2026-04-01

Reading Colonial Japan | Stanford University Press

Reading Colonial Japan | Stanford University Press

Reading Colonial Japan
Text, Context, and Critique
Edited by Michele M. Mason and Helen J.S. Lee
March 2012
320 Pages

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By any measure, Japan's modern empire was formidable. The only major non-western colonial power in the 20th century, Japan controlled a vast area of Asia and numerous archipelagos in the Pacific Ocean. The massive extraction of resources and extensive cultural assimilation policies radically impacted the lives of millions of Asians and Micronesians, and the political, economic, and cultural ramifications of this era are still felt today.

The Japanese empire lasted from 1869-1945. During this time, how was the Japanese imperial project understood, imagined, and lived? Reading Colonial Japan is a unique anthology that aims to deepen knowledge of Japanese colonialism(s) by providing an eclectic selection of translated Japanese primary sources and analytical essays that illuminate Japan's many and varied colonial projects. The primary documents highlight how central cultural production and dissemination were to the colonial effort, while accentuating the myriad ways colonialism permeated every facet of life. The variety of genres the explored includes legal documents, children's literature, cookbooks, serialized comics, and literary texts by well-known authors of the time. These cultural works, produced by a broad spectrum of "ordinary" Japanese citizens (a housewife in Manchuria, settlers in Korea, manga artists and fiction writers in mainland Japan, and so on), functioned effectively to reinforce the official policies that controlled and violated the lives of the colonized throughout Japan's empire.

By making available and analyzing a wide-range of sources that represent "media" during the Japanese colonial period, Reading Colonial Japan draws attention to the powerful role that language and imagination played in producing the material realities of Japanese colonialism.
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Contents Summary

Chapter 1: "The Shores of the Sorachi River" by Kunikida Doppo.
Critique: Writing Ainu Out/Writing Japanese In (Hokkaido).
Chapter 2: "Hokkaido Former Natives Protection Law."
Critique: Rule in the Name of "Protection" (Colonialism vocabulary).
Chapter 3: "Officer Ukuma" by Ikemiyagi Sekihō.
Critique: Subaltern Identity in Okinawa.
Chapter 4: "Demon Bird" by Satō Haruo.
Critique: Violence, Borders, and Identity in Colonial Taiwan.
Chapter 5: "The Manual of Home Cuisine" (Green Flag Association).
Critique: Nationalization of Settler Homes/Bodies (Kōminka Era).
Chapter 6: "Wolf Forest, Basket Forest, and Thief Forest" by Miyazawa Kenji.
Critique: Settler Colonialism and Children's Literature.
Chapter 7: "Manchu Girl" by Koizumi Kikue.
Critique: Imperializing Motherhood in Colonial Manchuria.
Chapter 8: "The Adventures of Dankichi" by Shimada Keizō.
Critique: Popular Orientalism and Japanese Views of Asia.

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Introduction
mature, Japan's modem ampin was formidable. The andy jur atea of Asla and nurmemus anchipelagos in the Pacific Ocean. Iti nach Sakhalin Idand north of the Japanem archipelago to Solomon danch in the South Pacific atul espanded tons Manchuria China, Korea, and much of Southeast Ada and Micmisia. Over the decades of Japannenial rule (1809-04). Japan fully naturaltad two colonies (Ainu Mudun Hokkaido and the Ryukyu Kingdom/Okinawa) into its national testtory The masive extraction of mances and exurmive cultural auntularion policies radially impunad the ver of millions of Adans and Prafic lalanders. The political, scomman cultural ratification of this oma are still felt made Our the hirty yum, the field of Japanese studies has produod an Impressive body of Japanese and English lampage scholarship Jap mial urs. Initially, adid groundwek was laid with wooks slucidating nomik, legal, and agricultural policies posduced in the imperial center and imposed on the cokosial periphery Mon nuanh, ctical work emphasis that despite overwhelming mequal power relations, all colonial prussies
mestnatally demand a pačekal, sonomic, and calmural selang thang segetation, struggle, collaboration, and restance Excellent scholarkiy wing the multitud sxchanges among Japan's lands and the manpole, the discursive comenict of colonised and colonizing subjects, ast key wocal scents academa, and cultural insttattoons that bered Japanese imperialiun imperialian is is now now availabl available. Numerous hou and y gate the complex cultural and political negotiation of colonial idmrities and seveal the importatios of the collective imagination and the role of onlinary Japanese in the colonial project.
Building on this strong foundation, Reading Colonial Japa deepen knowledge of Japanese inkonials, poviding both an electi on of manaland japanese petmary ananas and analytical sways that fuminans the specificities of Japan's mary and varted colonial project. The primary documen, which span a variety of gas, buluding legal dun children linatus, booka, serialized comies, as well as literary to highlight the centrality ts by well-known authors of the time. of cultural perduction and dissemination in colonial enders and mac the merrlad ways colorido pred very fact of life. In the contributors primarily omarmed with apresentation
and how these intersect with operations of power. They investi
workings of imperialist discourse though home readings of cul tural prosentations in colonial namatives and imagery, revealing how de Japanese imperial project was understood, imagined, and lived. The scholars preisise that coloniallum la tor tals tor simply a toilitary qони I pocess, or greminented proges. Rather, is a couples cultural buth in the emulation of underpinning ideology and the en policies backed by those ideological beliefs. In addition to foming stromic and political structures, colonial powers enlist the participation of instination, educatintod process, and publication nerworks, which a "knowledge that rationallas the colonial under. By reaking and analysing a wide range of wourses that pres modis during Japanese colonial period, we engage in a dialogue with scholandip is nunil studies and highlight the powerful role language and imagination play in producing the material valids of Japan comialam. No colonial project accords without substansial support froen in citi In fact, cultural production by a road spectrum of "sadinary Jap time intance, a houwwifs in Mashuria, wtikes in Kor atul fictio, wrius in mainlanil Japan-fusioned effictively avail
to win the affial plic, and dural policies that talked and stulated the lives of the colontand throughout Japan's empite Whether individual Japanese actively panned the impatial project ar quietly up to its demands, they were, no varying degrees, complien with imperial ideology. Although a young man's volunteering for the amy might have heen a conspicanas expresados of loyalty to the ingerial aste works herein show that no one was precluded from participating in the promson and maintance of the colonial campaign. Women, for Insan published "mmutin that mahilaed almal shumtic and their promotion of state policies in locally published cookbooks served imperial caus in vig nificant ways well beyond the rotricted domestic sphere of the hour. Like children's nangs, such as Theof Denkicks, included in thi showcase bech unsettling manisations of rachadheed colonial junt fuations and the unapologetic reclament of Japanese children's imaginary wold and ronds. In fact, every mode of expression wallad to fathet de colonid goods. If laws such as the Hokkaido Fouer Natives Notiction Law dramatically impinged on and reirited the lives of the unind,
riety of fictional wotke justified unequal power ndariom herwen Japan and in many colonial entities. the it depictions of the namamscape in Hokkaido that evand the esimenes of the island's indigo population, or the "will ing of a violen legend of Tawanan "harfariam," Inetary depiction of the Other joined funas with official arguments to dhore up a colonial workl unst. Many Japanno citizen from all walks of life consumed, asepood, and meltetated the implicit and explicit mesages of such wors, themby partkipar ing in the imperial project in the most muudate, you audiipesible, ways Serving at the mainoun of the theoretical framework of this volume
the following two prestasi that colonial discoune never nunha a total iring persuasive power and than ankonial powers do not nett their authority the ological vapacity to determine mality, eqpecially when backed by over through a single, whedve, and comanent ideology. As mida whelming military fimus and manic privileges, there always c omalistion, competing shodigies, and imetacting ubjectivities. As the ant in Tewan and Kates soggens, not everyone waru d of the "botevolmes of the Japanese imperid post. The experiences of a collaborating coontal win Kova, a Chinelle a Manchuria an Okinawan police affin, or a Japanese female sender diffond greatly as any individual's place within a group and the spin was dermined by a number of shifing, and non infiquely empati, fa In fut,
ECTION
of the meat labotins tiks of colonial authorities police levels of slippage that potentially undermined the order of the The empire instance, with growing numhen of Japanese sitiam living in cokomiss abroad, a great deal of apprehension and spion wat dinucted toward c alal werker who were decated morally bankrupt and woually decadent. The burometer of thuse "perversities" came in the firm of news of Japons I women becoming intiniune in every way possible with colonial subjects women kading independent lies, and the free thew of drisk, drogs will wx. After the defion, the diurust and dindain of the Japaneпра fecame event when sther than a hearty weicone hote, korful ement and humilising medical enaroinadons ghend the rentes. I w of Japanese purtates etcus the instability of the thetoris pro the inherent superiority and ctetlined ratione of the Japanese colo the imperial commption of colonial male subjects relate pounatse of the colonial preemment. le lising up an ingesave musher bodles for the front lines, the colonial government succeeded, but them mough with rifles was a matter that generated demonstrated by a few samples, mostple discourses cnculand and modified, and sometimes collided ponded to changing pritical, and
In the varying colonial comun Diputate, event contradicuny, idea, idea, identities, and imagery an mottar of any udonial project. This i tungnt that the dis instruction of, for example, the counter and unkontzed specifically or the undemial undertaking generally withunt devamating Thane are iniportant hint that mond the crimes and justicos of the Jipanne empe mandmod works by colonial subjects lend personal perspectives in the tragic Ins of livelihoods and lives hical madings hontal logic, in tests written by various members of the oslonizing neion in the siminly belligeren and violent fuse of colonial inte in mutlu cam, greater the whole of empire, and fan the fin of imperial desire. They expose and challenge the theorical mushanims and to erase the vukan of the culmined and nemopolise the authority to
detine their sulruss and hitorios. We hope in further fill in the picture of Japan's divene empire and stimulate dicasion among scholars comorned the header questions of colonialium in the past and presura
UCTION
Re-Viewing Japanese Colonial History
Typically, Japanis age of ampire is ad fum dysm 1945, beginning when Taiwan was dedo Japan following te victory over China in the Sino-Japanese Wir (1894-1991), and conclading with Japan's defeat in the Ada Pacific War 1993-94) What manly characterised as Japan's he compte incules Taiwan, Southern Sakhalin, Korea, the Kwantung of the Lindong perinda in China, and most lalands in the South Japan ala wilde comadderall political and scorum indurn over much of China through milkary threat and installed a puppet линии "Manchukan," which allowed de facto Japanese rule in Manchuria, By after sumemt military victories in the Pacifu ngion, the imperial extended to Vietnam, the Molippines. Burma. Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei, Tinen, Hong Kong, and Singapurn However, viewing Japan's forceful pasion of the Ainu homeland and the Ryukyu Kingdom during the M (868-tz) as vous act of colonialiun, we date the in Japanese offt undanerally laid claim to the bland now known as Hok and firmly locate Okinawa with colonial hisory Naturalind "Japan proper" in colenialist them, both Hokkaido and Okinawa commonly been damed as "Internal colonies, which obfiuncates the enterprise of rettitorial appropriation, connemic explotatium, and sion that enabled the "Japnination of those rophet industion of Hokkaido and Okna se lands and their and Oldnawe in Japan's colonial in this volante functions to challenge the Mellite's acurization of the explosion of the landhar "development of "Jap rritory and their subjugation of the Indigenous inhabits as "pro in Committed to a project of devonstrucning imperialise discourse, reflecting on the ways the cases of Hokkaido and Okinawa boch since and comple of undenial operations geneally
In an strenge to Fill a pap, we include two chapters on Hokkaido, which in gremer degree than Okinawa has been too often overlooked in wholaship In ding alas sexk to emphasise the crucial role the s unination of Hokkaido played in matrating the mundem Japanese nation and empion. It is ir presumption that the fledgling natioJapan (established in 1) the island called "Hokkaido" daimed in
150g) were med in tandem and that these process wort sked. Narrowing the worth of Low Ching, we affirms dan Sultural and political ickens du chensities, be thay mauropulisan ur colonial, do not esta peke the proces of dontalis Thus, Japan's identy as an "advancal" " Bol nation andowed with a natural political, woonsesic, and cultural e purkarny was forged in option to depictio "Buckward," "bubarte and incapable of surviving is modern times. These differences between colunteer and skoniand were in manifest maitint
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Introduction
MI CHELE M . MASON AND HELEN J . LEE

