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From Miracle to Mirage: The Making and Unmaking of the Korean Middle Class, 1960-2015
by
Myungji Yang (Author) Format: Hardcover
CONTENTS
List of Illustrations
Acknowledgments
Introduction
1. An Imagined Middle Class
2. The Rise of "Gangnam Style"
3. The Betrayed Dream of the Korean Middle Class, 1997-2015
Conclusion
Notes
References
Index
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
It feels unreal to finally finish a book and to write the acknowledgments. While I spent numerous solitary hours reading through archival materials at libraries and writing in front of the computer screen, this book would have not been completed without much guidance, support, and advice from my mentors, colleagues, and friends. During this process, I have accumulated numerous debts to many people.
This book started at Brown University, an extraordinary intellectual community where I learned comparative thinking, careful research design, and respect for theory and practice. First of all, I am deeply indebted to my mentor Patrick Heller, whose enthusiasm for democracy and social justice, intellectual rigor, and critical thinking greatly influenced my intellectual growth. I could not ask for a more patient, generous, and supportive advisor. He read every chapter of the original draft with care and interest and always encouraged me to draw a big picture. I am also grateful to other mentors who helped to sharpen my ideas and gave unfailing support over time: Jose Itzigsohn, Melani Cammett, Jim Mahoney, John Logan, and Richard Snyder. I have been fortunate to have amazing peers and friends who read my work, discussed it over coffee, and shared insights, as well as provided moral support, including Sinem Adar, Erin Beck, Julia Drew, Chris Gibson, Esther Hernandez-Medina, Adriana Lopez, Shruti Mamjudar, Holly Reed, Gabriela Sanchez-Soto, and Laura Senier. Special thanks to Jen Costanza, Sukriti Issar, and Celso Villegas, who have provided both intellectual and moral support over the years when needed.
A new intellectual home, the University of Hawai'i, Manoa, has been a great place to be an Asianist/Koreanist. I am extremely lucky to have great colleagues and friends in this intellectual community. I would like to thank Hoku Aikau, Petrice Flowers, Vernadette Gonzalez, Hagen Koo, Nevi Soguk, Manfred Steger, and Sankaran Krishna, who read parts of my manuscript and provided constructive feedback. I am also grateful to Manfred Henningsen and Ehito Kimura for their encouragement and generosity. A writing group for the first two years at UH was a great source of inspiration, both in the early stages of the manuscript and afterward. I thank Jennifer Darrah, Joyce Mariano, and Colin Moore for their timely comments and comradeship.
I had the luxury of spending a year working on my manuscript at the Korean Studies Institute, University of Southern California, in 2015-16. Thanks to a generous postdoctoral fellowship through the Academy of Korean Studies, I could commit myself to revising my manuscript without the burden of teaching and administrative work. I would like to express my sincere gratitude to David Kang for his intellectual and professional guidance. KSI also hosted a book workshop for me, which gave me the opportunity to clarify my argument and to refine the entire manuscript. I owe a great deal to Stephan Haggard and Laura Nelson, who served as reviewers at the workshop, carefully read the entire manuscript, and gave valuable suggestions. Daisy Kim and Hannah Lim, two other postdoctoral fellows at KSI, were great company, and not only provided constructive feedback on the manuscript but also made a year in LA less lonely. Our writing retreat to Palm Springs was memorable. I also thank Linda Kim, Gloria Koo, and Sarah Shear, who provided institutional support and made the Ahn House more enjoyable.
Numerous individuals helped me to make this book better along the way. For thoughtful comments and critical insights, I thank the late Nancy Abelmann, Nicole Constable, Nicholas Harkness, Junhee Kwon, Yoonkyung Lee, Eileen Otis, Saeyoung Park, Jaeyoun Won, and Sharon Yoon. Two anonymous reviewers for Cornell University Press gave incredibly detailed and sharp comments. Juyoung Lee, Haewon Moon, and Seungwoo Chin helped me present professional-looking maps and gave important advice on reading quantitative data. Jiyeon Lee and Miyoung Lee were always reliable friends whom I could ask to scan and send primary sources that I needed urgently. Jaehoon Bae also helped compile the references. I am deeply grateful for their time and critical input. I am also indebted to my mentor back in Korea, Dongno Kim, who taught me the importance of time and history in the social sciences and shaped my perspectives on Korean society.
This book would not have been possible without generous institutional support from the UH Center for Korean Studies, the UH College of Social Sciences, the Core University Program for Korean Studies through the Academy of Korean Studies at both UH and USC, Brown University, and the Watson Institute for Public and International Affairs for funding for research trips and editorial assistance. My appreciation also goes to the Institute for Social Development at Yonsei University, which allowed me to affiliate with it and to use its library resources. I also benefited greatly from participating in workshops and conferences, which helped to crystallize key ideas in the book. I would especially like to thank the participants in the 2009 SSRC Korean Studies Dissertation Workshop, the 2014 SSRC Korean Studies Junior Faculty Workshop, and a 2016 workshop on the middle classes at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. An early version of chapter 1 appeared in Sociological Inquiry's August 2012 issue under the title "The Making of the Urban Middle Class in South Korea (1961-1979): Nation-Building, Discip-line, and the Birth of the Ideal National Subjects." The book benefited from the input of the journal's anonymous reviewers.
Roger Haydon at Cornell University Press has patiently nurtured this project with great faith in my work. I could not ask for a better editor to work with; his prompt responses and strong support made the process of completing the book much smoother. Gary Ashwill and Colin Ong-Dean, two fabulous professional editors, read multiple drafts of the manuscript and made the best out of my writing.
Thanks to incredible groups of friends in both Korea and the United States, the long writing process was less burdensome. The conversations over coffee, dinners, and drinks were always lively, delightful, and encouraging. Deep gratitude goes to the Aikaus (my three angels, Sanoe, Imai, and Tita), Eunjin Cho, Minhyo Cho, Gru Han, Manfred Henningsen, Yangsook Jeon, Hyosun Kim, Jiyeon Lee, Miyoung Lee, Colin Moore, Sunmi Park, Hyera Shin, and Eunhye Yoo. Thank you for your friendship and your faith in me. Special thanks to Eunhye Yoo for helping me recruit interviewees during my fieldwork. I would also like to extend my gratitude to Korean hiking group members in Hawai'i, Kyungim Baik, Taeung Baik, Kyung Hee Cheon, Hojong Do, Seunghye Hong, Jiyoung Kim, Yangsun Kim, Sang-hyop Lee, and Young-A Park.
This book would not have been completed without the openness and generosity of many individuals who shared their personal stories with a stranger. Although I cannot name all of them because they appear in the book under pseudonyms, their contributions are enormous. I deeply appreciate their time and insights.
Lastly, my family helped me get through this arduous process. To my only and younger sister Hyunjung, thank you for your unwavering faith and confidence in me. This book was also inspired by my parents, who experienced struggles similar to those of the downwardly mobile middle class who are the protagonists of this book. As middle-class Koreans, they made sacrifices for their children's success, endured difficult times with hope and optimism, and taught us how to maintain our integrity. I dedicate this book to my parents as a small tribute to their hopes and dreams.
Notes on Romanization and Translation
All Korean words have been romanized according to the McCune-Reischauer system; exceptions are proper nouns, such as Korean people's names and geograph-ical names such as Gangnam. For Korean names, I generally put the given name first. The exceptions are famous political figures such as Park Chung Hee and Kim Dae Jung. But I use Syngman Rhee instead of Rhee Syngman because the former is more familiar in English and much of the West. All translations from Korean to English are mine.
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INTRODUCTION
The State, Development, and the (Un) Making of the Middle Class
After working for two decades as a midlevel manager for a big corporation, Mr. Kim was suddenly forced to retire in 2008. In his early fifties and casting about for options, he found himself unexpectedly embarking on a new career: he opened a small fried chicken restaurant in his neighborhood. Investing all his money, including his retirement and savings, and using his home as collateral for loans, he hoped that this small business would help him to retire comfort-ably. Contrary to his expectations, he now finds he has to scramble just to make ends meet. A sudden proliferation of fried chicken restaurants near his own significantly lowered the sales of his restaurant. Even though he and his wife work sixteen hours a day and take only one day off a month, after paying the rent and other bills they make barely two thousand dollars a month. Extremely concerned and stressed about their decreasing income, he has thought about closing the restaurant a number of times, but he does not have any alternatives. Twenty years ago, when he first got the corporate job that seemed to promise him everything, he never imagined he would face such a challenge at this point in his life. Instead of looking forward to a secure retirement, he now worries about his increasing debts.
