2019-07-02

19 박노자 Modern View of Joseon 朝鮮 Confucianism: Overcoming the Modernist Biases

Vladimir Tikhonov
2 hrs · 



Going to be published soon - my opus on how 1930s' Marxists (mis)interpreted Tasan and other presumed "Sirhak" thinkers into something close to the antagonists of the "feudal system" (although they at that point were careful enough to add a host of caveats to it). My argument - they were not necessarily that wrong in perceiving the world-systemic transition to capitalism as the essence of the global "big picture" for 18-19th centuries. BUT they had a very serious issue with ignoring ChosOn Korea's specificity. There was a marketizing tendency there too, and marked growth in monetary transactions. But it happened on a different scale compared to Canton etc. Development is uneven and combined, nothing wrong with it and it does not "depreciate" Korea's extremely eventful and deeply meaningful 18-19th C. story. The idea of viewing Korea's early modernity in a Marxist way is sound per se. But we have to be very careful about both universal and locally specific threads of the historical narrative....



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Modern View of Joseon 朝鮮 Confucianism: Overcoming the Modernist Biases Focused on the 1930s Marxist Interpretations of Sirhak 實學 Movement






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Emanuel Pastreich what do you think of 함석헌's 뜻으로 본 한국역사?
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Emanuel Pastreich As someone who has translated both Dasan and Yeonam, I have some interest in this topic.
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Vladimir Tikhonov Well, it was a nationalist Christian vision of Korea's teleologically ordained "national destiny". I would classify it together with 단재, 담원 and 민세's "history of spirit" approaches. Not exactly the same thing as history as an academic research subject, I guess.
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Journal of Toegye Studies Volume 2 Number 1                                                                                         ISSN 2635-9685
(Vol.2, No.1, 2019)∣pp.85~113
Modern View of Joseon 朝鮮
Confucianism: Overcoming the
Modernist Biases
Focused on the 1930s Marxist Interpretations of Sirhak 實學 Movement
Vladimir Tikhonov (Pak Noja 朴露子)*3)
Vladimir Tikhonov (Pak Noja) graduated from Leningrad State University and took his PhD in ancient Korean history from Moscow State University. He has taught at Kyunghee慶熙 University (Seoul, 1997-2000) and State University for Humanities (Moscow, 1996). Since 2000 he has worked at Oslo University. Currently he is a professor of Korean and East Asian Studies at the Department of Cul ture Studies and Oriental Languages, within the Faculty of Humanities. His research focuses on the history of modern ideas in Korea. Recent publications include: Social Darwinism and Nationalism in Korea: The Beginnings (Brill, 2010) and Modern Korea and its Others: Perceptions of the Neighbouring Countries and Korean Modernity (Routledge, 2015); an as co-editor Buddhist Modernities - Re-inventing Tradition in the Globalizing Modern World (Routledge, 2017) and Military Chaplaincy in an Era of Religious Pluralism (Oxford University Press, 2017). He took South Korean nationality in 2001.
Abstract
The 1930s witnessed a number of important developments in the intellectual life of Korea, which was under Japanese colonial rule at the time (1910-1945). Amidst the nascent growth of modern-type academia, Korean Studies attracted huge interest, as Korean intelligentsia attempted to counter the Orientalist assumptions of Japanese colonialist scholarship. This paper focuses on one concrete case of intellectual contention, namely regarding the attempts of 1930s Korean Marxists to interpret the iconoclastic, non-orthodox Sirhak Confucians of Joseon Korea (1392-1910) as precursors of modernity and critics of “feudalism.” Special emphasis is put on the Marxist reinterpretations of Dasan Jeong
* This work was supported by the Ministry of Education of the Republic of Korea and the National Research Foundation of Korea (NRF-2017S1A6A3A02079082)
Yagyong 茶山丁若鏞 (1762-1836), who was regarded as an adept of Western learning, a pioneer of modernity and the foremost antagonist of Joseon Dynasty’s “feudal system.” These interpretations were further deepened in both North and South Korea after the 1950s: nationalistic scholars on both sides of the Korean divide made Dasan, in fact a staunch conservative unwilling even to contemplate any loosening of Joseon’s slavery system, into a proto-democrat and a champion of societal equalitarianism. The present paper argues that the pre-1945 Marxists were “modernising” Dasan in much more careful way than the post-1945 nationalist scholarship in both Koreas. However, their presentist take on Dasan, combined with a disregard of Joseon realities and a focus on the global picture of Western advances and Korea’s assumed indigenous responses to them, did in fact constitute an act of epistemic violence which contributed to the nationalist nurturing of the historical myths in both Korean states after 1945.
Key Words: Sirhak, Dasan, Orientalism, Japanese colonialism, Baek Namun 白南雲, Choe Ikhan崔益翰.

1.     Introduction

Our view of the past is always a presentist interpretation. While not necessarily disregarding the facts per se, a presentist viewpoint always tends to emphasise facts currently regarded as more timely and important, and interpret it in ways strongly influenced by contemporary discursive struggles.1) In this way, the space of memory is always a battlefield. However, after the heat of battle has cooled, professional historians are usually able to come up with reflections on what was disregarded and neglected in the midst of the struggle. Some of the interpretative biases end up being corrected, and the academic community – sometimes in conjunction with the broader public – comes to understand certain episodes of the past in a more nuanced, inclusive and less teleological way. However, such a reflexive view over past discursive struggles in no way guarantees that biases of different kinds will not subsequently appear. Indeed, as long as present-day interests continue to dominate our general perception of the past and the present-day, and desires and concerns continue to be projected on our picture of the bygone days, “objective” history will remain an
1)  Fendler, Lynn. 2008. “The upside of presentism” Paedagogica Historica 44/6: 677-690
impossible aim. However, critical reflections over bygone historical battles do help to advance our historical consciousness, potentially preventing us, at the very least, from re-applying past interpretative biases again to different historical episodes and issues. In this way, historiographical reflection is the engine moving forward history as an academic discipline.
For both Korea and Japan, it was “modernity” that shaped images of the past for the most part of the twentieth century. Japan’s claim to rule over colonised Korea was to be underpinned by an extremely self-serving, teleological vision of history in which Japan, uniquely among the East Asian states, was following a sort of predestined historical trajectory towards its modern glories. By contrast, subjugated Korea was to be proclaimed as not only “pre-modern” but also as predestined to stagnation and unable to reach the coveted “modernity” by itself, due to what the Japanese colonialist scholars defined as its pre-eminent cultural flaws. Confucianism, as the dominant philosophy of the fallen Joseon Dynasty, was a natural target for colonialist deprecation, aimed at legitimising the colonial conquest in the name of Japan’s purported “modernising mission.”2) However, there was one salient difference between the frame through which the Japanese colonialist scholars viewed Korea’s Confucian heritage, and the general trends of the European Orientalist dismissal of the cultural or religious identity of the colonised elsewhere: Confucianism, including its Korean variety, could not be summarily dismissed as long as Japan’s own imperial ideology demonstrated strong neo-Confucian traits. Indeed, the Imperial Rescript on Education (Kyōiku ni Kansuru Chokugo教育ニ關スル勅語, 1890) and other important ideological landmarks of modern Japan deployed the Confucian phraseology of “loyalty,” “filial piety” and ‘self-sacrifice” in their attempt to construct Japan’s own version of authoritarian statist nationalism.3) So, it was not Confucianism per se but rather the
Korean way of appropriating it that was targeted for the Orientalist denigration.
2)  See a summary on the Japanese colonialist historiography in: Gim Yongseop. 1966. “Ilbon Hanguk e iseoseo Hanguksa seosul (Korean History Writing in Japan and Korea),” Yeoksa hakpo 31: 128-147.
3)  On the “morality” discourse in late Meiji Japan, see: Gluck, Carol. 1985. Japan’s Modern Myths: Ideology in the Late Meiji Period. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 102-127.
A typical example, Takahashi Tōru高橋亨 (1877-1967), Japan’s best-known “Korea hand” and the author of the seminal 1929 article on Joseon Korea’s Zhuxian 朱子學 tradition which pioneered the classification of Joseon Confucian thinkers into lineages primarily emphasising respective principle (ri 理) and material force (gi 氣) ,4) developed a framework for dealing with Joseon Confucianism in his brochure Chōsenjin朝鮮人 (Koreans), published in 1921 by the Academic Department of the Japanese Government General in Korea.5) According to Takahashi, the undoing of Korean Confucianism was its “slavish obedience” to the Zhuxian dualism of principle and material force, to the extent of not allowing any other Confucian schools to develop. Takahashi accused the Confucians of Chosōn Korea of dogmatic rejection of the new teachings of Wang Yangming王陽明as well as neglect towards the Qing philological studies of the late eighteenth-early nineteenth centuries. Takahashi’s conclusion was that Koreans were the only people in the world who had worshipped the same philosophical dogma for more than a half millennium. Moreover, this dogma was of foreign – Chinese – provenance, and this fact made it possible for Takahashi to additionally accuse Korean Confucians of blindly worshipping imported ideas while lacking their own. Of course, this pitiful picture of Joseon Confucianism painted by Takahashi was to contrast with his depiction of Japanese Edo-period Confucianism, with its abundance of both Yangming School thinkers and practically-, rather than simply doctrinally-minded scholars.6)
Certainly, colonial experts on Korean history did not fail to acknowledge the stature of such figures as Dasan Jeong Yagyong (1762-1836), an exegete of the Confucian classics with deep interests in many fields including geography, medicine and technology, whose theories arguably represented a challenge to the Zhuxian dogmas. Ayugai
4)  Takahashi Tōru. 1934 [1929] “Richo Jugakushi ni okeru Shuriha Shukiha no Hattatsu” (Development of the “Principle Faction” and “Material Force Faction” In Yi Dynasty Confucianism) In Chōsen Shina Bunka no Kenkyu (Research on the Sinitic Culture in Korea). 141-281. Keijō [Seoul]: Keijō teikoku daigaku.
5)  Takahashi Tōru. 1921. Chōsenjin (Koreans). Keijō [Seoul]: Sōtokufu Gakumukyoku. See also the recent Korean translation: Ku Inmo, transl. 2010. Singminji Joseonin eul Nonhada (Debating the Colonized Koreans). Seoul: Tongguk Daehakkyo Chulpanbu.
6)  Gu Inmo, transl. 2010. Singminji Joseonin eul Nonhada, 20-21, 25-43.
Fusanoshin鮎貝房之進 (1864-1946), another of the “old Korea hands” known for his expertise on Korea’s pre-modern past, published a journal article on Dasan as early as in 1912, emphasising Dasan’s role as an opponent of the canonical Zhuxianism of the dominant Patriarchs” Faction (Noron 老論) and his interest in Western scientific ideas. However, from Ayugai’s viewpoint, the iconoclasm of the kind Dasan represented was an exception rather than the rule in pre-modern Korea. weakened as it was by factional struggles inside its ruling class and its general ‘subservience” to the letter of Zhuxian dogma.7)
This colonialist misrepresentation expectedly provoked the resistance of the colonised. A broad spectrum of Korean intellectuals, from nationalistic academics and educators (many of whom, in fact, studied themselves in Japan) to Marxists, were involved in de-constructing the colonialist image of a helplessly dependent and stagnant Joseon Korea. Marxists, whose take on Dasan and other iconoclastic, non-orthodox Confucian thinkers of the Late Joseon period who since the early 1930s were being often collectively referred to as the Sirhak School (although in reality they hardly ever constituted any single coherent academic lineage)8) is the focus of the present paper, were doing their best to prove that Korea, like Japan or any other country, was simply following the universal laws of historical development. This affirmation of Korean history’s universality was only commendable per se, especially given the fact that it was to serve as an argument against the colonialist stance denying any potentiality of independent development for Koreans. The Marxist belief in the centrality of the development of European capitalism with its derivatives, liberalism and modern science, for the modern part of the universal history was also understandable, although the ways in which it often was articulated exposes 1930s Korean Marxists to retrospective accusations of somewhat naïve Eurocentrism. Affirming Europe’s centrality to world history simply for its own stake hardly was,
7)  Jeong JongHyeon. 2018. Dasan eui Chosang (The Portrait of Dasan). Seoul: Sinseoweon, 71-75.
8)  Baker, Donald. 1981. “The Use and Abuse of the Sirhak Label: A New Look at Sin Hu-dam and his Sohak Pyon.” Gyohoesa Yeongu 3: 183-254.
however, the intention of colonial-age Marxist historians. The universality of global historical development, exemplified by the growth of capitalism in eighteenth- nineteenth century Europe or the 1917 socialist revolution in Russia, was to give realistic hope for Korea’s own liberation from the colonial yoke as a part of the worldwide revolutionary movement.9) However, as I will attempt to demonstrate in this paper, the deductive, top-bottom manner of reasoning of the 1930s Marxists who strove to find at any cost the analogues of the global (by which we mean “European”) historical developments in contemporary Joseon Korea, constituted an act of epistemic violence vis-à-vis the inevitable specifics of Joseon history. Whereas the colonial-age Marxists were doing their best to make clear that, all the “general similarity of the historical trends” notwithstanding, Dasan still was a far cry from being a “propagandist of freedom ideas,” the post-1945 discourses on Dasan in both North and South Korea went exactly in this direction, unconditionally “modernising” Dasan into a direct forerunner of modernity. This mythologisation of Dasan and Sirhak, related as it was to the ideological demands of post-colonial Korean societies, represented, in a way, the further deepening of the logic of 1930s Marxist interpretation of Dasan.

