Embers of War: The Fall of an Empire and the Making of America's Vietnam by Fredrik Logevall | Goodreads
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Embers of War: The Fall of an Empire and the Making of America's Vietnam
by
Fredrik Logevall
4.43 · Rating details · 1,544 ratings · 239 reviews
The struggle for Vietnam occupies a central place in the history of the twentieth century. Fought over a period of three decades, the conflict drew in all the world’s powers and saw two of them—first France, then the United States—attempt to subdue the revolutionary Vietnamese forces. For France, the defeat marked the effective end of her colonial empire, while for America the war left a gaping wound in the body politic that remains open to this day.
How did it happen? Tapping into newly accessible diplomatic archives in several nations and making full use of the published literature, distinguished scholar Fredrik Logevall traces the path that led two Western nations to lose their way in Vietnam. Embers of War opens in 1919 at the Versailles Peace Conference, where a young Ho Chi Minh delivers a petition for Vietnamese independence to President Woodrow Wilson. It concludes in 1959, with a Viet Cong ambush on a U.S. outpost outside Saigon and the deaths of two American officers whose names would be the first to be carved into the black granite of the Vietnam Veterans Memorial. In between come years of political, military, and diplomatic maneuvering and miscalculation, as leaders on all sides embark on a series of stumbles that makes an eminently avoidable struggle a bloody and interminable reality.
Logevall takes us inside the councils of war—and gives us a seat at the conference tables where peace talks founder. He brings to life the bloodiest battles of France’s final years in Indochina—and shows how from an early point, a succession of American leaders made disastrous policy choices that put America on its own collision course with history: Harry Truman’s fateful decision to reverse Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s policy and acknowledge France’s right to return to Indochina after World War II; Dwight Eisenhower’s strenuous efforts to keep Paris in the fight and his escalation of U.S. involvement in the aftermath of the humiliating French defeat at Dien Bien Phu; and the curious turnaround in Senator John F. Kennedy’s thinking that would lead him as president to expand that commitment, despite his publicly stated misgivings about Western intervention in Southeast Asia.
An epic story of wasted opportunities and tragic miscalculations, featuring an extraordinary cast of larger-than-life characters, Embers of War delves deep into the historical record to provide hard answers to the unanswered questions surrounding the demise of one Western power in Vietnam and the arrival of another. This book will become the definitive chronicle of the struggle’s origins for years to come.
Advance praise for Embers of War
“Fredrik Logevall has gleaned from American, French, and Vietnamese sources a splendid account of France’s nine-year war in Indochina and the story of how the American statesmen of the period allowed this country to be drawn into the quagmire.”—Neil Sheehan, author of A Bright Shining Lie, winner of the Pulitzer Prize and the National Book Award
“Fredrik Logevall is a wonderful writer and historian. In his new book on the origins of the American war in Vietnam, he gives a fascinating and dramatic account of the French war and its aftermath, from the perspectives of the French, the Vietnamese, and the Americans. Using previously untapped sources and a deep knowledge of diplomatic history, Logevall shows to devastating effect how America found itself on the road to Vietnam.”—Frances FitzGerald, author of Fire in the Lake, winner of the Pulitzer Prize and the National Book Award (less)
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Kindle Edition, 864 pages
Published August 21st 2012 by Random House
Original Title
Embers of War: The Fall of an Empire and the Making of America's Vietnam
ASIN
B007EED4P8
Edition Language
English
Literary Awards
Pulitzer Prize for History (2013), Francis Parkman Prize (2013), Lionel Gelber Prize Nominee (2013), Arthur Ross Book Award for Gold Medal (2013), Cundill History Prize Nominee for Recognition of Excellence (2013)
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I'm working my way through this book and thoroughly enjoying it. Does anyone have a suggestion for other books along these lines? I'm looking to follow up with a book about the Vietnam War or the Korean War, now that this book is giving me such a thorough and fascinating look at the pre-Vietnam War history of the area.
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Jul 14, 2017Michael Finocchiaro rated it it was amazing · review of another edition
Shelves: american-21st-c, non-fiction, pulitzer-history
It is entirely unsurprising that Logevall swept nearly every history award with Embers of War. It is highly readable and incredibly enlightening. Having had a stepdad who was a Vietnam vet, I have become increasingly interested in the history of the war and this book provides a peerless view of the context and origins of the conflict. Each of the primary actors is described in realistic detail. I learned a lot about the country itself of which I was completely ignorant and I was fascinated by the human being Ho Chi Minh who was not the cardboard bad guy that I had been taught. Many of the mistakes that the French made during the Indochina War were repeated in the Vietnam War and have been once again committed in Afghanistan and elsewhere. This book should be read by anyone interested in Southeast Asia and the conflict that came to define a generation in America...and Vietnam.