Mr. Kim's story is not an uncommon one these days in South Korea (hereafter Korea, unless specified). After the economic crisis of the late 1990s, opening a small business such as a restaurant, convenience store, or coffee shop became a popular solution for baby boomers in their fifties or sixties who had been forced to retire from big corporations. Yet due to extreme competition and low sales, more than half of these small businesses fail within three years, and 70 percent go out of business within five (KB Research Institute 2012). Small business owners in Korea are almost forced to stake everything they have in starting a business, a bet that can lead to dangerous outcomes for themselves and others.
Currently, many Korean citizens are experiencing downward mobility, and the gap between haves and have-nots is growing. Since the economic crisis in 1997, the socioeconomic landscape in Korea has been completely overturned; the virtual lifetime employment and ever-increasing wages, based on seniority, that had supported stable middle-class lifestyles for many years are no longer widely available. Instead, many corporate employees are forced to retire in their forties or fifties, while younger generations have a hard time finding decent jobs and are forced to make do with irregular employment, low pay, and no benefits. Because Korea has an almost nonexistent social safety net and a severely constricted job market, young Koreans have limited chances for upward social mobility, while middle-aged citizens like Mr. Kim are thrust into working for themselves after forced early retirement. Membership in the middle class, a symbol of social and economic possibility and confidence in the 1970s and 1980s, is now a challenging status to maintain and is increasingly characterized by heightened anxiety and frustration. Many Koreans perceive their standard of living as having deteriorated, and belief in the chances of upward mobility is declining. Indeed, fewer and fewer identify themselves as members of the middle class (Korean National Statistics Office 2011), and those who believe that they belong to the middle class are anxious about their future financial situation. "Class polarization" (yanggük'wa) and "the collapse of the middle class" (chungsanch'ung mollak) have become media buzzwords in Korea. The decline of the middle class as a major social force has emerged as a serious concern among news media, politicians, and academics.
Economic indicators illustrate the growth of the squeezed middle class and rising social inequality. Official statistics show that the size of the Korean middle class as an income-based group (defined as those earning 50-150 percent of the median income) has declined by almost 10 percent, from 75.4 percent of the population in 1990 to 67.5 percent in 2010 (Korean National Statistics Office 2011). As the size of the middle class wanes, the overall picture of inequality becomes worse: the relative income of the middle class has declined, and the income disparity between the upper and middle classes has increased since the late 1990s (J. Lee 2015). At the same time, social inequality indices such as the Gini coefficient, relative income poverty statistics, and measurements of the top 10 percent versus the bottom 10 percent have all shown inequality significantly increasing over time. Yet changes in the economic landscape are not limited to statistics; the deteriorating economic conditions have translated into negative and pessimistic views and belief systems among ordinary citizens. For example, in 2009, 90.2 percent of surveyed Koreans agreed that income disparities in Korea are substantial (T. Lee 2015, 96). Furthermore, the majority of citizens are pessimistic about the prospect of upward mobility. More than 80 percent of people between the ages of twenty and fifty believe that it will be impossible to achieve upward mobility no matter how hard they try. And Koreans are more pessimistic about the future of their children's generation than citizens of China or Southeast Asian countries: 68 percent of Koreans believe that their children will have more difficulty becoming successful than they did, whereas only 38 per-cent of Chinese agree with the same statement ("An toel kõya ama, ibon saengae năn" 2015, 46-47).
Korean society is certainly not alone in witnessing a shrinking of the middle class and increasing social inequality. This phenomenon has become more common and widespread on a global scale. The global economic crisis has worsened ordinary citizens' standards of living by accelerating unemployment, pov-erty, and social inequality. The model of middle-class society and social inclusion in North America and Europe during the post-World War II period is in crisis. The US media have told us a story of the disappearing middle class: with the 2008 financial crisis, many middle-class families lost their jobs and homes, and increasing costs for housing, medical care, and college tuition have made the lives of many more challenging. Politicians have wooed their constituencies with a promise of the recovery of the middle class, yet it seems that for many the comfortable middle-class lifestyle is long gone, due in part to a shortage of good job opportunities. Despite the economic recovery after the crisis, US society is experiencing ever-increasing income disparity between the rich and the rest of the population. European countries are facing similar challenges to varying degrees across countries. While the European welfare state model has been believed to be stronger than the US model, income inequality in Europe has been rising, and stagnant wages and curtailed welfare provision threaten the well-being of the middle class. The growing popularity of the radical right and their winning of elections in Europe, including but not limited to France, Hungary, and Austria, while complicated, can be seen as a social backlash against immigrants and supporters of the European Union by those who have experienced economic deteri-oration and felt deprived of opportunities. Korea's neighbor Japan is not much better off. After the economic bubble burst in the early 1990s, Japanese society saw the decline of the middle class and a similar pattern of socioeconomic polarization. As Japanese corporations began to downsize and restructure their businesses in response to economic recession, lifetime employment was no longer the norm, and the flexible labor regime created low-paid, part-time workforce. Beginning in the 1990s, many Japanese youth entering employment as contract or temporary workers have subsequently been labeled "the lost generation"-a generation that is trapped in a bad economy and suffers from economic hardship and a sense of insecurity. Prevailing economic precarity and lack of social protection caused new social problems such as declining marriage, low birthrates, and increasing poverty and crime. In the midst of economic recession, the struggles of ordinary citizens to make ends meet are a familiar story.
It is common everywhere that many middle-class families experience a stagnant standard of living, while their children have a hard time maintaining the lifestyle and social status their parents had. The decline or collapse of the middle class in developed countries has often been explained by globalization and neo-liberal economic restructuring (Frank 2007; Newman [1988] 1999; Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook 2000; Zunz, Schoppa, and Hiwatari 2002). The movement of white-collar jobs from developed countries to places like China and India, corporate restructuring, retrenchment of welfare benefits, and rising costs of living all combine to increase the economic burdens on the shoulders of middle-class citizens and to increase their suffering. While it is important to understand how these changes after the economic crisis have led to the economic deterioration of the middle class in Korea, this perspective misses how particular domestic fac-tors, such as housing and education, have affected the lived experience and collective identity of the middle class.
The waning and suffering of the Korean middle class are more striking and dramatic because of the prevalence of images depicting its dazzling economic success and achievements. As one of the Four Asian Tigers, Korea has been taken as the most exemplary case for other developing countries, having transformed itself from a poor, war-shattered nation into one of the world's most successful economies within a mere generation. Explosive growth for three consecutive decades lifted the majority of the population out of absolute poverty, and it was not uncommon in the 1970s and 1980s to see the children of poor peasants
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attain comfortable middle-class lifestyles. In 1987 the country's authoritarian regime was overthrown by popular protests, and Korea became a democracy. Now a member of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Korea has joined the ranks of high-income, developed nations, as Korean corporations such as Samsung and Hyundai produce some of the best-selling cell phones and cars in the global economy. In addition, the entertainment industry in Korea, with the rise of the Korean Wave (hallyu), now makes huge profits by exporting K-pop (Korean popular music), soap operas, and movies to neighboring China and Southeast Asia and throughout the world. As of 2012, K-pop was a US$235 million industry (Korea Times 11/4/2013). In 1960, GDP per capita was US$156 (current US dollars), whereas it was US$27,222 in 2015. Korea's GDP per capita in 1960 was similar to that of Ghana or the Congo and much below that of the Philippines, but five decades later Korea had become the thirteenth largest economy in the world. For many scholars and commentators, Korea has seemed to be an ideal case of achieving both economic development and democracy.
