Wait, Why Is Israel Allowed To Have Nukes?
According to our elected leaders, we should be very scared of the possibility that Iran could get a nuclear bomb. But Israel already has them, and its government is increasingly unstable and belligerent.
Alex Skopic
filed 20 June 2025 in Israel/Palestine
Among U.S. politicians, there’s one consistent narrative you’ll hear repeated over and over. Iran, the story goes, must not be allowed to develop a nuclear weapon. Iran is unstable and untrustworthy; Iran is theocratic; Iran is evil. Supposedly serious adults, like Senator Ted Cruz, will use the words “the bad guys” to describe the country, like three-year-olds playing with action figures. And because Iranians are “the bad guys,” it’s supposedly legitimate to attack and kill them in order to prevent them from ever getting that terrifying nuke. Donald Trump is considering that very move now, posting in all-caps that “IRAN CAN NOT HAVE A NUCLEAR WEAPON!” and threatening to assassinate Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei. On Twitter, JD Vance echoes Trump, threatening “action to end Iranian enrichment.” But it’s not just Republicans. Trump and Vance have been egged on by their ostensible enemy, Democratic minority leader Chuck Schumer, who recently condemned the president for attempting nuclear negotiations, calling him a “chicken” who would “let Iran get away with everything.” John Fetterman, the most bellicose member of the Democratic caucus, just comes out and says it: “I really hope the president finally does bomb and destroy the Iranians.” Both of them have repeated the “Iran cannot have a nuclear weapon” mantra to justify beating the drum for war.
But there’s a sword of Damocles hanging over this whole situation, one nobody wants to acknowledge. If the possibility that Iran might get a nuclear weapon is so scary, why do none of our leaders seem to be worried about Israel, which already has a secretive nuclear arsenal of its own, and is acting more violently unstable by the day?
According to estimates by the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, published recently in the New York Times, Israel has “at least 90 [nuclear] warheads and enough fissile material to produce up to hundreds more.” President Jimmy Carter, who was in a position to know, said in 2014 that he believed the number is closer to “300 or more, nobody knows exactly how many.” In either case, this is more nukes than another country we’re routinely told to be terrified of: North Korea, which the Center estimates possesses “20 to 30 possibly assembled warheads.” These Israeli warheads can be delivered in a variety of ways, including by U.S.-made fighter jets, by German-made “Dolphin” submarines, and by a variety of missiles—including the Jericho 3, an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) that came online in 2011. Describing the early tests of this missile, Isaac Ben-Israel—who was both a scientist, a retired IDF general, and a member of the Knesset at the time—said in 2008 that “everybody can do the math and understand… that we can reach with a rocket engine to every point in the world.” If that’s not a thinly veiled threat, nothing is.
Of course, we don’t know exactly how many nuclear warheads Israel has, because Israeli leaders refuse to publicly admit they have any. The whole military program is kept in near-total secrecy, under a policy called “strategic ambiguity,” meaning the existence of the bombs is neither confirmed nor denied. Historians believe Israel first got a nuclear weapon in 1967, after secretly refining plutonium at the Dimona facility and running a “full deception campaign” to convince U.S. inspectors the purpose of the reactors there was civilian rather than military. (Ironically, this is exactly the kind of deception Israel now accuses Iran of practicing.) It’s also strongly suspected that Israel tested a nuclear weapon off the coast of South Africa in 1979, in partnership with that country’s apartheid government. It’s called the Vela incident, after the spy satellite that spotted the nuclear flash. But “strategic ambiguity” means there’s little international oversight or accountability involved with any of this, and much of it takes place in violation of international law. Like North Korea and a small handful of other nations, Israel has not signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), despite United Nations resolutions that it should do so. It has signed the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963, but likely broke it with the South African incident. And most importantly, its leaders refuse to allow inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to access Dimona, so we have no way of knowing what’s going on in there.
Under U.S. law, Israel’s rogue nuclear program means that the United States should not be supplying it with military aid of any kind. The law in question is the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976, and its language is unambiguous. But for more than 50 years now, U.S. leaders have been willing to ignore their own laws and accept this uneasy state of affairs. A 1993 report by the congressional Office of Technology Assessment, titled “Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks,” sums up the rationale well: “would the United States be willing to sacrifice its relationship with Israel—and possibly risk Israeli national survival—to pressure that state to give up a nuclear arsenal it believes essential to its security?”