I keep thinking of this book and would suggest that it is great to follow this one up with Frances FitzGerald's Fire in the Lake. (less)
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Jan 01, 2019BlackOxford rated it it was amazing
Shelves: american, vietnamese, war, scandinavian-icelandic
Tragedy Unpacked
The war in Vietnam was infinitely tragic. What Logevall establishes in his extended history of the conflict is that the tragedy is a cardinal order of infinity greater than is commonly thought. Its origins are deeper and more subtle than the American obsession with Cold War dominance. And its cycle of repetitive error continues to the present day in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria. This greater tragedy, it seems to me, is our self-imposed inability as a species to learn from collective experience.
The series of military conflicts in Vietnam is possibly the slowest and most destructive car crash in history. The 35 year war of Vietnamese independence had an almost inevitable trajectory given the diplomatically opportunistic and militarily expedient decisions of virtually everyone involved - the French, Japanese, British, and, most disastrously, the Americans - from 1919 onwards. The only exceptions to opportunism and expediency appear to be policies grounded in intense personal animosity - for example between President Roosevelt, the champion of national self-determination, and Charles de Gaulle with his post-war colonial ambitions.
It was the British, for example, worried about their post-WWII colonies in Southern Asia, who first raised the strategic Domino Theory for the region. Originally rejected by the USA as colonial paranoia, the theory eventually became the dominant rationale for American policy in the region. It was subsequently shown to be total bunk.
Similarly, it was the French who developed the high-tech military strategy of urban control and brutal rural counter-insurgency. This failed strategy was emulated with such horrible but unproductive effect by the Americans for more than a decade. Just as the French became hated as invading terrorists, so also did their American successors.
It was the Japanese who attempted to direct the civil government of Vietnam through a parallel military presence, thus provoking an international reaction leading to global war. America found itself on the brink of yet further global conflict through exactly the same political charade during its military occupation of the country. At least the Japanese recognised the hollowness of the regime they supported; whereas the US lived happily inside its own fiction.
The practical problem with opportunism and expediency is that the world changes even while computation is underway. The calculus used to weigh advantages and disadvantages thus becomes obsolete quickly. Meanwhile one is stuck with the consequences of irrelevant calculations. The world of international relations is simply to complicated to navigate without some reasonably accurate moral compass. America, in particular, didn’t even have an indication of true North as it attempted to continuously calibrate and re-calibrate its position.
The biggest player in post-war Vietnam, France, at least knew what it wanted: the re-acquisition of its former colonies. The USA, however, simultaneously wanted de-colonisation, popular support in France lest it veer to the Left domestically, and neutralisation of any potential Communist influence in Vietnam. These objectives were mutually incompatible and of constantly shifting priority. This situation, therefore, led to progressive policy failures throughout the critical period of 1945-1949. These failures continued and ramified for the next quarter century as the calculus of American advantage became even more complex and more obscure.
I find myself searching for a metaphor which can make sense of the historical detail of Logevall’s highly readable account. It seems to me that it has been the misfortune of the people of Indochina to have been considered by others as a commercial ‘asset’ for most of the 20th century. The French, the Japanese, and the Americans all valued this asset differently but shared the view that it was theirs to dispose of as a matter of right. The countries of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia constituted a collection of stocks - of rubber, of rice, of oil, and of productive people - to be developed, protected, educated, and if necessary written-off if they failed to ‘make the numbers.’ The traditional rationale of the mission civilisatrice and strategy of a politique de force were consistently applied by every invader.
For the Vietminh and latterly the Viet Cong and the NVA, Vietnam was not an asset but an obligation. This is more accurate, I think, than the facile attribution of nationalism and its connotations to the various parties. This attitude is made clear by the consistent behaviour of its leaders, particularly Ho and Giap, who spent their entire adult lives unswervingly committed to one outcome: the political independence of Vietnam, not just from France but also from China, the Soviet Union and America. This attitude clearly distinguished them from other so-called nationalists like Bao Dai and the Diems who had very much of an ‘asset-view’ of their own country.
The obligation felt by Ho and Giap was hardly ideological - Ho’s politics were pragmatic in the extreme. He sought alliance with America and reasonable compromise with France during most of the 1940’s. Nor was the obligation nationalistic in the sense that it touted the superiority of Vietnamese culture or language. It was an obligation which insisted on the unity of the three former French colonies of Cochin China, Amman, and Tonkin because they were historically one nation, separated for the convenience of colonial administration. If anything the culture that Ho was promoting was, inevitably given his education and experience, a sort of cosmopolitan Francophile socialism.
I am not competent to comment on the historical detail of Logevall’s narrative. What I can testify to, however, is its power in re-framing the origins of the war in a way I have not before encountered. It is also gripping, and often surprising. Highly recommended. (less)
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Jan 02, 2013Matt rated it really liked it · review of another edition
Shelves: vietnam-war
Fredrik Logevall’s Embers of War is not the first book I’ve read about the First Indochina War. However, it is the first book that doesn’t deal specifically with the infamous 1954 battle of Dien Bien Phu, which pitted the dying empire of France against the insurgent-nationalist Viet Minh.
