韓国反日感情、非は日本側に非ず
2/18(月) 23:17配信
A comfort women rally in front of the Japanese Embassy in Seoul， August 2011 出典：Wikipedia; Claire Solery
【まとめ】
・レーダー照射は実質上の軍事攻撃。
・韓国民の日本への悪感情は日本に非があるのか？
・反日とは韓国民の「自分らしさの宣言」なのである。
カリフォルニア州グレンデール市の公園に設置された慰安婦像 出典：Wikipedia; Ka-cw2018
【注：この記事には複数の写真が含まれています。サイトによっては全て表示されないことがあります。その場合はJapan In-depthのサイトhttps://japan-indepth.jp/?p=44198でお読み下さい。】
韓国の反日とはなんなのか――
日本と韓国との関係がこれほど悪くなってくると、日本側としては韓国がなぜこれほどに日本を叩き、ののしり、侮辱するのかを深層にまで踏み込んで探求する必要があるだろう。日本は韓国にどう対応すべきなのかという重大な課題も、まず相手の反日の真相を知ってからだろう。
韓国側の日本に対する一方的な悪意の言動は果てることがない。2015年の日韓両国政府間での慰安婦問題の最終決着合意を破っての問題を再燃化させての不当な日本誹謗、1965年の日韓国交正常化での国際公約を破っての戦時中の国家総動員への補償の理不尽な要求と、いずれも文在寅政権自体が反日の明確な意思を表示しての無法な動きだった。
韓国海軍の駆逐艦「広開土大王」 出典：Frickr; 大韓民国国軍 Republic of Korea Armed Forces Follow
韓国軍艦による日本の自衛隊哨戒機への火器使用レーダー照射にいたっては実質上の突然の軍事攻撃に等しい。韓国軍がともにアメリカの同盟相手である日本の航空機に対して戦闘行為に近い攻撃態勢をとることは、国際的な常識では想像もできない。
ベトナムで爆弾を投下するアメリカ空軍のボーイングB-52 出典：Official United States Air Force Website
私自身の報道体験でもこの火砲使用レーダー照射が平時に行われることは異様きわまることが歴然としている。古い話だが1970年代前半のベトナム戦争中、私は当時の南ベトナムで米軍の軍事行動を報道していた。そのころの米軍は南ベトナムに攻撃をかけてくる北ベトナム軍の拠点を空爆していた。その際には米軍機が北ベトナム上空を飛び、北側からレーダー照射を浴びると、もうその瞬間に攻撃を受けるに等しいという判断を下してその照射の発射源にロケットやミサイルを即時に撃ち込んでいたのだ。
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Robert E Kelly准教授（右）出典：Robert E Kelly Official Twitter
米軍はこの種のレーダー照射を英語でlock onと表現していた。つまりカギをかけるように攻撃目標として捕らえるという意味だった。米軍機がlock onされれば、それはもう敵がこちらを撃つために照準を合わせたことであり、瞬時に自衛のために攻撃に移る、ということなのだった。
だから照射を受けた自衛隊機は韓国軍からすぐに実射攻撃を受けてもおかしくなかったのだ。韓国軍のそれほど異様な行動だったのだ。韓国側のこのような日本に対する言動に共通するのは日本への憎悪、悪意、敵意である。一言にまとめれば反日だといえよう。日本はそれに対応すべきか。日本側の一部には「あくまで冷静に」とか「丁寧な無視を」という、結局はなにもしないことを提唱する声も強い。だが現実には韓国からすれば、日本にはなにをしても、なにを言っても、反発はないから大丈夫だという意識が明らかに徹底している。日本が相手ならば、どんなことをしても安心だという認識である。だから日本側への不当、無法の攻撃は果てしなく続き、さらにエスカレートしていくこととなる。
さてでは韓国の反日とはいったいなんなのだろう。なぜ反日なのだろう。
日本側では長年、韓国民が日本に悪感情を抱くのはひとえに日本の過去の行動、とくに日韓併合による朝鮮半島の統治の歴史が原因だとする考察が主流だった。あるいは戦後の日本側の韓国へのネガティブな言動が原因だとする考察も多かった。要するに非は日本側にあるという認識である。
ところがまったく異なる見解も存在する。しかもその見解は日本側でも韓国側でもない中立の第三者が発表しているのだ。その見解は簡単にいえば、韓国の反日感情は非は決して日本側にはない、原因も日本側になないのだという斬新な分析である。
つまりは「日本側の好ましくない言動が韓国側の反日を引き起こしている」という日本側の年来の考察の否定なのである。アメリカ人の政治学者による見解だった。その見解はワシントンで大きな波紋を広げた。
2015年6月のことだった。東アジア研究専門のアメリカ人政治学者で韓国の釜山国立大学准教授のロバート・ケリー氏は、「なぜ韓国は日本への脅迫観念にこれほどとりつかれているのか」と題する論文を発表した。アメリカの政治雑誌「ナショナル・インタレスト」など数誌に載った同論文はまさに韓国の反日の本質を論じていた。
ケリー論文の骨子は以下のようだった。
・韓国の反日は歴史や政治を原因とするよりも韓国民の自己認識（identity）そして朝鮮民族としての正統性（legitimacy）を内外に認めさせるため主張であり、自分の自分らしさの宣言なのだ。
