동아시아의 평화와 화해의 정치학 Scrapbook: 신뢰성에서 세속적 신앙으로: 전통 중국어에서 현대 중국어까지의 ‘신(信)’ 개념 변화

2026-02-13

신뢰성에서 세속적 신앙으로: 전통 중국어에서 현대 중국어까지의 ‘신(信)’ 개념 변화

From Trustworthiness to Secular Beliefs – Changing Concepts of xin 信 from Traditional to Modern Chinese | Brill

신뢰성에서 세속적 신앙으로: 전통 중국어에서 현대 중국어까지의 ‘신(信)’ 개념 변화

From Trustworthiness to Secular Beliefs
Changing Concepts of xin 信 from Traditional to Modern Chinese

Series: Religion in Chinese Societies, Volume: 19
Volume Editors:
Christian Meyer and Philip Clart

What does the Chinese term xin 信 mean? How does it relate to the concept of faith in a Western sense? How far does it still denote “being trustworthy” in its ancient Confucian sense? When did major shifts occur in its long history of semantics that allowed later Christian missionaries to use the term regularly as a translation for the concept of believing in gods or God?

This volume offers a broad picture of the semantic history of this Chinese term, throwing light on its semantic multi-layeredness shaped by changing discursive contexts, interactions between various ideological milieus, and transcultural encounters.
Copyright Year: 2023
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Chapter Introduction

Christian Meyer and Philip Clart

1 Topic: Trust, Belief, the Chinese Concept of xin 信, and a Global Genealogy of Religion

Trust—a concept that can tentatively be translated into Chinese as xin 信—is one of the most basic human capacities: mutual trust is a necessity for the ability of individuals to live and work together in groups. Therefore trust can be regarded as one of the key elements of human sociality in general—and trustworthiness therefore as a basis of social capital.1 The recent corona virus crisis that began in Mainland China in 2019 and has spread globally has revealed how trust in a government’s ability to cope with the pandemic is a critical issue for any kind of political leadership, as it may be undermined if authorities prove to be not trustworthy. In China already in the 1990s public intellectuals had proclaimed a “triple crisis of xin,” i.e., of confidence (xinxin 信心), trust (xinren 信任), and belief (xinyang 信仰) (san xin weiji 三信危機) within society, thereby expressing criticism and doubt in the trustworthiness of the Chinese leaders (and at the same time playing with local semantics in a unique way). Especially in democracies trust in a government regularly leads to re-election. In times of crisis it can mobilize collective efforts by infusing confidence and motivation. Therefore trust and trustworthiness appear as highly political.

Moreover, however—as the third element (xinyang, “belief”) of the dictum of a “triple crisis of xin” reminds us—trust and trustworthiness also play an important part in religious affairs. From an outsider’s standpoint, religion may in fact function to provide a basis for mutual trust to create social cohesion by means of shared belief and rituals. This functional view may well be applicable to most religious phenomena such as ancient Mediterranean religions and many others with their concern of shared worship of their gods, but especially in the Judeo-Christian tradition the idea of collective and individual “trust” or “belief” (Greek pistis/πίστις) in the one God has been highlighted and become one of the most basic religious concepts of this tradition. The biblical god proves trustworthy in being the reliable god of his people who leads them through all challenges and disasters. In Christianity, “trusting” or “believing” (pisteuein/πιστεύειν) Jesus to be the Messiah (or Son) sent by God Father mediates the belief in the one God and is merged into the one belief in the triune God. Belief (or faith, Latin fides) became hypostatized and appeared finally as the epitome of correct religious attitude or even of religion itself—and disbelief, or belief in false gods, as its contrary. While other traditions have less strong concepts of “belief,” it is hard to find traditions where trust or trustworthiness does not play any role at all. However, we should also be cautious about conceptual universalisms and should not expect that related concepts and terminologies have exactly the same meanings as in Western traditions.

Difference can certainly be found in China where “belief” in and “worship” of gods or spirits have not taken the same shape linguistically or in practice as in the Abrahamic monotheistic traditions. However, as we will see, the term xin shows at least some semantic overlapping and is used in modern translations of “trust” or “belief,” so it does have a role to play in Chinese semantics of religion in past and present. This makes it not only possible to reconstruct its semantic history in Chinese local contexts, but also meaningful to ask and analyze in detail how it might be relatable to Western or other non-Western semantics of religion. At the same time Chinese traditions appear so diverse that only a broad survey will enable us to see more clearly where relatable semantics diverge from or converge with Western or other non-Chinese meanings.

This task has been taken up by the presenters of a conference that took place in June 2017 at Freie Universität Berlin, organized by Christian Meyer, and constitutes the basis of this edited volume. In order to meet this challenge and provide a broad tableau of the Chinese long history, the conference chose a history of semantics approach focused on one Chinese term, xin, that in modern Chinese functions as the closest relatable lexical counterpart for the western terms of trust or belief. At the same time, as a pilot conference it constituted a first step of a larger project on similar phenomena under the title “Changing Semantics of Religion-Related Terminology from Traditional to Modern Chinese.” This project focuses more generally on the question how Chinese religious semantics evolved in its own long history in pre-modern times, but in particular how the encounter with the West especially since the nineteenth century has fundamentally influenced and “globalized” these semantics. Following this research program, this volume will therefore take a longue-durée view including pre-modern usages since antiquity, but a particular focus will lie on the more recent developments from the nineteenth century until today.

2 A Global Genealogy of Religious Terminology and a History of Semantics Approach

The basic idea behind the larger project can be described as taking up an earlier proposal of Roland Robertson (1988) of a “comparative” or “global genealogy of religion,” and pursuing it consistently on a level of concepts or semantics. While the Western genealogy of what is today addressed as “religion” in Western languages has already been analyzed in much detail in its multilayeredness and its complexity, this project aims now to contribute to an often neglected part of the global genealogy, viz., its non-Western side, here concentrating on Chinese usage. Some earlier research has already focused on the narrower semantic history of lexical “counterparts” of local non-Western terms such as zongjiao, shūkyō, dîn, etc., but the broader semantic fields that would imply many more related terms were mostly not included—partly for the pragmatic reason that it would have burst the limits of any monograph, but also because in fact such a task could only be done as a collaborative effort in a larger project as it is planned here.

With the focus on xin, this volume now addresses a concept that is prominently related to the global genealogy of religion, the idea of “faith” or “belief” and its modern Chinese counterpart, xin 信 (or xinyang 信仰). However, instead of taking xin simply as a modern lexical equivalent and assuming either a given lexical equivalency or an overwhelming Western influence that completely substituted newer semantic meanings for older ones (following a postcolonial view), this project aims at excavating its genealogies in detail and making transparent the multilayeredness, complexities, and ambiguities of local Chinese meanings of xin, which sometimes overlap with, but sometimes also clearly differ from Western meanings in pre-modern as well as modern contexts and also go beyond religious meanings. We hope to uncover both semantic connotations that facilitated adoptions of Western meanings, and local meanings that are ultimately incommensurable with Western meanings, thereby reconstructing important and neglected aspects of the Chinese part of the genealogy of xin(yang)/trust/faith/belief/etc. The focus therefore lies on its semantics in diachronic as well as synchronic perspectives, keeping in mind convergences with and divergences from Western semantics. In the following section, we will discuss this volume’s methodological and conceptual perspectives.

3 Some Relevant Methodological and Conceptual Dimensions and Perspectives

Several issues need further consideration and clarification in order to sketch out a shared framework for this volume. This includes general methodological questions, some adaptations to the Chinese case, the important issue of translation, and finally the question of changing semantics in a translocal and global context. It will be followed by a list of guiding research questions for the whole volume.

3.1 Global Genealogies, History of Semantics, and Discursive Analysis

While the general theoretical angle of the project is inspired by Robertson’s idea of a “global genealogy of religion” that takes its starting point from globally interconnected semantics, a more concrete methodological framework is provided by the idea that concepts on a semantic level are continually formed and reformed by their use in changing discursive situations. This approach therefore privileges a basic discursive and genealogical understanding (in the tradition of Foucault) with a focus on changing semantics.

This approach is reminiscent of Reinhart Koselleck’s conceptual history and indeed shares some concerns with it. In sinological research a conceptual history approach has been applied especially in a project led by Michael Lackner together with Iwo Amelung, Joachim Kurtz, Natascha Vittinghoff (Gentz), and others, beginning in the 1990s. This project focused on the emergence of Chinese neologisms and of a modern Western-influenced academic language especially in the natural sciences and philosophy. This huge change of the Chinese lexicon starting in the late nineteenth century resembles the emergence of important modern concepts, which occurred between 1750 and 1850 in the West. Koselleck characterized this period as a “threshold” or “saddle time.” For him it did not only provide the basic modern semantics of our language today, but it also reflects a huge change in social history and the history of mentalities. A comparable change took place in modern China beginning in the late nineteenth century.

However, the approach of “conceptual history” (or German “Begriffsgeschichte”) has also been subject to criticism. In particular, the German “Begriff” seems to be rather vague as it oscillates between the meaning of “term” (in a philological or linguistic sense) and a more abstract meaning of “notion”—thereby implying at least a partial identity between both meanings, even if a change of meaning in fact constitutes the focus of this historical approach. Methodologically its implementation therefore often resembles an old-fashioned history of ideas. This is probably due to the fact that the approach developed from the field of history, and so it does not have a strong connection to linguistic research. Our own project has therefore decided to take up the important issue of the correlation of change of linguistic and socio-political contexts (as emphasized by Koselleck), but concentrates in a first step on precisely describing changing semantics in different time periods. Each chapter therefore concentrates in a first step on certain periods or limited case studies and outlines a mapping of the semantic fields centered around the term xin, while also pointing to connections with other terms (if used together), fixed combinations, as well as antonyms or even the absence of certain terms (such as xin or combinations with it), substitution by other terms, and usages in different linguistic contexts. In a second step (even if in practice this step cannot always be clearly divided from the first one), each study takes into consideration the pragmatic context of the linguistic use in order to analyze, understand, and interpret xin’s changing uses.

At this point a discursive approach comes into play that in our opinion can be linked well with the focus on semantics. It not only understands (with Foucault) terms as the “smallest units of discourses,” but provides us with a more concrete methodology for interpreting semantic changes as part of changing discursive formations. In particular, it allows us to ask specific research questions. Within this framework, such a discursive methodology still allows a wide range of disciplines and methodological perspectives to be applied, such as linguistic, historical, sociological, and ethnological methods, related to past as well as contemporary contexts as long as they appear useful to reconstruct semantic changes in their contexts.

Applying the discursive toolkit of Jäger, we can ask not only about conceptual and semantic changes, but also about changing discursive conditions (entanglement with other relevant discourses, institutions, etc.), relevant agents (individual or groups), their motivations, strategies, but also specific discursive milieus or levels (inner-religious, academic, public, political, etc.), and finally how they form and transform usages of xin as part of knowledge formations.

3.2 Particularities of the Local Chinese Discursivities: Multiplicity of Levels, Religious Milieus, Interactions, and Semantic Ambiguities

As the named approaches have been developed and tested mostly in European contexts, we found that the Chinese case needs some special considerations concerning adaptations or particular foci of our analysis. The main reason lies in the fact that in the Chinese context not only one or two traditions have been dominant (such as Judeo-Christian and Greek-Roman traditions in the West), but that China has a long history of plural coexisting traditions and multiple socio-religious milieus that have together formed its historical and present lexicons. Moreover, not only religious or philosophical traditions, but also different social and religious milieus as well as discursive levels (such as public, legal, political, philosophical ones) have to be taken into account. In modern times in particular, the role of the new academic field has to be analyzed as a channel of transfer, especially in its interdependencies and overlaps with the religious and political levels.

