2026-03-11

Rogue Allies: The Strategic Partnership between Iran and North Korea - YouTube

Rogue Allies: The Strategic Partnership between Iran and North Korea

The Korea Society June 12, 2025

June 11, 2025 - What are the motivations and geopolitical significance of the ongoing partnership between the governments of North Korea and Iran? Join us for a program with Professor and Author Bruce E. Bechtol Jr., who discusses his new book co-authored with Professor Anthony N. Celso. During the program, Bechtol explains the ideological, financial, and environmental forces contributing to the partnership, the roles of Russia and China, the two regimes’ military capabilities, proliferation activities to terrorist organizations, and the partnership’s role in destabilizing the rules-based order.

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Transcript

Introduction
Hello and welcome to today's program, Rogue Allies, the strategic partnership between Iran and North Korea. Uh, thank
you all for joining us here at 350 Madison Avenue, the Korean Society's supporters. I'm Tom Burn, president and
CEO of the Korea Society. Um, in his new book, co-authored with Anthony Selso,
Bruce Bruce Bectal unveils the decadesl long alliance between Iran and North
Korea. Uh the two authors mobilized numerous incredible resources to demonstrate the elaborate military,
ideological and financial ties uh that bind Tan and Pyongyang together. Uh I
fortunately I was at the uh Upper West Side Republican Club. I heard probably a
very similar uh talk, book talk. But Bruce also expands to the other ties that North Korea has in the Middle East,
including with Hezbollah, uh the Assad government of Syria that no longer exists, and also um Hamas. So totally
fascinating. And uh the CRE Society is pleased to welcome the author, our friend Bruce Beal back. Uh Bruce is an
award-winning professor of political science at Angelo State University in Texas and a retired Marine. He is
currently on the editorial advisory board of the Korea Observer, uh the editorial board of the International
Journal of Security Studies, and is on the scientific board of global humanities. He is also the current
chairman of the board of the International Council on Korean Studies. Uh thanks for joining us today, Bruce.
Uh before we begin the conversation, I'd like to thank the Korea Foundation and our corporate sponsors, the names of
which are prominently displayed in the lobby uh for making this program possible. We are welcoming your
questions live. We will provide an opportunity for in-person attendees to ask questions directly. Uh for our
virtual audience, please send the questions through the program to policy at Koreasocciety.org.
Today's program will be moderated by uh policy director Jonathan Curado. Uh, Jonathan, over to you. Thanks very much,

Welcome
Tom. And thanks to our wonderful audience for joining us in person and online. Bruce, thank you for coming and
welcome. Can you hear me? Okay, I can hear you. Excellent. Everybody hear me? Yes. Raise your hand if you don't hear
me. There's going to be a call and response type of uh performance here today. So, not like our typical stayed
academic talks. This is going to be lively. So, I'm anticipating that. Uh so Bruce, let's start off just by saying
that fortunately for your book sales, but perhaps unfortunately for the world,
this topic has taken on renewed significance um thanks to events that
have happened recently. So can you talk us through how recent events hint at
this relationship that you describe in the book? Well, that's a broad rangranging and excellent question as

Recent events hint at this relationship
always. Jonathan, you're a very intelligent man. sucking up to him because he's running this show. But uh
uh so you want to know about October 7th in relation to North Korea. Can let me ask a question to everybody. How many of
you realize that North Korea was kneede in arms proliferation and training and
support for all of the bad guys during the events of October 7th and following that for the next year and a
half or so. How many knew that? How many people had no clue? How many people have seen three faces of
Eve? Joanne Woodward Academy Award-winning performance 1958. But I digress.
So let's let's talk about um one by one. I'll go through the countries if you like and I'll take a couple of minutes.
First I'll talk about Hezbollah. Hezbollah. I I'm sure that you know many
of our let us say left of center news networks in the United States and the United Kingdom and Australia were in
November when the Israelis went into Lebanon we're saying oh those evil
Israelis there they go again. Well just so you know um the reason they went into
Lebanon was because they had to Hezbollah had been attacking them. Hezbollah had encased themselves in a 45
kilometer long network of tunnels built by guess who? The North Koreans. I
actually know how much they paid to have it built. $13 million. Hezbollah contracted with the Korea Mining
Development Corporation. And some of you know who exactly who that is. It's a front company for the Reconnaissance
General Bureau. probably the biggest front company Korea has or one of them at least. Um, so that's that's Hezbollah
alone and there's lots of other stuff about you know who foot that who footed that bill for them that oh yes the bill

Who footed the bill
was uh Hezbollah there's no smoking gun for who exactly who footed the bill but Iran has footed probably about 70% of
Hezbollah's weapons sales the other they the others they get from themselves
because a lot of people here especially I know we have some UN panel of experts guys and you certainly looked into it
you're actually one of the experts I know on I wouldn't say that. Uh yeah, they have the kind of the equivalent to
office 39 which the North Koreans have that they've actually modeled after office 39 and they do a lot of stuff in
Venezuela and in Europe and marketing drugs etc. Anybody know why Hezbollah
does so much work in Venezuela? because there are a lot of Lebanese
expats in Venezuela and they they send money back and do stuff and so forth.
Anyway, that's Hezbollah. Hamas, October 7th uh of 2023, we actually saw pictures
of North Korean F7 rocket propelled grenades, real live pictures. We also
saw pictures in the days that followed as reported by the National Intelligence Service of South Korea of 122 millimeter
um multiple rocket launcher shells um that were very close to they had been fired already that were very close to
the Gaza Israel border. And just so we're clear on this, South Korea does
and they had Hongul writing on them, Korean writing. So, just so we're clear on this, South Korea does not
manufacture 122 millimeter month rocket launcher shells or they they go to NATO
standards. Uh, so that's one example. They also had, and I can go into more detail on this, they also probably
helped them with the tunnels they have. Um they gave them um uh or sold them I
should say the type 58 rifle which is their equivalent of the AK-47 uh and sold them the type 73 machine gun
which is distinct as a North Korean gun because it's it's an SKS but the North
Korean version of it. The reason it's distinct, you'll love this, and I'll say it very quickly, um, is because the
North Koreans, when they first started manufacturing it, decided they wanted to mount the SKS in a tripod.
And to do that, that meant you had to put the magazine in the top of the machine gun. But if you put the magazine
in the top, how do you focus in on your target? So, what do the North Koreans do? They
put the sights on the side. So if you see a guy shooting a North Korean made SKS, which is a type 73 machine gun,
you'll see him off like this shooting the gun. There's pictures of Houthies with that. Um Hamas obviously um and
Syrians of course. So that's Hezbollah Hamas. Um the Houthis have have now
entered a deal since 2019 that they were getting are getting um ballistic
missiles and all kinds of other things from conventional weapons from the North Koreans. Um, who did I not talk about?
Syria. Syria, uh, their chemical weapons program. Everybody knows about that.
Everybody in here who has anything to do with the UN panel of experts or has read anything Jonathan's ever written or
anything I've ever written knows about the 41 shipments that went between 2012
and 2017 from North Korea to uh to Syria. That largely chemical weapons,
but all kinds of other stuff, too. And paid for by our friends in our friends in Iran. That's right, baby. And in the
early 2000s, North Korea built something for Assad in the desert. Uh maybe you
can remember 2000. Yeah. What's interesting, I think, Jonathan, and I'm a Republican. Full disclosure, don't
hate me if you're a Democrat, but uh um 2003, and I'm putting down a Republican
here, actually. You remember George Bush and the axis of evil? And I would say the axis of evil was always North Korea,
Syria, and Iran. And I don't know why he threw Iraq in there other than so we could go to war. But uh I mean in 2003
as he as George Bush is talking about the seriousness of WMD in in Iraq the
same time the Syrians actually did have a nuclear program they were building.
The North Koreans were building it for them out in the middle of the desert in Syria. And it's really interesting. And
a lot of you know about this already, so I don't want to talk about it too long, but it essentially looked like Yangbian
in the middle of the Syrian desert. Now, the the North Koreans when they built
it, they put a fake roof over the top because apparently they think Israelis are stupid and wouldn't figure out that
it was actually a plutonium reactor. And of course, the Israeli Air Force destroyed it. That was in my third and
fourth books I wrote about that. And for those of you who haven't I and if you look at the innotes of my book, I
actually give the link for the DNI report on that which was comprehensive and detailed as you well know. Um so so
that all kinds of stuff for Syria. Um Iran, everybody knows about the two missile
attacks that we the two big giant ballistic missile attacks that that they launched at Israel. And um the second
one was actually the largest ballistic missile attack any nation has ever launched against another nation. Wow.
And so it's pretty important. Of course, Israel has the best ballistic missile defense of any country on earth,
including us. Of course, they're only protecting 10 million people. There are more people in the Houston metroplex
than there are in Israel. So So, and I love Texas, by the way. So uh um but
very interesting. So a combination of two things really protected the Israelis in both of those attacks. One, they had
a great ballistic missile defense system. Everybody knows about Iron Dome. But in reality, it's Iron Dome, David
Sling, and the Arrow 2 and three systems. So when when President Trump talks about uh Golden Dome, it's really
patterned kind of more like the Arrow system that the Israelis have only for the United States. Um, so two things did
that. One, the ballistic missile defense the Israelis had was great. And two, the North Koreans just don't make very good
missiles. So, uh, I mean, they had a lot of them that blew up in midair. Some
blew up on the pads on on the transporter director launchers. And one of them went down in the Dead Sea.
You'll like this. the one that went down in the Dead Sea. My good friend Tal Inbar, who was probably the best missile
expert in Israel, was called by the IDF to go look at it and do some analysis.
And I heard I figured they would be calling him. So I I emailed him and he emailed me a bunch of pictures back. It
was an eine, that is to say, a souped-up note. souped
up by the North Koreans for the Iranians at a facility that the North Koreans built for the Iranians back in early
2000s. I'll stop now. And you know, one of the things that we've seen in uh the

