[III-1] SUMMARY [THE NEW KOREA]
Category : 【 THE NEW KOREA 】::┣Chapter [I] ~ [III] 
Tag :
Tag :CHAPTER III SUMMARY
The internal administration of Korea has, for many years, been a matter of earnest solicitude to the Japanese. The dangers and annoyances associated with corrupt and grossly inefficient rule in a country whose southern coast-line is within a few hours' steaming from Japan will be obvious to those who have had occasion to study the causes of the Spanish-American War, and to those who, today, are hoping to see Mexico develop in such a way as to encourage the most cordial relations with the United States.
There exists, indeed, a certain type of mind to which the contagion of misrule conveys no threat to domestic tranquillity on the other side of a frontier, to which the circumstances of American territorial expansion, and of the extension of British rule in India, teach no lesson. Intelligent observers, however, are aware that bad government can be as poor a neighbor as bad health, that social unrest can cross a boundary line as readily as small-pox or yellow fever, that the "landgrabbing" of the English-speaking races, which followed the original conquest or settlement was due in large measure to the necessity of bringing within the national sovereignty a neighbor who, for one reason or another, was a menace to the national welfare.
In the case of Korea the menace to Japan arose from two main causes--first, that centuries of misrule had reduced the Korean people to a condition from which it was hopeless to expect that, through a popular demand for internal reform, Korea might lift itself into the rank of a State having sufficient wealth and sufficient power to maintain its independence; second, and as a consequence of the first, that, either by force or by guile, Russia or China might take possession of the Peninsula, thus creating a strategic situation which could not be tolerated by any person or party responsible for the national defence of Japan.
All available evidence tends to prove that for many years Japanese policy toward Korea was concerned chiefly with securing for that country the position of an independent sovereign State, and for herself the acceptance by the great powers of the principle that Japan's interest in Korean affairs was to be considered predominant, in the sense that England's special interest in Egypt, and that of the United States in Latin America, had received tacit recognition in the world's chancelleries.
In support of the first conception Japan declared war on China in 1894 and, in the Treaty of Shimoneseki, exacted the renunciation of China's suzerainty over Korea and the acknowledgment of that country's independence. In defence of the second conception Japan, having in view the Russian occupation of Vladivostok and of Port Arthur, the conversion of these places into two of the most formidable fortresses in existence, the extension of the Trans-Siberian Railway to the Korean frontier, and the persistent Russian intrigues in Manchuria and in Korea itself, fought the Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905.
At the conclusion of the War Japan decided that in the interest of Korea, in her own interest, and in the general interest of peace and progress in the Far East, her power to influence the Government of Korea in respect of administrative reform, which had hitherto depended upon diplomatic procedure and upon the activities of several Japanese advisers in various departments, could be made effective only by establishing a Residency-General somewhat after the pattern of that set up by the British in the Federated Malay States, a system which had yielded the most beneficial results. This was done in 1905, and had the practical effect of making Korea a Japanese Protectorate. Under the original arrangement the results of the new policy were unsatisfactory, because it was not mandatory upon the Korean officials to follow the advice of the ResidentGeneral. This situation was remedied in 1907 by the conclusion of a Convention between Korea and Japan, under the terms of which the Government of Korea "shall follow the direction of the Resident-General in connection with the reform of the administration" and "shall not enact any law or ordinance, or carry out any important administrative measure, except with the previous approval of the Resident-General."
Three years' experience under the new system showed that it could not be operated successfully in face of the hostility, of the indifference, incompetence, or dishonesty of the Korean officials. In Korea, as elsewhere, divided authority and responsibility--the method of diarchy--led to little but social unrest and administrative impotence. Accordingly, under the terms of a Treaty signed on August 22, 1910, by the plenipotentiaries of the two countries, the Emperor of Korea made complete and permanent cession to the Emperor of Japanof all rights of sovereignty over the whole of Korea. A week later the Emperor of Japan issued an Imperial Rescript announcing the annexation and ordering the establishment of the office of Governor-General of Korea. From August 29, 1910 Japan has had full responsibility for, and full power in, the administration of Korea.
The Japanese proclamations issued at the time of the annexation were couched in conciliatory language, and the measures adopted when the transfer of authority was effected were well calculated to mollify public sentiment. The imperial house of Korea was liberally provided for, its dignity was preserved by granting to the exemperor and to other members of the imperial family the same privileges and honors enjoyed by princes of the imperial blood in Japan, peerages were conferred upon a number of Korean nobles.
An imperial donation of thirty million yen (fifteen million dollars U. S.) was made by the Emperor of Japan, of which about one third was bestowed upon Korean noblemen, meritorious public servants, scholars, indigent widows, widowers, orphans, and others, the balance, of something over seventeen million yen, being set aside as a permanent fund of which the annual interest was to be devoted to giving various forms of aid to Koreans. If the imperial donation to Korea was only equal to three-quarters of that which the United States had paid in respect of the cession of the Philippine Islands, it should not be overlooked that the American money went to the Spanish Government, whereas the Japanese Donation went to the Korean people.
The problems confronting the GovernmentGeneral of Korea were neither few nor simple. The purpose of the Japanese was to set up a thoroughly modern administrative system, to develop the natural resources of the country, and to foster trade and industry. The road to success was encumbered with every imaginable obstacle, The whole machinery of administration had to be planned, a complete civil service had to be created, a large staff of technical experts had to be engaged, a financial system had to be devised capable of yielding the revenue essential for the carrying out of the government's policy.
The situation presented but one favorable circumstance, the docile character of the mass of the Korean people. There was not, at the time of annexation, nor has there since arisen, any ground for serious anxiety on the part of the Japanese military authorities. It is, therefore, difficult for a foreign observer to understand why the Japanese Government should have made the rule that the Governor-General of Korea could only be appointed from the roster of officers of the army or navy. Experience proved that in this matter a serious mistake in policy had been made, and in 1919 the restriction was removed, the appointment being thrown open to civilians.
The selection of military officers for colonial governorships has been a common practice both of the Dutch and the British; but it is an objectionable procedure. History furnishes, indeed, instances in which the talent for conducting military enterprises has been combined with the talent for civil administration; but such instances are extremely rare. The task of administering the affairs of a colonial dependency is one which calls for a temperament totally different from that which goes to the making of a good military man. The success of a military commander, sound technical knowledge being assumed, will depend upon the extent to which he enforces discipline and exacts compliance with thousands of precise and inflexible regulations; his duties are to issue orders and to see that they are obeyed without argument or protest; he need give no thought to the feelings engendered by his administration.