We will therefore, first, place particular emphasis on interactions between various milieus and levels that had important impacts on the semantic history, such as between Buddhism and Daoism, but also interactions between Christian missionaries and various indigenous traditions in different phases, to name just the most obvious examples. Interactions between modern academic and public debates as well as contemporary religious milieus or translocal connections (e.g., between Mainland China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan) are also relevant and their semantics are influencing each other.

Secondly, the plurality of traditions accounts for a high degree of semantic variety and persistent ambiguities within the Chinese linguistic field which should be taken seriously. The variety of meanings leads to semantic ambiguities that facilitate semantic changes. However, not every possible meaning is necessarily a valid one in a particular situation. In some milieus some meanings are preferred and become more stable over the time. Interactions led to ambiguities that were not always consciously reflected upon, but were tolerated or used strategically (e.g., in Christian missions). This situation challenges us to do a careful mapping of where, when, and how xin has been used (or not used), in which exact meaning, and where, when, how, and why meanings could change and thereby lead to significant semantic shifts.

Therefore these interactions and variations constitute a special concern of our volume. The chapter authors were asked to concentrate not only on their particular fields of interest, but refer to other chapters and look out for changes in diachronic perspective as well as for interactions between milieus (such as different religious milieus) or levels (such as political, academic, religious ones). Even if not all interconnections can be covered in detail, this volume hopes to provide some vistas and contribute to a more detailed picture of such linguistic interconnections between China’s diverse traditions and socio-religious milieus.

3.3 Some Observations and Reflections on Translation

The important issue of translation needs special consideration. It is strongly interwoven with the question of different meanings of xin or its Western counterparts. These meanings can be categorized in order to provide some orientation for describing and “mapping” the “semantic fields.”

The issue of translation has relevance on two levels: On the one hand translation is part of the local history of semantics, especially when Buddhist (or later, Western) vocabularies entered the Chinese lexicon in the form of translation. Translation as a historical process thereby is in fact the link to the global genealogy. On the other hand, the issue of translation always accompanies us as a hermeneutical problem: as this volume is written in English but mainly deals with things Chinese, it always involves translation as a necessary act of making things understandable in a quite different linguistic context. This hermeneutical issue must therefore always be kept in mind and be reflected upon by authors and readers.

In general, we follow here Lydia Liu’s idea of translation as “translingual practice” in a discursive context. First of all she distances herself from any simplistic understanding of translation as neutral linguistic transfer between seemingly synonymous “lexical equivalents” as suggested by dictionaries. More importantly, however, she understands “translation” constantly as “a shorthand for adaptation, appropriation, and other related translingual practices.” In this sense translingual practice(s) can only be understood through analyzing discourses in the “host language.” With a focus on neologisms she suggests that this approach therefore ought to examine processes by which “new words, meanings, discourses, and modes of representation arise, circulate, and acquire legitimacy within the host language due to, or in spite of, the latter’s contact/collision with the guest language.” Our approach basically follows Liu’s understanding, but broadens its perspective by not only focusing on the modern transformation of Chinese language, but also on its longer history in order to grasp its longue-durée perspective more thoroughly. Moreover, though we share the basic concern, we still regard an understanding of the “guest language” in its (here the Western) context as eminently helpful for a better hermeneutical reflection and have decided to place one chapter on the Western genealogy at the beginning of our volume as a hermeneutical reference point before turning to Chinese language contexts.

3.4 Globality and Semantics: Convergence and Divergence

A final aspect to be constantly considered is that of semantic globality or globalization. It is in fact related to the very focus of this project: a local (Chinese) genealogy intertwined with other local (Indian and Western) ones, forming a part of a modern global genealogy (of religion and its semantics) and the issue of translation on a global scale. Often globalization is still seen as implying a trend to homogenization. However, as scholars like Robertson have made clear, even if homogenizing effects of globalization may be highly relevant in the field of economic and financial markets, in the field of culture the case is more complicated. Processes of globalizing ideas or practices appear inseparable from processes of adapting to local contexts where agents pursue local interests and even show resistance to global influences. This is especially the case when it comes to identity issues. Robertson refers to these complex and interrelated processes of globalization and localization as “glocalization.” In fact, only adaptations to local socio-cultural contexts allow successful globalization. The phenomenon itself is well-known when it comes to, for instance, mission strategies such as the Jesuits’ accommodation approach (see the chapter by Standaert) or issues of translation (such as discussed above). Such processes of “glocalization” have to be examined in detail to understand how and in which fields exactly they occur to which degree, and why some fields “globalize” more than others that might even show some degree of resilience. This is also the case for semantic changes that are in fact a basic integral part of such socio-cultural processes—since language as the primary tool of communication plays an important part in mediating changes.

While there are trends of convergence through “glocalizing” processes of translations and personal encounters, there are also differing degrees of glocalizing effects and even forms of resilience. Also, in different fields or milieus these degrees may be stronger or weaker. An example—as we would suggest here and will show in some chapters—is the difference of semantic changes in debates within a tradition (such as a church or the Buddhist sangha) or when representatives of these groups or traditions have to position themselves vis-à-vis the outside world, i.e., the changing society.

This implies that there are on the one hand convergences towards a global genealogy and the ability to communicate internationally about matters of “belief.” This is surely the case not only in international political arenas, but also in academia. There are also communities (like Christian churches or Muslim communities) that constitute translocal and translingual networks. On the other hand, there are also fields of resilience (and even strategies of resistance), e.g., in traditionalist groups. In general, however, we will see in most of our case studies that there cannot be found a clear “either/or,” but only degrees of globalization/resilience and interpenetration of global and local aspects.

3.5 Some Guiding Questions

From these general theoretical and methodological considerations and the preliminary mapping of meanings, the following guiding questions can be derived that are pursued in the individual contributions.

The questions relate to the overall picture as well as to the case studies and apply the above-mentioned research perspectives:

– Our first question refers to the overall picture and longue-durée view of major historical changes in the semantics of xin: How has xin been employed in various Chinese-speaking contexts and with which specific meanings? This also involves a thorough mapping of the semantics in different time periods and fields. Each case study therefore has to ask: Which terms, including polysyllabic combinations or other related terms, form the connotational field at a certain time and place?

– With an emphasis on interaction we further ask: Through which channels of transfer (e.g., Buddhist influence, foreign missionaries, Japan, Christian and non-Christian Chinese overseas students) have new meanings—for example in modern times the new coinages of binominal terms such as xinyang 信仰 (Jap. shinko), xinxin 信心, xintiao 信條, etc.—entered the general Chinese lexicon? How did these various discursive milieus (religious, secular), levels (academic, public, etc.), and processes interact?

– To understand the pragmatic context, we focus on the discursive embedding of language change and ask: How, i.e., in which contexts and through which discursive processes and discursive mechanisms has this happened? Which discursive conditions were relevant, which debates have to be analyzed, who were relevant actors, and what were their motivations and strategies?

– Keeping the Western genealogy as our hermeneutical background and reference point as well as the question of convergences/divergences in mind, the following questions are relevant: How do these meanings compare to Western connotations? Do they exactly copy or mirror them, or are there specific Chinese usages that help(ed) to adapt (thereby “glocalizing”) the new concept of faith/believing into a new, culturally and linguistically foreign context? Is there still a specific resilience in some fields (for example in an absence of xin as a translation of the Western concept of belief/faith)? Are there even strategies of avoiding or substituting this modern concept and local resistance to its global spread?

– How far have new understandings replaced traditional ones? Or have they created hybrid or ambiguous (thereby glocal) ways of speaking and of “thinking religion”—depending either on internal use of xin within their respective religious milieus or on its external use directed, for example, to a secular public? How much or in which fields has modern vocabulary then in fact permeated religious thinking (or thinking about religion)?

– What does this mean for understanding modern religion(s), ideologies, and religious policies in China and for assessing their presumed aspects of transformation as well as of persistence?

– Finally, in a global and translingual/transcultural perspective: What does this possibly imply for a “global genealogy” and understanding of a “modern (global) concept of religion”? How might local linguistic ambiguities of multi-layered and multi-facetted terms help us to encompass the global discourse on the modern concept of faith (and thereby of religion)?

4 Structure of This Volume

The outline of this volume basically follows a chronological order. It starts from antiquity and ends in the present time. The length of the chapters varies according to the breadth of the topic and the presented material. In the first chapter—attached to the Introduction as part of the introductory section—Jiang Manke, a Chinese theologian and religious studies scholar based in Germany, provides an overview of Western genealogies of pistis, fides, faith, belief, Glaube, etc., with a focus on philosophical and theological aspects. This chapter serves as an important background for reading the following articles in several ways: First, it summarizes relevant aspects of the Western conceptual history that became relevant when Chinese and Western ideas encountered each other first in Tang times and later in modernity. Secondly, it provides a handy resource and update for readers who are not much acquainted with research on Western conceptual history, and in particular with Western theologies. Moreover, it will also allow contributors as well as readers to reflect hermeneutically on translational choices on the basis of this genealogy as we are here unavoidably using Western (English) language to talk about Chinese terminologies. Finally, it shows how so-called Western genealogies of faith/belief already appear as results of rather complicated interactions between different geographic and ideological traditions. It can therefore also serve as role model for us when looking at China.

In particular, Jiang fills some lacunae concerning the early history of the

Judeo-Christian tradition, and revises some classical stereotypes about Christian concepts of faith/belief. The account starts from biblical sources and extends to modern thinkers such as Schleiermacher and Hegel and finally to critics of religion such as Feuerbach, Marx, and Strauß. Her starting point is the Greek word pistis that had already been used in antiquity. Her first point is here to make clear that the term was rarely used in religious contexts in pre-Christian times. However, its meaning as the human virtue of loyalty, or fidelity, is reminiscent of usages in Chinese ancient contexts (see Gentz’s chapter). In her next section she revises older views on the Hebrew bible and presents recent exegetical results stating that there was already “a rich understanding of faith connected with the root אמן in its original form Hiphil, both in profane language use and in religious or theological usage.” In theological use it developed into a concept of personal trusting relationship to God, Moses, or the prophets, also involving aspects such as hope, waiting (for God), acknowledging (God as God), obedience, and faithfulness. With the New Testament—mediated through the Greek version of the Old Testament, the Septuagint (LXX)—older Greek and Hebrew genealogies intertwined when Hebrew semantics entered the Greek lexicon via the translational term pistis/pisteuein (πίστις/πιστεύειν). Related to Jesus’s teachings and his person, the term continued old and gained new aspects such as acceptance of the Christian message (gospel), acknowledgement of God as God, and, most notably, describing the personal relationship to Jesus (believing him to be God’s Messiah or the Christ). In the Western Latin church—as a fruit of the interaction between Greek philosophy and Jewish-Christian roots—reflections on the relationship between faith ( fides) and rationality (ratio; intellectus) became a prominent topic that evolved into the program of scholastic philosophy integrating rational thought into theology (e.g., Anselm’s “credo ut intelligam,” “I believe in order to understand”). This should be kept in mind when it comes to the intellectual background of the Jesuits in China, but even more concerning nineteenth- and twentieth-century discourses on religion when proponents of scientistic worldviews attacked religions as being irrational per se. The Reformation adds a new chapter, focusing all theological facts in faith through Luther’s re-reading of Paul’s teaching of justification by faith alone and an emphasis on subjectivity that paved the way for modern uses. The chapter finally highlights the contribution of Schleiermacher for a modern liberal understanding of faith as a human capacity (feeling of piety; religious experience) beyond and apart from dogmatic beliefs. This also influenced later usages in the new discipline of religious studies as well as secular uses of a “new” (non-religious) faith that included not only secular belief systems (such as Marxism), but also aspects such as strong convictions concerning an ideology. The whole chapter is closed by considerations of the Mainland Chinese author concerning the presence of Western-Christian terminologies in modern China via translations.