For successive administrations, the answer has been no. It would be easier, and cause fewer problems, to just let the issue be. For their part, heads of state from Yitzhak Rabin to Benjamin Netanyahu have pledged that Israel would not “be the first to introduce nuclear weapons” in the Middle East. Even that is another example of the “strategic ambiguity” at work, because “introduce” can be taken to mean Israel would not create weapons it already has (a lie,) or to mean it won’t use or publicly acknowledge them. But the underlying assumption for U.S. policymakers—tinged, it has to be said, with Islamophobia and anti-Arab racism—has been that Israelis are responsible stewards of the bomb, in a way that Egyptians or Jordanians, or most of all Iranians, would not be. The problem is, when we look at Israel’s actions and not its words, there’s a strong case to doubt that assessment—and the situation has gotten dramatically worse in the last few years.
For example, one of the most common reasons given for why Iran “CAN NOT HAVE A NUCLEAR WEAPON!” is that, having got them, Iran might share its nuclear weapons with the various militant groups it has alliances with across the Middle East, like Hezbollah. This isn’t a completely baseless concern. Nuclear proliferation is a very real threat, and nobody wants uranium or plutonium getting into the hands of terrorists. But once again, Israel is guilty of the very offense its supporters lay at Iran’s door.
As a Guardian investigation revealed in 2010, Israeli officials didn’t just conduct a likely nuclear test with apartheid South Africa back in the 1970s. They also tried to sell nuclear weapons to apartheid South Africa. As Ta-Nehisi Coates and others have written, the two regimes had a natural affinity, since Israel, too, is an apartheid state; in their official publications, South African officials would write that both nations were “situated in a predominantly hostile world inhabited by dark peoples.” For years, Israel defied international arms embargoes to trade conventional arms with South Africa. And in the documents uncovered by the Guardian, it’s revealed that Shimon Peres—then Israel’s defense minister, and later its president—offered to sell an early model of the Jericho missile to South Africa in 1975. In response, Lieutenant General R.F. Armstrong stipulated he would only accept if the missiles were “armed with nuclear warheads.” Peres agreed, reportedly saying that “the correct payload was available in three sizes,” only for the deal to fall apart because of the high cost. But the relationship wasn’t a complete bust: as the Guardian reports, “South Africa also provided much of the yellowcake uranium that Israel required to develop its weapons.” Does this sound like the behavior of a nation that can be trusted to act responsibly with the most lethal weapons ever created?
If not, don’t worry. It gets much worse. Since the October 7 attacks and Israel’s brutal collective punishment of Gaza, Netanyahu and his Likud government have become more and more erratic, unpredictable, and belligerent with every passing month. There’s really no other term for it: they’re operating like a dangerous rogue state. By itself, the assault on Gaza—which has included countless war crimes, and is now recognized by major human rights groups as a genocide—is enough to show Israel no longer cares about human rights or international law, if it ever did. Netanyahu himself now has a warrant for his arrest from the International Criminal Court, but rather than show any contrition for the more than 55,700 dead Palestinians on his ledger, he’s ranted that “No one will stop us—not the Hague.” That’s the kind of thing Slobodan Milošević would have said at the height of the Bosnian genocide, and it’s at least as bad as anything the Ayatollah has ever come out with.
But beyond Gaza, Netanyahu has taken this moment to attack and threaten his neighbors, too. There was the terror attack with the exploding pagers in Lebanon and Syria, which was illegal under international law and had horrifying collateral damage, including at least two dead children. (The attack has since become an inspiration for anti-Muslim terrorism generally, including an anonymous assassination threat which told New York City mayoral candidate Zohran Mamdani to “check your beeper” this week.) There was the April 2024 bombing of the Iranian consulate in Damascus, also illegal under international law according to UN experts. There was the December 2024 assault against Syria, which barely made a blip in the U.S. press, but included “480 strikes across the country over the past two days, hitting most of Syria’s strategic weapon stockpiles” and “destroyed the Syrian fleet overnight.” Israel also took this opportunity to seize territory within southern Syria, and promises to occupy it “indefinitely.” Again, this is something international law takes a dim view on.
Worst of all, Israeli leaders have begun making direct nuclear threats.