A civil administrator, on the other hand, can only succeed if he adopts a policy of give and take, and carries it out in a spirit of compromise. A large proportion of his work is constructive in its nature, and needs, for its fruition, the goodwill of the people. What is necessary above all things is that the administrator's rule should bear the impress of urbanity and conciliation--the two qualities least to be expected in a military man.
From 1910 to 1919 Japanese rule in Korea, though it accomplished much good for the people, bore the stamp of a military stiffness which aroused a great deal of resentment, hampered the progress of reform, and was largely responsible for the discontent which culminated in the proclamation of Korean Independence by the leaders of the Korean nationalists on March 1, 1919.
The merciless severity with which the revolt was repressed shocked the public sentiment of the world. In Japan itself the indignation reached such a height that the government was compelled to find means of appeasing it. The GovernorGeneral of Korea was recalled, the rule excluding civilians from eligibility for that post was canceled, the new Governor-General, Admiral Baron Saito (now Viscount), though not a civilian, was recognized throughout the Far East as a man of high administrative ability, of generous and humane disposition, and of great personal charm.
The New Korea of which I write is the Korea which has developed under the wise and sympathetic guidance of Governor-General Saito. I may quote here a few paragraphs of an article by Bishop Herbert Welch, Resident Bishop, in the Korean capital, of the Methodist Episcopal Church. The article appeared in The Christian Advocate of May 13, 1920, and the quotation derives particular significance from the circumstance that Bishop Welch has always been an outspoken critic of everything he has deemed to be blameworthy in the Japanese administration of Korea.
Referring to Baron Saito's assumption of the Governor-Generalship, Bishop Welch says:
A sharp contrast at once became evident with the methods and spirit of the preceding administration. The Governor-General himself was simple and unaffected in manner, genial, approachable, evidently anxious to know and to propitiate foreign opinion in the country. His advent was marked by the speedy disappearance of countless swords and uniforms. . . . His chief associate, Dr. R. Midzuno, the Administrative Superintendent, an official of high standing and wide executive experience, seemed to share with the Governor to a large degree the ideals of simplicity, directness and the permeation of the government activities by the civilian as contrasted with the military spirit. . . .
Meanwhile, on the Korean side the past year has unquestionably brought a further crystallization of opinion which is hostile to any Japanese government. The minds of many are fixed on complete national independence as the only goal, and they declare that they have no interest whatever in the question of reforms by the present or any Japanese administration. On the other hand many, including some of the most intelligent and far-seeing, are persuaded that there is no hope of speedy independence, and that they must settle down for a long period to build up the Korean people, in physical conditions, in knowledge, in morality, and in the ability to handle government concerns. . . .
It must be fully recognized that the Japanese government has by no means as yet won the hearts of the Korean people; rather they are further off from that today than fifteen months ago. . . . On the other hand, there are elements of decided encouragement. One of these I find in the character of the Governor-General, Admiral Baron Saito himself. He came to Korea last September with the possibility in his thought of declaring a general political amnesty-wiping the political slate clean and making a new start on the basis of a liberal and humane policy. He was met at the railway station in Seoul by a bomb thrown by the hand of a fanatic, an action which was promptly disavowed by representative Koreans, yet which could not but affect somewhat one's view of the situation.
Baron Saito, however, instead of taking a strong hand, as some would have justified him in doing under those circumstances, has continued of mild and friendly temper. I have implicit trust in his sincerity, and I believe that with time enough he will show the strength, even in spite of the difficulties which confront him in Korea, and of the backfire of criticism and opposition from the militaristic and bureaucratic groups in Tokyo, to bring to pass large things for the welfare of the Korean people. . . .
The foregoing paragraphs were written in 1920, when Governor-General Saito had only been a few months in the country. At the time of my own visit to Korea, in 1922, the GovernorGeneral had nearly completed three years of his tenure of office. He had latterly had the advantage of having as Vice-Governor-General, or Administrative Superintendent (the two titles appear to be used indiscriminately in the official documents) Mr. T. Ariyoshi, one of Japan's most expert and highly regarded civil administrators-a man whom, from my own observation, I know to be a tireless worker and sympathetic toward the Korean people.
The general consensus of opinion in Korea in 1922, except in so far as it reflected the feelings of the anti-Japanese extremists, was that Governor-General Saito had been animated by a sincere desire to rule Korea through a just and tolerant administration, that he had accomplished notable reforms, that in the matter of education he had ministered very generously to the cultural ambitions of the people, and that in regard to their political ambitions he had, whilst setting his face sternly against anything which could encourage the vain hope of independence, shown himself eager to foster local self-government, and to infuse into the personal relations of the Japanese and Koreans a spirit of friendliness and cooperation.
Discussing Korean affairs with a good many people--Korean, Japanese, and foreign, official and non-official--I found almost unanimous agreement on two points: one, that native sentiment had, in recent years, shown a continuing tendency to become less anti-Japanese; the other, that the remarkable increase in the country's prosperity had been accompanied by a striking improvement in the living conditions of the Korean people at large.
Writing now, four years after the date of my visit, and having in mind the most recent accounts of the state of Korea, I can express my conviction that there has occurred a steady and accelerating improvement in the general conditions of the country, in the administrative organization and personnel, and in the temper of the intercourse between the Koreans and the Japanese.
In the following pages I present a brief summary, under specific heads, of the salient features of Korean progress from the time of annexation down to the date of the latest available information. With reference to statistics it is to be noted that the official fiscal year begins on April 1 and ends on March 31 of the year following. The unit of money is the yen, which has a par value of fifty cents, U. S., fluctuating, however, with the movement of the foreign exchange market,
The internal administration of Korea has, for many years, been a matter of earnest solicitude to the Japanese. The dangers and annoyances associated with corrupt and grossly inefficient rule in a country whose southern coast-line is within a few hours' steaming from Japan will be obvious to those who have had occasion to study the causes of the Spanish-American War, and to those who, today, are hoping to see Mexico develop in such a way as to encourage the most cordial relations with the United States.
There exists, indeed, a certain type of mind to which the contagion of misrule conveys no threat to domestic tranquillity on the other side of a frontier, to which the circumstances of American territorial expansion, and of the extension of British rule in India, teach no lesson. Intelligent observers, however, are aware that bad government can be as poor a neighbor as bad health, that social unrest can cross a boundary line as readily as small-pox or yellow fever, that the "landgrabbing" of the English-speaking races, which followed the original conquest or settlement was due in large measure to the necessity of bringing within the national sovereignty a neighbor who, for one reason or another, was a menace to the national welfare.
