them in exchange for nuclear energy technology and protection under the nuclear umbrellas of nuclear arms states.
Signatories with nuclear arsenals commit to good-faith negotiations on nuclear arms reduction with the eventual goal of abolition.
Problematically, the NPT only recognizes the United States, Russia, China, the United Kingdom and France as “legitimate nuclear arms states,” and lacks any timetable for disarmament.
The NPT entered into force in 1970, and today includes 191 party states.
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)
The CTBT focuses exclusively on banning nuclear detonations outside of wartime.
The United Nations adopted the CTBT in 1996, however, the treaty can’t come into effect until 10 remaining states ratify — China, Egypt, Iran, Israel, the United States, India, North Korea, and Pakistan.
The CTBT claims 180 signatories with 170 ratifications.
Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW)
Unlike prior nuclear arms laws, the TPNW isn’t about reduction or who has legitimate possession. It aims to abolish nuclear weapons to the last warhead.
Signatories can’t possess, host, develop, use or threaten to use nuclear weapons, or allow passage of foreign atomic arms through their territories. They also give up the right to extended deterrence (no nuclear umbrella).
Adopted by the U.N. in 2017, the TPNW became international law on Jan. 22 last year. It boasts 86 signatories and 59 party states.