A Review and Evaluation on the Neutral Unification Policy of North Korea
Jong-il Kang / Director
Institute for Korean Peninsula Neutralization
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I. Introduction
After World War II, the United States and the Soviet Union divided the Korean Peninsula into South and North Koreas against the will of the Korean people. Since the Civil War in 1950, the two Koreas have been in ideological conflict for over half century as one of a few divided countries in the world.
This ideological conflict has had a negative effect on the effort to unify the Korean Peninsula. In fact, it is one of the major factors delaying Korea unification because it concerns not only the internal issues of the Korean Peninsula, but also the international problems that relate to the four great powers: the U.S., China, Russia, and Japan. Their national interests in the Korean Peninsula are keenly opposed to one another.
The unification policies of South and North Koreas are different from one another. The South favors a confederation system, while the North wants a neutral federation. In principle, there is not much difference between the two policies, but because they do not try to understand each other's position, the two Koreas stand far apart from one another.
However, the unification policy of North Korea has some importance to South Korea in the direction of its neutral unification policy. In the past, Kim Il Sung officially proposed his neutral unification idea three times to South Korea (Ro Jung-son, 1996, 218), and Kim Jong Il has also shown an interest in the "Swiss-like armed neutrality" of the Korean Peninsula (Kim M'yong-ch'ol, 2001, 111). In recent years, North Korean scholars have been working on the neutral unification of Korea(Yi Tae-jin 2001).
There is little difference between Kim Il Sung's neutral unification policy and Kim Jong Il's armed neutrality. Kim Il Sung's proposal, which was based on an offensive unification policy, seems to have been designed to pull South Korea into the socialistic system, whereas Kim Jong Il's armed neutrality focuses on maintaining his regime. According to Kim M'yong-ch'ol (2001), the basic scheme for Kim Jong Il's Swiss-like armed neutrality emerged from his father's neutral unification policy. Nevertheless, Kim Jong Il has not declared yet armed neutrality as an official unification policy, whereas Kim Il Sung did announce his idea publicly.
The purpose of this paper is to review the neutrality policy of North Korea, to seek its possible application for the unification of the Korean Peninsula, and to evaluate its function in the unification of the two Koreas.
The scope of this paper covers the evolution of the neutrality policy put forward by North Korea, especially since 1980 when Kim Il Sung officially proposed his neutral federation system to South Korea, including Kim Jong Il's armed neutrality and North Korean scholars' works on permanent neutrality.
Conventional definitions of neutrality, neutralization, and permanent neutrality are as follow:
According to O Ki-p'yong(1976, 277), neutrality has played a role in the history of war from the beginning of humankind. A third party in a war does not support any party, or supply any weapons to the other two sides. The effectiveness of the neutrality automatically ceases with the end of war.
Neutralization, in the similar meaning as permanent neutrality, is an international system in which political independence and territorial integrity are permanently guaranteed by the great powers located around the neutral state. The neutralized state will not take up arms against another state except for defending itself; and it will not assume treaty obligations that may compromise its neutralized status. Neutralization can be applied not only to a state, but also to international rivers, waterways, and regional areas. Finally, permanent neutrality is a special international agreement between a soon-to-be neutralized state and the great powers located around it (Black, 1968, xi-xii).
This paper aims to review and evaluate Kim Il Sung's neutral unification policy, its background, and Kim Jong Il's perspective on Swiss-like armed neutrality. Moreover, the current works on the neutrality policy by North Korean scholars will be examined in the light of the applicability of the North Korean neutral policy to the unification of the Korean Peninsula.
II. Kim Il Sung's Neutral Unification Policy of Korea
Kim Il Sung, the late president of North Korea, proposed his neutral unification policy for the Korean Peninsula in October 1980, October 1985, and April 1993. The basis for this policy is that neither of the two Korean governments should join political or military alliances with any foreign countries in any blocs of the world(Ro Jung-son, 1996, 218).
1. The Founding Plan of Kim Il Sung's Korean Democratic Federation Republic
In October 10, 1980, Kim Il Sung, the former president of North Korea, announced the founding plan for the Korean Democratic Federation Republic (KDFR) at the 6th Conference of the Labor Party. He proposed the neutral federation unification plan of the Korean Peninsula to South Korea based on the three principles of self-reliance, peaceful unification, and national grand solidarity(Ro, 1996, 216-9). It was the first time that Kim Il Sung officially suggested a neutral unification policy to South Korea.
Kim Il Sung argued that in order to bring about the unification of the Korean Peninsula in the near future, the same numbers of representatives from South and North Koreas along with South Koreans living abroad should build the KDFR peacefully without any foreign interference.
It is difficult to understand why Kim Il Sung proposed the neutral unification policy to South Korea; however, in consideration of the current political situation of South Korea and international relations in Northeast Asia, possible motives can be surmised.
First, Kim Il Sung stressed a self-reliant unification. This means that the two Koreas should achieve unification through inter-Korean cooperation, but devoid of any foreign assistance and intervention.
Second, in referring to the Korean unification, Kim Il Sung used the term, "neutral unification" for the first time. In order to fulfill the neutral unification of the two Koreas, he emphasized that neither Korea should ally itself with the United States or the Soviet Russia, which were the major actors during the cold war era.
Third, Kim Il Sung may have wanted to take advantage of the internal political situation of South Korea. In 1980, the political climate of South Korea was in the worst situation as the Kwangju May 18th democratization movement against the military government led by Chon Du Whan demonstrated to the world.
Fourth, despite social disorder in South Korea, the relationship between the two Koreas has, nevertheless, made progress. In this regard, Ro(1996, 214) has stated that North Korea was ready to seize the opportunity to unify the Korean Peninsula. The military government of South Korea continued in their effort to talk with North Korea even though there were fierce anti-government demonstrations by students. Some meetings and negotiations between the two Koreas were held in P'yongyang and Seoul several times from February 6th to March 18th 1980. For example, working level preparation meetings for prime ministerial talks were held four times in Seoul and P'yongyang respectively (Ibid.).
Lastly, the economic growth of South Korea exceeded that of North Korea. The level of economic development of both Koreas was much the same in the 1970s. In 1980, however, the economic growth of South Korea surpassed that of North Korea. Therefore, due to the increasing change in economic development between the two Koreas, Kim Il Sung seemed to modify his unification plan from communization to the neutral unification system(The Choson Year Book, 2001, 35).
2. Dialogues between Kim Il Sung and Chang Sae-dong
Kim Il Sung stressed the necessity of neutral unification of the Korean Peninsula to Chang Sae-dong, the South Korean CIA Director, who visited P'yongyang on October 17, 1985. Kim Il Sung remarked to Chang(Ch'oe Bo-sik, 1998, 201-224):
In the cold war era, South and North Korea went to a war in June 1950 instead of the United States and Soviet Union, and we became a scapegoat of the West-East confrontation. We should not repeat again such a stupid war representing the Western and Eastern blocs. Therefore, the Korean peoples should achieve the neutral unification in order to avoid war.
Kim Il Sung further added that if South and North Koreas were to achieve neutral unification, it would reduce the level of armed forces to 100,000 men on each side, pointing out how the Japanese military forces stationed in Korea during World War II were able to control the Korean Peninsula with armed forces of less than 200,000.
The first conditions of becoming a neutral state is
- to increase the number of people going and coming freely between South and North Korea,
- to officially recognize the legal authority and government of the two Koreas, and
- to sign a mutual non-aggression treaty between the South and the North (Ibid.).
Though we do not know how much of Kim Il Sung's remarks have the ring of truth, one thing is certain that he had a number of interests in the neutral unification of Korea. Therefore, while taking every precaution in examining his proposal, it is important to evaluate his intentions.