In the case of Korea the menace to Japan arose from two main causes--first, that centuries of misrule had reduced the Korean people to a condition from which it was hopeless to expect that, through a popular demand for internal reform, Korea might lift itself into the rank of a State having sufficient wealth and sufficient power to maintain its independence; second, and as a consequence of the first, that, either by force or by guile, Russia or China might take possession of the Peninsula, thus creating a strategic situation which could not be tolerated by any person or party responsible for the national defence of Japan.
All available evidence tends to prove that for many years Japanese policy toward Korea was concerned chiefly with securing for that country the position of an independent sovereign State, and for herself the acceptance by the great powers of the principle that Japan's interest in Korean affairs was to be considered predominant, in the sense that England's special interest in Egypt, and that of the United States in Latin America, had received tacit recognition in the world's chancelleries.
In support of the first conception Japan declared war on China in 1894 and, in the Treaty of Shimoneseki, exacted the renunciation of China's suzerainty over Korea and the acknowledgment of that country's independence. In defence of the second conception Japan, having in view the Russian occupation of Vladivostok and of Port Arthur, the conversion of these places into two of the most formidable fortresses in existence, the extension of the Trans-Siberian Railway to the Korean frontier, and the persistent Russian intrigues in Manchuria and in Korea itself, fought the Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905.
At the conclusion of the War Japan decided that in the interest of Korea, in her own interest, and in the general interest of peace and progress in the Far East, her power to influence the Government of Korea in respect of administrative reform, which had hitherto depended upon diplomatic procedure and upon the activities of several Japanese advisers in various departments, could be made effective only by establishing a Residency-General somewhat after the pattern of that set up by the British in the Federated Malay States, a system which had yielded the most beneficial results. This was done in 1905, and had the practical effect of making Korea a Japanese Protectorate. Under the original arrangement the results of the new policy were unsatisfactory, because it was not mandatory upon the Korean officials to follow the advice of the ResidentGeneral. This situation was remedied in 1907 by the conclusion of a Convention between Korea and Japan, under the terms of which the Government of Korea "shall follow the direction of the Resident-General in connection with the reform of the administration" and "shall not enact any law or ordinance, or carry out any important administrative measure, except with the previous approval of the Resident-General."
Three years' experience under the new system showed that it could not be operated successfully in face of the hostility, of the indifference, incompetence, or dishonesty of the Korean officials. In Korea, as elsewhere, divided authority and responsibility--the method of diarchy--led to little but social unrest and administrative impotence. Accordingly, under the terms of a Treaty signed on August 22, 1910, by the plenipotentiaries of the two countries, the Emperor of Korea made complete and permanent cession to the Emperor of Japanof all rights of sovereignty over the whole of Korea. A week later the Emperor of Japan issued an Imperial Rescript announcing the annexation and ordering the establishment of the office of Governor-General of Korea. From August 29, 1910 Japan has had full responsibility for, and full power in, the administration of Korea.
The Japanese proclamations issued at the time of the annexation were couched in conciliatory language, and the measures adopted when the transfer of authority was effected were well calculated to mollify public sentiment. The imperial house of Korea was liberally provided for, its dignity was preserved by granting to the exemperor and to other members of the imperial family the same privileges and honors enjoyed by princes of the imperial blood in Japan, peerages were conferred upon a number of Korean nobles.
An imperial donation of thirty million yen (fifteen million dollars U. S.) was made by the Emperor of Japan, of which about one third was bestowed upon Korean noblemen, meritorious public servants, scholars, indigent widows, widowers, orphans, and others, the balance, of something over seventeen million yen, being set aside as a permanent fund of which the annual interest was to be devoted to giving various forms of aid to Koreans. If the imperial donation to Korea was only equal to three-quarters of that which the United States had paid in respect of the cession of the Philippine Islands, it should not be overlooked that the American money went to the Spanish Government, whereas the Japanese Donation went to the Korean people.
The problems confronting the GovernmentGeneral of Korea were neither few nor simple. The purpose of the Japanese was to set up a thoroughly modern administrative system, to develop the natural resources of the country, and to foster trade and industry. The road to success was encumbered with every imaginable obstacle, The whole machinery of administration had to be planned, a complete civil service had to be created, a large staff of technical experts had to be engaged, a financial system had to be devised capable of yielding the revenue essential for the carrying out of the government's policy.
The situation presented but one favorable circumstance, the docile character of the mass of the Korean people. There was not, at the time of annexation, nor has there since arisen, any ground for serious anxiety on the part of the Japanese military authorities. It is, therefore, difficult for a foreign observer to understand why the Japanese Government should have made the rule that the Governor-General of Korea could only be appointed from the roster of officers of the army or navy. Experience proved that in this matter a serious mistake in policy had been made, and in 1919 the restriction was removed, the appointment being thrown open to civilians.
The selection of military officers for colonial governorships has been a common practice both of the Dutch and the British; but it is an objectionable procedure. History furnishes, indeed, instances in which the talent for conducting military enterprises has been combined with the talent for civil administration; but such instances are extremely rare. The task of administering the affairs of a colonial dependency is one which calls for a temperament totally different from that which goes to the making of a good military man. The success of a military commander, sound technical knowledge being assumed, will depend upon the extent to which he enforces discipline and exacts compliance with thousands of precise and inflexible regulations; his duties are to issue orders and to see that they are obeyed without argument or protest; he need give no thought to the feelings engendered by his administration.
A civil administrator, on the other hand, can only succeed if he adopts a policy of give and take, and carries it out in a spirit of compromise. A large proportion of his work is constructive in its nature, and needs, for its fruition, the goodwill of the people. What is necessary above all things is that the administrator's rule should bear the impress of urbanity and conciliation--the two qualities least to be expected in a military man.
From 1910 to 1919 Japanese rule in Korea, though it accomplished much good for the people, bore the stamp of a military stiffness which aroused a great deal of resentment, hampered the progress of reform, and was largely responsible for the discontent which culminated in the proclamation of Korean Independence by the leaders of the Korean nationalists on March 1, 1919.
The merciless severity with which the revolt was repressed shocked the public sentiment of the world. In Japan itself the indignation reached such a height that the government was compelled to find means of appeasing it. The GovernorGeneral of Korea was recalled, the rule excluding civilians from eligibility for that post was canceled, the new Governor-General, Admiral Baron Saito (now Viscount), though not a civilian, was recognized throughout the Far East as a man of high administrative ability, of generous and humane disposition, and of great personal charm.