y any measure, Japan's modern empire was formidable. The only major non-\Vestern colonial power in the twentieth century, Japan controlled a vast area ofAsia and numerous archipelagos in the Pacific Ocean. Its reach extended from Sakhalin Island north of the Japanese archipelago to the Solomon Islands in the South Pacific and expanded into Manchuria, areas of China, Korea, and much of Southeast Asia and Micronesia. Over the more than seven decades of Japanese colonial rule (1869—1945), Japan successfully naturalized two colonies (Ainu Moshir/Hokkaido and the Ryukyu Kingdom/Okinawa) 1 into its national territory. The massive extraction of resources and extensive cultural assimilation policies radically impacted the lives of millions of Asians and Pacific Islanders. The political, economic, and cultural ramifications of this era are still felt today.
Over the last thirty years, the field of Japanese studies has produced an impressive body ofJapanese and English language scholarship on Japan's coIonia] era. Initially, solid groundwork was laid with works elucidating economic, legal, and agricultural policies produced in the imperial center and imposed on the colonial periphery.2 More recently, critical work emphasizes that despite overwhelming unequal power relations, all colonial processes intrinsically demand a political, economic, and cultural exchange through negotiation, struggle, collaboration, and resistance. Excellent scholarship addressing the multifaceted exchanges among Japan's colonies and the metropole, the discursive construction of colonized and colonizing subjects, and key social, scientific, academic, and cultural institutions that bolstered Japanese imperialism is now available. Numerous books and essays interrogate the complex cultural and political negotiation of colonial identities and reveal the importance of the collective imagination and the role of ordinary Japanese in the colonial project. 
Building on this strong foundation, Reading Colonial Japan aims to deepen knowledge of Japanese colonialism(s), providing both an eclectic selection of translated Japanese primary sources and analytical essays that illuminate the specificities of Japan's many and varied colonial projects. The primary documents, which span a variety of genres, including legal documents, children's literature, cookbooks, serialized comics, as well as literary texts by well-known authors of the time, serve to highlight the centrality of cultural production and dissemination to colonial endeavors and to accentuate the myriad ways colonialism permeated every facet of life. In the essays, the contributors are primarily concerned with representation and rhetoric and how these intersect with operations of power. They investigate the workings of imperialist discourse through close readings of culrural representations in colonial narratives and imagery, revealing how the Japanese imperial project was understood, imagined, and lived. The scholars herein take as a premise that colonialism is not simply a military quest, legal process, or government-led project. Rather, it is a complex cultural system, both in the formulation of underpinning ideology and the execution of policies backed by those ideological beliefs. In addition to forming economic and political structures, colonial powers enlist the participation of various institutions, educational processes, and publication networks, which produce "knowledge" that rationalizes the colonial order. By making available and analyzing a wide range of sources that represent "media" during the Japanese colonial period, we engage in a dialogue with scholarship in cultural studies and highlight the powerful role language and imagination play in producing the material realities ofJapanese colonialism.
No colonial project succeeds without substantial support from its citizenry. In fact, cultural production by a broad spectrum of "ordinary" Japanese citizens—for instance, a housewife in Manchuria, settlers in Korea, manga artists and fiction writers in mainland Japan—functioned effectively to reinforce the official political, economic, and cultural policies that controlled and violated the lives of the colonized throughout Japan's empire. Whether individual Japanese actively promoted the imperial project or quietly acquiesced to its demands, they were, to varying degrees, complicit with imperial ideology. Although a young man's volunteering for the army might have been a conspicuous expression of loyalty to the imperial state, the works herein show that no one was precluded from participating in the promotion and maintenance of the colonial campaign. Women, for instance, published "memoirs" that mobilized colonial rhetoric and their promotion of state policies in locally published cookbooks served imperial causes in significant ways well beyond the restricted domestic sphere of the home. Likewise, children's manga, such as The Adventures ofDankichi, included in this volume, showcase both unsettling manifestations of racialized colonial justifications and the unapologetic recruitment ofJapanese children's imaginary world and minds. In fact, every mode of expression was mobilized to further the colonial agenda. Iflaws such as the Hokkaido Former Natives Protection Law dramatically impinged on and restricted the lives of the colonized, a variety of fictional works justified unequal power relations between Japan and its many colonial entities. Be it depictions of the naturescape in Hokkaido that erased the existence of the island's indigenous population, or the "retelling" of a violent legend of Taiwanese "barbarians," literary depictions of the Other joined forces with official arguments to shore up a colonial world order. Many Japanese citizens from all walks oflife consumed, accepted, and reiterated the implicit and explicit messages of such texts, thereby participating in the imperial project in the most mundane, yet indispensible, ways.
Serving as the mainstay of the theoretical framework of this volume are the following two premises: that colonial discourse never marshals a totalizing persuasive power and that colonial powers do not exert their authority through a single, cohesive, and consistent ideology. As formidable as is the ideological capacity to determine reality, especially when backed by overwhelming military force and economic privileges, there always exist inherent contradictions, competing ideologies, and intersecting subjectivities. As the resistance movements in Taiwan and Korea suggest, not everyone was convinced of the "benevolence" of the Japanese imperial project. The experiences of a collaborating colonial elite in Korea, a Chinese "coolie" in Manchuria, an Okinawan police officer, or a Japanese female settler differed greatly as any individual's place within a group and the empire was determined by a number of shifting, and not infrequently incompatible, factors. In fact,
 
one of the most laborious tasks of colonial authorities was to police various levels of slippage that potentially undermined the order of the empire. For instance, with growing numbers of Japanese citizens living in colonies abroad, a great deal of apprehension and suspicion was directed toward colonial settlers who were deemed morally bankrupt and sexually decadent. The barometer of these "perversities" came in the form of "news" ofJapanese men and women becoming intimate in every way possible with colonial subjects, single women leading independent lives, and the free flow of drink, drugs, and wild sex. After the defeat, the distrust and disdain of the Japanese expatriates became evident when rather than a hearty welcome home, forceful internment and humiliating medical examinations greeted the returnees.4 If the issue of Japanese expatriates evinces the instability of the rhetoric professing the inherent superiority and civilized nature of the Japanese colonizer, the imperial conscription of colonial male subjects reveals a bittersweet compromise of the colonial government. In lining up an impressive number of male bodies for the front lines, the colonial government succeeded, but whether to trust them enough with rifles was a matter that generated tremendous anxiety. As is demonstrated by a few examples, multiple discourses and representations were circulated and modified, and sometimes collided, as various actors responded to changing political, economic, and social imperatives in the varying colonial contexts.
Disparate, even contradictory, ideas, ideals, identities, and imagery are the mortar of any colonial project. This is not to suggest that the discursive construction of, for example, the colonizer and colonized specifically or the colonial undertaking generally was generated without devastating consequences. There are important historical works that record the crimes and injustices of the Japanese empire and translated works by colonial subjects that lend personal perspectives on the tragic loss of livelihoods and lives. The critical readings in this volume, however, focus attention on how coIonial logic in texts written by various members of the colonizing nation converts the obviously belligerent and violent facts of colonialism into a "palatable," noble cause, greases the wheels of empire, and fans the fires of imperial desire. They expose and challenge the rhetorical mechanisms used to erase the voices of the colonized and monopolize the authority to define their cultures and histories. We hope to further fill in the picture of Japan's diverse empire and stimulate discussion among scholars concerned about the broader questions of colonialism in the past and present.
Re- ViewingJapanese Colonial History
Typically, Japan's age of empire is dated from 1895 to 1945, beginning when Taiwan was ceded to Japan following its victory over China in the SinoJapanese War (1894—1895), and concluding with Japan's defeat in the AsiaPacific War (1931—1945). What is commonly characterized as Japan's "formal" empire includes Taiwan, Southern Sakhalin, Korea, the Kwantung area of the Liaodong peninsula in China, and most islands in the South Seas. 6 Japan also wielded considerable political and economic influence over much of China through military threat and installed a puppet government in "Manchukuo," which allowed de facto Japanese rule in Manchuria. By 1945, after numerous military victories in the Pacific region, the imperial reach extended to Vietnam, the Philippines, Burma, Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei, Timor, Hong Kong, and Singapore.
However, viewing Japan's forceful acquisition of the Ainu homelands and the Ryukyu Kingdom during the Meiji era (1868—1912) as obvious acts of colonialism, we date the inception of Japan's modern empire to 1869, when Japanese officials unilaterally laid claim to the island now known as Hokkaido, and firmly locate Okinawa within colonial history. Naturalized as 'Japan proper" in colonialist rhetoric, both Hokkaido and Okinawa have commonly been dismissed as "internal colonies," which obfuscates the violent enterprise of territorial appropriation, economic exploitation, and cultural repression that enabled the "Japanization" of these lands and their people. The explicit inclusion of Hokkaido and Okinawa in Japan's colonial history in this volume functions to challenge the Meiji elite's self-interested characterization of the exploitation of these lands as "development" of"Japanese territory" and their subjugation ofthe indigenous inhabitants as "protection." Committed to a project of deconstructing imperialist discourse, the contributors herein offer criticisms of colonial euphemisms and justifications, reflecting on the ways the cases of Hokkaido and Okinawa both reinforce and complicate received notions of colonial operations generally, and Japan's empire specifically.
In an attempt to fill a gap, we include two chapters on Hokkaido, which to an even greater degree than Okinawa has been too often overlooked in scholarship.7 In doing so, we also seek to emphasize the crucial role the colonization of Hokkaido played in constructing the modern Japanese nation and empire. It is our presumption that the fledgling nation-state of 'Japan" (established in 1868) and the island now called "Hokkaido" (claimed in 1869) were constructed in tandem and that these processes were inextricably linked. Borrowing the words of Leo Ching, we affirm that "cultural and political identities, be they metropolitan or colonial, do not exist prior to the processes of colonialism." 8 Thus, Japan's identity as an "advanced," "civilized" nation endowed with a natural political, economic, and cultural superiority was forged in opposition to depictions of other Asian countries as 'backward," 'barbaric" and incapable of surviving in modern times. *Ihese differences between colonizer and colonized were not manifest realities, but rather products of colonial discourse employed to validate Japanese imperial expansion in Asia. Before Japan consolidated its political and economic infrastructure and embarked on imperial expansion through the SinoJapanese War (1894—1895) and Russo-Japanese War (1904—1905), Hokkaido was fertile ground in which imperial ideology, legal rationalizations, assimilation policies, and settlement campaigns were conceived, implemented, and tested. The colonial experiments conducted during these early years of empire informed, in significant ways, the political, economic, and cultural strategies in the later 'formal" empire.
Although not the focus of this work, the question ofwhat should constitute the end of Japan's empire also deserves reconsideration. The year 1945 might mark the conclusion of the Asia-Pacific War and the liberation of Japan's colonial subjects, but residual effects manifest in many obvious and subtle ways to this day. *Ihe continued presence of U.S. bases in Okinawa with Japanese official sanction, the charged protests against prime ministers' visits to Yasukuni Shrine, territorial disputes over the Dokdo/Takeshima Islands and the "Northern Territories" with Korea and Russia respectively, and the ongoing debates about Japan's responsibility for Korean survivors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki are just a few examples of the ways the colonial past lives on in the present.
To help our readers, the next few pages present the broadest outline of Japan's complex imperial history that spanned more than seventy years. Richer detail provided in individual essays will build on this preliminary narrative and further contextualize each colonial case.
 
After the overthrow of the Tokugawa shogunate in 1868, which brought centuries of samurai rule to an end, the leaders of the newly installed government characterized their victory as a "restoration" of imperial rule. Scrambling to establish authority and consolidate a disparate population 7
along the lines of a Western model of the nation-state, the elite quickly defined the most pressing tasks—foreign relations, the tax system, and the 'development" (kaitaku) of Ezo, "land of the barbarians," the then Japanese appellation for the island of Hokkaido.9 *Ibis last priority, making Ezo into "a little Japan," was understood to serve a number of goals, including generating much-needed revenue for the nation-building project, showing the emperor's "power and prestige to the world," and discouraging RusSian designs on the territory. Elites soon realized that resettling disgruntled former samurai, who had lost their status and economic privileges, could also help dissipate pent-up dissatisfaction that had resulted in numerous violent uprisings. To that end, a colonial farming militia (tondenhez) was established, and general campaigns for migration to Hokkaido were pursued to alleviate worsening poverty in rural areas of the mainland. Already during the Tokugawa period (1600—1868) a certain degree of economic and political subordination at the hands of shogunal and Matsumae domain officials contributed to weakening Ainu communities. With the installation of the colonial government under the aegis of the Hokkaido Development Agency in 1869, Japan commenced full-scale economic exploitation of the island's resources and massive migration from the mainland so that by the end of the nineteenth century Japanese settlers greatly outnumbered the deprived and displaced Ainu population.
The Ryukyu Kingdom had its own long and troubled history with Japan. After nearly two centuries of political independence, vigorous maritime trade with much of Asia, and a flourishing of arts and architecture, the Ryukyu Islands were invaded by the Satsuma domain in 1609. For the next 270 years, Satsuma dispatched countless directives, injunctions, and judgments on matters of trade, governance, and cultural practices, forcing Ryukyuan kings to negotiate a delicate balance of power with Satsuma, the central shogunal officials of Japan, and the Ming and Qing courts in China. This quasi-autonomous status came to an end in 1879, a decade after the Meiji Restoration, when Japan officially, and unilaterally, annexed 'Okinawa," in what is called the 'disposition of Ryukyu" (Ryukyu shobun). 10 Despite having proclaimed the Ryukyu Islands Japanese territory, the disregard for the Okinawan population was extreme, evidenced by Tokyo's rejection of Japanese governor Uesugi Shigenori's proposal that would have greatly alleviated poverty without necessitating either an increased tax burden on Okinawans or financial support from the central government. Impoverishment, unemployment, and illiteracy engendered by Japan's singular and oppressive economic policies toward Okinawa were then attributed to an inherent inferiority of the people of the islands. Those able to migrate to the mainland encountered fierce discrimination in employment and lodging. Assimilation rhetoric may have suggested that Okinawans could become national citizens and the emperor's subjects through the eradication of local customs and the adoption of the Japanese language, but economic, political, and cultural campaigns that ensured hardship, privation, and stigmatization made clear that they were not to be considered fully "Japanese.'  Okinawa's marginalized position in the nation was made alarmingly evident in 1945 by the Battle of Okinawa, one of the bloodiest battles fought in the Pacific, when the Japanese Imperial Army mercilessly and indiscriminatly killed civilians and forced them to commit suicide.
After more than two decades of national consolidation and colonial exploits in Hokkaido and Okinawa, the Meiji leaders had established the foundation of Japan's political and economic infrastructure and inculcated nationalistic sentiment in its citizenry as deemed appropriate to a modern nation-state. The attempt to secure a colonial foothold in Taiwan in 1874 through the Taiwan Expedition had failed, but following triumph in the Sino-Japanese War in 1895, Japan ushered in its age of formal empire. The Treaty of Shimonoseki granted possession of Taiwan to Japan in perpetuity. As a measure to stave off anti-Japanese sentiment, Taiwanese were initially allowed to relocate to mainland China, yet for over ten years the colonial rulers met vigorous resistance to which they responded with violent repression. The colonial administration quickly embarked on plans to control and modernize police, transportation, communication, trade, and financial systems. It gradually promoted public education and health facilities and introduced agricultural innovations and new tax schemes. Although these did bring about various improvements in the lives of some Taiwanese, the colonial policies were crafted to benefit local Japanese settlers and the needs of the metropole. *Ibis was most evident in the policy of confiscating "untitled land" and selling it to Japanese migrants and corporate interests. With sugarcane and rice production dominating the economy, Taiwan proved to be a relatively profitable colony for the Japanese empire, evidenced by the fact that it did not receive governmental subsidies after 1904. I I Nevertheless Taiwanese experienced double standards in education and employment as well as constant surveillance by an extensive police force that was charged with a variety of tasks, including suppressing dissidents, taking the census, collecting taxes, and promoting and enforcing economic, social, and cultural programs.
Long before Korea's official annexation in 1910, Japan jockeyed to promote its national interests on the peninsula. As early as 1873, a faction in the Meiji government advocated an invasion of Korea, but officials of the Iwakura clique quashed the idea, arguing that Japan was not yet prepared to take on such a costly and provocative endeavor. In 1876, using "gunboat diplomacy," a tactic to which it had previously fallen victim, Japan pressured Korea to agree to unequal trade, the opening of ports, and extraterritorial rights for Japanese. In the ensuing years, Japan incited numerous confrontations with Korea in which its covetous officials attempted to take advantage of the escalating factionalism within the Yl court. Still, it was the stunning victory over Russia in 1905 that lent Japan vital leverage in negotiations. Granted "permisslon' by major Western powers to make Korea a "protectorate," Japan steadily took over the political and economic reins in the peninsula. In 1910, the Korean emperor was forced to sign away absolute sovereignty to the emperor of Japan. Japanese official and commercial interests were favored through the seizure and allocation of fertile or useful land, protection of markets for Japanese products, and numerous structural and tax incentives. To deal with problems of a growing population and increased wages in the metropolitan center, the colonial government tightly managed the production and cost of food and the flow of labor. Opposition to Japan's rule, most notably the March 1st Movement in 1919, was met with overwhelming military repression.
More so than other colonies, Taiwan and Korea constituted "agricultural appendages" of Japan, 12 providing much of the staple foodstuffs, especially rice, for the main islands. As the war dragged on, imperializing (köminka) policies that began in 1937 further impinged on everyday life as the colonizers tried to instill "Japanese spirit" in the colonized. Taiwanese and Koreans were urged to abandon their 'backward" traditions and to adopt Japanese daily customs and cultural practices. Additionally, in the 1940s, they faced the most thorough assimilation campaigns, exemplified by, for example, compulsory Japanese language acquisition, name changes, and emperor worship at Shinto shrines. At the same time that the people of Taiwan and Korea were assured that they were Japanese citizens, a wide array of publications disparaged their histories, societies, and cultures, effectively maintaining the divide between colonizer and colonized. Taiwanese and Korean men were first encouraged to volunteer and then from 1945 drafted into military service. Slogans such as 'Japan and Korea as One" (nissen ittai) aimed to channel all human and natural resources into the war effort and obfuscate the ever-increasing burden on colonial subjects in these occupied territories.
 