Part I (“Setting the Stage: Traditional Uses in Confucian, Buddhist, and Daoist Contexts”) includes perspectives on pre-modern Chinese usages of xin from antiquity to imperial times before or aside from the encounters with Western monotheistic traditions.

In the first chapter, Joachim Gentz describes and analyzes the semantic field of xin in early Chinese texts. For the purposes of a chapter-length presentation, he limits himself to textual examples from the Zuo zhuan, though the analysis is based also on research into Lunyu, Mengzi, Xunzi, Shangjun shu, Laozi, Zhuangzi, and Mozi. He distinguishes three different conceptual registers of terms in these texts. First, single conceptual terms that are explicitly discussed and for which explanative definitions are provided. Discussions of such terms often take the literary form of dialogues in which someone asks about the meaning of a term and some master provides comments and definitions of the term. Xin does not occur as such a single conceptual term in the literature under purview. When it is used as an individual term it does not have a conceptual meaning, when it is used as a conceptual term it is always used together with other terms as a component term. “Component term” refers to the second register employed by Gentz, i.e., terms that are used in compounds or wider sets of terms which can be presented in different literary forms such as catalogues, chain arguments, word pairs, or parallelisms. Gentz draws three conclusions for the term xin as component term. First, xin is frequently used as component term. Second, xin is only used as component term in its meaning of trustworthiness, not in its meaning of belief. The notion of belief thus never has a conceptual meaning when expressed by the term xin in early Chinese texts. Third, in contrast to terms such as ren 仁, li 禮 etc., it has no independent ethical value of its own, because its ethical value is always relational and can only be explained in a wider conceptual context. When used conceptually, xin operates always as a companion, not as a solo performer. When used alone, it is usually not used conceptually but in a colloquial meaning. Colloquial meaning also coincides with Gentz’s third register, i.e., the colloquial usage of terms as part of everyday language with no indication that terms carry much conceptual weight as analytical terms. Only on this level of practical language use is xin used in all its meanings (to trust, believe, etc.) in the early texts. At the more abstract conceptual level, it merely accompanies other, more central ethical concepts and derives its meanings from its relation to them; its semantic range stays close to “trustworthiness.”

Barbara Meisterernst’s chapter broadens the range of Gentz’s semantic analysis to include a wider range from Early Archaic Chinese to Early Middle texts, including early Buddhist texts, which she submits to rigorous linguistic analysis. She shows that xin appears in three different functions from Early Archaic to Early Middle Chinese, including the early non-secular (Buddhist) literature. These functions are:

a) As an unaccusative transitive verb; unaccusative verbs are characterized by theme subjects: “believable >> reliable, trustworthy”

(“X is believed >> can be believed, is reliable, trustworthy”)

b) As a transitive or intransitive mental attitude verb; mental attitude verbs characteristically have a cognitive agent (experiencer) subject; the transitive variant has a theme, or an underlying or overt clausal complement (“X believes [that] (Y)”) (to a certain extent comparable to psych verbs such as “fear”).

c) As a noun: the nominal functions can be derived from both verbal functions.

In terms of linear development, Meisterernst shows that in contrast to Archaic usage (as also shown by Gentz) in the Early Middle Chinese period, and particularly (but not exclusively) in the Buddhist literature, xin’s semantic range widens and comes to be predominantly employed with the basic verbal meaning “believe” and taking non-human entities and abstract concepts as objects. The basic nominal meaning is “faith,” the derivation from the transitive variant of xin “believe.” This may imply that the usage of xin extends from a more colloquial reference to trust and belief in human behaviors in different social (mostly Confucian) contexts to a reference to beliefs in abstract spiritual concepts, while the informal sense of believing still prevails. She surmises that the fact that xin did not appear as a singular conceptual term predefined in the philosophical Confucian tradition, but—as a singular term—rather occurs in a colloquial way in all its basic meanings, may have facilitated its new usage as referring to all kinds of beliefs, including belief in spiritual concepts.

Friederike Assandri’s chapter presents an inquiry into the concept of xin in early medieval Daoism, focusing on two narrow complexes of the semantic usage of the term xin: the V+O compound xin dao 信道, and the nominal use of the term xin, in parallel or in combination with the terms shi 誓, meng 盟, and yue 約, which refer to covenants. The chapter employs a combination of quantitative database research (“distant reading”) and close reading strategies, showing that out of the many ways for humans to relate to Dao expressed in V+O compounds, xin, as V+O xin dao, is used much less than others. However, xin dao appears in clusters in two early medieval Heavenly Masters’ texts, the Xiang’er 想爾 commentary and the Dadao jialingjie 大道家令戒, from the second and third centuries CE, as well as in the Taishang lingbao dongyuan shenzhou jing 太上靈寶洞淵神咒經, originating in a sectarian environment in the Jiangnan region in the late fourth or early fifth century CE. Taking her cue from the nominal use of xin in early medieval Daoist texts to refer to “pledges,” material objects that the disciple had to give to the master in the rituals of scriptural transmission as part of a contractual agreement, Assandri argues that the key to a coherent reading of the usages of xin in this corpus of texts might be the conception of a contractual nature of the relations of humans with the divine. If the verb xin is interpreted as entering a contract, or covenant, with divine beings, and the nominal use of xin as a pledge, given to sustain the contract, such a coherence of understanding can be achieved, and warrant the translation “to believe” for the term xin, but with a strong emphasis on the term’s contractual nature. While xin rarely takes “Dao” as its object in mainstream Daoist texts such as the Baopuzi 抱朴子, where the emphasis is laid on “obtaining” (de 得), rather than believing or trusting in, the Dao, it is in Daoist texts produced by communal, sectarian movements that we find the largest semantic overlap with the Western notions of “belief” and “believe-in,” in as much as xin is here the primary way for human beings to relate to Dao, which is conceived as both ultimate reality and personified deity. We could speculate that it was the aspect of personified savior deity that brought the abstract reality of Dao close enough to the “human plane” (because as personified deity it shared some features with humans or gods) to allow human beings to “xin” Dao—to “believe in Dao” in the sense of entering into a contractual relation with Dao.

Tam Wai Lun’s chapter provides a tour de force of contextual occurrences of xin in the Chinese Buddhist Canon, of which the most influential is probably the sequence that begins with “faith” (xin), proceeds to “understanding” ( jie 解) and “cultivation” (xing 行), and finally arrives at “attainment” (zheng 證). The doctrinal formula describes both the structure of the Flower Garland Sutra (Huayanjing 華嚴經) and that of the Buddhist path taught by this highly influential sūtra. This formula would seem to grant a foundational position to faith in Buddhist practice, but its relative importance differs from text to text and school to school, with the Pure Land school presenting a special case, but Tam stresses that, different possibly from certain Japanese versions of the Pure Land tradition, Chinese Pure Land Buddhism never let faith displace practice in its soteriology. Tam concludes his chapter by discussing the notion of the “Buddha-nature” as a uniquely Chinese elaboration of the Tathāgata-garbha doctrine. It is the Buddha-nature that comes to serve as the combined ultimate object and subject of xin: “the strong conviction of Buddha nature must be followed by dedicated practice before the essence of suchness, the Buddha nature, can manifest.”

Christoph Kleine’s chapter on “Japanese Buddhist Concepts of Faith (shin 信)” picks up from Tam’s disquisition on Chinese Pure Land Buddhism and addresses the specific development xin/shin has taken in Japanese Pure Land schools (Jōdoshū and Jōdo shinshū). He argues forcefully that shin in the sense of “faith” is in fact a central concept in Buddhism in general and in East Asian (and Japanese) Pure Land Buddhism in particular. No Western or Christian influence was needed to interpret the Chinese xin as “faith” rather than “trustworthiness.” A Buddhist believes in what is transmitted in the sūtras because he believes that these represent the words of the Buddha, a charismatic authority who is perfectly trustworthy. In Kleine’s view, there is no relevant difference between the Christian notion of fides and the Buddhist notion of xin, at least in Shinran’s 親鸞 (1173–1263) radical Jōdo shinshū formulation.

In her chapter, Esther-Maria Guggenmos provides a narratological analysis of miracle tales that served an outstanding role in spreading Buddhist belief. The analysis is based upon a fifteenth-century biographical collection, the Biographies of Thaumaturge Monks (Shenseng zhuan 神僧傳, T. 2064). These biographies offer condensed hagiographies focusing on thaumaturge activities. Guggenmos traces the function and role of xin in these hagiographical accounts. In her conclusion, she finds the central function of miracle accounts to be to effect amazement that in turn engenders “belief” (xin), understood as trust in the power of Buddhism, in the reader. Witnessing the pervasive workings of karma, the subtle complexity of cosmic connectivity, and a sincerity that combines with supernormal powers revealed in daily life, the imagined reader is amazed and finally convinced to trust in the Buddhist teaching.

Part I is concluded by Vincent Goossaert’s chapter on the notion of xin in morality books (shanshu 善書). Goossaert shows that when this genre developed from the twelfth century onward, its use of the notion of xin inherited all of the meanings of the terms that existed at the time. It thus referred simultaneously to xin as based on reciprocal trust (credit, faithfulness to one’s word), but early on also aggregated the idea of asymmetrical trust in an abstract principle. In morality books, one must be xin to both one’s friends and one’s moral principles (based on conviction of the reality of moral retribution). In that respect, xin bears comparison to concepts that in other cultures have also been translated as “faith” but cover much more ground, like Latin credo and Sanskrit śrāddha, the latter being a direct conceptual source for the Chinese Buddhist use of xin. The genre of morality books further elaborated the notion and by late imperial times, xin, while always keeping its sense of trustworthiness, had expanded to become a general virtue informing all mental and physical actions, which Goossaert proposes to translate as “commitment to natural moral values.” This commitment is the result of a rational decision, because natural moral values are knowable by observation and reasoning, but at the same time it is exalted as the foundation of all of one’s religious life and eventual salvation. The morality book genre largely reflected a moral-religious consensus of the late Imperial period.