2.     Dasan of the Nationalists, Dasan of the Marxists

As we might expect, Korea’s own cultural nationalists could not fail to respond to colonial Orientalism. What is noteworthy, however, is that in many cases, and not necessarily only these of the Marxists, this response followed the rules of the modernist game introduced by the colonisers who themselves had appropriated it from the Western historiography.10) Foremost amongst these rules was the decree that the sacred shibboleth of “modernity” was not to be questioned. It also remained
9)   See, for example, the analysis of the notion of universality in Baek Namun’s (1894-1979) historiography here: Bang Gijung. 1992. Hanguk GeunHyeondae Sasangsa Yeongu (Studies on Korea’s Modern and Contemporary History of Ideas). Seoul: Yeoksa Bipyeongsa, 129-137. On Baek Namun’s appreciation of Dasan, see below.
10) On Meiji period’s history research in general, see: Mehl, Margaret. 1998. History and the State in Nineteenth-Century Japan. London: Macmillan Press.
a textbook truth, for Korean nationalist scholars as well as their Japanese colonialist counterparts, that the “desirable” history was to teleologically lead to the fruits of modern development.11) The difference between the colonisers and their nationalist antagonists was in their views on the existence, or lack thereof, of such a “desirable” history in the Korean case. The latter, in contrast to the former, were eager to argue that Koreans were moving towards the predestined goal of “modernity” themselves, and could in theory have reached it on their own, even without Japanese interference. On Confucianism, the nationalist scholars were prepared to agree with Takahashi’s categorisation of Korean Neo-Confucian thinkers into introspective ones who were primarily interested in principle理, and the more extrovert, pragmatically oriented scholars who prioritised material force 氣.12) There was, however, one salient difference between them and the likes of Takahashi: they were much more interested in that group of less dogmatic and more practically oriented seventeenth-nineteenth century scholars, who by the late 1920s-early 1930s were being lumped together as the Sirhak (Practical Learning) School. These scholars, who often demonstrated serious interest in Western science and even Western religion (Catholicism) were the best argument in favour of the thesis that Korea, if left alone, could have attained the dream of modernity on its own.
One of the first modern, Japanese-educated nationalist intellectuals of the colonial age to seriously engage with the Joseon Confucian philosophical legacy was Hyeon Sangyun玄相允 (1893-?), later known for his pioneering outline history of Korean Confucianism (1949).13) Already in the colonial period, he devoted a number of popular scholarly pieces to the practically oriented late Joseon thinkers. In fact, he was among the first researchers to use the term Sirhak for characterising these thinkers as a group. Naturally enough, his interest was largely centred on Dasan who had
11)  On the privileging of modernity in modern Korean historiography, see Em, Henry. 2013. The Great Enterprise: Sovereignty and Historiography in Modern Korea. Durham: Duke University Press.
12)  Gim Gyeongho. 2015. “Talsingmin gwa Hanguk Yugyo” (Post-colonialism and Korean Confucianism) Yugyo Sasang Munhwa Yeongu 62: 91-124.
13)  Hyeon Sangyun. 1949. Joseon Yugyosa (History of the Korean Confucianism). Seoul: Minjung Seogwan.
already been promoted as a giant of “political and economic learning” by such earlier nationalist intellectuals as Chang Jiyeon張志淵 (1864-1921). The centennial anniversary of Dasan’s passing was celebrated in 1935-1936 by much of colonial Korea’s nationalist intellectual milieu. Two years prior to that, Hyeon dedicated a journal article to Dasan, in which he compared the Confucian pragmatist to the earlier Scottish thinker and seminal economist, Adam Smith (1723-1790). While Korea had its own “economic school”, the difference between it and Britain was, according to Hyeon, the Joseon Dynasty’s inability to implement its teachings. While in his later works Hyeon demonstrated a more favourable attitude towards Joseon’s orthodox Neo-Confucian thought, this article simply contrasted the scholastic debates of the Neo-Confucians after Toegye Yi Hwang 退溪李滉 (1502-1571) and Yulgok Yi I栗谷李珥 (1536-1584) with the pragmatic, down-to-earth attitude of Seongho Yi Ik星湖李瀷 (1681-1763) and his school, which included Dasan.14) One more article on Dasan followed a year later (“Yijo Yuhak sasang eui Jeong Dasan gwa geu wichi” 李朝 儒學史上의 丁茶山과 그 位置, 1935).15) There, Hyeon more or less followed Takahashi in representing the Joseon Neo-Confucian world as having been monopolised by the Zhuxian dogmas. However, against this stagnant backdrop Hyeon highlighted the role of what he was now terming the Sirhak movement – centred on Seongho and Dasan – in shifting focus towards the pragmatics of the administration and economy and pioneering the reception of the Western scientific ideas. In such a way, the Japanese colonialist scorn towards the “unmodern” legacy of the Korean Confucianism was at least partially refuted. Korea’s Neo-Confucianism as a whole could be stagnant and dogmatic but the Sirhak movement, with its supposedly imminent proto-modern traits, was to appear as the saving grace of Joseon’s Confucian history.
Yet another proponent of the Sirhak-centred vision of Joseon Confucian history,
14)  Hyeon Sangyun.. 2000 [1934]. “Yijo Yuhak gwa Dasan Seonsaeng” (Yi Dynasty’s Confucianism and Teacher Dasan) In Gidang Hyeon Sangyun Munjip (Literary Collection of Gidang Hyeon Sangyun). 368-372. Seoul: Gyeongheui Daehakkyo Chulpanbu.
15)  Hyeon Sangyun.. 2000 [1935]. “Yijo Yuhak Sasang eui Jeong Dasan gwa geu Wichi” (Jeong Dasan and his Place in the History of Yi Dynasty’s Confucianism) In Gidang Hyeon Sangyun Munjip. 397-401.
Jeong Inbo鄭寅普 (1893-1950), was a colourful figure, who, in a way, symbolised a certain degree of continuity between the pre-modern, authentic Confucian tradition and a modernist retelling of Korea’s traditional past. Born to a distinguished scholarly family and raised as a heir to the Late Joseon tradition of Wang Yangming School studies, Jeong, by the 1930s a professor at Yeonheui延禧College and a prominent public intellectual, was fond of contrasting the Wang Yangming School’s emphasis on authenticity and innate, embedded nature of knowledge against the penchant for uncritically accepting the authority of Zhu Xi which was supposedly so characteristic of Joseon Dynasty’s average Confucians.16) As he lamented in his own contribution (timed to the celebration of Dasan passing’s centennial) “Yuilhan Jeongbeopka Jeong Dasan Seonsaeng Seoron” (唯一한 政法家 丁茶山 先生 敍論, “The Prologue to the Writing on the Unique Legal and Political Thinker, Jeong Dasan”), serialised in Donga Ilbo 東亞日報, September 10-15, 1934: “self-respect forever morphed into the veneration of China as soon as our capital was moved to the banks of the Han River following the downfall of the Goryeo 高麗Dynasty”; all the diverse “theories on mind and human nature, righteousness and the cosmic principle (…) could astonish an eye, but they were nothing more than other people’s words, not my own.”
The liberation from the heteronomy of Zhuxian learning first came, according to Jeong, with the arrival of more pragmatic statesmanship by such seventeenth-century figures as Gim Yuk金堉 (1570-1658, Joseon’s Prime Minister in 1651-2 and 1655) or Chang Yu張維 (1588-1638, Minister of the Right in 1637-8). However, the systematisation of “authentic” scholarship rooted in Joseon’s own needs, took place only due to the efforts by Seongho and Dasan, whom Jeong considered, in broader sense of the word, a part of Seongho’s scholarly lineage. Jeong maintained that Dasan was a genius whom his own epoch rejected, and that he strove to renovate Joseon on the basis of practically oriented, non-dogmatic scholarship which represented
16)  Jeong Deokki, 2015. “Widang Jeong Inbo eui Sirhak Insik gwa Hangmun Jucheron” (Widang Jeong Inbo’s Understanding of Sirhak and his Theory of the Scholarly Subjectivity) In Yeonsei Daehakkyo Yeoksa Munhwa Hakkwa BK Plus Saeop Team, eds, Geundae Hangmun gwa Joseonhak Yeongu (Modern Scholarship and the Research on Korean Studies), 71-111. Seoul: Seonin.
a “synthesis of Eastern and Western ideas” and at the same time was in sync with the iconoclastic currents in the contemporaneous Qing academic milieu. Importantly, Jeong, as well-versed in the art of interpreting Confucian classics as he was, did not deny that Dasan strongly emphasized the exegesis of the Confucian canon in his life work; he explained, however, that Dasan was attempting to interpret the classics in the clearest and least confusing way, with popular enlightenment in mind.17) Jeong’s emphasis on the “illness” of uncritical subservience vis-à-vis China and its official Zhuxianism which supposedly befell Joseon practically from the time of its founding and which Seongho and Dasan as well as their older predecessor, Bangye Yu Hyeongweon磻溪柳馨遠 (1622-1673), were assumedly attempting to “cure,”18) indeed were not fully dissimilar to Takahashi’s assumptions about Joseon-era Koreans” “innate” propensity to blindly imitate China. However, whereas Takahashi tended to downplay the significance of Yangming School and other iconoclastic currents in Joseon’s intellectual history and sharply contrasted the intellectual ferment of late eighteenth-century Qing China with the purported ‘stagnation” in Joseon Korea, Jeong provided his readers with an elaborate genealogy of Late Joseon’s pragmatic thought (which also included a number of figures from the Yangming School lineage) and emphasised the similarity between Dasan’s quest for authentic scholarship and the philosophical inquiries of his contemporaries in Qing China. Seen this way, Joseon was not a static, stagnant “vestige” of antiquity of the kind which the Japanese colonialist scholars were so fond of describing; on the contrary, it was marching towards the same teleologically ordained goal of modernity, with its emphasis on pragmatism, practicality and subjectivity, as the rest of humanity. While Jeong’s accentuation of “authenticity” was definitely related to the philosophic tradition of his own Yangming School lineage, it also did not deviate from the standard definitions of epistemological and aesthetical modernity – centred around individuals’ inner
17)  Jeong Inbo, 1983 [1934]. Tamweon Jeong Inbo Jeonjip (Complete Works of Tamweon Jeong Inbo). Seoul: Yonsei Daehakkyo Chulpanbu, 68-86.
18)  Jeong Jonghyeon. 2018. Dasan eui Chosang, 100-102.
worlds and recognition of their unique subjectivity – as accepted in Korea’s intellectual milieu in the 1920s and 1930s.19)