The New Korea of which I write is the Korea which has developed under the wise and sympathetic guidance of Governor-General Saito. I may quote here a few paragraphs of an article by Bishop Herbert Welch, Resident Bishop, in the Korean capital, of the Methodist Episcopal Church. The article appeared in The Christian Advocate of May 13, 1920, and the quotation derives particular significance from the circumstance that Bishop Welch has always been an outspoken critic of everything he has deemed to be blameworthy in the Japanese administration of Korea.
Referring to Baron Saito's assumption of the Governor-Generalship, Bishop Welch says:
A sharp contrast at once became evident with the methods and spirit of the preceding administration. The Governor-General himself was simple and unaffected in manner, genial, approachable, evidently anxious to know and to propitiate foreign opinion in the country. His advent was marked by the speedy disappearance of countless swords and uniforms. . . . His chief associate, Dr. R. Midzuno, the Administrative Superintendent, an official of high standing and wide executive experience, seemed to share with the Governor to a large degree the ideals of simplicity, directness and the permeation of the government activities by the civilian as contrasted with the military spirit. . . .
Meanwhile, on the Korean side the past year has unquestionably brought a further crystallization of opinion which is hostile to any Japanese government. The minds of many are fixed on complete national independence as the only goal, and they declare that they have no interest whatever in the question of reforms by the present or any Japanese administration. On the other hand many, including some of the most intelligent and far-seeing, are persuaded that there is no hope of speedy independence, and that they must settle down for a long period to build up the Korean people, in physical conditions, in knowledge, in morality, and in the ability to handle government concerns. . . .
It must be fully recognized that the Japanese government has by no means as yet won the hearts of the Korean people; rather they are further off from that today than fifteen months ago. . . . On the other hand, there are elements of decided encouragement. One of these I find in the character of the Governor-General, Admiral Baron Saito himself. He came to Korea last September with the possibility in his thought of declaring a general political amnesty-wiping the political slate clean and making a new start on the basis of a liberal and humane policy. He was met at the railway station in Seoul by a bomb thrown by the hand of a fanatic, an action which was promptly disavowed by representative Koreans, yet which could not but affect somewhat one's view of the situation.
Baron Saito, however, instead of taking a strong hand, as some would have justified him in doing under those circumstances, has continued of mild and friendly temper. I have implicit trust in his sincerity, and I believe that with time enough he will show the strength, even in spite of the difficulties which confront him in Korea, and of the backfire of criticism and opposition from the militaristic and bureaucratic groups in Tokyo, to bring to pass large things for the welfare of the Korean people. . . .
The foregoing paragraphs were written in 1920, when Governor-General Saito had only been a few months in the country. At the time of my own visit to Korea, in 1922, the GovernorGeneral had nearly completed three years of his tenure of office. He had latterly had the advantage of having as Vice-Governor-General, or Administrative Superintendent (the two titles appear to be used indiscriminately in the official documents) Mr. T. Ariyoshi, one of Japan's most expert and highly regarded civil administrators-a man whom, from my own observation, I know to be a tireless worker and sympathetic toward the Korean people.
The general consensus of opinion in Korea in 1922, except in so far as it reflected the feelings of the anti-Japanese extremists, was that Governor-General Saito had been animated by a sincere desire to rule Korea through a just and tolerant administration, that he had accomplished notable reforms, that in the matter of education he had ministered very generously to the cultural ambitions of the people, and that in regard to their political ambitions he had, whilst setting his face sternly against anything which could encourage the vain hope of independence, shown himself eager to foster local self-government, and to infuse into the personal relations of the Japanese and Koreans a spirit of friendliness and cooperation.
Discussing Korean affairs with a good many people--Korean, Japanese, and foreign, official and non-official--I found almost unanimous agreement on two points: one, that native sentiment had, in recent years, shown a continuing tendency to become less anti-Japanese; the other, that the remarkable increase in the country's prosperity had been accompanied by a striking improvement in the living conditions of the Korean people at large.
Writing now, four years after the date of my visit, and having in mind the most recent accounts of the state of Korea, I can express my conviction that there has occurred a steady and accelerating improvement in the general conditions of the country, in the administrative organization and personnel, and in the temper of the intercourse between the Koreans and the Japanese.
In the following pages I present a brief summary, under specific heads, of the salient features of Korean progress from the time of annexation down to the date of the latest available information. With reference to statistics it is to be noted that the official fiscal year begins on April 1 and ends on March 31 of the year following. The unit of money is the yen, which has a par value of fifty cents, U. S., fluctuating, however, with the movement of the foreign exchange market,
[III-2] SUMMARY [THE NEW KOREA]
Category : 【 THE NEW KOREA 】::┣Chapter [I] ~ [III] Tag :
Tag :Material Progress Production--
About eighty-two per cent of the total population of Korea depend directly upon agriculture for their livelihood. The area under cultivation increased from about 10,600,000 acres in 1912 to nearly 15,000,000 in 1923. (*When two or more crops are raised in one year on the same land the area is counted for each crop.) During the same period the estimated value of agricultural produce rose from 435,000,000 yen to 1,169,000,000 yen. A considerable proportion of the increases noted above was due to measures taken by the Government for improving the condition of the farmers. Among these may be named organization of various forms of agricultural credit, the reclamation of waste lands, the construction of irrigation works, the improvement of farming methods, and the introduction of new agricultural industries.
In respect of the first of these measures it may be noted that in 1912 the amount of outstanding agricultural loans was less than five million yen, and in 1923 was more than 134 million yen, a large part of the increase representing investment in agricultural improvements of one sort and another. As an instance of the introduction of new industries silk culture is an example. In 1910 the total value of Korean sericultural products was only 400,000 yen; in 1923 it had risen to nearly 26 million yen.
Closely associated with agriculture is forestry. Under native rule there had been an almost complete neglect of forest conservation, so that at the time of annexation there was a serious shortage of fire-wood and of building lumber. What was even worse was that the denuded mountain sides could no longer absorb the heavy rainfall of the wet season. This resulted in serious annual floods and in the loss of the land's natural supply of moisture. As early as 1907 the Japanese Residency-General had induced the Korean Government to undertake afforestation work; and in 1911 the Government-General issued its new forestry regulations. In the same year the Governor-General established an Arbor Day. Since annexation more than a thousand million seedlings have been planted for the purpose of re-establishing the Korean forests. The Government, further, encouraged the formation of Forestry Associations, and of these there were in 1925 three hundred and fifty, with a total membership of nearly a million.