Part II (“Early Channels of Transfer: Monotheistic Uses of the Term xin from the Seventh to the Seventeenth Century”) deals with early monotheistic uses of xin from the seventh to the nineteenth centuries, resulting from the encounters between various Western (Christian, Manichaean, and Islamic) with Chinese traditions. After some introductory general reflections, Max Deeg’s contribution on the Jingjiao and Manichaean sources from the second to ninth centuries makes clear that the ground for a religious conceptual meaning of xin—based on its meaning of trust—was laid already by Buddhist use of xin as a translation especially for śraddhā (“belief, trust”) or for adhimukti (“strong inclination, attachment”) (cf. also Tam’s contribution). In the following passages he exemplifies how (and how far) Jingjiao (“Nestorian”) and Manichaean uses built on this. As a first observation it is noteworthy that no loanword (transcription) was used to express these foreign concepts. He further states that instances of xin as translation of faith or believing are not as numerous even for the “Church of the East” (Jingjiao 景教) as one might expect for a Christian tradition. However, there are examples of nominal or verbal usage, such “orthodox belief” (zhengxin 正信), “believing in this teaching” (xin ci jiao 信此教), or even believing in the (sacred) Dao (xin dao 信道 or xin shengdao 信聖道), which show not only that from the first encounter between Christianity and Chinese semantics xin was used in order to translate faith/believe, but also how the concept was negotiated by relating it semantically to indigenous concepts (such as dao). The case of Manichaeism is interesting as “due to the more cosmological nature of Mani’s teaching” the concept of faith was actually less important or positively connotated compared to Christianity, but interestingly the term was also present and used in rather affirmative ways. Summarizing his results, Deeg puts his findings from the extant sources in context and posits that (“Nestorian”) Christianity may “have ‘downplayed’ the role of belief/faith in one god in the Chinese context, while in the Manichaean texts the concept of xin in the sense of ‘trust, belief’ may have occupied a more prominent role than in other cultural environments to which the religion had spread.”

Nicolas Standaert’s chapter on early modern Catholic usages is the first in our volume that prominently relates a Western-European (Latin-Catholic) genealogy to its Chinese counterpart and interprets the different meanings of xin 信 in the early seventeenth-century Christian community as results of an interaction between different agents. It needs to be highlighted here that from the very beginning Jesuit missionaries used the term xin for their translation of faith or believing (even though this was not a central theme of their writings). However, it is not clear if there is any continuity with earlier Christian (Nestorian) or other monotheistic (e.g., Muslim) precursors. In general, we find a wide variety of usages from everyday to theological ones, whereby “the more explicit Christian meaning” appears as “grafted on the existing Chinese meanings.” In particular, Standaert makes clear that for Jesuit missionaries or converts in China faith was not in contradiction with reason.

In their Chinese texts this is reflected in a semantics that relates contents of belief to the Chinese concept of li 理, here understood as reason or (reasonable) “principles.”

Dror Weil’s contribution on Chinese Islamic uses from the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries shows again how an Abrahamic concept of faith obviously appeared as semantically close enough to Chinese semantics of xin—based again on the basic meaning of “trust”—for the term to serve as a translation. Using the example of the erudite Chinese Muslim Liu Zhi 劉智 (1660–1730) and others, Weil discovers at least three main aspects: Focusing on the interaction with the dominant Confucian environment, he demonstrates how xin could imply Confucian ethical values such as loyalty (to the Chinese state or to other people) on the one hand, but function as translation of Islamic concepts such as īmān (“faith”) or ʿ⁠aqīda (creed) on the other hand—though generally “references to ‘Faith’ in Chinese Islamic literature” seem to be rather “infrequent.” A very different, third level of meanings was added by xin’s use in the Islamic textual scholarship (that paralleled the contemporary trend of evidential or kaozheng 考證 scholarship) in which it denoted the authenticity of sources (kexin 可信, “trustworthy,” or “authentic”).

Part III (“From the Christian Milieu to the Entry into the General Lexicon of Modern Chinese: Late-Qing to Republican Religious and Secular Uses and the Role of Japan”) deals with the strong influences from the West from the nineteenth until the mid-twentieth century when Western knowledge categories entered the Chinese lexicon. Its altogether eight chapters deal with the complex channels of transfer in different phases as well as different fields or milieus of reception as case studies. The section starts with two chapters on the Christian missionary influence in China (Jansen taking Timothy Richard as an example) and a focus on early twentieth-century Chinese Christian usages (Starr), and turns then to Buddhist receptions first in Japan (Krämer) and in Republican China (and Taiwan) (Travagnin). The following three chapters address usages beyond the religious field: Fröhlich’s paper investigates Liang Qichao’s 梁啟超 prominent role in negotiating the complex semantics of faith that also influenced the next generations of intellectuals such as Hu Shi 胡適 and others. Meyer’s chapter deals with the role of faith/xin as a universal concept in the newly introduced discipline of religious studies, while Klein offers an example of secular adaptations in the political field by the National Party (Guomindang 國民黨). Broy’s chapter takes Yiguandao as an example for the milieu of popular religious movements and functions as an important complement to the other chapters showing that Western influences could also encounter resilience in inner-religious discourses.

Thomas Jansen’s chapter deals with the Welsh missionary Timothy Richard (1845–1919) who was an important bridge-builder between the different “worlds of Christianity and lived Chinese religiosity.” Among other things he is known for his translation of the Buddhist scripture Dasheng qixin lun 大乘起信論 under the English title “The Awakening of Faith in the Mahayana Doctrine.” Jansen shows here how the concept of faith and its Chinese translational counterpart xin played for Richard in fact a key role in linking the two conceptual worlds in his later lifetime. In order to understand this, he first traces Richard’s biographical development back to his roots and upbringing during the Welsh spiritual revival of 1858–60 where he received a concept of faith that emphasized personal commitment. His later ideas on faith built on these earlier roots in Welsh non-conformist Protestant religiosity and developed into a concept of a universal human capacity of religious experience, that was closely connected to his ideas of a “common genealogical heritage of all religions” and even a common future religion.

Chloë Starr carries on the topic of Christian-Chinese interactions: The chapter starts with a brief survey of the use of xin in late Qing publications by Protestant missionaries such as the leading secular-oriented newspaper Wanguo gongbao, or church periodicals like Zhongguo jiaohui xinbao. In general, these texts usually did not debate the meaning or philosophical basis of xin, but aimed at transmitting doctrine using language as a vehicle. Though “the scope of use of xin in Christian publications in the late nineteenth century was driven by western mission sources, it was also informed by prior Chinese-language usage.” In the second half of her contribution, Starr proceeds to the usage of xin in Chinese theological writings in early Republican China, taking Zhao Zichen’s 趙紫宸 1920 essay on the Apostles’ Creed and his creation of a new creed for the Chinese church as examples to investigate how interpretations of xin developed among Chinese theological educators and church leaders in the Republican period. Zhao’s example shows how Chinese liberal theologians—very different from the late nineteenth century—could not just propagate faith, but had to actively develop a modern, yet still Chinese understanding of faith/xin, negotiating meanings from the Western Christian tradition with those of Confucian heritage, and at the same time replying to modern challenges in order “to develop a mature Chinese faith.”

The next two chapters deal with the Buddhist reception of new meanings of xin in Japan and China: Hans Martin Krämer’s chapter on “Shin 信 as a Marker of Identity in Modern Japanese Buddhism” deals with the changes the new influences from the West brought to East Asian Buddhist concepts of xin. In this he clearly proceeds differently from Kleine who in his chapter emphasizes independently developed similarities of meanings in pre-modern Pure Land Buddhism with Christian ones. Though Kleine in his chapter surely identifies important general overlaps that could also have functioned as starting points for the reception of new meanings later, there were naturally still differences left in the relevance and exact semantic functions between both Buddhist and Christian usages. While Kleine therefore points to Jesuits’ perception of the—for them—highly surprising similarity between the Lutheran “heresy” and Pure Land Buddhism’s teaching two centuries earlier, Krämer now focuses on the changed conditions of encounter in the late nineteenth century when in the conceptual framework of “modernity” all religions around the world had to redefine themselves vis-à-vis the modern nation state or the new concept of science. Another difference lies in the communicative situation of speaking either within an inner-religious discourse (Kleine’s focus in his sources) or to an outer audience in a public sphere, which will naturally lead to different semantic chains and shift meanings contextually. In particular, Krämer argues for nineteenth-century Japan that the new political challenges privileged an emphasis on inner forms of worship, and thereby also added new nuances in the semantics of xin/shin. Already in the 1870s a variety of terms including the character xin/shin was instrumental in defining the “essence of religion” (or of shūkyō) which later influenced the wording of the relevant article in the Meiji Constitution of 1889 (“Japanese subjects shall … enjoy freedom of religious belief” [shinkyō no jiyū 信教の自由]). Analyzing his main example of the scholar-priest Shimaji Mokurai, Krämer discusses how the semantics of the Pure Land sect in fact helped to construct a modern identity for Japanese, and how shin—without dropping older “dogmatic” meanings—was used as a marker of Buddhism in public as well as also partly in inner-Buddhist texts. Hereby especially the pre-modern term “faithful mind” (shinjin 信心) played an important role in introducing new meanings.

Stefania Travagnin takes up the issue in her chapter “The (New) Buddhist Semantics of xin 信 in the First Half of the Twentieth Century: Arguments from China and Taiwan.” Here we recognize how Chinese-speaking Buddhists were facing partly the same topics and challenges as Japanese Buddhists—whose earlier semantic decisions often influenced them—such as a positioning themselves towards the new nation-state, nationalism, and science. Based on an analysis mainly of Buddhist journals of the time, Travagnin unfolds the whole variety of contextual usages of xin or xinyang that reaches from ones more based in traditional practice and doctrine (such as unconditional confidence as a preliminary step in spiritual cultivation, semantically related to the character xiu 修) via involvement with Christian notions of faith to political connotations concerning “rescuing the nation” and building a new China. Semantically Travagnin observes a strong emphasis on zhengxin 正信 (correct belief) vis-à-vis mixin 迷信 (superstitious belief). Travagnin further coins the term “xin’s institutionalization” when speaking about the use of the term to label lay Buddhist associations in China and Taiwan. A particular emphasis of this chapter lies also in translocal entanglements and interactions between Mainland China, Japan, and Taiwan. Thus, Buddhist Chinese (and Taiwanese) uses of xin(yang) in the early twentieth century show both continuities and ruptures that relate to inner-Buddhist matters (doctrine and practice, largely showing continuity) on the one hand and to its repositioning in the public sphere and towards society and state on the other hand.

Thomas Fröhlich analyzes in his chapter the changing usages of xin(yang) in the works of Liang Qichao. Liang stands out as a key figure in the process of adopting Western knowledge and terminologies in the first two decades of the twentieth century, including the temporal concept of evolution that was received by him via Japan and propagated as early as around 1900. Liang’s interest in all his writings and thinking was the creation of a future nation state, building on his concept of new citizens (xinmin 新民). This motivation also guided his interest in religion (zongjiao). Within his adopted framework of evolutionary progress, faith played an important role as a root of citizens’ “knowledge” and “ability” and thereby as one of the mental foundations of the state. At the same time, however, Liang continuously struggled to come to terms with the exact role of religion (in his case preferentially Buddhism) and so also of “faith.” In a later phase Liang dissociated xinyang partly from religion as he did not want to reduce xinyang to religion (zongjiao) and superstition (mixin 迷信) in particular. “Religion” was therefore sidelined in favor of alternative concepts and terms like “religious thought,” “religious spirit”—or “faith.” Finally, he again dropped this use and instead adopted “view of death and life” as his favorite terminology. These semantic changes reflect a typical problem of struggling with the multilayeredness of xin(yang): while faith appears as an almost unavoidable term as part of modern language, its multiple potential meanings, semantic breadth and ambiguity as well as religious connotations make it apparently difficult to grasp its exact meaning, clearly define its content, and give it a clear place in systematic thought. Ideas on faith by Liang—who generally exerted such a high influence on the next generation of new intellectuals—were, interestingly, only partially received by others: while his early use of xinyang generally helped to introduce this Japanese-coined binominal version to Chinese speakers, his rather positive evaluation of religions’ role was not adopted by many secular proponents. Thinkers such as Hu Shi (in his 1919 article “Immortality—My Religion” [Bu xiu—wo de zongjiao 不朽—我的宗教]) took up his parlance of a “new belief” (xin xinyang 新信仰) in the immortal (collective) Great Self (dawo), but understood it completely in secular ways.