This perception of Korea's miraculous transformation has shaped academic discourse on the nation's development. Many scholars have focused on explaining how Korea achieved this unprecedented economic development, overcoming adverse conditions such as its lack of natural resources and its unstable geopolitical situation. They argue that exceptionally successful, large-scale economic transformations in Korea (and also in East Asia) were made possible by the well-organized, efficient developmental state with a capable bureaucracy and effective policy implementation (Amsden 1989; Chibber 2003; Evans 1995; Kohli 2004; Woo-Cumings 1999). Korea's high economic growth and material prosperity, in turn, enabled the growth of the Korean middle class as a social backbone. Comprising massive armies of white-collar workers, corporate managers, and engineers in large conglomerates, the Korean middle class was provided with high wages, job security, and consumer lifestyles. By the late 1980s, the Korean middle class had become the dominant social force and played a crucial role in the democratic transition (Koo 1991; Villegas and Yang 2013). Many members of the Korean middle class were born to unprivileged backgrounds, but hard work and education enabled them to get decent jobs and to climb the economic ladder. The tale of the Korean middle class and its upward mobility is paralleled by the tale of the Korean nation as a whole-a change from a backward, agricultural, completely undeveloped country smothered by Japanese colonialism and torn by the Korean War to a strong player in the global economy. This inspiring story of the "miracle on the Han River" told by most scholars becomes quite puzzling, however, when one hears about the daily struggles that the current Korean middle class faces. This book tackles the puzzle of why the celebrated middle class of developed Korea has entered a period of decline. Why, in this age of prosperity, is Korean society experiencing a large-scale decline of the middle class? Why is household debt growing rapidly, and why are ordinary middle-class citizens losing their grip on the comfortable lifestyle they thought they had earned? What are the political economic dynamics that have exacerbated the lives of the middle class? Why does it feel more difficult to achieve and sustain a middle-class life-style now? And what are the broader social and political implications of the shrinking of the middle class?
The goal of this book is to explain why the Korean middle class is where it is now: first, by describing historical processes that triggered the current condi-tions faced by the Korean middle class; second, by offering a new account of the practices that constituted urban middle-class life; and third, by demonstrating how the notion of the middle class has changed over time. Throughout this book, I examine the origin, process, and outcome of middle-class formation along with Korean capitalist development-from ideological construct to mainstream actuality, and from the rise of comfortable lifestyles to a decline into a precarious existence. I look at the rapid, large-scale social transformations resulting in the making and unmaking of the middle class that took place in Korea within just a couple of generations, from the 1960s to the end of the 1990s and beyond. By demonstrating who has become the middle class and how, and how the rules of the game have changed over the past five decades, I seek to explain why the seemingly successful and progressive state project of building a middle-class society resulted in such an unexpected and unintended outcome. This book argues that the current conditions that the Korean middle class faces-its overall economic deterioration and its heightened level of status anxiety-can be understood only by looking at the historical trajectory of the middle class: the particular ways in which the Korean middle class was formed, both speculative and exclusive, have shaped the condition of the middle class and the pattern of social inequality in the long run.
Many of the first generation of the Korean middle class acquired their wealth by purchasing homes and gaining hefty benefits from skyrocketing real estate prices. In the midst of an overheated property market, those who invested in real estate were able to climb the social class ladder, leaving others behind. The success of profit making and upward mobility through real estate investment had a lot to do with simple luck. Some entrepreneurial people knew where to invest, which would bring them substantial income, but many families bought homes in booming areas by pure chance. Those who happened to own real estate in booming areas could get further ahead of others with similar household incomes and occupations who bought property somewhere else sometimes acquir-ing three or four times more wealth due to differential increases in real estate prices.
This book also views the process of middle-class formation as exclusive in two different ways. First, only certain groups of people could be the beneficiaries of state policies, and in particular the housing system. In a tight housing market, income-eligible people, mostly white-collar families, could apply for new, affordable apartment units in newly developing areas. Second, upwardly mobile social groups tried to nurture their own distinctive communities and culture and to prevent outsiders from gaining access to their networks and rationed benefits. By forming closed social networks and sharing information exclusively among themselves about schooling or investment opportunities, the upwardly mobile could perpetuate their privilege.
The speculative and exclusive process of middle-class formation contradicts a widely accepted depiction of the middle class as based on open membership and class mobility through merit and hard work during periods of high economic growth. This exclusionary process of selecting economic winners produced a corresponding sense of unfairness and frustration among those who did not benefit from the system-a feeling that the actual rules of the game were unfair and defective. By looking at the process by which economic winners were selected and, in turn, perpetuated their privilege over the long term, this book offers a story of the reality behind the myth of middle-class formation and the economic miracle in Korea and reveals the contradictory and contested nature of Korean development.
Why the Korean Middle Class?
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As far back as Aristotle, scholars have paid attention to the critical role of the middle class in social and political changes. The middle class has been considered variously as a carrier of economic and political modernization (Huntington 1968; Lipset 1959) or as a coalitional actor for political transformations (Luebbert 1991; Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens 1992). As countries industrialize and urbanize, the middle class emerges, expands, and becomes the social and cultural mainstream. For the government and politicians, the growth of the middle class is the basis of social and political stability, mitigating class tensions and promoting social cohesion. The expansion of the middle class exemplifies the material improvement of overall living standards for ordinary citizens. Thus, the growth and welfare of the middle class are linked to political legitimacy in important ways. For the business and corporate sectors, the rise of the middle class represents enhanced spending power and consumerism. Appealing to the middle class determines the success of their businesses. For these reasons, the middle class has often been the central topic in market research and political discussions in the public sphere as well as in scholarly debates.
For example, addressing the welfare of the American middle class has become a concern of US politicians and policymakers, and the agenda of rebuilding the middle class has been critical to winning elections. For emerging economies like those of China and India, creating a robust middle class is essential to at-tracting foreign direct investment and to achieving successful economic reforms by strengthening national development. In most societies, building the middle class has been an important political project: the social contract that promises the aspirational middle-class lifestyle as an outcome of hard work and frugal living becomes a source of political legitimacy, and the presence of the middle class in turn reinforces national identity and social unity (Fernandes 2006; Yang 2012). While the specific characteristics of a middle-class lifestyle might differ across time and place-from owning a home in the suburbs, to owning a car, to sending one's children to college, to having enough retirement savings in the bank-the term "middle class" has long evoked material comfort and optimism. However, when this "norm" or "social contract" shared by ordinary citizens is challenged or no longer applies, it can lead to frustration or social conflict. As the living conditions of the middle class strongly affect the overall social and economic conditions of a particular society, the middle class shapes contemporary political dynamics that influence political identity and public opinions.
Despite the importance of the middle class in the general literature, it has received relatively little attention in scholarship on Korea. Mainstream development scholars focus on state elites or state-business relations, whereas critical scholarship examines socially excluded or marginalized groups. Scholars of "developmental states" focus on explaining how rapid economic development was possible in East Asia. In this field, scholars provide state-centered, elitist explanations, emphasizing in particular how state bureaucrats promoted industrial transformations by collaborating with capitalists-mainly, big businesses, or chaebol (chaebol) in the Korean context (for example, Amsden 1989; Chibber 2003; Evans 1995; Waldner 1999; Woo-Cumings 1999). According to this line of thinking, particular geopolitical conditions in East Asia during the cold war were important, as economic failure could potentially jeopardize national
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sovereignty and interests (Campos and Root 1996; Doner, Ritchie, and Slater 2005). Under the pressure of economic growth, East Asian leaders built incentives for good performance into the system. Scholars argue that East Asia's "equitable" and "shared" growth strategies have allowed the wider population to reap long-term benefits, as indicated by relatively low rates of income inequality (Campos and Root 1996, 2). This approach contributes to understanding how the autonomous, efficient state bureaucracy promoted economic development in Korea (and East Asia). Yet its focus on strong economic growth emphasizes only the positive side of development and discounts the tremendous socioeconomic costs inherent in "compressed modernity" (Abelmann 2003; K.-S. Chang 1999), such as a lack of labor and welfare rights, chaebol's monopolistic business practices, and a growing rural-urban gap. Its elite-based, state-centric view also excludes the subordinated, popular classes from its explanations.2
A more critical perspective, running counter to the vast celebratory developmental state literature, examines how the socially excluded and marginalized undergirded the so-called economic miracle in East Asia. This approach takes account of political and economic costs as well as the human costs of growth-oriented development. These critics have identified a variety of social subjects who have had to make immense sacrifices for the glory of development-be they workers, the urban poor, farmers, or women (Abelmann 1996; K.-S. Chang 1999; Deyo 1989; S.-K. Kim 1997; Koo 2001; N. Lee 2007; Seungsook Moon 2005). By examining the politically or economically dispossessed, these scholars highlight tensions, conflicts, and struggles between the authoritarian state that tried to impose its own modernization project and the disempowered who challenged this project. Yet the emphasis on a dichotomous relationship between the state and the populace leaves unexplained the situation of the majority of people who were neither exploited nor politically active.