North Korea in the Middle East
the Russian war against Ukraine is North Koreans missile accuracy improving over time. Not good.
And Russian sharing uh some target data to help them improve the accuracy and
that having an impact. So that's another thing to trace. Um, I want to zoom out for a second because not everybody has
an understanding of North Korea as an international actor. A lot of times we think about North Korea acting in its
region and causing lots of trouble in Northeast Asia. Uh, but we don't always think about them acting internationally.
So for those unfortunate few souls who did not read your previous book on North
Korea in the Middle East and a for those unfortunate souls who did not read your last book which is most people uh can
you just give us a sense for what is North Korea doing in the Middle East?
Okay. And I'll I'll be short this time. I really will. I promise. My last book as some of you know John in the knows
because I gave him a free copy. Um it was entitled uh North Korea military
proliferation in the Middle East and Africa available on Amazon.com. Amazon.com Amazon.com is subliminal man.
Um so in that book I actually looked at a some of the context that we also
reexamined in this book which was the longstanding North Korea Iran
relationship. Um, and I also looked at how many how many I'll just look at how
many I don't want to raise hands again and then get back to three phases of Eve, but how many realized that North
Korea proliferated to a dozen countries in Africa? A dozen 12 countries. And
with with all of the um with all of the hype around North Korea's proliferation
stuff in 2018 that was generated by Syrian stuff in the Syrian civil war, people started looking at it more
closely. With all that hype and all the pressure put on those countries, the only country that we, you and me, and
other analysts can tell that North Korea stopped proliferating to was Namibia.
That's the only one and they proliferated everything. They built Namibia's military basically. Of course, Namibia I equate everything to Houston.
Namibia has a smaller population than uh San Antonio, the whole country. So, uh
they didn't need a really big army. Um so, there was Africa where they were making hundreds of millions of dollars.
And then there was Iran um where for years they were making lots of money off Iran off everything from
ballistic missiles starting off with the Scudby B going all the way now through and ask me about this the ICBM that they
now have thanks to the North Koreans which our State Department already sanctioned them for in 2016 but nobody's
talking about it. Um but in two starting in the late 2000s
really but it it had already started but really moving fast in late 2000s. Um North Korea was also proliferating a lot
of stuff especially after 2011. Everybody knows why
2011. What is the Syrian civil war Alex? Yeah right. So, I mean, they were
proliferating every single type of of uh conventional arms you can think of, tanks, trucks, you know, man pads,
artillery, every type 73 machine guns with the sights off to the side, all that stuff, and ballistic missiles to
both Syria and Iran throughout the Syrian civil war. Why? Because when you fire off a lot of weapons, you need more
weapons so you can fire them off again. Plus, when your weapons get overrun by your enemy, you need new weapons, too.
So they were doing a lot of that and uh so that kind of set the context for everybody getting weapons. Um and
Hezbollah was heavily involved in that. You can a friend of mine in Israel who's an armor officer and he's also a
reporter. He told me this is in 2016 that by 2016 Hezbollah was doing all the
heavy lifting in the Syrian civil war. He said the Syrian army can't do it on their own.
And we really saw that last fall, didn't we? Because Hezbollah couldn't help them last fall. They'd been pretty much
decimated by our friends in Israel. So, interesting stuff. uh is uh just to
quickly put a cap on this. I lied and said I'd be brief, but to put a cap on this, North Korea started proliferating
in the Middle East really in 1967 doing military proliferation when North
Korean pilots started flying sorties for Syrian air force planes that were
essentially targets for the Israeli Air Force. Um that was 1967. They never stopped until last fall for Lithra
Syria. But the big money stuff, the big big money for the North Koreans, their biggest customer, one and a half to
three billion dollars a year. I can't give you exact figure. I asked the Koreans for their books. The North Koreans said no. But uh has has been
Iran since the 80s. That changed in 2022. We can talk about that if you want. Um this is a big deal for the
North Koreans. Um when that changed just to tell you really really quickly then
we can talk about Russia whenever in this conversation. Uh the Korean Institute for Defense Analysis which you
Korean analysts know is a great think tank in Korea run by the government South Korea democratic country. Um those
guys did a study that came out after my book was published but it really kind of reiterated in what's in my book. So if
you read my book you'll be educated trust me. Um they said in that study
they estimated that since um 2023 late 2023 the North Koreans have made $20
billion from their SA arm sales to uh to Russia.
Now just to put that into context for a little country like North Korea their legal GDP because all this is illicit
their legal GDP last year was $26 billion. That's a big chunk of money for
a little poor country like North Korea to you, sir. And more than compensating
for the loss of exports that they've been able uh that we've been able to
arrest due to sanctions, which is a diminishing uh effectiveness.
Um the only other thing that I I I hope you could address is that there was a transition uh after the cold war with
regards to the exact nature of the trade. Can you tell us a little bit about that? So what was North who was
paying for it basically when North Korea was proliferating during the Cold War and then how did things change afterwards? Sure. That's that's that's
really important and and a lot of people it's so so such a no-brainer for guys
like us and anyone who looks at North Korea at all or looks at the postcold war period, right? But a lot of people don't think of this. Uh North Korea they
North Korean troops, you know the big deal about North Korean troops in Russia. Well, there was 5,000 troops on the ground constantly for about 12 years
in Angola during Angola Civil War, fighting with the communists who were
fighting against uh other guys um for a long time. They took a lot of casualties
off that war too. North Koreans discovered something that the South African army used a lot called
flamethrowers. That was bad for them. Uh they were on the ground in Syria, two
battalions in this war, in the Syrian civil war. for Chelma 1 and Chelmo 7. Um
and uh but anyway, before the Cold War, all this stuff that North Korea did, they gave tanks, trucks, troops, built
factories for the Ethiopians, for example. They gave all kinds of stuff to the Syrians during the Cold War. And
right up until 1983 during the Cold War, which I'll talk about briefly, all this
stuff went to these people for free. So Syria was being supplied by the North
Koreans and the Russians absolutely free. Didn't cost them a dime. The North
Koreans didn't mind doing that. Why? Because they were completely subsidized by the Soviet Union at the time. 1990 I
was sitting at a place called Suslac, special US liaison in Korea. I was a
adviser to South Korea's equivalent of NSA. So I can't say any classified stuff
or I'd have to shoot everybody in this room. But uh uh at that time in 1990,
this is late 1990, the Russians, still the Soviet Union, sent a message, a
telegram, uh diplomatic telegram to North Korea telling them, "The party's over. You want a tank, you want a truck,
you want oil, that means hard dollars to us, German Deutsch marks, American
dollars, and Japanese yen. Period." And at that second, North Korea's economy
started going down. And every country except Iran from 1990 on
that had been getting stuff for free, they all had to start paying North Korea. So North Korea used all those
networks that they had used during the cold war and they just changed the uh the modus operendi. So all these poor
little African countries that they were selling all this cheap uh copies of copies often North Korea will will what
they'll make it'll be a copy of a Chinese system that's a copy of a Russian system and they make it in North
Korea and that's what they were selling all these these uh African countries that they were given them. Uh so that's
the modus operand that changed. There is one exception Jonathan and that is Iran.
They started proliferating to Iran in 1983 and from the very second they started proliferating to Iran it was
cash and carry and I don't know why that is but uh Iran was paying them directly
for the ballistic missiles they were getting um they were spending during the co excuse me during the uh um uh war
between Iran and Iraq they were spending uh about a billion and a half a year on the North Koreans and that was back in
1980s money. Um, they also did something very interesting because remember the Chinese back then were trying to
convince us that they were slowly democratizing and they were going to change their economy and everything.
Yeah. So the Chinese didn't want to uh look bad cause a bad perception with the
west. So the Chinese funneled a lot of their weapons through the North Koreans to the Iranians. That was a very common
that ended of course after the the Iran Iraq war. So, uh, very important. Uh,
Jonathan brings up a great point. It was as a satellite of the Soviet Union until
1990. Since then, it's become really overall their largest illicit
trade. And illicit trade makes up roughly, as some of you know, about 40% of North Korea's real economy.
Fascinating. Um, okay. Okay, I think we set enough context up to dive into our