While Hyeon or Jeong were rather conservative nationalists, the nascent Marxist scholarship of colonial-age Korea was, interestingly enough, broadly sympathetic to the same picture of retrograde Neo-Confucians versus progressive Sirhak pioneers. Marxists too were keen to find the traces of pre-ordained movement towards modernity in the Joseon past: after all, from the Marxist point of view, such movement constitutes the teleological essence of history developing from feudalism towards capitalism and then hopefully further, to the bright socialist future. Korea was no exception. On the contrary, colonial-age Marxists, hopeful for the perspective of first anti-colonial and then socialist revolution in Korea, were even more eager than their nationalist rivals to draw a well-systemized picture of the Korean traditional society, its Confucian ideologists included, dutifully following the “world-historical rule” of modernity- oriented development. Unlike the nationalists, Marxists were less obsessed with personalities and more interested in the larger socio-economic structures. Personalities were, in the end, simply a part of the superstructure reflecting the developments in society’s socio-economic basis. However, as long as Confucian personalities were concerned it was again Dasan and Sirhak movement that stood in the centre of Marxist response to the Japanese Orientalist (mis)interpretations of Korea’s Confucian history. They attracted a special interest not only as Korea’s endogenous proto-modernists, but also as possible harbingers of modernity’s alternative, non-capitalist version. Indeed, Yun Yonggyun尹瑢均, a graduate of Keijō Imperial University京城帝國大學 who pioneered academic study of Dasan’s socio-economic ideas in early 1930s Korea, claimed in his 1930 and 1931 contributions to a Marxist student journal, Sinheung 新興, that Dasan was not only simply a “pioneer of modernity”: more than that, his ideas on the equalitarian distribution of land were even “Communist.” At the
19)  Gim Yeongchan. 2004. “Singminji Geundae eui Naemyeon gwa Pyosang” (Inner Side and Representations of the
Colonial Modernity) In Gim Hyeonsuk et. at, eds. Singminji Geundae eui Naemyeon gwa Maeche Pyosang (Inner Side and Media Representations of the Colonial Modernity), 9-36. Seoul: Gipeun Saem.
same time, however, Yun was academically-minded enough to acknowledge that Dasan’s immediate goal was to deal with the increasing number of landless vagrants and the tendency towards concentration of landholdings in the hands of richer landlords. “Communist” Dasan, it had to be acknowledged, indeed strove to preserve peasant holdings as the tax basis of the ruling dynasty and uphold the existing status distinctions.20) Rather self-contradictory statements of this kind, with Dasan being simultaneously interpreted as an indigenous forerunner of “historical progress” to come and realistically assessed as a thinker of his own time, are quite typical, as we will see later, of 1930s Marxist writings on Dasan.
Baek Namun (1894-1979), a pioneering Korean Marxist historian educated in Japan and, coincidentally, Jeong Inbo’s colleague and friend at the Yeonheui College where both were teaching, also considered Dasan the central figure in Late Joseon history of ideas as a whole. In his contribution to the centennial of Dasan’s passing (“Jeong Dasan eui Sasang” 丁茶山의 思想 Donga Ilbo, July 6, 1935), Baek construed the history of Korea’s eighteenth and early nineteenth century as the story of the struggle between the progressive tendency towards the development of monetary exchange, market economy and eventually capitalism on the one side, and the feudal exploitation ideologically sustained by the Neo-Confucian dogmatism on the other side. Feudalism was facing its terminal crisis, visible from the inability of the ruling bureaucracy to control the rent-seeking behaviour of its own local agents, notorious for levying extortionist taxes on the new-born toddlers and dead parents of the commoner taxpayers. The opposition to feudalism, buoyed by the rising tide of the “naturally growing” monetary exchange, was, as Baek saw it, taking a form of religious protest. The acceptance of Catholicism, this “vanguard of capitalist expansion”, was a sign of the progressive development, while the Neo-Confucian anti-Catholic repression epitomised the anti-modern feudal reaction. Baek likened the anti-Catholic persecutions, like the large-scale Sinyu辛酉purge of 1801 – which eventually sent Dasan into his
20)  Yun Yonggyun. 2018 [1930, 1931]. “Dasan eui Jeongjeongo” (On Dasan’s Well-Field System) Reprinted in: Jeong JongHyeon. 2018. Dasan eui Chosang, 201-228.
eighteen years-long exile – to the papal persecution of the natural scientists in the context of European Counter-Reformation. That Catholicism, obviously no friend of the liberal reforms in late eighteenth-century Europe (as Baek himself acknowledged by mentioning the papal repression of modern science), was to be assigned a role of an “anti-feudal opposition” in contemporary Korea, was indeed a serious self- contradiction in Baek’s logic, which Baek offered no further explanation for. In his picture, Dasan, a “feudal” yangban philosopher persecuted for his supposed conversion to Catholicism, was a harbinger of the modern changes, which the contemporaneous Joseon government was stubbornly rejecting, inflicting harm on its own country by refusing to trade with the Western powers. While Dasan’s association with Catholicism and Western thought was in the focus of Baek’s argument, Korea’s pioneering Marxist historian made also an important caveat: all his relative progressivity notwithstanding, Dasan “cursed the feudal society” only “passively,” never fully liberated himself from “feudal ideas” and did not attempt to actively propagate the “ideas of freedom.”21) This caveat demonstrates the soberness and meticulousness of the Marxist historical analysis, and the efforts not to exaggerate Dasan’s “proto- modern” stature which Baek was assiduously making. Nevertheless, the main conclusion is abundantly clear: Dasan was an adept of supposedly progressive European thought par excellence and was also, albeit half-heartedly, a critic of Joseon “feudalism.” When Baek revised and enlarged his paper for a journal publication (August 1935), the point was made even more clearly. Baek additionally mentioned American independence, the French Revolution, the first railways in Britain and the invention of the electric telegraph as the background against which Dasan supposedly came to critically reflect on Joseon Korea’s conditions, ending up as an adept of Western learning out of his admiration for “freedom ideas” and his protest against the “feudal closing of the country” and “class rule by the yangban scholar-officials.”22)
21)  Baek Namun. 1991 [1935] “Jeong Dasan eui Sasang” (Jeong Dasan’s Ideas) In Baek Namun Jeonjip (Collected Works of Baek Namun). Vol. 4. 113-116. Seoul: Iron gwa Silcheon.
22)  Baek Namun. 1991 [1935] “Jeong Dasan 100nyeonche eui Yeoksajeok Euimi” (The Historical Meaning of Jeong Dasan’s Centennial Anniversary Celebration) In Baek Namun Jeonjip. Vol. 4. 117-121.
The relationship between Sirhak – represented by the towering figures like Dasan – and the religious imports from the West were indeed intriguing for the pioneering Marxist thinkers of 1930s Korea. On the one hand, as good Marxists, they were not supposed to harbour any illusions about Christianity. Indeed, Korea’s pioneering Communists had already started their anti-religious movement by the early 1920s, aiming at Christianity in particular. While acknowledging its role in introducing Western culture to Korea, they accused Christianity of being essentially non-scientific and superstitious, of de facto supporting capitalism by “anaesthetising” the believers instead of sensitising them to the realities of class oppression, and of general social conservatism. Some Christian activists attempted to counter these accusations by introducing the notion of Christian socialism to Korea but, by and large, church reaction to socialist ideas was indeed mostly of rather inimical kind.23) On the other hand, especially as the grip of Japanese colonial rule was being further tightened from the late 1930s, there was some room to take a second look at Christianity and its role in Korea. After all, it was among few institutions not directly controlled by the colonial state, and it represented something qualitatively different from the “Imperial Way” ideology of the totalitarian statehood.24) Thus Im Hwa林和 (1908-1953) – the poet and critic who led the Marxist literature movement of the 1930s – went as far as to suggest in a 1941 journal publication that Christianity in Korea (as well as in Japan or China) played a role essentially different from that it had in the Western societies where its doctrine “did not possess any elements accelerating the collapse of the feudal system and nurturing the new bourgeois culture.” In East Asia, by contrast, the advent of Christianity was a direct consequence of the European maritime trade, an element in capitalist development; moreover, what primarily interested the Sirhak scholars, Dasan included, in the Western books, was early modern science
23)  Kang Weondon. 1992. “Ilche ha Sahoejueui Undong gwa Hanguk Gidokkyo” (Korean Christianity and Socialist Movement during the Period of the Japanese Imperial Rule). In Gim Heungsu, ed.Ilche ha Hanguk Gidokkyo wa Sahoejueui (Korean Christianity and Socialism during the Period of the Japanese Imperial Rule). 25-57. Seoul: Hanguk Gidokkyo Yeoksa Yeonguso.
24)  On the ideological formations of “imperialization” in late colonial Korea, see: Poole, Janet. 2013. When the Future Disappears: The Modernist Imagination in Late Colonial Korea. NY: Columbia University Press, 1-17.
rather than religion as such. Christianity provided a tool of self-reflection regarding the long-term Neo-Confucian domination over the realm of Korean thought; as to the nineteenth-century Korean peasant converts to Catholicism, they were mainly attracted by the egalitarianism of the universal brotherhood offered by popular Catholic literature. In a word, according to Im, Christianity was an important catalyst of the “collapse of Korean feudalism” as well as the soil on which Korea’s new culture was nurtured.25) However, as we will see below, not every contemporary Marxist was prepared to integrate Catholicism into the genealogy of Korea’s early modern transformation. For some, giving too much credit to any religion was in itself problematic: Dasan was to be left as primarily an adept of broadly Western rather than specifically Catholic learning.
A vision of Dasan’s importance for Korea’s modern development broadly similar to that of Baek Namun was further concretised in the works of Choe Ikhan (1897-?), a Japanese-educated Marxist scholar and Communist activist who extensively engaged with Dasan’s texts and later spearheaded research into the Sirhak school in North Korea, where he moved after liberation from Japanese rule in 1945. Not unlike Jeong Inbo – whose work he often referenced in his own writings – Choe was a rather special personality: he managed to experience the full spectrum of modern Korea’s ideological developments, from orthodox Neo-Confucianism to socialism. In his youth, he studied under Myeonu Gwak Chongseok 俛宇郭鍾錫 (1846-1919), a revered heir to the Yeongnam 嶺南School of Neo-Confucianism whose academic lineage went back all the way to Toegye Yi Hwang. The apprenticeship to Gwak was followed by an infatuation with modernity and nationalist ideas and a stint at Waseda University早稲田大学. There, Choe was, in turn, introduced to Marxism, becoming a member of an early Communist group of Korean students in Japan, the Sun and Moon Society (Irweolhoe 日月會). Several Communist groups, the Sun and Moon Society included, formed the underground Korean Communist Party in April 1925.
25)  Im Hwa. 2009 [1941]. “Gidokkyo wa Sinmunhwa” (Christianity and New Culture) In Im Hwa Munhak Yesul Jeonjip (Collected Works of Im Hwa: Literature and Art), Vol. 2. 296-308. Seoul: Somyeong.