The Government also interested itself in the development of the Korean fisheries. Measures were taken to improve the methods of fishing and of curing and packing aquatic products. Between 1912 and 1921 the value of the catch increased from eight million to forty-five million yen; the value of the exports of fresh fish from 138 thousand to over seven million yen; the value of marine products manufactured, from four million to twenty-five million yen; and the value of manufactured marine products exported, from less than two million yen to more than eleven million.
In the mining industry the total output was valued in 1912 at nearly seven million yen and in 1921 at over fifteen million yen. In the main group of metals and minerals the gold production shows a decline in value, other production a marked increase. Coal mounted from something over 500,000 yen to a little over three million, iron ore from 156,000 to nearly two million, pig iron from nothing to nearly five million, concentrates from 275,000 to nearly five million.
In regard to manufactures, commerce and industry progress was seriously hampered under native rule by the deplorable condition of the native system of currency, by the insecurity of life and property, by the lax or corrupt administration of law, and by the lack of governmental interest in the general question of development and in the advantages to be derived from scientific research in the various fields of industry. In each of these matters the Government-General has introduced wide-reaching reforms, of which the consequences can be observed in the following table:
TEN YEARS' GROWTH OF COMMERCE, MANUFACTURES, AND BANKING
(Values in thousands of yen)
* Figures for 1913
About eighty-two per cent of the total population of Korea depend directly upon agriculture for their livelihood. The area under cultivation increased from about 10,600,000 acres in 1912 to nearly 15,000,000 in 1923. (*When two or more crops are raised in one year on the same land the area is counted for each crop.) During the same period the estimated value of agricultural produce rose from 435,000,000 yen to 1,169,000,000 yen. A considerable proportion of the increases noted above was due to measures taken by the Government for improving the condition of the farmers. Among these may be named organization of various forms of agricultural credit, the reclamation of waste lands, the construction of irrigation works, the improvement of farming methods, and the introduction of new agricultural industries.
In respect of the first of these measures it may be noted that in 1912 the amount of outstanding agricultural loans was less than five million yen, and in 1923 was more than 134 million yen, a large part of the increase representing investment in agricultural improvements of one sort and another. As an instance of the introduction of new industries silk culture is an example. In 1910 the total value of Korean sericultural products was only 400,000 yen; in 1923 it had risen to nearly 26 million yen.
Closely associated with agriculture is forestry. Under native rule there had been an almost complete neglect of forest conservation, so that at the time of annexation there was a serious shortage of fire-wood and of building lumber. What was even worse was that the denuded mountain sides could no longer absorb the heavy rainfall of the wet season. This resulted in serious annual floods and in the loss of the land's natural supply of moisture. As early as 1907 the Japanese Residency-General had induced the Korean Government to undertake afforestation work; and in 1911 the Government-General issued its new forestry regulations. In the same year the Governor-General established an Arbor Day. Since annexation more than a thousand million seedlings have been planted for the purpose of re-establishing the Korean forests. The Government, further, encouraged the formation of Forestry Associations, and of these there were in 1925 three hundred and fifty, with a total membership of nearly a million.
The Government also interested itself in the development of the Korean fisheries. Measures were taken to improve the methods of fishing and of curing and packing aquatic products. Between 1912 and 1921 the value of the catch increased from eight million to forty-five million yen; the value of the exports of fresh fish from 138 thousand to over seven million yen; the value of marine products manufactured, from four million to twenty-five million yen; and the value of manufactured marine products exported, from less than two million yen to more than eleven million.
In the mining industry the total output was valued in 1912 at nearly seven million yen and in 1921 at over fifteen million yen. In the main group of metals and minerals the gold production shows a decline in value, other production a marked increase. Coal mounted from something over 500,000 yen to a little over three million, iron ore from 156,000 to nearly two million, pig iron from nothing to nearly five million, concentrates from 275,000 to nearly five million.
In regard to manufactures, commerce and industry progress was seriously hampered under native rule by the deplorable condition of the native system of currency, by the insecurity of life and property, by the lax or corrupt administration of law, and by the lack of governmental interest in the general question of development and in the advantages to be derived from scientific research in the various fields of industry. In each of these matters the Government-General has introduced wide-reaching reforms, of which the consequences can be observed in the following table:
TEN YEARS' GROWTH OF COMMERCE, MANUFACTURES, AND BANKING
(Values in thousands of yen)
| 1912 | 1921 | |
|---|---|---|
| Exports by sea | 20,985 | 207,280 |
| Exports by land | * 356 | 10,996 |
| Imports by sea | 67,115 | 205,210 |
| Imports by land | * 467 | 27,171 |
| Total foreign trade | 88,101 | 450,658 |
| Paid-up capital of business corporations | 103,720 | 1,083,551 |
| Value of factory products. | 29,362 | 166,414 |
| Number of Koreans employed in factories | 14,974 | 40,418 |
| Number of Japanese employed in factories | 2,291 | 6,330 |
| Government expenditure for advancement of commerce and industry | 2,932 | 8,797 |
| Bank deposits | 27,837 | 171,891 |
| Value of clearing house transactions | 98,488 | 852,053 |
[III-3] SUMMARY [THE NEW KOREA]
Category : 【 THE NEW KOREA 】::┣Chapter [I] ~ [III] Tag :
Tag :Government
On October 30, 1910, the Organic Regulations of the Government-General of Chosen ( Korea) were promulgated by a Japanese Imperial Ordinance. The Regulations established a Secretariat, and five Departments, to which were assigned, respectively, General Affairs, Home Affairs, Finance, Justice, and Agriculture, Commerce and Industry. For the purpose of carrying on the government a large staff of Japanese officials was installed. As few of these officials had any close knowledge of local conditions or of the Korean language, the actual position was that although a complete administrative machine was set in motion, it was realised by the authorities that from the experience of its employment the necessity would become apparent of many changes designed to make the system increasingly suitable to the particular circumstances of the country.
From year to year various reforms were introduced; but it was not until 1919 that, following the outbreak and suppression of the Independence Movement, and the appointment of Admiral Baron Saito to the Governor-Generalship, a matured plan of general reorganization was undertaken under the authority, of an Imperial Rescript.