Reading solely about Dien Bien Phu, without any accompanying context, is the historical-reading equivalent of eating all the frosting off a cupcake. In order to avoid relative habits currently practiced with zeal by my 2 year-old, I decided to read something that would give me a fuller picture of France’s war in Vietnam.
Embers of War proved to be a very good choice. In 2013, it won the Pulitzer Prize for history. The author has a PhD from Yale, teaches at Cornell, and is a respected expert on America’s foreign policy in Vietnam.
Logevall begins his story in 1919, where a young, slight Vietnamese leader arrives in Paris, in the shadow of Versailles, to plead his nation’s case before the great powers. What Ho Chi Minh failed to recognize, unfortunately, was that Woodrow Wilson’s doctrine of self-determination only applied to white people, and that darker hues would have to suck lemons while Great Britain, France, the U.S. (with an assist from Italy) carved up the world into various clients, colonies, and mandates.
After Ho failed to find an audience among the great powers, he settled in with the French Left, founding a journal, writing articles for socialist publications, and even writing a play. It was during this time that Ho drifted from Wilson and his laudable but empty words, and into the orbit of Lenin and the Bolsheviks.
As Logevall points out, Ho Chi Minh was both a communist and a nationalist, but his defining trait seems to have been pragmatism. Even after the disintegration of “the Wilsonian moment,” Ho did not give up entirely on the United States.
During World War II, France’s Vietnamese colony – divided into the regions of Cochin China (in the south), Annam (in the center), and Tonkin (in the north) – was administered by the Vichy French. When we think about France in World War II, the discussion is skewed by certain images, such as the brave Résistance, or the liberation of Paris by Free French troops. We tend to forget that the French were collaborators nonpareil. Their overriding concern in this period remained – in typically Gallic fashion – with themselves. The French wanted to save their Empire. They wanted to remain a Great Power, despite all qualitative and quantitative evidence to the contrary.
Understandably, Ho Chi Minh and other Vietnamese nationalists believed this to be a historical turning point for their embattled and perpetually-occupied nation. For awhile, they were encouraged by Franklin D. Roosevelt’s strong anti-colonial position. As Logevall notes, Roosevelt was “[s]hocked and appalled by France’s swift collapse against the Germans, despite having what on paper was arguably Europe’s strongest army.” Roosevelt came to see the French as a nonentity, and kept his distance from de Gaulle. He maintained an expedient policy of diplomatic relations with Vichy, but in general, his attitude towards the French became one of “unremitting hostility.”
As World War II drew to a close, the history of southeast Asia balanced on the pinpoint of Roosevelt’s failing health. Roosevelt insisted on a “trusteeship” of Vietnam; the U.S. parachuted supplies and advisers into Vietnam; and Ho Chi Minh actively embraced the words of Thomas Jefferson in formulating his appeal. Later history would prove Ho Chi Minh to be one of America’s most formidable adversaries. In 1944-45, however, he turned to the United States for help.
And then Roosevelt died.
With his assurances to de Gaulle in Washington, Truman had indicated the course his administration would follow on Indochina, at least in the short term. Washington would not act to prevent a French return to Indochina. There were voices in the State Department who objected to this policy, who believed firmly that the United States had to stand for change, for a new order of things, a decolonization of the international system, but they had lost out to those in Washington who stood, in effect, for the old order of things, and who moreover had their eyes firmly fixed on Soviet moves in postwar Europe…
In historical terms, it was a monumental decision by Truman, and like so many that U.S. presidents would make in the decades to come, it had little to do with Vietnam herself – it was all about American priorities on the world stage…
Despite American acquiescence, France was not long for Vietnam. The Viet Minh – the Vietnamese nationalist coalition – had momentum on their side. The French were a hollowed old tree of an empire, with more problems than they could count; the Vietnamese were fighting for their country, in their country.
Victory did not come easily, however. At times, it seemed, the French might even prevail. But with the death – from cancer – of Jean de Lattre de Tassigny, France’s most effective leader in Indochina, matters spiraled out of control. That spiral ended in defeat at Dien Bien Phu, and a peace treaty that called for France’s exit from Vietnam, the partitioning of the country into North and South, and for a nationwide reunification vote that never took place.
Despite the ever-present violence in the background, Embers of War is not a military history. Nor is it particularly concerned with the biographies of the various personages who strut across the stage with varying degrees of success. It is heavily tilted towards the political, with heavy emphasis on the byzantine backroom negotiations that translate into national policies that are later fulfilled by the nameless and the faceless.