First, his interest in the neutral unification of the Korean Peninsula seems to have been intended to achieve the withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Korea, hence, to weaken Korea-U.S. relations.
Second, it is very sensitive for both Koreas that Kim Il Sung suggested the neutral unification issue first. One particular thing he stressed is that both Koreas should be free from any alliance with foreign countries.
Lastly, since a neutral country must have sufficient armed forces for maintaining its neutrality, it is estimated that a total of 200,000 soldiers for Korea would be insufficient to defend the Korean Peninsula after unification.
3. Kim Il Sung's Ten Great Principles for Neutral Unification
Kim Il Sung remarked on the ten great principles for the peaceful unification of Korea at the Fifth National Conference held in P'yongyang on April 7, 1993(Ro, 1996, 518). He emphasized in the first principle to build the self-reliant, peaceful, and neutral unification of the Korean Peninsula with the great solidarity of the entire nation. His ten principles include some similar contents that he had already announced in the KDFR and dialogues with Chang Sae-dong(Ibid.).
He stressed that it is necessary to build the Pan-National Unification Conference (PNUC) with the participation of representatives from the various political parties of South and North Koreas, some NGOs, and all classes of people, while maintaining the current political systems of the two Koreas.
First, his interest in the neutral unification of the Korean Peninsula seems to have been intended to achieve the withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Korea, hence, to weaken Korea-U.S. relations.
Second, it is very sensitive for both Koreas that Kim Il Sung suggested the neutral unification issue first. One particular thing he stressed is that both Koreas should be free from any alliance with foreign countries.
Lastly, since a neutral country must have sufficient armed forces for maintaining its neutrality, it is estimated that a total of 200,000 soldiers for Korea would be insufficient to defend the Korean Peninsula after unification.
3. Kim Il Sung's Ten Great Principles for Neutral Unification
Kim Il Sung remarked on the ten great principles for the peaceful unification of Korea at the Fifth National Conference held in P'yongyang on April 7, 1993(Ro, 1996, 518). He emphasized in the first principle to build the self-reliant, peaceful, and neutral unification of the Korean Peninsula with the great solidarity of the entire nation. His ten principles include some similar contents that he had already announced in the KDFR and dialogues with Chang Sae-dong(Ibid.).
He stressed that it is necessary to build the Pan-National Unification Conference (PNUC) with the participation of representatives from the various political parties of South and North Koreas, some NGOs, and all classes of people, while maintaining the current political systems of the two Koreas.
The PNUC should consist of the same number of representatives from the South and North governments and maintain a neutral state that does not join global blocs(Ro, 1996, 518-9).
Kim Il Sung's proposal for the neutral unification of Korea is evaluated greatly because it was initiated by him for the unification of Korea. However, he did not mention the details for achieving neutral unification. For example, among the three approaches, simple neutrality, neutralization, and permanent neutrality, Kim Il Sung did not specify which one was a preferred method. Therefore, it is also a problematic proposition which needs to be explored further since a neutral state, by definition, is not automatically assured of immunity from neighboring countries' attacks and foreign aggression.
If he had an intention to absorb South Korea into the communist system with his neutral unification policy, it would not have helped to unify the Korean Peninsula. Moreover, if his idea were specifically aimed at unifying Korea under communism, his neutrality policy would have been rejected and would have been considered a cause for vigilance in South Korea.
III. Kim Jong Il's Swiss-like Armed Neutrality
1. Kim Jong Il's Perspective on the Korean Question
Kim M'yong-ch'ol(2001, 104) argues that Kim Jong Il likes to identify the root cause of Korea's problem from the gunboat diplomacy of the United States. The so-called 'Korean question' has emerged from the U.S. military policy towards the Korean Peninsula. To remove the cause is a prerequisite for a successful Korean settlement that will enable the Korean people to reassert Korean questions and live in peace.
Kim Jong Il offers the following three aspects regarding the Korean question(Ibid.):
First, the current issues between the North and the South are not an ideological conflict. They do not have fundamental causes to hate or fight one another. The main trouble is that South Korea is a vassal state of the United States, which is treating North Korea as its fundamental enemy. The United States still holds the right of wartime operational control over the South Korean armed forces.
Second, the United States is the main actor who divided the Korean Peninsula into North and South Koreas. It was a great mistake for the Korean people not to resist when the U.S. armed forces landed in South Korea just after World War II. The Korean question is still in a troubled situation because the South Korean people do not fight for the removal of the U.S. armed forces from South Korea.
Lastly, the Korean people with a strong sense of cultural pride should put an effort to settle their moral cores with the foreigners such as the Americans and the Japanese. In order to settle the Korean question, it needs to be in a way that would liberate the Korean people from their long-held sense of inferiority towards foreign countries. Their resentment can only be mollified when Korea has reunified independently and has become a sovereign nation in foreign policy and national defense without foreign military bases in the Korean Peninsula.
Kim Jong Il's perspective on the Korean question is, however, far from the current situation of Korea. He stresses that in an effort to achieve Korean unification, South and North Korea should suspend their calumny against each other. However, North Korea has criticized South Korea for a long time as a vassal of the United States, and has insisted on the withdrawal of the U.S. armed forces from South Korea.
Moreover, North Korea is likely to exclude South Korea from the U.S.-North Korea conference to settle directly the current nuclear issue even though it always emphasizes the necessity of close cooperation between the South and the North. It is analyzed that if North Korea had cooperated more closely with South Korea through inter-Korean collaboration in order to settle the current issues including the nuclear problem more smoothly, it would have gotten more economic assistance from South Korea than now and would have solved the nuclear issue far more efficiently in the negotiation with the U. S.
Kim Jong Il's argument in relation to the U.S. armed forces' immediate withdrawal from South Korea as a way of fulfilling the Korean unification is particularly aimed at the permanent retreat of the U. S. armed forces from South Korea. If he indeed wanted the Korean Peninsula to unify, he should have put his priority on dialogue with South Korea for the unification of the Korean Peninsula. The reason is that, once the Korean Peninsula is unified in neutrality, the U.S. armed forces would have to withdraw automatically from South Korea.
His argument on the withdrawal of the U.S. armed forces from Korea is believed to be false. When U. S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright visited P'yongyang on October 23rd, 2000, Kim Jong Il said that the U.S. armed forces stationed in South Korea plays an important role for the security of Northeast Asia(The Dong-a Ilbo on September 18, 2003). It can be said, therefore, that his argument requesting the withdrawal of the U.S. armed forces in South Korea hides his real purpose.
2. Kim Jong Il's Swiss-like Armed Neutrality
According to Kim M'yong-ch'ol(1996, 111-2), Kim Jong Il's perspective on solving the Korean questions is based on Swiss-like armed neutrality. In this regard, it is necessary to review the definition of 'armed neutrality' in order to understand Kim Jong Il's Swiss-like armed neutrality. As has been mentioned in the introduction, a state heading for neutrality can follow one of three approaches: simple neutrality, permanent neutrality, and non-alignment. In this case, regardless of the choice made by the state, it must not make any weapons to attack other countries. But it can develop any military weapons to defend itself from another country's attack.
Therefore, armed neutrality is defined as a neutral state which is equipped with any type of weapons necessary to defend itself from the attack of other countries. For example, Switzerland maintains a strong civil service system at the same level as the active duty soldiers.
Kim Jong Il believes that while South and North Koreas, born as the result of the cold war by the great powers, may have some alliances with them, nevertheless a unified Korea should not make any alliance with foreign countries. For instance, North Korea was once a military ally of Russia, and now it has a military alliance with China against the United States and Japan. On the other hand, South Korea is still maintaining a military alliance with the United States. However, a reunified Korea should not adopt any kind of military alliances that inclines it toward only one country (Ibid.).