Unlike the socially disadvantaged, the middle class was placed in a better position and benefited greatly from state-directed development. It was a social group that was neither economically deprived nor politically active, made up of individuals who were able to improve their lives by negotiating with, adapting to, and riding the wave of a rapidly changing society. Taking advantage of the chances provided by the state to the fullest, and following (but sometimes bending) the rules of the game to attain economic success, many middle-class citizens ascended the social ladder during Korea's socioeconomic transformation. Analyzing who gets what in the midst of social and economic transformations and how those who climbed the economic ladder have deployed diverse strategies to maintain their status enables us to illuminate the process of class formation. Through an examination of dramatic shifts in middle-class conceptualizations, identities, and boundaries over time, this book tries to contribute to the understanding of the nexus of development, social mobility, and class politics.
The Middle Class as a Contested Concept
Before moving on to explain how the Korean middle class was created and what changes this social group experienced over time, we need first to consider who the middle class is. Conceptualizing and defining social class, including the middle class, have long been controversial and challenging tasks in the social sciences. Not only is the concept of the middle class ambiguous-people use the phrase in different ways and mean quite different things by it-but the hetero-geneity within the middle class itself also makes it difficult to classify this group of people as one social class. This task of conceptualizing the middle class is particularly daunting in the context of developing countries, because their socioeconomic structures and degrees of development are very different from those of their Western counterparts. Moreover, the notion of the middle class becomes more ambiguous in societies where there is sociopolitical diversity that creates different layers of social inequality. As William Mazzarella writes, "Even if we accept the validity of the middle class descriptor for India, we are still left [with] a sense that the term is being stretched to cover a staggering diversity of socio-economic cultural situations. An income that in smaller towns or rural areas might qualify a family as middle class will, in the major Indian cities, only be barely enough to sustain life outside the slums" (2004, 2-3). No matter how challenging it is to attempt to conceive of the reality of the middle class, the category itself has been an important symbol of identification, aspiration, and public discussion.
Many scholars of social stratification and mobility have defined the middle class by objective socioeconomic characteristics, including income, occupation, wealth, and educational level (for example, Goldthorpe 2008; Weeden and Grusky 2005). Using one of, or clusters of, these attributes, these scholars have meas-ured the size of the middle class and focused on how people are objectively located in distributions of material inequality. Official statistics adopt this approach by defining the middle class as an income-based group due to the methodological convenience and plausibility of these factors. Yet this definition, mainly focus-ing on individual attributes, does not account for power relations and various mechanisms of exclusion and closure built into certain class positions (Wright 2008). By contrast, neo-Marxist scholars understand class as a relational concept (for example, Abercrombie and Urry 1983; Burris 1992; Wright 1985). From this perspective, the middle class occupies a unique, "contradictory class location," because it belongs to neither the bourgeoisie nor the proletariat (the working class) (Wright 1985). This middle class is distinct from the bourgeoisie since it does not own any means of production. Yet, unlike the working class, it is endowed with a certain level of power and privilege, as it derives its economic opportunities from organizational authority or possession of scarce occupational skills (Fernandes and Heller 2006). Human capital, the stock of skills and credentials a person possesses, generally commands higher wages in the labor market (Becker 1971; England and McLaughlin 1979; England 1992). The higher wages and occupational prestige of the middle class can be seen as the "natural" market out-come in other words, higher returns on years of schooling and/or job expertise. Yet the differences in pay scale and prestige between the middle and working classes are also maintained by the gatekeeping practices employed by the middle class to exclude others from access to resources (Wright 2008). Through the mechanisms of "opportunity hoarding" and "social closure" (Giddens 1973; Tilly 1998), the middle class reproduces its relatively privileged position with auton-omy and capability. For example, people with higher education and professional expertise effectively control access to certain jobs through institutional sanc-tions such as legal recognition of credentials or higher returns on certain skills. Furthermore, social networks and gatekeeping confer advantages by granting monopolized access to information and other resources. According to this definition, the middle class has three broad strata. The first includes professionals and technical elites with professional credentials or advanced skills. Because their skills and expertise are not easily replaced, they can enjoy a higher level of income and authority. The second category includes salaried employees in both the private and public sector, who are mostly white-collar workers. The last group is the old middle class or petty bourgeoisie, including self-employed small-business owners, merchants, and shopkeepers. This book focuses on people in the second and third categories, who are more vulnerable to downward mobility during economic crises. Many displaced workers in the second category also become self-employed, given the lack of options after an early forced retirement.
Previous scholarship on the middle class in Asia has adopted this approach, based on objective socioeconomic characteristics, by investigating the economic status and political perceptions of the middle class (Goodman 2008; Hong 2005; Hsiao 1993; Li 2010). Using quantitative or survey data, scholars in this school measure the size of the middle class or portray particular characteristics of the middle class, including lifestyles, political orientations, and consumption pat-terns. The essential assumption here has been that class behaviors and actions are derived from class interests based on actors' structural positions (Marx 1978). This approach helps to draw a broad picture of social inequality and stratification, placing the middle class within the larger class structure. However, because of the narrow definition of class as a static category that this approach adopts, it is difficult to see the process of class formation-how class identity is produced.
By contrast, anthropologists adopt a practice-oriented approach focusing on daily cultural or consumption practices of the middle class (Heiman, Freeman and Liechty 2012; Lett 1998; Liechty 2003; O. Moon 1992; Sukjae Moon 2000; Nelson 2000; Vogel 1963; Zhang 2010). Following Pierre Bourdieu (1984), who emphasizes class as performed and reproduced through daily interactions between objective conditions and subjective experiences, scholars in this tradition examine various aspects of middle-class lifestyles, including housing, family life, marriage strategies, education, and consumption patterns. Though this approach does not deny the fact that similar socioeconomic conditions produce class, it emphasizes everyday practices through which class is made and remade. In this approach, social class is not a fixed entity simply grounded in structural conditions. Instead, class boundaries and identities are constructed and recon-structed on a daily basis, as people perform symbolic cultural strategies. Ethnographic studies help us to understand how class is practiced and performed in everyday life. This scholarship makes it possible to grasp class as it is practiced daily rather than as a static structural category. However, it tends to overlook lar-ger political and economic dynamics and historical processes that shape the patterns and structures of social cleavages and inequality over the long term.
Scholars of working-class formation, who were inspired by E. P. Thompson's The Making of the English Working Class (1966a), have emphasized lived experi-ence and historical contingency. Class is made, not given, in an active process, which arises in human relationships. Class is also a historical phenomenon, as it occurs in the experiences and relationships of real people in specific contexts. As Thompson powerfully puts it, "We cannot understand class unless we see it as a social and cultural formation, arising from processes which can only be studied as they work themselves out over a considerable historical period" (1966a, 11).
This Thompsonian view offers some insights for scholars of the middle class. First, the middle class is not a fixed, structural category; it should be understood as a process "when some men, as a result of common experiences (inherited or shared), feel and articulate the identity of their interests as between themselves, and as against others whose interests are different from (and usually opposed to) theirs" (Thompson 1966a, 9). As Loïc Wacquant has noted, "The epistemic ambition of defining the real boundaries of the middle class is doomed to failure because it rests on a fundamentally mistaken conception of the
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ontological status of classes: The middle class, like any other social group, does not exist ready-made in reality" (1991, 57). Second, the Thompsonian view asks us to conceive of class as an emergent historical property, situated in certain historical moments, rather than as timeless. Class consciousness, dispositions, and languages are outcomes shaped by past historical experiences and struggles over a long time. Thus, this view helps to explain how members of the middle class came to articulate their particular identities, ideas, and dispositions.
Emphasizing historical dynamics that shaped the making of the middle class in Korea, I conceptualize the Korean middle class as three different but related levels: social narratives, structural existences, and cultural practices. First, I attempt to analyze competing narratives about the middle class-the ways in which concepts of the middle class in Korea were expressed, discussed, represented, and imagined in public discourses, through political speeches, newspapers, magazines, and advertisements. This dimension of the middle class is not so much the objective reality as a discursive construct containing a series of normative positions and ideas. Middle-class narratives invoked social desires, aspirations, and national imaginaries and established cultural norms by projecting particular aspects of middle-class culture and lifestyles. By looking at how the social narratives of the middle class have changed in Korea, I identify the middle class as an ideological arena in which different social groups have championed particular visions of and values for Korean society and the Korean nation.
The middle class is constructed and represented in social narratives, yet it has a corporeal and material reality as well, existing both in structural forms and through being practiced on a daily basis. Structural formation of the middle class takes place based on the clustering of people with similar incomes, occupations, and educational levels. But, at the same time, the middle class is articulated and takes actions together in a particular space in which people share common experiences, build social networks, and engage in collective actions. Through ongoing processes, they share similar dispositions, states of mind, and values and develop a sense of belonging. Class identity becomes more clearly articulated as it promotes solidarity and unity among members of certain groups, forging struggles against others with conflicting interests. Thus, in addition to looking at the macro-level conditions that structurally form particular occupa-tional groups, I closely examine the everyday process of class making in which individuals engage in inclusionary and exclusionary practices.