The battle of Dien Bien Phu is given an entire section of the book, but even here, the emphasis is on the political context, rather than the movement of men across the field of battle. Dien Bien Phu is the baton-passing section of Indochinese history, when France turned over her colonial duties to the United States. It is during this battle, in which American supplies were dropped by American planes, sometimes with American pilots, that we started our inextricably entangled relationship with South Vietnam, leading to our most inexplicable war. Logevall – who is also the author of a book called Choosing War – does not see America’s eventual military involvement as some tragic mistake, but as the end-result of a series of premeditated policy decisions. During the section on Dien Bien Phu, Logevall unveils his argument that President Dwight D. Eisenhower came perilously close to beginning “the Vietnam War” in 1954. This is in contrast to the common assumption of Eisenhower’s wise, moderating foreign policy.
Eisenhower has been praised by some historians for his prudence in keeping the United States out of the Indochina quagmire. But this analysis largely conflates his overall restraint in foreign policy…with his more aggressive approach to crises in the Third World…In 1954, he and Dulles were prepared to intervene directly to save the French position in the Indochina War, and came close to doing so; in the years thereafter, they gambled they could build a new state in southern Vietnam with a mercurial and unproven leader. As the Saigon government skidded and careened down treacherous roads in the late 1950s, Eisenhower, his attention mostly on other foreign policy concerns and his trusted Dulles no longer by his side as of early 1959, ordered no reevaluation, even though an insurgency was under way in South Vietnam and even though Diem continued business as usual, rejecting all calls to enact far-reaching reforms and insisting on framing the problem as primarily military in nature.
By no means does Logevall single Eisenhower out for any particular blame. Every U.S. president from Truman to Nixon made mistakes in Vietnam. Frankly, due to the domestic political climate of the Cold War, it would’ve taken a brave politician (with no particular concern about keeping his job) to cut ties to the corrupt South Vietnamese regime.
Embers of War does an exceptional job of providing the circumstances that led America into her devastating war in Vietnam. It can stand alone, or provide the foundation for further Vietnam-related reading. The writing is unadorned but clear, and after he is done telling his story, Logevall does a fine job summarizing his arguments. With a complex subject such as Vietnam, I really appreciated Logevall’s ability to be simultaneously sophisticated and readable. He is a smart guy with a point-of-view, but he is also generous in explaining his reasoning.
I’ve not read much on Vietnam, for the reason that the history is still so unsettled, still too wracked with passionate opinions. With Logevall, I felt I could trust what he wrote, and more importantly, understand it, despite not having read a dozen other books on the subject.
(less)
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May 05, 2013Joseph rated it it was amazing · review of another edition
Shelves: french, history, political-science, war
Fredrik Logevall's The Embers of War: The Fall of an Empire and the making of America's Vietnam takes Vietnam's struggle for independence to its very beginning and carries it through the beginning of America's “real” involvement in the war. It is clearly written and written in great detail. Logevall backs up his book with eighty-three pages of bibliography, roughly one page for every ten written.
At the Versailles Peace Conference in 1919, a young Vietnamese man in a rented morning coat comes to meet Woodrow Wilson and give him a letter. The letter is due almost entirely with Wilson, his Fourteen Points and his criticism of colonial empires. Ho Chi Minh was that man and hoped Wilson would help his country gain independence. Ho Chi Minh would leave disappointed never meeting Wilson or receiving a reply to his letter.
Jump to the end of World War II, China is the occupying country supervising the removal of the Japanese and keeping the peace. With the Japanese gone, Ho Chi Minh believes Vietnam is liberated and works to form a government. He gives speeches and quotes the Declaration of Independence. FDR as president did not support empires. He remained quiet about it to Churchill, but openly voiced how France could not support an empire. In other words France as a power was finished. However, it was Truman who was president after the war and Ho Chi Minh's independent Vietnam was ignored by France and England. Marshall Plan dollars allowed France to start sending troops back to Vietnam. Truman even allowed French troops to be transferred on American ships.
Ho Chi Minh called for free elections and land reform; he won the elections, but it matters little. The Chinese broker a peace that requires France to recognize the Republic of Vietnam and Vietnam to allow 25,000 French troops for a five year period. The French troops were replacing the Chinese troops. Ho Chi Minh travels to France looking for support. He is seen as a simple and genuine man although he admits to being a communist he says Vietnam is not ready for communism, just independence. He gains little support in France even from the socialists.
America is not too concerned about Vietnam. It is still seen as a defeated France trying to desperately to cling to its past. Truman is more concerned with Korea and the political fallout from the war. When Eisenhower is elected France asks for support and Eisenhower demands that there be a plan before any aid is given. This is also where things begin to change. Vietnam is not about France wanting to keep its empire, its about communism. The early development of the Domino Theory begins. If Vietnam falls, Thailand then India falls to communism. Suddenly America's opinion change. Communism changes the entire viewpoint.