Kim Jong Il also considers that the unified Korean Peninsula should maintain friendly relations with all the countries in the world through either a foreign policy based on Swiss-like armed neutrality or a non-nuclear policy. Kim Jong Il cites five considerations why the reunified Korea must maintain its foreign policy as a Swiss-like armed neutrality(Ibid.):
First, the demise of the Cold War regime must be officially declared in the Korean Peninsula. In order to end the Cold War regime in the Korean Peninsula, the reunified Korea should not have any particular need to form a military and political alliance with one country against another.
Second, the Korean people have a peace-loving tradition. In Korean history, the Korean people have never attacked foreign countries for aggressive purposes. They built their military forces only for defending themselves. Aggression and revanche are strangers to Koreans.
Third, South and North Koreas need to be free from war weariness. The Korean people have become weary of war, and have suffered for more than one hundred years from the end of the 19th century until the beginning of the 21st century at the hands of the Japanese and Americans. Now, it is time to take a respite and relish the peace. There is no reason to subject them to another trauma again.
Fourth, the geopolitical location of the Korean Peninsula makes it necessary for neutrality. Since the Korean Peninsula is surrounded by the world biggest four powers, Korea's decision to align with one particular country amongst the four would eventually bring forth greater risks in the interests of the other countries concerned. In this regard, the most effective action is to coordinate any possible conflict of interests.
Lastly, South and North Koreas have a sufficient defense potential. There is a sufficient defense capacity for the reunified Korea to be able to deter any would-be foreign military aggressors from attacking it. The North Korean Army(NKA) is equipped with defensive and offensive weapons that can strike any target in the remotest part of the world. Since the NKA and the South Korean Army will combine into a single deterrent, there will be no power vacuum created in the course of the withdrawal of the U.S. armed forces from South Korea.
The theory of Kim Jong Il's Swiss-like armed neutrality is more progressive than Kim Il Sung's neutral unification policy. Since becoming a permanent neutral state in 1815, Switzerland has never been attacked by neighboring countries. In consequence, Switzerland has been one of the countries with the highest income due to the savings in military defense expenditure.
Permanent neutrality is more effective in its validity than the simple neutrality. It is because the effectiveness of permanent neutrality continues either in peace or in war. It is possible to say that, therefore, Kim Jong Il's Swiss-like armed neutrality is closer to permanent neutrality than Kim Il Sung's simple neutrality.
It is necessary to review what differences there are between Kim Jong Il's Swiss-like armed neutrality and the Military First Policy(Son'gun chongch'i) of North Korea. Kim Jong-Il began to use the term "Military First Policy"(MFP) when he visited the 124th unit of the North Korean Army on January 1st 1995. The Rodong Sinmun daily, however, first used the term MFP much later on May 26th 1998(Pak Hyon-ok, 2001, 175-6).
The general concept of the MFP is that the military has priority, which emphasizes the role of the military forces before that of the Workers' Party and helps to secure the military power over the external and domestic ones in North Korea(The Rodong Sinmun, May 26th, 1998).
Chong Song-jang(2001, 88) believes that the special definition of the MFP is a political method, which has all the power of being able to unite the armed forces, the party, and the people for the national progressive movement towards the people's revolution and construction of North Korea.
In relation to the MFP, Kim Jong Il has increased his visits to the headquarters of military forces, specially treating them and maintaining his regime under the support of the armed forces. For example, among his fifty visits for on-the-spot guidance in 1996 he went to military camps a total of 37 times(74 percent), 67 percent in 1997, 70 percent in 1998, 59 percent in 1999, etc.(Ibid, 84).
It can be said that the MFP is one of the methods for internal rule in North Korea whereas Kim Jong Il's armed neutrality is a yardstick to measure the direction of North Korean foreign policy in the future. Though they seem to have little relation between them, they have some common factors. One is a means of currently maintaining Kim Jong Il's regime under the support of the North Korean armed forces, and the other is one of his concepts for the national survival of North Korean foreign policy based on the military power in the future.
IV. Studies on the Neutrality Policy of North Korean Scholars
1. Research on the Invalidation of Korea-Japan Annexation Treaty
There are a few North Korean Scholars who are currently working on the neutral unification policy of the Korean Peninsula. They are Yi Chong-h'yon, Chong Yong-nam, and Kim Kwan-gi, members of the North Korean Social Science Academy. They are hardly researching the neutral problems including something to find out the invalid cause of the 1910 Korea-Japan annexation agreement through the official diplomatic document of the permanent neutrality policy that was submitted by the Kojong(the 26th King of Yi Choson Dynasty) to the Japanese government in September 1903(The Choson Ilbo on February 8, 2001).
They attended the international conference on the 1910 Korea-Japan annexation treaty which was sponsored by Harvard University and held at the University of Hawaii on January 25th through 28th, 2001. In the argument of the North Korean scholars, the invalid cause of the 1910 Korea-Japan annexation treaty is as follows:
Kojong did not want his country to be annexed by Japan; on the contrary, he wanted a self-reliant independence from the intervention of Japan. If Kojong had wanted Korea to become a part of Japan, he would not have submitted the official diplomatic document in which Kojong asked Japan to help Korea in achieving its independence through the policy of permanent neutrality. In this context, it is easy to understand that Kojong was not a man who wanted Korea to be annexed by Japan, but who wanted to attain a true independence. Therefore, the 1910 Korea-Japan annexation treaty is entirely nullified(Yi Tae-jin, 2001).
It is remarkable for North Korean scholars to argue the invalidity of the 1910 Korea-Japan annexation treaty in light of the permanent neutral foreign policy which Kojong pursued. Therefore, it is especially urged that the scholars of South and North Koreas should find more primary sources and data to invalidate the 1910 Korea-Japan annexation treaty. To achieve this purpose, it is necessary for the South and North Korean scholars concerned to study on the 1910 Korea-Japan treaty by thorough textual research based on their close cooperation which is needed more than ever.
2. North Korea's Interest in Neutral Unification of the Korean Peninsula
The Russian Broadcasting System reported that North Korea has been considering neutral unification similar to that of Switzerland(The Naewe tongsin, January 20th 1998). In his interview with the Moscow Radio Broadcasting(MRB) on January 20th, 1998, Wain Dpacheko(spelling is not confirmed) said that in the past, the South Korean people argued strongly for permanent neutral unification of the Korean Peninsula like Switzerland, but now the North Korean people also believe that unified Korea should adopt a permanent neutrality for its foreign policy. Dpacheko further mentioned that South and North Korean scholars have not come to agreement on the political system of the unified Korea yet, but the North Korean scholars are seriously considering unified Korea as a permanent neutral state.
In 1961, the South Korean movement for permanent neutral unification was very popular because the South Korean people were able to take part freely in the social movement of Korean unification. For example, under the Chang M'yon government, a public opinion survey showed that a total of 32.1 percent of the South Korean people supported the neutralized unification of Korea(The Han'guk Ilbo, January 15th, 1961).
Dpacheko believes that a unified Korea could become either a friendly, neutral country with Russia or against it, but in considering the Russian position, it would be better for the Korean Peninsula to become a neutral state than a friendly state towards the United States. He argues that since Russia is located at the territorial boundary with the Korean Peninsula, Russia would like to see a unified Korea having no alliance with the United States.
After World War II, the Soviet Union provided the economic assistance to new and independent countries over the world in an effort to turn them into neutral states so as to prevent these states from becoming too friendly with the United States. Russia still prefers them to free themselves from the influence of the United States. In this context, Russia would like the Korean Peninsula to free itself from the United States influence. Therefore, Russia as well as China is anxious not to unify the Korean Peninsula into as a country friendly towards the United States(Kim Gab-ch'ol, 1979, 295-9).