The statement of the matters to be effected by the new plans shows that the authorities recognized clearly the character of the defects which had become apparent during the nine years which had elapsed since the original Organic Regulations had been put in force. The official list of the purposes to which the new measures were addressed was as follows:
1. Non-discrimination between Japanese and Korean officials.
2. Simplification of laws and regulations.
3. Prompt transaction of state business.
4. Decentralization policy.
5. Improvement in local organization.
6. Respect for native culture and customs.
7. Freedom of speech, meeting, and press.
8. Spread of education and development of industry.
9. Re-organization of the police system.
10. Enlargement of medical and sanitary agencies.
11. Guidance of the people.
12. Advancement of men of talent.
13. Friendly feeling between Japanese and Koreans.
In a Proclamation to the People of Chosen, issued by Governor-General Saito on September 10, 1919, His Excellency made the following declaration:
I am determined to superintend officials under my control and encourage them to put forth greater efforts to act in a fairer and juster way, and promote the facilities of the people and the unhindered attainment of the people's desires by dispensing with all formalities. Full consideration will be given to the appointment and treatment of Koreans so as to secure the right men for the right places, and what in Korean institutions and old customs is worthy of adoption will be adopted as a means of government. I also hope to introduce reform in the different branches of administrative activity, and enforce local self-government at the proper opportunity, and thereby ensure stability for the people and enhance their general welfare. It is most desirable that the government and the governed throw open their hearts and minds to each other and combine their efforts to advance civilization in Chosen, solidify its foundations of enlightened government, and thus answer His Majesty's benevolent solicitude. If anybody is found guilty of unwarrantably refractory language or action, of misleading the popular mind, and of impeding the maintenance of public peace, he will meet with relentless justice. May it be that the people at large will place reliance on all this.
The reader of the administrative chapters in the present volume will see that GovernorGeneral Saito has been as good as his word. He has kept his promise to rule with justice, firmness, and tolerance, and to keep in view the cultural and economic interests of the Korean people.
Among the more important of his administrative measures are to be noted the abolition of the gendarmerie, the abolition of the old Korean custom of flogging convicted offenders, the appointment of an increasing number of Koreans to high posts in the Government, the appointment or election of advisory councils, largely composed of Koreans, the delegation of a great deal of local administration to local authorities, thus contributing to the education of the people in local self-government, the expenditure of large funds in aid and in encouragement of agriculture, industry, and commerce, the notable increase in the expenditure on education, culminating in the founding of a University at which Koreans will be able to secure in Korea an education as thorough as they would be able to get in Japan proper.
Some of the foregoing points, and others bearing upon the general progress of the country, can be established statistically, as will be seen from the following table:
BUDGET ESTIMATES OF EXPENDITURES BY THE GOVERNMENT-GENERAL ON VARIOUS SPECIFIED OBJECTS (In thousands of yen. 1 yen = 50 cents U. S.)
BUDGET ESTIMATES FOR VARIOUS CLASSES OF EXPENDITURE
BY PROVINCIAL AND OTHER PUBLIC BODIES
(In thousands of yen)
*The year before Governor-General Saito's arrival.
†The second year after his arrival.
The following explanations may be given of the terms used in the foregoing tables: "Local Administration" means in this connection the local administrative offices of the Government-General, situated in each province, county, and municipality; "Public Works" includes roadmaking, bridge-building, and the construction and repair of public buildings; "Encouragement of Industry" covers items such as subsidies and expert services to various agricultural and manufacturing enterprises. The term "Provincial and Other Public Bodies" refers to administrative units organized in provinces, districts, municipalities, and villages for dealing with education, sanitation, industrial encouragement, civil engineering, social and charitable undertakings in various localities, and with general administrative services in villages. The increases in expenditure on education and on public works register the Practical character of Governor-General Saito's cultural policy; and it is to be noted that these increases were brought about within two years of Viscount Saito's assumption of office.
On October 30, 1910, the Organic Regulations of the Government-General of Chosen ( Korea) were promulgated by a Japanese Imperial Ordinance. The Regulations established a Secretariat, and five Departments, to which were assigned, respectively, General Affairs, Home Affairs, Finance, Justice, and Agriculture, Commerce and Industry. For the purpose of carrying on the government a large staff of Japanese officials was installed. As few of these officials had any close knowledge of local conditions or of the Korean language, the actual position was that although a complete administrative machine was set in motion, it was realised by the authorities that from the experience of its employment the necessity would become apparent of many changes designed to make the system increasingly suitable to the particular circumstances of the country.
From year to year various reforms were introduced; but it was not until 1919 that, following the outbreak and suppression of the Independence Movement, and the appointment of Admiral Baron Saito to the Governor-Generalship, a matured plan of general reorganization was undertaken under the authority, of an Imperial Rescript.
The statement of the matters to be effected by the new plans shows that the authorities recognized clearly the character of the defects which had become apparent during the nine years which had elapsed since the original Organic Regulations had been put in force. The official list of the purposes to which the new measures were addressed was as follows:
1. Non-discrimination between Japanese and Korean officials.
2. Simplification of laws and regulations.
3. Prompt transaction of state business.
4. Decentralization policy.
5. Improvement in local organization.
6. Respect for native culture and customs.
7. Freedom of speech, meeting, and press.
8. Spread of education and development of industry.
9. Re-organization of the police system.
10. Enlargement of medical and sanitary agencies.
11. Guidance of the people.
12. Advancement of men of talent.
13. Friendly feeling between Japanese and Koreans.
In a Proclamation to the People of Chosen, issued by Governor-General Saito on September 10, 1919, His Excellency made the following declaration:
I am determined to superintend officials under my control and encourage them to put forth greater efforts to act in a fairer and juster way, and promote the facilities of the people and the unhindered attainment of the people's desires by dispensing with all formalities. Full consideration will be given to the appointment and treatment of Koreans so as to secure the right men for the right places, and what in Korean institutions and old customs is worthy of adoption will be adopted as a means of government. I also hope to introduce reform in the different branches of administrative activity, and enforce local self-government at the proper opportunity, and thereby ensure stability for the people and enhance their general welfare. It is most desirable that the government and the governed throw open their hearts and minds to each other and combine their efforts to advance civilization in Chosen, solidify its foundations of enlightened government, and thus answer His Majesty's benevolent solicitude. If anybody is found guilty of unwarrantably refractory language or action, of misleading the popular mind, and of impeding the maintenance of public peace, he will meet with relentless justice. May it be that the people at large will place reliance on all this.
The reader of the administrative chapters in the present volume will see that GovernorGeneral Saito has been as good as his word. He has kept his promise to rule with justice, firmness, and tolerance, and to keep in view the cultural and economic interests of the Korean people.