As Seymour Hersh documents in his book of the same name, Israeli nuclear policy includes something called the “Samson Option.” It’s named after the biblical story of Samson, a hero with incredible strength who was captured by Philistines, but single-handedly yanked out the pillars of the building where he was chained up, killing both himself and his captors. In the modern world, the Samson Option refers to the idea that, if they ever perceive an “imminent, existential threat” to the country’s existence, Israeli leaders may deploy their nuclear weapons widely and indiscriminately, lashing out with “deliberate, disproportionate nuclear strikes against non-military targets, such as cities.” It’s a more extreme form of the already horrifying idea of “mutually assured destruction,” in which only one party possesses nuclear weapons and only its opponents’ destruction is assured. There are historical reasons for this; like so much in Israeli politics, the doctrine is informed by the “never again” mentality of early Israeli leaders for whom the Holocaust was a not-too-distant memory. But in today’s world, it’s the possibility of Israeli nuclear strikes that’s the real threat—to the Middle East, to the wider world, and even to Israel itself.
In September 2023, in the same breath as he promised to “do everything in my power to prevent Iran from getting nuclear weapons,” Benjamin Netanyahu also said that “above all, Iran must face a credible nuclear threat.” He immediately walked the comment back, but the damage was done. He’d admitted what everyone paying attention already knew: that the very “nuclear threat” Israeli leaders claim to fear from Iran is one they direct at Iran on a regular basis. Other members of his Likud Party have gone further. Shortly after the October 7 attacks, a Likud member of the Knesset named Revital Gotliv urged Netanyahu to use a nuclear weapon on Gaza, posting online:
Jericho missile! Jericho missile! A strategic alert, before we consider introducing our forces. A doomsday weapon! This is my opinion[...] Israel must use everything in its arsenal.
Another post from Gotliv soon followed:
Only an explosion that shakes the Middle East will restore this country’s dignity, strength, and security! It’s time to kiss doomsday.
Now, you could write this off as the rantings of a lone extremist, especially in the wake of a genuinely traumatic event like October 7. But what Gotliv’s saying here is in perfect accordance with the longstanding concept of the Samson Option. You perceive an existential threat—rightly or wrongly—and you lash out with everything in your arsenal. And Gotliv isn’t alone. In a November 2023 radio interview, Amichai Eliyahu—a member of the far-right Otzma Yehudit party, and a minister in Netanyahu’s government—also endorsed the idea of using a nuclear weapon on Gaza:
INTERVIEWER: Your expectation is that tomorrow morning we’d drop what amounts to some kind of a nuclear bomb on all of Gaza, flattening them, eliminating everybody there.
ELIYAHU: That’s one way.
Shortly thereafter, Netanyahu suspended Eliyahu from his ministerial duties—but, notably, did not fire him or ask him to resign. In 2024, Eliyahu doubled down on his statement, saying that “even in the Hague they know my position.” Despite this, he’s still the country’s Heritage Minister, and both he and Gotliv are still MKs in good standing. Taken together, this shows that, far from being an unthinkable last resort, the idea of using a nuclear weapon is just becoming an acceptable part of the political discourse in Israel, especially on the right.
And then there’s Netanyahu himself, who was increasingly corrupt and autocratic even before the Gaza genocide. Before October 7, his biggest political priority was to force sweeping structural changes to the Israeli government, which would strip power from the judiciary and concentrate it in the hands of the ruling Likud Party. Even writers like the Atlantic’s Anne Applebaum, who’s certainly no radical critic of Israel, called his actions an “attack on democracy” that could create “an undemocratic Israel, a de facto autocracy.” (For Palestinians in the Occupied Territories, of course, autocracy is nothing new.) There’s also the fact—widely reported in the Israeli press, but almost completely ignored in the U.S.—that Netanyahu personally backed Hamas for years, in order to undermine the Palestinian Authority, keep the West Bank and Gaza divided, and prevent a unified Palestinian state from ever emerging. And since 2019, he’s been under indictment for three separate cases of corruption. As even the New York Times’ Thomas Friedman, another firmly pro-Israel writer, admits, many of his decisions are driven by a simple calculus: “he must stay in power to stay out of prison.”
One way of staying in power is by prolonging the mass murder of the Palestinian people. Another way is by launching attacks on Iran, extending Israel’s seemingly never-ending state of crisis even further. If he’s really lucky, and if Donald Trump is particularly stupid and reckless, Netanyahu may even be able to lure the United States in to attack Iran for him. It’s usually a mistake to focus too much on Netanyahu as an individual, because Israel’s violence against Palestinians and others long predates him, and wouldn’t be solved just by removing him from office. But when we’re talking about nuclear weapons, he’s the man with his finger on the red button, and that’s not an encouraging thought. We already know he’ll commit war crimes and boast about it; how much further would he be willing to go?
