Vladimir Tikhonov
2 hrs ·
An interesting attempt to put oneself into Pyongyang rulers' shoes. All the talks of "provocations" notwithstanding, what they want in the end is basically one thing - US (and Japanese) diplomatic acknowledgement and iron-clad survival guarantees. They do not plan to become a nuclear superpower - they just do not wish to share the fates of Hussein and Gaddafi.
And small addition - it looks as if the nukes made the stakes higher, and imposed some sort of discipline on the both sides in the conflict. In fact, parallel with the bomb/missile tests, there is an element of de-escalation on the ground. The last naval clash between DPRK and ROK was in 2009, and shelling of YOngp'Ong Island took place in 2010. After that, the physical confrontations seemingly became rare (I would classify Ch'Onan Incident of 2010 and DMZ mine incident of 2015 as still unclear. There are no full and conclusive proofs that it was North Koreans' work). Which, I think, is one reason why the majority of South Koreans appears to care so little about all the nuclear/missile game. They reasonably suspect that it is a show for foreign public, which is not going to have consequences for their daily lives...
Analysis: Pyongyang's view of the North Korea-U.S. crisis
Here's how North Korea sees its storyline with the U.S. since the beginning of the Trump administration
CBSNEWS.COM
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