In this book, I analyze the urban middle class, particularly in the Seoul metropolitan area. The middle-class citizens who appear in this book are mainly white-collar workers and midlevel corporate managers employed in large conglomerates and the public sector, professionals and small-scale entrepreneurs who live (or once lived) middle-class lifestyles. Occupation is one of the most important criteria used to delineate the middle class, as other scholars have previously noted, for this structural condition provides material circumstances under which certain groups of people can pursue particular kinds of lifestyles. Income can be another important criterion for structurally defining the middle class, yet it is not the best indicator, as living costs vary across different locations, and income levels change over time. Thus, occupation is a more stable basis of material conditions. In addition to structurally defined characteristics, this book considers various markers of middle-class status particular to Korean society. As some scholars have pointed out, high-rise apartment living is an important feature of middle-class culture and identity in Korea (Gelézeau 2007; Lett 1998; H.-C. Park 2013). Such features broadly delineate who the middle class is (and was) in Korea. I map out how apartment living was promoted as a middle-class norm, how individuals strived to become apartment owners, and how homeownership status in turn affected people's state of mind and sense of security. Capturing different moments in the emergence, reproduction, and fragmentation of the Korean mid-dle class, this book highlights how the boundaries and identities of the middle class have been continually contested and transformed over time.
The Making and Unmaking of the Middle Class in Korea
Throughout this book, I analyze a dynamic process of the making and unmaking of the Korean middle class over the past five decades. To do so, I adopt a dialectical approach that bridges the gap between economic and cultural approaches, macro and micro levels, and class structure and practices. First, I reconcile the gap between economic and cultural conceptions of social class. A social class is not simply a group of people who are located in a similar position in the social hierarchy and have similar occupations and incomes. It involves individuals engaging in similar cultural activities and sharing similar tastes (Bourdieu 1984). This book shares a basic understanding of social class as derivative of capitalist production and state policies, that is, a material entity with certain objective conditions; but studying ideologies, cultural norms, and meanings associated with the middle class helps to provide more-nuanced analysis and to revise eco-nomically oriented explanations.
Second, I link political economic factors such as development and economic restructuring at the macro level with individual strategies at the micro level. Socioeconomic transformations broadly influence individual lives, yet different choices and strategies made by individuals in turn shape different life trajector-ies and outcomes. By highlighting how individuals strive to improve their standard of living during times of transformation, I try to portray divergent pathways of social mobility and various sensibilities about social change and development.
Third, this book focuses on the process of "becoming" middle class: how ordinary citizens become class subjects, engage in consumption and spatial practices in their everyday lives, and make sense of their positions in relation to other groups of people. This class practice and subjectivity are not universal but rather are embedded in particular social and cultural contexts. Looking at the lived reality that ordinary citizens have experienced and its changes over time, I demonstrate how middle-class identity was formed and articulated.
While adopting a dialectical approach to studying the middle class by overcoming dichotomous perceptions, this book foregrounds the middle class as a historical phenomenon: the constituency, concept, and experiences of the middle class are specific to a particular time period, and they change across time periods. I capture three differentiated historical moments of Korean middle-class formation: emergence, expansion, and contraction. The first moment is a period of social mobility, witnessing the emergence of the middle class in the course of industrialization. With rapid economic growth promoted by state-directed developmental plans in the 1960s and 1970s, a nascent middle class appeared. Mainly comprising salaried white-collar employees, teachers, and gov-ernment employees, the middle class started to gain in numbers over time. The middle class did not simply grow in the material sense. The idea of the middle class as a vanguard of national modernization the embodiment of national desires and qualities, including hard work, frugal living, and a balanced political orientation-was promoted by the state to evoke hope and optimism and to garner the legitimacy of nation building and modernization.
The second moment is the expansion of the middle class between the late 1970s and the early 1990s. Rapid industrialization and increasing real wages pro-vided material conditions through which white-collar workers and midlevel managers could enjoy comfortable lifestyles. Moreover, state-sponsored programs helped white-collar families with stable incomes to become homeowners and to benefit from skyrocketing real estate prices especially those who purchased homes in the Gangnam district. Not only did the middle class expand to include more people, but distinctive middle-class culture, lifestyles, and space were also developed. Members of the middle class engaged in "classificatory practices" to reproduce their relatively privileged positions (Bourdieu 1984). In particular, apartment living provided a space where particular middle-class norms and culture were being cultivated and where collective actions and living experiences of residents created clear boundaries against "others."
The third moment is the contraction and fragmentation of the middle class since the economic crisis in the late 1990s. Many members of the middle class saw the deterioration of their standard of living, and the chances of class mobility started to narrow because of increasingly precarious work arrangements, wage stagnation, and lack of economic opportunities. Along with the overall contraction of the middle class, there is an increasing polarization within the middle class. There has been a growing gap between those who had accumulated wealth in addition to their salaries-primarily through real estate investment-and those who had not, and this gap has shaped different trajectories for their children. I argue that while this growing inequality resulted partly from globalization and neoliberalism, it is necessary to look at domestic policy dynamics in which some people could take advantage of particular opportunities for making wind-fall incomes more than others.
In what follows I elaborate on the important factors that have affected the rise and fall of the middle class in Korea over the past five decades, including geopolitical contexts, state economic policies, urban space and the housing market, and globalization. The interplay of these factors has shaped three distinct periods: the emergence, expansion, and contraction of the middle class.
The Language of Social Class in the Context of a Divided Nation (1948-)
It is necessary to understand the historical and geopolitical backdrop that shaped the subsequent language and meanings of social class (sahoe kyegup) in South Korea. Although class hierarchy and social inequality have existed throughout Korean history, as in other places, using the term and the concept of "social classes" had long been a taboo. Cold war politics in the Korean Peninsula produced a repressive anticommunist South Korean state that stifled the language of class and labor.
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ontological status of classes: The middle class, like any other social group, does not exist ready-made in reality" (1991, 57). Second, the Thompsonian view asks us to conceive of class as an emergent historical property, situated in certain historical moments, rather than as timeless. Class consciousness, dispositions, and languages are outcomes shaped by past historical experiences and struggles over a long time. Thus, this view helps to explain how members of the middle class came to articulate their particular identities, ideas, and dispositions.
Emphasizing historical dynamics that shaped the making of the middle class in Korea, I conceptualize the Korean middle class as three different but related levels: social narratives, structural existences, and cultural practices. First, I attempt to analyze competing narratives about the middle class-the ways in which concepts of the middle class in Korea were expressed, discussed, represented, and imagined in public discourses, through political speeches, newspapers, magazines, and advertisements. This dimension of the middle class is not so much the objective reality as a discursive construct containing a series of normative positions and ideas. Middle-class narratives invoked social desires, aspirations, and national imaginaries and established cultural norms by projecting particular aspects of middle-class culture and lifestyles. By looking at how the social narratives of the middle class have changed in Korea, I identify the middle class as an ideological arena in which different social groups have championed particular visions of and values for Korean society and the Korean nation.
The middle class is constructed and represented in social narratives, yet it has a corporeal and material reality as well, existing both in structural forms and through being practiced on a daily basis. Structural formation of the middle class takes place based on the clustering of people with similar incomes, occupations, and educational levels. But, at the same time, the middle class is articulated and takes actions together in a particular space in which people share common experiences, build social networks, and engage in collective actions. Through ongoing processes, they share similar dispositions, states of mind, and values and develop a sense of belonging. Class identity becomes more clearly articulated as it promotes solidarity and unity among members of certain groups, forging struggles against others with conflicting interests. Thus, in addition to looking at the macro-level conditions that structurally form particular occupa-tional groups, I closely examine the everyday process of class making in which individuals engage in inclusionary and exclusionary practices.