Even a single nuclear bomb, dropped on a city in Gaza or Yemen or Iran, would be a horror. Hiroshima would be nothing by comparison, because modern nuclear weapons are capable of doing many times the damage. Hundreds of thousands of people would turn instantly to ash; many more would get cancer, radiation poisoning, and other debilitating health conditions in the weeks and months that followed. The air and water would be poisonous for years. But a so-called “regional” nuclear war would be devastating to the rest of the world too, far beyond the Middle East. As the Nobel Prize-winning group International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War warns, “a nuclear war using as few as 100 weapons anywhere in the world would disrupt the global climate and agricultural production so severely that the lives of more than two billion people would be in jeopardy from mass starvation,” mainly because it would create enormous clouds of smoke and soot, send temperatures plummeting, and kill everyone’s crops. In other words, Israel—more so than North Korea, Iran, or any of the official “bad” countries—now possesses the ability to plunge great chunks of the world’s population into nuclear winter. And in either scenario, a single bomb or many, Israel would not escape unscathed. Being in the near neighborhood of a nuclear blast, its people would also get cancer and radiation poisoning and dead crops and starvation, just like the people in whatever unhappy country received the strike. In the story of Samson, Samson dies too.
This nightmare scenario has to be prevented, and that means changing the political narrative. When we think about threats to humanity’s collective safety, nuclear weapons are near the top of the list, rivaled only by climate change and pandemic disease. But it’s not only North Korea’s nuclear weapons, or Pakistan’s, or Russia’s, or even the possibility that Iran might one day get them that we have to consider. Israel’s arsenal is also a threat. As we’ve seen, it’s actually one of the more worrying threats. For the Middle East and the wider world to truly be secure, Israel’s nuclear stockpile needs to be reduced and ultimately eliminated, just like all the others.
Fortunately, there are ways of doing that. For its part, Iranian officials have consistently said that what they want is a nuclear weapon free zone (NWFZ) covering the entire Middle East. In other words, the moment Israel denuclearizes, Iran would also abandon any ambitions for a nuclear bomb. So the main reason the supposed Iranian nuclear threat exists, and U.S. politicians are now debating whether or not to bomb Iran, is because the threat of Israeli nukes already exists. (For more on this, see the relevant chapter in The Myth of American Idealism.) A nuclear weapon free zone is not a theoretical concept; both Africa and South America are already covered by NWFZs, and it works quite well. (There are no nuclear weapons in Africa or South America.) Israeli leaders could even use denuclearization as a bargaining chip, trading a reduction of X number of warheads for concessions from Iran or any of their other regional antagonists.
This would require changing U.S. politics first. For decades, across both Democratic and Republican administrations, the United States has consistently backed Israel with financial and military aid in all its conflicts, only occasionally using its vast leverage to stop Israeli leaders from doing something really disastrous. It’s always been an untenable situation, but in the era of the Gaza genocide, it’s indefensible. If it really wants peace, the United States ought to position itself as a neutral diplomatic broker—neither an ally, nor necessarily an opponent, of Israel, Iran, or any other country in the region. Only then can it strike deals that benefit everyone and lead to actual peace and stability, which the Israel alliance has categorically failed to bring about. Again, this isn’t theoretical. It’s precisely the stance China, a more sensible superpower in many ways, has taken in the Middle East. As a result, China was able to broker a historic normalization deal between Iran and Saudi Arabia in 2023. There’s no reason, other than the influence of myopic and war-hungry politicians like JD Vance or Chuck Schumer, that the United States can’t do the same.