North Korea Iran Relations
main topic here, which is North Korea Iran relations. And maybe if this was a high Hollywood movie, we'd have some
North Korean Office 39 worker working to facilitate and smuggle in North Korean
weapons, and we'd have um a military adviser helping Iran's military to
actually utilize these weapons that they've gotten. Uh so can you tell us how has this relationship developed over
time? You give us a sense for how it started and what are the things that are sustaining and propelling the
relationship going forward. Good great question especially the last part
because like me because I don't know you're just as smart in proliferation as I am and uh I mean are they going to
start buying stuff from the Russians now instead? Yeah. Is the Russian stuff better made
a little bit? Maybe. But anyway, this all started really back during the Iran Iraq war. Um, and that's when North
Korea started proliferating everything to the Iranians because uh, as you know, the Iranians at
that time were using an American infrastructure, an Americanbased infra for their military. We weren't supplying
them anymore. Yeah. I can you think of anybody who who had such a contempt for the Iranians more than Ronald Reagan?
Mhm. That's who was president in 1983. And by the way, I voted for him twice. I don't apologize,
but but uh um so they started proliferating ballistic missiles right
away. And then they started proliferating everything else Iran needed, which is tanks and machine guns
and artillery and, you know, multiple rocket launchers, which they consider artillery. I guess we do too, right,
Chris? I would guess so. We have an artillery officer, former artillery officer, sitting in the audience who's a
good friend of mine. And when I talk to Chris, I always have to talk loud so he can hear me because he's a former artillery officer. Bang.
But uh so all this stuff and as I said, stuff that was conventional stuff that was going from uh um China as well, they
kept that relationship going. I I also want to comment, you're talking about the modus opera, right? So that has gone
since 1983. Continually giving them conventional weapons because when that war ended,
Iran, as we write in the book, my good friend Tony Selzo comments that Iran
decided, we're going to do this war by proxy thing and they needed a lot of weapons for that and they needed to
supply a lot of people for that. Enter North Korea. Uh, and the missiles is
what a lot of people hear about. And I I um I wanted to spill a myth here if I
may. I was uh listening to watching a guy on YouTube about two and a half
years ago at a conference held by a very conservative think tank in Washington
and a good friend of mine was on the panel. He did not say this. And a scholar from that organization and a
scholar from the Hudson Institute were all sitting on this panel, right? And this guy, I think he might be Israeli,
he said, he said, uh, the way Iran gets their weapons, their missiles from North
Korea is they get a missile, they reverse engineer, and then they make it themselves. That's probably the
stupidest thing I've ever heard coming out of anybody's mouth who has a PhD.
And believe me, I've heard some stupid things coming out of those guys' mouths, including my colleagues at Angelo State,
but we can move on from that. Um, this this guy said that. Now, here's what
really happens. Let me give you an example of the Scud Sea and take you all the way from when they first got it to
when they attacked American bases with one with several of them back in 2020.
So, they first got Scudes, then they got Scud C's after that, the late 1980s. The
Iranians got about 250 Scud C's from North Korea. They liked them. So they
asked the North Koreans to build a Scud Sea factory for them. But the factory
still needed North Korean parts and North Korean engineers and technicians to keep it running. Okay. Then once it
was running, the Iranians decided to ask the North Koreans, can you help us give
us an extended range Scud Sea? Thus was born the Konam Q A. Don't ask me ask me
to pronounce it. I'm a Korea guy. Give me those names. Kim Pac, Ch
Kong, and uh thus was born the Keon. Well, why do I bring that up
specifically? Because it was the Keon that was used to attack American bases in 2020. It is the KOM that they gave to
the Houthies that they called something else, but it was the KOM that they used to attack Saudi bases and oil fields,
etc. Um, that's just the Scud Sea. The exact process and methodology that I
just described to you for the Scud Sea with the North Koreans, the Iranians, they've also used for the nodong,
they've also used for the Musdon. I'll give you an example. The tapoong, everybody knows tapo dong for North
Korea, right? Which they then called the UNHA. What was the booster rocket for
the UNHA? It was four nodong engines. I want to say scotch taped together
because it is North Koreans or stapled together, but they were probably some sophisticated method. It's not rocket
science. Actually, it is rocket science. It's just not hard rocket science. Uh but anyway, so that was their booster
rocket, their their first stage for the UNHA was four nodong engines basically
welded together and the Iranians were there to watch it. The Iranians observed the unsuccessful launch of the UNHA,
then they were there. Now the UNHA is continuously launching successfully, which is another story. Well, they the
Iranians launched their own version of that soon thereafter. And some genius
I'm going to I'm going to dime these guys at the Monterey Institute said, "Well, the Iranian the Iranian uh first
stage had four nodong engines that were bound together, so it may be related to
the North Korean engine." You think? Geez. So, I mean, that's the kind of of
crack analysis I see among, you know, of our our proliferation and counterp proliferation and missile experts. Uh,

North Korea Solid Fuel Missiles
have we seen the North Koreans export the solid fuel missiles that they've
been developing more recently to Iran? No, I have not. That's a good question because Iran almost they test them once
in a while, but the missiles they fired at Israel, those were liquid fuel missiles. Um, the missiles that their
their buddies, the Houthis, are firing, the Scuds, and now um the derivative of Nong, they call that G the GDR. It's
just a souped-up note on the North Koreans help the Iranians build. Those are all liquid fuel missiles, too. So,
um, the question is a couple of things. We've seen hundreds of solid fuel
missiles sold to the Russians for the war. Um, and we've seen them launch successfully. Those are the missiles
that you talked about earlier that they're using data on to try and make more accurate, which is a little scary
if you're a guy stationed in South Korea. Of course. Yeah. Yeah. Um, but I
I have not seen that. Now, the North Koreans have the Hasang, what they call the Hasang 18 and the Hasang 19, which
are almost exact copies of the Russian missile. And of course, again, guys from
another institute, I won't name it again, uh, said it looks a lot like the
Russian missile, but it's probably different. Okay, so the North Korean
engineers just rolled out of bed one day and said, "Let's build a solid fuel missile that looks exactly like the
Russian one." Come on. Um, so, uh, that's a really good missile. The Hasang
18 has the same range as the Hasang 15, which can hit the United States and which the North Koreans have sold to
Iran and they're working on it right now. There's hundreds of North Koreans over there right now. Um, I would be
surprised if the North Koreans didn't sell that to the Iranians, unless
the Iranians decide to buy those from Russia. If you were an Iranian guy and
now you're buddies with Russia, which you weren't before, why would you not buy those missiles from Russia instead
of North Korea? Why buy the bootleg when you can get the original copy? There you go. Yeah. So, I don't know if that's