・韓国は朝鮮民族としての歴史や伝統での純粋性、自主性を説いても北朝鮮にはかなわない。そのギャップを埋めるのが日本叩きなのだ。北朝鮮との正統性主張の競争での道具として反日を使っているのだ。
・韓国独自の北朝鮮に対する優位を説くには韓国側には米欧諸国や日本からの影響が多すぎる。民主主義も腐敗が多すぎる。だから日本を悪と位置づけ、叩き続けることが自国や自国民礼賛の最有効な方法となるのだ。
以上がケリー論文の最重要点だった。
ケリー氏の指摘が真実を指し示しているとすると、韓国の反日は日本の過去や現在の言動にかかわりなく存在するということになる。反日はその存在自体に意義があるのだから日本が謝罪しても補償してもなにも変わらないことにもなる。
日本の学者や政治家がこんな見解を述べたら大変なこととなろう。だが日本との特別なきずなもないアメリカ人学者が韓国に長期、住んだうえでのこうした論考ならば客観性は否定できない。韓国側も文句はいえないだろう。
韓国側の反日の原因も責任も実は日本側にはないのだとすれば、韓国の日本叩きはますます不当で理不尽ということになる。自分たちの独特の劣等感さえがからんでいるような勝手な感情だとすれば、日本側はそんな不当な感情の発露には代償を払わせる必要があるだろう。勝手に他国、他国民を誹謗中傷して、なんの制裁も懲罰も報復も受けないというのは一般の人間社会でもあってはならない状態である。まして理性や規則が尊重されるべき国際社会ではさらにあってはならない状況だといえる。
日本もついに行動を起こす時である。
古森義久（ジャーナリスト・麗澤大学特別教授）
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共感順
***** | 11時間前
もう国交断絶でいいです
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110ban | 11時間前
現実問題として、韓国内で、対日強硬派が勢いづいて、日本人が危害を及ぼされかねないので、少なくとも3月中は、観光目的の韓国訪問は控えるべきだと思います。外務省も危険韓国を発布すべきでは、
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jij***** | 11時間前
最後の一行に激しく賛同。今まで謝罪の言動をきちんとやってきた日本は、これまでの静かな日本ではいけない。具体的な制裁に出ても世界は非難をしないと思う。世界は韓国の横暴をちゃんと見ているからだ。
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all | 11時間前
日本が韓国の面倒をだんだん見なくなったからでしょう。
日本から自立、独立したいのだけど、自信がない、資源がない、能力がないからでしょう。
だから日本に相手にしてもらいたくて、金を恵んでもらいたくて、他の国がどう見ようとなりふり構わず相手にしてもらえるような行動をしているのでしょう。
もう離れて70年以上経つのだから日本の金を当てにしないでやって貰いたいですよね。国らしく。
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hid***** | 11時間前
個人的には、既に断交しています
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san***** | 11時間前
「悪意」これに尽きるよね。
他人を貶めようと悪意を持って接してくるから反発するワケだけ。こちらは防衛本能でしかない。
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mat***** | 11時間前
永遠に断交でお願いします。
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g**** | 11時間前
そろそろやっちゃおう。
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kob***** | 11時間前
要は、中国のいち地方政権であり続くた事や、近代国家もどきになるために導入した制度などに独自性がないために、アイデンティティがなく、それがが原因で、アイデンティティを感じるための行動と言うことかな？
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cho***** | 11時間前
日本が甘すぎる感も否めない。
メディアも韓国人を取り上げたり、ドラマ放送などやめてほしい。
もっと強烈に事を起こすべきかと思う。
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https://nationalinterest.org/blog/why-south-korea-so-obsessed-japan-13065
Why South Korea Is So Obsessed with Japan
All in all, anti-Japanism is a pretty good strategy for managing S. Korea's many tensions, and so long as the U.S. is around, there are no geopolitical consequences to it either.