Although the book primarily is about France's handling of Vietnam, it does show the very gradual but growing U.S. involvement in the war. From denying France its empire, to aid, to Americans directly assisting the French, to support for Diem, to fighting the war. The book also shows the frustration of Ho Chi Minh. For fifty-five years from believing in Wilson, to the Declaration of Independence speeches, to having independence taken away, to wanting fair and free elections, to having his communism doubted by the USSR and China (but not the US), Ho Chi Minh never lived to see his county free. France left defeated in Vietnam only to fight another war with its colonial holding Algeria.
Embers of War is an excellent history of the Vietnam conflict before the American commitment. It is a conflict that never should have happened and had so many opportunities to be resolved without violence. I recommend this book to anyone with an interest in foreign affairs or history. (less)
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Dec 02, 2014Max rated it it was amazing · review of another edition
Shelves: american-recent-history
How did America become involved in Viet Nam and why was American policy so dysfunctional? Logevall lays it all out from French colonization in 1873 to 1959 with the killing of the first Americans to later have their names engraved on the Viet Nam War Memorial. He covers Ho Chi Minh’s lifelong nationalism from his attempts to meet President Wilson at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 through the decision in 1959 as President of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam to help the Viet Cong in the Sou ...more
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Sep 24, 2017Christopher Saunders rated it it was amazing · review of another edition
Shelves: non-fiction-to-read-2017, 2017-reads, pulitzer-prize-nonfiction, favorites,vietnam-war
Many books and documentaries explore the origins of America's tragic involvement in Vietnam, but few as thoroughly (and damningly) as Fredrik Logevall's Embers of War. Unlike most other historians of the conflict, Logevall successfully adapts a multinational perspective, giving insight into not only American but Vietnamese, French, British and Chinese perspectives on Indochina's "10,000 Day War." Logevall shows France's ill-advised, blundering efforts to reinstate colonial hegemony after WII; th ...more
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Nov 02, 2012Jerome rated it it was amazing · review of another edition
A comprehensive, well-organized, engrossing and very well-written history of the French war in Indochina that led to the beginning of US involvement in that region. Logevall begins with the Japanese occupation during the world war up to 1959.
Logevall’s coverage of US involvement with the Diem regime is very good, and he does a great job explaining the remarkable number of ill-formulated and sometimes unrelated decisions made in this time period. One of Logevall’s points is that pretty much every decision made by US policymakers during this period had the effect of narrowing the options of subsequent administrations. Still, Logevall argues that this did not make increased US involvement in the region inevitable; it just made it more likely.
Logevall also does a great job covering all the diplomatic aspects of the time period.Ho Chi Minh is a central figure to the story and Logevall does a great job fleshing out and bringing life to this confusing and mysterious figure.
Eisenhower is often portrayed as a peacekeeper when it comes to southeast Asia. As Logevall shows, this is not entirely accurate; he had no desire to send troops there, but nor did he want the South Vietnamese regime to fall. When Eisenhower left office, there were hundreds of US advisers already in-country.
There were a few errors: for example that Ho drafted the petition for Allied leaders in Paris in 1919: Phan Vang Truong wrote it. Also, Logevall claims that Ho Chi Minh would have easily won the national elections after the Geneva accords were signed, but offers no evidence to support this claim. He also writes that all the village chiefs appointed by Diem were Catholic. This is incorrect as far as I know. (less)
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Jul 18, 2013Sean Smart rated it really liked it · review of another edition
A fascinating history of the last decade of the French Empire in Indo-China and the beginning of the American involvement. Very good section on the Battle of Dien Bien Phu
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Jul 16, 2014Michael Perkins rated it it was amazing · review of another edition
"Wisdom comes to us when it can no longer do any good." —Gabriel García Márquez
Logevall explains who was the basis of the Alden Pyle character in "The Quiet American"
http://www.viet-studies.com/kinhte/Lo...
It's all here in this book, why getting entrenched in a war in Vietnam would never succeed. The French tried everything that the Americans would eventually try. But, of course, we thought we knew better. By 1965, U.S. officials finally understood the war was unwinnable. But we hung on and on in order to save face, even as so many continued to senselessly die. Hubris at its worse.
In the end, America would be in the same position as when the French left and Indochina back to its civil war, North Vietnam vs South.
As the botched evacuation of Saigon was underway in 1975, this was the last word.....
“This will be final message from Saigon station,” CIA Chief Thomas Polgar wrote in a clipped, telegraphic style. “It has been a long fight and we have lost. . . . Those who fail to learn from history are forced to repeat it. Let us hope that we will not have another Vietnam experience and that we have learned our lesson. Saigon signing off.” (less)
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Oct 16, 2012James Wilhelm rated it it was amazing · review of another edition
Embers of War explains the forty year history of Vietnam leading up to the debacle of U.S. involvement. It is a captivating and important book that I highly recommend to anyone with an interest in history or the Vietnam War.