Among the more important of his administrative measures are to be noted the abolition of the gendarmerie, the abolition of the old Korean custom of flogging convicted offenders, the appointment of an increasing number of Koreans to high posts in the Government, the appointment or election of advisory councils, largely composed of Koreans, the delegation of a great deal of local administration to local authorities, thus contributing to the education of the people in local self-government, the expenditure of large funds in aid and in encouragement of agriculture, industry, and commerce, the notable increase in the expenditure on education, culminating in the founding of a University at which Koreans will be able to secure in Korea an education as thorough as they would be able to get in Japan proper.
Some of the foregoing points, and others bearing upon the general progress of the country, can be established statistically, as will be seen from the following table:
BUDGET ESTIMATES OF EXPENDITURES BY THE GOVERNMENT-GENERAL ON VARIOUS SPECIFIED OBJECTS (In thousands of yen. 1 yen = 50 cents U. S.)
| 1918* | 1921† | Increase | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Local administration | 4,440 | 10,133 | 128% |
| Medical and Sanitary | 730 | 1,883 | 157% |
| Education | 2,196 | 6,100 | 180% |
| Encouragement of industry | 3,573 | 8,798 | 146% |
| Public Works | 7,341 | 15.329 | 108% |
BUDGET ESTIMATES FOR VARIOUS CLASSES OF EXPENDITURE
BY PROVINCIAL AND OTHER PUBLIC BODIES
(In thousands of yen)
| 1918 * | 1921† | Increase | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Medical and Sanitary | 782 | 1,723 | 120% |
| Education | 4,897 | 19,382 | 287% |
| Encouragement of industry | 2,139 | 5,411 | 153% |
| Public Works. | 3,210 | 11,953 | 272% |
| Social and Charitable | 194 | 383 | 97% |
†The second year after his arrival.
The following explanations may be given of the terms used in the foregoing tables: "Local Administration" means in this connection the local administrative offices of the Government-General, situated in each province, county, and municipality; "Public Works" includes roadmaking, bridge-building, and the construction and repair of public buildings; "Encouragement of Industry" covers items such as subsidies and expert services to various agricultural and manufacturing enterprises. The term "Provincial and Other Public Bodies" refers to administrative units organized in provinces, districts, municipalities, and villages for dealing with education, sanitation, industrial encouragement, civil engineering, social and charitable undertakings in various localities, and with general administrative services in villages. The increases in expenditure on education and on public works register the Practical character of Governor-General Saito's cultural policy; and it is to be noted that these increases were brought about within two years of Viscount Saito's assumption of office.
[IV-1] GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION [THE NEW KOREA]
Category : 【 THE NEW KOREA 】::┣Chapter [IV] ~ [V] Tag :
Tag :CHAPTER IV GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION
1. THE GOVERNMENT-GENERAL
Prior to the annexation of Korea--effected by the Treaty of August, 1910--the influence exerted by Japan upon government in Korea passed through two phases. The first of these may be described as a period of diplomatic advice, during which the Japanese Minister at Seoul, aided by a number of Japanese advisers engaged by the Korean Government, attempted to improve the deplorable condition into which the internal administration of Korea had fallen under native control. This period came to an end in November, 1905, when the JapaneseKorean Convention formulated a new relationship between the two countries.
This Convention introduced the second phase of Japan's influence in Korean government. It may be described as a period of administrative control and participation. In accordance with the terms of the Convention, Japan established in Korea, in February, 1906, a Residency-General, with subordinate Residencies at various points.The functions of the Residency-General were defined in a Convention signed in July, 1907. It was then provided:
(1) That the Government of Korea shall follow the directions of the Resident-General in respect of administrative reforms;
(2) That the Government of Korea shall not enact any laws, ordinances, or regulations, or take any important administrative measures without the previous approval of the Resident-General;
(3) That judicial administration in Korea shall be conducted independently of other branches of administration;
(4) That the appointment and dismissal of all high officials in Korea shall be made with the concurrence of the Resident-General;
(5) That the Government of Korea shall appoint, as Korean officials, Japanese subjects recommended by the Resident-General.
Under this arrangement considerable improvement occurred in the general administration of the country; but in two important matters the system failed of efficiency. These were finance, and the administration of justice.
In respect of the first of these Japan was confronted by the fact, almost universally overlooked, that whatever advantages may flow from administrative reform, and whatever economies such reform may eventually effect, these advantages and economies cannot be produced without increasing the initial cost of administration; in a word, that good government is cheap at the price, but that it cannot be had at a cheap price.
So far as justice was concerned the Korean system was such, both as to its procedure and its officials, that far-reaching reform appeared to be impossible unless its administration was placed in the hands of Japanese public servants.
In order to meet these difficulties Japan arranged for a loan, free of interest, estimated at ten million dollars, but actually reaching a total of thirteen million, for the purpose of stabilizing the Korean budget; and took over the administration of justice and of the prisons, whilst assuming the cost of these departments as a charge upon the Japanese Treasury.
The period of administrative control and participation was brought to an end by the Japanese annexation of Korea in 1910. The circumstances which led to this step have been dealt with in the historical section of Chapter II.
Simultaneously with the annexation of the country the Government-General of Korea was established, on August 29, 1910. It was not, however, until September 30, 1910, that the Organic Regulations of the Government-General were promulgated by an Imperial Japanese Ordinance which made them effective as from the following day.
These Regulations provided for the appointment of a Governor-General, and of a Vice Governor-General; and for the erection of a Government-General to consist of the following six departments: Secretariat; General Affairs; Rome Affairs; Finance; Agriculture, Commerce, and Industry; and Justice. Provision was made for the executive, administrative, technical, and clerical services; and an annual budget was prescribed as the basis of the financial system.
The Organic Regulations have been amended from time to time as experience indicated the necessity. Before describing the organization of the Government of Korea as it now exists a few paragraphs may be devoted to the form it assumed at the end of the first year after the creation of the Government-General.
At the head of the Government was the Governor-General, who conducted public affairs through the instrumentality of two groups of offices--one classified as the Government-General of Korea, the other as Affiliated Offices of the Government-General. The organization of these two groups at the end of 1911 is exhibited in the following table:
PERSONNEL OF THE GOVERNMENT-GENERAL, 1911
All the items in the foregoing table are, in a broad sense, self-explanatory, except "Central Council." This body was created at the time of the annexation, 1910, for the purpose of providing the Japanese Governor-General with a Korean advisory committee, which he could consult in regard to administrative measures. The Vice President and all members of the Council were chosen from the ranks of the Korean nobility, gentry, and officialdom. The president of the Council, the chief secretary, and the secretaries were chosen from the higher ranks of the Japanese officials attached to the GovernmentGeneral.