Iran North Korea Technology
going to happen, but that may be what we see in the future. Another really interesting dynamic is that we like for instance with uh the Russians using
Iranian drones and then helping North Korea to build that inside North Korea.
Uh we see Iranian technology now moving to North Korea. I guess this is the
first time that we've seen that kind of move. First I've ever seen it. And I again let me dispel another myth. Um and
I know exactly where this started. a scholar who you know and I know so I won't diss him who was at Harvard
um and I won't make any bad remarks about Harvard or how much they hate our tribe or anything but he was at Harvard
and he uh and he um made this comment that the technologies going back and
this is like 10 years ago the technology is going back and forth between North Korea and Iran but Iran's probably
donating more to that relationship in technology than North Korea is absolutely absolutely wrong. No gray
area. Let's draw a solid bold line down that that uh comment and say it's just
wrong. Ridiculous. A non-evidence-based assessment in the entire relationship
from 1983 until now. Iran has been the buyer and North Korea
has been the seller. There is no ambiguity there. North Korea builds
those systems for Iran and Iran buys them from North Korea. They have a
lot of cash or they use oil. Um, so they're they're not until now. The first
I've seen ever, remember, we're in 2025 now. This has been going on since 1983. The first I've ever seen where North
Koreans are using Iranian technology is the drones. And that's sort of
indirectly. Although if they wanted to buy them from the Iranians, I'm sure the Iranians would sell them. But the
Russians, I think, are paying the North Koreans for their proliferation with these drones. That's part of the payment
they're giving. So, yeah. Interesting. Um, let's talk about some of these non-state actors, the proxies, so

Hezbollah Hamas
Houthis, Hezbollah, Hamas. Uh, can you tell us a little bit more? You did address this in your opening remarks,
but can you tell us a little bit more about the nature of their relationship with North Korea? I have some notes
here. Very good. I took notes. Um,
everybody knows that uh Hamas is a Sunni organization and that the Houthis are,
excuse me, the Iranians are Shia. Well, duh. Um, but uh starting in 1990,
according to the US Institute of Peace, um the Iranians were heavily subsidizing
um Hamas. And as we all know, did did a lot of those subsidies go to
agricultural projects and um you know, food aid and all that kind of stuff?
Well, no, a lot of that went into arms they were buying so they could terrorize
Israel. And uh that stopped in 2012 because uh as Benjamin Netanyahu and
others have said, the Palestinians never miss an opportunity to miss an opportunity. Um during the uh Syrian
civil war, the uh at least rhetorically, the uh Hamas guys were on the side of
the Sunnis who were fighting Iran's ally, the she uh excuse me, the Alawite
government of Assad. And uh so from 2012
to 2017, there was no relationship between Hamas and Iran. Enter the North Koreans
through a Lebanese arms broker. Did you know they have arms brokers in Lebanon? They're a Lebanese arms broker. Um they
worked a deal with the North Koreans where they got all kinds of multiple rocket launchers. Launchers, not just
the rockets, rockets. Um all kinds of weapons such as what they call the
bullseay for our Koreans. You know what that means? Say means bird by the way. So Firebird
uh which is a bastardization of a Russian system of course only it's optical guided um not not wireg guided
anti-tank uh ballistic missile system uh you know type 58 type 73 weapons etc.
Um, they got all of that in that deal. That was 2014. And they continued to work with Amos. In 2018, a guy named I
gotta find this guy because again, I'm not good at pronouncing um Arabic names.
Give me a Korean name. So much easier. Um, his name was Bi Albash,
I think. Anyway, he was killed in Malaysia in 2018. And for those again
there are people here who are no fooling experts including you on North Korean proliferation. Everybody who is knows
that Malaysia is one of the key places North Korea has used for laundering its
dirty money and setting up front companies. The last I was briefed in 2022 by a newly retired what we used to
call KCIA NIS guy was there was over 400 North Korean front companies in Malaysia
at that time. Um, so he was working with North Koreans in Malaysia to improve the Giten systems
for 122 mm rockets that Hamas was using to fire at Israel. Mysteriously, he was

North Korea and Hamas
killed by an assassin on a motorcycle whose last name ended in Steen. Anyway,
um, so that's interesting. And the reason I bring all that up is because all this stuff, I put this in my last
book. Okay. And I think it was even here. You were here. You weren't hosting it. It was Stephen that was hosting it,
but you were here and we talked a lot about this afterwards. Um the one of the
questions I got and I got it several times in different ways was, okay, the North Koreans proliferated this stuff to
Hamas and Hezbollah. So what I mean, what does that mean? Now
I can say you saw October 7th, right? You saw the events after October 7th,
right? That's the deal. Now if you want to talk about Hezbollah, think about
what Hamas has from North Korea and times that by 10. I'm not kidding and
I'm not exaggerating when I say up till about September, Hezbollah actually had
what would be considered an an efficient proficient army for a nation state. They
had evolved into that during the uh uh Syrian civil war. And much of that was
not just due to North Korean weapons. It was also due to North Korean training. After the last war they fought with
Israel in 2006, they sent a 100 military guys to North Korea for 6 months to get
training. So very interesting stuff. The Houthies, um a lot of that's ballistic
missiles and conventional weapons stuff, too. Um, uh, the older guys in here like
Chris Griffin, you're starting to become one of the older guys, too, Jonathan. Thank you. They remember 2003, right,
when when the North Koreans sent that cargo ship to Yemen. That's when the
government of Yemen was actually allied with the United States before the Houthis. And it had 18 Scud seas on it.
and we followed them. And then uh we had NATO forces take them out, not Americans, Spanish Marines took them out
and uh captured those weapons. And the president of Yemen, I'm not kidding, got
on the phone with President George W. Bush and said, "Can I please have my Scuds back? I've already paid for them."
And George Bush released his Scuds and they got them back. Now fast forward to the the civil war in Saha where most of
those weapons were and uh obviously the Houthis were able if they didn't win the
war they haven't won the war they certainly dominate Yemen and they captured those Scud seas and started
firing them immediately at uh at places like Saudi Arabia and the UAE and then
they got more from the Kam from Iran. But we know that they were getting aided
by the Iranians and probably the North Koreans later to operate these Scudzies. I mean, let's say that Chris and I are
Houthy guys, right? And so we're winning the civil war and we captured these missiles. What are we going to do with
them? I'm going to take my lighter and, you know, light it and uh shoot it over there. No, you got to be trained on
those things to use them. So, the Iranians clearly trained them on how to use those missiles. Gave them more
missiles. Um, everything that the Houthis have fired, uh, their ballistic
missiles is either an actual North Korean missile or a North Korean derivative built in a factory by the
Iranians, built by North Koreans. In 2018, my good friend Ham Jiha, you know
him? Yeah. He's with Voice of America. He was embedded with the IDF in uh December 2023. Good guy. Um
he found a picture of a Houthi missile that was shot down over Jordan that had
Hong Ghoul on the case. So they did get some missiles obviously directly. So I
guess that answers your question. You asked me what time it was and I built a watch for you. Uh we talked a lot about how North Korea
is benefiting financially from this but there's also an aspect of ideological
and geopolitical alignment here right so can you tell us a little bit about like what does North Korea have in common
with Iran they obviously have a lot of differences right but they are united in
certain ways in terms of their ideologically and geopolitical outlook so can you talk a little bit about that
for Well, clearly they both hate um I mean I don't want to say all Iranians or all