The 1905 defeat of Russia also allowed Japan to take possession of the southern half of Sakhalin, which Japan named Karafuto, and the Kwantung territory on the Liaodong peninsula. The latter aided Japan in making crucial inroads into Manchuria and China. Strategic military bases were built in Port Arthur and Dalian. Japan's control of Manchuria extended out from the network of tracks of the Southern Manchurian Railroad, over which Japan held absolute authority. Japan wielded considerable influence backed by the constant military presence of the Kwantung Army, strategic alliances with local leaders, and its ascendancy in the economy. In 1931, the Kwantung Army, ignoring the chain of command, sabotaged a section of the Southern Manchurian Railroad and then blamed Chinese radicals. This, now known as the Manchurian Incident, precipitated the full-scale invasion of Manchuria and establishment of Manchukuo, a puppet-state of Japan, in 1932. Responding to a growing economic and population crisis in the metropole, Japanese colonial administrators implemented a massive immigration campaign and diversified Manchuria's economy according to state and corporate interests.
Another feather in the cap of Japan's formal empire was acquired in 1914 when, taking advantage of the outbreak of hostilities in Europe, Japan demanded a transfer of Germany's mandate in the colonial territories of the Marshall, Caroline, and Mariana Islands in Micronesia. This distant and diverse collection of islands was known to Japanese as the South Seas (Nanjo). Since the 1880s and 1890s, popular adventure novels and firsthand accounts by civilian attachments to naval training missions in the South Seas had fed the Japanese popular imagination fanciful images of a tropical paradise, enormous commercial profits, and exciting escapades in areas inhabited by "barbaric natives." First a naval and then, from 1922, a civil administration oversaw the typical political and economic integration of the well over 1,300 islands into the empire. Preferential support to Japanese individuals and companies generated substantial commercial profits, and an imported labor force of poor Japanese, Okinawans, and Koreans quickly outnumbered Micronesians. Material conditions may have initially improved for indigenous inhabitants, but social stratification clearly favored Japanese colonists, and in the last years of the war Micronesians endured some of the fiercest battles between Japan and the United States.
Beginning in 1940, the former Asian colonies and territories of Britain, France, Holland, Germany, and the United States fell into Japanese hands after bloody combat in the Pacific. For instance, Japan took over French Indochina (Vietnam) in 1940, the Philippines and Hong Kong were under Japanese occupation soon after the attack on Pearl Harbor, and 1942 saw the invasions of Burma, Singapore, and Indonesia. Japan's defeat in 1945 meant liberation for most of its colonized and occupied territories. Still, the legacy of this history continues to fundamentally shape political and economic relations in Asia.
Connecting Texts, Contexts, and Critiques
Our project is two-fold: if the primary sources accentuate the wide array of representations of the empire, the critical essays illuminate the encompassing human involvement, underscoring that people of all walks of life were not merely implicated in but inevitably or willingly participated in the expansion and management of the empire. The contributors have uncovered a corpus of original materials that represent the profusion of discourse during the colonial era, and the project is conceived partly out of a desire to bring these previously unearthed sources to a wider audience of scholars, students, and individuals interested in thinking about the many forms colonialism and imperialism assume.
The primary sources included in this volume expound on a set of questions and dilemmas that were defining features of Japan's imperial policies and institutions. We feature a customary colonial tool—legal documents— that did not just restrict, regulate, and punish individuals and communities, but also played a crucial role in constructing colonial identities. The 1899 Hokkaido Former Natives Protection Law exemplifies the potency of legal doctrines for imperial conquest, which were deployed in Hokkaido under the pretense of "protection," echoing the "developmentalist" rhetoric employed by the United States in subjugating America's native peoples. Analysis oflegal language and its underpinning logic offers insights into how laws masked violent and discriminatory practices.
In contrast to laws, sources such as manga and children's stories might at first seem innocuous and even unrelated to the colonial quest. The effects of these popular media are not directly linked to military actions. Rather, they help shape an imaginary realm, one that generates imperialist aspirations and builds a consensus for imperial conquests. Hence, the heroic tale of Dankichi's adventure in the South Seas in manga format, presented in the last chapter of this book, became an imperialist fantasy shared by many Japanese children and adults in the 1930s. In it, and many other colonial works, the theme ofthe "barbaric" Other looms large. Thus, juvenile publications, along with other popular and practical cultural texts such as literary texts and cookbooks, worked in tandem with political proclamations, economic treatises, and legal codes to construct the prevailing perceptions of and attitudes toward Japan's colonial subjects and imperial pursuits.
While the organization in this anthology generally follows a historical chronology of Japan's colonial *Tression, its theoretical and thematic currents warrant discussion. Each primary source in translation is paired with an essay that sæests one of the ways to corroborate its meaning in relation to imperial discourse. Because any study of imperialism has to first identifr the mechanisms of power, the point of departure for the contributors to this volume is an inquiry into the workings of power in a variety of cultural texts and contexts.
Compared to its European counterparts, Japan's empire as a main subject of postcolonial studies has had a shorter history, spanning just over three decades. The theories of colonial encounters modeled after the European experiences have thus served, to a certain degree, as points of reference and barometers for understanding the Japanese case. Drawing on intellectuals such as Michel Foucault, the contributing scholars in this volume investigate the processes of subjection, surveillance, and subordination that are underlying operations of power. The Althusserian notion of "ideological state apparatuses" and the significance of social practices in constituting the subject also inform the scholarship herein, which problematizes independent subjectivity outside of ideology. Edward Said's theorization of the Orient helps us understand how cultural productions of the Other both feed and feed off of the hierarchical relations between two entities. Examinations of the human psyche trapped in the colonial milieu benefit from the work ofAlbert Memmi and Homi Bhabha on identity formation. Contributors are inspired by and readily make use of the conceptual and linguistic tools that these and other theoreticians of postcolonial studies have advanced. At the same time, in addition to reinforcing such theories, the works in this volume shed new light on and complicate ideas and themes long studied in Western colonial contexts.
In addition to theoretical concerns woven through the essays, this anthol presents intertwining dialogues on intersecting subject matters. While Komori Yöichi   the juridical implementation of the expansionist aspirations in Hokkaido through a close analysis of the vocabulary and tone of colonial logic, Michele Mason's essay shows how fiction metaphorically
 
emptied the space of Hokkaido, facilitating the incursion of Japanese settlers. Despite ample evidence that testifies to the history of the indigeno us population, Japanese literary depictions of Hokkaido, such as s'The Shores of the Sorachi River," primarily and consistently evoke an uninhabited and richly resourced island in need of human 'development." These first two chapters speak to the way words and ideas bring into being very material and tragic realities, focusing sharp legal and literary lenses on Japan's earliest modern colonial project.
Komori's and Robert Tierney's essays emphasize the function of emerging educational institutions and disciplines in producing "knowledge" that underwrote and rationalized the empire. These scholars map the multidirectional pathways between the theories, histories, and conceptual frameworks formulated by intellectuals in fields such as archeology, linguistics, and anthropology and colonial policy and expansion. Although they treat two very different geographic locations, Hokkaido and Taiwan respectively, each conveys the disturbing fact of the complicity of academic institutions, scholarly research, and educational models in Japan's empire.
As brutal and oppressive as institutional and official colonial subjugation was, its more subtle and nuanced, but nevertheless lasting effects were inscribed in human psychology. Davinder Bhowmik most forcefully employs Homi Bhabha's theory of "hybridity" to discuss the split and straddling identities of an Okinawan policeman in the short fictional work 'Officer Ukuma." The protagonist pursues access to power and prestige through state-sanctioned roles only to confront in the end how he is structurally alienated in the power hierarchy. Tierney's essay on the short story "Demon Bird," which simulates ethnographic recordings of the irrational, superstitious colonial Other, elucidates how the narrator repeatedly undermines his own credibility as purveyor of "objective" knowledge. When read carefully, Tierney argues, the story does not necessarily reinforce colonialist logic, but rather calls into question the "civilized" nature of the colonizer and exposes the unsettling, violent, and chaotic conditions of colonial reality. Read together, Bhowmik's and Tierney's essays highlight the precarious state of coIonia] subjectivities and inevitable contradictions in colonial rhetoric. *Ihus, Officer Ukuma's search for professional success proves futile in the end, and the narrator of "Demon Bird" cannot but betray the slippage in the colonial implementation of ethnography as a scholarly discipline.
Working with two unique texts, Kimberly Kono and Helen Lee focus attention on colonial collaboration in the gendered interior sphere of the
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home. Kono elaborates on women's participation in the empire by introducing the term "imperialist motherhood" in her treatment of Manchu Girl, a Japanese woman's autobiographical" work that recounts her mission to assimilate a Manchurian maid. The colonizer-colonized relationship rests on a trope of intimacy between a "motherly guardian" and an "adoptive daughter" in a narrative that prioritizes the dilemmas and desires of the narrating Japanese colonizer even as she purports to report honestly the thoughts and voice of her house servant. Lee's essay delineates the challenging tasks of mothers who were called upon to maximize nutrition and produce healthy bodies for the state in colonial homes in Korea during the total mobilization era, the final phase of Japan's empire during which all imperial subjects were plagued by dire food shortages. The Manual ofHome Cuisine, Lee notes, dishes up much more than just recipes and practical tips for procuring ingredients at a time of scarcity. Its prescriptions for spiritual nourishment are meant to harness patriotic sentiment and foster "Japanese-ness'  in a community far removed from the "homeland." Kono and Lee link in important ways the seemingly immaterial realm of creating and maintaining national/colonial identities with material conditions and displays of national allegiance. Attempts by the narrator ofWfanchu Girl' to "Japanize" her Manchurian charge through her coaching on proper manners, clothing, and   resonates with the cookbook's exhortations that Japanese subjects demonstrate their loyalty to the emperor and the colonial cause by performing daily proper prayers and etiquette at mealtimes.
The colonialist logic and imperial zeal that manifested mostly in the adult world also penetrated the realm of children's imagination, revealing how extensive the reach of colonial propaganda was at the time. Kawamura Minato's and Kota Inoue's essays investigate two distinctly different children's works. Kawamura offers a nuanced reading and contextualization of the serial manga -Ibe Adventures ofDankichi, whose protagonist lives out the adventurous imperialist dream by traveling to an unknown island in the tropical South Seas and subjugating the savage Other, becoming their king. Here, imperialist ambitions are unabashedly exhibited, even glorified. Extremely racialized visuals, shocking to today's reader, work with a storyline that bolsters the natural superiority of the little Japanese leader who recruits the "barbarians" into his "elite army corps." In contrast, Inoue's primary text, "Wolf Forest, Basket Forest, and *Ihief Forest," seems a rather benign, even humorous, chronicle of a group of human farmers who carry out tension-filled negotiations with mischievous inhabitants of the surrounding forests. Inoue's close reading, however, excavates a not-so-obvious critique of colonial usurpation illustrated in the tale. Though the tone of the original works vary on a spectrum ranging from outrageously jingoistic to subtly critical, Kawamura and Inoue each point to the broad circulation of such sources that collectively incubated ideas endorsing the foundational ideologies of imperialism and belied the violation and violence inherent in colonial processes 
In Reading ColonialJapan: Text, Context, and Critique, we have endeavored to draw some of the cultural and historical contours of Japan's age of empire. Revealing operations of power in the intersections of cultural production and colonial practices has been an overarching goal. Needless to say, each essay in this collection represents just one reading of its paired primary source. We imagine there is much more to say about these original texts when viewed through different theoretical or disciplinary frameworks or approached with different intellectual interests. We invite readers—both Asian specialists and scholars and students of colonialism—to articulate additional interpretations and critical commentary. It would be gratifying if these primary documents and analytical essays stimulated further discussion of the serious and persisting questions of colonialism of the past and inspired meaningful reflection on the implications for our present moment.