Christian Meyer’s chapter is dedicated to the specific field and discipline of zongjiaoxue 宗教學 (“Religious Studies” or “Academic Study of Religion”). Nowadays the use of xinyang within Chinese academia is generally widespread. However, its use also appears somewhat vague. The use in Religious Studies—and also its vagueness—goes all the way back to its adoption in the first wave of interest in the discipline in the early twentieth century when Western academic disciplines were massively introduced to China in introductory works and curricula. As Meyer shows for Religious Studies, it was especially the universalist idea of faith/belief as a general human capacity that was of interest. Main proponents in the field were Christian, mostly Western-educated, academics. In their use, older missionary concepts of (true) faith vs. superstition (mi-xin) were replaced by a liberal and open concept of faith that would include all religious faiths of the globe and be found in the whole of history of religions. During the early 1920s, this concept played an important strategical role of bridge-building to other non-Christian proponents or sympathizers of religion when Christianity in particular and religion in general was harshly attacked by radical secularists. His analysis of introductory works on religion in the 1920s confirms this inclusivist understanding of xin(yang). However, it also shows that the semantic multilayeredness and complexity of the term caused some problems to define the role of xinyang in a clear way and ascribe an exact meaning to it. It is therefore indicative that a religious thinker like Xie Fuya 謝扶雅 (1892–1991) in the end rather preferred specific terms such as religious experiences (zongjiao jingyan 宗教經驗), religious consciousness (zongjiao yishi 宗教意識), or religiosity (zongjiaoxin 宗教

心) instead of xinyang to denote this human capacity as a commonly shared universal characteristic of religion.

Thoralf Klein’s chapter focuses on secularized, political uses of xin(yang) by the National Party (Guomindang) in the late 1920s within the theoretical framework of “political religion” (Voegelin and others). Based on the writings of Sun Yat-sen (Sun Zhongshan 孫中山) and a number of religious figures, as well as Party documents and publications mostly related to the Weekly Remembrance (Zongli jinianzhou 總理紀念週), he analyzes the language of Guomindang texts and demonstrates how the GMD understood xin 信 or xinyang 信仰 as central elements in propagating its ideology (Sun Yat-sen’s Three People’s Principles) as a creedal system to be believed in. This rhetoric drew heavily on Christian, but also Buddhist and even Confucian concepts and terminologies, while at the same time secularizing them for political purposes. In particular, belief (as a set of ideological propositions held to be true, an emotional attachment to the Nationalist cause, and as a translation of knowledge into activities by the party members, and by extension by all citizens) was regarded as a source of strength and unity for both party and nation. This adoption of terminology—and related practices such as the ritual of the Weekly Remembrance—might be attributed to the membership of Christians such as Sun Yat-sen himself, but fits also with general trends of a broadened, de-religionized, and functional understanding of faith or belief, as also the chapters by Fröhlich on Liang Qichao or Wielander’s chapter on Communist language later in this volume show.

Finally, popular religious movements like the Way of Pervading Unity (Yiguandao 一貫道) are the chief subject of Nikolas Broy’s chapter. It drew on the moral-religious consensus of the late Imperial period, as described by Vincent Goossaert’s chapter above, but added and developed their own doctrines and practices. An overview of texts by different religious movements of the late Imperial period allows Nikolas Broy to conclude that both “belief” and xin were not primary topics in them, but became more visible in the twentieth century. While on the conceptual level xin was never discussed as a central value in sectarian ethical or theological discourses, he argues that belief did and does play a major role in terms of assenting to the teachings of the movement (and thus identifying with it) and structuring one’s spiritual and quotidian life accordingly. A fixation on religious terminology might thus run the danger of hiding from us the practical importance of belief and believing in religious life, especially in religious movements that maintain a certain degree of tension with the surrounding society. In this section, Broy’s chapter plays an important role in showing how semantics in traditional milieus—in spite of encounters with the Christian presence in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries—could largely adhere to older usages and appear to a high degree as resilient towards new meanings.

The final Part IV (“Contemporary Usages in Special and Everyday Language Discourses in Mainland China and Taiwan”) gathers four chapters on various aspects of early twenty-first-century uses of xin in selected religious and ideological contexts.

Huang Weishan and Johanna Lüdde carry the Buddhist story forward into the twenty-first century by exploring dimensions of xin in the religious lives of Buddhist practitioners. In Huang’s case, these are Shanghai-based lay activists of the Taiwanese “Buddhist Tzu Chi Foundation.” Huang provides a statistical breakdown of occurrences of xin in her interview data, both singly and in word combinations. Similar to (yet also significantly different from) the four-part formula derived by Tam Wai Lun from the Flower Garland Sutra (cf. above), Tzu Chi’s leader, Ven. Cheng Yen 證嚴法師 (*1937), propagates a three-part sequence of religious life that begins with xin, then proceeds to yuan (“vows”), and culminates in practice (faith, vow, and practice 信願行). While once again xin is the basis of the path, it is also essentially just its precondition, not its core or aim. In the eminently practical world of Tzu Chi, practice (xing) ultimately trumps all, a Buddhism very congenial to the Taiwanese expatriate business community from which Tzu Chi activists are primarily drawn. Johanna Lüdde’s case-study of a Buddhist convent presents a quite different social world in which xin’s semantic dimension of “confidence” moves to the foreground. Xinxin 信心, meaning confidence and/or faith depending on the respective context, has a particular significance for Buddhist nuns, since it is connected with the Buddhist notion of a masculine hero (dazhangfu 大丈夫) and therefore implies a gender transition. The idea of xinxin involves determination, will-power, and steadfastness as prerequisites for attaining enlightenment that nuns in particular need to cultivate (especially in the strict observance of monastic discipline) to overcome supposed “feminine weaknesses” and develop the masculine qualities needed to reach their goal.

Adam Yuet Chau stresses that even where xin does not loom large on the conceptual level, belief may still play an important role in religious practices. His case examples are drawn from the Shaanbei 陝北 region (northern Shaanxi Province) in north-central China. Arguing that many religious practices there are motivated by the psychological state that we might recognize as “belief” but do not necessarily or explicitly invoke this word, Chau proceeds to analyze ideas concerning divine efficacy and ritual expressions of thanksgiving to deities as presupposing some form(s) of beliefs in the sense of accepted knowledge about the nature and powers of gods and the resulting obligations for humans entering into a relationship with them. Conversely, notions of belief also shine through in ideas concerning divine punishment for unbelief manifested in blasphemous acts.

Gerda Wielander, in her chapter “What China is Missing—Faith in Political Discourse,” focuses on the use of the word xinyang 信仰 in recent Chinese political discourse. She analyzes the renewed attempts to create a belief system and hagiography around socialist core values and the history of the Communist party, with particular emphasis on strengthening the faith of party members and university students. The chapter argues that the current emphasis on xinyang is a direct response to the—from the Party’s perspective—worrying appeal of religion (in particular Christianity) to the country’s elite, as well as to “credible moral alternatives” and counter-hegemonic discourses by influential intellectuals such as Liu Xiaobo and Xu Zhiyong. Methodologically the chapter applies an understanding of xinyang “as a ‘floating signifier’ whose precise definition is contested, but which is connected to questions over China’s future ‘salvation’.”

An Epilogue summarizes the general insights reached in this volume.

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Lopez, Donald S., Jr. 1998. “Belief.” In Critical Terms for Religious Studies, edited by Mark C. Taylor. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 21–35. Luhmann, Niklas. 1973. Vertrauen. Stuttgart: Enke.

Luhmann, Niklas. 1979. Trust and Power. Chichester: Wiley.

Lüsebrink, Hans-Jürgen. 1998. “Begriffsgeschichte, Diskursanalyse und Narrativität.” In Aufklärung und Historische Semantik: Interdisziplinäre Beiträge zur westeuropäischen Kulturgeschichte, edited by Rolf Reichardt. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 29–44.

Masini, Federico. 1993. The Formation of Modern Chinese Lexicon and Its Evolution towards a National Language: The Period from 1840 to 1898. Berkeley: Journal of Chinese Linguistics (Monograph Series 6).

MCST—Modern Chinese Scientific Terminologies (近現代漢語學術用語研究), A Reposi-

tory of Chinese Scientific, Philosophical and Political Terms Coined in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Century, compiled by Michael Lackner, Iwo Amelung, and Joachim Kurtz, http://mcst.uni-hd.de/search/searchMCST_short.lasso (accessed 12 June 2017).

Meert, Alexander. 2017. “Positive Atheism in Antiquity: A Social and Philosophical Analysis (500 BC–200 AD).” PhD diss., Ghent University.

Meyer, Christian. 2014. “How the ‘Science of Religion’ (zongjiaoxue) as a Discipline Globalized ‘Religion’ in Late Qing and Early Republican China.” In Globalization and the Making of Religious Modernity in China: Transnational Religions, Local Agents, and the Study of Religion, 1800-Present, edited by Thomas Jansen, Thoralf Klein, and Christian Meyer. Boston: Brill, 297–341.

Misztal, Barbara A. 1992. “The Notion of Trust in Social Theory.” Policy, Organization and Society 5, no. 1: 6–15.

Nongbri, Brent. 2013. Before Religion: A History of a Modern Concept. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Putnam, Robert D. 2000. Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community. New York: Simon and Schuster.

Pye, Michael. 1994. “What is ‘Religion’ in East Asia?” In The Notion of ‘Religion’ in Comparative Research, edited by Ugo Bianchi. Rome: L’Erma di Bretschneider, 115–122.

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Chapter 25 Epilogue: Reflections and Theses on the Semantic History of xin 信 and Faith In: From Trustworthiness to Secular Beliefs

Author: Christian Meyer

In this epilogue—as a kind of summary of observations from this volume—we will attempt two things in a very tentative way: In a first step I will sketch out some common structures of the semantic field of xin as well as the relatable field of faith/belief. We will collect here observations on both the Western genealogy (drawing among others on the chapter by Jiang) and, in particular, its Chinese counterpart that has been the main focus of this volume.

In a second step I would like to provide a comprehensive picture of the genealogy of xin in China and eventually summarize its results in four theses. These theses will shed light on its history of semantics from antiquity to present times as a complex history of linguistic interactions taking into account different traditions, fields, and milieus that have shaped its modern usages.