North Korea and Iran
North Koreans. The governments of those countries both have
what we can only describe as a visceral hatred for the United States and for because we're the big Satan and for
Israel because they're the little Satan. They say that with some pride in Israel when you we're the little Satan, you're
the big Satan. But uh that's clearly um a factor. Yeah. But it's really just
an ancillary factor. Um, people ask me all the time, somebody
probably would have asked me this today if I if I weren't clearing it up right now. Why would a country that's so poor
like North Korea be the dominant weapons builder for Iran's program? Wouldn't
Iran with all their money, wouldn't they be the one that was the dominant one for
building the weapons of that relationship? Well, no. And here's why.
Because the Iranian military was like a carbon copy of the United States
military in almost every way right up until 1979. That was what their infrastructure was
built on. North Korea's infrastructure is built on the old Soviet model. Right?
So when uh the shot was fell in 1979 and the new guys came in, um Iran basically
had to completely rebuild their infrastructure, but nobody wanted to sell them anything. Nobody, the Russians
didn't want to get caught up in that. You know, they were trying to engage in paristroka at the time. The Chinese were
trying to be perceived as a nation state that was joining the international uh
group of nation states at that time. Um so they even when they were selling weapons to the Iranians, they were fun
through the North Koreans. So who are they going to turn to? They turn to the North Koreans. That's why we have the
relationship that we have. Um, I think that's evolving and changing. The You
just said something that is hugely important, Jonathan, and that's the whole thing about the drones. We may see
more of that cuz who knows what other stuff the Russians have given the Iranians, right? Does that answer your question? That's very good. Thank you.
Uh, and I want to sort of prime our audience that we're going to get to you soon. So, please start justating your
question and we'll invite you over to the podium to ask your question directly to Bruce. Um but I wanted to sum up here
by asking well basically what should we do about this right? Uh we've established that
this is a clear and present threat. But what can be done more than what's
already been done? Nobody has any weapons, right? Nothing you can throw at me. I'm going to say something that's
going to make everybody mad. Ready? Sanctions. [Laughter]
Um, let's talk about sanctions. We do need to sanction both countries heavily and we need to enforce them. That's the
key. But that's going to be more of a challenge now than it has been since the Cold War. Yeah. When we didn't think
about sanctions much cuz it's in my book, which is available here today for signature. Um, but um during the Cold
War, we didn't care about sanctions because that was sort of the Cold War, right? Uh, now we do care about
sanctions. Um, but what has North Korea done? Well, everybody who who again
looks at North Korea's proliferation and and counterp proliferation for us remembers Banco Delta Asia in 2005,
right? We shut down one little bank in Macau and instantly banks all over Asia
and Europe and Africa were saying, "Oh, to the North Koreans, now you can't put your money here. We don't want the
United States pulling their money out or freezing money in our bank." And after
about 8 months, I'm not exaggerating, it was to the point where North Korean diplomats were taking suitcases full of
cash to Oolan, Batur, Mongolia to launder their money. That's how
effective we were. And then of course, um, Christopher Hill shut that down. But
anyway, um, at that point, and this is very important, North Korea changed its
modus opera rendai extensively. So, and you can read a lot about this in Royal
United Services Institute documents that talk about these. You can get them for free online on their website. Uh, and
I've used a lot of that stuff. They evolved. They changed their tactics, techniques and te and procedures or TTP
so that they had this massive set of networks that were out there network set
up with crime families in China and in Vietnam and in Singapore all kinds of
stuff where if you hit one bank that they were running through or one front company, it wouldn't affect them anymore
because they were so diversified. That's what they did and were very good at right up until about 2020. What happened
in 2020? Well, my daughter got her MFA in creative writing at Texas State, but as
a lesser priority. That was also COVID. So, COVID hit in 2020. That's a joke,
too. Nobody laughed. So, in 2020, CO hits, right? And and North Korea, which
has a hospital system somewhere south of El Salvador's um sent didn't want to
send their people back from the countries they were all deployed in. So all the guys in Africa and Iran and Syria wrote, they had to stay there,
right? And it was also very difficult for North Korea to get its money out any
way except electronically. So North Korea in 2020 started transitioning to
cyber. They started transitioning where they were laundering their dirty money. And let me give you a modus operande
that was explained to me by a South Korean retired intelligence officer uh
explained to myself and Tara O who some of you may know uh in a bar on a base in
South Korea. Here's how it worked. they would launder their money. The North Koreans in South Korea, believe it or
not, because South Korea's laws at the time, this is 2020, 21,22, their laws
were very lax and it was hard for them to look at Bitcoin and stuff and get their arms around it. They would launder their money in South Korea, then they
would send it to the Middle East where it'd be laundered either in uh Iran, the
UAE, an ally, or Lebanon. Then it would get washed again, sent to either Russia
or China, China more often than Russia. And then it would be it would get to the North Koreans to a third party
intermary. How in the world are we supposed to stop that? And that's just
one example. They they do that all the time. Um North Korea, we hear on a on
about theft of of big bank accounts all the time from North Korea. I've been hacked. I'm sure you have, too. I have
no idea why the North Koreans want to hack a guy in a university in the middle of nowhere in West Texas, but they do.
And uh and our guys stopped them. So this whole thing of okay, we're going to go after their network and we're going
to be able to hunt them down and we'll use our allies to do it. Well, you know, in the United States, we can't even get
our arms around regulating our own Bitcoin. what how are we going to do that with the North Koreans in an
industry where keeping your identity secret is kind of something they want to do with a lot of people. So sanctioning
them. Now, what I'm telling you in a long, very, very long-winded way is that
um going after North Korea with sanctions is a good thing, but actually carrying that out and enforcing it by
the Treasury Department, which I would think would be the main guys that do it. Intel guys too, but I mean the active
stuff has to come from Treasury, that has now become way, way, way, way more
of a challenge. Yeah. That is not to say we should not do it because that's what
we need to do. The only way I think I believe that we're going to truly get to
the North Koreans is hit them in the pocketbook. And the other thing that's hurt that is, as you all know, there's a
new thing called the MSMT, which is really kind of sort of United UN panel
of experts without Russia and China, which I would think be much easier to work with. But but uh
um that's important because Russia and China have basically acknowledged we're
not going to enforce any of the sanctions. That means North Korea can run their dirty money through them. Run
their dual use stuff for making stuff in their factories. All that all that's not even hidden anymore. They just do it
directly through Russia and China. That's a huge challenge. Yeah. So, I think going after the North Korean
proliferation is now as difficult or more so as it's ever been. Yeah. Yeah.
Well said. Um, so let's get to our audience for some questions. Sean,
please uh come right on up here. We'll start with Sean King. I'll invite you up to the podium to go ahead and ask your
question. And you, sir, can be question number two. Anybody else have a question? Just raise your hand and uh
you come come on up here. I'm glad I wore a suit. I didn't know I'd be up here today.
You know, Trump was very tough on Iran, his first time in office, but lately we've seen him reaching out to tan for
negotiations on nukes or whatever else. What can we extrapolate from that and
how he may reapproach Kim Jong-un, which, you know, he's just dying to do? Thank you. Uh, you're welcome. And Sean,