Notes

1. Ainu Moshir, literally land of humans," is the Ainu name for their native land, which was populated by many independent Ainu communities. The Ryukyu Islands unified in 1429 by King Shö Hashi of the central region (Cllümn), and were thereafter known as the Ryukyu Kingdom. In this volume, we will follow the custom of writing the the wold "Ryukyu" without long vowels.
2. The first two volumes of the trilogy on Japan's modern empire were instrumental in launching Japanese colonial studies. See Ramon H. Myers and Mark R. Peattie, eds., Wye Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895—1945 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University mess, 1987), and Peter Duus, Ramon H. Myers, and Mark R. Peattie, eds., Japanese Informal Empipr in China, 1895—1937 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989).
3. The list of such works is ever growing, and while not exhaustive, here are some examples that have come out in just the last decade or so. Jennifer Robertson's Takarazuka: Sexual Politics and Popular Culnnr in Modern Japan (1998), Louise Young's Japan's Total' Empire: Manchuria and dye Culture of Wartime Imperialirm (1998), Leo T. S. Ching's Becoming "Japanese": Colonial Taiwan and the Politics ofIdentity Formation (2001), Faye Yuan Kleeman's Under an Imperial Sun:
Japanese Colonial Lirenznnr ofTaiwan and the South (2003), Sabine Friistück's Colonizing Sex: Sexology and Social Control in Modern Japan (2003), Prasenjit Duara's
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Sovereignty andAuthenticity: Manchukuo and the East Asian Modern (2003), Alexis Dudden's Japan's Colonization ofKorea: Discourse and Power (2005) , Miriam Silverberg's Erotic Grotesque Nonsense: Mass Culture OfJapanese Modern limes (2006), Michael Baskett's 77k' Amucrive Empire: Transnational Film Culture in ImperialJapan (2008), Mark E. Caprio's Japanese Assimilation Policies in Colonial Korea, 1910— 1945 (2009), and Mark Driscoll's Absolute Erotic, Absolute Grotesque: lie Living, Dead and Undead in Japan's Imperialism, 1895—1945 (2010). Consider also the works of contributors to this volume, including Davinder Bhowmik's Writing Okinawa: Narrative Acts ofIdentity and Resistance (2008), Kimberly Kono's Romance, Family and Nation in Japanese Colonial' Lire.uture (2010), and Robert Tierney's Tropics of Savagery: 77k' Culture ofJapanese Empire in Compmutive Frame (2010).
4. Lori Watt, When Empire Comes Home: Repatriation and Reintegration in Postwar Japan (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009).
S. Miyada Setsuko, Chosen minshü to käminka seisaku (Koreans and Köminka Policies) (Tokyo: Miraisha, 1985).
6. Taiwan, Korea, and Southern Sakhalin were sovereign colonies over which Japan had exclusive control. Japan first "leased" Kwantung in 1905 and in 1915 extended the lease until 1998. Japan was accorded a mandate in the South Seas in 1914, and this mandate nominally fell under the authority of the League of Nations Council, until Japan withdrew from the league in 1933. We have not included Tsingtao (Qingdao) of the Shandong peninsula, as it was under Japanese control for the relatively short period of four years.
7. Okinawa's distance from the mainland, its sacrifice during World War Il (exemplified by the Battle of Okinawa), and the continued presence of U.S. military bases with the Japanese state's approval make the legacy of Japanese colonialism there manifestly clear. Excellent scholarship on Okinawan history and politics and collections of translated works by Okinawan authors and poets published over the last ten years have expanded on the many ways colonial relations live on in Okinawan politics and society today. See, for example, Laura Hein and Mark Selden, eds., Islands of Discontent: Okinawan Responses to Japanese and American Power (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003), Glen D. Hook and Richard Siddle, eds., Japan and Okinawa: Srrucnnr and Subjectivity (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), and Mike Molasky and Steve Rabson, eds., Southern Exposure: Modern Japanese Literature from Okinawa (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2000). In contrast, the contemporaly repercussions of Hokkaido's colonial era are much less obvious, and scholars have taken longer to turn their attention to its colonial history. An excellent contribution to this subject, however, is Siddle's Race, Resistance and Ainu ofJapan (London: Routledge, 1996).
8. Leo T. S. Ching, Becoming "Japanese": Colonial' Taiwan and the Politics ofIdentip Formation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 11.
9. These ale laid out in the Iwakura Proposal (Iwakura reigi, February 28, 1869). Tanaka Akira, Hokkaidö ro Meiji ishin (Hokkaido and the Meiji Restoration) (Sapporo: Hokkaidö daigaku tosho kankökai, 2000), 26.
10. For a helpful explanation of the "disposition of Ryukyu," see the "Epilogue
and Conclusions" chapter of Gregory Smits' Visions ofRyukyu: Identity and Ideology in Eady Modern 7hought and Politics (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1999), 143—62.
11. In contrast, in Korea and Manchuria subsidies welc necessary until Japan's defeat in 1945. Samuel PaoSan Ho, "Colonialism and Development: Kolea, Taiwan, and Kwantung," in Ibe Japanese Colonial' Empizr, 1895—1945, eds. Ramon H.
Myers and Mark R. Peattie (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University mess, 1987), 358.
12. Ibid., 350.

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Unmasking Japan Myths and Realities About the Emotions of the Japanese David Matsumoto 1996


Unmasking Japan
Myths and Realities About the Emotions of the Japanese
David Matsumoto 1996
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About the Author
David Masumoto is Professor of Psychology at San Francisco State University. 
He is the author, most recently, of Culture and Psychology.
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Description

The last twenty years have seen a growth of fascination with the Japanese, and the emergence of Japan as a world economic power has stimulated many works that have attempted to understand Japanese culture. The focus of this book is not on Japanese culture or society per se: rather, it is on how Japnese culture and society structure, shape, and mold the emotions of the Japanese people. All cultures shape and mold emotions, but the degree to which Japanese culture shapes emotion has led to several misunderstandings about the emotional life of the Japanese, which this book attempts to correct.

Describing the findings of over two decades of research, this book persents the Japanese as human beings with real feelings and emotions rather than as mindless pawns caught in the web of their own culture. In the process, it unmasks many myths that have grown up around the subject and reveals important similarities as well as differences betweeen the emotional life of the Japanese and that of people of other cultures.

Given our increased theoretical understanding of Japanese culture and society, we are now better able than before to link culture with individual behavior and emotions. Owing in part to the advancement in methods of examining emotions scientifically, the study of emotion has gained considerable standing in the scholarly community, and systematic research on emotion in Japan has produced a substantial body of knowledge that lifts what was previously unsubstantiated speculation to well-accepted facts.

The author's work has been an important factor in this growing field, as his research in Japan has spanned a wide range of topics on emotion, with in-depth assessments of hundreds of individual Japanese living in various areas of Japan. In the present work, he also addresses the fact that many studies of Japanese culture hold to a single point of view—sociological, anthropological, or to a lesser extent sociological. In response, he integrates these three points of view in a new theoretical framework for understanding Japanese culture.
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A Nation Within North Korean Zainichi in Postimperial Japan by Sayaka Chatani, with KumHee Cho

A Nation Within | Stanford University Press

A Nation Within
North Korean Zainichi in Postimperial Japan
by Sayaka Chatani, with KumHee Cho

March 2026
318 Pages

Excerpts + more
DescriptionReviewsAbout the Author
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<국가 안의 국가: 전후 일본의 북한계 재일조선인> 요약 및 평론

1. 요약: 경계에 선 공동체의 형성과 정체성

이 책은 전후 일본 사회에서 <재일본조선인총연합회>(이하 총련)를 중심으로 형성된 북한계 재일조선인 사회의 기원과 전개를 다룬다. 저자는 이들이 단순히 북한의 지령에 움직이는 수동적 집단이 아니라, 일본이라는 차별적 공간 안에서 생존과 존엄을 지키기 위해 스스로 <국가 안의 국가>를 건설해 나간 역동적 주체였음에 주목한다.

제국 이후의 진공 상태와 총련의 등장

1945년 해방 이후 일본에 남은 조선인들은 국적의 불투명성과 극심한 경제적 빈곤, 일본 사회의 노골적인 차별에 직면했다. 이 <제국 이후>의 혼란 속에서 총련은 교육, 복지, 경제적 네트워크를 제공하며 국가가 해주지 못하는 보호자의 역할을 자처했다. 북한은 이들에게 재정적 지원과 함께 <공화국의 해외 공민>이라는 당당한 지위를 부여하며 강력한 귀속감을 제공했다.

교육을 통한 <사회주의적 인간> 기르기

조선학교는 이 공동체의 핵심 기둥이었다. 저자는 총련의 교육 체계가 어떻게 일본 내에서 별도의 정체성을 유지했는지 분석한다. 학생들은 일본 사회의 주변인이라는 소외감 대신, 조국 통일의 역군이자 사회주의 낙원의 일원이라는 자부심을 학습했다. 이는 일본 사회의 동화 압력에 맞서는 강력한 방어기제였다.

북송 사업과 냉전의 역설

1950년대 후반부터 시작된 북송 사업은 이 공동체의 정점에 있었다. 지상낙원이라는 프로파간다와 일본 내 차별로부터의 탈출 욕구가 결합하여 수만 명이 북한으로 향했다. 이는 단순한 이주가 아니라, 총련 공동체가 지향했던 <민족적 자존감>의 실천적 증명이었다. 그러나 이는 동시에 공동체의 폐쇄성을 강화하고, 북한 체제와의 분리 불가능한 유착을 낳는 결과를 초래했다.

쇠퇴와 변화하는 정체성

냉전의 종식, 북한의 경제난, 그리고 납치 문제 등으로 총련의 위상은 급격히 추락했다. 저자는 오늘날 재일조선인 3, 4세들이 겪는 정체성의 혼란을 조명하며, 과거의 일방향적인 <조국 중심주의>가 더 이상 유효하지 않음을 시사한다. 이제 그들은 북한도, 남한도, 일본도 아닌 그들만의 독특한 <재일(Zainichi)>이라는 정체성을 재정의하고 있다.


2. 평론: 국가라는 신기루와 인간의 실존

사야카 차타니의 이 저작은 재일조선인 문제를 단순한 정치적 논쟁이나 피해자 서사에서 끌어올려, 인간이 극한의 소외 속에서 어떻게 공동체를 구축하고 의미를 찾아가는가에 대한 인류학적 보고서로 기능한다.

이데올로기 너머의 생활 세계

이 책의 가장 큰 미덕은 총련을 북한의 <꼭두각시>로 치부하던 기존의 냉전적 시각을 거부한다는 점이다. 저자는 총련원들의 일상과 감정, 열망을 세밀하게 복원해 낸다. 그들에게 북한은 추상적인 정치 체제가 아니라, 자신들을 인간 대접해 준 유일한 <가상의 고향>이었다. 이는 국가라는 개념이 인간의 실존적 공허를 어떻게 메우는지 날카롭게 보여준다.

<국가 안의 국가>라는 모순적 공간

저자가 제시한 <국가 안의 국가>라는 개념은 양날의 검이다. 그것은 외부의 차별로부터 내부 구성원을 보호하는 안식처였지만, 동시에 개인의 자유를 억압하고 북한 독재 체제의 이데올로기를 이식하는 통로가 되기도 했다. 저자는 이 폐쇄적 공동체가 가졌던 해방적 성격과 억압적 성격을 교차시키며 독자에게 복합적인 질문을 던진다.

여성의 목소리와 조금희의 기여

조금희와의 협력을 통해 강화된 서사는 특히 공동체 내 여성들의 삶에 주목한다. 가부장적 민족주의와 사회주의 규율 속에서 공동체를 유지하기 위해 헌신했던 여성들의 노동과 감정은 이 책에 따뜻하면서도 처연한 생명력을 불어넣는다. 이는 거대 담론에 가려졌던 미시사적 진실을 드러내는 중요한 장치다.