Last month I wrote about the possibility that 'Korea fatigue' – a Japanese phenomenon arising from Korea's relentless criticism of Japan over its World War II conduct—might be coming to the U.S. It was one of my most-read posts on The Interpreter, and I received a lot of comments and retweets regarding my suggestion that South Korea's 'anti-Japanism' flows from its debilitating national legitimacy contest with North Korea. So I thought I would flesh out that argument.
It is immediately obvious to anyone who has spent substantial time in South Korea that its people and its elites have an extraordinary, and negative, fixation with Japan.
Korea's media talks about Japan incessantly, usually with little journalistic objectivity and in negative terms: as a competitor for export markets which must be overcome, as a rival for American attention , as an unrepentant colonialist, as a recipient of the 'Korean Wave' (watch Korean analysts triumphantly argue that Japanese housewives are learning Korean ), as a lurking military imperialist just waiting to subdue Asia again, and so on.
Korea's territorial dispute with Japan over the Liancourt Rocks is similarly illustrative. A major Korean newspaper actually suggested samurai might invade Dokdo (the Korean name for the Rocks). The Government has taken out advertisements in Western newspapers and Korean pop stars have sought to act as 'ambassadors' to the world to press Korea's claim. The Korean military holds war drills around Dokdo. Political stunts at athletic events have undermined Japan's willingness to participate in joint sports events with Korea. The Government has launched a global campaign to rename the Sea of Japan the 'East Sea' (in the belief that doing so reinforces its claim to the Rocks) and even considered pushing Psy to rework his hit song 'Gangnam Style' as 'Dokdo Style.'
Foreign students in Korea get pulled into this campaign too, on the assumption that (gullible) foreigners add credibility. I have ridden on subway cars painted with the likeness of Dokdo, and I recall watching a documentary on Korean television on the 20th anniversary of Korea's accession to the UN where the political highlight of joining the world body was defined as the ability to press Japan on Dokdo and the war.
On Korean independence day, Korean children use squirt guns to mock-kill dressed-up Japanese soldiers (yes, really), and I have attended sound-and-light shows on that day which portray the Imjin War of the 1590s as part of a millennial Japanese effort to dominate Korea, culminating in the 1910 annexation. It is a staple of Korean historiography that Japan has invaded the country dozens or even hundreds of times (most of these were actually pirate raids), and that Japan 'received' its culture via the Korean 'bridge.' Perhaps the most ridiculous example I can think of is a talk-show guest who was forced to apologies for wearing a red-and-white striped shirt that looked vaguely like the rising sun flag. This 'anti-Japanism,' as Victor Cha has termed it , has spread to the U.S., where ethnic Korean lobbying has brought comfort-women memorials and changes to US textbooks.
I could continue, but the point is that, as a social science observation, this obsession cries out for explanation, and it is hard to imagine that it is all just about the war seventy years ago (this is not to say Korea's historical concerns are not authentic; they are ).
One obvious explanation for the sheer intensity of feeling is that South Korea's disputes with Japan have graduated from politics to identity. As Cha notes, South Korea's nationalism is negative, defined very much against Japan and, importantly, not against North Korea. The reason, I hypothesize, is that North Korea so successfully manipulates Korean nationalist discourse that South Korea cannot define itself against North Korea in the same way West Germany did against East Germany. So South Korea uses a third party against which to prove its nationalist bona fides in its national legitimacy competition with the North.
It is now widely accepted that North Korea's real ideology is not socialism but a race-based Korean nationalism in which the DRPK is defending the Korean race (the minjok) against foreign depredation. The ' Yankee Colony ' South Korea — with its internationalized economy, American military presence, cultural Westernization, resident foreign population, and so on—cannot compete with this racial purity narrative.