3. Kim Jong Il's Sons and Their Education in Switzerland
Kim Jong Il has three sons; the oldest is Kim Chong-nam, the second is Kim Chong ch'ol, and the third is Kim Chong-wun. They each studied in Switzerland for more than 10 years. The oldest one attended an international school in Geneva from 1980 to 1989. The second and the third studied English and French at an international school in Beron from 1991 to 2001(Sindong-a, July 2001).
What is interesting is why Kim Jong Il let his sons study in Switzerland. Is there any possibility that there is some political connection between Kim Jong Il's Swiss-like armed neutrality and his sons' education there? Though it is hard to assume the real motives, a number of hypotheses can be made in this case.
First, it is well known that Swiss educational organizations' curriculum for foreign languages is very compatible for foreign students, especially in mastering French and German, which are used as the Swiss official languages, and English. In Switzerland, moreover, there are many international organizations where foreign languages are rigorously used.
Second, the security organizations of Switzerland are well known for providing bona-fide protection to foreigners. The banks of Switzerland are likely to keep secret individual deposits. These merits that are offered by Switzerland for foreigners are said to help the safe education of Kim Jong Il's sons.
Third, Switzerland is located at the center of Europe. Whenever Kim Jong Il's family had the opportunity to travel to Europe, Switzerland seemed to have been a center for his family's activities.
Based on the above factors, it may not be improbable to think that Kim Jong Il particularly selected Switzerland not only for his sons' foreign study and leadership in preparation for their future, but also in relation to his perspective on Swiss-like armed neutrality. This is not to say that their study in Switzerland will help them to understand the Swiss political system of permanent neutrality for their future leadership. If North Korea continues to pursue a foreign policy of Swiss-like armed neutrality in the future, North Korea might benefit from the Swiss model in becoming a neutral state.
V. Conclusion
The Korean Peninsula has been divided for more than a half century. Even though the question of Korean Peninsula's unification is one of the foremost issues for the Korean people, the past political leaders of South and North Koreas have shown that their attention to Korean unification has mainly been related to the maintenance of their regimes.
The unification policies of South and North Koreas are now at opposite poles to one another. The South favors a confederation system, while the North wants a federation. Though there is not so much difference between the two systems, the two Koreas are still standing far from one another because they do not try to understand the other's position.
In this political situation of the two Koreas, Kim Il Sung's proposal for the neutral unification of the Korean Peninsula and Kim Jong Il's view on the Swiss-like armed neutrality assume a critical meaning in the political process of Korea unification.
Kim Il Sung's proposal for the neutral unification policy and Kim Jong Il's perspectives on the Swiss-like armed neutrality are the first unification method that pushed the Korean Peninsula in the direction of neutral unification. Kim Il Sung's proposal for neutral unification was based on an offensive unification policy in order to absorb South Korea into the socialist system, while Kim Jong Il's armed neutrality seems closely related to the maintenance of his regime.
In order to apply Kim Il Sung's neutral unification and Kim Jong Il's Swiss-like armed neutrality on the Korean Peninsula, it is recommended that South Korea and the four powers should make an effort to achieve a neutral unification policy in Korea. So far, the positions of South Korea and the four powers concerning the neutrality of the Korean Peninsula are as follows:
Kim Dae-Jung, the former president of South Korea, said in June 1989 that after unification Korea would go to a permanent neutrality system along the model of Austria(Kim Dae-jung, 1994, 362).
In his letter to President Roh Moo Hyun, the Chief Justice, and the Speaker of the Assembly, Kang Y'ong-hun, the former Prime Minister and the Chairman of National Senior Association, recommended that the diplomatic and security policy of the Korean Peninsula in the future should follow permanent neutrality.
In the past, the United States was interested in South Korea's neutralization. John F. Dulles, Secretary of State of the United States, signed a plan of South Korean neutrality in June 1953, in preparation for the military armistice of the Korean War. He submitted it to the joint conference of the National Security Council. The Joint Chiefs of Staff did not accept Dulles' idea. They believed that if South Korea had become a neutral state, it would become a satellite nation of the Soviet Union(Hwang In-Kwan, 1986, 798-801).
Other American individuals who shared a similar position to Dulles' include General Albert Wedemyer, Senator Mike Mansfield, Professor Robert A. Scalapino, Professor Zbigniew Brezinski, Professor Gregory Henderson, Professor Edwin Reischauer, and journalist Selig S. Harrison(Ibid.; Yi Hong-dong et al trans, 2003, 526).
China wants the unified Korea to become neither a pro-American state nor a non-friendly state towards China, but prefers the withdrawal of the U.S. armed forces from South Korea as soon as possible. In a public survey, some 62 percent of the Chinese scholars who are experts on the Korean issues support Korean neutralized unification and the withdrawal of the U.S. armed forces from South Korea. Therefore, China might want the Korean Peninsula to experience a neutralized unification(Mun Su-on et al, 1998, 98).
Russia is also known as a supporter for the Korean Peninsula to be unified in neutrality. It estimates that if the Korean Peninsula were to become a permanent neutral state, no kind of foreign troops could be stationed in united Korea since reunification would be premised on the withdrawal of foreign troops(Ibid.).
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The above discussion indicates that the most related countries with immediate national interests in the unification of the Korean Peninsula are not unfamiliar with the neutrality of Korea. Therefore, the neutrality policy of North Korea will function positively for the unification of the two Koreas. If the North Korean government had strongly urged the neutral unification policy, its realization would have come sooner.
To realize its neutral unification policy initiated by North Korea, the government of South Korea should play a major role for the neutral unification of Korea. This means that the willingness of the South Korean people is more important than that of other countries. Since the South Korean government has maintained its diplomatic relations with the four powers, it should assume a more active role in convincing the four powers to sign a treaty for permanent neutrality for Korea. Moreover, South Korea is in a military alliance with the United States, which as exercised the most influence over the Korean Peninsula.
In considering the current internal and external situation in the Korean Peninsula, it is believed that the will of the South Korean people and their government is essential in bringing the neutral unification of Korea.
Kim Il Sung's proposal for the neutral unification of Korea is evaluated greatly because it was initiated by him for the unification of Korea. However, he did not mention the details for achieving neutral unification. For example, among the three approaches, simple neutrality, neutralization, and permanent neutrality, Kim Il Sung did not specify which one was a preferred method. Therefore, it is also a problematic proposition which needs to be explored further since a neutral state, by definition, is not automatically assured of immunity from neighboring countries' attacks and foreign aggression.
If he had an intention to absorb South Korea into the communist system with his neutral unification policy, it would not have helped to unify the Korean Peninsula. Moreover, if his idea were specifically aimed at unifying Korea under communism, his neutrality policy would have been rejected and would have been considered a cause for vigilance in South Korea.
III. Kim Jong Il's Swiss-like Armed Neutrality
1. Kim Jong Il's Perspective on the Korean Question
Kim M'yong-ch'ol(2001, 104) argues that Kim Jong Il likes to identify the root cause of Korea's problem from the gunboat diplomacy of the United States. The so-called 'Korean question' has emerged from the U.S. military policy towards the Korean Peninsula. To remove the cause is a prerequisite for a successful Korean settlement that will enable the Korean people to reassert Korean questions and live in peace.
Kim Jong Il offers the following three aspects regarding the Korean question(Ibid.):
First, the current issues between the North and the South are not an ideological conflict. They do not have fundamental causes to hate or fight one another. The main trouble is that South Korea is a vassal state of the United States, which is treating North Korea as its fundamental enemy. The United States still holds the right of wartime operational control over the South Korean armed forces.