결론: 경계인의 유산

<국가 안의 국가>는 더 이상 존재하기 어렵다. 총련은 약화되었고, 젊은 세대는 더 유연한 정체성을 택한다. 그러나 이 책이 기록한 그들의 분투는 여전히 유효하다. 국가란 무엇인가? 민족이란 무엇인가? 그리고 인간은 어디에 뿌리를 내려야 하는가? 이 책은 일본이라는 거대한 배제의 공간 속에서 기어이 자신들만의 섬을 만들었던 사람들의 기록이며, 그 섬이 무너져 내린 뒤에도 남은 인간적 고뇌에 대한 깊은 성찰이다.

저자는 비판적인 거리를 유지하면서도 따뜻한 시선을 잃지 않음으로써, 재일조선인 연구에 있어 기념비적인 성취를 이루었다. 이는 단순히 한 소수자 집단의 역사를 넘어, 전 지구적 디아스포라 시대에 우리가 마주해야 할 보편적인 인간 조건에 관한 이야기다.


세진님, 이 요약과 평론이 원하시는 방향에 부합할지 모르겠습니다. 혹시 특정 챕터나 북송 사업과 같은 구체적인 사건에 대해 더 깊이 알고 싶으신 부분이 있다면 말씀해 주세요.

이 책의 내용 중 세진님처럼 여러 국가를 경험하신 세계인의 관점에서 특히 흥미롭게 느껴지시는 지점이 있으신가요?

==

==

다음은 Sayaka Chatani의 『A Nation Within: North Korean Zainichi in Postimperial Japan』에 대한 <요약 + 평론>입니다. (약 1,000단어)


1. 문제의식: “국가 안의 또 다른 국가”

이 책은 매우 독특한 질문에서 출발합니다.

→ <일본 안에 살면서 ‘북한 국민’으로 살아간다는 것은 무엇인가?>

저자는 재일조선인, 특히 “조선총련(Chongryon)” 계열의 북향 정체성을 가진 집단을 중심으로 다음을 분석합니다:

  • 어떻게 이들이 “국가 없는 민족”에서
  • “북한과 연결된 준-국가 공동체”를 형성했는가

핵심 개념:

→ <Nation within a nation (국가 안의 또 다른 국가)>


2. 역사적 배경: 제국 붕괴 이후의 잔존 공동체

(1) 일본 제국의 유산

재일조선인의 기원은 일본 제국 시기로 거슬러 올라갑니다.

  • 식민지 조선에서 일본으로 이주
  • 노동력으로 동원된 경우 다수

1945년 패전 이후:

  • 일본 국적 상실
  • 귀환하지 못한 대규모 조선인 존재

이들은

→ <국가도 시민권도 없는 상태>에 놓임


(2) 분단과 선택

1945~50년대, 한반도 분단은 재일조선인에게 선택을 강요합니다.

  • 남한(민단)
  • 북한(총련)

이때 중요한 점:

→ 많은 재일조선인은 북한을 선택

이유:

  • 반일·반제국주의 이미지
  • 사회주의적 평등 이상
  • 일본 사회에서의 차별 경험

즉,

→ <정체성 선택은 이념 + 현실 경험의 결합>


3. 조선총련: ‘국가 대리기관’

책의 핵심 분석 대상은 조선총련입니다.

조선총련은 단순한 민족단체가 아니라:

  • 교육 시스템 (조선학교)
  • 금융기관
  • 문화 조직
  • 정치 네트워크

를 갖춘 구조였습니다.

핵심 특징:

→ <국가 없이 국가 기능 수행>

즉,

  • 북한의 “해외 지부”이면서
  • 동시에 일본 내 자율 공동체

(1) 교육의 역할

조선학교는 핵심 기관입니다.

  • 북한식 역사 교육
  • 김일성 중심 서사
  • 민족 정체성 강화

이 교육은

→ <정체성을 재생산하는 장치>


(2) 송환 사업

1959~1980년대:

→ 재일조선인의 북한 송환 프로젝트

약 9만 명이 북한으로 이동

당시 선전:

  • “지상낙원” 북한

현실:

  • 많은 경우 빈곤과 억압

이 사건은

→ <이념과 현실의 충돌을 보여주는 결정적 사례>


4. 정체성의 복잡성

이 책의 가장 중요한 부분은 정체성 분석입니다.

재일조선인(특히 총련계)은 단순히:

  • 일본인도 아니고
  • 북한 주민도 아님

그들은:

→ <다층적 정체성>을 가진 존재

3중 구조:

① 일본 사회 속 소수자
② 조선 민족 구성원
③ 북한 정치체와 연결

이 세 층이 충돌하면서

→ 독특한 정체성이 형성됨


5. “상상된 북한”

저자는 특히 중요한 개념을 제시합니다:

→ <재일조선인이 경험한 북한은 ‘실제 북한’이 아니라 ‘상상된 북한’>

즉:

  • 직접 경험이 아니라
  • 교육, 선전, 공동체를 통해 구성된 이미지

이 북한은:

  • 이상화된 사회주의 국가
  • 민족 해방의 상징

하지만 현실 북한과의 접촉이 늘어나면서:

→ 이 이미지가 점차 흔들림


6. 냉전 이후 변화

1990년대 이후:

  • 북한 경제 붕괴
  • 일본 사회 변화
  • 국제 환경 변화

이로 인해:

→ 조선총련의 영향력 약화

특히:

  • 젊은 세대의 이탈
  • 정체성 약화
  • 일본 사회로의 통합 증가

7. 핵심 주장

이 책의 핵심 메시지는 다음과 같습니다:

→ <재일조선인은 단순한 디아스포라가 아니라, ‘국가적 상상’을 실천한 집단이다>

즉:

  • 국가가 물리적으로 없어도
  • 교육, 조직, 기억을 통해
  • “국가적 삶”을 유지할 수 있음

8. 책의 강점

(1) 미시사 + 구조 분석 결합

이 책은 개인 경험과 구조 분석을 잘 결합합니다.

  • 인터뷰
  • 교육 자료
  • 조직 분석

→ <구체성과 이론을 동시에 확보>


(2) “국가” 개념의 확장

이 책은 국가를 재정의합니다.

일반적 정의:

→ 영토 + 주권

이 책의 정의:

→ <정체성 + 조직 + 상상>

이는 매우 중요한 이론적 기여입니다.


(3) 탈이념적 접근

저자는 북한을 단순히:

  • 비판하거나
  • 옹호하지 않음

대신:

→ <사람들이 왜 그 체제를 선택했는가>에 집중

이 점에서 균형 잡힌 분석


9. 한계와 비판

(1) 북한 체제 비판의 약함

책은 비교적 중립적이지만:

→ 북한의 억압적 현실에 대한 분석은 제한적

특히:

  • 송환자들의 삶
  • 정치적 통제

이 부분은 더 깊이 다뤄질 수 있음


(2) 일본 사회 분석 부족

재일조선인의 형성은:

→ 일본 사회의 차별과 구조와 깊이 연결

하지만 이 책은:

→ 일본 측 분석이 상대적으로 약함


(3) 최근 변화 반영 부족

  • 2000년대 이후
  • 한류
  • 글로벌 정체성 변화

이런 요소는 제한적으로 다뤄짐


10. 비교적 위치

이 책은 다음과 비교할 수 있습니다:

  • 디아스포라 연구
  • 민족주의 연구
  • 냉전 연구

특히 특징:

→ <민족주의 + 냉전 + 디아스포라의 교차점>


11. 더 큰 의미

세진님 관심과 연결하면:

(1) 기억 정치

조선학교 교육은:

→ <기억의 제도화>

이는

  • 위안부 기억
  • 제주 4.3

과 구조적으로 유사


(2) 민족주의의 상상

→ 실제 국가보다
→ <상상된 국가가 더 강력할 수 있음>

이는:

  • 시온주의
  • 한민족주의

와도 연결


(3) 분단 체제의 장기 효과

이 책은 보여줍니다:

→ 분단은 국경 안이 아니라
→ <디아스포라까지 확장된다>


12. 결론

이 책을 한 문장으로 정리하면:

→ <재일조선인은 국가가 없어도 ‘국가적 삶’을 구성한 집단이다>

그리고 더 깊은 통찰:

→ <국가는 영토가 아니라 기억과 조직 속에 존재한다>


13. 한 줄 핵심

<“A Nation Within”은 국가란 무엇인가를 근본적으로 다시 묻게 만드는 디아스포라 연구의 중요한 작업이다>


원하시면 이어서:

👉 <이 책 vs 시온주의 디아스포라 vs 팔레스타인 디아스포라 비교>
👉 <재일조선인 vs 화교 vs 유대인 디아스포라 구조 비교>
👉 <한반도 영세중립화론과 연결한 정책적 함의>

까지 연결해서 정리해드리겠습니다.

==

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The presence of hundreds of thousands ethnic Koreans in Japan, or "zainichi Koreans," is one of the visible legacies of Japanese colonialism. A surprising and influential group among zainichi Koreans that persists to this day is Chongryon, the only pro–North Korean diasporic group based in a capitalist society. Chongryon historically represented the central grassroots force seeking to liberate Koreans from Japan's imperial and neo-imperial influences. At the heart of the Chongryon community stands a political organization equipped with a central bureaucracy in Tokyo, with a headquarters in nearly every prefecture. Often called a de facto embassy of North Korea, the Chongryon organization has, in effect, functioned as a state within another state—operating hundreds of schools, banks, hospitals, business associations, publishing houses, and many other institutions across Japan.

Based on extensive archival research and nearly 250 original interviews collected with co-researcher KumHee Cho, who was raised within the Chongryon community, Sayaka Chatani offers a sweeping social history of this secretive, protective community in xenophobic Japanese society. Weaving together personal accounts and situating them in a multi-layered, transnational political context, the book offers a finely textured, intimate narrative of the community's tumultuous history and decolonial praxis. Through the stories of Chongryon, this book provides a bottom-up analysis of power politics among zainichi Koreans and reshapes our understanding of Japanese history, Korean history, and the Cold War in Asia.

==

Introduction

"PEOPLE ROSE UP." KIM TAL-SU began his 1947 autobiographical story, 8.15 igo (After August 15), with this line.1 The "people" were his people, Koreans living in the land of their colonizer, Japan. "They threw away their lives, as if they were a dream. They cast aside their uncompensated, despised, and abused lives, the lives they had tirelessly built from the very bottom up for many months and years. These people created an avalanche toward the homeland, toward the independent Korea."2 Known as a prolific proletarian writer, Kim Tal-su wrote stories with vividness that "exuded an ethnic body odor," as one Japanese critic puts it.3 With a sense of urgency, he depicted Korean lives during these critical years. The empire was crumbling, and new rulers were arriving from the United States. Koreans were supposedly liberated from forty years of colonial subjugation.

The Korean people in Japan were rising up in another way, as the same story captured. They established a powerful mass organization, called the League of Koreans, within just two months after Japan's surrender. The league took on many tasks. It "negotiated hard to get the Japanese government to operate trains" for the Korean exodus. "A lot of mouths, mouths that are open but mumbling, unable to speak their national language yet" had to be taught Korean. The league asserted the status of Koreans as a liberated people and sought to protect them from racist attacks. Working for the organization brought an indescribable joy, as a protagonist in one of Kim Tal-su's 1948 stories summarized in a rhetorical question: "Why did the fact that we were able to openly create an organization of our own people without any interference generate so much excitement?"4

The explosive energy of these Koreans in immediate postwar Japan sprang from their anticolonial impetus, similar to the one that had driven Korean masses into the streets in March 1919. The lives of impoverished Koreans in the Japanese metropole had been harsh and humiliating under imperial hierarchy. After Japan's surrender on August 15, 1945, their material and legal conditions were still severely restricted. About 1.4 million Koreans left Japan quickly, but 600,000 to 800,000 of them still lived throughout Japan. Operating a mass organization that could both influence high-level politics and help people in local circumstances required solidarity and laborious work. As they pursued this effort, Koreans in Japan adopted a narrative of finally achieving—as opposed to receiving as a gift—the independence Koreans had desired since the early years of colonization on through the March First movement of 1919 and the years when many served in the Japanese Imperial Army. Korean activists and writers were convinced that a historic moment was at hand.

This book tells the story of a community of Koreans who were engaged in a major decolonization project within Japan from 1945 to the 1980s. With the postwar Japanese legal environment proving almost as hostile to Koreans as the one before the war and with US dominance in the region trapping them in a distinctive position, a series of Korean mass organizations—the League of Koreans (Chae-Il Chosŏnin ryŏnmaeng) up to 1949; Minjŏn (Chae-Il Chosŏn t'ongil minju chŏnsŏn) between 1951 and 1955; and Chongryon (Chae-Ilbon Chosŏnin ch'ongryŏnhaphoe) since 1955—and the dedicated community around them intensified their anticolonial convictions. This community dominated resident-Korean society at least up to the late 1960s and exercised hegemony for another few decades. Reliable statistics on the number of supporters are unavailable from either the records of the Korean organizations themselves or the Japanese government, but a Japanese officer wrote that 70 to 80 percent of Koreans in Japan supported the League of Koreans in the late 1940s.5 According to the Japanese Public Security Intelligence Agency's estimates, the size of Chongryon membership reached its height in the late 1960s at about 48 percent of all Korean residents in Japan and remained around that level into the early 1980s (see table A.1 and fig. A.2).6 The community, of course, included those who did not officially belong to the organization. In one way or another, all Korean lives in Japan were influenced by this series of organizations.