Bizarrely, it’s the fringe elements of the Republican Party who seem to realize where things stand better than many of their Democratic counterparts. This week, national intelligence director Tulsi Gabbard took to Twitter with a video where she excoriated a “political elite and warmongers” who are “carelessly fomenting fear and tensions between nuclear powers,” and warned that the world is “on the brink of nuclear annihilation.” She seemed to be criticizing other factions within the Trump administration for their eagerness to strike Iran—perhaps even Donald Trump himself—and Trump reportedly became “incensed” and “expressed his disapproval to her personally” soon afterward. But Gabbard was entirely correct. So is Representative Thomas Massie of Kentucky, a libertarian whose ideas about other subjects are mostly horrible, but whose foreign policy positions are strangely good. Massie has introduced a War Powers Resolution in an effort to prevent the U.S. attacking Iran, which currently has 39 co-sponsors from both parties. And of all people, the disgraced former Representative Matt Gaetz has proposed Israeli denuclearization—or as conservative pundit Benny Johnson sums it up, “a dual disarmament deal, brokered by Trump, sealed with a Nobel Peace Prize.” Gaetz is loathsome in too many ways to count, and to anyone familiar with Trump’s record of bombing civilians in Yemen, the suggestion of giving him a Nobel is distasteful. But like Gabbard, Gaetz is right about this one issue. If President Deals could really pull such a thing off, he’d arguably deserve that Peace Prize more than Barack Obama or Henry Kissinger deserved theirs. At the very least, it’s better than what John Fetterman has in mind.
Right now, the United States is trying to defend a double standard, in which Israel can have all the nuclear weapons it wants—and talk threateningly about using them—but nobody else in the Middle East is allowed to make even tentative steps toward acquiring any. We’re now on the brink of a catastrophic war with Iran, all from trying to enforce that double standard. It’s not a sustainable situation. There are only two coherent stances: either Iran has just as much right to a nuclear weapon as Israel does, or neither country should have one. Of the two, the latter is obviously the safer option for everyone involved. There are practical and political obstacles to a nuclear-free Middle East, and they’re significant. But the consequences of not reaching one could be apocalyptic.
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<왜 이스라엘은 핵무기 보유가 허용되는가?>
(Wait, Why Is Israel Allowed To Have Nukes?)에 대한 요약과 평론
요약
이스라엘의 핵 보유에 대한 미국의 이중잣대와 그로 인한 중동의 핵 전쟁 위기를 다루고 있다. 미국 정치권은 공화당과 민주당을 가리지 않고 이란의 핵 개발을 절대 용납할 수 없는 악으로 규정하며 전쟁 불사론을 펼치고 있다. 그러나 정작 이스라엘은 이미 최소 90기에서 많게는 300기 이상의 핵탄두를 보유한 것으로 추정되며, 이는 북한의 보유량을 상회하는 수준이다.
이스라엘은 이른바 <전략적 모호성> 정책을 통해 핵 보유를 공식 부정하면서도 전 세계 어디든 타격 가능한 미사일 기술을 과시하며 주변국을 위협하고 있다. 특히 과거 아파르트헤이트 정권하의 남아프리카 공화국에 핵무기 판매를 시도했거나 함께 핵실험을 감행했다는 의혹 등 이스라엘의 과거 행적은 그들이 핵무기를 책임감 있게 관리해 왔다는 서구의 믿음을 정면으로 반박한다.
최근 가전쟁과 네타냐후 정부의 우경화는 이 위기를 심화시키고 있다. 이스라엘 내부에서는 가자에 핵을 투하하자는 주장이 공공연하게 나오고 있으며, 네타냐후 역시 이란에 대한 핵 위협을 숨기지 않는다. 이는 국가 존립 위기 시 핵무기를 무차별적으로 사용하는 <삼손 옵션> (Samson Option)이 단순한 이론을 넘어 실제적인 위협으로 부상했음을 시사한다.
글쓴이는 이 비극적 상황을 해결하기 위해 중동 전체를 <핵무기 없는 지대> (NWFZ)로 만들어야 한다고 주장한다. 이란은 이스라엘이 비핵화한다면 핵 야욕을 버리겠다는 의사를 지속적으로 밝혀왔다. 결국 미국이 이스라엘에 대한 맹목적 지지를 멈추고 중립적인 외교 중재자로 나서서 이스라엘의 핵을 제거하는 것만이 인류를 핵겨울의 위협으로부터 구하는 유일한 길이다.
평론
본 문건은 서구 언론과 정치권에서 금기시되는 이스라엘의 핵 보유 문제를 정면으로 응시하며, 국제 관계의 뿌리 깊은 이중잣대를 날카롭게 비판한다. 특히 이란을 <나쁜 놈들>로 규정하는 미국 정치인들의 유치한 이분법적 사고를 꼬집으며, 실질적인 핵 위협이 어디서 오고 있는지를 실증적인 수치와 역사적 사건(벨라 사건 등)을 통해 입증하는 과정이 논리적이다.