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Apr 25, 2014Jimmy rated it it was amazing · review of another edition
Shelves: war-vietnam
I had the good fortune of hearing the author speak and then talking to him a bit about the Vietnam War. The book won the Pulitzer Prize. Excellent, especially in its "what if" tendencies.
In June 1919, a young man from Vietnam set out to approach the world leaders gathered in Paris to present them with a petition entitled "The Demands of the Vietnamese People." He especially hoped to reach Woodrow Wilson whose fourteen points seemed to promise self-determination for all people. The petition spoke of "the struggle of civilization against barbarism." The man's name was Nguyen Ai Quoc (He Who Loves His Country). He would later become one of the great revolutionaries of the 20th century Ho Chi Minh (He Who Enlightens). The first of so many opportunities to prevent the tragedies that would occur in this small country.
Saigon was known as the "Pearl of the Far East" or the "Paris of the Orient."
The next opportunity comes with President Roosevelt. He wanted postwar independence for Indochina. DeGaulle on the other hand did not. He wanted to keep the colonies. For that matter, so did the British. It would be difficult for Roosevelt to hold sway, especially since he would eventually be facing death.
Many Vietnamese hoped the Americans in WWII would liberate them. And many Americans wanted to. But the French seemed determined. Even Sartre complained about "the inferiority complex" France had acquired in the War. So a defense of the empire was necessary. And of course there were companies like Michelin Tire who wanted the rubber plantations, known as the "graveyard of the peasants." To this day, I hate to buy Michelin tires.
The American Office of Strategic Services (OSS) was the key intelligence service in the War. They fought with the Vietnamese and Ho knew them. Once again, he hoped they could make a difference, but it was difficult to go against the French and the so-called "conservatives" in the US government.
Ho actually rescued US pilots that crashed. He once got an autographed picture from Claire Chenault, the founder of the famed "fighting tigers." Ho proudly brandished the photo everywhere. The OSS probably did not fully comprehend Ho's communism, but so what. Ho hoped young Vietnamese could go to the US and study to learn to build a modern country. He once asked, "Am I any different from your George Washington?"
Harry Truman came along, and he was not Roosevelt's first choice for VP. Unfortunately, when the UN was formed, the "conservative" defenders of colonialism held sway.
Emperor Bao Dai spoke to his people, "I prefer to be a free citizen than an enslaved king." Viet Minh flags were everywhere. Vietnamese excitement was everywhere, hoping for a free nation. Ho spoke, "All men are created equal . . . " from our own Declaration of Independence. He called on the Allies to recognize Vietnamese freedom and independence. The crowd cheered the American flag. America seemed to be their only hope. Americans and Vietnamese celebrated together.
Truman worried about a stable and friendly France to secure Europe. De Gaulle had Truman's ear. But when Archimedes Patti of the OSS wrote, he was ignored. If he had been listened to, Vietnam could have been free. There would have been a struggle, but it would have been better than what happened. Maybe Ho could have been more like Tito of Yugoslavia.
Chinese troops came to Hanoi to help with withdrawing the Japanese. The Communists were not as popular in Saigon. The North/South split was always there.
The French General Gracey arrived in Saigon and proclaimed martial law. He sent out a thousand French soldiers to almost no restrictions. They terrorized the Vietnamese. They were beaten, jailed, and even hanged. One French woman who sympathized with the Viet Minh had her head shaved like in France to women who went with German soldiers. They took over. Angered by their brutality, Gracey ordered the men back to their barracks. The Vietnamese got revenge, massacring scores of civilians, including women and children. This could be the beginning of the war: September 23, 1945.
Peter Dewey became the first American killed. The French and Viet Minh accused each other of being responsible.
A Major with the pseudonym "Leclerc" took over. But it was the policies of his civilian counterpart that would lead to war with France. That man was Georges d'Argenlieu, a former monk who was told by de Gaulle to brook no defiance from any Vietnamese. While Vietnam was referred to as "independent," it was really controlled by France.
Ho still tried to gain support. He promised to safeguard private property. Any change in the economic system would be "gradual." "Capitalists" would be welcome. Meanwhile, French forces returned to Vietnam. In negotiations, the French referred to "guided self-government." The French also had the support of the "colons" or the French who had moved there. Socialists and Communists in France abandoned Ho. Ho always looked at the Philippines as an inspiration because America had allowed its freedom. Ho clearly warned the French that if they wanted a fight it would happen. Such discussions were a missed opportunity. Ho claimed he was not looking for complete independence, but who can say.
Vo Nguyen Giap led the Viet Minh while Ho was away. He was only 35, a self-taught military commander. He would lead fights against both the French and the Americans. The author ranks him with the finest military leaders in history. His name meant "armor." His father and older sister died in a French camp. He hated the French. Yet he admired Napoleon. His wife would later die in prison, and he would not know for 3 years. He would notice Ho's piercing eyes. But he believed Ho was manipulating people rather than being sincere. Perhaps that was his own rationality seeing a different view of things.