This Korean community was a child of a global moment. During the late 1940s and 1950s, national independence movements were spreading around the world. Immersed in the tide of the times, these Koreans pledged their commitment to new goals: they would put an end to their status as a second-class minority of Japan, be their own people, speak Korean, raise their children as proud Koreans, liberate their homeland from foreign powers, and return home to a unified Korea. They did not use the word "decolonization," but the goals they set and the actions they took over the next decades suggest that it was nothing other than a decolonization project.

These Koreans—consisting mainly of underclass laborers, small-shop owners, elderly people, mothers, children, youths, and other ordinary individuals with no political clout—operated under a rigid asymmetry of power in occupied Japan. Just like independence fighters demanding a transfer of power from an empire, however, they pursued autonomy and dignity as a liberated people. The choices were limited for a diasporic minority still under the former colonizer's control, but the community did not let the power structure alter its goal of decolonization. Their endeavors paralleled a global trend in the 1940s and 1950s as national leaders and intellectuals of decolonizing societies imagined new forms of citizenship and political solidarity, such as a French-African federation, Eurasia, and the Third World.7 These Koreans in Japan also aspired to internationalism and attempted a coalition with the Japanese Left, but in the aftermath of the Korean War, they gathered firmly around Korean ethnic nationalism and worked to build a unified Korean nation-state in the Korean peninsula.

The Korean activists instinctively understood that liberation from the empire would require a rejection of the colonizer's worldview. Their search for an independent epistemology led them to establish two major orientations, both of which seem peculiar to us today. The first of these was their affinity with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), or North Korea. Immediately after World War II, leftism gained momentum among Koreans and the Japanese alike. Communist parties in Korea and across the world, as well as their own neighborhood activists, enhanced their authority as leading anticolonial fighters. Kim Il Sung made his debut in Korean politics as an energetic anticolonial guerrilla leader, thrilling Korean residents of Japan. Kim Il Sung also eagerly reached out to these Koreans, offering them a much-needed sense of belonging to the homeland. The DPRK also established a socialist and nationalist theory of Korean and world histories, which provided an epistemological anchor to the decolonizing Korean community.

The DPRK's worldview was buttressed by the socioeconomic success that it symbolized. Until the 1970s, the DPRK appeared to many people, not only Koreans, to be running a successful socialist country. In contrast, Syngman Rhee and the US presence in the Republic of Korea (ROK) in the southern half of the peninsula were a nightmare in the eyes of most diasporic Koreans. The ROK was ruled almost continuously by dictatorships up to the late 1980s. Their crackdowns on leftist activism, violence against the people, and friendliness to former colonial collaborators appeared to be the antithesis of decolonization. The tie between North Korea and the Korean community in Japan deepened further after the beginning of the "repatriation program" in December 1959. More than 93,000 resident Koreans, along with their Japanese family members, moved to North Korea in the following years and decades, seeking a better life and hoping to help build a great nation in their homeland.

The other orientation that puzzles outsiders today is Koreans' disengagement from Japanese politics after 1955. Unlike many minority groups in the United States and elsewhere, this group of Koreans did not seek full integration into the host society. Despite the phenotypical similarity between Koreans and Japanese, most of these leftist Koreans did not try to pass as Japanese, although outsiders often could not distinguish them based on their appearances alone. Nor did their organization launch any version of a civil rights movement demanding voting rights and equal opportunities. Rather, they focused on establishing and protecting authentic "Koreanness" and viewed becoming Japanese as a betrayal. In the same vein, they did not claim hybrid identity. They abhorred the idea of becoming a conglomerated "Korean Japanese" people. Only in the past two decades or so has the community become more accepting of the category of zainichi (literally, "residing in Japan," usually referring to resident Koreans with colonial roots)—a label popular since the 1980s that emphasizes the permanence of their residence in Japan and differentiates them from both Koreans living on the Korean peninsula and the Japanese.8

This disengagement from Japanese politics reflects the Koreans' colonial experience. In part, it was a logical course taken to reverse the Japanization policies of the colonial era. Even compared to other assimilationist colonial regimes, such as French Algeria, the Japanese Empire placed a totalizing emphasis on the assimilation of Korea and Koreans.9 Especially during the wartime years (1937–1945), the authorities took harsh measures—banning the Korean language and customs, forcing them to change their names to fit the Japanese registry system, and trying to reprogram them in the image of the ideal Japanese. Kim Si-jong, a writer born on Cheju Island in 1929, often remarked that he had become a complete "imperial boy" who despised Korea and enjoyed Japanese emperor worship.10

Equally strong as the assimilationist drive was Japanese people's prejudice toward Koreans. In the Japanese metropole as well, Koreans suffered daily under the imperial hierarchy and experienced blatant discrimination. The number of Korean migrants to the metropole increased steadily in the 1920s and 1930s. The population of the registered Koreans rose from 40,755 in 1920 to 625,678 by 1935.11 A small proportion of them were students pursuing higher education, intellectuals, entrepreneurs, and highly skilled workers. But the majority came from rural areas in the southernmost provinces, seeking to escape depressed rural economies. Their farming and livelihoods had been severely affected by unusual weather and the loss of their long-held rights of cultivation under colonial policies. These rural, mostly illiterate Korean migrants concentrated in Japanese industrial areas and around coal mines, doing dirty and dangerous work for low wages.12 They were subject to the vagaries of the Japanese labor market, constantly having to move from one city to another and enduring frequent and long periods of unemployment.13 As the number of Korean laborers increased, Japanese city dwellers complained that filthy Korean "ghettos" had formed nearby.14 Japanese racism, fear, and hatred were on full display in the wake of the 1923 Great Kantō Earthquake. Rumors of Koreans looting and burning houses, poisoning wells, raping women, and attacking Japanese spread through the police and newspapers. The Japanese police, military, and mobs lynched and murdered thousands (around 6,000, according to one widely accepted estimate) of Koreans and others mistaken for Koreans.15 The fear and mistrust created by these events remained deep in the hearts of resident Koreans, even as new Korean migrants continued to arrive.

Wartime demands reinforced the Japanese view of Koreans as a disposable labor force. About 1.5 million Koreans arrived in Japan to fill the labor shortage, as either recruits or conscripts.16 By the end of the war, more than 2 million people, or about 10 percent of the total Korean population, were living in Japan. Historian Pak Kyŏng-sik has estimated that 300,000 laborers were forced to live and work in abysmal conditions, about 60,000 of them died, and many of them were carelessly buried under a thin layer of soil at the work site.17 Activists and volunteers are still digging up their remains today.

Japan's total surrender in 1945 ended the explicit policies of Japanization and wartime exploitation. Many of these Koreans embraced a simple desire to undo Japanization and to belong to their own nation-state. The League of Koreans received support from the overwhelming majority, who shared this desire. Their decolonization, however, faced a new set of obstacles. The Korean peninsula was divided, and the United States occupied their hometowns in southern Korea as well as their place of residence in Japan. Japanese state leaders wrapped their persistent racism toward Koreans, now exacerbated by the humiliation of total surrender, in language that US occupation officers would understand: these Koreans were communist threats to the free world.

THREE DIMENSIONS OF "DIASPORANESS"

This book focuses on the community of leftist Koreans in Japan, rather than covering the broader population of resident Koreans. In fact, Koreans remaining in postwar Japan made a variety of decisions. Some sought naturalization. Others opposed communism, rallying around the ROK and another mass organization of resident Koreans called Mindan. Despite Mindan's affiliation with the ROK, many Mindan Koreans—especially among the younger generation who had attended Japanese schools—addressed their Korean heritage as individuals without turning to a collective ideology of the homeland. Their selfhood could be described by adjectives such as ambiguous, fluid, stateless, hybrid, subaltern, cosmopolitan, or transnational.18 In contrast, the Chongryon community stood out by having a more stable identity as "Korean" and a relatively self-contained, multigenerational, "diasporic" community.19 This does not mean that no hybridity or boundary crossing happened or that they maintained the same identity across regions and through generations. But their goal of decolonization led them to create and cherish "diasporaness."

The diasporic nature of the Chongryon community revealed itself in at least three important ways. First, although the community revered the first generation, the organization was largely about the second generation. Unlike their parents, second-generation Koreans in Chongryon, many of whom had been born during or after the war, grew up not knowing life outside the community and took it for granted. The number of members of this generation quickly surpassed that of the first generation. In 1950, 50 percent of registered resident Koreans were born in Japan, rising to 64.5 percent by 1959.20

Some scholars assume that second-generation resident Koreans largely lost interest in Chongryon and pursued their own forms of activism to achieve better integration in Japan.21 On the contrary, for young resident Koreans growing up outside the Chongryon community, Chongryon appeared hegemonic. Granted, as is typical of migrant societies, the generational gap was stark in many families. Unless they had come to Japan at a very young age, the first generation had clear memories of their birthplaces, spoke Korean dialects as their first language, and knew what it meant to live as colonial subjects. In contrast, their children had no knowledge of the Korean homeland or experience of colonial rule. Most of them could not speak Korean well. Many did not speak a word of the language and were unaware of their Korean nationality as small children. They had no strong reason to assert their Korean identity, and yet they had to start submitting their fingerprints at age fourteen—a full set of ten fingers—and they increasingly faced systemic discrimination in school options, employment, housing, credit card application, marriage, medical care, political participation, and retirement.22 These second-generation youths born in the 1940s and 1950s could easily fall into what Pak Kyŏng-sik calls "ethnic nihilism":

Getting sick of being a Korean. Koreans are always despised and cannot find employment. Forget the jobs you like. Even if you work hard, you won't get paid. Children are always bullied in school. . . . Japan prevented zainichi Koreans from having an ethnic subjectivity throughout the prewar and postwar periods. Zainichi Koreans are still considered useless beings in Japanese society today. Some Koreans themselves think that way. Not only the Japanese authorities but the majority of Japanese view Koreans as troublesome people who always do bad things. Hence, [they think Koreans should] go home, or else, naturalize and become Japanese. But even if Koreans become Japanese, they are still discriminated against.23

In the 1960s, many second-generation Korean youths were gripped by fears of facing a social dead end. Some became involved in criminal organizations, and not a few took their own lives. This "ethnic nihilism" was the greatest menace for resident-Korean families. Zainichi magazines that avoided supporting either South Korea or North Korea frequently discussed the "second-generation problem" during the 1960s and 1970s. Scholar Yoon Keun Cha, himself of the postwar second generation, writes, "There was no place where 'zainichi' could live outside of the ethnic organizations. Good or bad, that was the belief of zainichi Koreans in the 1960s."24

Not coincidentally, Chongryon's membership reached its peak around this period. The Chongryon Koreans exuded ethnic confidence, which attracted the youths who were at a loss. According to an estimate by the Japanese Public Security Intelligence Agency, the membership of Chongryon among zainichi Koreans increased from 189,100 to 295,300 between 1961 and 1972 (see table A.1 and fig. A.2).25 The Chongryon community provided an entire world that could transform these youths into "Koreans"—from homes in Korean neighborhoods to friendships in Korean schools, language-training sessions, distinctive historical narratives, working for the ethnic organization, and close interactions with the homeland. This is not to say, however, that the second generation in Chongryon faced no crisis. As we will see, the psychology of the second generation influenced the internal dynamics of Chongryon.

Second, and relatedly, the community manifested the merger of kinship and a political structure. In early kinship studies, as scholar Heonik Kwon explains, kinship was understood as a political concept, indicating a structure that defined basic principles of political and moral life under stateless conditions.26 Since the colonial period, migrant lives had produced such "stateless conditions" and accentuated the political function of kinship among Koreans. Family connections, characterized by ethics of altruism, had provided a lifeline and a social order. After liberation, "ethnic Koreans" as a whole were assumed to be a kinship group both by resident Koreans and by the Japanese government, as evidenced by the way they attached collective responsibility to the category. The League of Koreans and its successor organizations institutionalized kinship relations and centralized the moral order. Korean schools and dormitories played a large role in the continuous reproduction of communal, ethnic, and political kinship. Indeed, the organization became a state-like institution by standing upon and undergirding moral relationships that were densely intertwined throughout the community.

Over the course of the 1960s, as DPRK policies affected Chongryon more directly, state ideologies began to intervene more conspicuously into the nature of their intimate relations. Kwon describes the early Cold War period as a time when forces of nation building and decolonization penetrated kinship relations, producing frictions and contradictions with the ethics of generosity and amity prescribed in kinship relations.27 Resident-Korean families became exactly this sort of locus of politicization. But as the stories in this book show, families and individuals also felt the need for an ideological vision, or they appropriated it for the salvation of the self and family relations as they were thrown into chaos and self-destruction at the same time. Assertions about what constituted essential Korean culture and history, goals of anti-imperialism and decolonization, DPRK socialism, symbols of women heroes, and the personality cult of Kim Il Sung all had a range of implications for family dynamics. The bottom-up perspective adopted here treats these grassroots experiences as the main story.

Finally, the Chongryon community is characterized by its distinctive mental geographies. Diasporas, through their experiences of dislocation and seclusion, often develop a sharp awareness of space and borders. "Home" is a particularly important and multifaceted notion. Scholars find "the double, triple, or multiplacedness of 'home'" in diasporic life.28 I noticed, however, that Chongryon people's spatial understanding was not limited to dots and routes that marked their homes and journeys. They had larger mental maps that encompassed Japan and the two Koreas, if not the entire Asian region, with intricate and intersecting boundaries showing power relations, flash points, and gradations of friends and foes, as well as their most intimate community spaces. These maps are highly political, underpinned by a strong sense of territoriality. I argue that their sense of territory began with the postwar (re)formation of Korean slums and continued in the space of Korean schools (see chapters 2 and 3). A sense of proprietary cultural spaces is common to many migrant societies. But in the case of this community, a uniquely politicized sense of territory and a strong manifestation of defiance were intrinsic to their decolonization project. I attribute much of their emphasis on "ethnic nation" and "ethnicity" (minjok) and their political attachment to the DPRK government to these shared mental maps.