가장 인상적인 지점은 <삼손 옵션>이라는 성서적 비유를 통해 이스라엘의 핵 교리가 가진 자멸적 특성을 분석한 부분이다. 자신들이 죽더라도 적과 함께 죽겠다는 논리는 현대 국제 정치의 <상호 확증 파괴>보다 훨씬 불안정하고 위험한 광기를 내포하고 있다. 최근 이스라엘 극우 정치인들의 핵 사용 발언을 단순한 일탈이 아닌, 이러한 교리의 연장선상에서 파악한 통찰력은 현재 중동 정세의 위험성을 선명하게 보여준다.
다만, 해결책으로 제시된 <중동 비핵지대화>가 현재 네타냐후 정부의 호전성과 미국의 강력한 이스라엘 로비를 고려할 때 지나치게 이상적이라는 느낌을 지우기 어렵다. 그럼에도 불구하고 <이란도 핵을 가져야 하는가, 아니면 둘 다 없어야 하는가>라는 이지선다의 질문은 독자에게 도덕적, 실무적 타당성을 동시에 고민하게 만드는 강력한 수사적 장치로 작용한다. 결론적으로 이 글은 이스라엘-팔레스타인 갈등을 단순한 영토 분쟁을 넘어 인류 전체의 생존이 걸린 핵 안보 문제로 확장 시켰다는 점에서 그 가치가 높다.
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<이중잣대와 핵무기: 이스라엘·이란 핵문제의 정치학>
Summary & Review of <Wait, Why Is Israel Allowed To Have Nukes?>
1. 요약 (Summary)
이 글은 미국 정치권이 이란의 핵무기 가능성에는 극도로 위협을 느끼면서도, 이미 핵무기를 보유한 이스라엘에 대해서는 침묵하거나 묵인하는 이중 기준을 강하게 비판한다. 필자는 이란이 핵을 가져서는 안 된다는 정치적 수사와 달리, 실제로 중동에서 이미 핵무기를 보유하고 있는 국가는 이스라엘이며, 그 존재 자체가 지역 안보의 핵심 변수라고 주장한다
이스라엘은 공식적으로 핵보유를 인정하지 않는 ‘전략적 모호성(strategic ambiguity)’ 정책을 유지하고 있다. 그러나 외부 추정에 따르면 최소 90기에서 많게는 300기 이상의 핵탄두를 보유한 것으로 알려져 있다
. 이 무기들은 전투기, 잠수함, 장거리 탄도미사일(Jericho 3) 등 다양한 방식으로 운반 가능하며, 사실상 전 세계 타격 능력을 갖추고 있다는 점도 지적된다
이스라엘은 핵확산금지조약(NPT)에 가입하지 않았고, 국제원자력기구(IAEA)의 사찰도 허용하지 않는다
. 그럼에도 미국은 군사원조를 지속해 왔으며, 자국 법률조차 사실상 무시해왔다고 필자는 주장한다
. 이러한 배경에는 이스라엘을 “책임 있는 핵 보유국”으로 간주하는 암묵적 전제가 자리 잡고 있다는 분석이 제시된다
글은 특히 최근 가자 전쟁 이후 이스라엘 정치권 일부 인사들이 핵무기 사용 가능성을 공개적으로 언급한 사례를 들어, 핵무기 사용 담론이 더 이상 금기 영역이 아니게 되었다고 경고한다
. 이는 이른바 ‘삼손 옵션(Samson Option)’이라는 개념과 연결되는데, 이는 국가의 존립이 위협받는다고 판단할 경우 광범위한 핵 보복을 감행한다는 독트린으로 설명된다
필자는 결론적으로 중동 비핵지대(Nuclear Weapon Free Zone) 구상을 대안으로 제시한다. 이란 역시 이스라엘이 비핵화한다면 핵무기 추구를 중단할 의사가 있다고 밝혀왔으며, 아프리카와 남미에 이미 비핵지대가 존재한다는 점을 근거로 중동에서도 가능성이 있다고 주장한다
. 핵심 메시지는 단순하다. “이란도 가질 권리가 있다”거나 “양쪽 모두 포기해야 한다” 중 하나인데, 인류 안전을 위해서는 후자가 유일한 합리적 선택이라는 것이다
2. 평론 (Review)
1) 문제 제기의 힘
이 글의 가장 강력한 지점은 ‘이중 기준’ 문제를 정면으로 제기한다는 점이다. 미국 정치 담론에서는 이란의 핵 개발 가능성은 “절대 용납할 수 없는 위협”으로 묘사되지만, 이스라엘의 실제 핵무장은 공론장에서 거의 논의되지 않는다. 이 침묵은 단순한 외교 전략의 문제가 아니라, 국제 규범의 신뢰성과 연결된다.