1 General Structures of the Semantic Field: Possible Dimensions for Mapping xin and Trust/Belief in China and the West

1.1 Basic or Everyday Meanings of xin 信 (and pistis/credo/fides) in Contrast to Conceptual Uses

While the project has taken its main starting point from the idea of a global genealogy of religion and accordingly is focusing on religious language, Chinese or Western terminologies of xin, trust or belief/believe originally occur in everyday language. Their conceptual use is in fact derived from it (see esp. the chapters by Jiang, Gentz, and Meisterernst). It is therefore important to differentiate between more general everyday (and non-religious) uses of the term in contrast to more abstract and complex conceptual uses (see nos. 1.2–1.5). Xin (as much as the Greek term pisteuein) often simply means putting trust in somebody as a person, in his/her actions, his/her words or deeds. Often it can be simply understood as: “trusting or believing somebody about something,” or in a more abstract wording: “putting trust in a truth claim of another person.” It correlates with the importance of trust and trustworthiness as the very basis of sociality and humans as communicative beings. In this everyday use, trusting and believing appear as almost interchangeable though believing might point more to that which is believed (e.g., a truth claim), while trusting puts a stronger emphasis on human relations and the person who is trusted. This basic meaning also occurs in many religious texts.

1.2 Conceptual Uses I: Ascribed Trustworthiness as Value and Virtue

This leads to a second aspect when trustworthiness is ascribed to a person as a virtue or prescribed as a desirable human quality: Anthropologically speaking, this aspect of meaning expresses a universal value reflecting the relevance of trust and trustworthiness in human relations as a basic necessity in any functioning human society in contrast to distrusting outsiders. It denotes an important value that is of high importance in social co-operation, including customs, institutions, legal contracts1 (often “by handshake”), etc. In common language context, trusting a person, or regarding him/her as trustworthy, and believing the truth value of a person’s claim are often closely interrelated. It is therefore no surprise that trustworthiness—similar to specific trust-related virtues like sincerity, loyalty, or devotion to somebody (as found in component terms like chengxin 誠信 or zhongxin 忠信)—appears as a virtue in general socio-ethical canons, including the Chinese (see Joachim Gentz’s contribution) or the ancient Greek or Latin (see Jiang’s chapter). The notion of trustworthiness as value or virtue can be regarded as a simple conceptualized use. It may also become embedded in more comprehensive conceptual (e.g., ethical or religious) frameworks.

1.3 Conceptual Uses II: “Religious” Uses or Believing in Invisible Entities and Their Power

Furthermore, religious vs. secular uses can be differentiated cautiously (although the concept of the “religious” has to be problematized as soon as we leave the relatively firm ground of the modern Western linguistic world). From a genealogical view such uses that explicitly relate to “religion” semantically or to a certain tradition that we nowadays call “religious” can be included here. However, at this point we would like to highlight another approach emphasizing usages that apply the human act of trusting from tangible or visible to invisible objects of trust. In a functional perspective trust in, say, an invisible source of the foundations of life or of superhuman support fulfills important functions as a coping strategy in overcoming or reducing the feeling of uncertainty in human life generally, and in times of change and crises in particular.2 Sharing belief (or trust) in the same invisible, symbolically charged and superhuman authority of trust may not only create strong conviction (as a feeling of certainty) for the individual, but also strengthen a group in mutual trust and confidence to each other.

In emic language the mode as well as object of trust, belief, or xin can be characterized in specific ways. In particular it can be contrasted to seeing or knowing (rationality). The motif of believing as being certain of “what we do not see” is expressed explicitly not only in the bible,3 but appears also in modern Chinese debates.4 The issue of faith (fides) as trusting in invisible truths in contrast to rationality had been a major topic of debate already in medieval western scholasticism.5 Putting both in clear contrast has been, however, a rather modern phenomenon.6

Often the trust in an invisible entity will be mediated through visible or tangible entities or through living persons. To trust in the trustworthy guidance of a spiritual (or even political) leader, in what a priest in the authority of his position speaks, or what tradition (or a written scripture) reveals as trustworthy truth are examples for this. In the Greek New Testament, pisteúein was originally understood as putting trust in the living (tangible) Jesus as an authoritative person who possesses powers of healing and forgiving (given by the transcendent God), and believing in his words and deeds, and above all in his distinctive role (Messiah or Christ).7 After his death and supposed resurrection (followed by his ascension to heaven that made him ultimately intangible), believing implies trusting the words of the witnesses about his epiphanies after resurrection (handed down in a “chain of trust” of trustworthy witnesses, the apostles).

In Buddhism, trust or belief in the Buddha (śraddhā) and his teachings is an important prerequisite.8 In the dissemination of Buddhism it was mediated through images, sutras, and the saṅgha as representing the Three Jewels. In some early medieval Daoist scriptures even dao (the Way) became a possible object of xin, as Assandri’s chapter attests.

Thus, trustworthiness as reliability in human matters is here applied to spiritual (or invisible) and superhuman entities.

1.4 Conceptual Uses III: from Trusting or Believing as Simple Action to Dogmatic Belief or Faith

The conceptualization gains more complexity when faith or belief as a noun does not only denote the simple act of believing (fides qua creditur, in scholastic terms), but shifts semantically to its content, or “what is believed” (i.e., the belief in God [his existence], or any “dogmatic” truth claim) (fides quae creditur). Such a use for the object of believing surely reflects the significant role of dogmatic truth claims and creeds in the Christian tradition. Only if the above-mentioned aspects are taken together, “faith” (fides) can be understood as the summarizing epitome of the Christian message that includes both aspects, believing as an act as well as what is believed.

It is very obvious that in Chinese this linguistic ambiguity and complexity is originally not present. Accordingly, the adoption of such semantics marks a major change in the Chinese genealogy. In modern Chinese, linguistic differentiations were made when individual doctrinal teachings had to be translated as xintiao 信條, or the complex concept of “faith” by the neologism xinyang 信仰, which leads us to our last aspect.

1.5 Conceptual Uses IV: Faith or Belief as a Universalist Concept: Religious and Secular

The highest degree of conceptualization (and abstraction) is obtained when the term no longer denotes a human capacity of believing as an act (fides qua creditur) or single objects of “what is believed” (fides quae creditur), but an abstract and complex idea of a “belief system.” As a general and comparative term, the idea of “faiths”/“beliefs” (or “belief systems”) beyond the Christian faith only developed rather late (in the nineteenth century). In this case, “faith” or “belief” (as a noun!) is not only an element that can be located somewhere, fulfilling a (minor or major) function within a tradition, but it becomes a signifier for the totality of a (religious or even secular) tradition. Also, the idea of “secular beliefs” developed only in the nineteenth century when the idea of “faiths” or “beliefs” as summarizing generic terms for basic systems of thought (“belief systems”) developed. This kind of non-quotidian belief (as belief in any kind of Weltanschauung) appeared now as a typical “universalist concept” and was hypostasized as a basic anthropological capacity (similar to Rudolf Otto’s idea of the Holy as a human a priori).

It therefore could be used almost synonymously to “religion” and play a role in the new concept of a “universal history of religion” (and of “comparative religion”). In the newly written textbooks for the emerging discipline of “History of Religions” or “Comparative Religion,” belief could further denote specific comparative aspects. Aside from the use as synonym for a specific religion or tradition, it could imply belief in contrast to ritual, i.e., cognitive aspects in contrast to religious action. It could also be related to different forms of theism (polytheism, monotheism). In evolutionary models of religion, belief could mark a higher plane than that of magic (associated with primitive ritual), and if a religion had a distinct and reflective doctrinal system of belief(s), it could be ranked as high as Christianity. This is also reflected in China when the academic field of religious studies was introduced and the new term was applied to its traditional “teachings.”9

Aside from religious beliefs, however, it became popular to apply the term to new secular teachings as “new belief” (David Friedrich Strauß, 1808–1874) that saw themselves not only in intellectual competition with Christian or generally religious teachings (“old faith”), but that also combined collectively shared and propagated “faith convictions” with practical application (such as revolutionary activities like in Marxism). Positivism (Comte) or scientism could be understood as such secular beliefs and would hereby be distanced from “blind believing,” instead claiming a rational basis for their beliefs. It is striking that the term belief was still used with a new “positive” content while any kind of religion became denunciated as irrational or blind beliefs and therefore superstition (German Aber-glaube, Chinese mi-xin). This use of “(new or) secular belief” was imported to China in the early twentieth century by Republican intellectuals10 and is still relevant in Chinese Marxism. The element of a strong (individual and collective) conviction in the semantics of belief may have been one reason for maintaining the term. Especially in ideological groups such as the Guomindang or the CCP this aspect appears as part of their rhetorics.11

2 A Comprehensive Semantic History of xin 信: Global Genealogies and the Issue of Interaction

Building on the observations above, I will now attempt to draw a brief but comprehensive picture of the genealogy of xin. This volume has made clear how the semantics of xin 信 has been—and still is—of high importance for the field of religions and beyond. Not only have Chinese observers nowadays stated a “triple crisis of xin,” i.e., of confidence (xinxin 信心), trust (xinren 信任), and belief (xinyang 信仰) (san xin weiji 三信危機)12 within society in the PRC. Xin has also played an eminent role in the field of different religious traditions in China since antiquity. Our contributors have shown in particular how interactions between different fields have regularly played an important role in shaping its multi-layered semantics.

This is true already for the pre-modern period. Gentz has shown in his chapter that while xin has been applied in the meanings of “believe,” “trust,” or “trusting” already in ancient everyday use, it was never used in this time as a qualified concept of its own. Conversely, whenever it was used as a concept—typically forming a component term together with other terms such as a “trustworthy companion”—it had always the meaning of trustworthiness, never that of belief. The first major change occurs already in late antiquity and early medieval time when Buddhism and its new semantics enter the stage and interact with local Chinese semantics. As Meisterernst’s chapter shows, in Early Middle Chinese, particularly in the Buddhist literature, xin adopts more and more the meaning of “believing” in non-human entities and abstract concepts, taking up early colloquial use. Assandri adds to this perspective by showing how this is true at least in some degree also for Daoist texts where in some cases even dao (“Way”) can become the object of xin. The major shift can therefore be reconstructed as result of the confluence of semantic histories of Chinese and Indian (Buddhist) origin.

It is therefore not by accident that a large portion of this volume— altogether eight chapters—deals with Buddhism in pre-modern or modern China and Japan. As several chapters (Meisterernst, Tam, Kleine, cf. Deeg) make clear, the new concept of trust or confidence in the Buddha and his teachings, translated from Sanskrit śraddhā, was understood as a prerequisite for the following steps in the Buddhist path of enlightenment. As Kleine presents in his chapter, in the Jōdo-Shinshū (True Pure Land Sect) in Japan the emphasis on faith in the Buddha Amitābha and his grace, in order to become reborn in the Western Paradise, would go so far that Jesuit missionaries reported home that the Lutheran heresy obviously had reached already the Far East. In this context, the semantic leap from traditional Chinese to Western influenced meanings of xin appear as much smaller. Accordingly, the ostensible mis-translation by Christian missionaries who translated credo or fides with xin appears as less distorted or “wrong.”

The early genealogy of xin already shows us how earlier meanings were not erased or completely replaced by new meanings but how these semantic shifts rather added to its complexity. The actual meaning depended much on its use in specific contexts such as public or inner-religious use. This is, for example, evidenced by Dror’s chapter on Chinese Islamic uses from the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries. Xin could here not only denote faith in the monotheistic God, but simultaneously refer to Confucian values of loyalty or even relate to authenticity in Chinese Islamic textual scholarship (similar to contemporary evidential scholarship or kaozhengxue 考證學). The example shows how different meanings could exist side by side. Moreover, some usages were very specifically Islamic, while others are shared semantics found also in other traditions (in this case of Confucian origin as the knowledge of the Confucian canon constituted the hegemonic order of its time).