The members of the Council were given honorary official rank; but as they were not to be classed as Government servants, they were not included in the official figures from which the foregoing table was compiled. The actual number of Koreans in the Council at the end of 1911 was 71; and the Japanese staff of the Council consisted of one president, one chief secretary, one assistant secretary, and one interpretersecretary.
1. THE GOVERNMENT-GENERAL
Prior to the annexation of Korea--effected by the Treaty of August, 1910--the influence exerted by Japan upon government in Korea passed through two phases. The first of these may be described as a period of diplomatic advice, during which the Japanese Minister at Seoul, aided by a number of Japanese advisers engaged by the Korean Government, attempted to improve the deplorable condition into which the internal administration of Korea had fallen under native control. This period came to an end in November, 1905, when the JapaneseKorean Convention formulated a new relationship between the two countries.
This Convention introduced the second phase of Japan's influence in Korean government. It may be described as a period of administrative control and participation. In accordance with the terms of the Convention, Japan established in Korea, in February, 1906, a Residency-General, with subordinate Residencies at various points.The functions of the Residency-General were defined in a Convention signed in July, 1907. It was then provided:
(1) That the Government of Korea shall follow the directions of the Resident-General in respect of administrative reforms;
(2) That the Government of Korea shall not enact any laws, ordinances, or regulations, or take any important administrative measures without the previous approval of the Resident-General;
(3) That judicial administration in Korea shall be conducted independently of other branches of administration;
(4) That the appointment and dismissal of all high officials in Korea shall be made with the concurrence of the Resident-General;
(5) That the Government of Korea shall appoint, as Korean officials, Japanese subjects recommended by the Resident-General.
Under this arrangement considerable improvement occurred in the general administration of the country; but in two important matters the system failed of efficiency. These were finance, and the administration of justice.
In respect of the first of these Japan was confronted by the fact, almost universally overlooked, that whatever advantages may flow from administrative reform, and whatever economies such reform may eventually effect, these advantages and economies cannot be produced without increasing the initial cost of administration; in a word, that good government is cheap at the price, but that it cannot be had at a cheap price.
So far as justice was concerned the Korean system was such, both as to its procedure and its officials, that far-reaching reform appeared to be impossible unless its administration was placed in the hands of Japanese public servants.
In order to meet these difficulties Japan arranged for a loan, free of interest, estimated at ten million dollars, but actually reaching a total of thirteen million, for the purpose of stabilizing the Korean budget; and took over the administration of justice and of the prisons, whilst assuming the cost of these departments as a charge upon the Japanese Treasury.
The period of administrative control and participation was brought to an end by the Japanese annexation of Korea in 1910. The circumstances which led to this step have been dealt with in the historical section of Chapter II.
Simultaneously with the annexation of the country the Government-General of Korea was established, on August 29, 1910. It was not, however, until September 30, 1910, that the Organic Regulations of the Government-General were promulgated by an Imperial Japanese Ordinance which made them effective as from the following day.
These Regulations provided for the appointment of a Governor-General, and of a Vice Governor-General; and for the erection of a Government-General to consist of the following six departments: Secretariat; General Affairs; Rome Affairs; Finance; Agriculture, Commerce, and Industry; and Justice. Provision was made for the executive, administrative, technical, and clerical services; and an annual budget was prescribed as the basis of the financial system.
The Organic Regulations have been amended from time to time as experience indicated the necessity. Before describing the organization of the Government of Korea as it now exists a few paragraphs may be devoted to the form it assumed at the end of the first year after the creation of the Government-General.
At the head of the Government was the Governor-General, who conducted public affairs through the instrumentality of two groups of offices--one classified as the Government-General of Korea, the other as Affiliated Offices of the Government-General. The organization of these two groups at the end of 1911 is exhibited in the following table:
PERSONNEL OF THE GOVERNMENT-GENERAL, 1911
| High Officials | Subordinate Officials | Total | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Government-General: | |||
| Secretariat | 5 | 5 | 10 |
| Department of General Affairs | 13 | 116 | 129 |
| Department of Home Affairs | 26 | 140 | 166 |
| Department of Finance | 30 | 142 | 172 |
| Department of Agriculture | |||
| Commerce, and Industry | 23 | 66 | 89 |
| Department of Justice | 4 | 16 | 20 |
| Total, Government-General | 101 | 485 | 586 |
| Affiliated Offices: | |||
| Courts, Police, Prisons | 363 | 811 | 1,174 |
| Local Government | 404 | 2,321 | 2,725 |
| Railway Bureau | 55 | 405 | 460 |
| Communications Bureau | 39 | 1,005 | 1,044 |
| Land Survey Bureau | 29 | 1,069 | 1,098 |
| Government Schools | 24 | 91 | 115 |
| Customs Service | 17 | 245 | 262 |
| Hospital and Medical School | 15 | 28 | 43 |
| Model Farm | 13 | 52 | 65 |
| Monopoly Bureau | 4 | 43 | 47 |
| Printing Bureau | 3 | 22 | 25 |
| Bureau of Ancient Customs | 6 | 8 | 14 |
| Government Lumber Station | 5 | 16 | 21 |
| Government Coal Mine | 2 | 5 | 7 |
| Central Council | . . . . | 2 | 2 |
| Total, Affiliated Officers | 979 | 6,123 | 7,102 |
| Grand total | 1,080 | 6,608 | 7,688 |
All the items in the foregoing table are, in a broad sense, self-explanatory, except "Central Council." This body was created at the time of the annexation, 1910, for the purpose of providing the Japanese Governor-General with a Korean advisory committee, which he could consult in regard to administrative measures. The Vice President and all members of the Council were chosen from the ranks of the Korean nobility, gentry, and officialdom. The president of the Council, the chief secretary, and the secretaries were chosen from the higher ranks of the Japanese officials attached to the GovernmentGeneral.
The members of the Council were given honorary official rank; but as they were not to be classed as Government servants, they were not included in the official figures from which the foregoing table was compiled. The actual number of Koreans in the Council at the end of 1911 was 71; and the Japanese staff of the Council consisted of one president, one chief secretary, one assistant secretary, and one interpretersecretary.
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