Choe Ikhan participated in the Party’s activities in the most active way (he was elected the Party’s Organisational Secretary on September 20, 1927), but his socio-political engagements were interrupted when he was arrested by the Japanese police on February 2, 1928. After a seven- year-long stint in the colonial prisons, the Confucian-turned-nationalist-turned-Communist returned to Seoul where the underground Communist Party was no longer in existence. Consequently, as a number of other ex-militants, Choe switched to academic and journalistic pursuits. And, due to his first-hand experience of Confucian education, it was only natural that Korea’s Confucian past stood in the centre of his interests.26) It has to be remembered that Choe’s scholarly interests were indeed broader than Confucianism per se. As a result of his research on Dasan’s opus magnum, Mongmin Simseo 牧民心書 (“Admonitions on Governing the People,” 1818),27) and other sources on Joseon Korea’s institutional history Choe came up, for example, with first-ever outline history of pre-modern
Korea’s societal relief policies, Joseon Sahoe Jeongchaek Sa 朝鮮社會政策史 (“The
History of Social Policies in Korea”, 1947).28) Choe moved to North Korea in 1948, and his meticulous research contributed greatly to the early development of the academic studies on traditional Korea there.
Choe’s serialised articles, entitled altogether “Yeoyudang Jeonseo reul Tokham” 與猶堂全書를 讀함 (“Reading [Dasan’s] Yeoyudang Jeonseo”, Donga Ilbo, December 9, 1938 to June 4, 1939) are perhaps the most detailed and comprehensive research on Dasan ever appearing in colonial-era Korea’s periodicals. A staunch Marxist, Choe paid indeed little attention to Takahashi’s selective depreciations of particularly Korean Confucianism: from Choe’s viewpoint, any Confucianism, in whatever from and wherever, was a “cultural product of the Oriental feudal societies” and at the
26)  Song Chanseop. 2011. “Joka ga Jakseonghan Choe Ikhan (1897-?) Yeonbo” (Choe Ikhan’s (1897-?) Life Chronology Compiled by his Nephew) Yeoksa Yeongu 20: 271-298.
27)  This classic was recently translated into English: Choi Byonghyon, transl. 2010. Admonitions on Governing the People: Manual for All Administrators. Berkeley: University of California Press.
28)  Song Chanseop. 2011. “1940 Nyeondae Choe Ikhan eui sahoe Guje Jedo Yeongu - 『Joseon Sahoe Jeongchaek Sa』(1947) reul Jungsim euro” (A Study on the Social Relief System [in Traditional Korea] by Choi Ikhan in 1940s: focusing on the History of Social Policies in Korea) Yeoksa Gyoyuk 120: 227-260.
same time an ideology “rationally supporting the dignified life of their dominant classes.” As Choe saw it, the degradation of Confucianism into “pseudo-learning and evil custom” followed the downward trajectory of the ruling classes which used these teachings in their interests; in the very end, Confucianism became simply a tool of “oppressing and crushing all the progressive elements of human life.”29) Choe, indeed, found few reasons to be more merciful towards the Catholic missionaries, through which the classic Chinese translations of the Western books came into the hands of Gwangam Yi Byeok 曠菴李檗 (Yohan Yi, 1754-1785) and the other Catholic pioneers whom Dasan closely interacted with. As Choe remarked, religion and science had already parted their ways in Europe in the age of Renaissance: Jesuit missionaries coming to East Asia were using the ideas of Copernicus (1473-1543) and Galilei (1564-1642) in order to attract the attention of East Asian scholars, but they were in no hurry to reveal to their local interlocutors the truth about the Catholic church’s persecutions against the pioneers of modern astronomy.30) Contrary to Baek Namun’s and Im Hwa’s benign vision of Catholicism as relatively progressive compared to Joseon’s own Neo-Confucian dogmas, Choe emphasised the rather lukewarm attitude of Seongho vis-à-vis Catholicism as it was (Seongho saw a number of similarities between Catholicism and Buddhism)31) and defined Dasan’s engagement with Western science, and not Western religion, as the essence of his greatness. Attempting to situate Dasan in the context of what he himself saw as the mainstream of global history, Choe, just as Baek Namun had done several years earlier, reminded his readers that Dasan’s youth, the 1770s, 1780s and early 1790s, was the time of the epochal shifts in the Euro-American part of the world. Choe listed American independence, the French Revolution and the Polish struggle for the preservation of country’s dying statehood as the crucially important events temporally coinciding with Dasan’s formative years. The events in Paris in 1789 signalled “the most basic
29)  Choe Ikhan. 2016 [1938-1939]. Yeoyudang Jeonseo reul Tokham (Reading [Dasan’s] Yeoyudang Jeonseo). Seoul: Seohae Munjip, 104.
30)  Choe Ikhan. 2016 [1938-1939]. Yeoyudang Jeonseo reul Tokham, 115.
31)  Choe Ikhan. 2016 [1938-1939]. Yeoyudang Jeonseo                     , 108-110.
change in the organization of human culture”;32) against such a background, it was of paramount importance that Dasan was, first and foremost, a diligent student of the faraway European teachers.
Accordingly it was, indeed, Dasan’s posture of learning from the “advanced West” that earned Choe’s highest praise. Choe did his best to situate Dasan in the context of the global scientific development: Korea’s greatest thinker was born exactly 130 years after Galilei published his epoch-making comparison of the Copernican and
Ptolemaic systems, Dialogo sopra i due massimi sistemi del mondo (Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World Systems, 1632) and 96 years after Newton’s (1643-1727) discovery of universal gravitation and the physical quality of light (which Choe placed around 1666). In addition, Dasan had to learn whatever Western science he could access via the writings of the missionaries who, as Choe once again put it, used the scientific theories in order to cast the “bait,” in search of educated converts. Dasan thus had to be praised for “eating the bait” and studying the science of the missionaries in defiance of all the associated political dangers, in order to share these discoveries with the Joseon public; yet another praiseworthy trait of Dasan was, according to Choe, his willingness to propose learning science and handicrafts from China while at the same time countering Sinocentric theories and effectively “de-centring” the Middle Kingdom.33)
Viewed from our current angle and compared against the much less reserved and less nuanced praise of Sirhak and Dasan by nationalistic contemporaries and the future scholars, Choe’s take on Dasan perhaps has to be commended for its noteworthy sobriety in delineating Dasan’s achievements and limitations. Making clear that whatever Dasan could learn were at best smatterings of the pre-existing Western scholarship carried to East Asia by Catholic missionaries – who also had a different, and not necessarily very “scientific” agenda of their own – Choe also emphasised
32) Choe Ikhan. 2016 [1938-1939]. Yeoyudang Jeonseo reul Tokham, 118-119. 33) Choe Ikhan. 2016 [1938-1939]. Yeoyudang Jeonseo                , 171-175.
that Dasan’s crowning achievement was an epistemological shift rather than a full-blown socio-political reform program. While the later scholars redefined Dasan’s short treatise on the origins of country magistrate system, Weonmok原牧, as “proto- democratic” or suggestive of the inchoate development of popular sovereignty notion,34) Choe makes it abundantly clear that Dasan remained a “monarchist” and an adept of the Confucian “moral politics,” with their focus on the rulers” “civilising influences” upon the ruled. At the same time, as Choe saw it, Dasan managed to historicize the emergence of autocracy out of relatively equalitarian original human communities and, in his other famed short treatise, Tangron湯論 (Exposition of King Tang) redefined the supreme power as a product of a historical shift from a down-top to the top-down modes of the political representation. Dasan’s historicizing approach highlighted the role of the ruled as the original source of the societal power and could imply a measure of relativization of the current mode of the governance “from above,” but never developed into a structured theory of political reform challenging the existing system of governance. As Choe formulated it, whereas Benthamite utilitarianism advocated the greatest good for the largest number of the beneficiaries, Dasan, at best, saw the benefits for the majority as a secondary derivate from the success of rulers” moral self-cultivation and “civilizational influence.” This having been said, the degree to which Dasan took the position and interests of the majority into consideration and contextualized the power of the ruling minority as a result of historical shifts (rather than an unchanging constant of the human affairs) was, according to Choe, a major achievement per se.35)
The arguments deployed by the colonial-age Korean thinkers were fully adequate for their place and time – that is, for the circumstances of the discursive battle over Joseon Dynasty Confucianism in which they had to be engaged. The battles of this kind were raging all over Asia: Chinese modernist thinkers were foregrounding the
34)  See a critical overview of such views in both North and South Korean scholarship since the 1950s in: Gim Jinho.2013. “Dasan JeongchI sasang e Daehan “Min”kweon iron” Bipan” (Criticism of the Application of “Popular Rights Theory” to Dasan’s Political Thought) Gukhak Yeongu 23: 347-377.
35)  Choe Ikhan. 2016 [1938-1939]. Yeoyudang Jeonseo                     , 231-240, 243-254.