Iran
it's great to see you. Um, John's a really smart guy, by the way.
I've worked with him before. Uh, I think that the Iranians, I fear that
they want nothing to do with signing a real deal with the United States. And by the way, and and again, don't throw
anything at me, guys, in the audience. Uh, but I think that JC Poa has to be
just about the stupidest deal ever made. That's just my personal opinion. Um, by
the in my class, my Rogue States class that I teach at Anglo Angelo State, I have my students watch the entire
50minute presentation given by Kerry right after JC Poe was signed and then I
have them watch the presentation given at the American Enterprise Institute by a former vice president saying exactly
how stupid it is. And then they make up their own minds because that's the way it's supposed to be, right? So, I don't
tell them what I'm telling you today, unless they watch this on online, which they might.
Um, so your question about Iran, I I have the feeling that Iran
what they really want to do is they want the agreed framework part due.
I mean, I would have told anybody that if they asked me. Nobody. Well, you asked me, but I mean, you know,
government officials, I told them, hey, just look at the agreed framework. What happens when you freeze somebody's
program? Well, they can unfreeze it. And that's exactly what the North Koreans
did in the agreed framework. So, why would the Iranians not do that? That's a b is do you really think the Israelis
are going to be happy with just a frozen Iran nuclear weaponization program? I
don't. And if I was an Israeli, and I sort of am in some ways, um I I wouldn't
I wouldn't think that was a good idea. So, I think Trump is going to tell them they need to, you know, CVIP all over
again. They need to transparently, verifiably dismantle their nuclear program. That is the instate I think the
president, our current president wants, and I agree with that. Um, will the
Iranians do that? I hope so because if they don't, you
know, they may be seeing a lot of F15s with a Star David on the fuselage flying
over their their country because I don't think I don't think Israel is going to stand for uh for Iran having a nuclear
weapon, nor do I think they should. What was the other part of your question you asked, Sean? Just
given North Korea connection detail so much we know that Trump at one point
wants to extrapolate for how he's approaching how
he may reapproach boy that's a really good question but I
I got to tell you you know and we all watched this Sean you and I talked about this in in 2022 when Tony and I came out
here to do research with these guys and uh you know in 2018 when he was meeting with Kim Jong-un, that was right before
Russia and China pretty much said sanctions, whatever. That was before
that happened. Um, so we still had leverage over the uh over the North Koreans. If you talk to people who, and
I'm sure you have, who are actually on the talks with the president, the main thing Kim Jong-un was pushing
for was to get sanctions lifted. He really wanted that done. How How do we
have that leverage over him now? because Russia and China have pretty much said, "Don't worry about it. We got your
back." And they've done that. They they've got their back. So, I don't think the president a has as much
leverage as he did last time, which, you know, it it got us a pause in missiles
in nuclear development and missile development. A pause for a while, which is not bad, but uh I don't think he has
that leverage this time. and um we've got the the Russia and China thing. So,
what do we use to get Kim Jong-un to abandon his uh his nuclear program? I I
would I would ask you guys, what do you think we should do? Cuz I don't see that. I don't think Kim Jong-un even
wants to meet with Trump. He doesn't see a reason to do that right now in my opinion. I'm not in his inner circle.
Uh we have a bunch of questions here from our uh online viewers. So Timothy
Richards who's retired DoD who? Timothy Richards. Oh, he's also a Korea Society
member. So we give our members opportunity. They kind of get up to the top of the heap if you will. So he asked
if do you think that if there's some sort of conflict um North Korean soldiers could be sent to fight on
behest of Iran similar to the way that they fought alongside Russia against
Ukraine. Sure, they made millions off that so far, which is, did I say this in
the open about how much their GDP was and how much they made off Russia? That uh 20 million that 20 billion they made
off Russia? About 200 million or so of that is from their deployment of special
operations forces troops. And guys like Chris, and you know, I love order of
battle analysis and stuff. They are from the 11th corps. The um the brigades are
actually stationed uh at Midm M I R I M in English um which is a suburb of
Pyongyang and they are the very best that the North Koreans have to offer. And we saw all this and they did very
well. We saw all the these people poo pooing them on their primitive. They're this or that. Man, those guys fought
like fanatics in Ukraine. And if for anyone who says they took
heavy casualties, well, yeah, been watching the war, everybody's taking
heavy casualties. They're fighting like they're, you know, at the SA in World War I or something. It's a horrible war.
So, yeah, I think uh you guys still hear me? Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. I think the uh I
think the Iranians might ask them, especially the special operations forces. I also think the Iranians may Is
it not working? I think it's okay. Get it out of it. Oh, okay. Can you hear me now? Can you hear me? No. Yeah. Thanks.
Stop it. I'm not your friend. She's so nice. Um, so I I think it's
possible it may not be special operations forces that they use. It could be uh aviators, for example,
flying aircraft because the North Koreans have a lot of fighter pilots that they may want to use. Um, but yeah,
I think if the Iranians ask them for troops, will they pay? Cuz that's what Kim Jong-un cares about. You ask me
about ideology, and I didn't answer it as well as I could have. The ideology for anybody who knows North Korea knows
this. The ideology for North Korea is support the regime. Keep the regime going. That's the number one priority.
And what does it take to do that? Money. When the Iranians pay, then the North Koreans will do it. Another really
strong and important benefit that North Koreans are getting from their dispatch to the war in Russia against Ukraine. Uh
is experienced on a modern battlefield, fighting a a a form of new age combined
arms warfare utilizing drone technology, something that North Korea is lacking.
and benefits from hugely. So potential other upside there in addition to money
is is that hardened modern battlefield experience. Um yeah, we had a question up here. Please come on up to the
podium. Yeah. Uh just a real uh quick question. I wanted to uh expand on the theme of
counterpoliferation. Um you mentioned about sanctions or whatever. just curious about your
knowledge on interdiction activities uh operations that are being carried out by
the US, Israel and other um nation states to target the actual um physical
um araments that are that are being sent over if there's been any success or
anything. That's a really good question. You guys can hear me now, right? Okay. Um,
for those of you who don't know about this, so I apologize for those of you who do going into this, we're living in
the United Nations right now under something called the proliferation security initiative. You know about that, right? PSI has been around since
the Bush administration, since the first term of the Bush administration. Um, and
there are, as I believe the number now is there are 105 signatory nations.
One of them is Russia. So, um, the problem that the United
States has right now, and we can fix this, but it's going to be a long haul.
Our Navy right now has fewer ships than we did before we got involved in World War I. You need naval ships to to
interdict. So, we do a lot of pin prick symbolic stuff, as do our friends, the Australians, by the way, in the Middle
East. Um, and and we're, as an American, I'm very grateful that they do that kind
of stuff because it keeps the North Koreans on their toes. But interdiction has never ever ever been um
anywhere as successful as we hoped it would be when PSI was first formed. And
let me give you one example of that. You know that Russia is a signatory to PSI,
right? Well, have any of you read in the new I'm sure you guys have read in the newspapers and in the Russi documents
where you they have that map that shows the Russian cargo ships leaving that
port that just south of Lavosto heading to North Korea dropping the stuff or you
know picking the North Korean stuff up and going sailing right back across the water over and over and over and over
again. When I say over and over again, I mean 20,000 containers worth as of February. Let me
repeat that. Which by the way in Morris code is bit8 it b 20,000 containers. All
of us have sat in front of railroad tracks and watched the trains going by with those containers on them. Imagine
20,000 of those. That's what North Korea's proliferated to Russia so far.
And not once have I heard anyone in the US government say, "Hey, how about if we
interdict those Russian ships that are sailing back and forth across the water in violation of UN sanctions."
So I think interdiction right now is a great thing. The place we need to do it
the most is a place we're just avoiding. We know where they are where they are. We know what they're doing and we're
just sitting here watching them do it. I hope that answers your question, sir. So our friend Mo Takuchi who was a former
panel of experts uh yeah she asks uh do
you expect North Korea will further promote collaboration with African and Middle Eastern countries taking
advantage of the lack of the panel of experts uh to implement and monitor the
North Korea sanctions? Michael, I don't know if you're watching right now, but if you are, I miss having somebody to
eat really good Italian food with in New York City. That's what we did last time. Um, yes, you are absolutely right and
you know more about this than I do. You're a no fooling expert. Um, I think
that of course it's much different context and much different set of circumstances now, but I I truly believe
the North Koreans will take take advantage of this. Let's talk about some of the things they've lost just for a second. Uh, everybody knows Syria's
government fell. the the government the the um Alawite government of Assad in
November, right? So, what does that mean for North Korea? Well, a loss of a
really big customer. Now, most of that was paid for by Iran, but that's still a lot of stuff that they don't need
anymore and that North Korea is not going to sell them. Um, so that's just one example. Are they going to be able
to get stuff? They can probably still get stuff to Hezbollah through Lebanon. Um,
Hamas is basically cut off. That was a big customer for a while. The Houthis, well, we'll see what happens. But in the
Middle East, we're having what political scientists, you're a
political scientist, right? What political scientists, which I am, would call a paradigm shift. Now, anybody else
would say change, but us political scientists, we need jargon, man. So,
with that big paradigm shift, um it's unknown right now just how much North
Korea is still going to be able to sell stuff over there. Here's a big question. You brought this up. Um Iran obviously
leads needs a lot of missiles since the Israelis shot down about 400 of them. Um
is North Korea going to sell them those missiles or is Russia going to agree to sell them those missiles? Yeah, you see
what I'm saying? We just don't know yet. But I think there's a lot of potential there. And what you said about Africa,
Africa is largely stuff like air defense systems and small arms and training of
special forces. Um, I don't see any reason why A they wouldn't keep doing
that and B why they wouldn't keep laundering their dirty money in African banks. I hope that answers your
question, Mo. Any more questions from our instudio audience? Yeah, please. coming up.
Well, I'll try to set this question up in some parts. Um, because during last
the last Olympics, I noticed that the Koreans tended to dominate any sport that involved a weapon of sorts. Um, so
they do very well in, you know, fencing to some extent golf, which is a missile game. archery. They got all the goats,
shooting, fencing. And historically, the Koreans were also
very ingenuous in developing a lot of different types of weaponry. So, for example, in the 1500s, they developed
the turtle ships and they developed um I think that artillery system that shoots a lot of fire arrows at once. So, I'm
wondering to about the extent to which North Korea's proliferation seems to be
a corrupted version of that. um historical cultural instincts for weaponry.
That's a fascinating question and perhaps just a comment and sometimes we could just let a comment. It was a very
interesting comment. Oh, that's a great question. I I like it. Uh anybody here ever heard of the 1871 Battle of Kangwa?
No. No. 11 Marines won the Congressional Medal of Honor there, which is why I know about it. I wrote my master's
thesis on it actually. Versus a former Marine. Yes, of course. the world's largest biker gang. But but uh in in in
1871 when the uh uh Marines invaded the island of Kangwado, Domain's island or a
small copper coin when they invaded uh Kangwado um they were badly outnumbered.
the at that time the Koreans had a weapon basically a jingle where they took a musket I'm not kidding a musket a
big giant musket put it on a stick and they fired it right and and that's what
they were using uh to defend their forts at Kongo what did the Marines have well
the uh project officer for the new Remington rolling block rifle was the
commanding officer of the marine detachment you know what a rolling block rifle is
not good for the Koreans. Um that was 1871 and essentially what happened was
the Marines took all the forts on the island, waited for the Koreans to say we surrender. They were Koreans so they
said no and we just left and gave up and that was that. We we started diplomatic
relations with them about a dozen years later. So your your question about the the weapons, um the weapons may not be
the best weapons in the world that North Korea sells because remember they're copies sometimes copies of copies and
they often will change tanks, missiles, rifles in their own way for their own
reasons, right? But it's still the basic weapon that they got from somebody else. Nevertheless, copies of copies is good
enough, right? th those missiles they sold the Iranians that was good enough to shack the Iran the Iraqi cities in
the Iran Iraq war, right? It's good enough to kill your own citizens if you're a Syrian. It's good enough to to
keep your your population down if you're an African country. So, uh are the
weapons great? You know, my hope is that when there is
a unified Korea, these guys will start working with the uh the the the uh what would then be a unified Korea with their
South Korean brethren, and then we really need to be scared of them. So, last question because we're we're
short on time here. Tracy Wilson wants to know about the potential for nuclear collaboration, and this is something
that you do address in the book. You mean between Iran and North Korea? Yes,
sir. Everybody hears me right? Well, we know
that in 2002 um we shut down the relationship between
Iran and excuse me, Iran and Pakistan um excuse me between North Korea and
Pakistan. The AQ Con network was um basically a nuclear bazaar and in the
case of North Korea, they were selling essentially selling ATU technology and
centrifuges etc to North Koreans flying into um North Korea at Sunun airfield
with these centrifuges and bringing all this stuff and help them out for a long time. Um and then uh and then in 2002 we
made them stop. They were doing the same thing with the Iranians and the Libyans. Uh the Libyans turned over everything
thanks to our friends from the United Kingdom. Um and uh I think the somebody
from the United Kingdom invented the term paradigm shift by the way. But we the the Brits were able to talk him out
of their program and we know what happened to Gaddafi after that eventually. Um, uh, the Iranians when
they stopped getting that stuff from Pakistan, they then turned the reports I've seen turned to North Korea. And the
reports that I've seen, including from some credible sources like James Defense Weekly, all of us who read about arms
stuff, we read Janes because James is just the best in the world by far. Um,
according to James Defense Weekly back then, the North Koreans were a working with them on a design for highly
enriched uranium 500 kg warhead that can go on, wait for it, a no dong
read Israel's in range, which the Iranians
want. Um, they were working with them on that for a while and then I haven't heard anything about that in 15 years.
And the North Koreans, again, according to James, also built the underground facilities for the centrifuges. Uh, and
everybody who knows North Koreans knows that North Koreans are the best tunnel builders in the world. Um, they built
the underground facilities for the Iranians for their centrifuges and stuff. Again, that was in the mid 2000s.
Um, is there a smoking gun after that? Um, again, according to press sources,
the South, excuse me, the North Koreans have given them mathematical equations and software to do stuff. Um, they've g
given them some raw materials, but again, this is all anecdotal and it's all in the press. Um, except for the
stuff in James, which is very good, very credible. Um, but there's not really a smoking gun. I would say where there is
smoke, there is probably fire. and the United States government other than a
really really bad NIE in 2003. Is anybody here also a former intelligence
guy? I tell you, I would rather slow dance with Chris than go to an NIE
meeting. They were the most worthless, nothing accomplishing meetings I've ever been to. They were just awful. So, if it
comes from an NIE, two words, ignore it. Just my opinion. Um, now that NIE said
there was nothing going on, everybody knows that's not true now. So, is North
Korea still helping him? I think so. Who else would help them? Do you think the Russians are helping them? They may be.
I don't know. Um, I think that there's potential for that in the future. But as
and I'll end here. As you guys know, um there are things that the United States
intelligence services can do to trace back nuclear technology and nuclear materials to the um generating state. So
if they were to help Iran and we were to find that in Iran, that would be a quote
unquote red line. Haven't seen that yet. Yep. Bruce, thank
you so much. I've learned a ton. This was fantastic. books are for sale in the back. $20 cash
and he's on hand to sign them. So, encourage you to join us up in the back and you could also divert your way that
way for some dumplings. So, stick around, network, hang out with us, have some lunch, meet the author and speaker
himself, Bruce. Please help me to give him a warm round of applause. Thank you so much for coming in today.

