The Doomsday Machine by Daniel Ellsberg — assured destruction

The Doomsday Machine by Daniel Ellsberg — assured destruction

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The Doomsday Machine by Daniel Ellsberg — assured destruction Lawrence Freedman on a famous whistleblower’s account of the terrifying nuclear risks run during the cold war Share on Twitter (opens new window) Share on Facebook (opens new window) Share on LinkedIn (opens new window) Save Save to myFT Lawrence Freedman JANUARY 5, 2018 11 Although Daniel Ellsberg eventually found fame in 1971 for leaking the Pentagon Papers, a secret history of decision-making on Vietnam, he made his name as a super-smart young analyst working for the RAND Corporation think-tank, initially largely on issues of nuclear command and control. He opens The Doomsday Machine by describing how, in addition to the Pentagon Papers, he had also intended to release an even more shocking cache of documents on nuclear issues. As this was lost after being buried for safekeeping while Ellsberg was on trial, there could be no immediate revelations. Instead, over the years he pieced together the core materials to prepare a disturbing account of the risks of being run at the height of the cold war. In 1959 Ellsberg joined a RAND team investigating whether a nuclear attack would be launched if properly authorised. He chose instead to investigate whether one might be launched without authorisation. The rules were quite specific. Presidential authority was always required. But the more Ellsberg looked, the less robust the supposed political and legal safeguards seemed, especially in the fraught and chaotic circumstances in which the issue could arise. What if the US and its overseas bases had been hit, or apparently might be hit soon, by a Soviet first strike? What if the president was dead? Ellsberg visited a small Air Force base in South Korea, and talked to the major in charge. The major knew the rules but explained that as his duty was to protect his forces, he would get his aircraft off the ground if he had reason to suspect an incoming attack. Though these aircraft were meant to return to base if they did not receive an “execute” order, the major could imagine circumstances in which they might press on to their targets. One related risk was that one of these aircraft, each carrying a 1.1 megaton bomb, might crash on take-off, causing a nuclear explosion, dreadful in itself and sending a dangerous message to aircraft already in the sky. The rules said responsibility for Armageddon had to be presidential but the practice suggested that it could rest with a single aircraft, should the crew decide the fateful moment had come. Nor were the warning systems wholly reliable. In one famous incident, signals from the radars supposed to give early warning of a ballistic missile attack bounced back off the moon as it rose over Norway, resulting in a computer-generated alert of an imminent attack. Most terrifying of all, Ellsberg discovered, any US attack, whether prompted by the outbreak of a real war or a malfunctioning system, would follow a stunningly inflexible plan. It would result in the indiscriminate obliteration of not only the Soviet Union but also China. No account was taken of the growing fissure between the two Communist giants. Later, working as a consultant on war plans in the Pentagon under the Kennedy administration, he came across casualty estimates that posited 275m-325m deaths in these states. These were likely underestimates. The effects of fire had not been fully assessed and at this point the potential for a “nuclear winter”, with the climate irretrievably altered by so many massive explosives, was unknown. The suggested 10m American deaths looked light by comparison, although still a catastrophe beyond imagination. It is not surprising that when Ellsberg and a colleague went to see Stanley Kubrick’s 1964 film Dr Strangelove they pronounced it a documentary. © Getty Images This played on the tortured logic of deterrence. Nuclear war was so terrible that it would be foolish to fight one, but if it was so foolish then how could a deterrent threat be credible, for credibility came from being prepared to fight a nuclear war? This much Ellsberg understood. What he was less prepared for was the military treating a nuclear war like any other war — and determined to keep control of its conduct without interference by meddling politicians. Ellsberg’s attempt to make sense of this casual approach to mass death makes for a compelling narrative. He records his efforts to improve matters but is doubtful whether the risks are much less now than they were 50 years ago. The command systems have improved and we now expect military forces to be used with precision, avoiding civilians where possible rather than making them prized targets. We have survived the nuclear age for far longer than many anticipated. Yet, he argues, the Doomsday systems still exist and they have spread to other countries. If there is an underlying theme it is that we tolerate probabilities of utter disaster because they seem small (he cites as an example queries about whether the first test of an atomic bomb in July 1945 would ignite the atmosphere). Ellsberg’s message is that in the nuclear age nothing should be taken for granted. He wishes for the abolition of nuclear weapons, but his prescriptions stress measures to make them harder to launch, abandoning strategies that envisage first use and risk hair-trigger alerts. The Doomsday Machine: Confessions of a Nuclear War Planner, by Daniel Ellsberg, Bloomsbury, RRP£20/$30, 432 pages Lawrence Freedman is emeritus professor of war studies at King’s College London and author of ‘The Future of War’ (Allen Lane) Join our online book group on Facebook at FTBooksCafe. Subscribe to FT Life on YouTube for the latest FT Weekend videos