allegedly progressive and equalitarian Mohist School墨家, as largely rediscovered by the philologists of late imperial China,36) Buddhist scholars were mastering the art of modernist Buddhist apologetics with an emphasis on the supposedly scientific nature of the Buddhist teachings,37) and Indian scholars were rediscovering the materialism of ancient India.38) In the fight against colonial Orientalist (mis)perceptions of Asia and Asians as inherently unable to progress, the history of philosophy was to be re-assessed from an explicitly presentist viewpoint and utilised as a discursive weapon of sorts. And in Korea and elsewhere, in fact all around the Asian and African periphery of the West-centred capitalist system, the epistemic privileging of “modernity” was to be taken for granted by the combatants in these ideological battles. The history of the past was to mirror the situation of the present where the modern nation states were triumphing over the traditional polities. The best hope for the colonised was, in fact, an independence universally understood as transition towards modern national statehood modelled after one of the Western patterns (classical capitalist or Soviet). Marxists, with their penchant for placing the protagonists of their historical accounts into the concrete socio-economic context of the periods in question, sometimes contributed to checking and balancing the usual modernist exaggerations through more meticulous historicization of the proud narratives of new-born or reborn nations’ past. They were, however, in complete agreement with modernity – by definition, measured against the modern European developments – being made into the epistemological axis of the newly produced national narratives. The question, however, is whether privileging “modernity” and making the whole pre-modern history appear as a prelude to the teleologically ordained modern development makes any sense today, with modernity widely seen as the principal reason for the ecological crisis of potentially apocalyptic proportions and generally treated as the object of deeply critical reflection rather than the pre-ordained apex
36)  Defoort, Carine. 2015. “The Modern Formation of Early Mohism: Sun Yirang’s Exposing and Correcting the Mozi” T”oung Pao 101/1/3: 208-238.
37)  McMahan, David. 2008. The Making of Buddhist Modernism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 89-117.
38)  Chattopadhyaya, Debiprasad. 1959. Lokayata: A Study of Ancient Indian Materialism. New Delhi: People’s Publishing House.
of the human history.39) In the case of the Joseon Confucian history, modernist interpretation, with its focus on the allegedly progressive Sirhak, clashes with a number of facts perhaps better known to today’s researchers than to their colonial-age predecessors who had shaped our paradigm of the understanding of Joseon Confucian history. Was Dasan, a heir to the academic lineage stretching all the way back to Toegye,40) and a staunch proponent of the maintenance of both slavery and the hereditary status system,41) really a proto-modern thinker of the kind Baek Namun or Choe Ikhan were attempting to paint? Was Sirhak ever a unified, coherent group, and can it be termed “movement”? And was not a relatively tolerant attitude towards Western science a trademark of Confucian pragmatism in general rather than of a particular Confucian school? Indeed, Dasan’s mastery of Western geometry, optics or astronomy was hardly exceptional by the standards of Korea’s late eighteenth-century intellectual elite, and was mostly dependent on the rather outdated Jesuit missionary sources42) which also implied that the great Joseon scholar could hardly ever familiarise himself with contemporary Western developments, be it the French Revolution or American independence. While Dasan could be indeed iconoclastic in his rejection of the time-honoured Five Elements theory, or in his rather personalist understanding of Heaven and general emphasis on human subjectivity in his philosophical writings and poems,43) and such iconoclasm must have reflected important cultural and ideological shifts in late Joseon’s changing social environment, should measure the Korean philosopher be measured against the standards of his European contemporaries with whom he never had any direct contact throughout his life?
39)  Spaargaren, Gert, Mol, Arthur P. J. and Buttel Frederick H. 2000. “Introduction: Globalization, Modernity and the Environment” In Spaargaren, Gert, Mol, Arthur P. J. and Buttel Frederick H., eds. Environment and Global Modernity. 1-17. London: Sage.
40)  Yi Gwangho. 2006. “Toegye Yi Hwang eui Simhakjeok Ihak i Dasan Jeong Yagyong eui Dodeoknon Hyeongseong e michin Yeonghyang” (The Influence of Toegye Yi Hwang’s Studies of Heart-Mind on the Formation of Dasan Jeong Yagyong’s Theories of Ethics) Hanguk Sirhak Yeongu 12: 21-45.
41)  Mongmin Simseo, Fascile 8 (Yejeon 5, Pyeondeung). See also: Gim Yeongsik. 2014. Jeong Yagyong eui Munje teul (Problems of Jeong Yagyong). Seoul: Hyean, 29-40.
42)  Gim Yeongsik. 2014. Jeong Yagyong eui Munje teul, 212-141.
43)  Torrey, Deberniere. 2010.” Separate but Engaged: Human Subjectivity in the Poetry of Dasan Jeong Yagyong Journal of Korean Studies 15/2: 95-122.

3.    In Place of Conclusion: beyond the Modernisation of Dasan and Sirhak

To be sure, the modernist interpretations of Sirhak or even the phenomenon of
Dasan were never monolithic and unitary, even inside the time and space of Korea’s 1930s. While a prominent nationalist writer, An Jaehong安在鴻 (1891-1965), characterised
Dasan’s Weonmok as a “socio-democratic” treatise in 1935, and this characterisation was approvingly cited by one of South Korea’s seminar systemisers of the official nationalist view of Sirhak, Hong Iseop洪以燮 (1914-1974), in 1959,[1][2]) Choe Ikhan demonstrated a much more nuanced approach in his 1938-39 series on Dasan. He made clear that Dasan’s views, all the novelty of his historicizing approach and his attempts to relativise the hierarchical governmental system of East Asia’s centralised monarchies notwithstanding, essentially constituted a self-reflection by a member of a ruling class caught in a serious crisis rather than a challenge to this ruling class.45)Indeed, Choe’s pre-Liberation approach to Dasan was perhaps more scholarly and objective than his own post-1945 take on Dasan, more openly influenced by the political considerations. His opus magnum on Sirhak and Dasan, published in Pyeongyang in 1955,[3]) the same year when Gim Ilseong 金日成, North Korea’s supreme leader, made his famous speech emphasising “self-reliance” (juche 主體) in ideological work and chiding Soviet Koreans in positions of power for their inattentiveness to the splendour of Sirhak tradition, made Dasan into a champion of “democracy,” although it noted at the same time his failure to develop scientific materialist views. Choe went as far as to liken Dasan’s project of restoring China’s ancient Well-Field system 井田制 (which was supposed to guarantee the state’s tax income and prevent the loss of the land by the peasantry) to Russian late nineteenth- century populist Narodniks’ interest in building socialism via resuscitation of the traditional peasant obshchina community. 47) With Dasan promoted into the ranks of Korea’s home-grown “revolutionary democrats,” the advent of Marxist socialism to 1920s Korea could be portrayed as more of an endogenous development, in good “self-reliance” spirit. Choe Ikhan, as we saw above, never made claims of this kind before 1945. However, even Choe’s pre-1945 portrait of Dasan hardly can be free from the charges of epistemic violence:48) Sirhak as a significant Other of the contemporary architects of the Korean historical identity was being constructed on the basis of the interpretation which, indeed, had little to do with the Sirhak scholars themselves.
Of course, not only the Marxism of Choe Ikhan’s own times but also much of today’s global historiography would define the age of Dasan as the time directly predating and partly overlapping with the “great divergence” of the early nineteenth century when Western Europe, with its nascent industrialism and growing modern science, starting its unprecedented jump, increasingly differentiating itself from older civilisational centres, East Asia included, in its standards of productivity, incomes or literacy.49) Indeed, by the late eighteenth century, East Asia was already in a position of learner rather than teacher, vis-à-vis such imports from the West as Copernican astronomy, Newtonian physics, or improved gunnery.50) With the larger picture like this in mind, there is undeniably a strong temptation to assess Dasan primarily from the vantage point of his encounters with the West – mediated via the Jesuit writings in classical Chinese – and the (dis)similarity of his views with that of his European contemporaries. And, while the suggestions that Dasan managed to develop a “popular rights” theory directly corresponding with the contemporary
47)  Choe Ikhan, 1955. Sirhak pa wa Jeong Dasan, 487-489. On the ideological uses of Dasan in North Korea, see: David-West, Alzo. 2001. “Between Confucianism and Marxism-Leninism: Juche and the Case of Jeong Dasan” Korean Studies 35: 93-121.
48)  On the notion of the epistemic violence in constructing one’s Other on the basis of extraneous interpretations, see: Spivak, Gayatri. 1988. “Can the subaltern speak?” In Nelson, Cary and Grossberg, Laurence, eds., Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture. 271–313. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
49)  Pomeranz, Kenneth. 2000. The Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the Making of the Modern World Economy. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
50)  Landes, David S. 2006. “Why Europe and the West? Why Not China?” Journal of Economic Perspectives 20/2: 3–22.
European quests for more contractual and balanced interrelationship between the rulers and the ruled51) are hard to accept at their face value, it is also undeniable that a shift of sorts was taking place. Indeed, Dasan’s focus in Weonmok and Tangnon on the assumed system of nominating higher-ups by their subordinates in ancient times and the well-being of the ruled as the ultimate goal of the government, while albeit patently Mencian in its spirit, does strike a different note if compared to much of Joseon’s theory of statecraft, with its emphasis on the minutiae of the bureaucratic rule. It is undisputable that the epochal changes of the age, from the crisis of the Joseon polity (which Choe Ikhan accentuated in his writings on Dasan) to the intensified international flow of knowledge, made at least some Joseon thinkers, Dasan among them, more reflective and more disposed to broader historical analyses, often more focused at relativising and re-thinking some of the most sacrosanct contemporary institutions than many of their predecessors.
However, at the same time the characterisation of Dasan as a persecuted proto- moderniser and an adept of Western knowledge par excellence, as strongly proposed by both Baek Namun and Choe Ikhan, constitutes an act of epistemic violence against the late Joseon thinker, cast in a role he hardly could ever envision for himself. While definitely interested in imported science, Dasan envisaged himself as, first and foremost, an exegete of the Confucian canonical writings. He made it abundantly clear in his writings that he considers the “laws of the sages” sacred and basically inviolable,52)and was deeply worried about the progressing weakening of the traditional hereditary status distinctions between the yangban lineages and the rest of the population.53)A rather socially conservative thinker, he wanted to strengthen the system of slavery which was economically so important for the status and prestige of yangban clans, and concurrently ensure that the local authorities were able to control the non-yangban petty officials and richer peasants and protect weaker
51)  Jo Gwang. 1976. “Jeong Yagyong eui Minkweon Euisik Yeongu” (Research on Jeong Yagyong’s Consciousness of Popular Rights) Asea Yeongu 19/2: 81-118.
52)  Gyeongse Yupyo (Deathbed Petition for Governing), Fascicle 7 (Jeong jeoneui 1).
53)  Bal Go Jeong nim Saengweon non (The Preface to Gu Yanwu’s Treatise on the Junior Degree-holders)
commoners from the violence on the part of their stronger neighbours. It was abundantly clear to him that Joseon’s system of government was no longer up to the task of controlling private rent-seeking on the part of its own local administrators and could not fully enforce its own laws in the local communities; however, his preferred recipes for mending the system had indeed little to do with what we commonly conceptualise as “modernity”, be it abolition of bound labour or status equality.54) Would not defining such a thinker primarily in the context of West- generated modernity – as Choe Ikhan and Baek Namun did in the 1930s – be tantamount to an act of epistemic violence towards an intellectual who lived and worked inside the framework of a completely different reality, even if his lifespan coincided with and was in diverse ways indirectly influenced by the world-historical changes with Europe as their epicentre? Why should not it be possible to acknowledge that, while being – in a larger sense of the word – a part of the global transformation towards an economy based on commercial production and monetary exchange, a more participatory polity and a society less constrained by the hereditary status system, the Joseon Korea of Dasan’s time manifested at the same time its own special traits, stronger persistence of ascribed statuses or Confucian political orthodoxy (obviously visible from Dasan’s spirited defence of slavery or the “laws of the sages”) being some of them? Should not the global development towards economic, social or political modernity be viewed as highly uneven and combined – a view which would allow integrating relative conservatism of such unorthodox Joseon thinkers as Dasan into the larger picture of late eighteenth-early nineteenth century global changes?
Of course, the modern scholarship on Joseon Confucianism in general and Sirhak in particular has long developed far beyond its colonial-age pioneers. However, the modernist framework dating back to the discursive battles of the 1920s and 1930s still underpins much in the way how Sirhak is being represented in both North and South Korea.55) It may be timely to critically reflect on this framework, with a view
54)  Gim Ho. 2013. “Dasan Jeong Yagyong eui “Minju” Gyehoek” (The “Democracy” Project of Dasan Jeong Yagyong) Dasan gwa Hyeondae 6: 289-325.
to paint a picture of Joseon Confucian developments which would be closer to the historical realities of the past rather than the expectations of the present. It is undoubtable that late Joseon Korea was undergoing important changes, with at least some of its finest intellectuals growing increasingly critical of Zhuxian dogma, pragmatically appreciative of the scientific developments elsewhere and more relativist – or at least broadly-minded – in their approach towards the received truths of statecraft. Dasan has to be given due credit for exemplifying this trend. But it would amount to an act of epistemic violence to measure him against the contemporary developments in faraway Europe – as 1930s Korean Marxists indeed did, albeit with the best of intentions.