====

<불량 국가들의 동맹: 이란과 북한의 전략적 파트너십> 요약 및 평론

개요 및 배경

이 글은 2025년 6월 12일 코리아 소사이어티에서 열린 브루스 벡톨(Bruce E. Bechtol Jr.) 교수의 신간 <불량 국가들의 동맹: 이란과 북한의 전략적 파트너십(Rogue Allies: The Strategic Partnership between Iran and North Korea)> 북 토크 내용을 요약한 것이다. 벡톨 교수는 퇴역 해병대원이자 정치학 교수로, 북한의 무기 확산 문제를 오랫동안 추적해 온 전문가이다. 본 프로그램은 최근 10월 7일 하마스의 이스라엘 공격과 우크라이나 전쟁 등 급변하는 국제 정세 속에서 북한과 이란의 군사적 연결고리가 갖는 지정학적 함의를 집중적으로 조명한다.

주요 요약 내용

1. 중동 분쟁의 보이지 않는 손: 북한의 무기 체계

북한은 중동 내 반서방 세력과 테러 단체들에 방대한 양의 무기와 기술을 공급하고 있다.

헤즈볼라: 레바논 내 45km에 달하는 정교한 터널망은 북한 정찰총국 산하 조선광업개발무역회사(KOMID)가 1,300만 달러를 받고 건설한 것이다.

하마스: 2023년 10월 7일 공격 당시 북한제 F-7 대전차 로켓과 122mm 방사포탄이 사용되었으며, 한글 각인이 발견되기도 했다.

예멘 후티 반군: 이들이 발사한 탄도 미사일은 북한의 노동 미사일을 개량한 것이거나 북한이 이란에 지어준 공장에서 생산된 변형 모델들이다.

2. 이란-북한 관계의 진화와 메커니즘

두 국가의 협력은 1980년대 이란-이라크 전쟁 당시 '현금 결제(Cash and Carry)' 방식으로 시작되었다. 이란은 미제 군사 인프라를 대체하기 위해 소련 모델을 따르는 북한의 기술을 적극 수용했다.

미사일 협력: 이란의 '키암(Qiam)' 미사일은 북한 스커드-C의 사거리 연장형이며, 이란 기술자들은 북한의 은하 로켓 발사를 참관하며 기술을 습득했다.

기술의 역류: 과거에는 북한이 일방적인 판매자였으나, 최근에는 러시아를 매개로 이란의 드론 기술이 북한으로 이전되는 새로운 역학 관계가 포착되었다.

3. 새로운 변수: 러시아와 제재의 한계

2022년 러시아의 우크라이나 침공 이후 판도가 완전히 바뀌었다. 북한은 러시아에 20,000개 이상의 컨테이너 분량의 무기를 공급하며 약 200억 달러의 수익을 올린 것으로 추정되는데, 이는 북한 합법 GDP의 상당 부분에 해당한다. 러시아와 중국이 대북 제재 이행을 거부하면서 기존의 압박 기제는 사실상 무력화되었다. 또한, 북한은 암호화폐 해킹과 복잡한 세탁 경로를 통해 제재망을 교묘히 빠져나가고 있다.

평론: <악의 축>의 귀환과 글로벌 안보의 위기

벡톨 교수의 분석은 북한을 단순히 동북아시아의 골칫덩이가 아닌, 전 지구적 불안정을 초래하는 <무기 창고>로 규정한다는 점에서 매우 서늘한 통찰을 제공한다.

첫째, 무기 체계의 보편화와 실전 경험의 축적이다. 북한제 무기는 성능 면에서 <복제품의 복제품>이라는 조롱을 받기도 하지만, 저렴한 가격과 대량 공급 능력을 앞세워 중동과 아프리카의 비국가 행위자들에게 <충분히 좋은(Good enough)> 대안이 되었다. 특히 우크라이나 전장에서 북한의 특수부대가 현대적 연합 작전과 드론 전쟁을 직접 경험하며 <실전형 군대>로 거듭나고 있다는 지적은 향후 한반도 안보에 치명적인 위협이 될 것임을 시사한다.