Ho made effort possible to gain independence but was rebuffed in almost every instance. There was interest almost solely with the Americans but the Cold War was just beginning to heat up. So the conservatives in the State Department and in France triumphed and war began. The French worked hard to convince Americans that Ho and the Viet Minh were one and the same with Stalinism.
Giap promoted terror and assassinations. He had to watch out that he did not lose the Vietnamese people though by too many. He always tried to be selective in his killings.
The French set up Bao Dai as the emperor, hoping to use him. But he was smarter than they realized.
Henry R. Luce had an enormous impact with his two magazines: Time and Life. Along with conservative columnist Joseph Alsop, they pushed for American support of the French against the Communists.
Dean Acheson would be part of US involvement here for two decades. He was one of the men who finally told Johnson there was no light at the end of the tunnel. For a while he was supportive of Vietnamese independence. But soon Mao took over China and nuclear proliferation began. Some of the red baiters even accused him of being a communist. Truman and Acheson felt the need to show strength against its spread somewhere. By 1950, America was ready to support fully the French. Ho's hope for support from America that he held since WWI was now almost certainly dashed.
In 1950, the Viet Minh won a great victory at RC4 when Giap made his biggest blunder of the war. A young French Lieutenant named de Lattre began a new policy by setting up a defense line around the Hanoi Haiphong area. Giap saw how the Chinese human wave attacks helped in Korea, so he planned a massive assault. For the first time, American made napalm canisters would be used. It was a huge defeat for the Viet Minh. De Lattre became known as King Jean. His death of cancer would be a great loss. He complained on his death bed about not understanding Indochina. His last words were searching for his son who died fighting there.
Senator John Kennedy would go to Vietnam. He was taken aback and realized the French were losing. He became convinced the US should connect with emerging nations. Nehru warned him about going to war over communism. Sadly, many other senators, both Republicans and Democrats, and even Truman and Acheson agreed with JFK. The pressures of the Cold War affected decisions.
In January 1952, two time bombs exploded in the center of two main downtown squares. Some people are quick to claim that the US was involved. I could never understand that. Why? Logevall, like myself, finds no evidence to justify such a claim.
Giap spoke of the war with the French as having no front. He quoted Pascal: "The enemy is everywhere and nowhere."
French soldiers had much to deal with. Lack of food. Biting insects. Burrowing ticks. Poisonous snakes and scorpions. Bloodsucking leeches. Fearsome tigers. And, of course, the rats. I have seen them, and they are huge. In your fear, they can seem as large as a woodchuck.
A new president was elected in the US with a crazy VP. Ho was worried and could never understand how anti-colonial US could support imperial France. He even reminisced about seeing Harlem and the Statue of Liberty.
For Eisenhower and others, it was a case of wanting to speak out against Communism, but defend the rights of people who want to be free. I believe they were sincere. It's just that their anti-Communist comments often came back to haunt them. McCarthyism was still a powerful force.
The French used erroneous conclusions to feel they had control. But the great Bernard Fall found out that the Viet Minh dominated 70 percent of the delta INSIDE the French perimeter, pretty much everywhere except Saigon, Hanoi, and Haiphong.
I found it interesting that Britain did not share the US's worries about Communism. They had no powerful Red Baiters. The British also had a concern about the US's unwillingness to negotiate with adversaries.
Giap had his own problems at Dien Bien Phu. His soldiers were tired of the high casualties. One surgeon and six assistants took care of 50,000 men. Soldiers lacked steel helmets, so many head injuries. Flies laid eggs on the wounds. Ticks infested the infirmary. Acute shortage of beds.
One big question I had is what would have been the result if the US agreed to send in B-26 bombers at Dien Bien Phu. Leaders resisted the French pressure. It is possible, however, it may have made a difference, at least for a while. It might have ended Giap's tenure as head general. I think the US knew the future was hopeless. Yet they would get into the same hopeless situation later.
The mud at Dien Bien Phu grew so bad, men had to relieve themselves where they were than slog through it. Genevieve de Galard-Terraube, age 29, was known as the "Angel of Dien Bien Phu for her work as a surgeon there. By April 17th of 1954, the first gangrene case occurred. Maggots grew under bloody bandages. They crawled over the hands and faces and in the ears of wounded soldiers. The lead surgeon, Major Grauwin, assured the men that the maggots aided in healing.
Among the Viet Minh, a man known now only by his initials as N.T. asked to postpone an attack for one day so his men could rest. He was called "unruly." His pleas were ignored: 3 of his 71 men survived the attack.
Even Moscow floated a partition idea in 1954 to divide the country between North and South, like Korea.