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References

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Vietnam: A New History by Christopher E. Goscha



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Vietnam: A New History

by
Christopher E. Goscha
3.97 · Rating details · 202 ratings · 36 reviews
A 2017 Cundill History Prize Finalist
"Groundbreaking...Goscha has provided quite simply the finest, most readable single-volume history of Vietnam in English."--Guardian
In Vietnam, Christopher Goscha tells the full history of Vietnam, from antiquity to the present day. Generations of emperors, rebels, priests, and colonizers left complicated legacies in this remarkable cou ...more

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Hardcover, 592 pages
Published September 13th 2016 by Basic Books (first published June 2016)
ISBN
0465094368 (ISBN13: 9780465094363)
Literary Awards
John K. Fairbank Prize (2017), Cundill History Prize Nominee (2017)

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Nov 12, 2016Hadrian rated it really liked it
Shelves: history, nonfiction, vietnam
Thoughtful single-volume history of Vietnam which presents a complex picture, more than a blank history page before the arrival of the French and the Americans.

Begins with the Han Dynasty's invasion of the Red River valley in the 1st century BCE and the emergence of what Goscha calls a 'Sino-Viet' elite. Vietnam has been influenced much by its larger neighbor - the Vietnamese language was written with Chinese characters until the 19th century, Buddhism is still popular, and an imperial examination system based on Confucian texts was in place for centuries. It was not until the 10th century CE that the Chinese were routed by the general Ngô Quyền, who formed an independent Viet state.

His successors were not content with that; they expanded their state further south with a combination of military campaigns and rural administration to reach to the Mekong, and 'civilize' Lao, Cham, and other minorities along the way. By the time the French arrived in the mid-19th century, there was already a colonial bureaucracy - the new one just had a French veneer.

Goscha moves through the 20th century at a brisk pace (spending only one chapter on the American intervention), and then Vietnam invaded Cambodia to dislodge the Khmer Rouge, then the Chinese invaded the north, then years of economic scarcity and hundreds of thousands of refugees. After a series of economic reforms and a diplomatic reversal, Ho Chi Minh City, formerly Saigon, is now a wealthy city, and they much prefer Americans to the Chinese.

The book closes with a few sharp observations on the political future of the CPV, where no one knows what comes after. (less)
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Apr 15, 2018Andrew rated it really liked it
Shelves: vietnam, asian-history
Vietnam: A New History by Christopher E. Goscha is an interesting one volume look at Vietnamese history from its earliest times to the modern day. The book seeks to move away from a Vietnamese history dominated by French and American-centric examinations, and seek a broader history of Vietnam as a geographic concept, and the forces that shaped its modern existence, from internal division, Confucian thought, Buddhism, and French Republican and Marxist thought. All of these forces, internally adapted and applied often by external forces, shaped Vietnam into the nation state it is today.

However, this area was not always a homogeneous state. Vietnam developed in the Southeast Asian sphere, with many people groups and states evolving in different areas. It's early history, like many states, is one of competing tribes and people groups who constantly shift, move, displace and disappear. Modern Vietnam as a concept did not exist at this time. The Chinese under the mythical Han, right up to the Tang dynasty, controlled Northern Vietnam off and on as a province called Jiaozhi. The Chinese rulers of this area sought to export their Confucian ideology and turn Northern Vietnam into an internal Chinese province. China at this time was not a culturally unified state, and the Chinese ruled over many "foreign" peoples as subjects or vassals. Jiaozhi was on the periphery of Chinese control, and the Chinese government utilized local leaders and administrators to rule over local peoples. These administrators were trained in Confucian ideology, but also retained there local identities and religious backgrounds, and peoples in this region often mixed Buddhist and local traditional religions together to form a more Vietnamese style ideology.

To the south of Jiaozhi, a kingdom called Cham arose. It took advantage of its strategic maritime position to develop valuable trading routes with China, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia. This kingdom heavily incorporated Hindu and Buddhist traditions from India, mixing them with more local customs. These people were culturally separate from the Vietnamese of the north, and resisted Chinese attempts at expansion into the region. To the south of the central Cham kingdom, the Mekong delta was dominated by a collection of Khmer tribes more related to neighbouing Cambodians than the Vietnamese and Cham peoples of the north. The Chinese led domination of the north lasted for almost a thousand years, and this incubation of Chinese and Vietnamese culture led to a nominally Sinicized elite ruling over a more traditionally minded Vietnamese mass. These local people kept there own culture and religion, and sometimes resisted Chinese domination. The Sinicized elite of Jiaozhi took advantage of the cycle of growth and decay common in Chinese dynastic history to claim independence, and after the collapse of the Tang dynasty, largely succeeded. This new kingdom, called Dai Viet, incorporated both Chinese thought and local traditions to build a cultural distinct Viet polity in Northern Vietnam.

Throughout its history, Dai Viet would attempt its own Imperial expansion by fighting wars of conquest in central-Southern Vietnam, and into neighbouring Laotian and Cambodian kingdoms. It also attempted to maintain its independence from China, as further Chinese dynasties grew and fell, holding off invasions from the mongol-Yuan dynasty, for example. Even so, the Viet began to import Buddhist and Confucian scholars from China in order to build there own national and state-backed ideals. They mixed these teachings with local myths, legends and personalities to form a unique Viet identity that they then tried to export to southern and central Vietnam. At times throughout history, the Dai Viet kingdom began to take the form it would largely hold as a French colony - that of Indochina. Viet military leaders expanded control over southern Vietnam, into Laos, and Cambodia, and tried there hand at cultural dominance in these regions. Far from being a long time puppet of foreign powers, Vietnam has also had its share of imperial expansion and cultural homogenization.

Eventually, the French began to take interest in Vietnam. Catholic missionaries from France and the nearby Philippines (Spanish possession) began to infiltrate Vietnam and convert locals. Viet leaders looked at these incursions as potential threats, and eventually began to crack down on Catholic and other religious minorities to try and centralize Vietnam along Japanese lines - utilizing a unique brand of Confucian paternalism and local customs and myth-building to ideologically control there imperial populations. This led to eventual confrontation with France/Spain, and the French conquest of a region in the south - now called Cochinchina. The French further spread there influence over Cambodia and into Laos, and eventually conquered the entire Indochinese area and creating the colony of Indochina. They split this region into five administrative zones largely based on historical separations - Cambodia, Laos, Cochinchina (the southern Mekong region of Vietnam), Annam (the central region of Vietnam) and Tonkin (the northern region).

The French utilized local mandarin bureaucrats to maintain control over the colony, and at first sought to centralize and "civilize" there colony along French lines. Colonial administrators were at first military figures from the French navy, but soon civilian administration took over. Local Vietnamese peoples were often conflicted on how to act. Cooperation was common, with local bureaucrats, but also with the French puppet monarchy and many modernizers in Vietnam who though France was the best way to modernize Vietnam into a nation-state. These Vietnamese collaborators sought education in the French Empire, going to Paris for education, gaining French citizenship, and trying to apply French models at the local level. A rival school developed that turned to Meiji Japan for ideas. Japan in the 1800's was Asia's first nation to modernize along Western lines, and Japan became a central location for nationalists to study, organize and arm. Many Vietnamese nationalists traveled to Japan, and also to China to assist in nationalist struggles, learn nationalist rhetoric, and study models for development. These two schools bred competing nationalist interests - one centered on France and professing for a slow development and eventual independence within the French Empire as a commonwealth state (much like Britain and its colonies), and the other looking at revolutionary tactics to decolonize the area and expel the French.

Although nationalism did exist in Vietnam, French influence did change much on the ground. Catholicism became more popular. The French began to exploit divisions inside Vietnam to maintain control, empowering local groups like the Hao Hao, and Cao Di religious extremist groups in southern Vietnam. They also divided Vietnam into northern, central and southern regions, much like how Vietnam had been before its Imperial period. The Latinization of the Vietnamese language also occurred at this time, which France sought to use as a language to tie Vietnam into the French orbit, but has the unintentional consequence of making foreign political texts more easily translatable. French texts like those of Rousseau began to be read by nationalist elite, and revolutionary works by Chinese, Japanese, and Communist authors came pouring into the country. French instability after there loss in the Franco-Prussian war in 1871 caused some chaos in the colony, and gave the nationalists the idea that France was a weak ruler, and could not successfully run Vietnam as a state.

This led to increasing revolts by local Vietnamese peoples, followed by crackdowns by the French in a cycle of repression and revolt that only exacerbated thoughts of independence. A major revolt in 1908 was brutally suppressed by colonial forces, killing many hundreds of Vietnamese peasants. This led to both horror and revulsion in Vietnam, and at home as France grappled with the Dreyfus affair and began to move toward more Socialist politics. This led to both an easing of political repression in Vietnam, and a move toward a more radically communist nationalism. French administrators began to promise more lenient rule, and a slow movement toward eventual independence along commonwealth lines. These promises empowered the collaborationist camp, and led to thoughts of internal democratic participation. This however, was a step to far for the French, who denied Vietnamese delegates the right to make decisions internally for the colony, and eventually disenfranchisement of nationalists who sought cooperation with France.