Second, the United States is the main actor who divided the Korean Peninsula into North and South Koreas. It was a great mistake for the Korean people not to resist when the U.S. armed forces landed in South Korea just after World War II. The Korean question is still in a troubled situation because the South Korean people do not fight for the removal of the U.S. armed forces from South Korea.
Lastly, the Korean people with a strong sense of cultural pride should put an effort to settle their moral cores with the foreigners such as the Americans and the Japanese. In order to settle the Korean question, it needs to be in a way that would liberate the Korean people from their long-held sense of inferiority towards foreign countries. Their resentment can only be mollified when Korea has reunified independently and has become a sovereign nation in foreign policy and national defense without foreign military bases in the Korean Peninsula.
Kim Jong Il's perspective on the Korean question is, however, far from the current situation of Korea. He stresses that in an effort to achieve Korean unification, South and North Korea should suspend their calumny against each other. However, North Korea has criticized South Korea for a long time as a vassal of the United States, and has insisted on the withdrawal of the U.S. armed forces from South Korea.
Moreover, North Korea is likely to exclude South Korea from the U.S.-North Korea conference to settle directly the current nuclear issue even though it always emphasizes the necessity of close cooperation between the South and the North. It is analyzed that if North Korea had cooperated more closely with South Korea through inter-Korean collaboration in order to settle the current issues including the nuclear problem more smoothly, it would have gotten more economic assistance from South Korea than now and would have solved the nuclear issue far more efficiently in the negotiation with the U. S.
Kim Jong Il's argument in relation to the U.S. armed forces' immediate withdrawal from South Korea as a way of fulfilling the Korean unification is particularly aimed at the permanent retreat of the U. S. armed forces from South Korea. If he indeed wanted the Korean Peninsula to unify, he should have put his priority on dialogue with South Korea for the unification of the Korean Peninsula. The reason is that, once the Korean Peninsula is unified in neutrality, the U.S. armed forces would have to withdraw automatically from South Korea.
His argument on the withdrawal of the U.S. armed forces from Korea is believed to be false. When U. S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright visited P'yongyang on October 23rd, 2000, Kim Jong Il said that the U.S. armed forces stationed in South Korea plays an important role for the security of Northeast Asia(The Dong-a Ilbo on September 18, 2003). It can be said, therefore, that his argument requesting the withdrawal of the U.S. armed forces in South Korea hides his real purpose.
2. Kim Jong Il's Swiss-like Armed Neutrality
According to Kim M'yong-ch'ol(1996, 111-2), Kim Jong Il's perspective on solving the Korean questions is based on Swiss-like armed neutrality. In this regard, it is necessary to review the definition of 'armed neutrality' in order to understand Kim Jong Il's Swiss-like armed neutrality. As has been mentioned in the introduction, a state heading for neutrality can follow one of three approaches: simple neutrality, permanent neutrality, and non-alignment. In this case, regardless of the choice made by the state, it must not make any weapons to attack other countries. But it can develop any military weapons to defend itself from another country's attack.
Therefore, armed neutrality is defined as a neutral state which is equipped with any type of weapons necessary to defend itself from the attack of other countries. For example, Switzerland maintains a strong civil service system at the same level as the active duty soldiers.
Kim Jong Il believes that while South and North Koreas, born as the result of the cold war by the great powers, may have some alliances with them, nevertheless a unified Korea should not make any alliance with foreign countries. For instance, North Korea was once a military ally of Russia, and now it has a military alliance with China against the United States and Japan. On the other hand, South Korea is still maintaining a military alliance with the United States. However, a reunified Korea should not adopt any kind of military alliances that inclines it toward only one country (Ibid.).
Kim Jong Il also considers that the unified Korean Peninsula should maintain friendly relations with all the countries in the world through either a foreign policy based on Swiss-like armed neutrality or a non-nuclear policy. Kim Jong Il cites five considerations why the reunified Korea must maintain its foreign policy as a Swiss-like armed neutrality(Ibid.):
First, the demise of the Cold War regime must be officially declared in the Korean Peninsula. In order to end the Cold War regime in the Korean Peninsula, the reunified Korea should not have any particular need to form a military and political alliance with one country against another.
Second, the Korean people have a peace-loving tradition. In Korean history, the Korean people have never attacked foreign countries for aggressive purposes. They built their military forces only for defending themselves. Aggression and revanche are strangers to Koreans.
Third, South and North Koreas need to be free from war weariness. The Korean people have become weary of war, and have suffered for more than one hundred years from the end of the 19th century until the beginning of the 21st century at the hands of the Japanese and Americans. Now, it is time to take a respite and relish the peace. There is no reason to subject them to another trauma again.
Fourth, the geopolitical location of the Korean Peninsula makes it necessary for neutrality. Since the Korean Peninsula is surrounded by the world biggest four powers, Korea's decision to align with one particular country amongst the four would eventually bring forth greater risks in the interests of the other countries concerned. In this regard, the most effective action is to coordinate any possible conflict of interests.
Lastly, South and North Koreas have a sufficient defense potential. There is a sufficient defense capacity for the reunified Korea to be able to deter any would-be foreign military aggressors from attacking it. The North Korean Army(NKA) is equipped with defensive and offensive weapons that can strike any target in the remotest part of the world. Since the NKA and the South Korean Army will combine into a single deterrent, there will be no power vacuum created in the course of the withdrawal of the U.S. armed forces from South Korea.
The theory of Kim Jong Il's Swiss-like armed neutrality is more progressive than Kim Il Sung's neutral unification policy. Since becoming a permanent neutral state in 1815, Switzerland has never been attacked by neighboring countries. In consequence, Switzerland has been one of the countries with the highest income due to the savings in military defense expenditure.
Permanent neutrality is more effective in its validity than the simple neutrality. It is because the effectiveness of permanent neutrality continues either in peace or in war. It is possible to say that, therefore, Kim Jong Il's Swiss-like armed neutrality is closer to permanent neutrality than Kim Il Sung's simple neutrality.
It is necessary to review what differences there are between Kim Jong Il's Swiss-like armed neutrality and the Military First Policy(Son'gun chongch'i) of North Korea. Kim Jong-Il began to use the term "Military First Policy"(MFP) when he visited the 124th unit of the North Korean Army on January 1st 1995. The Rodong Sinmun daily, however, first used the term MFP much later on May 26th 1998(Pak Hyon-ok, 2001, 175-6).
The general concept of the MFP is that the military has priority, which emphasizes the role of the military forces before that of the Workers' Party and helps to secure the military power over the external and domestic ones in North Korea(The Rodong Sinmun, May 26th, 1998).
Chong Song-jang(2001, 88) believes that the special definition of the MFP is a political method, which has all the power of being able to unite the armed forces, the party, and the people for the national progressive movement towards the people's revolution and construction of North Korea.
In relation to the MFP, Kim Jong Il has increased his visits to the headquarters of military forces, specially treating them and maintaining his regime under the support of the armed forces. For example, among his fifty visits for on-the-spot guidance in 1996 he went to military camps a total of 37 times(74 percent), 67 percent in 1997, 70 percent in 1998, 59 percent in 1999, etc.(Ibid, 84).
It can be said that the MFP is one of the methods for internal rule in North Korea whereas Kim Jong Il's armed neutrality is a yardstick to measure the direction of North Korean foreign policy in the future. Though they seem to have little relation between them, they have some common factors. One is a means of currently maintaining Kim Jong Il's regime under the support of the North Korean armed forces, and the other is one of his concepts for the national survival of North Korean foreign policy based on the military power in the future.