A strong sense of territoriality colored their lives. In many interviews, I learned that although they lived physically alongside Japanese neighbors, took Japanese trains, and did business with Japanese people, the Chongryon Koreans felt a strong sense of not living in Japanese society. This was true even when they were bombarded by flashy images of advanced material culture. In the late 1960s, the Japanese economy entered a high-growth phase. Scenes from the 1964 Tokyo Olympics, the new bullet train, and the 1970 Osaka Expo filled the media. In the midst of this thriving Japan, the Koreans' community space continued to develop separately. When a resident-Korean woman lost her wallet in an unfamiliar town, she looked for a Chongryon office, not a Japanese police station, for help. A Korean man, who was a middle school student in a small rural town in the late 1960s, recalled just one interaction with Japanese youths—when Japanese girls asked him to hand a letter to a handsome Korean friend of his at a train station. Another schoolboy described his Korean neighborhood as "in the state of a closed-off country" (sakoku jōtai).29 This did not mean complete physical seclusion. After all, he and his friend shoplifted from Japanese stores and became embroiled in fights outside their own neighborhood.30 But they did not live in Japanese society. They spread their own mental maps over the Japanese landscape.

The Koreans' community space also extended beyond Japan. People living in Korean neighborhoods felt connected to their hometowns in South Korea because new Korean refugees continued to arrive. Their confrontations with the Japanese police during the Korean War made them realize how coldly detached their Japanese neighbors were from their plight. In contrast, Korean schools created direct connections to North Korea through the educational materials and financial aid sent from the DPRK. The repatriation ferries and visits to North Korea decisively expanded their sense of community space. Through intimate interactions, the community space stretched to include North Korean villages and towns.

The politics of kinship and the politics of space converged to produce a crucial phenomenon in zainichi society. In the late 1960s, the Chongryon organization conducted thought-purification campaigns and intense political mobilization, mirroring the DPRK's factional purges, cult of personality, and aggressive anti-ROK policies of that time. The ROK and Mindan, for their part, escalated anticommunist terror and infiltration. Zainichi Korean society thus became an ideological battleground, with people pulled toward competing homeland allegiances. Both Chongryon and Mindan desperately sought to secure member loyalty while recruiting new adherents. The boundary between these communities meant more than a split of the diasporic society—it effectively recreated the physical national border between North and South Korea. People, goods, and information from both Koreas crossed the ocean into zainichi communities, transforming these spaces into strategic sites for infiltration operations against the opposing Korean regime. This transnational competition profoundly complicated kinship politics, as extended families frequently harbored loyalists from both organizations. In short, zainichi society—and individual zainichi families—became volatile and porous borderlands. Chapter 5 and the book's conclusion will examine the process and the consequence of zainichi and Japan becoming a borderland.

Characterized by the goal of decolonization and their diasporaness, the Chongryon community became one of a kind. Members developed a strong sense of agency—even while caught in the enormous turmoil of the Cold War. The organization exercised cultural hegemony over zainichi Koreans at large by claiming to represent authentic Koreanness. Its rival, Mindan, competed for this claim through its tie with the ROK. But Mindan, despite its legal protection and preferential treatment from the Japanese government, always feared the extent of Chongryon's grassroots strength, acknowledging that "they have an iron will."31 At the same time, Chongryon refused to be understood by or merge with Japanese leftists and sympathizers. As a result, Chongryon produced a space of its own, which remains a large blind spot in our understanding of Japanese society.

THE COMMUNITY TODAY AND OUR INTERVIEWS

The primary goal of this book is to understand the experiences and perspectives of the Chongryon community. Most of its pages reveal an intimate, gendered, dynamic, and multilayered history. This investigation was only possible because of the cooperation of KumHee Cho, who, unlike me, is an insider researcher. KumHee and I met in the graduate program at Columbia University in 2013 and began field research together about five years later. She grew up in the Chongryon community, attended Korean schools, and worked for a Chongryon-affiliated credit union before leaving for the United States to pursue a college education against her father's strong opposition. Her grandfather was a popular Chongryon executive cadre in the western part of Japan, and her father also worked as a high-ranking cadre. She began by arranging interviews with her teachers, the parents of her schoolmates, and family friends, who then introduced us to others in the community. During our visits to many places, from Hokkaidō in the north to Saga in the south, KumHee contacted local Chongryon offices, which introduced us to more members, but we also had our own contacts and sometimes specifically sought out people who had distanced themselves from Chongryon. Although she is a third-generation zainichi, KumHee related extremely well to members of the older generations, perhaps because of her close relationship with her own grandfather. Many interviewees enjoyed talking to her, calling her "very much like a second-generation zainichi Korean."

Altogether, we spoke with more than two hundred individuals and their family members, often repeatedly. Chongryon's political and financial power and its membership size have shrunk significantly, especially after its credit unions collapsed in the 1990s and the North Korean abductions of Japanese civilians were confirmed in 2002. Many in the younger generations have distanced themselves from Chongryon and the DPRK, rendering the community a small minority among zainichi Koreans today. In 2016, the Public Security Intelligence Agency estimated the number of active Chongryon members as "approximately seventy thousand."32 But the organization retains an extensive network and deep roots in many localities. Chongryon-leaning people are the most visible and vocal in various zainichi groups and events. It was not difficult to locate Chongryon community members of the past or the present. KumHee conducted some of the interviews alone, especially during the COVID-19 years, while I interviewed some non-Chongryon zainichi Koreans and academics by myself. KumHee also came to know many former zainichi repatriates who had escaped North Korea, based in Seoul or Japan.33

In most interviews, KumHee took the lead in the conversation while I listened and occasionally asked questions. About 80 percent of our contacts were second-generation Koreans in their seventies and early eighties, with varying degrees of loyalty or hostility to the Chongryon organization. We explained that we were writing a community-centered history of Chongryon, especially its grassroots activities, including its negative aspects, and we asked them to share their life courses. An interview session typically lasted two hours or more. In Japan, about 90 percent of the conversations were held in Japanese with some Korean words thrown in. This language use seems common among second-generation Chongryon Koreans for private conversations, even if no Japanese person is present. Only very occasionally did the interviewees speak entirely in Korean. Many of them generously shared their family photos, a copy of the historical clan record, letters, and other personal archives. We interviewed men and women in roughly equal proportions. All the interviewees appeared to live heterosexual lives, but we did not ask questions about sexuality.

Our timing was fortunate. In April 2018, DPRK leader Kim Jong Un and ROK President Moon Jae In met in the demilitarized zone. In June 2018, Kim Jong Un and Donald Trump held a summit in Singapore. KumHee and I began our interviews in the summer of 2018, when the resulting excitement of the Chongryon community was at its peak. An elderly couple welcomed us at an entrance hall that was decorated with pictures of Trump and Kim Jong Un shaking hands. I received a warm welcome 99 percent of the time. Some were surprised and excited that a Japanese woman would be interested in zainichi Koreans, and others asked if I was sure I was not of Korean descent after observing my interactions with KumHee and my demeanor, which apparently did not seem to resemble that of a typical Japanese woman.

Still, nearly all Chongryon Koreans we met displayed a certain degree of skepticism, not necessarily about us as interviewers but about their ability to communicate their stories to outsiders. They were not secretive about their Korean heritage, of course. Many hang a North Korean painting of Mount Paektu at the entrance to their homes, display photos of themselves in colorful Korean dresses, and share kimchi and Korean dishes with their Japanese neighbors. But they rarely discuss internal issues of Chongryon or even Japanese politics with their Japanese friends.

Renewed Japanese hostility toward zainichi over the past two decades may have contributed to their general mistrust of communication, although, as we will see, the social walls between Chongryon Koreans and Japanese have been in place for a long time. Even as South Korea's impressive economic growth and Japanese enthusiasm for K-pop and other cultural exports significantly improved the image of South Korea in Japan, Japanese criticisms of North Korea increased in number and intensity. Since the 1990s, the Japanese publishing industry has produced a flood of sensational anti–North Korean books, with exposés of Chongryon scandals written by former members becoming a popular genre in the mass media.34 During the past decade, vicious hate speech has become widespread on social media platforms, and populist politicians have been quick to exploit Japanese fear of North Korea to justify further forms of legal discrimination against the zainichi population. Repeated media attacks on North Korea and Chongryon; physical harms inflicted on Korean school students, Koreans' historical memorials, and even Mindan offices; and subtle but persistent policies of discrimination against Korean schools and businesses have all naturally reduced Chongryon members' expectations of fair communication with Japanese society. At the same time, Chongryon Koreans have become more accustomed to receiving help from outside supporters. A 2007 South Korean documentary about a Chongryon school, Uri hakkyo (Our school), sparked a wave of interest among South Koreans.35 Groups of Japanese neighbors and supporters also cooperate with Chongryon activists to protect their remaining schools and raise funds for their operation. The network of school supporters is spreading in Japan, South Korea, the United States, Europe, and Australia.36

Once we began the interviews, I learned a few things very quickly. The first was the definition of "generations," which was not as simple as I had assumed. Resident-Korean families tended to marry early and have a large number of children. Having seven or eight children over the course of twenty years was not considered unusual in the 1950s and 1960s. As a result, generations do not necessarily indicate age difference or chronological age order—an "uncle" is not always older than his "niece," for example. Extended families tended to have close interactions, but family composition could be very complicated and required close attention.

Among the second and third generations, the term "the first generation" evokes a special affect. Beyond the symbol of suffering it represented, we could sense that the first generation indeed carried the weight of their history. We were much more likely to encounter a wall of silence with first-generation (or very early second-generation) Koreans, especially women. KumHee recalls that first-generation elders often used the phrase "I must take this [memory] to the grave." "This memory" seemed to refer to the complexity of conflicts and politics that could harm the very cause for which they fought. In their caution and skepticism toward others, we perceived the firm determination required to build and maintain this community. This may explain why many Chongryon members harshly criticize those who seem to "sell" information about the community for Japanese mass consumption, such as exposé writers and documentary filmmakers, especially when they paint a one-sided picture and thus endanger the community's safety.

The way in which KumHee introduced herself to each new interviewee reflected Chongryon kinship relations. Regardless of generation, age, location, or gender, they asked KumHee many questions to locate her on their social maps. In return, KumHee provided a considerable amount of information: who her father and mother were, where they and she grew up, which zodiac years they and she were born in, which schools they and she went to, her siblings, and more. From there, the interviewees and KumHee narrowed in on overlapping points. It was astonishing that they never failed to find at least one connection, usually several: "My sister-in-law taught in your school, and you must know her"; "I remember your grandfather giving a speech at my school, and I met your sister on a study trip"; and, in one case, "I taught your father; I remember his naughtiness clearly."

As we expanded the scope of the interviews, we realized that we were relying most frequently on the network of Chongryon women. Women's Union staff were particularly closely connected across Japan. Within their families, women often maintained intergenerational ties. Many daughters and daughters-in-law listened to their aging parents, becoming familiar with the early history of the community activities. During our interviews, the interviewees' daughters, daughters-in-law, or Women's Union staff tactfully bridged our communication gaps and provided background information. The fact that both KumHee and I were women enabled us to seek their cooperation, stay in touch, and ask casually about everyday experiences and gender dynamics. Insights gained from these conversations provided the core of chapter 4.

Within the community, people shared a moral system, norms, and a social hierarchy that made people quite sensitive to family reputations. For instance, in Osaka and Hyōgo, most people in their seventies or older knew who Madame Elisé was—a legendary businesswoman in the region—even though she was not a known figure in Japanese society. Our interviewees often mentioned how "popular" or "famous" someone was, but that fame was usually limited to the community. Matchmakers paid great attention to family status as defined by their original clans, occupations, and positions and reputations within the organization. The community shared internal jokes. I was surprised that they could joke about North Korea's political problems, even referring to its prison camps with dark humor.

I have reconstructed a history of the Chongryon community based on the testimonies of these people as well as a variety of memoirs, printed records, and secondary sources. Of course, memories are fluid, and our presence as interviewers doubtless influenced their recalling and retelling. Some people were much more accustomed to narrating their lives than others, and their crafting (or lack of crafting) of the narrative became another useful source of information. My work of interpretation was also fluid. After conducting interviews, we continuously found new information related to the interviewees through the community network. The interviews thus required constant recontextualization. Some interviewees were inspired by KumHee's international experience, and others became curious regarding my public engagement in fighting comfort women denialism. Most notably, I sensed that our interviews made the informants realize that the community was turning into a history, something that would be forgotten unless it was recorded now. Some local Chongryon staff arrived at that realization when they accompanied us for interviews, becoming motivated to collect more stories on their own. In short, KumHee and I, many interviewees, and many other people who helped us changed through interacting with one another. The research was thus a multivalent, evolutionary process rather than scientific data collection.