As WWII got underway, France was quickly invaded by the Nazi's, and Petain supporters gained power in Vietnam. The Japanese swiftly moved in to Vietnam to take control of its geostrategic location, and at first utilized local French administrators who were sympathetic to nationalistic style rule. However, as WWII came to a close in 1945, the Japanese sought to oust the French and turn Vietnam independent (albeit under Japanese control), forming the short lived Empire of Vietnam, run by France's puppet Emperor turned nationalist. This state was short lived, but lit a fire in terms of Vietnamese national consciousness. The Empire reorganized states, merged the three separate colonies into one entity, and implemented new political elite from local peoples. After Japan lost the war, there soldiers remained in Vietnam. The allies sought to disarm them, and French troops moved into the South, while Chinese nationalist troops took the North. The Chinese had no interest in seeing a resurgent French colony, and empowered local Nationalists along the lines of China's internal party at the time. The French sought to reestablish there authority in the region in order to retake there colonial empire.

A third party existed at the time; the communists under Ho Chi Minh. The communists began to operate in Vietnam as part of the broader nationalist front, and cooperated closely with Soviet internationalist Comintern directive. They cooperated largely in China's united front against Japan, and received training, arms and material in Chiang Ki-Sheck's military academies in southern China. The communists in Vietnam sought to seek wider power through cooperation with nationalist forces in a united front against French forces. They participated in the war with Japan, and China installed Ho Chi Minh in power in Vietnam in order to combat Japanese troops on his southern flank. Although the Chinese considered removing the communists from power as there war with the Chinese Communists flared up, they largely left them in power due to lack of ability to oust them, and the rapidly decaying situation at home. This led to a briefly unified Vietnam under a nationalist coalition. However, ideological differences saw more right leaning nationalists to seek French aid in ousting the Communists, leading to the occupation of southern Vietnam by French forces eager to reestablish there colonial presence. This led to a split in Vietnam, as the communists cemented power in the North, and the French in the south.

The two Vietnam's came to participate in the larger conflagration between the USSR and USA on a global scale. The Americans propped up French Vietnam as a better alternative to Northern communist Vietnam. The Northern state was largely supported by Soviet and Chinese communist forces after they took power in 1949. The French were largely against a unified Vietnam unless under French control, and vetoed any attempt by the Americans at building a coalition system based on democracy. Instead, the Americans sought to avoid French hostility in their need to build a larger European alliance aligned against the USSR. The French terms were control in Vietnam. Evens so, the North began to crack down internally on dissidents and build a communist state based on collectivist and Maoist principles. They then initiated guerilla warfare against the south, as France began to maneuver to retake their old colonial territory. This war became costly for the French, who were also dealing with colonial chaos in their other colonies in Africa. As Vietnamese forces began to turn the French back, and eventually defeated the French in the historic battle of Dien Bien Phu in 1954, the French began to seek an exit.

This exit alarmed the Americans, who had been funding about 80% of the cost of the French's war with the Communists. The Americans began to take a greater role in southern Vietnam, first propping up the South as a rival regime, and then sending in advisors and eventually combat troops into Vietnam. This happened over a longer period. The south Vietnamese state began to take shape as a authoritarian style state in the vein of Taiwan and South Korea, two other American backed states in Asia. South Vietnamese politicians attempted developmentalist reforms along these lines, initiating there own rival land reform schemes, and seeking aid and assistance from Western backers. However, a lack of centralized control in south Vietnam led to corruption, and the growth of rival power groups in the Buddhist community, and in extremist splinter groups like the Cao Di and the Hao Hao. The south Vietnamese government began to crack down on these dissident groups, but this backfired as chaos began to reign in the south. This allowed the Northern state to being its infiltration of the south, setting up rival administrations in rural areas, and contesting southern control in various regions. It also caused the Americans to lose faith in their puppet, and initiate a coup d'etat and install a military government.

Increasing hostility between the north and south led to open warfare, as the North sought to reunite the nation through force of arms, and the Americans sought to keep them apart. The US commitment to this region began to accelerate into open warfare, as the US eventually sent many hundreds of thousands of soldiers into Vietnam, and committed massive amounts of money and material to the war. Millions of Vietnamese would lose there lives in this war, which led to terrifying bombing campaigns, and inter-communal violence across Vietnam and into Laos and Cambodia. The North came out ahead through its use of guerilla tactics and declining American interest in the war, leading eventually to the evacuation of US troops in 1975 and the annexation of south Vietnam by the North. Communist regimes also took power in Cambodia and Laos.

Vietnam after 1975 began to utilize communist ideology to try and integrate the culturally distinct south into a new unified sphere. The south had spent decades as a separate entity, with a larger degree of Western influence, commodification of the economy, and susceptible to greater global influences. The North sought to disrupt this by nationalizing the powerful Chinese merchant lobby in the south, and reeducating thousands of local bureaucrats and administrators. Land reform also took place, although this was less disruptive than in China due to the south's previous expirements and success with developmentalist land reform. A growing Sino-Soviet split in the late 70's, however, led to increasing tensions in southeast Asia. Vietnam had sought to support its communist brethren in Laos and Cambodia, but Cambodia's Khmer Rouge would have none of it. This genocidal group was largely backed by China for its more nationalistic brand of Communism, while Laos and Vietnam increasingly cooperated and were backed by the Soviets. The Vietnamese timed there crackdown on the Chinese community in Vietnam with growing tensions with Deng Xiaoping's modernizing China, which was increasingly improving ties with the West. This led to open warfare between Vietnam and China in 1980, as Chinese troops entered Vietnam, and swiftly occupying northern Vietnam before departing. Vietnam got the message, and its attempts to influence other southeast Asian nations and its hostility to the Khmer largely ended and Vietnam began to focus inwardly.

From 1991 onward, Vietnam has begun to develop along Chinese lines. While largely holding power to this day, the Communist government has begun to espouse more market-orientated development strategies while maintaining centralized political control. This development has slowly turned Vietnam into another "Asian Tiger." Even so, it has maintained its hostility to China, and has largely warmed ties with the US, who seek to use Vietnam's important naval bases to increase their control over the south China sea. Vietnam retains border disputes with China in this coastal area, as well as with other states in the region. Vietnam has faced similar problems with this rapid development. Nationalism largely aimed at Chinese businesses and residents in prevalent. Hostilities and disputes do remain with some of its neighbours. Corruption is an issue due to the centralized nature of the Vietnamese government, and the retention of power by the Communist elite. Even so, Vietnam's rapid development has brought many out of poverty, while increasing internal pressures to increase individual rights and political participation. Vietnam has maintained a cult around Ho Chi Minh, who is in state in a similar fashion to Lenin in Russia and Mao in China.Clearly the history of Vietnam continues to develop in an interesting fashion, with internal struggles, rivalries and successes continuing to play out into the future.

Goshcha has written an excellent account of Vietnamese history, focusing on internal Vietnamese factors, and largely disputing the exceptionalist versions of Vietnam that show them as as a homogeneous people dominated by evil foreign empires in from China and the West. Contrary to this, Vietnam has largely developed as separate and competing states and people groups, and has had its own experimentation with Imperial domination and attempts at cultural assimilation. This book is a great and relatively concise read on the subject of Vietnamese history, and touches on aspects of politics, global history, economics, and cultural and social changes. This is a great modern history on Vietnam as a nation. Although lacking in depth in some areas, especially Vietnam's history during its Dai Viet period, this book is largely concise, inward looking, and thoughtful. Not to be missed by those who wish to brush up on a modern account of Vietnamese history. (less)
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May 07, 2017J.M. Hushour rated it it was amazing
I'm no SE Asia specialist, but this is easily one of the best histories of a state/region I've read over the last few years reading a history of every country in the world.
I'm sure there are those who will find something to gripe about, no matter what their political stripe. After all, that's what that stripe is for (much like a skunk). For the layfolk, this is a grand book, balancing enough ancient past for precedent's sake with enough modern stuff, thankfully giving the Second Indochinese War (here in the States, we call it 'Nam or, "the shit") a decent, respectable section without going overboard. As for political balance, I think Goscha does his best with what will prove to be an area of study possessed of an interminable sense of controversy. The war was fucking terrible and he makes that clear, and all sides share in the blame.
What I liked best was his approach to Vietnam itself, as a state, finding the whole idea of "European colonialism" sufficient in one sense but one-sided in another, for Vietnam itself was very much a colonial state. The S-shape came from Nguyen conquests all the way done to the Mekong and back. Folks in the highlands were colonized and Vietnized just as the Viet were Frenchified and colonized. (The French come out the worse in all this.)
Nothing is as clear cut. Diem was just as rank and guilty of despicable acts against his own people as much as Ho Chi Minh was. America's SE Asia policy was horrible, but so was China's, and Goscha spends some time discussing the third wave of conflict in the area involving Cambodia and Vietnam.
Overall, a great book. The highland peoples and Viet culture only get one chapter each, near the end, but as it is largely a political narrative, I found that acceptable. (less)
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May 24, 2017Mike Flores rated it it was amazing
VIETNAM A New History lives up to its title. For the first time we discover all sides of the conflict, that's right, we get Vietnam's side,too. Both the North and the South and the groups at play in both.

The book takes us on a journey through Vietnam's history ands it turns out we were only one of many who had problems in the region. The book even shows us how disaster could happen again. As China and the U.S. tries to understand how to deal with each other this book becomes urgent. Best history of Vietnam I have ever read and author Christopher Goscha is now the top Vietnam historian.

For the first time, all sides of Vietnam. Including Vietnam's. (less)
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Jun 02, 2018Martin Lowery rated it really liked it
I enjoyed the way the author told the history of Vietnam, but he spent the last 50 pages covering Vietnam from 1954, until the modern day, condensing crucial history regarding the war with America.

Otherwise, the historical perspective the author provides shows that the differences and animosity between the North and South Vietnam had been going on since the 18th century. America may have played these animosities against each other, but they didnt start the war that was already brewing for 100 years. (less)
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Aug 09, 2017Peter A rated it really liked it
Shelves: current-affairs, history
Growing up in the United States in the late 1960’s, Vietnam received a lot of coverage. Being a male of a “draftable” age, it also focused me a great deal on Vietnam. After I visited Vietnam for the first time in 2007, I started forming new impressions of the country and its people. Subsequent visits only increased my desire to learn more about Vietnam. When I started looking for books about the country, most of what I uncovered focused on the period of the late 60’s and early 70’s. Finally, I discover the book by Christopher Goscha, and read several reviews that were all very positive. Thus, I read it.

