China and the Developing World: Beijing's Strategy for the Twenty-first Century (East Gate Books) - Kindle edition by Joshua Eisemann, Eric Heginbotham, Derek Mitchell. Politics & Social Sciences Kindle eBooks @ Amazon.com.

China and the Developing World: Beijing's Strategy for the Twenty-first Century (East Gate Books) - Kindle edition by Joshua Eisemann, Eric Heginbotham, Derek Mitchell. Politics & Social Sciences Kindle eBooks @ Amazon.com.

China and the Developing World: Beijing's Strategy for the Twenty-first Century (East Gate Books) 1st Edition, Kindle Edition
by Joshua Eisemann (Editor), Eric Heginbotham (Editor), Derek Mitchell (Editor)


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ISBN-13: 978-0765617132

China's relationship with the developing world is a fundamental part of its larger foreign policy strategy. Sweeping changes both within and outside of China and the transformation of geopolitics since the end of the cold war have prompted Beijing to reevaluate its strategies and objectives in regard to emerging nations.Featuring contributions by recognized experts, this is the first full-length treatment of China's relationship with the developing world in nearly two decades. Section one provides a general overview and framework of analysis for this important aspect of Chinese policy. The chapters in the second part of the book systematically examine China's relationships with Africa, the Middle East, Central Asia, Latin America, South Asia, and Southeast Asia. The book concludes with a look into the future of Chinese foreign policy.

Product details

File Size: 2674 KB
Print Length: 212 pages
Page Numbers Source ISBN: 938050215X
Simultaneous Device Usage: Up to 4 simultaneous devices, per publisher limits
Publisher: Routledge; 1 edition (August 20, 2015)
Publication Date: August 20, 2015
Sold by: Amazon Digital Services LLC
Language: English