Although I learned as much as I could from insiders, and however much I got to know them, this book is ultimately an outsider's analysis. KumHee and I often exchanged views, and KumHee generously offered the best sounding board with which to test my interpretations, but I accept sole responsibility for synthesizing and contrasting information and constructing arguments. Against my repeated suggestions that we write a book together, KumHee explained that she was too close to the community and to her family memories and that she felt too vulnerable to commit to a coherent analytical voice. To be clear, this is not an exposé. My priority is to protect the safety of our interviewees (including KumHee) against internal or external criticisms. The book presents individual accounts as if they were separate samples, but in reality, they are well connected. I divided each person's life course into separate parts where that was necessary in order to maintain their anonymity. I use pseudonyms unless the interviewees wanted me to use their real names or unless I refer to their publications. Quotation marks and block quotes relay their words directly, and italics indicate my paraphrase of them. I mostly refer to these long-term Korean residents and their descendants in Japan as "resident Koreans" to stay close to the original meaning of the phrase zainichi Chōsenjin, but I sometimes use the word zainichi for the sake of readability. No political meaning is intended by the alternation between these two expressions.37

Engaging with the history of this community was a journey of self-scrutiny. It caused me to reflect constantly on my abhorrence of nationalisms. I first left Japan for New York and became an academic in order to analyze and resist nationalism. Even if I could explain why people embrace nationalism, I did not know how to engage with it sympathetically, just as scholarship more broadly condemns nationalisms and looks for ambiguity, hybridity, fluidity, dilemmas, identity crises, and resistance to the state. Japanese readers' fascination with zainichi literature, I believe, consumes exactly these aspects. Any hint of the Chongryon color quickly turns off outside readers, who reduce such work to "propaganda poems" and consider them "not worth studying" despite the deep dilemmas and quagmires experienced by Chongryon writers.38 I began to suspect that our preference for stories of zainichi's identity crises rather than accounts of identity affirmation reflects a subconscious desire to view them as a precarious and thus fascinating minority, in accordance with academic trends, or as something that soothes the pain of our own ignorance: we should not feel guilty for not understanding them because they themselves are not sure of who they are. Throughout this research, the exuberant sense of pride shared among the Chongryon community destroyed this buried prejudice of mine. I began to find new messages and signals in their expressions of nationalism. I will return to this point in chapter 8.

A POSTIMPERIAL JAPAN

I had contradictory desires in writing this book. On one hand, I hoped to situate zainichi stories in a global history, available for comparisons. Toward this goal, I used academic concepts generated from other cases. On the other hand, I desired to avoid using the Chongryon history as a lens through which to demonstrate a theoretical point. I am not only an outsider but also a descendant of the former colonizing nation and a member of the current oppressor society that discriminates against them. I am also writing this book in English—a completely foreign language for the community and a neoimperial mode of communication. Operating in these layers of power, I tried my best to place Chongryon experiences at the center of the work, but the book embodies the tension inherent in a project that values both intimacy and generalizability. In the end, I resisted most suggestions by others and my own inclinations to develop the research into a theory-building contribution to the study of diaspora and borders, ethnic identities, decolonization, or the Cold War. I hope, however, that this book offers the necessary foundation for such projects.

I made one critical exception. At the end of the book, I use the Chongryon history as a lens and propose ways in which we can reconceive postwar Japan as postimperial Japan. A postimperial history investigates how new forms of imperial domination characterize the social and legal system of Japan today. It requires a sharp focus on the legal foundation, including the principle stated in the constitution, that deliberately excluded "foreigners" from legal protection. This legal assumption penetrated both government surveillance systems and diplomatic goals.

This is not a simple story of top-down domination, however. The postimperial structure developed through intertwining forces, a major part of which was Chongryon's decision to separate itself from Japanese politics. I am aware that this is a bold hypothesis, but I propose that Chongryon became a critical enabler of the long-term one-party dominance of the conservative Liberal Democratic Party in Japanese politics, widely known as the "1955 system." Examining such a hypothesis will awaken us from methodological parochialism and link Japanese politics more closely with peninsular and regional Cold War tensions, which are often overshadowed by the usual emphasis on the Japan-US relationship.

Perspectives gained from a history of the Chongryon community productively destabilize what we take for granted about postwar Japan. A postimperial history does not show much democratic transaction between the government and the people. The society was neither safe nor peaceful. The police were far from friendly. These facts reflect that the Japanese government had difficulty maintaining sovereign control over its territory. Zainichi society, where Korean national spaces overlapped and national borders kept shifting, constituted an important reality for Japan and the Japanese. These spaces and boundaries were not mere imaginations of resident Koreans or forces that mattered only to them. Japan's function as a borderland of the two Koreas produced grave consequences, possibly relating to the assassination attempt of Park Chung Hee by a second-generation zainichi man and the DPRK abductions of Japanese civilians in the 1970s and 1980s. My proposal adds a new dimension to the growing set of Korean-and Japanese-language works in cultural studies that critically examine "postwar" Japan.39 The lens of zainichi Koreans, along with that of Okinawans and the Ainu, has played a major role already. But my proposal suggests that zainichi histories can more specifically highlight Japan's legal and political structure and teases out the complex role that resident Koreans themselves played in reproducing this structure.

THE PLAN OF THE BOOK

The chapters are organized according to components of the community and do not follow a strict chronological order. Chapter 1 presents an overview of institutional changes from the League of Koreans through Minjŏn to Chongryon from 1945 to the mid-1960s. It addresses the rapidly changing political situations of Japan, the Koreas, and the world as well as the shifting political goals of leftist Koreans. It pays particular attention to how the mental geographies of these Koreans were shaped in relation to the Japanese Left.

Bottom-up social histories of the community follow in the subsequent chapters. Chapter 2 examines the emergence of a sense of territoriality in Korean slums (tongne). After August 1945, the exodus of Koreans from Japan to their Korean hometowns as well as their relocations within Japan assigned new functions to Korean slums. Frequent clashes with the police and autonomous life within the Korean neighborhoods heightened a sense of territoriality. The idea of ownership of physical space continued in the Korean schools that people built in or near the Korean neighborhoods.

Chapter 3 explores the internal dynamics of the Korean schools (hakkyo). In the 1960s and 1970s, schools formed a cultural bubble that protected Korean children from outside prejudice and discrimination but also created community edges that were violent and inaccessible. The stronger and more coherent the community grew inside the cultural bubble, the larger a quagmire many non-Chongryon Koreans fell into. Today, Korean schools often appear in Japanese (and sometimes international) news as either sacred ethnic havens or dangerous North Korean outposts. Their history, in contrast, offers a microcosm of the power and dark shadow of leftist Koreans' efforts to build a community sphere.

Chapter 4 recounts how women members and cadres produced community stability to counter the precarious realities of Korean lives. Navigating socialist feminism and Korean patriarchal norms, the Women's Union (Nyŏmaeng) of Chongryon elevated the value of women's work and opened up new educational and career avenues for women. At the grassroots level, women cadres fulfilled the role of cultural arbiter, making judgments on conflicting values and customs. The chapter also shows how kinship relations were reshaped by ideological messages. At the microlevel, widespread assumptions about the mother-child emotional bond in the 1960s influenced young women's relations with their mothers, often generating an unbridgeable gap. Chongryon intervened in this gap, producing both tighter bonds and seeds of defiance.

Chapter 5 analyzes Chongryon's heyday in the 1960s with a focus on the roles of men cadres (ilkun). As dedicated community activists, men cadres became more directly tied to the DPRK government during this decade. Reflecting the heightened political tensions in the Korean peninsula, the organization underwent a period of radicalization—a version of a cultural revolution—in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The severe thought control, filled with individual and mutual criticisms, tends to be the focus of later exposés of Chongryon. But this radicalization reflected larger Cold War tensions and a generational turnover in diasporic politics. Stories of those mobilized reveal how zainichi society became a porous borderland where state borders were projected onto resident Koreans. As information, goods, and people from South Korea, North Korea, and Japan crossed the borders through zainichi society, Japan as a space was virtually turned into a volatile borderland between the two Koreas.

Chapter 6 discusses the experiences of some Japanese women who married into leftist Korean families (Ilbon ŏmŏni, or "Japanese mothers"). This focus may seem unusual at first, but it reveals the contradictions and confluences between Chongryon's decolonization and postwar Japan's national reconstruction. These Japanese women had diverse backgrounds before stepping into the Chongryon social circle. Some of them sought to atone for Japan's imperial sins through their dedication to the community, while others, without much political conviction, found a home in the community's network of mutual support. By largely submitting to Korean patriarchy and Chongryon's aversion to "Japaneseness," many of these women protected the "Koreanness" of the community and resolved the contradictions between the reality of ethnic hybridity and the idea of ethnic purity.

Chapter 7 traces the meanings of the repatriation program to North Korea for the Chongryon community. Although most scholarship views this program as a catastrophe, the relocation of their families and friends to North Korea ushered in an important new phase for the community. In the late 1970s, temporary visits to North Korea became possible, and Chongryon businesspeople began to earnestly make investments in the homeland. Through repatriated families, frequent visits, and business relations, Chongryon members extended their community space to include North Korean society, where they developed nuanced and complex views of the realities of the homeland.

Chapter 8 very briefly summarizes the major crises that have hit the organization and the community in more recent decades. They include Chongryon credit unions' bankruptcies and the broached news of the DPRK abductions of Japanese citizens, which have influenced the present public image of Chongryon in Japan. A new crisis is ongoing since the 2024 DPRK denunciation of the goal of Korean reunification.

Many important aspects of and groups within Chongryon have been omitted from this book, including the Youth Union, the Business Owners' Association, professional soccer and rugby teams, the newspaper Chosŏn sinbo, professional stage performers, the work conducted by Chongryon doctors for the zainichi population and for North Korean medical personnel, and the organization's human rights committee, among others.

The book ends by suggesting new research directions regarding postimperial Japan. I believe that gaining knowledge of Chongryon's experiences not only helps us understand its influences on more recent zainichi activism or immigration policies. It also forces us to reexamine the dominant narratives of both "postwar" as a temporal frame and "Japan" as a national space and to unlearn and relearn the politics of East Asia. Although it is a rough form of proposal, I present a new narrative thread that brings the Chongryon history back into Japanese society—and the Korean peninsula back into Japanese history—in the hope of inspiring further critical historical research on zainichi Koreans and postimperial Japan.

Notes

1. Sakasai and Palmer 2023, 9. Unless otherwise noted, all translations are my own.

2. Kim Tal-su (1947) 1980, 144.

3. Nozaki 2008, 116–17.

4. Kim Tal-su (1948) 1980, 144, 159, 165.

5. Tsuboi 1977, 728.

6. Kōan chōsa-chō 1981, 6.

7. Cooper 2014; Burbank and Cooper 2023; Prashad 2007.

8. Scholars have argued that later generations have used the word zainichi to indicate their opposition to the earlier generations' attachment to the homeland around the 1970s; see, e.g., Wender 2000, 77–79; Chapman 2008, 4–6, 44–50.

9. Chatani 2018.

10. Kim Si-jong 2015, 37, e.g.

11. Morita Yoshio 1996, 33.

12. M. Weiner 1994, 126. On Korean residents in prewar and wartime Japan, see also Tonomura 2004.

13. Kawashima 2009.

14. M. Weiner 1994, 94–153.

15. Ishiguro 1998.

16. Morita Yoshio 1996, 74–75.

17. Pak Kyŏng-sik 1992, 194. On the issue of "forced" and "volunteer" laborers, see Morris-Suzuki 2010, 37–41.

18. For these categories of zainichi, see Lie 2008; Chapman 2008.

19. Brubaker 2005; Akao and Hayao 2009. I am aware that the term is contested in Sinophone studies, such as by Shih 2010; Chan 2015.

20. Morita Yoshio 1996, 126.

21. E.g., E. Chung 2010.

22. Fingerprinting became a requirement in 1955. The age of fingerprinting changed from fourteen to sixteen in 1982. The requirement was abolished for permanent residents in 1993 and for all foreigners in 1999 but was reinstated in 2007 for non-permanent-resident foreigners.

23. Pak Kyŏng-sik 1989b, 24–25; also see Fukuoka 2000 on the issues and identities of the second generation onward.

24. Yoon 2015a, 5.

25. Kōan chōsa-chō 1981, 6. Mindan, which had not enjoyed the same popularity as Chongryon, also expanded its membership during this period from 64,700 in 1961 to 200,100 in 1971. The normalization treaty signed in 1965 between the ROK and Japan triggered the expansion of Mindan membership most directly; see chapter 1.

26. H. Kwon 2020, 10–20.

27. H. Kwon 2020, 18.

28. Brah 1996, 191.

29. Sakoku refers to the policy of avoiding foreign influence by the Tokugawa shogunate in early modern Japan.

30. Pak T'ae-sik 2012, 31–32.

31. Hwang Ch'il-bok 2018.

32. "Chōsen sōren wa yaku 7 man nin, Jimin kaigō de kōhyō Kōan chōsa-chō," Tere-Asa nyūsu, February 17, 2016, https://news.tv-asahi.co.jp/news_politics/articles/000068557.html.

33. We are aware that some escapees from North Korea are known to make things up and dramatize their stories to make money or become celebrities. We did not interview anyone who requested money. As a gesture of gratitude, we offered about fifty United States dollars to the few interviewees who were minimum-wage workers or were hospitalized.

34. Wada and Takasaki 2003.

35. Kim Myeong-joon 2007.

36. See the International Network in Solidarity with Korean Schools, n.d.

37. In the very early postwar period, zainichi Chōsenjin referred to all Koreans remaining in Japan, but as some took ROK nationality, many writers now use zainichi Kankoku Chōsenjin or zainichi Korian or just zainichi to refer to the entirety of these Korean people and their descendants.

38. Nozaki 2008, 98, 272; Song Hyewon 2023. An art historian, Pek Rum also makes a similar point: "As soon as the artwork contains a little bit of political message, the viewers tend to lose the ability to assess it." Pek 2021, 120.

39. For scholarship that questions common narratives of postwar Japan, see, e.g., H. T. Kwon and Cha 2017; Ko Youngran 2010; Nakano 2024; Yoon 1997; Choi Seungkoo 2020; Koga 2016; Nishikawa, Ōno, and Banshō 2014.

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