On April 29th, the all-out assault on Dien Bein Phu began. Air drops of supplies were often unable to be retrieved. Almost 700 drops were made by American pilots. James McGovern and Wallace Buford were the only ones to die. Many of the "French" soldiers were actually Moroccans, Algerians, Vietnamese, Tai, Arabs.
When Captain Jean Pouget asked for reinforcements, the response he got was, "Not another man, not another shell, my friend. You're a para. You're there to get yourself killed." Pouget signed off and disabled the radio. By the end of the day, he was captured.
General de Castries at the command post was told, "But what you have done until now surely is magnificent. Don't spoil it by hoisting the white flag. You are going to be submerged by the enemy, but no surrender, no white flag." He would be captured also, dressed impeccably. The battle was over. Asian troops had defeated a European army in fixed battle for the first time.
In France, citizens demanded to know who was responsible for putting soldiers in this trap. The author reviews mistakes that were made. Even so, the main problem was failing to account for an independent Vietnam.
At the Geneva Conference, Americans were told not to socialize with the Chinese. The Viet Minh wanted an end to the war because of the high toll they suffered. Efforts were made to try and keep Laos and Cambodia somewhat neutral. One of the problems with setting up a vote was the fear that Ho would win. But elections were to be held in two years after the signing: 1956. That agreement would give nationalists time to build up their support. The Viet Minh did not get a fair line across the country between North and South. It is believed it was the pressure of China and the Soviets who put pressure on to end this all.
The final French losses for the war were enormous. Staggering percentage of deaths. The remaining soldiers left Hanoi. The Viet Minh had a victory parade. Ho Chi Minh did not attend, as always modest. Sadly, many Vietnamese wanted the French connection. Viet Minh leaders spoke of French poetry books. All of this could have been handled so differently. Ho always insisted he was not a pawn of the hard liners in his government. Unfortunately, the hard liners were there as in any government.
Eisenhower, however, made it clear he had no intention of supporting the Geneva accords. Essentially, other than Ho, none of the countries involved cared much.
President Diem, meanwhile, had little charisma or managerial talent or even a sense of humor. So nationalists made little progress. Senator Mike Mansfield referred to Diem as the "last chance."
The North followed China's lead in land reform. It failed just as badly. Land was seized and panic set in. It pitted neighbor against neighbor. Everything "belonged to the people" including buffalo dung.
Colonel Lansdale was assigned the CIA role of helping Diem. About a million people fled to the South. No such movement went north. When I spoke to Vietnamese from the North, they all told me about atrocities, especially to Catholics. I think the author underplays this in his efforts to make Ho sound almost perfect. He puts some of the blame for the movement on Lansdale.
In "The Battle of Saigon" Diem's national army fought against the criminal syndicate Binh Xuyen. His victory cemented his role as president. The vice kingpin Bay Vien went to Paris and settled to a cushy retirement.
Now the Americans were in South Vietnam and the French were out. Ngo Dinh Diem now had American backing. Ho now knew the 1956 elections were in jeopardy. No country was out there to push for following the Geneva accords. Even supervision by the ICC would not satisfy American leaders. In 1955, Diem had an election to determine whether or not to keep a monarchy with Bao Dai. Even friendly observers were dismayed at the cheating. Diem was now in virtual total control. On the plus side, he did help modernize the country. His chief adviser was his brother Ngo Dinh Nhu who was married to the crazy and charismatic Madame Nhu. Americans stressed words like freedom and democracy. Graham Greene referred to Diem as Patriot Ruined by the West. Even JFK started to support Mr. Diem.
Diem continued to alienate people whose backing he needed. He ignored American experts on land reform. His Can Lao party, mostly Catholics, pervaded all South Vietnamese life. A new insurgency began against Diem.
Bernard Fall went back to Vietnam in 1957 calling it a "bad love affair." He thought the Americans were at least not colonialists like the French. He realized the situation was not at all stable. He noted how village chiefs had a high casualty rate. They were, of course, being assassinated. He soon realized Saigon was surrounded by village chiefs who were now communists. There was a clear pattern. To survive, the chief had to declare loyalty to the communists. The ARVN were not being outfought but rather "outadministered." No one could convince Diem of this. Some key Americans knew what was happening but were unable to change things.
Both the Chinese and the Soviets did not want Ho to begin any kind of fight in the South. They had other interests.
Finally, the North decided to step up its activities in the South. Just in time with the infamous 10/59 decree by Diem which effectively cut out opposition. He only managed to grow the opposition. Catholics were granted power more than any other group. The Americans were too unwilling to interfere.
On July 8, 1959, eight American advisers near Bien Hoa watched a movie. Six VC guerrillas slipped in undetected and open fired. Chester Ovnand and Dale Buis were killed. They are the first of the second Indochina War. They are the first two names on the Vietnam Veterans' Memorial. Along with over 58,000 others.
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