In this book, I analyze the urban middle class, particularly in the Seoul metropolitan area. The middle-class citizens who appear in this book are mainly white-collar workers and midlevel corporate managers employed in large conglomerates and the public sector, professionals and small-scale entrepreneurs who live (or once lived) middle-class lifestyles. Occupation is one of the most important criteria used to delineate the middle class, as other scholars have previously noted, for this structural condition provides material circumstances under which certain groups of people can pursue particular kinds of lifestyles. Income can be another important criterion for structurally defining the middle class, yet it is not the best indicator, as living costs vary across different locations, and income levels change over time. Thus, occupation is a more stable basis of material conditions. In addition to structurally defined characteristics, this book considers various markers of middle-class status particular to Korean society. As some scholars have pointed out, high-rise apartment living is an important feature of middle-class culture and identity in Korea (Gelézeau 2007; Lett 1998; H.-C. Park 2013). Such features broadly delineate who the middle class is (and was) in Korea. I map out how apartment living was promoted as a middle-class norm, how individuals strived to become apartment owners, and how homeownership status in turn affected people's state of mind and sense of security. Capturing different moments in the emergence, reproduction, and fragmentation of the Korean mid-dle class, this book highlights how the boundaries and identities of the middle class have been continually contested and transformed over time.
The Making and Unmaking of the Middle Class in Korea
Throughout this book, I analyze a dynamic process of the making and unmaking of the Korean middle class over the past five decades. To do so, I adopt a dialectical approach that bridges the gap between economic and cultural approaches, macro and micro levels, and class structure and practices. First, I reconcile the gap between economic and cultural conceptions of social class. A social class is not simply a group of people who are located in a similar position in the social hierarchy and have similar occupations and incomes. It involves individuals engaging in similar cultural activities and sharing similar tastes (Bourdieu 1984). This book shares a basic understanding of social class as derivative of capitalist production and state policies, that is, a material entity with certain objective conditions; but studying ideologies, cultural norms, and meanings associated with the middle class helps to provide more-nuanced analysis and to revise eco-nomically oriented explanations.
Second, I link political economic factors such as development and economic restructuring at the macro level with individual strategies at the micro level. Socioeconomic transformations broadly influence individual lives, yet different choices and strategies made by individuals in turn shape different life trajector-ies and outcomes. By highlighting how individuals strive to improve their standard of living during times of transformation, I try to portray divergent pathways of social mobility and various sensibilities about social change and development.
Third, this book focuses on the process of "becoming" middle class: how ordinary citizens become class subjects, engage in consumption and spatial practices in their everyday lives, and make sense of their positions in relation to other groups of people. This class practice and subjectivity are not universal but rather are embedded in particular social and cultural contexts. Looking at the lived reality that ordinary citizens have experienced and its changes over time, I demonstrate how middle-class identity was formed and articulated.
While adopting a dialectical approach to studying the middle class by overcoming dichotomous perceptions, this book foregrounds the middle class as a historical phenomenon: the constituency, concept, and experiences of the middle class are specific to a particular time period, and they change across time periods. I capture three differentiated historical moments of Korean middle-class formation: emergence, expansion, and contraction. The first moment is a period of social mobility, witnessing the emergence of the middle class in the course of industrialization. With rapid economic growth promoted by state-directed developmental plans in the 1960s and 1970s, a nascent middle class appeared. Mainly comprising salaried white-collar employees, teachers, and gov-ernment employees, the middle class started to gain in numbers over time. The middle class did not simply grow in the material sense. The idea of the middle class as a vanguard of national modernization-the embodiment of national desires and qualities, including hard work, frugal living, and a balanced political orientation-was promoted by the state to evoke hope and optimism and to garner the legitimacy of nation building and modernization.
The second moment is the expansion of the middle class between the late 1970s and the early 1990s. Rapid industrialization and increasing real wages pro-vided material conditions through which white-collar workers and midlevel managers could enjoy comfortable lifestyles. Moreover, state-sponsored programs helped white-collar families with stable incomes to become homeowners and to benefit from skyrocketing real estate prices especially those who purchased homes in the Gangnam district. Not only did the middle class expand to include more people, but distinctive middle-class culture, lifestyles, and space were also developed. Members of the middle class engaged in "classificatory practices" to reproduce their relatively privileged positions (Bourdieu 1984). In particular, apartment living provided a space where particular middle-class norms and culture were being cultivated and where collective actions and living experiences of residents created clear boundaries against "others."
The third moment is the contraction and fragmentation of the middle class since the economic crisis in the late 1990s. Many members of the middle class saw the deterioration of their standard of living, and the chances of class mobility started to narrow because of increasingly precarious work arrangements, wage stagnation, and lack of economic opportunities. Along with the overall contraction of the middle class, there is an increasing polarization within the middle class. There has been a growing gap between those who had accumulated wealth in addition to their salaries-primarily through real estate investment-and those who had not, and this gap has shaped different trajectories for their children. I argue that while this growing inequality resulted partly from globalization and neoliberalism, it is necessary to look at domestic policy dynamics in which some people could take advantage of particular opportunities for making wind-fall incomes more than others.
In what follows I elaborate on the important factors that have affected the rise and fall of the middle class in Korea over the past five decades, including geopolitical contexts, state economic policies, urban space and the housing market, and globalization. The interplay of these factors has shaped three distinct periods: the emergence, expansion, and contraction of the middle class.
The Language of Social Class in the Context of a Divided Nation (1948-)
It is necessary to understand the historical and geopolitical backdrop that shaped the subsequent language and meanings of social class (sahoe kyegüp) in South Korea. Although class hierarchy and social inequality have existed throughout Korean history, as in other places, using the term and the concept of "social classes" had long been a taboo. Cold war politics in the Korean Peninsula produced a repressive anticommunist South Korean state that stifled the language of class and labor.
ontological status of classes: The middle class, like any other social group, does not exist ready-made in reality" (1991, 57). Second, the Thompsonian view asks us to conceive of class as an emergent historical property, situated in certain historical moments, rather than as timeless. Class consciousness, dispositions, and languages are outcomes shaped by past historical experiences and struggles over a long time. Thus, this view helps to explain how members of the middle class came to articulate their particular identities, ideas, and dispositions.
Emphasizing historical dynamics that shaped the making of the middle class in Korea, I conceptualize the Korean middle class as three different but related levels: social narratives, structural existences, and cultural practices. First, I attempt to analyze competing narratives about the middle class-the ways in which concepts of the middle class in Korea were expressed, discussed, represented, and imagined in public discourses, through political speeches, newspapers, magazines, and advertisements. This dimension of the middle class is not so much the objective reality as a discursive construct containing a series of normative positions and ideas. Middle-class narratives invoked social desires, aspirations, and national imaginaries and established cultural norms by projecting particular aspects of middle-class culture and lifestyles. By looking at how the social narratives of the middle class have changed in Korea, I identify the middle class as an ideological arena in which different social groups have championed particular visions of and values for Korean society and the Korean nation.
The middle class is constructed and represented in social narratives, yet it has a corporeal and material reality as well, existing both in structural forms and through being practiced on a daily basis. Structural formation of the middle class takes place based on the clustering of people with similar incomes, occupations, and educational levels. But, at the same time, the middle class is articulated and takes actions together in a particular space in which people share common experiences, build social networks, and engage in collective actions. Through ongoing processes, they share similar dispositions, states of mind, and values and develop a sense of belonging. Class identity becomes more clearly articulated as it promotes solidarity and unity among members of certain groups, forging struggles against others with conflicting interests. Thus, in addition to looking at the macro-level conditions that structurally form particular occupa-tional groups, I closely examine the everyday process of class making in which individuals engage in inclusionary and exclusionary practices.
In this book, I analyze the urban middle class, particularly in the Seoul metropolitan area. The middle-class citizens who appear in this book are mainly white-collar workers and midlevel corporate managers employed in large conglomerates and the public sector, professionals and small-scale entrepreneurs who live (or once lived) middle-class lifestyles. Occupation is one of the most important criteria used to delineate the middle class, as other scholars have previously noted, for this structural condition provides material circumstances under which certain groups of people can pursue particular kinds of lifestyles. Income can be another important criterion for structurally defining the middle class, yet it is not the best indicator, as living costs vary across different locations, and income levels change over time. Thus, occupation is a more stable basis of material conditions. In addition to structurally defined characteristics, this book considers various markers of middle-class status particular to Korean society. As some scholars have pointed out, high-rise apartment living is an important feature of middle-class culture and identity in Korea (Gelézeau 2007; Lett 1998; H.-C. Park 2013). Such features broadly delineate who the middle class is (and was) in Korea. I map out how apartment living was promoted as a middle-class norm, how individuals strived to become apartment owners, and how homeownership status in turn affected people's state of mind and sense of security. Capturing different moments in the emergence, reproduction, and fragmentation of the Korean mid-dle class, this book highlights how the boundaries and identities of the middle class have been continually contested and transformed over time.