IV. Studies on the Neutrality Policy of North Korean Scholars
1. Research on the Invalidation of Korea-Japan Annexation Treaty
There are a few North Korean Scholars who are currently working on the neutral unification policy of the Korean Peninsula. They are Yi Chong-h'yon, Chong Yong-nam, and Kim Kwan-gi, members of the North Korean Social Science Academy. They are hardly researching the neutral problems including something to find out the invalid cause of the 1910 Korea-Japan annexation agreement through the official diplomatic document of the permanent neutrality policy that was submitted by the Kojong(the 26th King of Yi Choson Dynasty) to the Japanese government in September 1903(The Choson Ilbo on February 8, 2001).
They attended the international conference on the 1910 Korea-Japan annexation treaty which was sponsored by Harvard University and held at the University of Hawaii on January 25th through 28th, 2001. In the argument of the North Korean scholars, the invalid cause of the 1910 Korea-Japan annexation treaty is as follows:
Kojong did not want his country to be annexed by Japan; on the contrary, he wanted a self-reliant independence from the intervention of Japan. If Kojong had wanted Korea to become a part of Japan, he would not have submitted the official diplomatic document in which Kojong asked Japan to help Korea in achieving its independence through the policy of permanent neutrality. In this context, it is easy to understand that Kojong was not a man who wanted Korea to be annexed by Japan, but who wanted to attain a true independence. Therefore, the 1910 Korea-Japan annexation treaty is entirely nullified(Yi Tae-jin, 2001).
It is remarkable for North Korean scholars to argue the invalidity of the 1910 Korea-Japan annexation treaty in light of the permanent neutral foreign policy which Kojong pursued. Therefore, it is especially urged that the scholars of South and North Koreas should find more primary sources and data to invalidate the 1910 Korea-Japan annexation treaty. To achieve this purpose, it is necessary for the South and North Korean scholars concerned to study on the 1910 Korea-Japan treaty by thorough textual research based on their close cooperation which is needed more than ever.
2. North Korea's Interest in Neutral Unification of the Korean Peninsula
The Russian Broadcasting System reported that North Korea has been considering neutral unification similar to that of Switzerland(The Naewe tongsin, January 20th 1998). In his interview with the Moscow Radio Broadcasting(MRB) on January 20th, 1998, Wain Dpacheko(spelling is not confirmed) said that in the past, the South Korean people argued strongly for permanent neutral unification of the Korean Peninsula like Switzerland, but now the North Korean people also believe that unified Korea should adopt a permanent neutrality for its foreign policy. Dpacheko further mentioned that South and North Korean scholars have not come to agreement on the political system of the unified Korea yet, but the North Korean scholars are seriously considering unified Korea as a permanent neutral state.
In 1961, the South Korean movement for permanent neutral unification was very popular because the South Korean people were able to take part freely in the social movement of Korean unification. For example, under the Chang M'yon government, a public opinion survey showed that a total of 32.1 percent of the South Korean people supported the neutralized unification of Korea(The Han'guk Ilbo, January 15th, 1961).
Dpacheko believes that a unified Korea could become either a friendly, neutral country with Russia or against it, but in considering the Russian position, it would be better for the Korean Peninsula to become a neutral state than a friendly state towards the United States. He argues that since Russia is located at the territorial boundary with the Korean Peninsula, Russia would like to see a unified Korea having no alliance with the United States.
After World War II, the Soviet Union provided the economic assistance to new and independent countries over the world in an effort to turn them into neutral states so as to prevent these states from becoming too friendly with the United States. Russia still prefers them to free themselves from the influence of the United States. In this context, Russia would like the Korean Peninsula to free itself from the United States influence. Therefore, Russia as well as China is anxious not to unify the Korean Peninsula into as a country friendly towards the United States(Kim Gab-ch'ol, 1979, 295-9).
3. Kim Jong Il's Sons and Their Education in Switzerland
Kim Jong Il has three sons; the oldest is Kim Chong-nam, the second is Kim Chong ch'ol, and the third is Kim Chong-wun. They each studied in Switzerland for more than 10 years. The oldest one attended an international school in Geneva from 1980 to 1989. The second and the third studied English and French at an international school in Beron from 1991 to 2001(Sindong-a, July 2001).
What is interesting is why Kim Jong Il let his sons study in Switzerland. Is there any possibility that there is some political connection between Kim Jong Il's Swiss-like armed neutrality and his sons' education there? Though it is hard to assume the real motives, a number of hypotheses can be made in this case.
First, it is well known that Swiss educational organizations' curriculum for foreign languages is very compatible for foreign students, especially in mastering French and German, which are used as the Swiss official languages, and English. In Switzerland, moreover, there are many international organizations where foreign languages are rigorously used.
Second, the security organizations of Switzerland are well known for providing bona-fide protection to foreigners. The banks of Switzerland are likely to keep secret individual deposits. These merits that are offered by Switzerland for foreigners are said to help the safe education of Kim Jong Il's sons.
Third, Switzerland is located at the center of Europe. Whenever Kim Jong Il's family had the opportunity to travel to Europe, Switzerland seemed to have been a center for his family's activities.
Based on the above factors, it may not be improbable to think that Kim Jong Il particularly selected Switzerland not only for his sons' foreign study and leadership in preparation for their future, but also in relation to his perspective on Swiss-like armed neutrality. This is not to say that their study in Switzerland will help them to understand the Swiss political system of permanent neutrality for their future leadership. If North Korea continues to pursue a foreign policy of Swiss-like armed neutrality in the future, North Korea might benefit from the Swiss model in becoming a neutral state.
V. Conclusion
The Korean Peninsula has been divided for more than a half century. Even though the question of Korean Peninsula's unification is one of the foremost issues for the Korean people, the past political leaders of South and North Koreas have shown that their attention to Korean unification has mainly been related to the maintenance of their regimes.
The unification policies of South and North Koreas are now at opposite poles to one another. The South favors a confederation system, while the North wants a federation. Though there is not so much difference between the two systems, the two Koreas are still standing far from one another because they do not try to understand the other's position.
In this political situation of the two Koreas, Kim Il Sung's proposal for the neutral unification of the Korean Peninsula and Kim Jong Il's view on the Swiss-like armed neutrality assume a critical meaning in the political process of Korea unification.
Kim Il Sung's proposal for the neutral unification policy and Kim Jong Il's perspectives on the Swiss-like armed neutrality are the first unification method that pushed the Korean Peninsula in the direction of neutral unification. Kim Il Sung's proposal for neutral unification was based on an offensive unification policy in order to absorb South Korea into the socialist system, while Kim Jong Il's armed neutrality seems closely related to the maintenance of his regime.
In order to apply Kim Il Sung's neutral unification and Kim Jong Il's Swiss-like armed neutrality on the Korean Peninsula, it is recommended that South Korea and the four powers should make an effort to achieve a neutral unification policy in Korea. So far, the positions of South Korea and the four powers concerning the neutrality of the Korean Peninsula are as follows:
Kim Dae-Jung, the former president of South Korea, said in June 1989 that after unification Korea would go to a permanent neutrality system along the model of Austria(Kim Dae-jung, 1994, 362).
In his letter to President Roh Moo Hyun, the Chief Justice, and the Speaker of the Assembly, Kang Y'ong-hun, the former Prime Minister and the Chairman of National Senior Association, recommended that the diplomatic and security policy of the Korean Peninsula in the future should follow permanent neutrality.
In the past, the United States was interested in South Korea's neutralization. John F. Dulles, Secretary of State of the United States, signed a plan of South Korean neutrality in June 1953, in preparation for the military armistice of the Korean War. He submitted it to the joint conference of the National Security Council. The Joint Chiefs of Staff did not accept Dulles' idea. They believed that if South Korea had become a neutral state, it would become a satellite nation of the Soviet Union(Hwang In-Kwan, 1986, 798-801).