세진님이 여러 차례 지적하신 “국제질서의 규범성과 현실정치의 괴리” 문제와 정확히 겹친다. 규범이 선택적으로 적용되는 순간, 그것은 도덕이 아니라 권력의 언어가 된다.
2) 분석의 설득력과 한계
글은 다음 점에서 설득력이 있다.
이스라엘의 비공식 핵보유 현실
NPT 비가입 및 사찰 거부
미국의 법적·정치적 묵인
최근 극우 정치인의 핵 사용 언급
이 요소들을 연결하여 “가장 위험한 핵 위협은 이미 존재한다”는 결론을 끌어낸다.
그러나 몇 가지 한계도 존재한다.
이란의 핵 프로그램에 대한 우려를 상대적으로 축소한다.
이란은 실제로 고농축 우라늄 생산을 확대해 왔으며, 이는 단순한 수사 이상의 문제다.
이스라엘 안보 환경의 특수성을 충분히 다루지 않는다.
이스라엘은 1948년 건국 이후 여러 차례 생존 위기를 겪었고, 핵 억지력은 그러한 역사적 기억과 결합되어 형성되었다.
미국-이스라엘 동맹의 전략적 이유를 충분히 구조적으로 설명하지 않는다.
단순히 “이중 잣대”만으로는 중동 전략 전체를 설명하기 어렵다.
3) 더 깊은 질문
이 글이 던지는 핵심 질문은 사실 더 본질적이다.
핵무기는 누가 가져도 정당화될 수 있는가?
논리를 일관되게 적용한다면 선택지는 둘뿐이다.
이란도 가질 권리가 있다.
아무도 가져서는 안 된다.
필자는 2번을 지지한다. 이것은 도덕적으로 가장 정합적이다. 그러나 현실정치에서 핵 억지력은 여전히 작동하고 있으며, 이스라엘이 자발적으로 핵을 포기할 가능성은 매우 낮다.
4) 세진님의 문제의식과의 연결
세진님은 그동안
중동 문제를 단순한 선악 구도로 보지 않으려 했고,
헤게모니적 언어를 경계해 왔으며,
상호 비대칭적 책임 담론을 문제 삼아 오셨습니다.
이 글은 바로 그 지점에서 중요한 자료가 된다. 왜냐하면 이 글은 “누가 더 나쁜가”가 아니라 “규범은 누구에게 적용되는가”를 묻기 때문이다.
동아시아 맥락에서도 같은 질문이 가능합니다.
북한 핵은 절대 악인가?
일본의 잠재적 핵 능력은 왜 다른 의미로 해석되는가?
미국의 핵은 왜 ‘안정’으로 불리는가?
핵 문제는 도덕의 문제가 아니라 권력과 인식의 문제라는 점에서, 이 글은 사고의 균형을 흔드는 역할을 한다.
3. 종합 평가
이 글은
도발적이고
규범 비판적이며
미국 중심 질서의 이중성을 공격한다.
감정적 표현이 일부 존재하지만, 제기하는 구조적 질문은 무겁다.
핵심은 이것이다.
핵 억지는 안정인가, 아니면 지연된 재앙인가?
글은 후자에 가깝다.
세진님이 관심 갖는 “중립화”와 “비핵지대 구상”의 논의와도 연결됩니다. 한반도 영세중립화론과 중동 비핵지대 구상은 구조적으로 닮아 있습니다. 둘 다 현실 정치에서 이상론으로 보이지만, 장기적 인류 안전이라는 관점에서는 오히려 가장 현실적인 선택일 수 있습니다.
원하신다면 다음 단계로
<중동 비핵지대의 현실 가능성 분석>
<이스라엘 핵무기 형성의 역사적 맥락>
<이란 핵 프로그램의 실제 기술적 단계>
<동아시아와 중동 핵 질서 비교>
중 하나를 깊게 들어가 보겠습니다.
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