This would not matter if South Korea's political identity was democratic and post-racial, but it isn't. The minjok myth is in fact deeply resonant . South Korean education teaches it (the resultant racism is a huge problem ); government media campaigns and commercials stress it; my students write about it in glowing terms; until a few years ago the national pledge of allegiance was to the minjok, not to the democratic state . Nor does South Korea's democracy provide a strong legitimacy competitor to race-nationalism. Corruption, illiberalism, and an elitist political-opportunity structure have generated a robust street protest culture, a strong sign that elections are weak vessels of legitimacy.
If South Korea can only weakly legitimate itself through democracy, and with race-nationalism so powerful, Seoul must go head-to-head with Pyongyang over who is the best custodian of the minjok and its glorious 5000 year history . This is a tussle South Korea cannot win, not only because of the North's mendacious willingness to falsify history, but South Korea's Westernized culture, massive U.S. presence, rising multiculturalism leading to mixed race citizens, and so on.
The North's purer minjok nationalism will always have resonance in the South, where for a generation former dictator Park Chung Hee invoked race for legitimacy, 10% of the public voted for an openly pro-North Korean party in the last parliamentary election, and the main left-wing party has consistently equivocated on whether the U.S. represents a greater threat to South Korea than North Korea does.
Enter Japan, then, as a useful 'other' to South Korea, in the place that really should be held by North Korea. All Koreans, north and south, right and left, agree that the colonial take-over was bad. The morality of criticizing Japan is undisputed, whereas criticizing North Korea quickly gets tangled up in the 'who-can-out- minjok-who' issues raised above. This should not be necessary. West Germany was able to define itself against the East and win that legitimacy competition. But the North has dumped Marxism for a legitimacy language that resonates in the South too, and democracy is not strong enough to combat it.
So beating up on Japan is great solution. It bolsters South Korea as defender of the minjok, sidesteps a brutal head-to-head nationalist competition with the North which might provoke open Northern sympathies in the south, and avoids any debate over the long-term need to shift South Korean political legitimacy from race to democracy, which in turn would require a desperately needed clean-up of Korean politics at the expense of today's entrenched elites , most notably the chaebol.
All in all, anti-Japanism is a pretty good strategy for managing South Korea's many tensions, and so long as the Americans are around, there are no geopolitical consequences to it either. What's not to like? If South Korea cannot be the anti-North Korea, then it can be the anti-Japan.
This piece first appeared in the Lowy Interpreter here.
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Is America, like Japan, getting 'Korea fatigue'?
BY Robert E Kelly
@Robert_E_Kelly
19 May 2015
Economic forecasting: Broken models
Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe recently completed a successful trip to the US. As Brad Glosserman and Scott Snyder of CSIS argue, the trip came off about as well as anyone might have expected. Abe is the first Japanese prime minister to address Congress and seems to have built a good rapport with President Obama.
The expected, almost ritualised South Korean and Chinese criticisms of Abe's policy pronouncements seem to have left the Obama Administration unmoved. Earlier in the year, US Under Secretary of State Wendy Sherman said publicly that Korea's fixation on historical issues was 'frustrating' and produced 'paralysis, not progress.' The Korean response was predictably sharp, but as Karl Friedhoff and Alastair Gale both recently argued, the Koreans are slowly losing this global perceptual struggle with Japan.
What the Japanese call 'Korea fatigue' – exhaustion with South Korea's relentless hammering of war-time issues, particularly its demand for another apology from Japan – is hitting the US, which deeply wants future-oriented cooperation between South Korea and Japan .
As Sherman and countless Western analysts have noted, the real issue for the US in Asia is, of course, China. While the US is not openly balancing China, the days of US belief in China's 'peaceful rise' seem to be fading. Increasingly, the relationship is becoming competitive, particularly as Beijing's South China Sea expansion continues.