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Gregorio Savio
5.0 out of 5 starsChina and the Developing World book reviewOctober 27, 2007
Format: Paperback
The "sleeping dragon" has wakened up and is becoming a major political and economic force in regional and world affairs. Chinese diplomacy is signing investment agreements, building roads, forming strategic partnerships and gaining membership in regional and international organizations. Developing Countries are the favorite target for Beijing policy, seen both as extremely important sources of energy and raw materials, and as supporters to its multilateral approach to international affairs. China's foreign policy towards the "Third World" shifted, beginning from the early `80s, from being political-ideological to pragmatic-economic aimed. Developing countries represent for China many opportunities: sources of oil and raw materials, new markets for its products and possible allies in the United Nations and in the Taiwan's issue. This book provide a broad but still precise view of the strategies and accomplishments of China's diplomacy toward the Developing World, also mentioning the challenges that Beijing will have to face in this century and the implications for U.S.
SUMMARY OF THE BOOK
The book is divided in three sections and eight chapters. The first section and chapter is an historical introduction to China's interaction with the Developing World, from the Xia Dynasty (2206-1766 BCE) to the present. Adhering to the Confucian value system, during the Imperial era Chinese leaders focused their energies and strategies internally to secure their rule also because China was generally self-sufficient in terms of natural resources. Its self-image was one of a moral, cultural and technological superior country posed at the center of the world, as its name suggests: "the Middle Kingdom". All the foreigners were considered barbarians. The first interactions with the exterior world were obviously with the surrounding strategic periphery, mostly in the west to safeguard the Silk Road. When China was dealing with internal troubles, usually during a period of dynastic consolidation or dissolution, Chinese leaders took an essentially defensive position to hold off border threats and challenges. When stronger, they attacked the nomad barbarians and expanded the strategic periphery. In this way Chinese domain tended to expand and contract throughout history, making historic nation a geographically difficult concept to define, also because Chinese identity is based on culture rather than ethnicity. What defined a periphery state autonomous or tributary related was the military strength of the barbarians.
During the Ming period (1368-1644 CE) China began to isolate itself from the wider world outside its immediate periphery, complacent of its superiority and conditioned by antimilitaristic Confucian principles. The Empire weakened both internally and externally, particularly in terms of military power, letting the European powers and Japan conquer parts of it and compelling China to sign a series of "unequal treaties" starting from the Treaty of Nanjing after its defeat in the Opium Wars (1839-1842). This period, until the end of World War II, is considered by Chinese the "century of humiliation" that fundamentally altered China's perception of any kind of self-superiority.
With Mao's victory in the civil war and the founding of People's Republic of China (PRC), China opened a new phase in its external relations based on equalitarian ideology, focusing not only with U.S. and U.S.S.R. but also with underdeveloped and developing countries, supporting their struggles for independency. At the Bandung Conference in 1955, a meeting of 29 Asian and African states, most of which were newly independent, Premier Zhou Enlai enshrined the "Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence". Mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, non-aggression, non-interference in internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence led to the creation of the "Non Aligned Movement" in which Third World nations refused to take one side in the bipolar international system headed by the U.S. and U.S.S.R.
In the 1960's China sponsored the Third World radicalism, sending arms, money, military instructors and economic aid to communist and independency insurgents in many African and South-Asian countries. Although gradually reentering the community of nations, replacing the Republic of China (ROC, in Taiwan) in the U.N. in 1971 and opening a new era in relations with the U.S. in 1972, China continued to promote anti-imperialist solidarity and economic aid based on ideology. In the late seventies, realized the economic catastrophe of the Cultural Revolution, Deng Xiaoping reformed Chinese policies to a more market-oriented economy that is still within a rigid political framework under Communist Party control. The reforms replaced collectivization of Chinese agriculture with privatization of farmlands, increased the responsibility of local authorities and industry managers, allowed a wide variety of small-scale enterprises to flourish, and promoted foreign investment. Foreign policy was now applied according to practical considerations of economic development and technology acquisition, without regard to a nation's political system or ideology. Nonetheless China continued providing military aid to Third World nations to gain capital for internal investments, buy influence, and demonstrate its continued fealty and leadership in the developing world. Pragmatism is the today priority because the Middle Kingdom is not anymore self-sufficient and has a survivor need for raw materials and energy resources owned for the most part by the developing countries.
All this long history is very important to understand the contemporary political leaders' frame of mind, reflecting a tradition of deception and a highly developed sense of political strategy to be able to gain advantage over rivals.
The second chapter examines China's post cold war strategy in Africa. Until Mao's death the main strategy toward the continent was conditioned by national security interests and the fear of a Soviet threat to China. Local fights (in Angola for example) far from the Middle Kingdom were encouraged as a diversion to keep Moscow's forces dispersed. Africa is now a component in China's larger strategy to cultivate political support, acquire energy and natural resources, secure its commercial interests and support its claims to Taiwan. Political support to China's policies is granted by $5 billion loans over three years and $5 billion China-Africa development fund that Beijing distributed in November 2006. The United Nations is the very important forum where China enjoys the support of African nations for its "one-China" policy and they can count over its veto power on censures concerning human rights violations (Sudan i.e.). China's strategy to securing raw materials and oil supplies is to gain control of African natural resources at its source to not be menaced by market prices shocks. Beijing methods to achieve African elites' benevolence are pragmatic as organizing cultural meetings, medical cooperation, tourism, bringing African students to China, agricultural and technical assistance, investment and economic support, military patronage and peacekeeping, and diplomatic support. U.S. and China have competing interests for energy and other natural resources and divergent views on democratization and human rights, but none of them wants Africa to become a region of aggressive competition.
The third chapter is dedicated to China's emergence in Central Asia. China has strategic and diplomatic interests here that play into China's overall foreign policy, such as providing a potential alternative to the Russian dominated Collective Security Treaty Organization (a collective defense institution for many Central Asian states); establishing stronger ties with its neighbors to counter in the long term a potentially hostile United States presence on its western borders. China also seeks to safeguard the stability of borders negotiated after the fall of the U.S.S.R. and has focused on preventing any external influence and support for Uyghur separatists in Xinjiang. Chinese economic and trade interests in the region, especially the development of energy resources, are also becoming increasingly important to its internal economic development. However, the U.S. and Russia still provide the largest amount of development assistance, financial aid and security assistance in the region and the gap that China is trying to fill is still pretty wide.
Chapter four present the Chinese interests in South America, focusing over relations with Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, Cuba, Venezuela and control of the Panama Canal. China and Latin America have complementary economic structures. South American natural resources are vital to China's booming economy and Chinese purchases and investments will very much help economic development in the area. The Middle Kingdom looks to Latin America for supply of oil, iron ore, copper and other raw materials, along with foodstuffs such as soybeans, grain and beef meat. Chinese leaders have emphasized summit diplomacy and "win-win" relations to cultivate local support for expanding economic relations and market penetration of Chinese cheap goods. China's strategic moves and economic diplomacy will inevitably present challenges to the United States, also given that anti-Washington sentiment have increased in the region.
Chapter five explains China's interests and strategy in the Middle East and Arab countries. The main interest is obviously the stability of the region to not put in danger the extensive oil supplies. Furthermore, the M.E. and Arab world are important markets for Chinese products and services, and the Chinese government counts on the region to continue supporting the one-China policy related to Taiwan. To promote its interests, China has adopted strategies such as the use of diplomacy to help Chinese businesses make inroads to the oil industry and markets, the adaptation of an offend-no-one approach to regional politics in order to maintain a friendly environment to Chinese business interests, and the use of soft-power resources to cultivate friendship also in the long term. But China does not have the resources to maintain stability in the area to secure its strategically economic interests, and it has to rely on the United States as the primary force for peace. That is why a priority is not to confront with the U.S. over regional issues.
Chapter six and seven deal with China's strategies and relations with South and South-East Asia. In South Asia the main actor that China faced is India. In the past they had prolonged territorial disputes that also drove to a war in 1962 together with the Tibet issue. Since the sign of the "Agreement to Maintain Peace and Tranquility along the Line of Actual Control" in 1993, political relations have been distensile and the remaining border disputes are not worth of war. Despite official statements that India has accepted China's sovereignty over the Tibet, the Tibetan issue remains contentious because of the spiritual and political influence of the Dalai Lama residing in Dharamsala, India. Anyway China is warming up relations with the subcontinent, fearing an U.S.-India alliance to contain it. China and India have growing economic and trade ties that contribute to an improving security relationship, but their status of cheap producers is also making them economic competitors. Southeast Asia is considered the back yard by Chinese leaders, and the Middle Empire has always had a big influence and power of intervention over these countries' affairs. In the present China is focusing on its internal economic development, trying to secure access to raw materials in Southeast Asia such as oil, natural gas, rubber, and tin. For these reasons ASEAN nations are worried about a return to a colonial economic relationship with Beijing. China's future military modernization, especially if it is combined with more threats against Taiwan, are likely to make it more difficult to believe that Beijing has only peaceful intensions in the region. At the moment the U.S. and Japan remain better positioned to wield considerably greater influence in Southeast Asia, thanks to higher trade and investments levels. Anyway China's increasing influence in the area is a challenge that United States and their allied will need to confront in the next decade.
The eight and last chapter is devoted to the evaluation of China's strategy toward the whole developing world, pointing out that Beijing new diplomacy is more proactive and flexible. It has embraced multilateralism and confident building measures to mitigate security concerns, it has identified several states and regional organizations as strategic partners, it has provided economic assistance strategically to further bilateral relationships and it has emphasized and cultivated soft power.
The main purpose of the book is to respond to four sets of questions. Each author aims to identify how China defines and pursues its interests in the region under question, which methods and assets are brought to bear to achieve policy objectives, identify relative successes in meeting policy goals, and examine the implications of Chinese foreign policy for other regional and global actors (mostly the U.S.). The book is very effective and explicative in exposing the different issues China is managing, and definitely maintains what it promises in the introduction. I found very interesting the shift from an ideology based foreign policy to an economic based and the major concern Chinese diplomacy has to secure raw materials supplies. It seems that every diplomatic effort is made in synergy to ensure this goal. I also find the book complete and exhaustive in presenting China's strategies for the developing countries in the twenty-first century even if everything is presented in almost 250 pages.