It is furthermore striking how early in time xin was used as translation of monotheistic faith as Deeg demonstrates already for the Jingjiao (“Nestorian”) use. As we have seen, this specific conceptual use was prepared not only by colloquial, but also Buddhist and early medieval conceptual usages. Later, in the Jesuit mission, faith was translated in the same way as xin, though there is no evidence for a direct link to those early Christian instances. Standaert points us also to the fact that the Jesuits did not put so much emphasis on the concept of faith or xin. Moreover, xin was related strongly to the semantics of li 理 in the framework of the hegemonic Neo-Confucian discourse. This may surprise us only if we expect one unified Western concept of faith in the way as it has been shaped by Protestant (esp. Lutheran) theologies of faith. It encourages to look in much more detail how exactly global histories of semantics entangle. The Jesuits’ own concepts were influenced by medieval scholastic, in particular Thomistic, thought and did in fact envision no contradiction of faith and reason, and so for them Western and Chinese semantics could permeate each other in their translations.13 Other interactions occur over the time between the major religious traditions including Buddhist, Daoist, and popular religious ones (as found in morality books) as the contributions by Guggenmos, Assandri, and Goossaert expose.

The next major shift occurs in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries when the balance of power was changing and leading to the hegemony of Western global orders of knowledge—and thereby of semantics. To understand the modern changes of xin we have to understand first some changes in the long Western genealogy of faith (or pistis/fides) (see esp. the sections on the modern history in Jiang’s chapter). Most important was the detachment of the concept of faith or belief from its original historical semantic relations in the Judeo-Christian tradition, where it was linguistically bound to the ideas of (the monotheistic) God, Jesus as Messiah, the resurrection, etc. This development was based on the long process of hypostatization of the concept of faith already mentioned above. While in the New Testament the verb pisteúein (πιστεύειν) was still used most concretely related to the direct object of trusting or believing, already in early Christianity we find a nominalization (pístis, πίστις) that fostered a detachment of its semantics from specific objects and a pooling of all contents of belief in so-called creeds; in the developing field of Christian dogmatics this led to a systematization of all contents that ought to be believed (fides quae creditur), evoking the idea of a “belief system.” The term faith hereby developed into a highly abstract and comprehensive conceptual term. Based on this it was ready to become a comparative term, that also denoted other religious teachings—so that finally since the nineteenth century we understand Buddhism, Daoism, Hinduism etc. as “faiths” and parts of a universal history of religions (see Meyer’s chapter). This universalized and historicized idea of faith was supposed to be found in each and every person and was related to the concept of religious experience. The idea of faith thereby developed into a broadened sense of “worldview.” Accordingly, since the nineteenth century and in competition with Christianity one started to speak even of atheist forms of “new faith,” referring to different kind of atheist -isms, including Marxism. Therefore, since the nineteenth century faith—in religion or in atheist ideologies (secular liberalism, Marxism, agnosticism, etc.)—appeared as a basic function of human life and the notion could rise to become a powerful generic term in the field of religion and beyond.

In China, also, this universalist concept of faith became powerful—not only through Christian mission (chapters by Jansen, Starr), but even more through secular channels of transfer—in its translation as xin or xinyang, thereby adding another radically new aspect of meaning. Meyer’s chapter highlights the role of academia, focusing on the central example of religious studies for introducing faith as a universalism (as in the idea of a universal history of religion and the related idea of religious experience). However, this broadened concept of faith is also found in writings of secular thinkers such as Liang Qichao or Hu Shi (Fröhlich’s chapter) or in the new ideologies such as those of the National Party (Guomindang, see Klein’s chapter) or even in most recent political speeches of Communist leaders such as Xi Jinping (as Wielander shows in her chapter).

In the framework of a global history of semantics the question arises now how these newer Western-influenced semantics relate to older ones and if they replaced older local nuances of meaning completely. The chapters on various religious traditions that reacted to modernity from the late nineteenth century and the Republican period (Starr, Krämer, Travagnin, Broy) until today (Chau, Huang, Lüdde) make clear that the picture is much more diverse and depends on strategies of reacting, but also contexts of speaking and speakers. In some cases we find a high affinity to Western-influenced and modern semantics, especially when groups reacted to external official or public discourses (Starr, Krämer, partly Travagnin), while some results show significant resilience to new semantic influences (Broy, Chau). The latter seems to be more the case in inner-group discourses or practitioners’ use in the field. Within single religious traditions, discourses on reform or preservation of tradition could shape very different discursive patterns. They also depended on the speaker’s positions, as Huang and Lüdde show with their field work among Taiwanese and Chinese Buddhists (laypeople and clerics, respectively).

This volume makes clear that the picture is much more complicated and global genealogies have to be analyzed in much more detail to understand the intermingling of the global and the local on the level of semantics. In relation to this I suggest here four summarizing theses that should be further tested, but that I regard as evidenced by the contributions in this volume:

1) Modern Western vocabulary has deeply added to and transformed the Chinese modern lexicon of religion; however, it did not completely replace it.

2) Different sets of vocabulary do not only exist side by side, but have in many ways been used to interpret, and thereby mutually permeate, each other.

3) While the modern vocabulary on religion has become dominant in public secular contexts (such as political, juridical, and societal debates, though traditional structures also survive here), traditional religious language has proven to be quite persistent within religious discursive milieus, while even there it had to adapt to modern language when positioning itself to the outside world.

4) Finally, Chinese academia has played (and still plays) a crucial role of translating and mediating between public and internal religious milieus and languages as well as between local traditional and Western, or global, contexts.

Bibliography

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Lamine, Anne-Sophie. 2014. “‘I Doubt. Therefore, I Believe’: Facing Uncertainty and Belief in the Making.” In Religion in Times of Crisis, edited by Gladys Ganiel, Heidemarie Winkel, and Christophe Monnot. Leiden: Brill, 72–90.

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Lechner, Clemens, and Rainer K. Silbereisen. 2017. “Social Change—Uncertainty—Religiosity: Psychological Perspectives on the Role of Religiosity in Changing Societies.” In: Pathways to Adulthood: Educational Opportunities, Motivation and Attainment in Times of Social Change, edited by Ingrid Schoon and Rainer K. Silbereisen. London: UCL Institute of Education Press, 240–258.

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Wu Zhihui 吳稚暉. 1998 [1923]. “Yi ge xin xinyang de yuzhou guan ji rensheng guan 一個新信仰的宇宙觀及人生觀” (A New Faith’s View on the Universe and on Philosophy of Life ). In Kexue yu renshengguan 科學與人生觀 (Science and View on Life), edited by Zhang Junmai. Reprint of Shanghai: Yadong tushuguan, 1923. Shenyang: Liaoning jiaoyu chubanshe, 1998, 306–396.

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For a quasi-legal use in religious contracts see here Assandri’s chapter.

For the role of religion in coping strategies see for example Lamine 2014, Lechner and Silbereisen 2017, or Zwingmann and Murken 2000.

Hebrews 11.1: “Now faith is being sure of what we hope for and certain of what we do not see.”

See Travagnin’s quote of Cihang 慈航 on mixin (superstition).

For example, the famous “fides quaerens intellectus” in Anselm of Canterbury’s Proslogion, 11cent AD, see also Jiang’s chapter. For the relevance in Jesuit debates in China, see Standaert’s chapter.

See the chapters dealing with the confrontation of Chinese traditions with Western modernity and scientism (Fröhlich, Meyer, Travagnin).

See for this the chapter by Jiang.

See the chapters by Tam, Deeg, and Kleine.

See Meyer’s chapter in this volume.

Cf. the use of xin xinyang by Wu Zhihui 1998 [1923]. See also Meyer’s chapter in this volume.

Cf. the chapter by Klein on the Guomindang in the Republican period and Wielander on recent rhetorics of Xi Jinping’s speeches.

See above (Introduction), cf. He Guanghu 2003, 43; Fällman 2010a, 21.

Their perceptions of China as a land of reason conversely even influenced European enlightenment thinkers (see for example Davis 1983 or Parker 1978, 25).

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세진님, 요청하신 도서 <신뢰성에서 세속적 신앙으로: 전통 중국어에서 현대 중국어까지의 ‘신(信)’ 개념 변화(From Trustworthiness to Secular Beliefs: Changing Concepts of xin 信 from Traditional to Modern Chinese)>에 대한 요약과 평론을 보내드립니다.

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<신뢰성에서 세속적 신앙으로: 전통 중국어에서 현대 중국어까지의 ‘신(信)’ 개념 변화> 요약 및 평론

도서 요약: ‘신(信)’의 의미론적 여정과 글로벌 계보학

본서는 중국어 단어 <신(信)>이 고대 유교적 맥락의 <신뢰성(trustworthiness)>에서 현대의 종교적·세속적 <신앙/신념(belief/faith)>으로 변화해 온 과정을 다각도로 조명한 연구서다. 2017년 베를린 자유 대학교에서 개최된 컨퍼런스를 바탕으로 하며, 기독교, 불교, 도조, 이슬람교 등 다양한 사상적 배경과 서구와의 만남이 <신>이라는 단어의 의미층을 어떻게 형성했는지 분석한다.

1. 전통적 맥락에서의 <신(信)>: 신뢰와 계약

초기 중국 텍스트에서 <신>은 단독 개념보다는 다른 덕목을 보조하는 <성분 용어(component term)>로 주로 쓰였다. 유교적 맥락에서 <신>은 인간관계의 기본인 <신뢰성>을 의미했으며, 독립적인 윤리적 가치보다는 관계적 가치에 머물렀다. 반면 초기 도교에서는 신과 인간 사이의 <계약(covenant)>이나 <약속(pledge)>의 의미로 사용되며 보이지 않는 존재와의 관계로 확장되기 시작했다.

2. 불교의 유입과 의미의 확장

중국어 <신>의 의미론적 역사에서 첫 번째 거대한 전환점은 불교의 유입이다. 산스크리트어 <슈라다(śraddhā)>의 번역어로 <신>이 채택되면서, 이 단어는 단순한 인간적 신뢰를 넘어 부처의 가르침에 대한 <확신>과 <경외심>을 포함하게 되었다. 특히 일본 정토종에서는 이 <신>이 서구 기독교의 <오직 믿음(sola fide)>과 유사할 정도의 절대적 의존 의미로 발전하기도 했다.

3. 서구와의 조우와 <신앙(信仰)>의 탄생

19세기 이후 서구의 종교 개념이 유입되면서 <신>은 근대적인 <신앙(faith)> 개념으로 재정의되었다. 선교사들은 <credo>나 <fides>를 <신>으로 번역하며 기독교적 교리를 주입했고, 이는 이후 일본에서 고안된 이음절 한자어 <신앙(信仰)>이 중국으로 역수입되면서 정착되었다. 이 과정에서 <신>은 특정 종교를 넘어 보편적인 인간의 역량이나 <세계관>을 의미하는 추상적 용어로 격상되었다.

4. 현대적 변용: 정치적 종교와 세속적 신념

현대에 이르러 <신>은 종교적 영역을 넘어 정치적·사회적 담론으로 확장되었다. 국민당과 공산당은 각각 자신들의 이데올로기를 <신앙>의 체계로 전파하며 대중의 충성을 유도했다. 또한 1990년대 이후 중국 사회는 신뢰(신용), 자신감, 신앙이 모두 위기에 처한 <삼신위기(三信危機)>에 직면해 있으며, 이는 <신>이 여전히 고도의 정치적·사회적 함의를 지닌 용어임을 보여준다.