In this climate, a strong US-Japan relationship is critical. Japan is the only Asian state that can really go head-to-head with China (barring India, perhaps). Japan is a unique bulwark against the expansion of Chinese power. It has the world's third-largest GDP and is the lynchpin of America's security structure in Asia. The 'pivot,' America's defence of South Korea, any intervention to assist Taiwan and all other US Asian engagements are premised on the Japanese 'way-station.' Abe emphasised Japan's centrality before Congress, and both the joint Obama-Abe statement from their trip and the new US-Japan Defense Guidelines repeat this. As Friedhoff sharply noted:
Mr. Abe saved the biggest dig at South Korea for near the end of his speech. In one of his only explicit references to South Korea, he mentioned it as an additional partner to the 'central pillar' of the U.S.-Japan alliance. In doing so, he made it clear that he views South Korea not as an equal—which is how Seoul views the trilateral alliance—but as a junior.
Unsurprisingly, all this causes great heartburn in Korea. As a middle power, it deeply irks Korean elites when the US, Japan and China engage one another over Korea's head. The hyperbole of Korea's response to Sherman illustrates this hankering for status in a region where Seoul is dwarfed by its neighbours. Korea's ruling Saenuri party retorted: 'If the U.S. continues its stance of ignoring victims, its status as the world's policeman won't last long.' No less than American hegemony might be the cost of US uninterest in Korean historical issues! Obviously this is not so; rather the comment illustrates Seoul's fear that the US is simply burned out with this issue.
An important, post-Abe trip editorial in Korea's major center-left paper, The Hankyoreh, admitted this and suggested the previously unthinkable: that South Korea should give up defining its relationship with Japan through the lens of the war. Even the Park Administration seems to realise this. It was always a somewhat implausible hope that Japan would issue a monolithic, thorough-going apology that everyone in Japan would permanently cleave to. Open societies just do not operate like that. To my mind, Korea's concerns with Japan's historical representation, particularly at the Yasukuni Shrine museum and Abe's (somewhat creepy) coalition, are quite justified. But badgering Japan is not the way to encourage contrition. The needed internal reckoning is ultimately something Japan must do for itself and on its own. Outside pressure will only breed a nationalist backlash, as it does in Japan over the war or in China over human rights.
But South Korea has built its national identity so much around Japan as a competitor, if not enemy, that it is difficult to move on. Victor Cha acutely observed that South Korea teaches a 'negative nationalism' of 'anti-Japanism,' and that most countries would have accepted Japan's two big apologies in the 1990s (the Murayama and Kono Statements) and moved on.
But 'anti-Japanism' is now a form of political correctness in South Korea; public officials dare not bend (particularly on the right, where many are the children and grandchildren of collaborators). Maximalism on Japan, such as the needlessly provocative campaign to re-name the 'Sea of Japan' the 'East Sea', is so common and strident that Japanese elites are all but certain to regard concessions as humiliations before a state and people who loathe them. In the language of international relations theory, anti-Japanism is a part of South Korea's 'ontological security.' The contention is so formative that it is hard to let go.
For this reason, the Hankyoreh editorial flagged above is rare. But even there, one can see the 'enemy image' at work: Abe's trip to the US, which is fairly traditional diplomatic activity that had little to do with Korea, is described as an 'icy blast from Japan.' The US-Japan summit, by two democracies whose assistance in managing the North Korea threat is crucial, is described as a 'shock,' that sent Korea 'reeling.' That South Korean diplomats could somehow not stop the Abe-Obama bonhomie means they are 'inept,' 'silent,' 'cowardly,' and so on. There have even been calls for the foreign minister to resign over the successful Abe summit with Obama.
This zero-sum, if-Japan-is-up-we-must-be-down mentality is deeply ingrained.
I have argued elsewhere why this is so. In short, I believe Korea's national division explains this intense, almost dogmatic 'anti-Japanism.' North and South Korea are in a direct, permanent, enervating legitimacy contest. North Korea has long since been a racist, nationalist, almost fascistic (rather than Marxist) state. Defending the Korean race (the minjok) against foreign predators is its raison d'etre, and in doing so, it routinely damns South Korea as the 'Yankee colony,' selling out the national patrimony and race purity to foreigners. South Korea cannot contest such reactionary nationalist credentials; it is too internationalised and Americanised, complete with a foreign military presence. Nor does South Korea's corrupted, elitist, chaebol-dominated democracy generate enough internal legitimacy to counter Northern minjok fetishism.
So Japan fills in nicely. It is the nationalist whipping boy, generating ontological security for a South Korean state unable to 'out-minjok' its competitor.
Photo courtesy of the White House.
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