Other American individuals who shared a similar position to Dulles' include General Albert Wedemyer, Senator Mike Mansfield, Professor Robert A. Scalapino, Professor Zbigniew Brezinski, Professor Gregory Henderson, Professor Edwin Reischauer, and journalist Selig S. Harrison(Ibid.; Yi Hong-dong et al trans, 2003, 526).
China wants the unified Korea to become neither a pro-American state nor a non-friendly state towards China, but prefers the withdrawal of the U.S. armed forces from South Korea as soon as possible. In a public survey, some 62 percent of the Chinese scholars who are experts on the Korean issues support Korean neutralized unification and the withdrawal of the U.S. armed forces from South Korea. Therefore, China might want the Korean Peninsula to experience a neutralized unification(Mun Su-on et al, 1998, 98).
Russia is also known as a supporter for the Korean Peninsula to be unified in neutrality. It estimates that if the Korean Peninsula were to become a permanent neutral state, no kind of foreign troops could be stationed in united Korea since reunification would be premised on the withdrawal of foreign troops(Ibid.).
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The above discussion indicates that the most related countries with immediate national interests in the unification of the Korean Peninsula are not unfamiliar with the neutrality of Korea. Therefore, the neutrality policy of North Korea will function positively for the unification of the two Koreas. If the North Korean government had strongly urged the neutral unification policy, its realization would have come sooner.
To realize its neutral unification policy initiated by North Korea, the government of South Korea should play a major role for the neutral unification of Korea. This means that the willingness of the South Korean people is more important than that of other countries. Since the South Korean government has maintained its diplomatic relations with the four powers, it should assume a more active role in convincing the four powers to sign a treaty for permanent neutrality for Korea. Moreover, South Korea is in a military alliance with the United States, which as exercised the most influence over the Korean Peninsula.
In considering the current internal and external situation in the Korean Peninsula, it is believed that the will of the South Korean people and their government is essential in bringing the neutral unification of Korea.
For South Korea to meet Kim Il Sung's neutral federation unification policy, the following actions are recommended:
First, South and North Koreas should select a hundred negotiators from each side, let them organize the confederation system of the Korean Peninsula and discuss unification methods such as the federation system of the North, the confederation system, or the neutral unification policy that Kim Il Sung had already proposed.
Second, South and North Koreas should operate a permanent organization such as 'South and North Korea Unification Promotion Committee' (SNKUPC) with a few working-level officials from the two Koreas and let them study everyday the political issues relating to the unification of the Korean Peninsula.
Third, in order to accelerate the unification process, the South Korean government, which is in a better position both politically and economically than North Korea, should take the initiative in creating a unification method that would benefit the South and the North as well as the four powers.
Lastly, the South Korean government should persuade the United States to make an effort for the unification of the Korean Peninsula since the U.S. was a main actor who divided it into the two Koreas.
There is a full possibility for the Korean Peninsula to realize its neutralized unification if the peoples of South and North Koreas strongly urge it on the four great powers.
Therefore, the South Korean government should take a positive measure to meet the proposal for the neutral unification policy of North Korea.
ABSTRACT
The purpose of this paper is to review and evaluate the neutral unification policy of North Korea, and to seek its possible application to the unification of the Korean Peninsula.
Kim Il Sung, the former president of North Korea, proposed three times for the neutral unification of the Korean Peninsula to South Korea on the condition that the two Korean governments should not join in political and military alliances with the foreign countries or in any blocs of the world in October 1980, October 1985, and April 1993.
Then, Kim Jong Il, Chairman of the North Korean National Defense Commission, is also known as having expressed his view of Korea's unification in the Swiss-like armed neutrality.
It is analyzed that Kim Il Sung's proposal was based on an offensive unification policy in order to conform South Korea into the socialistic system whereas Kim Jong Il's armed neutrality seems to have the maintenance of his regime.
North Korean scholars like to argue the invalidity of the 1910 Korea-Japan annexation treaty in light of the permanent neutral foreign policy which Kojong pursued. It is necessary for the South and North Korean scholars concerned to study on the 1910 Korea-Japan annexation treaty by thorough textual research based on their close cooperation which is needed more than ever.
If the Korean Peninsula were to be unified in a neutral state as Kim Il Sung's proposal, it is most unlikely that Korea could avoid foreign aggressions after its unification in a form of neutral state as the Korean history has shown.
The people of South and North Korea should critically consider the neutralized unification of the Korean Peninsula, and strongly urge it to the four powers, the U.S., China, Russia, and Japan.
Bibliography
Black, Cyril E., Richard A. Falk et al. (1968) Neutralization and World Politics. New Jersey. Princeton University Press.
Ch'oe, Bo-sik (1998) Kim Jong Il gwa Chang Sae-dongui bimilhoedam (The Secret Dialogues between Kim Il Sung and Chang Sae-dong). Walgan Choson (Monthly Magazine Choson). Seoul. Choson Ilbosa.
Choson Ilbosa (2003) Walgan Choson (Monthly Magazine Choson). (March).
Chong, Song-jang (2001) Kim Jong Ilui son'gun chongch'aek: I'nyomgwa chongch'aekui hamui. H'yondae Bukhan yon'gu (Kim Jong Il's Military First Policy: The Ideological and Policy Consensus). Seoul. K'yongnam daehagg'yo ch'ulpansa.
Dong-a Ilbosa (2001) Walgan Sindong-a. (July).
Hong, Chong-p'yo (trans) (1988) Chungniphwa tongillon (The Theory of Neutralized Unification). Seoul. Sin'gu muwhasa.
Hwang, In-kwan (1980) The Neutralized Unification of Korea. Cambridge. Schenkman Publishing Co.
____ (1986) The 1953 U.S. Initiative for Korean Neutralization. Korea and World Affairs: A Quarterly Review. 10 (4) (Winter). (pp. 798-826).
____ (1987) One Korea via Permanent Neutrality. Cambridge. Schenkman Books Inc.
(1990) The United States and Neutral Reunited Korea: Search for A New Basis of American Strategy. Lanham ML. University Press of America, Inc.
Kang, Kwang-sik (1987) Kukje ch'aegaeui saeryok kwanri bang'anurosochungniphwa'ae kwanhan yon'gu: Hanbandoae chokyong kanungsong mosaekgwa kwalr'yonhaeso (A Study on Neutralization of the Methodof Balance of Power in the International System: Exploring the Possible Application to the Korean Peninsula). Unpublished. dissertation, Kyong Hee University.
Kim, Dae-jung (1994) Naui kil naui sasang(My Way and My Thought). Seoul. Han'gilsa.
Kim, Gab-ch'ol (1979) Kangdaegukgwa Hanbando: Sagang ch'aejewa Han'guk tong'il (The Great Powers and the Korean Peninsula: the Four Power System and Korea Unification). Seoul. Ilsinsa.
Kim, M'yong-ch'ol (2001) Kim Jong Il's Perspectives on the Korean Question. The Brown Journal of World Affairs. VIII (1) (Winter/Spring) (pp. 103-113).
Kim, Nak-jung and Ro, Jung-son (1989) H'yondan'gae chaetong'il bang'an (Several Unification Methods at Current Stage). Seoul. Hanbegsa.
Kim, N'yon-kwang (2001) Kim Jong-Ilui ch'yo Ko Yong-hui. Wolgan Choson. Seoul. Choson Ilbosa (April).
Mun, Su-on et al. (1998) International Politics of Korean Unification and Multilateral Security Cooperation in Northeast Asia. in The Korean Journal of International Relations. 37 (3) (pp. 77-115).
Ro, Jung-son (1996) nyonp'yo: Nambukhan tong'il chongch'aekgwa tong'ilwundong osimnyon (The Fifty Years of Unification Policy and the Movement of South and North Korea). Seoul. Sagaejol.