The Making and Unmaking of the Middle Class in Korea
Throughout this book, I analyze a dynamic process of the making and unmaking of the Korean middle class over the past five decades. To do so, I adopt a dialectical approach that bridges the gap between economic and cultural approaches, macro and micro levels, and class structure and practices. First, I reconcile the gap between economic and cultural conceptions of social class. A social class is not simply a group of people who are located in a similar position in the social hierarchy and have similar occupations and incomes. It involves individuals engaging in similar cultural activities and sharing similar tastes (Bourdieu 1984). This book shares a basic understanding of social class as derivative of capitalist production and state policies, that is, a material entity with certain objective conditions; but studying ideologies, cultural norms, and meanings associated with the middle class helps to provide more-nuanced analysis and to revise eco-nomically oriented explanations.
Second, I link political economic factors such as development and economic restructuring at the macro level with individual strategies at the micro level. Socioeconomic transformations broadly influence individual lives, yet different choices and strategies made by individuals in turn shape different life trajector-ies and outcomes. By highlighting how individuals strive to improve their standard of living during times of transformation, I try to portray divergent pathways of social mobility and various sensibilities about social change and development.
Third, this book focuses on the process of "becoming" middle class: how ordinary citizens become class subjects, engage in consumption and spatial practices in their everyday lives, and make sense of their positions in relation to other groups of people. This class practice and subjectivity are not universal but rather are embedded in particular social and cultural contexts. Looking at the lived reality that ordinary citizens have experienced and its changes over time, I demonstrate how middle-class identity was formed and articulated.
While adopting a dialectical approach to studying the middle class by overcoming dichotomous perceptions, this book foregrounds the middle class as a historical phenomenon: the constituency, concept, and experiences of the middle class are specific to a particular time period, and they change across time periods. I capture three differentiated historical moments of Korean middle-class formation: emergence, expansion, and contraction. The first moment is a period of social mobility, witnessing the emergence of the middle class in the course of industrialization. With rapid economic growth promoted by state-directed developmental plans in the 1960s and 1970s, a nascent middle class appeared. Mainly comprising salaried white-collar employees, teachers, and gov-ernment employees, the middle class started to gain in numbers over time. The middle class did not simply grow in the material sense. The idea of the middle class as a vanguard of national modernization-the embodiment of national desires and qualities, including hard work, frugal living, and a balanced political orientation-was promoted by the state to evoke hope and optimism and to garner the legitimacy of nation building and modernization.
The second moment is the expansion of the middle class between the late 1970s and the early 1990s. Rapid industrialization and increasing real wages pro-vided material conditions through which white-collar workers and midlevel managers could enjoy comfortable lifestyles. Moreover, state-sponsored programs helped white-collar families with stable incomes to become homeowners and to benefit from skyrocketing real estate prices especially those who purchased homes in the Gangnam district. Not only did the middle class expand to include more people, but distinctive middle-class culture, lifestyles, and space were also developed. Members of the middle class engaged in "classificatory practices" to reproduce their relatively privileged positions (Bourdieu 1984). In particular, apartment living provided a space where particular middle-class norms and culture were being cultivated and where collective actions and living experiences of residents created clear boundaries against "others."
The third moment is the contraction and fragmentation of the middle class since the economic crisis in the late 1990s. Many members of the middle class saw the deterioration of their standard of living, and the chances of class mobility started to narrow because of increasingly precarious work arrangements, wage stagnation, and lack of economic opportunities. Along with the overall contraction of the middle class, there is an increasing polarization within the middle class. There has been a growing gap between those who had accumulated wealth in addition to their salaries-primarily through real estate investment-and those who had not, and this gap has shaped different trajectories for their children. I argue that while this growing inequality resulted partly from globalization and neoliberalism, it is necessary to look at domestic policy dynamics in which some people could take advantage of particular opportunities for making wind-fall incomes more than others.
In what follows I elaborate on the important factors that have affected the rise and fall of the middle class in Korea over the past five decades, including geopolitical contexts, state economic policies, urban space and the housing market, and globalization. The interplay of these factors has shaped three distinct periods: the emergence, expansion, and contraction of the middle class.
The Language of Social Class in the Context of a Divided Nation (1948-)
It is necessary to understand the historical and geopolitical backdrop that shaped the subsequent language and meanings of social class (sahoe kyegūp) in South Korea. Although class hierarchy and social inequality have existed throughout Korean history, as in other places, using the term and the concept of "social classes" had long been a taboo. Cold war politics in the Korean Peninsula produced a repressive anticommunist South Korean state that stifled the language of class and labor.
The birth of a right-wing regime in South Korea after the national partition and the Korean War was directly related to the repression of class language and discourse. Using hostility toward communism and North Korea as a fundamental ideological pillar, the authoritarian regimes repressed any radical and leftist language outright. On this extremely narrow ideological and political terrain, any critical thought or discourse could be cast as a threat to the national security of South Korea and condemned by association with North Korea. Merely using terms such as "social class" (sahoe kyegup), "revolution" (hyōgmyõng), "labor" (nodong), and "radicalism" (kūpchinjuŭi) was enough to brand someone a "radical" or "commie" (ppalgaengi). Discussing class and inequality was imme-diately condemned as communist and connected to North Korea. In this particular context, South Korea was a "classless" society not because social classes were abolished but because nobody dared to utter the word "class" or publicly discuss social inequality. Any talk of class, whether moderate or radical, was completely suppressed, and class identity based on material conditions was never developed in South Korea. Not until the 1980s, when minjung movements and social ac-tivism developed fully and radical discourse was popularized, did class discourse emerge. It was even rare to study social class and inequality in academic circles.
Against this backdrop, the term "middle class" played a role in depoliticizing and sanitizing class language in South Korea. The Korean term chungsanch'ung refers literally to the middle propertied stratum, as opposed to sõmin, which refers to nonprivileged, unpropertied, or impoverished people. Though social scien-tists and academics used the more academically exact terms chungsan kyegüp (propertied middle class) and chunggan kyegüp (middle class) to refer to the middle class, chungsanch'ung was used more widely. Use of the term kyegüp (class) was linked to Marxist or leftist thought, which assumed a confrontational relationship between the exploiter and the exploited. Even though chungsanch'ũng indicated a social stratum, the avoidance of the Marxist term "class" in chungsanch'ung made it more moderate. In this sense, chungsanch'ung was a more sanitized term that did not imply class conflict or class tensions.2 Unlike nodongja (workers) or any other class terms, the usage of chungsanch'ung was thought to be free from any ideological taint. As a vague term, it could effectively and conveniently replace more explicit class language by celebrating equal opportunity and upward mobility. Given that class language was otherwise largely banned, it is noteworthy that the majority of the population identified themselves as middle class over several decades.
Middle-Class Formation as a State Project (1961-1979)
The state plays a vital role in the making of the middle class (Davis 2010; Fernandes 2006; Heiman, Freeman, and Liechty 2012; Savage, Barlow, Dickens, and Fielding 1992; Yang 2012). As a main provider of education, a source of employment, a propagator of ideology, and a regulator of social and economic policies, the state allocates and redistributes resources, selects economic winners, and shapes class structure. The state bureaucracy makes decisions about particular industrial, labor, welfare, and tax policies, which in turn affect the pattern of income distribution and social inequality. While the middle class is often treated as an outgrowth of capitalist development and industrialization, especially in the case of the earlier middle class in Europe, the expansion of the middle classes in western Europe, the United States, and Japan was an outcome of state efforts to build "mass society" and of proactive social policies providing extensive safety nets during the postwar era (Zunz, Schoppa, and Hiwatari 2002). In the context of developing countries, particularly in East Asia, the role of the (developmental) state becomes even more direct and proactive in making and unmaking the middle class. I emphasize the political nature of middle-class formation as a deliber-ate state policy, in both material and ideological senses.
First, the state formulates specific industrial and social policies that shape the overall welfare of citizens. The export-oriented, big-business model that the Korean state pursued to promote heavy industry beginning in the 1970s produced white-collar workers, engineers, midlevel managers, and technicians who could take advantage of rising wages and extensive welfare benefits provided by employers-mainly big businesses. This developmental model, emphasizing trickle-down effects, focused on rapid economic growth and produced distorted economic outcomes over the long run by ignoring the welfare of the majority of workers. Unlike in Europe and the United States, where extensive welfare benefits and social security programs created broad middle-class social contracts-embracing blue-collar workers during the postwar period, the middle class in Korea was more limited to salaried white-collar employees in big corporations, though it is true that the living standards of the majority of the population improved somewhat. More notably, an apartment lottery program adopted in the mid-1970s promoted homeownership among white-collar families who had stable incomes and employment by allowing them to purchase homes below mar-ket prices. Those who bought homes (mostly apartment units) in booming areas greatly benefited from housing price inflation and climbed the economic ladder much faster than others.