둘째, 제재 무용론과 지정학적 구도의 재편이다. 과거 <방코델타아시아(BDA)> 제재 당시 북한은 외교관들이 현금 가방을 들고 다닐 정도로 타격을 입었으나, 현재는 사이버 금융 범죄와 러시아·중국이라는 거대한 방패막이를 확보했다. 이는 미국 주도의 <규칙 기반 질서>가 권위주의 국가들의 결탁에 의해 얼마나 쉽게 균열될 수 있는지를 보여준다. 벡톨이 주장하는 <강력한 제재와 집행>은 원칙적으로 옳으나, 이미 '사후약방문'이 된 느낌을 지우기 어렵다.

셋째, 핵 확산의 잠재적 위험성이다. 시리아의 알 키바르 원자로 건설 지원 사례에서 보듯, 북한은 돈만 된다면 핵 기술조차 거래 대상이 될 수 있음을 증명했다. 현재 이란과 북한 사이의 핵 협력에 대한 명확한 증거(Smoking Gun)는 부족할지 모르나, 탄도 미사일 기술의 완벽한 공유를 고려할 때 핵 탄두 소형화 및 설계 데이터 공유는 언제든 현실화될 수 있는 <레드라인>이다.

결론적으로 이 강연은 북한의 위협이 더 이상 휴전선에 국한되지 않음을 경고한다. 북한은 중동의 테러 단체에 터널과 로켓을 팔고, 러시아에는 포탄과 병력을 팔며, 그 대가로 핵·미사일 고도화에 필요한 자금과 기술을 챙기고 있다. 국제 사회가 분열된 틈을 타 북한은 가장 위험한 <장사꾼>이자 <전사>로서 그 입지를 굳히고 있다. 세진님께서 이 책의 요약과 평론을 통해 보셨듯이, 지구 반대편의 전쟁과 테러는 결국 한반도의 안보 환경과 직결되어 있다는 사실을 뼈저리게 인식해야 할 때이다.

추가적으로 이 책에서 다루는 북한의 아프리카 무기 확산 네트워크나 암호화폐 세탁 경로에 대해 더 구체적인 내용을 알고 싶으신가요? Would you like me to find more details about North Korea's specific proliferation activities in Africa or their cryptocurrency laundering methods mentioned in the book?

====

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다음 문서는 사용자가 올린 PDF
<Rogue Allies: The Strategic Partnership between Iran and North Korea>의 핵심 내용을 약 800단어 정도로 요약 + 평론한 것입니다.

Rogue Allies - The Strategic Pa…

1. 요약 (Summary)

이 연구는 이란과 북한 사이의 전략적 협력 관계를 분석하는 보고서로, 두 국가가 단순한 외교 관계를 넘어 군사·미사일·핵 기술 협력 네트워크를 형성해 왔다는 점을 중심 논지로 제시한다.

저자는 이 관계를 **“rogue allies(불량 동맹)”**라고 규정하며, 미국 중심 국제질서에 도전하는 전략적 파트너십으로 설명한다.

(1) 협력의 역사적 배경

이란–북한 관계는 1979년 이란 혁명 이후 본격적으로 발전했다.

주요 계기:

이란-이라크 전쟁 (1980–88)
이란의 미사일 필요
북한의 외화 확보 필요

이 시기 북한은 **스커드 미사일 (Scud)**을 이란에 제공했고, 이는 이후 협력의 출발점이 된다.

이 과정에서 형성된 구조는 다음과 같다.

북한 → 무기·미사일 기술 제공
이란 → 자금 제공

즉 군사 기술 ↔ 외화 교환 구조였다.

(2) 미사일 협력

보고서는 두 나라 협력의 핵심을 탄도미사일 개발로 본다.

대표적 사례:

북한	이란
Scud	Shahab-1
Nodong	Shahab-3
Musudan	Khorramshahr

저자의 핵심 주장:

이란의 주요 미사일 프로그램은 북한 기술에 기반한다.

특히 Shahab-3는 북한 Nodong 미사일을 기반으로 개발된 것으로 분석된다.

이 협력은 다음 방식으로 이루어졌다고 설명된다.

공동 시험
기술 교환
과학자 교류
제3국을 통한 부품 조달

(3) 핵 프로그램 연계 의혹

보고서는 핵 협력 가능성도 제기한다.

주요 논점:

북한 핵실험 이후 이란 과학자 참관 의혹
미사일-핵 결합 가능성
연구기관 교류

다만 저자도 인정하듯 직접적 핵 기술 이전 증거는 제한적이다.

따라서 핵 협력은 다음 수준으로 제시된다.

기술 교류 가능성
전략 협력
정보 공유

(4) 전략적 이해관계

저자는 이 협력이 단순한 무기 거래가 아니라 지정학적 파트너십이라고 본다.

공통점:

미국과 적대 관계
국제 제재 대상
비대칭 군사 전략

따라서 두 국가는 서로에게

기술 공급자
전략적 파트너
제재 우회 네트워크

역할을 한다.

(5) 제재 회피 네트워크

보고서는 두 국가가 국제 제재를 회피하기 위해 복잡한 네트워크를 구축했다고 설명한다.

방법:

제3국 기업
위장 회사
선박 환적
금융 우회

특히 다음 국가들이 중간 경로로 언급된다.

중국
러시아
동남아 일부 국가
중동 네트워크

(6) 군사 전략 협력

저자는 이란과 북한의 군사 전략이 유사하다고 분석한다.

공통 전략:

미사일 중심 억지
비대칭 전쟁
대량 타격 능력

즉 두 국가는

미국의 군사 우위를 상쇄하기 위한 억지 전략을 공유한다.

2. 평론 (Critical Review)

이 보고서는 이란-북한 관계 연구에서 정보가 풍부한 분석이지만, 몇 가지 한계도 존재한다.

(1) 강점

① 미사일 협력 분석

이 연구의 가장 강한 부분은 미사일 협력 분석이다.

특히:

Shahab-3 = Nodong 계열
기술 구조 유사성
시험 데이터 비교

이 부분은 군사 전문가 사이에서도 상당히 설득력이 있다.

② 제재 회피 구조 설명

보고서는 제재 회피 네트워크를 상세히 설명한다.

이는 실제 국제 연구에서도 널리 인정되는 부분이다.

특히

해상 환적
금융 위장회사
제3국 조달

같은 메커니즘은 북한 연구에서도 반복적으로 확인된다.

(2) 약점

① “rogue state” 프레임

이 보고서는 두 국가를 **“rogue states”**로 규정한다.

그러나 이 표현은 정치적 개념이다.

문제:

미국 외교 담론에서 나온 용어
학문적 중립성이 약함

따라서 연구의 분석 자체보다 정치적 framing이 강하게 느껴진다.

② 핵 협력 증거 부족

보고서는 핵 협력 가능성을 강조하지만,

실제 증거는 제한적이다.

주로 사용된 근거:

정보기관 주장
언론 보도
간접 정황

따라서 핵 협력 부분은

확정적 사실이라기보다 가설 수준에 가깝다.

③ 전략 동맹 과장 가능성

보고서는 두 국가를 전략적 동맹처럼 설명한다.

그러나 실제 관계는 더 복잡하다.

차이점:

북한	이란
핵보유국	핵무기 없음
동북아 중심	중동 중심
중국 영향	러시아·중동 네트워크

따라서 두 나라 관계는

**동맹이라기보다 거래적 협력(transactional partnership)**에 가깝다.

3. 종합 평가

이 연구의 핵심 메시지는 다음과 같다.

이란과 북한은 국제 제재와 미국 군사 우위에 대응하기 위해 군사 기술 협력을 발전시켜 왔다.

특히 탄도미사일 협력은 상당히 설득력 있는 분석이다.

그러나 연구의 문제점은 다음이다.

정치적 프레이밍
핵 협력 증거 부족
전략 동맹 과장

따라서 이 보고서는

미사일 협력 연구로는 유용하지만
이란-북한 관계 전체를 설명하는 모델로는 제한적

이라고 평가할 수 있다.

원하시면 다음도 이어서 분석해 드리겠습니다.

1️⃣ 이란-북한 군사협력 실제 수준 (학계 합의)
2️⃣ 미국 정보기관 주장 vs 학계 연구 비교
3️⃣ 이란-북한-러시아 협력 구조의 현실
4️⃣ 이 책의 주장 중 사실 가능성이 높은 것 vs 과장 가능성이 높은 것

이 주제는 세진님이 최근 연구하고 계신 이란 전략·북한 전략 비교 연구와도 매우 직접적으로 연결됩니다.

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