Overall this book is very insightful and well researched. As the subtitle of the book states, and the author argues in his opening pages, that given recent research it is time to write a new history. “It still takes into account this country’s position in a coveted part of the world where empires collide, but it also emphasizes Vietnam’s own role in shaping its history and highlights the country’s extraordinary diversity and complexity. Most importantly, it emphasizes that there has never been one Vietnam but several remarkably varied ones.”

The author presents a very interesting perspective about Vietnam, through focused chapters and how narrates the chapters. In each chapter, he also provides a very nice lead section that help illustrate what we are going to discover in the chapter.

After reading the book and the insights therein, my view of Vietnam has deepened. In many ways, Vietnam is a mixture of cultures; not just of the French influence, but more importantly of the multiple groups that populated Vietnam over at least the last two thousand years. Vietnam is a story of how one group, the Viet, ultimately expanded from the north and “colonized” the rest of what we now know as Vietnam (and of course the influence into Laos and Cambodia). The current national boundaries are relatively recent (say 1940’s). It is also the story of nationalism, strong desire to be independent of France, US, and China, of the different approaches (republicanism from the French, communism from the Soviet Union and China) to state building and statecraft. The book also shows the ugly side of politics gone awry, the plunge into the Vietnam war without thinking about the consequences – an important lesson for today - for not wanting to back down; and how global politics can play out and influence local issues.

I very much appreciated the final chapter and conclusion. The final chapter, “Vietnam from Beyond the Red River”, talks about the many other ethnic groups that are part of the larger story. The conclusion, “Authoritarianism, Republicanism, and Political Change” points to the ongoing dynamics that continue to influence Vietnam into its future, with a hint of the staying power of republicanism in the Vietnam.

A note to the author: I appreciate the maps and the brief summary of abbreviations. I wish there were an annotated list of “key characters”, with an indication of when and where they appear in this story.

A note to potential readers: You will learn a great deal from this book. However, there are many details (and names), and you may feel overwhelmed with these details.

Other Books: Since 2015 at least three books with a more comprehensive look at Vietnam has been published.

Current Book: Vietnam: A New History, Christopher Goscha (published September 2016, 592 pages)

Two other books that look interesting and seem to have very good reviews are
Viet Nam: A History from Earliest Tim, Ben Kiernan (published March 2017, 656 pages, https://www.amazon.com/Viet-Nam-Histo...
and
Descending Dragon, Rising Tiger: A History of Vietnam, Vu Hong Lien and Peter Sharrock (published January 2015, 272 pages)
https://www.amazon.com/dp/1780233647/...

I would be interested to hearing from those who read any of these books, or others.


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Apr 12, 2017Keen rated it liked it · review of another edition

This is a fairly exhaustive and extensive account of modern Vietnam and is clearly the work of a skilled authority, backed up with a whole myriad of research. Goscha has done a fine job of tracking the history from the early settlers through to colonialism, colonial collaboration, colonial expansion, through various warring dynasties and demonstrates how seemingly outside events like the Opium Wars and the Cold War came to impact on Vietnamese shores. He traces the horrendous events of the 20th century through three Indochinese conflicts and the eventual Modernisation.

Goscha illustrates how the legacy and influence of around 1000 years of Chinese rule and around 80 years of French rule have been absorbed to help create the Vietnam of today. He describes the Nguyen state era, with compelling characters like Minh Mang. We see how Confucianism, Catholicism and Buddhism fought for supremacy amidst an ever shifting political, religious and territorial landscape. He also shows us how the country managed to form and shape its own culture, partly through the long standing Sino-Franco influence but how they transformed an identity of their own with the introduction of the Quoc Ngu script. We see that the Vietnam as most of the world knows it has never really existed for long as one, united nation.

The US apparently subsidised around 80% of France’s campaign against Vietnam during the first Indochina War before getting involved directly and causing the Second Indochina War (or Vietnam War). I was unaware that an estimated 5000 to 15000 people were murdered by the communists during the 50s before the US intervened. It was a harsh regime which encouraged children to spy on their parents and neighbours to denounce each other. Apparently both North and South Vietnam indulged in human rights abuses, arbitrary arrests, torture, censorship, executions, forced labours and use of concentration camps before the Americans got involved.

Goscha produces the horrifying facts and stats about the hugely imbalanced Vietnam War and the appalling consequences, particularly for innocent civilians and minority hill tribes. The legacy of the war continued for years afterwards with hundreds of thousands of boat people fleeing to places like the US, Canada, France and Australia. It took the reforms of 1986 to eventually lead the country into taking some large, though measured and limited steps towards capitalism and the nation seems to have grown steadily since then eventually becoming the 3rd largest exporter of rice in the world and the 2nd biggest producer of coffee.

This was an interesting read that should please scholars and the history/Vietnam enthusiast alike. There were times when it was maybe a little too dry and detailed, but that’s sometimes the price you have to pay for such a well-researched and detailed work. (less)
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Jul 27, 2017Howard rated it liked it · review of another edition
On the positive side, I now know a huge amount more about how Vietnam developed into the unitary state that it became, for the first time, after 1975, and how the regional tensions within the country persisted over several centuries (and probably right up to the present time). And my knowledge of the pretty disastrous French colonial period has gone from practically nothing to a reasonable amount, as has my awareness of how Ho Chi Minh and the DRV interacted with the Chinese and Soviet states from the 1920s until the end of the twentieth century.

But, I have to say it was immensely hard going at times. One of the problems being that keeping track of Vietnamese names was (for me) almost impossible. Another that the author seems to abhor data, so there are very few figures to help get the reader's mind immersed in the practical development of modern Vietnam. Additionally, despite being almost 500 pages long, Goscha's history seemed to me to be rather lacking in detail relating to where the actual power lay at various periods -- particularly the four decades since unification -- and how that power has been wielded, and what the reaction of the Vietnamese people has been to all this.

Informative, yes. Big holes in the narrative, however, and not exactly an enjoyable read (less)


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Hilton Yip 6 December 2016 Non-Fiction, Reviews
“Vietnam” by Christopher Goscha


Vietnam is often featured in Western media and culture as the battleground where the US actually lost a war in the 20th century. This is unfortunate because it obscures a fascinating Southeast Asian nation that is now on the cusp of significant economic growth and prosperity. Vietnam: A New History presents a more comprehensive account of the country by explaining how it came about, originating as a collection of tribal entities in the north over two thousand years ago that coalesced into kingdoms that gradually expanded, combined, and suffered colonization by the French before becoming united in the 20th century after a brutal war with the US.

Yet the story of Vietnam cannot be told without highlighting the significant influence, and interference, of outside actors, whether indirect rule and cultural influences from China, colonization by France or war with the US. As a local student guide told me when I visited the country a few years ago, “We fought the Chinese for a thousand years, the French for 100, and the Americans for 20.” There was no boastfulness or arrogance in her remark, just a matter-of-factness that reflected the country’s turbulent past, coveted by a much larger neighbor and powerful Western nations.

But Vietnam had not always been an innocent victim: it expanded by taking over and absorbing weaker kingdoms like the Cham and waging war against the neighboring Khmers. Vietnam had its origins in the Red River region near Hanoi, its expansion south was a continual process over several hundred years from the 15th century that gradually saw Vietnam take its modern shape. The fact that part of Vietnam’s Mekong Delta was actually taken from neighboring Khmer, the precursor of what is now Cambodia, hundreds of years ago is a reminder that European powers were not the only ones in world history to colonize and conquer.Vietnam: A New History, Christopher Goscha (Basic Books, September 2016; Allen Lane, June 2016)

Though Vietnam has a history stretching back well over a thousand years, it only really came into being as a single entity a couple of centuries ago when the emperor Gia Long declared a unitary state in 1802. Most of the book is devoted to the time from this period on to Vietnam’s colonization under the French, and the 20th century, with the more that one thousand years of pre-French colonization period condensed into the first two chapters.

The section covering the French colonial era is comprehensive, covering various aspects from the economy to societal make-up. These chapters are actually the book’s most informative, especially as in contrast with the US-Vietnam War, about which a lot of literature and film has been and continues to be produced, the French colonial period is not well known or often covered in Western media, even—as the author stresses—in France.

There is also a good account of Vietnam’s place on the international geopolitical stage, first as a useful tool of the colonial era as France sought to hold onto its dwindling international prestige and obstruct Vietnamese self-rule to prevent its other colonies from getting similar ideas, and then as an actor during the Cold War. The short-sightedness of the French in giving the Vietnamese as few political rights as possible meant that it was almost inevitable that their rule would be violently resisted and decisively cast off. Even after 100 years of colonization, French rule is hardly remembered with much nostalgia, if any at all, though signs of their influence remain: coffee, baguettes, and colonial cathedrals and opera houses.

The French only formed a tiny part of the population, numbering at most only in the tens of thousands but retaining the top positions in administration for themselves. The French ruled Vietnam not as a single colony, but divided into three parts: Tonkin (the north), Annam (the central) and Cochinchina (the south). The French also colonized and annexed neighboring Laos and Cambodia, and later tried to rule these two plus their three Vietnamese colonies as a united entity. This resulted in Vietnamese resistance taking on a regional scope as they supported fledgling Cambodian and Laotian resistance movements while ironically, the French sought to use Vietnamese talent to help administer those two colonies.

Not surprisingly, France’s colonization led to growing sentiment for Vietnamese unification which is where the rise of Ho Chi Minh and the Communists come into play. The invasion by the Japanese and the temporary ousting of French rule during World War II provided the chance for Ho and his Communist followers to create the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) in 1945, thus setting the stage for all-out war with the French and the division of Vietnam into north and south. After the French pulled out following their shock military defeat by the Communists at Dien Bien Phu in 1954, war between the two Vietnams then followed, leading to US intervention and the devastating, drawn-out war many of us are most familiar with.

This is when Vietnam’s place in modern history as much more than just a French colony becomes assured. For the French and the US, it was where they suffered their worst defeats in war and accelerated the decline of the former as a global force. Concurrently, the rise of Ho’s Communist regime led to the country becoming a participant in the Cold War as the US and the Soviet Union contested global supremacy, which was then complicated by tensions between the latter and China. After defeating the Americans, Vietnam would fall out with China, while attempting to maintain its influence in neighboring Laos and Cambodia. War with Cambodia’s Khmer Rouge led to invasion from China in 1979, and despite forcing the Chinese back, Vietnam would endure international ostracism in the ensuing decade, with China aided in this by the US.

Goscha’s last chapters detail Vietnam’s economic modernization as it turned away from Communist central planning, following its neighbor China, while still grappling with maintaining authoritarian control, a challenge that is ongoing and also mirrors China.

The many wars and conflicts of the 20th century that Vietnam went through were a continuation of its past as a complex, turbulent but resilient country that managed to survive while continually resisting outside actors such as its giant northern neighbor and Western powers, while itself subjugating weaker neighbors.

Despite the summary treatment of Vietnam’s first millennium which is squeezed into just two chapters, as a history of modern Vietnam, the book is a worthy addition to this sparse category.
Hilton Yip is a writer currently based in Hong Kong and former book editor of Taiwan’s The China Post.