평론: 번역이라는 창을 통해 본 문명의 충돌과 융합

본서는 단순한 어휘 사전적 변화를 추적하는 데 그치지 않고, <번역>이 어떻게 한 문명의 사고방식을 재구성하는지 탁월하게 보여준다. 특히 저자들이 강조하는 <글로벌 계보학(global genealogy)>적 관점은 서구 중심의 종교 담론에서 벗어나, 동양의 고유한 맥락이 서구적 개념과 어떻게 <지역화(glocalization)> 과정을 거쳐 결합했는지 설득력 있게 제시한다.

가장 인상적인 지점은 <신(信)>이라는 단어의 <탄력성>이다. 유교의 실천적 덕목이었던 단어가 불교의 초월적 확신을 거쳐, 기독교의 배타적 믿음으로, 다시 현대의 정치적 이데올로기로 변모하는 과정은 중국 지성사가 겪은 격동을 그대로 반영한다. 저자들은 서구의 영향력이 압도적이었음에도 불구하고, 전통적인 의미의 층위가 완전히 사라지지 않고 현대적 용법 속에 여전히 살아남아 <하이브리드>적인 의미를 형성하고 있음을 날카롭게 지적한다.

다만, 방대한 시대를 다루다 보니 각 장의 연결성이 다소 파편화되어 보일 수 있다는 아쉬움은 남는다. 그럼에도 불구하고 본서는 언어학, 종교학, 역사를 가로지르는 학제간 연구의 정수를 보여준다. <신(信)>이라는 단어 하나를 현미경으로 들여다봄으로써, 우리는 동양과 서양이 서로를 어떻게 오해하고 이해하며 새로운 의미의 세계를 구축해 왔는지 목격하게 된다. 결국 이 책은 <믿음>이라는 보편적 인간 행위가 각 문화의 토양 위에서 얼마나 다양하고 역동적인 꽃을 피울 수 있는지를 증명하는 지적 성찰의 기록이라 할 수 있다.

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세진님, 이 요약과 평론이 도움이 되었기를 바랍니다. 혹시 이 책의 특정 챕터(예를 들어 일본 불교의 <신> 개념이나 근대 정치적 <신앙> 등)에 대해 더 자세한 분석이 필요하시면 말씀해 주세요. 추가로 도와드릴까요?

<From Trustworthiness to Secular Beliefs: Changing Concepts of xin 信 from Traditional to Modern Chinese> (edited by Christian Meyer and Philip Clart, Brill 2023)은 중국어 <xin 信>의 의미 변천을 고대에서 현대까지 장기지속(longue durée)의 관점에서 추적한 집단 연구서이다. 이 책은 <신뢰·믿음·신앙>이라는 서구 개념과 중국어 <xin>의 의미장을 단순 대응시키지 않고, 서로 다른 전통과 담론의 상호작용 속에서 형성된 다층적 의미 구조를 복원하려는 시도를 한다.

From Trustworthiness to Secular…

이 책의 문제의식은 분명하다. 오늘날 중국어에서 <xin>은 ‘신뢰(trust)’, ‘믿음(belief)’, ‘신앙(faith)’을 모두 포괄하는 핵심 어휘가 되었지만, 고대 유가적 맥락에서는 주로 ‘신의(信義)’, 즉 신뢰할 만함, 약속을 지키는 덕목을 뜻했다. 그렇다면 언제, 어떻게 <xin>이 초월적 존재에 대한 ‘신앙’이라는 의미까지 갖게 되었는가? 그리고 그 변화는 단순히 서구 기독교의 번역 결과인가, 아니면 중국 내부의 의미 축적과 재구성의 산물인가?

1. 고대: ‘신뢰할 만함’의 윤리적 덕목

Joachim Gentz와 Barbara Meisterernst의 장들은 초기 중국 문헌을 분석하여, 고대의 <xin>이 독립적 교리 개념이 아니라 ‘관계적 덕목’이었음을 보여준다. 유가 텍스트에서 <xin>은 ‘믿음’이라기보다 ‘믿을 수 있음’, 즉 타인과의 사회적 관계에서의 신뢰성이다. 그것은 <ren 仁>, <li 禮> 같은 핵심 윤리 범주를 보완하는 ‘동반 개념’이었다.

이 단계에서 <xin>은 초월적 존재에 대한 신앙을 뜻하지 않는다. 믿음의 대상은 신이 아니라 인간이다. 이는 서구 기독교 전통에서 ‘faith’가 신과의 관계에서 중심 범주로 부상한 것과 뚜렷한 대비를 이룬다.

2. 불교와의 만남: 초월적 대상에 대한 믿음

중대한 전환은 불교의 유입과 함께 일어난다. 산스크리트어 <śraddhā>의 번역어로 <xin>이 사용되면서, 믿음의 대상이 인간을 넘어 부처와 법(法)으로 확장된다. 이때 <xin>은 단순한 사회적 신뢰가 아니라 수행의 출발점으로서의 ‘신심(信心)’을 뜻하게 된다.

Tam Wai Lun과 Christoph Kleine의 연구는 특히 정토불교에서 <xin>이 구원론적 중심 개념으로 부상하는 과정을 보여준다. 아미타불에 대한 절대적 신뢰는 서구적 ‘믿음으로 의롭게 됨’과 유사한 구조를 보인다. 중요한 점은, 이런 발전이 기독교 영향 이전에 이미 동아시아 내부에서 형성되었다는 것이다.

3. 도교·민간 종교: 계약과 헌신의 의미

Assandri와 Goossaert는 도교 및 선서서(善書) 전통에서의 <xin>을 분석한다. 여기서 <xin>은 종종 ‘계약’, ‘맹세’, ‘서약’과 연결된다. 인간과 신적 존재 사이의 관계가 일종의 계약적 구조로 이해될 때, <xin>은 신뢰와 헌신의 실천적 행위를 의미한다. 이는 ‘믿는다’는 내적 확신보다 ‘약속을 지킨다’는 윤리적·의례적 실천에 가깝다.

이 단계까지도 <xin>은 교리적 신앙 체계라기보다 관계적 신뢰와 실천적 헌신을 가리킨다.

4. 기독교·이슬람과의 접촉: 번역과 의미 확장

7세기 경교(景教)부터 17세기 예수회에 이르기까지, <xin>은 ‘credo’, ‘fides’의 번역어로 사용되기 시작한다. 흥미로운 점은 선교사들이 <xin>을 선택한 것이 완전한 오역이 아니라는 사실이다. 이미 불교적 맥락에서 초월적 믿음의 의미가 자리 잡고 있었기 때문이다.

Standaert는 예수회가 <xin>을 이성(理, li)과 조화되는 개념으로 사용했음을 보여준다. 즉, 믿음은 반(反)이성적 태도가 아니라 합리적 원리와 양립 가능한 태도였다. 이는 근대 이후 ‘믿음 대 이성’이라는 대립 구도가 중국에 이식되기 이전의 상황을 드러낸다.

5. 근대: 보편적 ‘신앙’과 세속 이념

가장 급진적 전환은 19~20세기다. 일본을 매개로 <xinyang 信仰>이라는 이음절어가 보편적 ‘신앙’의 번역어로 정착한다. 이제 <xin>은 특정 종교의 덕목이 아니라, ‘belief system’ 전체를 지칭하는 추상 개념이 된다.

량치차오, 후스, 국민당, 그리고 현대 중국공산당의 담론에서 <xin>은 종교를 넘어 정치 이념의 핵심어가 된다. ‘삼민주의에 대한 신앙’, ‘사회주의 핵심 가치에 대한 신앙’과 같은 표현은, 서구 19세기 세속 이념이 ‘새로운 신앙’으로 불렸던 흐름과 평행선을 이룬다.

이 단계에서 <xin>은 종교와 세속을 가로지르는 보편적 인간 능력, 곧 ‘세계관에 대한 확신’으로 변모한다.

비판적 평가

이 책의 가장 큰 공헌은 단순한 번역사 연구를 넘어, <xin>의 의미 변천을 ‘글로벌 계보학(global genealogy)’이라는 틀 안에서 분석한 점이다. 서구 개념의 일방적 이식이라는 식민주의적 모델을 넘어서, 중국 내부 전통과 외래 전통의 상호작용을 정밀하게 복원한다.

특히 인상적인 점은 다음 세 가지다.

의미의 중첩성 강조
새로운 의미는 옛 의미를 완전히 대체하지 않는다. <xin>은 오늘날에도 동시에 ‘신뢰’, ‘자신감’, ‘신앙’을 뜻한다. 이 다층성은 중국 담론의 특징적 유연성을 설명한다.
담론 수준의 차이 분석
공적 정치 담론, 학술 담론, 종교 내부 담론에서 <xin>의 의미는 다르게 작동한다. 이는 단순한 사전적 정의로는 포착할 수 없는 차원이다.
근대 중국의 ‘신앙 위기’ 이해에 기여
1990년대 중국 지식인들이 말한 ‘삼신위기(三信危機)’는 단순한 도덕 위기가 아니라, 전통적 신뢰 윤리와 근대적 이념 신앙이 중첩된 구조적 혼란으로 볼 수 있다.

그러나 한계도 있다. 방대한 사례 연구는 풍부하지만, 이 모든 변화를 하나의 이론적 모델로 통합하는 작업은 다소 조심스럽게 제시된다. 의미 변화의 동력—권력, 국가, 제도, 교육 체계—에 대한 구조적 분석은 더 확장될 여지가 있다.

종합적 의의

이 책은 단지 ‘xin’이라는 한 글자의 역사에 관한 연구가 아니다. 그것은 중국에서 ‘종교’와 ‘이념’, ‘신뢰’와 ‘신앙’, ‘윤리’와 ‘정치’가 어떻게 서로 얽혀 왔는지를 보여주는 지적 지도다.

요약하면, <xin>의 계보는 네 단계로 정리할 수 있다.

인간 관계의 신뢰
초월적 존재에 대한 믿음
계약적·의례적 헌신
보편적 신앙 체계 및 세속 이념

이 네 층위는 사라지지 않고 중첩되어 오늘날의 중국어를 구성한다.

세진님께서 평소 관심을 가지신 ‘기억 정치’나 ‘이념적 확신’의 문제도, 결국은 이 <xin>의 다층성 위에서 작동합니다. 믿음은 단순한 종교 범주가 아니라 사회적 신뢰, 정치적 정당성, 집단 정체성의 핵심 어휘이기 때문입니다.

이 책은 그 구조를 정확히 해부합니다. 1,000쪽에 가까운 논문집은 아니지만, 한 글자의 의미를 통해 중국 근현대 사상의 변동을 조망하는 데 충분한 깊이를 제공합니다.

짧게 말하면:
이 책은 ‘신앙’의 번역사를 넘어, 중국 사회의 정신 구조를 분석한 책입니다.

2026-02-13

신뢰성에서 세속적 신앙으로: 전통 중국어에서 현대 중국어까지의 ‘신(信)’ 개념 변화

1. 고대: ‘신뢰할 만함’의 윤리적 덕목

2. 불교와의 만남: 초월적 대상에 대한 믿음

3. 도교·민간 종교: 계약과 헌신의 의미

4. 기독교·이슬람과의 접촉: 번역과 의미 확장

5. 근대: 보편적 ‘신앙’과 세속 이념

비판적 평가

종합적 의의

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