Here it is worth noting how different state policies produced divergent outcomes in the welfare of ordinary citizens. Hong Kong and Singapore, two other Asian Tigers that experienced industrialization and urbanization in roughly the same time frame as Korea, provide illuminating comparative cases in which strong states controlled the real estate market and provided more inclusive state-sponsored homeownership (Castells et al. 1988; B. Park 1998; Shatkin 2014; Yuen 2009). Like Korea, both Hong Kong and Singapore have high population densities and have historically promoted high-rise housing for efficient living, yet their paths diverged sharply from Korea's: they built high-rise public housing stock on a massive scale and housed the majority of the population there. The strong coalition between the state and private developers (notably chaebol) in Korea led to less equitable housing distribution than in Hong Kong and Singapore. Government housing policies and privatized high-rise building projects promoted homeownership primarily for middle-income families, not for the less privil-eged, and less regulated speculative activities escalated housing prices and worsened housing inequality over the years.
In addition to shaping material conditions such as homeownership, wages, and welfare benefits, the state also propagates particular ideologies and ideas about the middle class. By doing so, the state attempts to shape a particular class subjectivity that helps to shore up its political legitimacy and strengthen national identity. For example, the official discourse of middle-class society and mass consumption in Japan in the 1950s evoked a sense of prosperity, national confidence, and social peace (Neitzel 2016; Young 1999). Similarly, the postsocialist Chinese state's promotion of middle-classness and a vision of xiaokang (moderately prosperous) society was an effort to dispel the intense class struggle and conflict of the Cultural Revolution, to legitimize increasing social inequality brought about by economic reform, and to disseminate specific conceptualizations of model citizens embodied in the entrepreneurial, self-responsible, and educated middle class (Anagnost 2004; Ren 2013; Tomba 2009). The middle class in official discourse in Korea was often associated with the ideal Korean nation, one that was economically productive and had a politically docile citizenry. Economically, a middle class consisting of hard-working, savvy consumers was seen as vital for growth. And politically, an educated middle class with rational, moderate, balanced worldviews was believed to contribute to social stability without the taint of any oppositional ideologies, particularly communism. The state projected the idea of the middle class as model citizens who would contribute to so-cial homogenization and harmony.
The middle class, in this sense, was an aspirational category (Heiman, Freeman, and Liechty 2012, 19) rather than a reflection of the current class structure. By promoting the images of consumerism and comfortable lifestyles associated with the middle class in commercial and social rhetoric, the state and elites could contain discontent and prevent social disruptions-though this strategy was not always successful. The authoritarian state promised ordinary people prosperity and national progress, and many bought into the notion of the ascendant middle class. The ideals of the middle class-a new social group manifesting an ethos of opportunity and upward social mobility helped the state strengthen its vision of development.
Speculative Urbanism and the Pathways to Becoming Middle Class (1978-1996)
Housing issues are critical to understanding the welfare of citizens, social rights, and social inequality as the site of social reproduction. Housing is more than the physical built environment or shelter; it is a source of personal safety and security. Rampant eviction and displacement, as well as the lack of affordable housing, which are increasingly common everywhere-including, but not limited to, New York, London, Shanghai, Mumbai, and Lagos-deprive ordinary citizens of a universal necessity and threaten their lives. Thus, as David Madden and Peter Marcuse argue, housing should be understood as the "political-economic" problem that reveals the existing class structure and power relationships (2016, 12).
Gentrification and lack of affordable housing have often been understood in the context of neoliberalism, financialization, and the flow of transnational capital (Smith 2002). Henri Lefebvre described real estate as a means of capital accumulation: "As the principal circuit-current industrial production and the movable property that results-begins to slow down, capital shifts to the second sector, real estate. It can even happen that real-estate speculation becomes the principal source for the formation of capital, that is, the realization of surplus value. As the percentage of overall surplus value formed and realized by industry begins to decline, the percentage created and realized by real-estate speculation and construction increases" (2003, 160).
Deregulation, financialization, and globalization have contributed to hyper-commodification of housing, subordinating it to the logic of the market and making it an investment for private companies (Madden and Marcuse 2016, chap. 1). The amount of public and rent-stabilized housing has decreased, and
gentrification has become the dominant strategy to transform "underutilized" buildings into more valuable, profitable "commodities." Justifying development projects and construction as boosting local economies by creating jobs and tourism and generating tax revenue, local governments often promote development projects and gentrification in partnership with private developers. These processes usually create starkly unequal, distorted outcomes: private developers and investors make tremendous fortunes in the real estate market, whereas low-income households lose their homes and are forced into uninhabitable dwelling spaces.
In a similar way, housing and real estate properties are a major source of capital accumulation and class inequality in Korea. But it is difficult to argue that globalization and neoliberalism are the main causes of this phenomenon. Rather, it should be seen as an outcome of domestic political-economic dynamics. Real estate speculation was pervasive among domestic actors, not among foreign investors or multinational corporations, and was the outcome of state-directed industrialization and urbanization. The state promoted rapid urbanization and changes to the built environment, and the strong alliance between the state and private developers carried out massive construction projects. Rapid industrialization and urbanization stimulated the real estate market, and the surplus capital was channeled to the real estate market. Seeing the opportunities presented by rapidly increasing real estate values, chaebol and construction companies alike engaged heavily in real estate speculation (J.-M. Son 2003; N.-G. Son 2008). Many individuals also participated in speculative activities, expecting windfall profits from real estate investment. Widespread speculative activities among both corporations and individuals, coupled with lack of state regulation, resulted in sky-rocketing real estate prices. Since the late 1960s, land prices have risen sharply, and real estate speculation in land and housing (especially newly built apartment units) has exacerbated the situation. Between 1974 and 1996, land prices in Seoul increased by 32.9 times, and in the six largest cities by 28.9 times (H. Jung 1998, 136). Increases between 1963 and 2007 were even more stunning: land prices in Seoul increased by 1,176 times, and in six major cities by 923 times (N.-G. Son 2008, 25). Given the rise of this overheated real estate market over several decades, it is unsurprising that many organizations and individuals who invested in real estate made huge profits and quickly became rich. In the process, land and housing have become commodities that are sold and bought for profit, as well as a means of capital accumulation.
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Myungji Yang's From Miracle to Mirage is a critical account of the trajectory of state-sponsored middle-class formation in Korea in the second half of the twentieth century. Yang's book offers a compelling story of the reality behind the myth of middle-class formation. Capturing the emergence, reproduction, and fragmentation of the Korean middle class, From Miracle to Mirage traces the historical process through which the seemingly successful state project of building a middle-class society resulted in a mirage.
Yang argues that profitable speculation in skyrocketing prices for Seoul real estate led to mobility and material comforts for the new middle class. She also shows that the fragility inherent in such developments was embedded in the very formation of that socioeconomic group.
Taking exception to conventional views, Yang emphasizes the role of the state in producing patterns of class structure and social inequality. She demonstrates the speculative and exclusionary ways in which the middle class was formed. Domestic politics and state policies, she argues, have shaped the lived experiences and identities of the Korean middle class.
From Miracle to Mirage gives us a new interpretation of the reality behind the myth. Yang's analysis provides evidence of how in cultural and objective terms the country's rapid, compressed program of economic development created a deeply distorted distribution of wealth.
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Review
...I would encourage my readers to read From Miracle to Mirage. Yang writes clearly, the book's structure is sound, and fifteen pages of references indicate mastery of an extensive literature.-- "Pacific Affairs"
The study addresses a critical problem of housing among the Seoul middle class, and hopefully will draw others to examine the issue. It may be useful as a reference for graduate students and for researchers on urban topics.-- "American Historical Review"
While Yang's findings have great importance as an explanation for the making and unmaking of middle-class consciousness in Korea, they have even greater value as a diagnosis of Korea's pathologies today.-- "American Journal of Sociology"
About the Author
Myungji Yang, a Brown alumna, is Assistant Professor in the political science department at the University of Hawai'i at Mānoa.
Product details
Publisher : Cornell University Press
Publication date : 15 March 2018
Edition : 1st
Language : English
Print length : 200 pages
ISBN-10 : 1501710737
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