RECEPTION, CRITIQUE AND RELEVANCE OF THE BOOK
Since this book has been edited in August 2007 I did not find any exhaustive review. Anyway the few comments that I found concord over considering it the first comprehensive treatment of contemporary Chinese diplomacy's strategy in the developing world. The commentators underline the relevance of China's growing use of soft power to win friends in key emerging regions and the comprehensiveness of data presented, together with the sharp analysis provided. I agree with these comments and I think that the book is covering the lack of knowledge about Chinese strategies present in the Asian field of studies. It is well written, easily understandable and full of profound insights. The division in chapters associated to a particular region, and the chapters' internal schematization of the intensions, actions and implication of China's policies make it a perfect manual for International Relations students and readers.
The authors are not providing predictions of future China's effect on the international system, but they depict probable scenarios based on the analysis of present policies and strategies. It is important to notice that they do not consider China's emergence in the recent years coming merely at U.S. interests' expenses. They see the Middle Kingdom both as a challenge and an opportunity for the international community. They do not have a closed view of power as a zero-sum game, but they consider also the possibility of win-win relations.
If I may find a weakness in the book, I think that the authors should have dedicate a more detailed section to expose the psychology behind Chinese leaders and their millenary tradition to deception's practices in carrying out foreign policies. As Mei Yaochen, a commentator of Sun Tzu's Art of War stated "Without deception you cannot carry out strategy, without strategy you cannot control the opponent". The strong insights that the book displays are many: the already mentioned structural organization of the book, the view of China's foreign policy as a quest for strategic and economic influence, the centrality in Chinese interests of acquiring raw materials and energy resources, the preeminence in leaders' worries of borders' security and internal and external stability, the use of soft power and regional cultural and economic organization to build confidence about China's aims and actions, the recognition that China's trade and investments are in the developing countries are devoted to allow Beijing meet its domestic needs, the Chinese strategically avoid to directly confront the U.S. and the seek to expand Chinese influence in the Middle East and the Arab world, the acknowledgment of the progress made by India and China toward building a strategic partnership and the recognition of an existing structured Chinese foreign relations agenda for the developing country that U.S. does not seem to have at the moment. This volume places the recent developments of China's diplomacy in the broader context of its overall foreign policy and history of relationships with developing countries.
The book is also very relevant to the field of United States foreign policy. Every author addressed the following questions: "What impact does Beijing recent engagement have on U.S. interests? And what impact does it have on the preservation or evolution of international norms and institutions?"
As the major world's actor, the United States are always considered and mentioned along the chapters and Chinese policies always take in consideration Washington policies and interests in the different regions. Even tough the top front target of China's diplomatic agenda is to secure resources to develop economic evolving national interests; China does not want to confront the U.S., at least in the present period. The book also presents suggestions for American foreign policy, responding to Chinese protagonism. The authors analyze American and Chinese interests pointing out where they collide or they coincide, very often advising U.S. to pay closer attention to the development of China's relations with the developing world. The Middle Kingdom has many chances to become the second major world power in the twenty-first century, and U.S. diplomats and politicians need to keep constantly an eye on its moves.

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