O, Ki-p'yong (1976) Kaehang baegnyon: Hanbando chungniphwa anui yogsajok non'gowa bunsok (The Hundred Years of Open Door Policy). Korean Political Science Review. 10 (pp. 275-292).
Pak, H'yon-ok (2001) Son'gun chongch'iwa kunsa cholyak (Military First Politics and Military Strategy). North Korea. (April).
The Choson Ilbo (2001) Choson yon'gam (The Choson Year Book). Seoul. Choson ilbosa.
The Dong-a Ilbo (2003) (September 18th).
The Han'guk Ilbo (1961) (January 15th).
The Naewae tongsin (1998) (January 20th).
The Rodong sinmun (1998) (May 26th).
The Sindong-a (2001) (July).
Yi, Hong-dong et al trans (2003) Korean Endgame. Seoul. Samin.
Yi, Tae-jin (2001) Ilbonui Han'guk hapb'yong muh'yo (The Nullification of Japanese Annexation to Korea). The Choson Ilbo. (February 8th).
Yun, Yong-mu (2000) Kim Jong Il ui tongil cholyak (Kim Jong Il's Unification Strategy). Seoul. Sallimto.
First, South and North Koreas should select a hundred negotiators from each side, let them organize the confederation system of the Korean Peninsula and discuss unification methods such as the federation system of the North, the confederation system, or the neutral unification policy that Kim Il Sung had already proposed.
Second, South and North Koreas should operate a permanent organization such as 'South and North Korea Unification Promotion Committee' (SNKUPC) with a few working-level officials from the two Koreas and let them study everyday the political issues relating to the unification of the Korean Peninsula.
Third, in order to accelerate the unification process, the South Korean government, which is in a better position both politically and economically than North Korea, should take the initiative in creating a unification method that would benefit the South and the North as well as the four powers.
Lastly, the South Korean government should persuade the United States to make an effort for the unification of the Korean Peninsula since the U.S. was a main actor who divided it into the two Koreas.
There is a full possibility for the Korean Peninsula to realize its neutralized unification if the peoples of South and North Koreas strongly urge it on the four great powers.
Therefore, the South Korean government should take a positive measure to meet the proposal for the neutral unification policy of North Korea.
ABSTRACT
The purpose of this paper is to review and evaluate the neutral unification policy of North Korea, and to seek its possible application to the unification of the Korean Peninsula.
Kim Il Sung, the former president of North Korea, proposed three times for the neutral unification of the Korean Peninsula to South Korea on the condition that the two Korean governments should not join in political and military alliances with the foreign countries or in any blocs of the world in October 1980, October 1985, and April 1993.
Then, Kim Jong Il, Chairman of the North Korean National Defense Commission, is also known as having expressed his view of Korea's unification in the Swiss-like armed neutrality.
It is analyzed that Kim Il Sung's proposal was based on an offensive unification policy in order to conform South Korea into the socialistic system whereas Kim Jong Il's armed neutrality seems to have the maintenance of his regime.
North Korean scholars like to argue the invalidity of the 1910 Korea-Japan annexation treaty in light of the permanent neutral foreign policy which Kojong pursued. It is necessary for the South and North Korean scholars concerned to study on the 1910 Korea-Japan annexation treaty by thorough textual research based on their close cooperation which is needed more than ever.
If the Korean Peninsula were to be unified in a neutral state as Kim Il Sung's proposal, it is most unlikely that Korea could avoid foreign aggressions after its unification in a form of neutral state as the Korean history has shown.
The people of South and North Korea should critically consider the neutralized unification of the Korean Peninsula, and strongly urge it to the four powers, the U.S., China, Russia, and Japan.
Bibliography
Black, Cyril E., Richard A. Falk et al. (1968) Neutralization and World Politics. New Jersey. Princeton University Press.
Ch'oe, Bo-sik (1998) Kim Jong Il gwa Chang Sae-dongui bimilhoedam (The Secret Dialogues between Kim Il Sung and Chang Sae-dong). Walgan Choson (Monthly Magazine Choson). Seoul. Choson Ilbosa.
Choson Ilbosa (2003) Walgan Choson (Monthly Magazine Choson). (March).
Chong, Song-jang (2001) Kim Jong Ilui son'gun chongch'aek: I'nyomgwa chongch'aekui hamui. H'yondae Bukhan yon'gu (Kim Jong Il's Military First Policy: The Ideological and Policy Consensus). Seoul. K'yongnam daehagg'yo ch'ulpansa.
Dong-a Ilbosa (2001) Walgan Sindong-a. (July).
Hong, Chong-p'yo (trans) (1988) Chungniphwa tongillon (The Theory of Neutralized Unification). Seoul. Sin'gu muwhasa.
Hwang, In-kwan (1980) The Neutralized Unification of Korea. Cambridge. Schenkman Publishing Co.
____ (1986) The 1953 U.S. Initiative for Korean Neutralization. Korea and World Affairs: A Quarterly Review. 10 (4) (Winter). (pp. 798-826).
____ (1987) One Korea via Permanent Neutrality. Cambridge. Schenkman Books Inc.
(1990) The United States and Neutral Reunited Korea: Search for A New Basis of American Strategy. Lanham ML. University Press of America, Inc.
Kang, Kwang-sik (1987) Kukje ch'aegaeui saeryok kwanri bang'anurosochungniphwa'ae kwanhan yon'gu: Hanbandoae chokyong kanungsong mosaekgwa kwalr'yonhaeso (A Study on Neutralization of the Methodof Balance of Power in the International System: Exploring the Possible Application to the Korean Peninsula). Unpublished. dissertation, Kyong Hee University.
Kim, Dae-jung (1994) Naui kil naui sasang(My Way and My Thought). Seoul. Han'gilsa.
Kim, Gab-ch'ol (1979) Kangdaegukgwa Hanbando: Sagang ch'aejewa Han'guk tong'il (The Great Powers and the Korean Peninsula: the Four Power System and Korea Unification). Seoul. Ilsinsa.
Kim, M'yong-ch'ol (2001) Kim Jong Il's Perspectives on the Korean Question. The Brown Journal of World Affairs. VIII (1) (Winter/Spring) (pp. 103-113).
Kim, Nak-jung and Ro, Jung-son (1989) H'yondan'gae chaetong'il bang'an (Several Unification Methods at Current Stage). Seoul. Hanbegsa.
Kim, N'yon-kwang (2001) Kim Jong-Ilui ch'yo Ko Yong-hui. Wolgan Choson. Seoul. Choson Ilbosa (April).
Mun, Su-on et al. (1998) International Politics of Korean Unification and Multilateral Security Cooperation in Northeast Asia. in The Korean Journal of International Relations. 37 (3) (pp. 77-115).
Ro, Jung-son (1996) nyonp'yo: Nambukhan tong'il chongch'aekgwa tong'ilwundong osimnyon (The Fifty Years of Unification Policy and the Movement of South and North Korea). Seoul. Sagaejol.
O, Ki-p'yong (1976) Kaehang baegnyon: Hanbando chungniphwa anui yogsajok non'gowa bunsok (The Hundred Years of Open Door Policy). Korean Political Science Review. 10 (pp. 275-292).
Pak, H'yon-ok (2001) Son'gun chongch'iwa kunsa cholyak (Military First Politics and Military Strategy). North Korea. (April).
The Choson Ilbo (2001) Choson yon'gam (The Choson Year Book). Seoul. Choson ilbosa.
The Dong-a Ilbo (2003) (September 18th).
The Han'guk Ilbo (1961) (January 15th).
The Naewae tongsin (1998) (January 20th).
The Rodong sinmun (1998) (May 26th).
The Sindong-a (2001) (July).
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